
UNCHARTED GROUND: CANADA, MIDDLE POWER LEADERSHIP, AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

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This paper examines Canada's role in the treaty to ban landmines as an innovative foreign policy process. In doing so, the Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal middle power typology is applied to Canada's leadership in the Ottawa Process which culminated in the signing of the historic treaty in December 1997. It is argued that Canada's leadership in the Ottawa Process was made possible through a synergy of states, international organizations, and a global network of non-governmental organizations. It is this new form of "public diplomacy" that the authors contend has redefined Canada's traditional approach to multilateralism. As a case study, important policy lessons can be extrapolated from this paper's analysis.

INTRODUCTION

The unprecedented and politically courageous effort to lead the ban on anti-personnel mines, culminating in the opening of the Ottawa Treaty in December 1997, brought to the fore Canada's international status in perhaps the most significant way since the Suez Crisis. On 5 October 1996, forty years after the efforts of Lester B. Pearson at the United Nations,¹ Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy made the now-famous challenge and invitation to "see a treaty signed no later than the end of 1997" (Axworthy 1996). By 4 December 1997, no fewer than 121 countries gathered in Ottawa to do just that, setting a record for the highest number of opening signatures for any treaty in history. The

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achievement of banning such a commonly used weapon was made possible through a partnership of states, international organizations, and a global network of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). It is this synergy that has effectively redesigned the rules of multilateralism. As a middle power with a long multilateralist tradition, Canada emerged first as a catalyst, and then as a manager-facilitator in a coalition that had grown exponentially in a short period of time.

This paper examines Canada's role in the treaty to ban landmines as an innovative foreign policy process and explains how these events point to the emergence of a new form of middle power international diplomacy. The paper begins with a discussion of the importance of multilateralism and functionalism to Canadian foreign policy. It then discusses how these characteristics provided Canada with an incentive and advantage to lead the Ottawa Process. The second section discusses the humanitarian nature of the landmine problem and explains how the non-governmental community was able to stimulate state action using the power of public opinion. This brief overview covers the period between the birth of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) in 1992 to the Review Conference of the Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Convention ending in May 1996. The third and final section uses an analytical framework to understand the concept of "public diplomacy" which emerged from the Ottawa Process. It examines how this new approach to diplomacy may set a precedent for the future conduct of international relations.

A CAPACITY TO LEAD: FUNCTIONALISM AND MULTILATERALISM IN CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Canada's relative position in the world, based on its population, economic strength, and military capability, has been a key determinant of its behavior as an international actor. The title "middle power" has been bestowed upon this country by most writers on the subject of Canadian foreign relations since the Second World War to describe its status with respect to other states within the international system. Cooper, Higgott and Nossal describe such states as those "occupying the 'middle' point in a range . . . usually measured by reference to such quantifiable attributes as area, population, size, complexity and strength of economy, military capability, and other comparable factors" (Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal 1993, 17). On the other hand, Cranford Pratt has used a more functionalist method to describe middle powers by their behavior. He grouped Canada with Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden as states

that are active supporters of the international community through the provision of more nationals to the international civil service, more military personnel to peace operations, and more funds to overseas development assistance through multilateral agencies than other countries. Overall, these states “have both the capacity and the will to play an important role on the international scene” (Pratt 1990, 14).


As a middle power, Canada’s greatest influence has been exercised multilaterally through its membership in various international institutions and organizations. In accordance with Pratt’s description, Canada’s foreign policy has been functionalist, in that it has deliberately focused on issues where it has had the greatest potential to exert influence in the international system. This section briefly examines multilateralism and functionalism as defining features of Canada’s foreign policy approach. It is argued that these characteristics assisted and motivated Canada to emerge as a leader in introducing an *avant-garde* approach to international diplomacy during the Ottawa Process.

Multilateralism

As a middle power, Canada possesses the ability to use its institutional membership to exert its influence on specific issues. The Canada 21 Council, a group of Canadian scholars and public officials brought together to examine the importance of the concept of “common security” to Canadian foreign policy, discussed the importance of multilateralism in its report *Canada and Common Security in the Twenty-First Century*. The Council claimed that “[c]ooperation with other nations and peoples is the only way that [Canada] can protect the quality of [Canadian] lives and environment, create and enhance opportunities for Canadians, and guarantee [their] security” (Canada 21 Council 1994, 12). In this regard, Canada’s interests and foreign policy objectives have been based largely on its need for cooperation in the international system. According to John Holmes, “[a]s a middle power, [Canada’s] role is more constructive if it is played not in isolation but in association with many other countries - with friends and allies and fellow members of the world community. For [Canadians], international associations and above all the United Nations, are of supreme importance. Without them we are impotent” (Holmes 1976, 13).

It can be argued that Canada’s support for multilateralism has been based largely on its own self-interests. Tom Keating contends that “Canadian support for multilateralism has not been an altruistic commitment to international order but a means of meeting vitally important

Figure 1 Concentric Circles of “Universal Multilateralism”



Source: The Authors

* Underlined countries represent G7 members

national objectives” (Keating 1993, 18). Thus, for Canada to wield influence and authority, the most effective medium is a cooperative and rules-based system whereby Canada’s strength is derived not from traditional sources such as its military capabilities or its economic status, but instead from its ability to generate ideas. What can be termed “universal multilateralism,” or the use of special channels of communication to reach a large number of states regardless of size or relative position in the international system, is available to Canada through a network of multi-lateral organizations that span the globe. *Figure 1* clearly illustrates Canada’s unique position at the crossroads of several prominent multilateral institutions.

Each organization represents a venue for diplomats to maximize Canada’s influence. They can both advertise policy in public statements and offer the chance to conduct bilateral deliberations in order to broker additional support or solidify established coalitions. This form of “universal multilateralism,” which provided Canada with the capacity to adopt a leadership role in the Ottawa Process, is discussed in greater detail in the third section of this paper.

FUNCTIONALISM

The functionalist view of Canadian foreign policy is closely tied to the concept of “niche diplomacy” whereby nations concentrate resources in the specific areas that offer the best returns. Evan Potter claims that niche diplomacy emerged as a response to the decline of resources available for states to address an increased number of foreign policy issues (Potter 1997, 25). Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, who argue that since the Second World War middle powers have directed their diplomatic attention towards spheres where they possess a high degree of resources and reputational qualifications, also advance this idea. This application by countries of issue-specific skills and capabilities is legitimized through the practice and rhetoric of functionalism (Cooper et al. 1993, 7).

This functionalist approach has increased Canada’s strength as a mediatory middle power and has emphasized the importance of cooperation, as well as technical and informational expertise. The importance of the latter attribute was highlighted by the Canada 21 Council’s conclusion that Canada, which draws on a wide range of instruments and resources, must rely on its social, human, and intellectual capital to carve out an influential role for itself in the international arena (Canada 21 Council 1994, 12). Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal argue that waning American hegemony has given way to alternative forms of leadership whereby “games of skill” have increasingly replaced “tests of will” (Cooper et al. 1993, 13). This emphasis on technical and entrepreneurial leadership refers to what Lloyd Axworthy has termed “soft power,” a concept which he argues must be cultivated and wielded by Canada if it is to emerge as an important and influential actor in the twenty-first century (Axworthy 1997, 192). This increasing need for non-traditional modes of diplomacy has enabled Canadian foreign policy-makers to create a niche for Canada’s capabilities and skills. Potter elucidates the value of this non-traditional form of diplomacy:

In the coming century, the values (multilateralism, civility, and tolerance), innovative ideas (legislative reform, Canada’s proposal for a standing United Nations rapid reaction force), and the solid research capabilities of Canada’s public and private sectors will set Canada’s foreign policy apart. Given Canada’s history of mediation, participation in major international agreements and regimes, and solid performance in assisting the developing world, the new post-Cold War landscape is ready made for it to flex its soft power muscle (Potter 1997, 34).

Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal’s book *Relocating Middle Powers* develops a new typology of middle powers based on three distinct categories of

foreign policy behavior. The first category involves the role that middle powers can play as catalysts by “providing intellectual and political energy to trigger an initiative” (Cooper et al. 1993, 24). A second category is that of facilitator whereby middle powers could adopt leadership roles in building coalitions around various issues. Such a role would involve “the planning, convening and hosting of formative meetings, the setting of priorities for future activities, and drawing up rhetorical declarations and manifestos” (Cooper et al. 1993, 24). Finally, the third category is that of a manager, where middle powers could actively participate in institution-building and play an integral role in the development of conventions and norms. This role requires the development of confidence-building measures and conflict resolution efforts “to alleviate misunderstandings through liaison efforts, shuttle diplomacy [and] the use of alternative formal and informal fora” (Cooper et al. 1993, 25). These three categories presented in Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal’s analytical framework are used in the third section of this paper to explain Canada’s role in the Ottawa Process. Before doing so, an overview and rationale for the international movement to ban landmines—specifically, the humanitarian nature of the problem and the interest of the non-governmental community—is necessary.

SETTING THE STAGE: INITIAL STEPS TOWARDS A BAN

While most arms control treaties are governed by established disarmament norms applicable to nation-states, the movement to ban landmines is unique because it gained considerable momentum as a humanitarian issue, driven largely by non-state actors. All the various treaties and conventions adopted throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, such as the Conventional Forces Europe Treaty, the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the Mutual Balanced Force Reductions Treaty, were derived from a state-centered concept based on the destabilizing effects of military proliferation. The landmine issue was devoid of such concerns. Consequently, the onus rested on the NGO community to pressure governments. This was done by establishing an international network of interest groups that created public sympathy by underscoring the humanitarian aspect of the problem through various publicity campaigns. They also appealed to governments by orchestrating mass letter-writing campaigns.

Despite the fact that landmines have been the subject of various forms of international activity since the 1970s, there was no international treaty regulating the manufacture, stockpiling, or sale of mines internationally, nor was there any verification or monitoring system to curtail use (Austin 1994, 21–24). International humanitarian law of armed conflict, governed by the Geneva Convention of 1949, builds upon the norm that the

use of indiscriminate weapons is unacceptable. Related to this is the international norm that certain types of weapons can be restricted or banned because of their inhumane nature, based on the amount of damage they inflict on the body, the permanency of injuries incurred, and the degree of control exercised by the user. Scholars of international treaty law cite the 1868 St. Petersburg Declaration (prohibiting the use of exploding bullets) and the more recent Chemical Weapons Treaty, as precedents that whole categories of such weapons can be banned (Goldblat 1996, 826–827). The only treaty law pertaining to landmines was Protocol II of the CCW Convention, which opened for signature in 1980.² It defines a “mine,” prohibits their indiscriminate use by setting rules on mapping and detectability, and outlaws the bounding and scatterable mine systems. However, the Protocol only covers the use of mines (as opposed to manufacture and sale) and fails to assign any responsibility for de-mining and compliance mechanisms.

The humanitarian nature of the landmine issue engendered popular support and was the focus of the NGO effort. Public opinion towards humanitarian crises has successfully shaped foreign policy in the past, as witnessed by the United Nations (UN) mission in Somalia in 1993, or more recently, the Canadian-led Multi-National Force intervention in Eastern Zaire in 1996. The simplicity of the issues surrounding a landmine ban ensured widespread comprehension, while the disturbing images and statistics galvanized public opinion and provoked state action. Aid workers from NGOs and international diplomats alike were well aware that the existing landmine regime was little more than a formality of international law, and could not easily be applied or enforced in countries like Cambodia, Afghanistan, Mozambique, and Angola. Landmines were no longer confined to the inventories of professional armies and employed in accordance with the CCW Convention.³ The vast majority of the devices on the market were being used by belligerents in internal conflicts, often with the specific purpose of terrorizing civilians, disrupting economies, and forcing relocation. As early as 1991, the NGOs and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) expressed their dissatisfaction with the shortcomings of the existing CCW regime, particularly with the lack of compliance mechanisms. What began as an appeal by five NGOs to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to pursue a total ban on anti-personnel landmines in 1991 quickly expanded in a flurry of activity as over 650 NGOs in three dozen countries formed the ICBL (Greenaway 1997, B1).

The debate over the utility of the CCW Convention provided the impetus for the international community to pursue a total ban on anti-

personnel mines. Despite concerted efforts by the ICBL to press for a total ban, governments opted for an incremental approach of convening a series of review conferences for the Convention. By the conclusion of the Third Session of the CCW Review Conference in Geneva in April and May 1996, it became clear that this incremental approach was insufficient. Fifty-one participating states had agreed to expand Protocol II's application to internal conflict. Nevertheless, many states began to concur with the NGO community that the restrictions placed on mines were insufficient in addressing the humanitarian concerns and that the protocol served merely to legitimize the use of the weapons (Lawson 1997, 18). By the end of the Review Conference, due to the lobbying efforts of the ICBL, an initial list of 29 states expressed their support for a total ban on anti-personnel mines. It therefore came as no surprise when it was announced that an International Strategy Conference would be convened that October. Fifty countries and eight international organizations including the UN, ICRC, and the European Union, met in Ottawa to discuss future actions towards a ban. Many nations resolved to "enhance their cooperation and coordination of efforts" to ensure "the earliest possible conclusion of a legally binding treaty" (Axworthy 1996). It was Canada's unexpected initiative, manifested in Foreign Minister Axworthy's invitation and challenge to the delegates for their return to Ottawa in 14 months that expedited progress towards the signing of a treaty.

While Axworthy's words met mixed reviews—ranging from supportive comments from the ICRC and NGO community to accusations from certain states that "Canada was grandstanding . . . and hi-jacking the process"—it could also be argued that Canada adopted an innovative and effective mode of diplomacy. This concept, based on the notion of "public diplomacy" is discussed in the next section. The Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal typology of facilitator, manager, and catalyst, referred to in the first section, is modified and applied to explain Canada's role in the Ottawa Process.

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: A STEP BEYOND TRADITIONAL MULTILATERALISM

The Global Conference to Ban Landmines in Ottawa on 2-4 December 1997—hosting an audience of 158 countries, 189 NGOs, and 13 international organizations—represented the culmination of an innovative diplomatic process that has effectively reshaped Canada's position in the international system. This section examines how Canada forged a network spanning multiple regimes, creating a strong link between state and non-state actors in civil society, and discusses Canada's leadership in forging the

new “public diplomacy.” Building on the concepts articulated by Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, this section will also analyze the public diplomacy approach followed throughout the short life-span of the Ottawa Process.

Although Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal apply their typology of middle power behavior directly to various case studies of Australian and Canadian leadership, this study adopts a modification of their typology in explaining Canada’s leadership in the landmine issue. It is argued that two out of the three stages of middle power behavior outlined in the model—catalyst and facilitator—apply directly to Canada’s role in the effort to ban landmines. However, one must have some misgiving about the authors’ third role of states in the typology—that of manager and institution-builder. The authors’ assumption that institutions are the sole vehicle for international relations is brought into question by the Canadian government’s decision not to institutionalize the Ottawa Process for fear of exclusivity.⁴ Finally, in applying this typology of middle power activity, an additional stage of behavior, that of a synergist, is used to discuss Canada’s leadership in pioneering a new approach to international diplomacy.

Canada as a Catalyst: Forging Links Between Like-Minded Nations and NGOs

Canada’s behavior as one of the key players during the Third Session of the CCW Review Conference during April and May 1996 paved the way to its eventual leadership role that became linked to the future success of the international campaign. This relates very closely to the view expressed by Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal that nations use intellectual and political capital to take the initiative and, in so doing, broker the diplomatic support of like-minded states (Cooper et. al. 1993, 24). The lack of progress in amending the CCW Convention brought groups together in a shared frustration and motivated a renewed effort towards a total ban. That last conference saw “NGO representatives and . . . pro-ban states explor[ing] the potential for opening a new track of diplomatic action on the anti-personnel mine issue” (Lawson 1997, 18).

The Quakers provided the venue for the first such “discrete meeting,” an informal dinner with representatives of 12 countries and a group of NGOs on 22 April 1996, with a view to developing a plan of action to ban landmines. One option was amending the CCW Convention; however, it was clear that little progress was being made so far, and no further amendments were likely. The second option favored the United Nations Conference on Disarmament (CD), an undoubtedly slow-moving process governed by the United States, Russia, and China (which were also mine-producing nations). The final option proposed a “Fast Track” concept

whereby a new forum would be developed specifically for the landmine campaign.⁵ Between the first meeting on 22 April and a subsequent meeting a week later, Canada exercised its political and diplomatic energy to quietly lobby states for support in the Ottawa Process (Greenaway 1997, B1-2). It became increasingly clear to the initial group of 29 states, including Canada, that while the *motivation* was present among the states pursuing a total ban, the essential *leadership*—traditionally advanced by the Great Powers—was non-existent. The United States, Russia, China, and the major European states of Britain, France, and Italy all had various vested interests in opting for the CCW regime or the slower Conference on Disarmament. This enabled Canada, as a middle power, to assume a key position. The quiet deliberations that took place between the various proponents of a ban culminated in the public announcement at the end of the Third Session of the CCW Review Conference on 3 May 1996 that Canada would host an International Strategy Conference to be held that autumn.


A combination of several factors paved the way to Canada agreeing to host the conference. First, there was a lack of interest displayed by principal powers in participating in, and much less hosting such a conference. Second, as demonstrated above, Canada enjoyed a unique position in the international system through its multilateral linkages, which enabled it to play an integral role in hosting the Strategy Conference. It should be noted that it was unknown at this time just how significant an impact the conference would have: both on the movement to ban landmines, and on the international community at large.

Canada as a Facilitator: Network-Building and Universal Multilateralism

The Canadian delegation's efforts to facilitate a meeting of minds, in the form of the Strategy Conference in Ottawa on 3–5 October 1996 provide an application of the facilitator concept identified in the Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal typology (Cooper et. al. 1993, 24). The mechanics of this process can be divided into four elements: (i) the task of building a network among NGOs and the ICRC and using this to practice "public diplomacy;" (ii) complementing this network with traditional diplomacy through bilateralism and multilateralism; (iii) setting the international agenda by announcing the ban treaty; and (iv) maintaining the momentum by convening conferences worldwide.

First, Canada and the ICBL undertook classic coalition-building, albeit with a modern twist of "public diplomacy." Instead of restricting participation to states, the ICBL leadership brought NGOs into the fold at the

Figure 2 State-NGO Network of Relationships



Source: The Authors

Ottawa Process as active and essential participants. The coalition formed in Ottawa forged a network that served the process well in subsequent months. The model in *Figure 2* summarizes this new approach and illustrates how states used formal linkages to work closely with NGOs, interest groups, and the general public to influence each “target state.”

The Canada-ICBL coalition developed at the Strategy Conference and the actors within each target country are illustrated by the rows; the columns represent state and NGO channels of communication. Most notable was the ICBL, which was able to coordinate de-mining and humanitarian NGOs worldwide.⁶ All exerted influence on target governments by appealing to the media and orchestrating letter-writing campaigns.

While this network of “public diplomacy” operated through the NGO community, a second element of Canada’s facilitator role involved dialogue with target states through the careful use of bilateral and multilateral diplomatic resources. While this newly formed NGO-state relationship exerted pressure on target governments by galvanizing public opinion at the grassroots level, Canada also utilized its diplomatic relations to pressure states through more traditional bilateral and multilateral channels at the international level. Bilateral pressure was exerted in routine deliberations with the creative use of *démarches* to foreign diplomats and briefing notes to Canadian overseas missions.⁷ Canadian officials were able to ensure that the landmine issue was on the agenda of every relevant and/or major international conference between October 1996 and December 1997.⁸ Overall, diplomats from Canada and like-minded countries made

effective use of bilateral deliberations at international conferences during the landmine campaign.

The third task as a facilitator involves agenda-setting, manifested in the landmine campaign by Axworthy's landmark "invitation and challenge" of 5 October 1996. Although perceived as spontaneous, these words had been the climax of a period of secret consultations between senior decision-makers at the national and international levels.⁹ Moreover, it became clear that if the landmine campaign's momentum and position on the international agenda was to be maintained, a deadline had to be imposed. The *true* purpose of the deadline was to stimulate international activity and progress in the regime, even if the deadline was passed.¹⁰ The task of setting the agenda for an initiative or "project" such as this requires a clear definition of an objective in order to maintain the focus. James Fuller, a prominent project management analyst, identifies a series of criteria that help define a project's objectives. Fuller concludes that a well-defined objective must contain an unequivocal statement of aim, a timeline of achievement, and clear language (Fuller 1997, 12–13). Mr. Axworthy's short objective statement fulfilled these criteria: "The challenge is to see a treaty banning mines signed no later than the end of 1997" (Axworthy 1996).

In order to successfully carry out its role as a facilitator Canada had to maintain the momentum of the campaign. Facilitation clearly goes beyond the description offered in the Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal typology as simply "planning, convening, and hosting formative meetings, setting priorities for future activity, and drawing up rhetorical declarations and manifestoes" (Cooper et al. 1993, 24). In the case of the landmine issue, the primary logic behind Axworthy's announcement at the October 1996 Strategy Conference was that the issue had to stay on the international agenda, or risk losing its salience.¹¹ Referring again to the principles of project management science, the use of milestones serves three purposes: first, they ensure the continued maintenance of the objective; second, they provide an opportunity for mid-course review and correction; finally, and most importantly, milestones ensure a continued momentum of effort (Fuller 1997, 36). These milestones took the form of a series of conferences throughout 1997: De-mining and Victim Assistance (Winnipeg: February); NGO Conference (Maputo: February); Mine Clearance Technology (Tokyo: March); Africa Experts (Johannesburg: May); Follow Up Strategy Conference (Brussels: June); Treaty Adoption (Oslo: September); and, finally, Treaty Signing and Mine Action Forum (Ottawa: December).

The four stages clearly show Canada adopting a facilitator role articulated by Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal in their study of middle power behavior. The next sub-section examines an addition made to the typology to suit the uniqueness of the landmine case. While the facilitator role describes Canada's activity with respect to the Ottawa Process, a third indicator of middle powers is the ability to influence the overall conduct of global interactions.

Canada as a Synergist: Redesigning the Rules of International Diplomacy

Although Canada's role as a catalyst and a facilitator was instrumental in bringing forward the landmine issue, the synergistic role it played in developing the NGO-state network into the emerging spirit of "public diplomacy" was even more important. Canada emerged as a leader in fundamentally altering the nature of international diplomacy. According to Jody Williams, coordinator of the ICBL, Canada was able to rise and meet the challenge it issued on 5 October 1996 because "it took the courage to work with this campaign [the International Campaign to Ban Landmines] . . . and to work with NGOs and UN agencies in partnership."¹² In an age where state institutions may no longer be the primary and sole mode of analysis in global affairs, where grassroots NGOs are bearing the brunt of humanitarian crises, and where sub-state political-militant groups are influencing the conduct of internal conflicts, state institutions are finding themselves increasingly unable to control the conduct of world affairs. The adoption of this new "public diplomacy," a partnership between states and non-state actors in the global system, is an answer to these realities.

It was Canada's facilitative and managerial efforts to bring together national governments, NGOs, individuals, and international agencies in a historical event (now commonly referred to as the Ottawa Process) that enhanced Canada's reputation as an international leader. This leadership role assumed by Canada was applauded by United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his inaugural speech at the opening of the landmine treaty to signature: "It is only right that the convention marking the signing of this landmark treaty be opened in Ottawa . . . because of Canada's leadership position in formulating this treaty" (Annan 1997). This partnership and non-traditional mode of diplomacy, reflected in Canada's approach and leadership in the Ottawa Process, has enabled middle powers to carve out niches for themselves in the international system.¹³ This pioneering approach of public diplomacy, and Canada's

leadership in its conduct, culminated in the signing of a global treaty to ban landmines by 121 nations.¹⁴ Bob Lawson, one of the Ottawa Process' chief architects, wrote:

At a time when a growing number of challenges require rapid and effective responses, the success of the Ottawa Process holds open the hope that multilateral diplomacy will continue to flourish as an adaptable and popular instrument of global governance (Lawson 1993, 23).

A question arising from the treaty is whether Canada's foreign policy during the Ottawa process was merely a response to a timely and captivating issue, or if its traditional foreign policy approach has been fundamentally and irreversibly altered. Therefore, in the final section of this paper, the adaptability and transferability of this "new diplomacy" to other emerging international issues is discussed.

CONCLUSION: THE SHAPE OF DIPLOMACY TO COME?

It has been demonstrated throughout this paper that Canada's success in the landmine campaign was a result of its activity as a middle power within the international system. Drawing from, and building upon, its multilateralist foreign policy tradition, Canada was able to forge a partnership between states and NGOs in order to accelerate the signing of the Ottawa Treaty. While Canada's efforts in facilitating and hosting this process have been regarded as a development that challenges the rules governing state interactions, the question arises as to whether this will set a precedent for the shape of diplomacy to come. Perhaps the landmine issue was an isolated case and Canada's activity during the Ottawa Process will never be repeated. One can only speculate at this early stage in the wake of the Ottawa Treaty whether this new form of diplomacy and middlepowermanship will be applied to other issues.

Axworthy's landmine campaign might well represent an exception rather than a rule of Canadian diplomacy. As articulated in the first section of this paper, it was the humanitarian nature of the issue that contributed to the success of the campaign. Therefore, it can be argued that international political support was relatively simple to broker once states were convinced that the military utility of the devices was in question. Valerie Warmington of Mines Action Canada admits that the ban campaign dealt with "a narrowly-defined issue which can be easily focused on and seen as an achievable objective."¹⁵ That being the case, it may be that on an issue-specific level alone, the landmine success may be merely a single event in which Canada played a key role.

On the other hand, the use of “public diplomacy” as a uniquely Canadian foreign policy tool may be the beginning of a process-oriented trend. The landmine campaign has forged connections and networks between states and non-state actors that may never have existed before. Given the new realities of global affairs, in which states are but one actor in an increasingly complex system, this reengineering of the way these actors interact provides compelling possibilities for the future.

A possible issue to which these networks and processes may apply is that of preventive diplomacy. The Rwandan disaster of 1994 ignited a flurry of activity to develop mechanisms to identify and act upon violent internal conflict before the outbreak of hostilities.¹⁶ There exists a plethora of definitions and conceptual frameworks of preventive diplomacy currently in circulation. However, a consensus exists that states, NGOs, regional organizations, and the United Nations must work together as partners in order to obtain adequate early warning of impending social unrest.

Whether Canada will take a leadership role in spearheading that preventive diplomacy effort, or whether another middle power, such as Sweden, will follow the example set by Canada, remains to be seen. Exactly who adopts the trends and methods pioneered in the Ottawa Process may be irrelevant. What is important is that the Ottawa Treaty was able to prevail despite the notable absence of the United States, Russia, and China. This set a precedent in demonstrating that major international events are no longer solely determined by the leadership of the Great Powers. What is strikingly evident in these events is that a new forum of global interactions, one that expands upon but does not preclude traditional state-to-state diplomacy and invites non-state actors to join the middle powers as major players in the international system, has now emerged.

Notes

¹For his efforts in the United Nations to bring an end to the Suez Crisis in October 1956 by dispatching an international force of peacekeepers, Lester B. Pearson (the Canadian ambassador to the UN) was later awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

²Full title: *Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects*. Opened for signature at the United Nations in April 1980. Entered into force: December 1983. Number of signatories as of July 1996: 55.

³Despite this commonly publicized view that landmines were to be utilized in a defensive capacity and in accordance with international

norms, it can be demonstrated that the weapons had primarily an offensive mission in Western armed forces. The rapid development of air-delivered scatterable smart mines such as the “Gator” in the late 1980s enabled NATO to sow hundreds of unmarked minefields behind enemy lines in order to wreak havoc in rear areas. See Lt. Gen. (retired) Robert Gard, “The Military Utility of Anti-Personnel Mines.” A presentation at the conference *An Agenda for Action: A Global Ban on Landmines*, Ottawa: 2-4 December 1997; and International Committee of the Red Cross, *Anti-Personnel Landmines: Friend or Foe? A Study on the Military Use and Effectiveness of Anti-Personnel Mines* (ICRC 1997, 15-16).

⁴The question of institutionalizing the Ottawa Process at the UN or through regional organizations was raised during a seminar given by Ralph Lysychyn and Jill Sinclair at the Lester B. Pearson Building, Ottawa: 14 October 1997. Mr. Lysychyn is the Director-General of the International Security Bureau; and Ms. Sinclair is the Director of the Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division; both at the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

⁵Interview in Ottawa with Mr. David Atwood of the Quaker United Nations Office, 5 December 1997.

⁶The channels included daily telephone conversations and frequent meetings. Source: interview with Ms. Celina Tuttle of Mines Action Canada.

⁷*A Governmental Perspective of the Ottawa Process*: a presentation delivered by Mark Gwozdecky at Carleton University: 28 October 1997. Mr. Gwozdecky is the Deputy-Director of the Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament Division (IDA) of the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

⁸*Ibid.*

⁹The initiative had been developed in secret on 4 October by several senior Canadian Foreign Affairs Department (DFAIT) officials, then discussed with the Canadian Permanent Representative to the United Nations Mission in New York, followed by Minister Axworthy, the Prime Minister, and the United Nations Secretary-General. Finally, the heads of the ICRC and the ICBL were consulted. Source: Interview with a DFAIT official, Ottawa: November 1997.

¹⁰Source: interviews with Ms. Celina Tuttle, Mines Action Canada and Mr. Mark Gwozdecky.

¹¹Source: *A Governmental Perspective of the Ottawa Process*, a presentation delivered by Mark Gwozdecky at Carleton University: 28 October 1997.

¹²Taken from a speech by Jody Williams at Carleton University, Ottawa, 3 November 1997.

¹³For a discussion on niche roles for middle powers, see Andrew F. Cooper, In Search of Niches: Saying 'Yes' and Saying 'No' in Canada's International Relations, *Canadian Foreign Policy* 3 (Winter 1995), pp.1–13.

¹⁴List of signatories to the landmine treaty as of 17.00, 4 December 1997 (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade).

¹⁵Interview, Ottawa: 28 October 1997.

¹⁶See for example, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping in the Post-Cold War Era*, (New York: United Nations, 1992); Gareth Evans, *Cooperating for Peace: A Global Agenda for the 1990s*, (Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1993); and Michael Lund, *Preventing Violent Conflicts*, (Washington: United States Institute for Peace, 1996).

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