

# Journal of Security Sector Management

Published by  
Global Facilitation Network for Security Sector Reform  
Cranfield University  
Shrivenham, UK

ISSN 1740-2425

Volume 1 Number 1 - March 2003

## Security Sector Reform - Streamlining National Military Forces to Respond to the Wider Security Needs

Dr. Ann M Fitz-Gerald

### Abstract

This short concept paper will draw linkages between some of the players and their activities to achieve more comprehensive solutions to SSR. A set of actors will be identified, as well as general categories which can serve as enablers or disablers to the reform of these actors, and policy implications for external and internal agents which fall out of the SSR debate. The paper will then examine some of the linkages between these areas of policy and programme development. In addition, it highlights examples of where the failure to identify these linkages resulted in an incomplete SSR programme or one that was not linked to a wider development agenda. The analysis also reveals that SSR continues to be viewed as a 'post-conflict' activity – a view which has worked detrimentally to post-conflict solutions, despite the progress of its conceptual ideas.

## Introduction

Security Sector Reform (SSR) is a subject that has garnered significant attention from the development community and has crystallised into a debate that has been tackled holistically by the national governments, as well as by many multilateral and non-government actors.<sup>1</sup> Whilst efforts to generate and build on the theory and concepts have encouraged the development of wider approaches and mindsets, the way in which these concepts have been translated into practice remains unclear at worst, and disparate at best.

It is necessary to acknowledge the wide spectrum of activities and actors involved in SSR issues, and the institutional co-operation this implies both at the international and local levels. For example, it is impossible to initiate a comprehensive military reform programmes without addressing legal and constitutional frameworks that ensure an acceptable degree of accountability and transparency of the armed forces. Similarly, a country's defence sector cannot undergo a completely successful transformation without equal efforts being extended to the reform of the internal security forces and their civilian oversight mechanisms, such as the police and judicial systems. The impending plans to overthrow Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq will result in an extensive agenda for the international community to take on, particularly with regard to Iraq's security structures – a vacuum which, if left, will have a further fractious effect on the region.

Whilst a plethora of additional humanitarian and civil protection responsibilities, which have come in the early stages of many recent military interventions, has triggered cries of 'mission creep' from national military contributors, today's interventionists must be cognisant of the wider security needs of the transitioning societies to which they are deployed. This notion bridges the gap between the emergency response phases of a conflict and the wider development agenda – a gap which, if left, can have a enormous destabilising effect on a society and re-ignite the roots of the conflict quite quickly.

This paper examines security in its broader context and identifies the key actors and activities of the wider security sector. It gives an overview of the main programme and policy areas for SSR and discusses the potential contribution of international military forces to each of these areas. Lastly, the paper looks at the current state of doctrine for peace support operations, and the operational training that supports contemporary approaches to peace operations, and makes recommendations as to how SSR concepts can be blended into strategic planning and policy to account for the evolving 'developmentalisation of security'.

## Security Sector Reform

The agenda for international military forces has always included elements of broader security concerns, many of which are addressed in the later stages of a conflict intervention, also known as the 'post-conflict development' or 'post-conflict reconstruction' phases. For example, international military forces serving under the NATO Stabilisation Force (SFOR) mandate in Bosnia now find themselves responsible for operations such as minority returns, the settlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs), the support of mine action programmes and the collections of small arms and light weapons (SALW) caches from an array of different areas in the country. More recently in Afghanistan, British forces serving in Kabul have focused on garnering local support through the implementation of 'quick impact programmes', which have included community rebuilding and local integration programmes.<sup>2</sup>

Even in different types of interventions, such as NATO's Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the British Army's ongoing operations in Northern Ireland, a focus on the need for civil protection for minority groups dominates the agenda. Both cases have parallels with experiences in Haiti, El Salvador and other internal crises where internal policing became the priority and the international military forces strived to reach an endstate where the police could regain primacy. Although events in Northern Ireland have progressed to a level where the Royal Ulster Constabulary has held primacy since the early 1990's, the military still plays a support role to boost the effectiveness of the overall security sector and work towards achieving wider development goals.

Due to the complex and multi-disciplined nature of the subject, SSR has recently been identified as one of the most important challenges facing a range a government ministries and agencies. Chris Smith, of King's College, London University, suggests that the academic history behind the evolution of SSR is one of fits and starts, lacking continuity and lucidity.<sup>3</sup> It has emerged with the wider examination of military institutions in the Third World and with the study of defence diplomacy, or the development of democratic market-based defence forces. Important linkages have also been drawn between defence expenditures and economic development in these countries, which is often seen in bloated defence budgets and the absence of any civilian oversight governing the activity of the military.

The subject further evolved when the relationship between defence forces and internal security forces was examined, and a recognition that in many countries, there were little differences between the military, what constituted internal police forces and systems underpinning justice and the rule of law. A wider security community became identified, which, in addition to the police, the armed forces and the judiciary, included border guards, civil defence forces, intelligence services and paramilitaries. Professor Robin Luckham,

from the Institute for Development Studies, Sussex University, describes SSR as:

*[...] the quintessential governance issue. This is so both in the sense that there is enormous potential for the misallocation of resources and also because a security sector out of control can have an enormous impact on governance – indeed, be a source of malgovernance.<sup>4</sup>*

Other academics and practitioners typologise the actors involved in the wider security sector, which include those statutory and non-statutory security services authorised to use force, civil society actors and oversight mechanisms, and non-statutory forces that are not authorised to use force on any occasion. Nicole Ball describes the ‘wider security family’ as including:

- The security forces (armed forces, police, paramilitary and intelligence services);
- The relevant ministries and offices within the executive branch charged with managing and monitoring the security forces (such as the ministries of defence, finance, internal and foreign affairs, national security councils, and budget and audit offices);
- Informal security forces;
- The judiciary and correction system;
- Parliamentary oversight committees;
- Private security firms; and
- Civil and political society<sup>5</sup>

Because this paper will focus on the contribution of the military to SSR activities, a framework will be developed which is slightly more focused than Ball’s list of actors, and draws a distinction between the players, the enablers/disablers and the activities/programmes, which collectively, draw on most of Ball’s descriptors listed above.

Figure 1 outlines a framework that describes the central players within a country’s security sector along the horizontal axis. These include the intelligence services, the armed forces, the police, the judiciary, paramilitaries, and border and customs officials. A number of policy imperatives, which can serve as ‘enablers’ or ‘disablers’, are listed along the vertical axis, all of which taken together should underpin the activities of each of the security-related agencies listed below. These include accountable and transparent legislative frameworks, civilian oversight, capacity, structure and capability, and policy and budgetary planning. The application of professional competencies to some of these combined areas results in bilateral and multilateral policy being developed to address the more prominent problems inherent in some of these categories. Examples of this may include the development of programmes and policies on United Nations (UN) peacekeeping,

Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR), Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), Democratic Governance and Civilian Policing.

**Figure 1<sup>6</sup>**

**Combined areas for programme and policy development**

Legislative Framework					
Civilian oversight					
Budgetary Planning					
Capacity, Structure & Capability					
Policy and Planning					
	Military	Police & Judiciary	Paramilitaries	Intelligence	Border guards/customs
<b>SECURITY SECTOR ACTORS</b>					

It is important to note that these programme areas can respond to the needs of a number of security agencies and their respective enablers/disablers, simultaneously, depending on the programme and the way in which it is implemented. It is these programme areas which the paper will focus on, and not the elements characterising the vertical and horizontal axis of the model. Moreover, the analyses will draw linkages between each programme area and study the implications for international military forces.

**SSR and Peace Support Operations**

The realisation that UN peacekeeping spanned a number of undefined modes of military intervention - some of which did not necessarily require a specific ‘peace’ agreement to be in place prior to the deployment of international military forces - brought about a number of new definitions for what constituted peacekeeping in its broader sense. Whilst the United States popularised the term ‘Military Operations Other Than War’ (MOOTW)<sup>7</sup>, the UK crafted the term ‘Peace Support Operations (PSO)<sup>8</sup>’ which would serve to embrace all the UN bespoke ‘tools of peace’ such as peacekeeping, peacemaking,

peace enforcement and peace building (the details for each can be found in the UN's 1995 *Supplement to the Agenda for Peace*<sup>9</sup>).

Over the last decade, the UK Armed Forces have further developed doctrine and concepts dealing with the broader notion of PSO. As a result, the UK has earned itself the position as 'custodian' for the development of NATO doctrine on PSO, and has served as an influential lead nation on these issues at the UN Headquarters in New York. Moreover, it has projected these ideas further a field and has played a role in doctrine development and training in African, Latin American and South-East Asian countries.


There are essentially three types of military responses to regional war, intrastate war or internal civil strife: a UN led – UN endorsed intervention, such as the 1992 UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia and UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH); a regional organisation led - UN endorsed intervention, such as NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia or the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe's (OSCE) initial intervention in Kosovo; or lastly - and the type of intervention that the international community is seeing more of due to bureaucratic constraints to rapid reaction, mobility and the high readiness of multinational troops – an 'executive agent' or 'coalition of the willing' led – UN endorsed intervention. The common element to all of these interventions is the endorsement of the UN Security Council or, in the case where the Council has, in the past, been grid locked by the veto of any of the five permanent members, resolutions have still been passed in the UN General Assembly to sanction the efforts of others. Thus, the evolution of programmes and policy on UN PSO requires continuous support. This will undoubtedly be facilitated by the UN's commitment to implementing recommendations for improving UN peacekeeping as articulated in the Brahimi report.<sup>10</sup>

Recent debate over the situation in Iraq has also prompted the UK Government as well as most other European Heads of State and international diplomats to reiterate the importance of international responses to international crises and, therefore, the need for the response to Iraq to be supported by a UN resolution. However, strengthening the expediency of political decision-making mechanisms must run parallel to a more robust capacity to respond militarily, even if this capacity is outsourced.

The concept of PSO continues to be defined in terms of level of consent and degree of impartiality of the intervening forces. When both these factors are low, the environment tends to be quite volatile, with fighting continuing and little prospect of peace in sight. This is normally characterised as a 'peace enforcement' intervention, where troops are sent into theatre under Chapter VII of the UN Charter where consent, and sometimes even a stable government, are non-existent. As the levels of consent and impartiality increase, international military forces often find themselves in a 'peacekeeping'

environment, which is typically supported by some sort of interim peace agreement.

Figure 2 illustrates this argument:



**Figure 2** - Illustration taken from *Peace Support Operations, Joint Warfare Publication 3-50*, Joint Doctrine and Concept Centre, Shrivenham, Wiltshire, p.3-2

However, there is often a blurred distinction as to what constitutes a pure peacekeeping environment, as peace agreements can remain quite fragile and often exclude many non-state actors that perpetuate the violence in the first place. Lastly, a state of ‘peacebuilding’ comes when the peace agreement has gained wide acceptance, when the international community has secured a degree of local trust and confidence and when the international military forces take a backseat to the primacy of local actors who develop new democratic roles in an effort to sustain peace.

Not surprisingly, the primary problem with this military model is that it presumes that these states exist on a continuum and that one always precedes the other. All too often, we have witnessed the case where this continuum works backwards and peace processes disintegrate overnight, as was the case in Sierra Leone in May 2000, when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) attacked Freetown and caused havoc to ongoing development activities and reform programmes. The continuum-based approach therefore does not give the attention it should to transitional management backwards, as well as forwards, as the state of the security environment regresses. As SSR has traditionally been associated with the last phase on this continuum, and one that is often not reached due to the backward swings characteristic of a regressive peace or flawed intervention, a lack of attention to the wider security issues often serves to impede progress.

It is essential that doctrine and concepts on PSO further evolve to reflect the wider security challenges that can be encountered in a theatre of operations – challenges that should not necessarily be left to the ‘peacebuilding’ or ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ phases of the operation. Intervening military forces should be fully aware of how their activities may impact the development of a new national police force or the rebuilding of a national justice system. Similarly, knowledge acquired on small arms, light weapons, paramilitary groups and ex-combatants might usefully feed into the information repositories developed for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and SALW programmes, which may be more formalised following an interim peace agreement. If a government already exists, and the level of consent for the international intervention is high, the role of the peacekeepers should also contribute to strengthening civil society and educating parliamentarians, journalists and NGOs on the democratic role of the military - something which still undermines levels of public confidence in Belgrade where a relatively stable government has now been in place for some time. These local actors play an important role in feeding government policy, advocacy, agenda-setting, educating young opinion formers and in communicating these issues to the greater public.

Efforts to build SSR into PSO doctrine and training should extend to both NATO and UN peacekeeping countries, due to the influence both organisations exert on the policy and procedures of troops deployed under their respective organisational mandates. At the moment, large disparities exist in the approaches of different countries in implementing effective peace support activities.<sup>11</sup> Different levels of commitment to local dynamics become apparent, particularly in the ‘post-conflict’ phase of an intervention when the more professional national military contributors, normally earmarked for the more intense phases of military activity, are replaced by forces from countries that have more suited to contributing once some degree of peace and stability has been achieved and more of a monitoring and confidence-building role is required by the international military forces. All too often, many peacekeeping contributors in this ‘second tranche’ are quite removed from the current debate on PSO doctrine and training and, as a result, are less committed during a critical stage for SSR programmes. The Nigerian-led UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) serves as a good example of where a lead military contributor was ill-prepared for the deterioration of a conflict and failed to respond to the wider security needs that could have prevented the resurgence. For example, despite the initiation of a large-scale DDR programme called for in the framework of the 1999 Lomé peace agreement<sup>12</sup>, Nigerian troops were unsuccessful in deterring further attacks by the RUF on Freetown, a series of which culminated in the hostage-taking of 500 UN peacekeepers. The UN and the British Government immediately called for the deployment of troops to solve the hostage crisis, secure the airport and assist the Sierra Leone Army in more credibly deterring further rebel attacks.



Once again, this underlines the danger in using the ‘continuum’ model, which is still imbued in the mindset of many national militaries as well as aid organisations, and which comes across quite vividly in the illustrations of doctrine on peace support operations. SSR has been misplaced as an activity in the ‘post-conflict reconstruction’ or ‘peace-building’ phases of a conflict, which is often left to the authority of development agencies and international peacekeepers, which play only a marginal, and often disinterested, support role. Military and civilian interventionists who ignore requirements to reform security sectors in the earlier phases of intervention do so at their peril, and fail to provide more comprehensive solutions to wider security needs. Broadening their stakeholder base and awareness of other inter-related activities does not suggest a shift towards ‘mission creep’ – security is the core business of the military and SSR issues must be incorporated into their mindset, mandate and operational planning.

The following sections will examine some of the SSR programme areas and the potential contribution that international military forces could make to these activities. Whilst it is beyond the scope of this paper to address all programme areas, the relationship between PSO and police reform, DDR, SALW, and Civil Society will be discussed, albeit in slim detail only.

## The Linkages between PSO and Policing


As described in earlier sections, the transition between military to civilian policing has been a common element of many complex emergencies and military interventions, particularly in countries where there is a breakdown in the rule of law and civil protection. Generally speaking, there are three circumstances in which there is need for police reform:

- Where there is a political transition and a need to transform the police forces from an oppressive to a democratic institution (i.e. South Africa and Russia);
- Where there was no civil war, but where the military was the primary source of security and the police forces stood as the poor relatives with no resources (i.e. Nigeria, Uganda)
- In a post-conflict situation where the police forces were either non-existent or needed rebuilding by an external third party such as UN Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) (i.e. Sierra Leone, Mozambique, Afghanistan)

Police reform normally involves a tripartite process, whereby international military forces are initially responsible for securing and stabilising an environment before handing over to civil authorities. An international civilian police force, such as UNCIVPOL<sup>13</sup>, then assumes

police primacy as a newly developed or newly reformed force trains under international authorities and prepares for an eventual handover of the civil protection function. The diagram below illustrates is need for supporting mechanisms to underpin each end of the 'military/police primacy spectrum'. If overlooked, the resulting vacuums (shown in grey) must be filled for a cooperative and amicable relationship to develop in the future.

**Figure 3: The Military-Police Primacy Spectrum**



During this process it is absolutely critical that the initial military mandate includes an element of civil protection and does not convey the impression that the presence of international peacekeeping forces is merely to offer protection to politicians and international personnel. As a result, peacekeepers must be perceived to be offering credible security guarantees to the majority of the civilian population, or individuals and groups will go in search of security by other means. Paramilitary groups and warlords who do not have an interest in disarming and demobilising garner the support of these local groups, who then serve as a prime target market that justifies their continued existence. This subsequently makes the job of the international police forces even more difficult as they lack the local confidence necessary to rebuild a national police force in an environment where local acceptance provides a more promising foundation for sustainability.

As outlined in the typologies above, in many cases there is a limited distinction between a country's military force and police force, and the former is usually the dominant ruler of both internal and external security. As a result, the separation of these powers becomes hugely challenging, let alone efforts to encourage the forces to work 'in concert' with each other, as opposed to 'in competition' with each other. Thus, it is difficult to directly draw on the templates used in Northern Ireland and Bosnia for police intervention in Africa, South-East Asia and Iraq.<sup>14</sup> The former cases assume a degree of transparency between the two forces and the willingness to offer mutual support regardless of which party maintains primacy. Other 'entry points', or perhaps 'supporting strategies' would have to be

developed for different global regions, where issues such as ‘primacy’ and ‘aid to the civil power’ remain unfamiliar terms.

It is therefore essential that issues concerning the rule of law and civil protection be factored into a robust international peacekeeping mandate at the earliest stages of a military intervention. This does not mean that the military should take on civilian policing activities but acknowledge the endstate required both for a successful withdrawal of military forces and a well-managed transition to civilian protection for internal security. As a result, a more comprehensive approach to rebuilding the security sector can be undertaken by both internal and external actors. This underlines the importance of understanding the full ‘security development spectrum’ at the earliest stages of international involvement.

### **The Linkages Between PSO and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)**

As civil wars and regional conflicts continue to be fuelled by the proliferation of rebel forces, paramilitaries and break-away armies, the need for effective and comprehensive DDR programmes remains critical for post-conflict peace. DDR programmes come with enormous social, economic and political implications and, as a result, must be integrated into the wider institutional development strategy.

Questions have been asked as to whether or not a peace agreement must be in place in order to initiate a successful DDR programme.<sup>15</sup> In most cases, this would be a necessary pre-requisite for the wider ‘buy-in’ of the national government and the necessary support for local structures needed to sustain an effective DDR programme, such as a National Commission for DDR. Arguably, much of the relative success of the Mozambique DDR programme could be attributed to the fact that the programme was strongly supported and subsidised by the Mozambican government, as well as supported regionally by the South African government. As the successful transition of post-Apartheid events in South Africa preceded the disarming of RENAMO rebels in Mozambique, border security interests represented one of the many mutual interests between the two countries in stabilising the region. This encouraged South Africa to provide a proactive contribution to Mozambique’s DDR process.

The case of the DDR programme in Mozambique also opens the debate for more regional solutions to DDR. Small arms and ex-combatants do not become obsolete easily, are not-easily traceable and can continue to operate in vigilant and criminal networks beyond the immediate borders of their countries. For example, despite the relative success enjoyed by the National Commission for DDR in Sierra Leone, many RUF fighters are continuing their aggressive action in Liberia, Guinea and the Ivory Coast. Thus, national DDR programmes must engage the many existing regional and sub-regional

structures, such as the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS), the G-8 countries, the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and encourage them to be instrumental to the wider SSR agenda for the region.

For example, the deployment of the Nigerian-led ECOMOG force in 1998 and the subsequent contribution the Nigerian government made to the UNAMSIL force serves as an example of 'regional solutions to regional problems'. Bilateral discussions between the Governments of Sierra Leone and Guinea prepared Guinean forces to meet rebel groups attempting to penetrate the Guinean border, which sent a powerful message to the RUF concerning the support to the international community offered by Sierra Leone's neighbours. Similarly, immediate efforts to implement UN sanctions on Liberia also sent out an important message and served as an effort to break ties between Liberian leader Charles Taylor and the RUF. The creation of an International Contact Group (ICG) on Liberia which included France, Monrovia, Senegal, Britain, Nigeria, the UN and ECOWAS also sought to create stability in the sub-region and find a resolution between Liberia's government forces and the rebel groups.

Beyond the regional level were the consistent efforts at the international level to keep the conflict in Sierra Leone high on the agenda of the UN Security Council (UNSC). The problem with diamonds providing an incentive for violence, paying for weapons and fuelling the war was also mitigated by the US Government-led Kimberly Process, which sought to combat the conflict diamond trade through the implementation of a global rough diamond certification system.

A more recent trend which has surfaced from ongoing DDR programmes is the tendency to concentrate on the 'Disarmament' and 'Demobilisation' parts of DDR, but not as much on the 'Reintegration' aspect. Due to the chronological nature of this equation, donor fatigue tends to have an eroding impact on the DDR programmes, as well as a reluctance to accept the wider community needs for successful reintegration.<sup>16</sup> These difficulties arise from the tendency to disaggregate the term 'DDR' when, ironically, the emphasis should be on 'reintegration' with disarmament and demobilisation seen as necessary pre-requisites. Besides a loss of interest and lack of resources, funds are often borrowed for 'stop-gap measures' during disarmament and demobilisation from the reintegration budget. Lastly, DDR straddles parts of both the emergency relief and the development domains. As bilateral and multilateral donors and operational agencies increasingly pursue more coherent strategies that place them in only one of these camps, more divisions are created between what may be considered as the more emergency-related phases of the DDR programme, and the longer-term development activities.

Furthermore, the international community often underestimates the economic challenges for the successful reintegration of ex-combatants when poverty levels characteristic of post-war economies even present limited opportunities for civil society. Because the public disdain and lack of confidence towards armed forces, there is a reluctance to consider the possibility of reintegrating ex-combatants into a democratic armed force as a viable source of employment. The post-war emphasis on 'downsizing' often rules out areas of employment most compatible with the training and core competencies of the ex-combatants. Should the US-led military intervention in Iraq result in provisional governance by an International Administration, as in Kosovo, the restructuring of the security forces, complemented by a well-orchestrated public information campaign, will be quintessential elements for consideration.

Beyond this, however, is the need to focus on the reintegration of the wider community, and not just the ex-combatants. More effective research and demographic and market analyses must underpin DDR programmes in order to produce skill sets to support a country's wider development needs. For example, the infrastructural rebuilding of roads and bridges to stimulate internal economic activity and improve logistics to attract foreign investors requires engineers and labourers accustomed to working in team environments. Institutional rebuilding requirements could also produce skill set profiles that could directly influence national DDR objectives.

The wider community may also be affected by large groups of refugees who have either been internally displaced or who have no home to return to. Reintegration strategies must consider these other groups who do not form part of the pool of ex-combatants but who face similar problems with regards to community reintegration. Families of ex-combatants will also require support as will former female soldiers who often represent a significant part of a rebel force, as was the case in Eritrea and El Salvador.

Most importantly, DDR programmes must be integral to the national plan and link into economic, social and political imperatives. This has important implications for strategic planning with regards to other strands of the wider security sector and the linkages between programmes such as DDR and the development and training of democratic armed forces and a transparent and accountable internal security system. From the highest foreign policy objectives, which are a function of national interests and core values, should be drawn the broader implications for security planning. It is important to note that national interests of many countries will differ to most western templates, as other societies are built upon different sets of values. Consequently, different objectives to support a national security strategy will be developed.

A national security strategy should therefore embrace all strands of the wider security sector, and should clearly articulate objectives and

priorities for each strand. At the operational level that follows, implementation imperatives for each area should be specified, such as details on national DDR programmes, which may then be linked back to the highest levels of a country's national strategic plan. The same is true for other SSR programme areas, such as the requirement for a strategic defence review, a review of national defence expenditure, boosting the degree of civilian oversight for security agencies, and perhaps preventative measures like weapons stockpile management and legislation on arms exports. This encourages wider 'buy-in' at all levels of government, as well as codes of transparency and accountability, which underpin how these objectives should be achieved.

The above merely touches on the extent to which PSO, strategic planning for a country's defence sector and DDR programmes are so tightly linked to more comprehensive SSR strategies. The linkages create opportunities for military intervention at the strategic level as well as the operational level. For example, Force Commanders negotiating with local governments must be aware of how the international military intervention will support other strategic priorities in the national plan, particularly if the international military force is still the dominant actor in the transitioning society.

At the operational level, international militaries can contribute information on ex-combatants to local government authorities as well as the appropriate international and local commissions tasked with addressing DDR requirements. In addition, they could advise on the type of weapons that the commissions could expect to collect prior to encampment and on what may be required before rebel soldiers are able to renounce their combatant status. Lastly, the international military force could also contribute to the security of the demobilisation camps and advise on the skill sets of ex-combatants and their applicability in civilian employment.

## **The linkages between PSO and Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)**

The linkages between SSR and SALW relate to much of what has already been discussed in earlier sections. It is important to acknowledge the relationship between the demand for arms and the perception of a threat, and therefore, the associations between SALW and areas such as policing, international peacekeeping, judicial reform and the role of civil society.

Once again, the common denominator for all of these areas is the place of SALW in the national strategic plan. Implementation objectives and priority areas for security planning across the sectors have wide-reaching implications for SALW programmes. For example, the need for legislation on central procurement can serve to specify procurement needs for national defence and internal security

purposes. Similarly, requirements for weapons stockpiling and inventory management should also underpin the objectives of all the security service portfolios and be a priority for external actors tasked with assisting in military training and DDR programmes.

International military forces can also contribute to the planning of SALW programmes. As mentioned in earlier sections, UN peacekeepers are often on the ground before any thought has been given to SSR. With a broader understanding of comprehensive SSR requirements and the activities scheduled to ensue following the departure of these forces, peacekeeping troops should be able to provide critical knowledge to other incoming external actors, particularly on ex-combatants and armaments. One often assumes that 'lists' documenting the location and details of arms, landmines and rebel forces are readily available; whilst this has been the case in a very small number of post-war societies, it is certainly not the case for most countries.

Due to the earlier interventions of NATO forces in Bosnia, as well as improved relations between the Bosnian entity armed forces and the international military forces, SFOR now plays a vital role in mine action programmes. The same logic could be used to increase the contribution international peacekeeping forces could make to SSR programmes, simply by sharing information on rebel and paramilitary forces, as well as the location of arms caches, types of weapons used, weapons trafficking channels, etc.

In their role as post-conflict military training advisers, as with the International Military Assistance Training Teams (IMATT), which operate in different African and Central and Eastern European countries, knowledge on the military's contribution to SSR and wider development strategies could also be communicated to the newly trained forces. This information should also be channelled towards civil society groups in order to boost confidence in the newly formed military force.

## **The Linkages between PSO and Civil Society**

As described in the earlier framework outlined in Figure 1, as well as in Nicole Ball's list of members of the 'wider security family', civil society plays an enormously important role in the development of democratic security forces and SSR. Following the end of a civil conflict, particularly when it involves serious human rights abuses by the country's military and internal security forces, the public perception towards security forces in general is quite negative. The long-lived nature of these forces in many countries prevents civil society from understanding or accepting any other use for the military.

In societies where remnants of elitist and oppressive military regimes still haunt the post-war Ministries of Defence and the Headquarters of

the General Staff, parliamentary oversight becomes key to ensuring an acceptable degree of transparency and democracy within military politics. Such is currently the case in Serbia, where civil servants and former Generals of Slobodan Milosevic's regime still hold prominent positions within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's Ministry of Defence. It is essential that these government representatives are presented with well-informed debates by Parliamentarians to ensure political accountability to the wider electorate. Unfortunately, newly elected members of Parliament are often ill-informed on the essentials of democratic security forces and lack the ability to pose challenging debates. In Belgrade, the fact that the perceived status of a Member of Parliament (MP) is directly proportional to one's role in the corporate world, precludes any commitment to current debates, particularly in more remote portfolios such as defence and security.<sup>17</sup> Similarly, news reporters and editors formally controlled by information monopolies of the oppressive regimes lack the skills required to conduct investigative, as opposed to sensationalised, journalism.

These problems open opportunities for international non-governmental agencies (NGOs) to provide support to local actors to strengthen their knowledge and skills and provide a more informed level of oversight to the elected officials. Whilst the role for international military forces here is more marginal than in other SSR-related programme areas, the forces can certainly help to inform NGOs and media groups on the activities of newly trained forces, newsworthy information and areas requiring further research and empirical studies that could be fed into Parliamentary questioning. Furthermore, they could engage their own defence ministries to fund capacity-building programmes in-country and advise on the democratic control of armed forces and the management of defence resources in market-based environments.

## The Need for Regional solutions

Earlier sections highlighted the need to engage existing regional mechanisms to provide regional solutions for post-conflict and transitioning states. The need for local constituents to develop national plans was also identified, in order to secure wider local 'buy-in' to the solutions proposed.

It is essential to underpin both of these imperatives with clear direction from the international community, or the particular bilateral donors who wish to see themselves engaged in a specific area. More explicitly, a country supporting the post-conflict rebuilding of another country must be able to state, uncategorically, why it has a national interest to do so. All too often are national militaries and development agencies deployed overseas with no clear idea of the strategic interest supporting their mandate. It is just as important for the private soldier on the ground as it is for a western nation's Head of State to fully understand why their country is assisting in the effort. If it is simply to



fill a widespread humanitarian/security vacuum, intervention agents should still understand the longer-term objectives and wider development agenda.

This theory must also be applied to supplementary support given to these countries, which often falls under the well-known label of 'Outreach Programmes'. For a long time now, many different bilateral and multilateral programmes have come to the assistance of post-conflict and transitioning countries by offering foreign militaries training and courses on 'peacekeeping'. One must sometimes question whether or not this is indeed what these countries are really in need of, and whether or not courses and training on the 'professionalisation of armed forces' might better serve their requirements. More blatantly, what some countries might really desire is training on how to be a professional platoon or company commander, or on how to run an accountable and transparent Ministry of Defence. After all, what good is the most effectively trained army if it cannot be controlled?

## Conclusions and Recommendations

International and national military forces intervening in civil wars, collapsed states and transitioning societies, must consider the wider security agenda in their overall mandate, campaign planning, doctrine and training curriculum. SSR requires comprehensive solutions and the joined-up government efforts of bilateral donors who respond to these problems. In addition, what was traditionally an issue for the 'post-conflict reconstruction' group of players must now be seen as an issue for conflict prevention and conflict phases of an intervention. For example, international development agencies and embassy staff should concentrate on preventive mechanisms such as better arms export control, legislation on customs and excise, the state of a country's armed forces and other vulnerabilities that could trigger the collapse of the security sector.

During the 'conflict' phases of an intervention, when international military forces occupy the most prominent position on the ground, measures must be put in place to consider existing security structures and information gathered on the wider security sector, to ensure better transitional management from military to civilian primacy and a sustainable development agenda. This paper has taken a cursory look at certain SSR programme areas, such as Police Reform, DDR, SALW and Civil Society, and discussed how the work of international military forces can usefully contribute to these programme areas.

As we live in the shadow of a possible American-led war on Iraq, the exigencies of post-conflict peace and support to the security sector remain large and looming questions – questions that must be addressed and married with any proposed strategy to install an interim government or an international 'custodial' administration. Even in Kosovo, which seems now to have become a long forgotten land for

which no one is interested in taking on responsibility (including Serbia), internal security and civil protection of minority groups, as well as democratic governance, still remain the biggest obstacles to a sustainable peace. Weighed against the post-conflict security challenges following a military engagement in Iraq, Kosovo's problems seem negligible.

The last section will outline specific recommendations to enhance the military's contribution to SSR at the multilateral and bilateral levels.

- ***'Joined-up' government*** – It is essential that formal mechanisms are developed within states (particularly donor countries) for 'joined-up' decision-making between the relevant ministries who have an interest in SSR issues. This would clearly involve the participation of the Ministry of Defence, Ministry for International Development, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry for Intelligence Services, or Intelligence and Critical Infrastructure. SSR Steering committees also should be created across these ministries, as should a common pool of funding to which each of the ministries contributes. The funding should be used to support policy development on wider security issues and capacity-building initiatives like in-country training and education in regions where the government has a national interest.
- ***The development of in-depth assessment tools and methodologies*** – in order to improve information and knowledge management throughout the relevant ministries, in-depth assessment/analytical tools and methodologies should be produced for country/regional surveys and scoping studies. Other subject experts such as historians and social anthropologists should be drawn on to add to these studies to ensure that there is a well-developed information repository on all areas to which the country in questions may be asked to respond.
- ***National defence ministries*** should be encouraged to build SSR concepts into their respective doctrine on peace support operations to recognise the wider spectrum of security-related activities and the linkages to international military mandates. The concepts should also be factored into campaign planning and identifying 'lines of activity' which, in the past, have included issues like humanitarian assistance and support to refugee programmes;
- ***National defence ministries*** should also build SSR concepts into their operational training courses and modules, particularly those that prepare new units for rotational deployments to different operational theatres – these courses should include briefings on the relationship and linkages between PSO and other SSR programme activities, as well as the notion of 'security development' beyond military endstates

- ***National defence ministries*** should ensure that the concepts of ‘transitional management’ and ‘change management’ become integral parts of management modules at the Armed Forces Command and Staff Colleges – module managers should spend time applying these concepts to a more comprehensive understanding of SSR imperatives in PSO
- ***UN Military Advisers to Permanent Diplomatic Missions*** at the UN Headquarters in New York should help stimulate the awareness of the relationship between SSR concepts and UN peacekeeping doctrine, particularly within the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations;
- ***More detailed scoping studies and research*** should be undertaken - as a follow-on to this paper, on the role of international peacekeeping forces in SSR programmes and the contribution these forces can make to DDR and SALW programmes;
- ***Research should also be undertaken which looks at the development of national strategic planning tools*** that works to the benefit of the intervention agencies and donor governments and to the benefit of the local government. This will encourage the wider ‘buy-in’ of local governments to SSR programmes and articulate separate and inter-related objectives for each of the security portfolios. For external actors, a national strategy will encourage their efforts to work towards a wider development agenda which has already garnered the support of local constituencies.<sup>18</sup>

## Endnotes

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<sup>1</sup> The extent to which a country's security sector requires reform depends on whether or not the country is undergoing significant political, social or economic transitions or whether or not it is considered a 'post-conflict' state. In the latter case, SSR is a much better reference due to need for widespread reform. In the former case, Security Sector Transformation (SST) is increasingly being used. For the sake of consistency, the paper will use 'SSR' to refer to all contingencies.

<sup>2</sup> Based on discussions with Captain Ian Richardson (RN), Assistant Director, Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre, UK MOD, July 2002.

<sup>3</sup> Chris Smith, "Security Sector Reform: Developmental Breakthrough of Institutional Re-engineering?" in *Journal of Conflict, Security and Development*, Issue 1, Volume 1, pp. 5-17.

<sup>4</sup> Robin Luckham, IDS, University of Sussex, May 1998.

<sup>5</sup> Nicole Ball, "Transforming Security Sectors: The World Bank and IMF Approaches" in *Journal of Conflict, Security and Development*, Volume 1, Issue 1, pp 45-66.

<sup>6</sup> An SSR planning tool developed in conjunction with Colonel Witek Nowosielski, UK Defence Attaché, Belgrade.

<sup>7</sup> See *Army Field Manual 'Operations'*, Headquarters, Department of the Army, United States Department of Defense, p.1-4

<sup>8</sup> See UK Joint Warfare Publication 3-50, *Peace Support Operations*, United Kingdom Ministry of Defence Joint Doctrine and Concept Centre, p. 4-2

<sup>9</sup> See Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *Supplement to Agenda for Peace*, UN Publications, New York, 1995

<sup>10</sup> In response to calls put forward by several UN members for a major revision of United Nations "peacekeeping" operations, to be submitted to the organisation's Millennium Summit in New York, Algerian foreign minister Lakhdar Brahimi was commissioned to draft what has become known as 'The Brahimi Report'. The report details recommendations on how the UN's capacity to undertake more effective peacekeeping operations can be strengthened in the future.

<sup>11</sup> See Ann M Fitz-Gerald, "Multinational Land Force Interoperability: Meeting the Challenge of Different Cultural Backgrounds on Chapter 6 Peace Support Operations," in *Choices*, Volume, Issue, July 2002.

<sup>12</sup> The UN's Special Representative in Sierra Leone continued diplomatic efforts to eventually bring all parties to sign an agreement at Lomé, Togo under which rebels would receive posts in government and assurances that they would not be prosecuted for war crimes. The agreement also called for a more expanded role for the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL). This resulted in the deployment of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which was mandated to implement the Lomé peace agreement and assist with DDR plan. In the 10 months that followed, efforts to keep the peace and rebuild the country's infrastructure were interrupted periodically by further rebel activity and unrest.

<sup>13</sup> The involvement of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in Bosnia and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) in Kosovo, provide other

examples of bilateral, as opposed to multilateral, international police intervention.

<sup>14</sup> Based on discussions with Inspector-General Keith Biddle, Sierra Leone Police Force, 30 January 2003.

<sup>15</sup> Julia Taft, Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery, UNDP, "From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts", IPA-UNDP workshop, *A Framework for Lasting Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Crisis Situations*, 12-13 December, 2002, German House, UN, New York.

<sup>16</sup> Based on discussions with Ambassador James Jonah, Senior Fellow at the Ralph Bunche Institute, New York and former Finance Minister, Sierra Leone, 1998-2001, 16 December 2002, New York.

<sup>17</sup> Based on discussions with Miroslav Filipovic, Head of the Defence and Security Committee, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's Parliament, Belgrade, 26 November 2002.