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Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
‘Future Plays Will Depend On How The Next One Works’: Franklin Roosevelt And The Canadian Legation Discussions Of January 1938
Dr. Galen Perras, Dept of History, University of Ottawa
Abstract
On 12 December 1937, Japanese aircraft sank the USS Panay near Nanking, China, killing several sailors. When the American Cabinet met five days later, Secretary of the Navy Claude Swanson made it quite clear that he “wants war and he wants it right away.” Though a self-described pacifist, as Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes believed conflict with Japan was “inevitable sooner or later,” he opined “isn’t this the best possible time” with the Japanese mired in their war with China? But President Franklin Roosevelt “didn’t want to have to go to war” to restrain Japan. Instead, he suggested an Anglo-American naval blockade to bring Japan “to her knees within a year.” In his diary, Ickes averred he would not be “greatly surprised” if America was not already talking with Britain and France about restraining the “bandit” nations of Germany, Italy, and Japan. 1 Ickes was closer to the mark than he knew. Recalling that the Royal Navy and the United States Navy (USN) had undertaken staff conversations prior to 1917, the President had informed Britain’s Ambassador on 16 December that he desired new naval staff talks. As Ronald Lindsay told the Foreign Office, Roosevelt backed an Anglo-American blockade that would cut off vital imported raw materials after Japan’s “next grave outrage.” Although Lindsay opposed a blockade, staff talks had appeal for Lindsay had proposed exchanging military information with Washington the previous March. Secretary of Foreign Affairs Anthony Eden told Lindsay on 20 December that Britain would “be delighted to receive the officer” selected by Roosevelt. Six days later, the USN’s Captain Royal Ingersoll left for London to investigate naval cooperation if America and Britain had to confront Japan.