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## Linkages between Security Sector Reform and Peacekeeping Intelligence

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### Introduction

In response to contemporary post-conflict challenges, the nexus between the development and security communities, and the requirement for joint implementation by security practitioners, 'G2' operations – traditionally known as intelligence activities – still play a critical role in the immediate post-conflict phases of an operation. Until recently, appropriate concepts, models and tools have not been crafted by bilateral or multilateral institutions to help military and civilian security agencies coordinate activities during these earliest post-conflict phases. Much of the challenge has involved ways in which information can be shared by all relevant stakeholders, in a way that does not compromise the military's core business, mission command and its intelligence 'assets'.

This paper will look at activities carried out in the immediate post-conflict phases of an intervention. It will start by addressing the environment, review the actors involved, and determine the types of information and relevant information channels through which such information can be shared, to ensure a reasonable degree of sustained progress in stabilizing a security situation.

There are varied views on what is meant by today's 'catch-all' reference to 'security'. Indeed, countries have adopted policy approaches to human security that stretch this concept to very broad parameters.

Notwithstanding the label placed upon it, societies and states should offer their citizens guarantees that protect them from any unlawful abuses of physical, social or economic security, in a way that respects fundamental human rights.

This definition assumes that security has its roots at the most strategic levels of governance, from which implications can be drawn for foreign policy, social policy, defence policy and economic policy.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, an assumption can also be made towards a state's national security framework, in terms of being the highest macro level state instrument for security, and one that is based on a country's national interests and core values.

At this point, two rather premature conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, that interventionists tasked to respond to global conflicts must be encouraged to work towards a national security 'endstate' within the state confines of that particular intervention. Secondly, that the same interventionists must unite in the planning and implementation of external assistance, in a way that produces an end product conducive to good governance within the broader definition of security. Despite recent noises from the United States' Department of Defense (DOD), it is the author's view that such was not the case in the recent intervention in Iraq.

## The Environment

Despite the changing dynamics of international relations, there is no such thing as a time sensitive, 'templated' conflict environment. Indeed, some of the lessons learned from the British Army's campaigns in Kenya and Dhofar have been applied in both Northern Ireland and Kosovo. Similarly, the 'coalition of the willing' model used for military interventions in both World Wars held similar utility, albeit using different tactics, for the two more recent interventions in the Gulf States region. Parallels can also be drawn between UN multinational approaches in East Timor and Sierra Leone.


Moreover, these environmental conditions that engage the assistance of international security agents do not remain constant. Indeed, problem areas often depend on the governing political regime, and the resulting security 'gaps' that may open following political transitions. Infiltrating the political 'centres of gravity' becomes key for the interventionists and, once this is done, determining what elements of the wider security sector will be most impacted by inevitable political reforms.

Though not exhaustive, the model shown in Figure 1 illustrates the importance of political ideologies, or form of political rule, which often embraces the strategic 'centre of gravity' that external actors seek to penetrate. Examples may include states suffering from military authoritarianism, radical forms of socialism and that which may be more informally dictated by oppressive non-state actors. It also shows the

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<sup>1</sup> See Macnamara and Fitz-Gerald, "Developing a National Security Framework", *Policy Choices*, IRPP publication, Montreal, 2003.

different policy instruments from which broader security implications can be drawn.



Implications emanating from the Defence, Internal Security (coined 'Homeland Security' in some countries'), Justice and Rule of Law areas will remain the focus of this paper. This acknowledges the distinction between the protectionist function of the state and the development function of the state. In addition, it underlines the principle that physical security is a pre-requisite for social and economic security.

Within the above-mentioned sub-categories, a range of actors and agencies which, generally speaking, can be subsumed under one of the following groups:

- Bodies authorised to use force (the armed forces, police, paramilitary units and intelligence services);
- Civil management and oversight bodies (the President/Prime Minister, the legislature and legislative committees, national security advisory bodies, statutory civil society organisations, the Ministries of Defence, Interior, Finance and Foreign Affairs);
- Judicial and public security bodies (the judiciary, justice ministries, defence and prosecution services, prisons and corrections services, human rights commissions and customary and traditional justice systems);
- Non-state security bodies (private security companies, political party militias, liberation armies, civil defence forces); and
- Civil society bodies (the media, religious, professional, advocacy and non-governmental organisations<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> UK Global Conflict Prevention Pool publication, *Security Sector Reform Policy Brief*, London, 2003.

Therefore, when a national, multinational or coalition-based military force intervenes in an internal or regional conflict, a loosened and sometimes non-existent level of political control can adversely impact at least one (and often more than one) strand of the wider security sector.

Undoubtedly, the task of rebuilding a country's security sector falls outside the strategic remit of the external armed forces. However, their experiences and contributions made in the earlier phases of the conflict are integrally linked to the follow-on activities that underpin broader security and development.

## **Broader security areas**

Following post-conflict political transitions, defence reforms are often undertaken to ascertain requirements for a democratic armed forces, as well as the civilian oversight necessary to make these forces accountable and transparent. At one end of the spectrum, a transitional state's armed forces may only require assistance in the form of training, procurement priorities and restructuring. At the extreme, rebel groups and other non-state actors may have to disarm, demobilise and register onto military and community reintegration programmes that contribute to the overall development agenda.

Whether or not a country's police force has been a 'poor relative' of a more dominant and oppressive military, or whether the police itself has been a corrupt, coercive and unlawful security institution, the need for police reform is critical in avoiding the opening of immediate post-conflict security vacuums.

Police reforms are ineffective without the simultaneous reform of the justice system. Even partially functioning judicial systems still require the existence of courts, educated and qualified judges, legislative frameworks that explicitly set out constitutional rights, and sound penal systems.

While the climate may not always be right for these reforms to be enacted simultaneously, thought into how the reforms are sequenced must be discussed and planned at the strategic level. Past failed attempts have been costly, ineffective and in many cases have exacerbated tensions between fighting factions and the local communities. The post-conflict programmes in both Sierra Leone and Haiti provide good examples of where a huge amount of donor funding used for police reform initiatives was wasted in part due to the scant recognition of the need for an equally strong justice system.

## **Implications for the military**

Undoubtedly, the information gathered and used by the military during the early phases of armed conflict through to conditions characterizing a 'peace support operations (PSO)' environment contribute enormously to reforms used to achieve a desirable national security endstate.

Before elaborating on this point, a 'health warning' must be issued towards the perception of what constitutes peace support theatres, as opposed to war-fighting theatres, and what characterizes security, rather than development, activities.

Much has been written on different 'tools of peace' that can be drawn on by the UN or regionally-led forces to mandate their operations. More recently, these instruments have bonded collectively under the broader definition of 'peace support operations' that acknowledges the uncertainty underpinning key principles of the earlier 'peacekeeping' models such as consent and impartiality. Today, it is necessary to take this analysis one step further to acknowledge that, particularly in post-conflict theatres where regional skirmishes can shift quickly to other parts of the country/region, and where there has been a massive proliferation of nonstate security actors, there is a reluctance to engage in 'peace support activities' even after the end of the initial fighting. This phase of uncertainty, and an often under-resourced military commitment, fails to have a 'lock-tight' effect on the security situation and opens up security vacuums for which the international community, and the relevant security agents, lack a set of coherent tools.

The same observation can be said of the civilian community that plays a role in post-conflict reconstruction and rebuilding. In an era where donors are becoming much more rigorous with their funding policies, a shift towards 'core competencies only' is being increasingly observed. For example, in the past, non-governmental organisations dealing with emergency relief would also play a role in the development work in post-conflict communities, and vice-versa. Today, organisations such as Medecins sans Frontieres and MERLIN are intervening only during the emergency phases of a conflict and exiting soon after. On the other hand, agencies such as the UN Development Programme, Christian Aid, and OXFAM, all of which have straddled both remits in the past, are now striving to achieve development objectives only.

This phenomenon, or 'civil/military retreat back to core competencies only', has also contributed to the security vacuums that traditionally open following the achievement of 'first phase' objectives, the immediate aftermath of which is plagued by military indecision towards commitment and a combination of civilian core competencies to which few organisations subscribe. Thus, is it critical that, in the ongoing debates articulating the nexus between security and development, tools are crafted that give external actors the wherewithal to operationalize this thinking.

Within contemporary post-conflict security frameworks, there are a number of areas in which work carried out by the wider security community could benefit from closer cooperation in the exchange of information. For example, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes normally involve a three-stage process that unfolds in a relatively insecure and unstable environment. Information held by the military in terms of the identity of militant and vigilant non-state leaders and their followers can assist in programmes that encourage ex-combatants to relinquish their combatant status and reintegrate back into civilian life. Logistical information on how

registration and demobilization camps should be best protected can also help sustain a secure environment for ongoing reforms.

Where 'lists' of combatants do not exist, information shared on the location of weapons caches and assistance in the destruction of such stockpiles can provide more certainty to the success of Small Arms and Light Weapons programmes in a way that is mutually supportive to the security and development communities. Similarly, arms taken to regional depots require stockpile and inventory management that should be carried out in concert with the work of other post-conflict agencies. Security arrangements around these depots are critical to avoid the recurrence of conflict and the routing of arms back into the hands of rebel groups.

Police reform is another critical area where information from military interventionist forces can be used to enhance the role of a newly created or reformed police force. In the case of the former, an international representative is sometimes used as a 'mentor' for the newly appointed Chief Inspector of Police, who perhaps might not have the experience, or political legitimacy, to assume his/her responsibilities immediately. In this case, there is sufficient room for relationships to be forged between the military force commander and those tasked with improving internal security and public safety. In past PSO environments, there has been a very blurred division between criminality and other PSO activities. For this reason, information channels between these two entities are invaluable.

During later post-conflict phases institutional rebuilding becomes priority. The civilianisation of defence ministries is an example of institutional reform that must complement reforms of the armed forces. Civil servants have been known to flee, or be expelled, from autocratic and military regimes that leave all governing decisions to the powers of the uniformed personnel. During the conflict in Sierra Leone, each time the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launched attacks on Freetown, there was a recurring tendency for the civil servants to leave their posts, anticipating the return of the old regime. In many countries, civil servants exist only as a façade in order to give international authorities the impression that a sufficient degree of civilian oversight is exercised over the armed forces - however, in most cases, their role is negligible.

Improving the military's contribution to these broader security activities must be done in a way that does not undermine or expose the military's main intelligence assets. This would break the confidence and trust built within the local community and the desirable perception for the military to be seen as a 'facilitator' only. Thus, forms of intelligence and intelligence gathering techniques used in this immediate post-conflict phase must be carefully balanced with the needs of the post-conflict society.

Perhaps the best way to articulate this need is through peacekeeping (or PSO) doctrine. Serving as a body of knowledge that presents some useful ideas and guidance, doctrinal publications and manuals may be good channels in which broader security activities could be addressed. These ideas could also be given some operational merit by including them in PSO campaign planning/analysis tools - in relation to concepts such as

‘decisive points’ and ‘lines of activity’. The most recent edition of the UK PSO Doctrine has included humanitarian elements such as refugees and internally displaced persons – surely this more comprehensive approach could also include elements that characterize the more unresolved ‘pre-PSO’ phase, which brings together a wider security community.

Closer inter-departmental linkages must also exist between the development, defence and foreign policy mechanisms within donor governments. While this is difficult to achieve overnight, informal joined-up structures can be tasked through cross-functional steering committees, which include all the relevant security agencies. During a time when donors are being encouraged to take a more responsible approach towards their funding commitments, the same governments tend to extend their commitment to funding conflict, post-conflict and development agendas within a particular country or region. As such, it is necessary for development agencies to be aware of the security sector reforms that provide a permissive environment in which their work can be carried out. More importantly, the security agents on the ground must be aware of their country’s foreign policy towards the region/country in question, and the strategic imperatives their operational agenda seeks to achieve.

Lastly, in cases where certain countries or multilateral organizations feel that their involvement in an immediate post-conflict situation is too premature, military forces from the region must be supplied with appropriate levels of intelligence to have an impact on the ground and win over credibility at the local level. The present case of engaging the Nigerian army under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia provides a good example. It is important that the American government (and others) supplies these forces with the most useful intelligence and local information in order that their activities have a credible impact.

## Conclusion

Before declaring the beginning of a ‘post-conflict’ phase of operations, the wider security community must seek ways to bring members of the wider security community closer together with international military forces. This can be facilitated through the sharing of information between these security agents, subsequently improving the planning and implementation of wider security sector reform activities such as Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), Police Reform, and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes. In the past, rigid conceptual approaches to war-fighting and peacekeeping operations have left this more ill-defined immediate post-conflict phase insufficiently clarified and, as a result, adrift of coherent operational approaches.

In seeking improved operational approaches to these environments, it is important not to compromise or marginalize the military’s main intelligence assets. Doing so would jeopardize the conflict community’s confidence in the overall intervention.

For the military, the means through which a more collective approach to addressing immediate post-conflict security could be achieved may be

PSO, or Peacekeeping, doctrine, which recognizes the immediate post-conflict vulnerabilities and the coordinated activities required to contain security vacuums. Once this concept is illustrated, it may be much easier for military forces to determine how information they hold might usefully assist in activities undertaken during this stage. For maximum impact, this initiative should be supported by formal or informal joined-up structures within bilateral and multilateral funding mechanisms in order to ensure seamless transitions along a much wider spectrum of post-conflict activities.