Security Sector Reform as a Governance Issue: The case of Mozambique

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Abstract

Security Sector Reform constitutes a major challenge in post-war societies undergoing different simultaneous transitions within the context of a democratisation process. In these situations, the understanding and management of the security sector often reveal severe shortcomings as regards governance good practice. This paper analyses how Mozambique has been dealing with the challenge of improving the efficiency and governance within its security sector taking into account the strong legacy of the violent history of the country in the last thirty years and that of the Rome Peace Agreement, which ended the internal conflict in 1992 and set the ground for the new political system and policies to be adopted in governing the country. It also discusses how the interplay between security and development evolved and what kind of outcome resulted given the country's governing priorities and the interface between internal political options and external influence.

Introduction[1]

Mozambique has been, since 1992, in a post-war reconstruction dynamic and despite the image of economic and political success widespread in the international media, the country has been facing major challenges as regards the democratisation process and its impact over the achievement of security and development for its people. It is a country characterised by high level of poverty, extreme economic imbalances between the various regions of country and between rural and urban areas. Adding, the complex ethnic puzzle and the intra and inter-group political rivalries, which create room for politicisation of group identity[2], transform the maintenance of stability and prevention of cyclical legitimacy crisis into a difficult and sensitive task.

The historical and the regional political framework lead the country to experience accounts of extreme violence in the latest 30 years of its recent history. Independence was achieved in 1975 after a liberation war against Portugal that lasted ten years. Immediately after an internal desestabilization process started within the context of the Cold War and the regional confrontation between the newly independent countries and the racist regimes of Rhodesia and Apartheid. An insurgent group, the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) was created and supported by former Rhodesia, and after Zimbabwe's independence, by South Africa's Apartheid regime, in order to exert political and military pressure over Frelimo's socialist regime that supported the national liberation movements of these countries. Adding, the existence of internal dissatisfaction with the new Mozambican socialist political regime turned into a vulnerability that allowed the recruitment of people that felt excluded. This internal dimension would link up with the accentuated regional and international dynamics and make the violent conflict last sixteen years, only ending up with the signature of a peace agreement in 1992, in Rome.

The Peace Agreement signed in Rome is the document that framed the new orientation to be followed in terms of political system and policies to be adopted in governing the country.
Furthermore, it constituted the embryo of the reforms to be implemented in the security sector, but it has been the complexity of the overall context, characterised by a multitude of simultaneous and interconnected transitions and reforms, which has been shaping the achievements and flaws of the sector.

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[1] This article is widely based in the author' previous research works, namely 'Security Sector Reform and the Defence Establishment in Mozambique' and 'Security Sector Reform in post-war Mozambique'.

[2] For further on the issue see NILSSON, 1999.

Hence, the transition from war to peace, from one party regime to a plural democracy, from a centralised model of economy to a capitalist system, have entailed new discourses, resultant from the interaction of the interests of the country governing elites and the external partners which have been shaping policies and determining courses of action in its implementation.

Also, the interconnections between imperatives of the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) and the Public Sector Reform (PSR) bear influence over reforms in the security sector, mostly impacting over institutional capacity.

Face to these challenges, the new post-war priorities were set as the maintenance of peace and achievement of development and for this purpose the Government decided that combat to poverty is the core objective to be achieved.[3]. In line with this,the Government discourse is that all the areas of Governance, including the security sector, are to be re-structured to contribute to this aim.

For purpose of this article and to understand the new dynamics of the sector in Mozambique a wider definition of security sector was adopted, i.e., encompassing state institutions with formal mandate to ensure safety of the state and its citizens against acts of violence and coercion (e.g. the armed forces, the police, paramilitary forces, the intelligence services and similar bodies) and the elected and duly appointed civil authorities responsible for control and oversight of these institutions (e.g. Parliament, the Executive, Defence ministries)[4].

Thus, informed by the objective of understanding the post-war process of security sector reform in Mozambique, follows an analysis of the impact of the transitions and interlinked reforms entailed by democratisation into the roles and mission of the security-related institutions, a reflexion on how governance is being affected by these changes, and on how the external actors influence constitutes stumbling blocks or stepping stones in the process.

1. Democratisation and Security Sector Reform

The need to reform the Mozambican security sector matures with the convergent processes, which led to the end of the internal war between Renamo and the Government, namely the end of the Cold War, the end of apartheid, and the exhaustion of the belligerents.

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[3] See Resolution nr. 4/2000 de 22/03. in Boletim da Republica no12, Ia serie suplemento.

[4] See OECD-DAC (Informal DAC Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation) 2000 approach. Security Issues and Development Co-operation: A Conceptual Framework for Enhancing Policy Coherence (working document DCD(2000)4/REV2). P.4.

The end of the Cold War was important particularly in terms of the external sources of political, financial and logistical support to the belligerents. The end of apartheid was important because it removed the cause for confrontation at the regional level, with the independence of Namibia and the democratisation of South Africa, and the end of the internal war was important because it would allow the re-structure of forces, releasing resources to be used for development.

Hence, the environment, which surrounded these changes, entailed simultaneous transitions that would also impact on the democratisation process de per se. The transition from a centralised model of economy to a market economy, involving the admission of the country into the Bretton Woods system and the adoption of a structural adjustment program (SAP) in 1987 implied several difficulties. Among these, the economy of war constituted a major obstacle in terms of reducing state budget expenditure, which even so, started to be implemented, by cutting at the level of state administration. Thus, the perspective of the end of the war was eagerly foreseen and desired by the Bretton Woods institutions and by the national supporters of these reforms, in order to be able to implement them in full scale. With the achievement of peace, the new post-war economic environment and all the forthcoming reforms would be remarkably influenced by this state of affairs.

The transition from war to peace, implied the need to reform the security sector, deciding upon the role and importance each institution should play face to the new security challenges in peace time. This implied the redimension of the armed forces, of the police, of the intelligence agency and the reframe of its role into one suitable for peace time.

The transition from one party regime to a plural democracy, implied a new approach as regards the oversight over the security forces, especially concerning the subordination of the armed forces to the political power, a new institutional model of insertion/link with the executive and the legislative power, and a re-shape in terms of civil-military relations.

Though these transition processes evolved and assumed a dynamics on its own on a post-war context, those referent to from war to peace, and from one party regime to a plural democracy, developed from the General Peace Agreement (GPA) signed on 4th October, 1992, between Renamo and the Government of Frelimo, in Rome.

1.1 The General Peace Agreement

The GPA is a consistent technical document and its contents establish the basic orientation to deal with the immediate post-war problems, in the political, military and economic areas, during the transition period, until the first elections. It established the base for the instalment of multiparty-system and respective electoral mechanisms. It included

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aspects relative to the integration of the demobilised and other fragile groups into society, the establishment of a strong mechanism to supervise the process and the set up of a basis for the financing of the process, demonstrating an underlying vision and awareness for the diversity and the intertwining of the social, economic, political and military issues that were self-imposing as a challenge for the country, in the immediate transitional period.

If on the one hand the agreement determined the post-war issues, on the other also set the way in which they should be dealt with. And if it is true that the International Community pressure was decisive for the signature of the agreement, the same applies as to the way that characterised implementation and the whole framework of the post-war transition. Implementation was assured by the U.N, which assumed the leadership of transition with a strong hand over decision-making and exerting vigorous pressure over the parties to implement the agreement. To continue the build-up of trust between the parties over the transition period, specific Conjoint Commissions subordinated to the Joint Commission of Supervision and Control (headed by the U.N Secretary General Representative) were established. These included Renamo, Government and representatives of foreign countries, to oversight the security forces from the cease-fire period until elections were held, and a new democratically elected Government instituted.

The Protocol IV, on Military Issues, established the withdrawal of the foreign troops from the Mozambican territory, regulated the activity of the private and irregular armed groups and established the economic and social reintegration of demobilised soldiers, including timetables (though not implemented on time due to financial and other logistical constraints).

The state intelligence agency (SISE) and the Police (PRM) were to continue operations during the transition phase, but had to take into account democratic principles internationally established such as: respect for civil, political and human rights of the citizens; action according to the interests of the state and free from partisan or ideological considerations, or any other kind of discrimination[5].

Concerning the creation and near future of the Mozambican Defence Forces (FADM), Protocol IV implied that the process comprised first, the dismantling of the former governmental forces (FAM) and of the Renamo guerrilla forces, and then the merger of voluntary people from both parts on a fifty/fifty basis. The forces should be exclusively constituted of Mozambican citizens, be professionally trained and competent, non-partisan, professional and respectful of the democratic order and the rule of law. Its composition should preclude all forms of

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[5] GPA 1992 Protocol IV/ IV; IV/V.

racial or ethnic discrimination based on language or religious affiliation[6].

However, it remained to be seen whether such enterprise would be viable through the merge of non-professional and quasi-professional forces, that were aimed to be transformed into a small, professional and efficient force. This would reveal a complicated task having into account the environment of pressure in which the GPA was achieved, translated into a small room of manoeuvre held by the Government that was almost 100% dependent on the International Community for the reconstruction of the country. Thus, the 'new security forces' had to come into being in a context of a post-war period characterised by severe economic restrictions and by the adoption of a new political stand of the Mozambican ruling elite concerning the re-structuring of the sector.

Hence, the peace discourse that generated from the Rome Accord entailed a new thinking about how to achieve security and development in the post-war period. The new discourse was one about the need to establish a democratic system of governance and to open the economy to foreign investment. By democratising the country and achieving peace it was implied that the security threat to the state and the people targeted by war would vanish, and by opening the economy and following the prescriptions of the International Financial Institutions (IFI"s) development would be attained.

Also, the logic of a 'peace-dividend' would govern this discourse, prescribing that the areas of education and health should merit investment in detriment of the security sector, once the threats had vanished. This thought was informed by the general immediate post-cold-war global trend on gaining from the 'peace-dividend' and transposed to the Southern Africa region as a consequence of the fall of Apartheid, seen as the removal of the only great threat in the region.

Mozambique would be no exception to the rule and the International Community and especially the IFI's constituted the major advocates of this cause. This was then, the general discourse moulding the environment where the security sector re-structuring would occur.

2. Impact of Security Sector Reform over Governance Processes

2.1. Contending Positions over Security

After the creation of FADM and in the immediate post-elections, with the institution of the new government, the first revealing change within the security sector was the shift of focus from the activity of the

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[6] GPA Op. Cit. Protocol IV/ I-i, 2.b.

FADM (understood it should have an external oriented role), to the activity of the PRM, (with an internal oriented role).

This shift of emphasis over the institutions was in line with the International Community argument that, with peace, the most important security dimension was the creation of public order and an internal stability environment that could attract foreign investment, as the basis for development.

As stated above, from the first democratic elections in 1999 onwards the perspective of downsizing the Defence forces expenditure continued and the International Community exerted an extreme pressure to cut security expenditure as a whole after the demobilisation process. The argument was that the allocation of these resources to the social sector, namely the areas of health and education would better serve the interests of the Mozambican people. The Government complied with this policy[7].

Within the security sector the majority of financial resources were gradually being concentrated in the public security area, with the imperative to combat crime that from 1990 until 1996 showed an increasing tendency[8].

In Mozambique two different positions would emerge as regards the shift from the military to the Police. The political elite in general, tended to agree with the vision of the international community, backed also by the emerging national business community. They also argued that the armed forces needed to be rationalised, modernised and professionalised and peace would provide such opportunity. The military elite would be the detractor of this shift of attention, because they understood the loss of their benefits and prestige, as well as of their status in society.

These stands reveal, however, the result of an interest-oriented attitude and not the outcome of a general debate, which should have followed in any post-war society. No real discussion about future security threats to the country was publicly held, apart from the debate generated from a conference on security matters organised by an American sponsored institution. Consequently the re-structuring that would follow was not openly discussed, nor was there any consultation process to the civil society or to the think thanks over what kind of reform should the sector embark on.

The gap in the positions between the Government and the military was also the mirror of their divergent threat analysis. Whilst the

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[7] See table for Defence and Security expenditure, 1987-1999, Chachiua Op. Cit. P.5.

[8] Chachiua Op.Cit . P. 2.

military could be thinking of regional military threats, even if still biased by the Apartheid era, the Government might have been thinking of how to prevent a possible overthrow of power by Renamo. The latter would mean the necessity to transfer military resources to the PRM as an instrument to cope with instability in case of Renamo questioning the election results in a violent manner. Thus these issues if discussed at all, were done in a very restricted milieu composed by the very high political decision-makers and the officers of the higher military ranking.

This reveals that a reform of the sector as a long-term strategy, the re-evaluation of the role and capability of the forces as regards the new security and threat environment, and a thought over their role and functioning in terms of democratic governance was not deeply taken into account. Hence, it can be questioned, whether at that moment, the Government implemented a policy entailing the shift of emphasis in the security sector, towards the Police, aiming at a security sector reform sustainable in a long-term perspective and at the establishment of conditions for development, or if moved by the need of regime survival.

This seems a plausible argument, once mutual suspicion between Renamo and the Government created a precarious peace balance. The existence of many arms caches undismantled by the UNOMOZ[9] may partially suggest that Government fears might have led to the choice of concentrating resources in the police forces (once they were less controlled by the International Community) in opposition to the FADM (not to be trusted), once bearing the disadvantage of having members of Renamo integrated[10].

The case implies that those short-term concerns with security and the maintenance of the political balance were the driving force that determined the re-shaping of the security sector at that time. It was not a proactive motivation towards a long-term perspective of an overall security sector reform, implicating efficiency of the security forces to meet their new roles inside a security and development framework, as argued in the public discourse of the political elite.

2.2 Re – Structuring the Defence Sector

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[9] LUNDIN et al. 2000. "Reducing Costs through an expensive Exercise: The Impact of Demobilisation in Mozambique". In KINGMA, Kees.ed. Demobilisation in Sub-Saharan Africa. Palgrave Publishers P. 205.

[10] For more on this check Chachiua, 2000. The following account is elucidative: " What is known is that from about 1990 onwards there were a large number of military personnel being transferred to the national police...an arsenal was allegedly found in the Ministry of Interior in September 1994. What are witnessed...are the gap between the country's security concerns and its security policies. Security policies were very much a reflection of the narrow political interests of the former warring parties. Efforts to curb crime were postponed or crime was used as the reason for militarising the Police".

2.2.1 The build-up of FADM

As stated above the General Peace Agreement of 1992 established the conception of the FADM. This occurred in a context in which the International Community was still under great influence of Cold War security thinking and conceived the armed forces as a counterproductive institution for the establishment of peace, once it had been the crucial instrument utilised in the conflict.

In a complex process of negotiations where Government, Renamo and the external powers that would train the forces (Portugal, Britain and France) had different positions, the number of men was stipulated to be 30,000. From these, 24,000 were due to go to the Army, 4,000 to the Air Force and 2,000 to the Navy[11].

However, there were very few volunteers from both sides to join in, once most combatants were tired of the war and had experienced bad living conditions in both sides. Also, the most skilled and well-trained personnel left the Armed Forces looking for better payment and better working conditions. The result was the recruitment of unskilled people and their allocation to
specific positions as those of navel or airmen, resulting of course in a very low level of tasks accomplishment.

In 1995 there were only 12 195 members, 8533 from the FAM and 3662 from RENAMO[12] This integration had intrinsic problems from its conception. First the GPA established, from a political inception, a bicephalous chain of command in order to achieve trust between the parties, but after the elections this practice was abandoned and a chief of general staff was appointed. However, the compromise maintained and for every command function given to those coming from the ex-government forces there was another to be occupied by those coming from Renamo ranks, in order to create accommodation.

Second, the ex-Government forces although without a strong preparedness had at least some degree of training and professionalism, whilst Renamo forces had none impacting over the operational capability of the branches. In this regard the Air Force and the Navy, were the most affected once the tasks to be fulfilled by them imperatively need skilled and well-trained personnel. The investment made by the Mozambican State in the formation of human resources for these areas in the latter years was completely lavished with the general demobilisation process.

Adding to this, the FADM were born within the shape of an inverted pyramid, i.e., with more officers than soldiers, creating a negative

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[11] GPA Op. Cit. Protocol IV/ I- ii, 1.

[12] YOUNG, Oran. 1996. "The Development of the FADM in Mozambique: Internal and External Dynamics". In African Security Review, Vol 5 ,No 1. P.2.

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impact in terms of the tasks being performed and the availability of people to perform lower rank activities.

Another aspect to take into account is the fact that the FADM were heirs to run down and obsolescent equipment[13]. In financial terms the conditions created by the logic of the 'guns or butter' policy of the international community imposed a constrained budget under the PRES, which priorities were set up to be social sectors. As such, no funds were available to allow an effective restructuring of the sector.

Despite the fact that by law the military were forbidden to have and express any political affiliation, internal rivalries based on former affiliation still existed, since the cantonment areas where parts would look suspiciously at each other. Unfortunately politicians used to often attempt to create breaches in the cohesion of the organisation (idem). In this regard, a public interview given by the Deputy-Chief of General Staff, which formerly pertained to the Renamo guerrilla forces, stating the impartiality of every member of FADM and reassuring their commitment in defending the constitution, helped to curb initiatives of destabilisation from the part of the Renamo politicians, that at each divergent point as regards the governing strategy of Frelimo, threatened with a return to war.

In technical terms, the training of FADM upon its creation was assigned to Portugal, Britain and France. Each of these countries has a different system of military organisation, endangering any attempt to uniformity in training. Britain has given some support through BMATT, which trained infantry battalions. France has since, been contributing by inviting FADM to observe and sometimes participate in regional peacekeeping exercises organised by them in the Indian Ocean Islands. Portugal has been of the three, the most persistent over the years, supporting a series of projects in the short and long term. Each country had their own agenda when delivering military assistance, but despite occasional constraints it has been possible for FADM to benefit from these programs. However, the lack of a general vision of how the Defence sector should be re-organised and which should constitute the priorities to focus upon once resources are limited, diminishes the impact of the co-operation projects, which then remain without a clear vision of in which umbrella they fit in.

All these constraints and restrictions implied the creation of a fragile institution, with a very low morale among the military ranks. Nevertheless and regardless the difficulties, up to date, the FADM have been able to constitute a positive example of reconciliation, by not attempting against the constitution and the democratic established order. Even if not being able to fulfil its traditional duties, or even less to play an active role in development, by supporting reconstruction of

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[13]MACARINGUE, Paulino. 1998. "Mozambican Defence in the Post-War Era". (unpublished) Master thesis in Defence and Security Analysis at Lancaster University.P.67.

the country and contributing to assurance of satisfaction of the population's basic needs, the new developments such as their need to intervene in calamities situations, are imposing themselves upon those with the decision-making power to change the situation.

The recent floods of 2000 and 2001 that constituted one of the major natural calamities of the last years in Mozambique raised a new awareness about the role of the Armed Forces. The limited intervention due to lack of resources and the need to recur to support of a number of armed forces from the region and others raised the debate about their role. The state of FADM's institutional development became an issue within the civil society, and generated concern from the part of the security institutions and inclusively of the international community.

The newspapers extensively discussed the missions allocated to the Armed Forces and the debate about the need to confer them capability to deal with the new type of security threats, in a pro-human security position gained momentum. This also raised the fact that even the traditional missions were not being met and the need to control the territorial borders, the aerial space, and the maritime exclusive economic zone were put as imperatives moulded by the geographical situation of the country.

Hence, within FADM, and taking into account its limited resources, efforts are being made to overcome the setbacks as regards its functioning. There is an ongoing learning process which can be illustrated, for example, by the current debate about a new command and working structure, once the actual based in the application of foreign models did not conform to local needs and circumstances.

2.2.2 DDR

The Disarmament of the ex-belligerents and Demobilisation and Reintegration of the ex-combatants also occurred as a result of the GPA, and its implementation by ONUMOZ revealed complex nuances in the process.

The task of disarmament, namely in what concerns small arms, was by far incomplete. The majority of the weapons that were delivered by the former soldiers and ex-guerrillas, when assembling in cantonment camps were obsolete. Also, some of them possessed more than one weapon and they didn't turn them down all, once face to a situation of future uncertainty as to their economic situation, the gun remained the instrument which could guarantee some means of subsistence.

In a vast country like Mozambique and with dense vegetation in the majority of the operational theatre of war, it was impossible for ONUMOZ to get hold of the many hidden arms caches. These proliferated all over the country and until the present there are hidden places with arms being dismantled. This reveals the parties' mutual suspicion and demonstrates the risks of a return to war.

The task of finding and dismantling these caches is now being performed by a special Police unit, which occasionally receives support from South Africa, in a conjoint program to deal with the small arms regional problem. Also, Mozambican NGO's have designed projects like the 'Arms for Hoes', which encourage the deliver of weapons in exchange for agriculture instruments.

The process of demobilisation itself was successful once its implementation came to an end without major incidents, i.e., without putting the peace process at risk. As to the effectiveness of the process of reintegration, the fact that no outbreak of armed conflict happened in the later years seems to be taken as a positive indicator by the mainstream discourse of the Mozambican success story.

Nevertheless, if looking for sustainability of this reintegration in the longer term, and using the lenses of the aims towards security and development, the actual situation might be generating different signals.

Although the process of demobilisation and reintegration had been agreed and stipulated in the GPA (1992), support for this activity only came by the end of 1993. Accordingly to UNDP numbers 92,890 combatants were demobilised, of which 70,910 belonged to the Government troops and 21,980 to the former guerrilla fighters (Lundin et al 2000: 181-183).

The process of assembling soldiers in special areas and disarmament was carried by UNOMOZ. They were supported by IOM to transport them and their dependants to the place of resettlement. Furthermore, there were special training activities and information on employment carried out by various organisations and NGOs. The demobilised received financial support for 24 months. The Government paid 6 months and the rest was subsidised by the International Community (idem).

Despite the support received by the demobilised, there were occasions of instability, when the demobilised were strongly demonstrating against the delay in payment of pensions and threatening to disrupt the process.

Also, some organisations and NGO's conducted training programs without taking into account where these people would settle down, and many times the skills acquired were not adequate. In a country like Mozambique there is the need to differentiate whether one needs to have skills to live in the major urban centres, in the villages or in the remote localities. Settlement in a coastal area as opposed to an interior area is also an important factor. According to this the employment skills needed may vary widely.

Some studies point out that those who settled in the rural areas had potential to have a more stable and faster reintegration process, mainly

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due to the traditional authorities' methods to introduce them and legitimise their intents towards the local community. Also, subsistence is assured through agriculture and access to land could be obtained for example by marriage or by finding a 'godfather' (Lundin et al 2000: 192). Conversely, there are arguments suggesting that the strong encouragement for the demobilised to settle down in rural areas was mostly due to the intention of having them out of urban areas and dispersed.

Notwithstanding this, the major obstacle to reintegration whether in rural or urban areas, was the economic situation of the country. This was a problem generally felt by the population, but with particular burden on the demobilised, former refugees or internally displaced people. The reforms under the SAP implicated high rate of unemployment that tended to rise with the privatisation policies.

The new and mostly foreign investment in Mozambique only represents an opportunity to people with at least a medium level of education or strong level of skills training. Also, these investors opt by modernisation of the equipment, implicating the absorption of very little highly skilled labour.

The agriculture alternative is a very difficult one, as the infrastructures in terms of transport networks are poor and the commercial net is very weak. This restrains the peasant to basic daily survival, which at certain times of environmental trouble can become even unsustainable.

The government has adopted a discourse promoting enterpreneuship on a small scale but with limited incentives. Credit lines are being established for small and medium enterprises but the repayment rates are barely affordable. Some NGOs have also similar programs, but the majority of the demobilised do not have access to information or the opportunity to have training to be able to set up and sustain these projects. Apart from that, these initiatives are mostly concentrated in urban or village areas, voting to abandon the rural areas.

The impact of this situation on the Mozambican society has been a rise in criminality, although no study could prove a direct relation between the disarmament, the demobilisation of soldiers and the high levels of crime. A rise in crime has resulted from an interplay of factors such as the ready availability of small arms on the market, the remaining and new agglomeration of people in the urban areas, the increasingly difficult economic conditions, and the massive loss of jobs with the privatisation process, apart from other wider explanations such as the weight of societal values or the (in) efficiency of the judiciary system.

This shows that the re-integration process has been marred with problems that can only be taken into account by considering the major strategic goals of the Government in its long-term plan to achieve the claimed objectives of human security and human development.

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However, at the time, donors' considering support to this process, as part of a development strategy, were not homogeneous, which limited any short-term options[14].

2.2.3 Achievements on the Legislative Domain

The adopted Constitution in 1990, understood as an internal legal transformation instrument that prepared the ground for the post-war period, allowed the nature of the political system to change from a socialist-oriented to a western democratic and multiparty system, and enabled the transformation of the military conflict into a political one. It also, set up the basis of the future Defence and security policy by defining as priorities the defence of national independence, preservation of the country's sovereignty and integrity, and guarantee of the normal functioning of institutions and the security of citizens against any armed aggression[15].

In terms of subordination of the security forces, the Law states that the President is the Commander in Chief of the armed and security forces[16], and invests him with the powers to declare the state of war and its termination, curfew or a state of emergency. The National Assembly must, however, sanction the latest two dispositions[17]. There is also a consultation body of the President for defence and security-related matters[18].

However, the need to re-structure the security sector and establish the guidelines for its re-organisation within a democratic context was only crystallised into new legislation, with the Defence and Security Act, passed by the National Assembly in 1997.

General principles such as the prohibition of the defence and security institutions to have and express any political affiliation[19], commitment towards a policy of peace, only recurrent to force in case of legitimate defence, priority to prevention and negotiated solution of conflict, commitment to contribute for a peace and security climate in the region, continent and internationally [20], are reiterated in the Defence and Security Act.

Concerning the operationalization of security goals, those established refer to the traditional aspects as the guarantee of independence,

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[14] Nicole Ball and Sam Barnes, "Mozambique," pp. 159-203, in *Good Intentions: Pledges of Aid for Postconflict Recovery*, ed. Shepard Forman and Stewart Patrick, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000.

[15] Constitution of Mozambique 1990, III- Ch. 5, art. 59.

[16] Idem Ch. 2, art. 117.

[17] Idem art. 122.a.

[18] Idem art. 158.

[19] Defence and Security Law, 17/97 de 07/10, art. 2.e.

[20] Idem art. 2.g, h, i, j.

sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability. Simultaneously, these goals include protection of state security (internal and external), but also the providence of security for the citizens, their possessions, rights and fundamental liberties[21]. In theory this shows awareness of the need to take into account both state and human security, including human rights from the point of view of the rights and liberties of the citizen.

As regards participation in development, the law foresees action of the institutions of the security sector in what concerns prevention and rescue of populations in case of calamities or accidents, and the guarantee of economic and social development [22].

The role of the different institutional forces is established and consequently, missions defined. Defence retains a major role and actuation in external-related concerns such as: the guarantee of the integrity of national territory, the sovereignty; the liberty of the citizens and the security of the means of development of the nation; the participation in actions towards peacekeeping and the maintenance of peace and respect to the international law"[23].

Conversely, to the Public Order institution were assigned missions internally oriented that include, among others, the assurance of public order and respect to the legality, prevention and combat of crime, as well as of acts contrary to the law and the guarantee of border patrolling[24].

Concerning the state security agency, its responsibility is to compile, research, produce, analyse and evaluate information of use for the security of the State, prevention of acts against the Constitution and the functioning of the state organs, and to combat espionage, sabotage and terrorism [25].

This Act, though containing the usual general provisions existent in security legislation, in Mozambique represents a major step towards a democratic insertion of the security institutions into the governance milieu, once in the past, legislation on these matters was non-existent and decisions solely dependent on the Commander-in-Chief.

Nevertheless, the conditions for its application and for the fulfilment of their role by institutions concerned it has become a much more complicated issue due to the various constraints in analysis.

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[21] Idem art.3.

[22] Idem art.3.

[23] Idem art 10.

[24] Idem art 13.

[25] Idem art 14.

2.2.4 The Defence Ministry

Within a generally marginalised security sector, before the imperative to rebuild the country, the Defence arena identified as the engine of the conflict during the peace process, was dismantled. An organisational re-structuring of the Defence was needed and this comprised the creation of a Defence Ministry detached from the military and as part of the mechanism of
civil oversight over FADM. The FADM thus, subordinates in administrative and legal matters to the Ministry of Defence.

The Ministry is responsible for elaboration and implementation of defence policy. This requires co-ordination with the other related Ministries within the Government (especially Foreign Affairs, Interior, State Security and Justice), but this relation unfortunately seems to have become looser than under the one-party regime. The impact is pernicious with each institution competing for visibility, preventing the existence of timely interconnected action and of the maximisation of use of common resources, and relegating intersectorial areas of work. An example of this is the still existent need of drafting a Defence Strategic Concept. Also, the mechanisms of co-ordination and co-operation between the Ministry of Defence and the FADM still have to be improved in order to attain internal coherence in the sector.

At the policy level there has been an effort in terms of drafting a defence white paper. Nevertheless, this is still not developed due to shortcomings in terms of enough and adequate personnel in the MoD to work within this project. The daily current issues and the amount of extra-tasks to perform, which arrive always with urgent call, absorb completely the personnel available. This added to the difficulty of the decision-makers to establish priorities, allocate them resources, and maintain the issues as such, within a myriad of challenges, prevents major projects becoming reality. From these we can highlight the need to develop the strategic defence concept, the military strategic concept and the strategic plan of institutional development. These documents, especially the strategic concepts, seem to be, however, dependent on the general guidelines to be defined in the White Paper that should constitute the overall basis of reflection and direction of the way to follow.

The Minister of Defence as a member of the executive answers before Parliament to the Joint Standing Defence and Public Order Committee that has oversight and investigation powers over actions in this area. In Mozambique, the assumption that the Minister of Defence should be a civilian was taken into account after the first democratic elections in 1994. This measure has had a positive impact in terms of provoking discussions and pushing through reforms with costly repercussions for the military (which supposedly would have been much more difficult for a military to do), as well as in terms of efforts to establish a better relationship with the civil-society. Nevertheless, the process has had its major setbacks, mostly due to the lack of will of the military elite in accepting a civilian Minister, perceiving him as a newcomer without

enough sensitivity to deal with Defence issues. As a result, in the last elections a former military was appointed in order to balance the situation and allow the major re-organisation projects to be implemented.

As part of the new image, the Ministry has also been recruiting civilians to work within the sector, but these are far outnumbered by demobilised and reformed military officers, which is usual in a transition phase. The two groups have a lot to learn from each other. The newcomers barely have enough knowledge about the past of the sector, what is necessary to understand unclear and unspoken nuances of the process. The majority of former officers often lack expertise in non-military security issues that are of crucial importance. The interaction between the two groups often brings to the surface different perspectives in the approaches to the issues, what is positive in terms of raising debate. In this sense, the conjoint work and the training courses to which both groups attend are of great value, as ice breaking and exchange of experiences. However, in what should become a consolidation of the personnel affected by this institution, due to internal power rivalries, the lack of a clear institutional human resources policy including incentives, amidst a general-cutting public sector reform, the result is again the disaffection of the most skilled personnel.

The Ministry of Defence is also responsible for the links with the civil society. After the end of war the society had a negative image of the whole Defence establishment, due to the deprivations by which they were put through under conscription, and also to mismanagement in this area. To overcome these images, at the beginning of the re-structuring process, first steps were given in this direction and the Ministry organised a seminar on Defence issues to open the dialogue with the civil society.

Recently, efforts were made by the Defence Ministry to explain, listen to concerns, and debate the new law on conscription with parents and organisations interested. Also there has been an increase of media coverage as regards defence-related activities, such as co-operation projects, accomplishment of military exercises, participation in peace support operations, among others. However, the suspicion in relation to the Defence is very deep and ten years after the peace agreement, the trust of the civil society in relation to the establishment is very low.

Interviews revealed people claim that the legitimacy of this sector can only be re-established if the activities implemented by these institutions contribute to the reconstruction of the country and the assurance of security and development. 'Even if it is already happening, as most issues are restricted in debate of selected social

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spheres and governing structures, such work has to be made more explicit' [26].

On the other hand, allegedly to deal with the inverted pyramid problem of the FADM, the new law on conscription allowed recruitment to start, raising discussion and questioning by the civil society, as regards the need for such a system in peace time. Even if the levels of incorporation are very low, at about 1,000 a year, as there are not enough financial resources to support the process, the new conscription system has been targeted by harsh critique.

There is a dispute over how effective this measure will reveal itself. The process of recruitment involves high costs in terms of undertaking population census, only to incorporate a small number. Also, at the end of this process, in what concerns recruitment (and having in mind the need to invert the structure of FADM) the volunteers to ingress in the military career are very few. As regards rationalisation of costs the census should be done in co-ordination with the work developed by the National Institute of Statistics, avoiding duplication and lack of accuracy of data, thus acting in a complementary basis.

Other than that, the compulsory nature of conscription is debatable, bearing in mind the need to secure manpower and bring quality for the armed forces. This has been difficult to achieve not only because social 'wounds' brought by the war still persist and damage the Defence image, but because at present the new establishment has no monetary, educational or professional career development incentives. In a peace context and where the establishment still has to achieve some degree of internal functionality, perhaps it would have been wiser to let a voluntary system in place.

2.2.5 Oversight

As regards the Parliament, the Act that foresees that the National Assembly accompanies the execution of this policy and assumes an oversight role established checks and balances[27]. For this effect there is a Committee for Defence and Public Order installed at the National Assembly.

The fact that this was the first comprehensive Act over Defence and Security since the country's independence (1975) and that establishes the action of the security sector under the guarantees needed for the construction of 'rule of law' is a considerable step towards the achievement of democratic accountability.

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[26] LALÁ, Anícia. 2001. "Security Sector Reform and the Defence Establishment in Mozambique". CEEI-ISRI/PADRIGU. (Master Thesis).P 75.

[27] Defence and Security Act. Op. Cit. art 19.

The whole point comes into discussion when one asks how much of this, is there capability to meet from the part of the security forces and from the part of the parliamentary oversight. With the inherited experiences from the past, including having been part of the one party rule, where accountability was only due to the party high decision-makers and the lack of resources to reconstitute themselves in an efficient way, the security forces are unable to meet their roles as stated in the law. They still have not developed a culture of total openness to those institutions that should exert oversight.

As to parliamentary oversight, as a new concept it will take time to develop a specific culture.
A general problem is that the majority of the MPs are not knowledgeable about normal parliamentary procedure and take too much of its time learning it. But specifically, the main obstacle is the fact that security issues were, in the Mozambican political culture, up to date, a matter restrained to discussion in very limited circles, i.e., either by the high ranks of the security forces or by the senior political decision-makers. As a result there are not many people outside these areas with technical insights and expertise to perform an active and effective check role in the legislature.

A foreseen problem, for example, will be that of effective and conscious control over the budgets for the security arena, which is nevertheless minimised by the role played by the Public Accounts Committee, which although with its own limitations, is nevertheless more technically competent.

Despite the constraints, the activity of the Committee for Defence and Public Order is a relevant contribution to bring the Security Sector under accountability. It helped to end with the spirit of a 'state within a state', to generate the conscience of control over the policies that are established, as well as over the way they are being implemented. The visits of the members of the Commission to the military and police units in order to check their functioning and their interest in following the developments of the most problematic issues in this sector help to maintain the executive institutions permanently engaged in accompanying implementation by the operational units. This leads the Executive to exert oversight by them, once they are responsible for answering before Parliament.

The Committee does not however, work without problems. Various problems arise in terms of checks and balances. As a member of this Committee from the former legislature revealed the partisanship spirit is still prevailing in the functioning of the Committee. As a result, issues related to defence and security that should be considered of national interest are still analysed in partisan terms. This prevents dispositions of the general interest to be passed or rejected, just because of a party reluctance to express agreement with the other,

even with no clear argument against [28]. As such, though pressure is publicly exerted over the Executive, within a restricted party environment, agreements can be made between the Executive and the parliamentarians over a determined issue and the supposed national interest harmed.

Regardless of the shortcomings, the Committee still remains as a positive achievement, especially taking into account its role as the potential liaison with the civil society, in terms of discussion of security issues. Though usually a strong debate in the Parliament precedes the appreciation for approval of legislation related to security matters, unfortunately, presently, the links for consultation with the civil society for these matters remains very loose. The civil society claims the need to be informed, but also to be given room to influence the thinking and policies that are going to prevail.

Paradoxically civil society in Mozambique is still in the making and it is dubious to say that represents the voice of all the unheard, i.e., of the majority of people, who live in rural areas and barely have means to channel their claims. It remains notwithstanding, an important actor to exert oversight, though the practice has been showing that its understanding and sometimes even willingness to participate and debate defence-related issues is limited.

2.3 The Internal Security Dynamics
From 1997 onwards, a different posture started to be displayed by the Government in relation to internal security matters. The pressure from crime rates and their impact on the internal stability in relation to investors' confidence seemed to have led the Government to re-evaluate the security threat analysis and put in practice efforts to revitalise the police forces.

The International Community could have seen the Defence and Security law as a Government statement in terms of achieving transparency and improving the security situation. They reacted positively; manifesting availability to support reforms in the internal security area, once the crime wave was attaining alarming proportions and the judicial sector manifesting an increasing incapacity to deal with the phenomenon[29].

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[28] Lalá, Op. Cit. P.77.

[29] It is interesting to notice how events have impact over the International Community and the Governments' attitude in relation to certain matters. The wave crime had been consistently increasing, but the International Community only took a clear stand in terms of providing assistance and resource availability to support the reforms after the occurrence of armed assaults to foreign diplomats. There was even an unfortunate killing of a Spanish doctor in one of the most upper-class neighbourhoods of Maputo. It is said she was killed by chance, in an exchange of shots between a policeman and a criminal. This event could also have put the Mozambican Government before a situation of having to act, immediately pre-disposing itself for reforms.

A UNDP led programme that had been in discussion since 1996, only started to be implemented in 1998, with the assistance of the Spanish Civil Guard, in the areas of training, reorganisation and equipment of the Police[30]. This also shows that even in relation to this arena there was a cautious attitude of the donors on whether and how to engage, once being an issue related to the security area.

Adding to these efforts a Police Academy (ACIPOL) was opened, with the support from UNDP and the Spanish Civil Guard, in October 2000, aiming to train a new generation of police officers. According to a senior decision-maker, comprehensive reforms in the security sector must entail the thought that security is a means to serve the people's welfare and not as an end in itself. To operationalise this, there is need both to retrain old contingents and train new people that will gradually substitute the old ones, bearing a new perspective and with a solid background in Human Rights dimensions as well as Good Governance practices[31].

Indeed, the unconventional security threats that the country has to face presently, such as drugs trafficking, money laundering, car robberies, flows of refugees, HIV/AIDS, *inter alia*, make the need to possess an efficient internal security establishment an imperative.

Realising the need to improve the Judiciary system as a complementary measure in the efforts towards good governance, the Government established this, along with the education, health and agriculture sectors, as one of its priorities for the General Budget for 2001. The activities foreseen imply the strengthen of capacity through training of judges, justice officers and recycling of prison guards, actions of divulgation of law, and improvements in the conditions of prison establishments [32].

Notwithstanding these efforts, the majority of stories in the action of the internal security establishment have been those of failure. Ironically, the death toll of the events related to killings of policemen and Renamo protesters (contesting 1999 elections results) as an outcome of the clashes in the northern province of Cabo Delgado, the degrading conditions of the prison establishments in the origin of the death of *circa* 89 people[33] in the prison cells overnight and the police professional *incuria*, show that the human rights record is still not in the order of the day in the Mozambican security sector efforts to assure security for its citizens.

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[30] Chachiua Op Cit. P. 6.

[31] Lalá Op. Cit. P.78.

[32] State Budget 2001.Ministry of Finance. 25/10/2000.P.23.

[33] in Metical 12-13/11/2000 and HYPERLINK http://www.news.bbc.co.uk 24/11/2000.

Moreover, the society trust in the security system is extremely shaken due to the recent and critical events which pre-empt new cycles of violence, even if structural, over the citizens. Recently, the Rapid Intervention Police have met peaceful demonstrations made by Mozambican ex-workers of the former East Germany, claiming the payment of their pensions to the state, with violent measures.

The deaths of Mr. Carlos Cardoso, a prominent journalist which was investigating the frauds on the Commercial Bank of Mozambique and of Mr. Siba Siba Macuacua, which was the responsible for clearing up the insolvency of Austral Bank, remain without a clear solution by the Mozambican Justice. Furthermore, in the case of Mr. Cardoso the main suspect that was imprisoned, awaiting trial, disappeared just a few days before the date set. This reveals the rise of corruption in the state apparatus, the state of the whole institutional criminal justice system that has been characterised as being 'ill' by the country' general attorney, and the extent to which organised crime is implanted in Mozambique face to the inoperative efforts of the state security institutions.

2.4 Obstacles to Reform

The security sector is one in which institutional problems are multiple. In the Defence arena there is a legacy of problems like the existence of an inverted pyramid in the FADM, and the need to retire people from older generations, who have been unwilling to lose their privileges. Nonetheless, the fact remains that the Defence is still an area exhibiting a need for reform, in which a fragile balance exists between old military elite interests and the new defence leadership's desire to innovate. The Government signals show however, preference to manage the situation, promote the *status quo*, instead of acting more pro-actively towards change.

To foster change, however, is not an easy task when there is a lack of a clear strategic vision in terms of what a security sector and within it, a Defence sector is. There is not enough historical experience, which can serve as a basis for organising Armed Forces in peacetime and especially in a democratic context.

The Mozambican experience regarding the Defence sector has always related to armed conflict, first during the liberation struggle, then with the need to fight against the Rhodesian and the Apartheid minority regimes, and lastly with the need to combat Renamo. Also, the fact that there was no ownership in terms of defence guidance meant that Mozambique always followed external visions in terms of Defence. This created an institutional vacuum in terms of instruments to deal with the need to organise a Defence strategy. The task is considerable, once it was about creating a Defence strategy, and not redefining it, once Mozambique never owned one. This moment, as the 'days' after the independence, represent a crucial opportunity to engage in the task of reform and create an internally generated security vision, an

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adequate Defence strategy and to sow basis for strong and effective institutions.

In terms of decision-making, as most with Mozambican institutions, the Defence arena has been characterised by a very people-centred process with lack of institutional memory as an aide, enabling perceptions, images and obviously cognitive dissonance to play a strong role. As such, provoking change at the wrong pace and without an institutional framework able to handle the process seems an adventurous enterprise that might endanger the relative stability of the country.

On the other hand, even where financial resources and support are available, i.e., the internal security and criminal justice system, the efforts directed to generate change are meeting strong resistance generated by the interconnection between these sectors and organised crime. The latter, in its turn, appears to have decisive influence on the outcome of attempts to apply justice.

All these interrelated factors prevent initiatives and incentives from the Government to push forward a Security Sector Reform, and the transformations occurring in the sector indicate to be collateral results of the transitions being undergone by the country. More than that, this state of affairs, led to a relegation of the security sector within the governance arena, and to an ostracism of the defence area within the security sector.

Indeed, the main guiding document materialising the goal of combat to poverty, the Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (PARPA, adopted in 2001), constituting the basis of funding and the concentration of activity of the Executive, includes the contribution of almost every sector, but excludes the Defence arena. This reveals a biased approach as regards the missions of the armed forces, which are not seen as able to contribute to this goal, even if having performed a role on occasions such as the floods. In continuing with this kind of posture, the government is assuming the risk of procrastination that might lead to a crisis in which the stability that is to be preserved can be jeopardised.

3. The Impact of External Influence

Apart from the influence the international community held at the time of the peace agreement, conditioning the re-organisation of the armed forces, their overall posture in relation to changes in the security sector has been one entrenched in the logic of 'guns or butter', embedded in the IMF/WB policies. Mozambique is a clear-cut case in which there is a need for donors to overcome the tendency to dichotomise between security spending and social spending and start to address these issues in a holistic way, within a governance perspective. The equation between human security and state security is still perceived as a zero-

sum game, in which strengthening efforts to enhance security means decreasing efforts to reduce poverty.

If we analyse the ongoing discourse on security and development, and specifically the thinking on security sector reform at the OECD-DAC and what donor member states of this organisation argue and implement at the level of foreign representations in Mozambique we will realise the existence of a wide gap. From the part of the foreign representations of the main OECD donor countries in Mozambique, there seems to be a vague impression of what the debate about security sector reform is, in its whole conception.

Interviews from a previous work showed different awareness from the different representatives. Some mentioned that reforms are occurring and being supported in the areas of Justice and Police. However, they were sceptical of any involvement in the Defence arena, which is very sensitive[34].

Diplomats from one of the countries in the vanguard of SSR, argued that after the peace agreement and with stability achieved, the role of the FADM in Mozambique was taken for granted as it has argued to be the role of the armed forces in other stable countries. Moreover, at the beginning of the conversation, some even expressed reservations about the fact that the armed forces could involve themselves in activities with impact towards poverty reduction[35].

Among the representatives of countries engaged in supporting the Defence sector, this activity was understood as an act of bilateral co-operation. The aim is to help the country to build basic capacities to affirm itself as a sovereign state, to develop a defensive posture and back initiatives of conflict resolution in the region. It is seen as an effort to support these forces to re-organise in a Democratic context. They do not perceive that the defence establishment is being left aside in the overall democratic reforms. They also mentioned that this arena does not have to be privileged in terms of conflict prevention because this should be seen as a horizontal perspective, which means that by building houses and roads, one is also working towards conflict prevention [36].

This diversity of positions raises the question to what extent the main precursor of the security sector reform agenda, OECD that works as an intergovernmental agency is able to pass down information about their work and to influence policy-making on a bilateral basis. The policy statements achieved in that forum are not binding, but guidelines on how the countries and the development agencies should proceed. So we face the fact that to trickle down there is a need to

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[34] Lalá, Op. Cit.

[35] Idem P.95.

[36] Idem Loc. Cit.

move in the foreign affairs and development co-operation departments and that takes time to reach the diplomats and the practitioners in the field. The time it takes to reach the bottom (when it does) can be enough for these policies to lose momentum or for the generation of a crisis, which again will be dealt with short-term remedies. Otherwise, it can be understood that there is a deliberate will for leaving aside issues related to the security sector reform in light of the policies which are set as priority, i.e., poverty reduction in the case of Mozambique[37].

As to the Defence arena in the case of Mozambique, most of the interviewees of donor representations identified the fact that this area is the core of sovereignty and as such, a sensitive arena in which donors should not, in general, step in[38]. This only reveals that the mindset of the old concept of security, as well as the framework of the Cold-War in which security was seen as an issue only for the military is still very much alive, also in the donor's reasoning.

The fact that donors did not see security sector reform as a post-war area of priority for reconstruction, added to the closed attitude from the part of the Mozambican Government when discussing the new role of the Defence sector in a post-war context, became obstacles to the process. Donors claim lack of openness from the military institution towards the Mozambican civil society and the international community. They allege the factor corruption, (although not explicitly said), the involvement of the FADM in drug trafficking and unclear business related to demining activities, as factors that do not allow for trust[39].

Nevertheless, in relation to the specific issue of Armed Forces, the floods of 2000 and 2001 seem to have raised some awareness about the needs of the FADM. Despite FADM's intervention with the little equipment they possess, the donor's general tendency was to criticise the poor operation. Although this might be related to the lack of a clear policy and strategy for the sector (as regards the use of available resources), donors seemed to forget that the state of being in the Defence arena is greatly due to the downsizing policies they fostered after 1992.

Despite the resistance towards engagement with the Defence, donors are much more open to engage in activities related to the Police and Justice reforms, as well as in relation to strengthening civilian oversight of institutions like the Parliament. For them security sector reform

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[37] There are other *fora,* besides the OECD. Some scholars point out to the "Utstein group" as an interesting possibility. This group consists of the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, and Norway and is beginning to look at the work it supports in the security area. It nevertheless depends on individual donor representatives.

[38] Idem.

[39] Idem.

from the Police and Justice perspective seems to be more plausible, and support has been reinforced after the event of the Montepuez deaths. Thus, the need to rethink and discuss the violent conflict prevention perspective was re-launched into the donor's agenda of discussions[40].

Overall the foreign representatives argue there is increasingly better donor co-ordination on the national level and a very good dialogue with the Government. At first sight, this can represent an opportunity because as one interviewee explained 'one thing that the Peace brought to Mozambique was the good will from the donors'[41]. According to this opinion, there would be openness to discuss the issue if it were to be introduced by the Government in the agenda.

On the other hand, some Mozambican decision-makers point out that 'the image of the other' still constitutes an aggravating factor in this dynamic. The barrier lies in the fact that donors still look suspiciously on the Government due to the socialist model of governance adopted during the Cold War period. This seems to constitute a subconscious obstacle, which hinders clarification of the relationship and intentions from part to part.

The bottom-line analysis points to the fact that donors in Mozambique are very much entrenched in the discourse that human security and poverty reduction can only be achieved through curtailing the security sector and resources should mostly be channelled to education and health. This then is reinforcing the status quo in the policies of 'guns or butter', meaning that the security sector reform discourse in creation is still not yet consistent and it is not consistently set in the donor's agenda for Mozambique. So it seems due to remain in the short-term, if the Mozambican stakeholders are not to provoke and engage in this debate.

4. Implications Generated by the Interface between internal political options and external influence

The interplay of the posture of the International Co-operation Institutions (ICI's) represented in Maputo, and the posture of the Mozambican government in relation to the need to bring security in line with development and vice-versa, has been convergent and affected negatively the Mozambican security sector. The security sector is not being re-structured in a holistic manner, taking into account the impact of the benefits produced in one area to the other. There have been some re-structuring actions but their lack of a general framework is not conducive to better practices in terms of governance,

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[40] Idem.

[41] Idem, P.97.

institutional capacity building, and performance in a democratic and accountability context.

The 'guns or butter' discourse and practice of the international community, after the GPA, allowed the Mozambican ruling elite accommodation of their interests, which were to guarantee internal security through the Police. It even conferred on them legitimacy to restructure the security sector according to their uncertainties, i.e., concentrating efforts into the Police, an institution of trust, once not penetrated by the opposition. This, adding to the institutional weaknesses of the defence area reinforced the exclusionary pattern towards the FADM, which has been relegated in the Government agenda of reforms.

This leads to a subjacent equation in analysis in this article, i.e., if the input that was brought from the alleged peace-dividend into the social and economic life of the country is having its positive correspondent concerning the assurance of security to the people.

Evaluating the socio-economic situation of the country, it can be argued it is improving living conditions for everyone. Nevertheless, taking into account the fact that the country has been immersed in conflict for the past sixteen years, the trend would predictably be that. Peace obviously brought an environment for economic recovery, at least at the macro-level. However, what we also experience side by side with the high rate of growth is an increasing level of unemployment, and loss of people's livelihoods.

Bearing in mind the high expectations held by people with the advent of peace and the improvement in the education and health care system; the fact that they cannot achieve a sustainable livelihood creates frustration and increases insecurity. This insecurity is also simultaneously becoming more deeply rooted as the differentiation between the rich and the poor increases and strangles the possibilities of creation of a middle class.

State institutions that should be providing poor people with support do not have the capacity to meet their needs and the efforts from the International Community have mostly been short-term oriented. Adding to this, the security sector falls short of delivering public goods, i.e., security in direct terms, as protection from crime, direct or organised, respect for people's human rights, protection for the natural resources of the country or effectively helping in calamities situations.

This interplay of factors leads to the result that the attained welfare is not only not contributing to security, but that the framework, which is being created is raising insecurity for the people.

At the same time, the existent gap between the OECD-DAC thinking and that of the foreign representatives at the local level is also

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contributing to the failure of the Mozambican Government in seeing the opportunity to engage in a dialogue with all stakeholders towards this issue. The fact that this has been a taboo-area in the dialogue with the International Community and the ICI's determination not to support any security related area in the aftermath of the GPA seems to have created some resilience from the Government in terms of approaching the issue.

The fact that Mozambique is entering the 'second generation of democratic governance' and that it has maintained stability so far, should in itself constitute a reason to start to address reforms in sectors poorly involved to date. Once sectors like Justice, the Police and the Judiciary are already on the agenda of ICI's support to Mozambique, like UNDP, *inter alia*; this should be seen as one more reason to include the Defence arena. Also, the fact that the issue of Security Sector Reform is being raised at the level of the major ICI's should be seen as an incentive to rethink political will and commitment from the part of the executive concerning the issue. This would be the first step in order to provoke the debate nationally and to establish dialogue with the ICI's.

Although the window of opportunity seems to have a small degree of openness, a hand push from the interested might transmit signals in the right direction. Determinant are the posture of the military, of the civil society, and to a certain extent of the business sector, together with the Government, which are responsible for building the constellation of forces necessary to create open dialogue on the issue and push for reform. Only then will it be plausible to explore the possibility to reform the sector and to do it with enough ownership of the process, in order to empower the Mozambican institutions as regards the decision-making process.

Otherwise, the actual coincidence of interests between the Government and the International Community as regards the principles that guide attainment of security will prevent the achievement of human security, which is the objective they disseminate. This will also reinforce the tendency for national policies based in regime needs of security, instead of the search for an all-inclusive (in terms of participation and benefits) model of security.

An all-inclusive model of security implies looking at other forms of organisation below the state, but where legitimacy once high, has also declined, and perhaps is determinant to be built. This in a security sector perspective for Mozambique would mean to discuss with the communities the build-up of a mechanism in which they can participate directly to help assure security. This could be the basis of close interaction with the populations, and would allow the military units the availability to perform tasks that will impact directly on the lives of the communities.

On a higher level it has to bear in mind the fact that the implementing countries, as is the case of Mozambique, are usually marginalised states in the international system, and that security sector reform has been a marginal issue within the state. This imposes a great challenge, the one of building a strong (legitimate and able to perform its functions effectively) state, to which a security sector reform characterised by local ownership will certainly contribute.

The Mozambican security sector has undergone a positive restructuring, in terms of shape, orientation, role and missions. However, the changes have not yet accomplished the substantial quality transformation of an aware, long term and integrated strategy that allows it to be called a reform. On the contrary, the ongoing re-structuring seems to be purely generated by the need to conform to the other changes entailed in the transitions above stated. The genesis of the re-structuring lays down on the convergent vision and interests of the ICI's and the Mozambican political elite in downsizing the sector, instead of on an integrated vision for the overall reform of the country's public service and governance improvement, consequently harming institutional development.

Indeed, it can even be questioned whether we should be thinking of reforming or of building afresh. Considering the bottom line reasoning that guides security sector performance is still not one that adequately addresses the needs of a society undergoing rapid changes, characterised by major vulnerabilities, and aiming to manage the process peacefully, the latter will be the appropriate answer.

This re-structuring whose pillars were set within an environment of achieving and implementing a Peace Agreement, highlight how political considerations such as the need to achieve trust between the parties, may hamper the future development of institutions in peace time. As such, in the discussions of like-type situations, in the making of these documents and during its implementation, issues related to capability, performance and effectiveness of institutions which impact in the delivery of essential public goods, should merit at least an attempt to equilibrium.

Actually the Mozambican State remains a source of vulnerability to its citizens, not because it attempts to act deliberately against their rights, but rather by default. This means that it is failing through the restructuring of the security sector to assure conditions conducive to human security and to achieve the *leit motif* of its existence i.e., to provide security to the Mozambican people.

To overcome this situation there is a need for various confluent processes to take place. The consolidation of the Mozambican security forces into accountable and strong institutions, the development of an interested, informed and demanding civil society as regards security issues, and the maturing of capable oversight institutions, with a special reference to the Parliament. The substance of the interaction

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that will develop among them, more than the legal form prescribed for that to happen, will reveal to which extent the synergy created will encounter external actors' influence. Hopefully this interplay will shape a strong, vibrant and healthy relationship allowing the delivery of human security to the Mozambican people and will inculcate practices of good governance within the security sector.

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