

STRENGTHENING THE RELATIONSHIP: NORAD EXPANSION AND CANADA COMMAND

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Introduction

The three exigencies of Canadian defence policy have traditionally been the defence of Canada, cooperation with the United States (US) to ensure the defence of North America, and selected contributions to operations aimed at maintaining international peace and stability. However, a consequence of the increasingly globalized and interwoven world has been the blurring of the boundaries between these three broad geo-strategic imperatives. Events in other regions can, and frequently do, have immediate and significant ramifications in North America. Thus, the traditional approach of looking at the Canadian Force's (CF) principal defence roles of domestic, continental, and international operations in isolation is no longer appropriate. In many ways, these traditional roles have merged and are now interdependent layers in the nation's defence. Domestic security is increasingly related to continental security, which is, to a degree, contingent on international security.

The threats to this security now come from a wider range of sources, and meeting these challenges effectively requires a fundamental change in the posture of a nation's armed forces. Despite the claims of many analysts that with the end of the Cold War, a more peaceful era fuelled by liberal democracy and the triumph of the free market over communism would spread throughout the world, conflict and international

strife have remained enduring features of the post-Cold War security environment.¹ Recent events, such as the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States and the 7 July 2005 London bombings, have brought this strife directly to western societies, and have demonstrated the link between international and domestic security and stability. One need only visualize the implications to this country of a terrorist act perpetrated on the US that originated from Canada, or used it as a springboard from which to attack, to see the inextricable link between domestic and continental security.

Despite the increasingly interrelated nature of domestic, continental, and international security, the fundamental nature of conflict has not changed. It will continue to be characterized by a violent clash of wills pulled between Clausewitz's 'paradoxical' trinity of primordial violence, hatred and enmity, the play of chance and probability, and the rationality of policy.² What has changed, however, is the typical means by which conflict is carried out. The spectrum of conflict will still range from inter-state and intra-state warfare to asymmetric threats to Canada or the North American continent from trans-national terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda, which have both the ability and the willingness to cause a level of destruction once reserved solely for nation-states.³ Indeed, the latter are presently far more likely, and in many

¹ John Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday. The Obsolescence of Major War* (New York: Basic Books, 1989), pp. 240-242; Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest*, Summer 1989, available at http://www.marion.ohio-state.edu/fac/vsteffel/web597/Fukuyama_history.pdf#search='the%20end%20of%20history%20the%20national%20interest'; Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992); John Keegan, *A History of Warfare* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1993), pp. 378-385; Niall Ferguson, *The Cash Nexus. Money and Power in the Modern World, 1700-2000* (New York: Basic Books, 2001), pp. 395-425; Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 71 (Summer 1993), pp. 22-49; Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), and perhaps the most concise criticism, Joseph Nye, "What New World Order?" *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 71 No.2, (Spring 1993), pp. 83-96.

² Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. M. Howard and P. Paret, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 89.

³ The number of casualties suffered on 11 September 2006 was 2,986, including the 19 hijackers (number taken from Wikipedia online at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/September_11,_2001_attacks#Victims_and_damage). The number of casualties suffered during the Pearl Harbour attack of 7 December 1941 was 2,388 (number taken from USS Arizona Memorial website at <http://www.nps.gov/usar/phcas.html>.)

ways are more difficult to defend against. The nightmare scenario of a terrorist attack employing weapons of mass destruction has forced western societies to view their national security in a new light, including enhancing law enforcement and other domestic security practices, and also to draw stronger links between the military and lead civil authorities.⁴

It seems unlikely that any country would attempt to defeat the current terrorist threat through improving domestic security alone. Rather, there is a demonstrated preference to both improve homeland security while at the same time seeking to eliminate the sanctuaries of the world's failed and failing states that terrorists use as bases from which to train and launch attacks. Failing to deal with both areas leads to the dynamic Anthony Cordesman has described as 'squeezing the balloon', by which squeezing one area causes another to expand.⁵ Focusing solely on domestic defence, for example, merely pushes the attackers to the relatively safe havens where they can train and seek to exploit the seams in even the most robust domestic defence. A more fitting strategy must give appropriate attention to the defence of the homeland while engaging potential adversaries overseas.

⁴ Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II, *Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2001), pp. 9–12; *The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets* (Washington: The White House, 2003), available at: http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/Physical_Strategy.pdf; Richard A. Falkenrath, "Problems of Preparedness. US Readiness for a Domestic Terrorist Attack," *International Security* Vol. 25 No. 4 (Spring 2001), pp. 147–86; US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, *Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Assessing the Risks*, OTA-ISC-559 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 9–11; Thomas J. Badey, "Nuclear Terrorism: Actor-based Threat Assessment," *Intelligence and National Security* 16, 2 (Summer 2001), pp. 39–45; Brian M. Jenkins, "Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?" *Orbis* 29, 3 (Autumn 1985), pp. 507–516; J. Carson Mark, Theodore Taylor *et al.*, "Can Terrorists Build Nuclear Weapons?" available online at <http://www.nci.org/k-m/makeab.htm>.

⁵ Anthony H. Cordesman, *Overview: Defending America. Redefining the Conceptual Borders of Homeland Defence* (12 December 2000). Cordesman's Report is available on the website of the Center for Strategic and International Studies at <http://www.csis.org/homeland/reports/overprininvestnmd.pdf>

The proximity of this country to the US, as well as the shared cultural and economic ties, pose unique and far-reaching problems for Canadian policy-makers, and for the CF, but also considerable advantages. Given the imperative of maintaining close ties with the US, the CF and other security partners must not only protect Canada, but also contribute, and be perceived to be contributing, to the broader security of North America.⁶ One of the “great challenges confronting Canada in the years ahead will be defining an appropriate strategy that can deal with the shifts in US strategic focus as it responds perceived threats to its interests.”⁷ Following the 11 September attacks on the US, there was an understandable increase in the importance of homeland security, and a concomitant increase in continental security cooperation. As the focus to the elimination of the sanctuaries for terrorists – either tacitly, as was argued before the invasion of Iraq in 2003, or in the context of a failing state – the US will expect strong allies to be prepared and capable of participating in ‘coalitions of the willing.’ A critical aspect of dealing effectively with these shifts in focus, and in the successful defence of Canada and contributing to the defence of North America, will be the maintenance, expansion, and streamlining of the military and civilian network connectivity that Canada shares with the US. Moreover, also critical will be the formalization of a strong presence at appropriate positions in the evolving NORAD/USNORTHCOM fusion centres in Colorado Springs, and potentially elsewhere, in order to ensure that

⁶ Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, *In the National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy in an Insecure World* (Ottawa: Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2003), pp. 15-23.

⁷ Peter Johnston and Dr. Michael Roi, *The Future Security Environment 2025*, (Ottawa: DOR (CORP) PR 2003/14, 2003), p.31; Department of National Defence, *Canadian Forces Strategic Operating Concept*, (Draft 4.5A, 15 December 2004), p. 9.

information and intelligence of value to Canada alone is not lost amid the concerns of our powerful ally.⁸

Canada/US Defence Relationship

Following the outbreak of the Second World War, in the context of heightened anxiety about continental security, Canada and the US established the Permanent Joint Board on Defence (PJBD).⁹ The main focus of the PJBD during the war was to facilitate cooperation in infrastructure projects and defence production, and continues to be the highest level of the numerous bilateral defence fora between the two countries. To get a sense of the breadth and depth of this important defence relationship, one only has to consider that there are more than 80 treaty-level defence agreements between Canada and the United States, as well as more than 250 MOUs between the two defence departments, and roughly 145 bilateral fora in which Canada/US defence issues are discussed.¹⁰ The broad range of threats posed by the security environment facing Canada and its key ally require a closer coordination of all environments of defence and the efforts of the other security partners in both nations, in order to eliminate the seams that currently exist between the air, land, and sea domains. The stand-up of Canada Command (CanadaCOM) on 1 February 2006 was an important step in the evolution of this important and complex defence relationship. As will be shown later, there is still a

⁸ The term 'fusion centre' refers to on or more centres where all available intelligence and information is fused with reports from naval ships and aircraft conducting operations. This information provides enhanced situational awareness for decision-makers. See Captain (N) Peter Avis, "Surveillance and Canadian Maritime Domestic Security," *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 4, No. 1, (Spring 2003), p. 4.

⁹ Peter Haydon, *The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Canadian Involvement Reconsidered*, (Toronto: Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1993), p. 68; DND Backgrounder, *The Permanent Joint Board on Defence*, available at http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=298.

¹⁰ Brad Gladman and Michael Roi, "Defence Commitment – Capability Gap Analysis", Version 3, 01 October 2004, p.1.

role for the bi-national NORAD agreement in the context of an increasingly bilateral military relationship.

NORAD. The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) is a bi-national military organization originally established in 1958 to monitor and defend North American airspace. Employing data from ground based radars and satellites, NORAD provides surveillance and control of the airspace of Canada and the United States from aircraft, missiles, and space vehicles.

The NORAD Agreement was first signed by the governments of Canada and the United States on 12 May 1958, and has been continually renewed for different periods ever since. Although "...there have been eight NORAD renewals since 1958, the basic text of the Agreement has been revised substantially only three times — in 1975, 1981 and 1996."¹¹ Following the events of 11 September 2001, a joint US-Canadian operation called operation 'Noble Eagle' was developed and launched in order to enhance the protection of North American airspace. This operation has forced the CF and US forces to monitor and intercept flights of interest within continental North America, regardless of their origin. In Canada, this has involved the Canadian NORAD Region (CANR) in Winnipeg, Manitoba, as well as "...the Sector Headquarters in North Bay, Ontario, the Canadian CF-18 forces in Cold Lake, Alberta, and Bagotville, Quebec, air-to-air refuellers from Winnipeg, and Mobile Radar Forces from Cold Lake and Comox, British Columbia."¹²

¹¹ Government of Canada, *NORAD History*, available at http://www.canadianally.com/ca/nasec/norad_hist-en.asp.

¹² *Chief of the Defence Staff Annual Report 2001-2002*, available at http://www.cds.forces.gc.ca/pubs/anrpt2002/AnnexA_e.asp.

This is a fundamental shift in posture from the traditional focus on air threats originating outside the continent, and although the procedures governing the interception and possible destruction of civilian aircraft are well established, they are contingent on the immediate availability of key political leaders who may be unavailable. Given the political sensitivity surrounding such an incident, it seems unlikely that the procedure for responding to a 'Noble Eagle' event will change. However, it makes sense, from a military perspective, to examine the role of the Commander of CanadaCOM in this operation when the CDS is absent, and how the decision-making procedure for a Canadian only 'Noble Eagle' event would be accomplished when political leaders are unavailable. Indeed, given the eventual evolution of the National Defence Command Centre (NDCC) into a strategic situational awareness centre, one could argue that the Commander of CanadaCOM will possess better situational awareness than NDCC, especially on resources available for consequence management. As such, one could also argue that it is more fitting for the Commander of CanadaCOM to act on behalf of the CDS in communicating the situation to the MND and Prime Minister, and ensuring that immediate action is taken in response to their decisions.

A recent incident illustrates the importance of developing a strong CanadaCOM presence in NORAD, as well as the need to coordinate the component parts of the response to threats to Canadian security and defence. On 3 June 2005, Canadian CF-18 fighter jets intercepted a Virgin Atlantic Airbus A340 aircraft over the Atlantic in

response to a 'Noble Eagle' scramble caused by a hijacking transponder code (7500) being entered into the Virgin Atlantic Airbus' transponder.¹³ It was later revealed that the code was mistakenly entered, and no military intervention was required. Indeed, the response to this incident worked quite well. The CF-18s intercepted the jet in time to avert a more serious incident, and it was escorted to Halifax where a police response unit was prepared to meet it. The CF counter-terrorist unit (JTF 2) was alerted, and would have been in place if required. However, the commander of CF Joint Task Force Atlantic (JTFA), Rear Admiral McNeil, learned of the incident through his maritime operations staff that was watching CNN.¹⁴ With the lack of a sufficiently powerful Canadian voice responsible for domestic operations and speaking on behalf of Canada, there seems to have been little option but to divert the aircraft to a Canadian airport as opposed to an American airport. Still, had the aircraft crashed or had to be shot down on approach to Halifax, the commander of JTFA would quickly be required to provide assistance to the lead civil authorities, and his lack of forewarning (although not a problem in this instance) could have had serious consequences.

Maritime Warning. Potential adversaries could exploit the seams that currently exist between Canadian and American maritime warning. Moreover, there are additional seams between the maritime and aerospace domains that could also be exploited. An example illustrating the seams that exist between the two distinct, at this stage, maritime and aerospace domains would be a vessel of interest presenting a cruise

¹³ CBC News Online Staff, "Jet leaves Halifax after false hijack alert", 3 June 2005, available at http://www.cbc.ca/story/canada/national/2005/06/03/airplane-diverted050603.html?GXHC_GX_jst=90c78ae4662d6164&GXHC_gx_session_id=8f835e6252cfb411&

missile threat heading into Canadian waters. This vessel of interest potentially affects both domains, as the vessel itself is a potential maritime threat, while the cruise missile element may develop into an aerospace threat. In the current reality, however, the response to a maritime threat would come from CanadaCOM and USNORTHCOM, while the response to the aerospace threat would be initiated through NORAD. Both responses are dependant upon accurate intelligence and information, but, as has always been the case, this information must reach those who can use it in time to respond effectively. Thus, CanadaCOM, USNORTHCOM, and NORAD need to know about this vessel as far distant as possible in order to ensure an appropriate response. Indeed, the earliest warning may come through the evolving NORAD/USNORTHCOM fusion centre, and thus CanadaCOM must have an appropriate presence in whatever form this fusion centre takes to ensure that it is adequately forewarned of potential threats.

USNORTHCOM, CanadaCOM, and NORAD. The stand-up of USNORTHCOM on 1 October 2002 saw the reorganization of the homeland defence missions performed by other Department of Defence organizations under a single command whose role is homeland defence and civil support. USNORTHCOM provides command and control of Department of Defense homeland defence efforts and works to establish strong ties with other security partners to ensure a timely and effective response to a variety of challenges.¹⁵ The specific mission statement of the command is to conduct

¹⁴ This report was passed along to CDS Action Team 1 analysts by Col. Kampman during an O Group on 8 June 2005. It was later confirmed to the author in an e-mail from RAdm McNeil, Commander of Maritime Forces Atlantic and JTFA.

¹⁵ US Northern Command information available online at http://www.USNORTHCOM.mil/about_us/about_us.htm.

operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within the assigned area of responsibility; and as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, provide defense support of civil authorities including consequence management operations.¹⁶

NORAD's role, on the other hand, is to provide surveillance and control of the airspace of Canada and the United States from aircraft, missiles, or space vehicles.¹⁷

USNORTHCOM shares a Commander with NORAD, although the deputy commanders of both NORAD and USNORTHCOM are different, and an operations centre in Cheyenne mountain Colorado.¹⁸ Moreover, many of the resources are shared, and much of the staff works for both commands. Indeed, it seems this trend will be continued with the amalgamation of at least the J5 (Plans and Policy) directorates of NORAD and USNORTHCOM, but possibly also the J3 (Operations) directorates.¹⁹ Given the presence of Canadian officers in many NORAD directorates, including both the J5 and J3 directorates, and suggested changes to the operations centre, there may be an opportunity to use NORAD as a bi-national conduit to bring CanadaCOM and USNORTHCOM closer together. If the merger and other changes occur, there may be an elimination of the barriers between US domestic and continental operations. For example, Canadian officers would be attached to these combined NORAD/USNORTHCOM directorates, and in the context of possible changes to the operations centre setup it would be impractical to restrict them to NORAD only

¹⁶ US Northern Command Mission Statement, available at http://www.USNORTHCOM.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=s.who_mission.

¹⁷ *Terms of Reference for the North American Aerospace Defence Command*, 9 September 1996, pp. 1-2.

¹⁸ Joseph T. Jockel, *Four US Military Commands: USNORTHCOM NORAD, SPACECOM, STRATCOM — The Canadian Opportunity*, (Montreal: IRPP Working Paper Series no 2003-03, 2003), p.2.

¹⁹ Conversation between Dr. Brad Gladman and Colonel Mike Hache, DWH(Pol), on 15 March 2006.

operations. From this perspective, combining these two directorates has the potential to provide a unique window through which CanadaCOM could gain a better appreciation of USNORTHCOM's plans and method of operation. This would likely mean a concomitant improvement in the efficiency and effectiveness of a combined response to domestic and continental threats.

The stand-up of CanadaCOM on 1 February 2006 is an important step in the evolution of the Canadian and American defence relationship. CanadaCOM's mission, at this stage, is to conduct both routine and contingency operations with the exception of those executed under the direct command of the CDS or NORAD.²⁰ CanadaCOM is thus the national operational authority for the defence of Canada and North America, and is the primary operational military link with USNORTHCOM and NORAD.²¹

Similar to the mission of USNORTHCOM, CanadaCOM's mission is to conduct operations to detect, deter, prevent, pre-empt, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at Canada within its area of responsibility. This area of responsibility includes not just Canada, but reflecting the interrelated nature of domestic and continental security, also includes the continental United States, Alaska, Mexico, and the approaches to this territory.²² Understanding that the CF is often not the first responder to domestic security events, CanadaCOM will, when requested, provide military assistance to civil authorities in order to protect and defend Canada.²³ Detecting and responding appropriately to threats and aggression aimed at Canada, or indeed the North American

²⁰ 1950-2-4 CFTT/DTP 18 October 2005, *Concept of Operations: CF Strategic Command* (paragraphs 10 and 11).

²¹ Department of National Defence, *Canada Command Concept of Operations* (Draft document dated 3 April 2006), p.1-1.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

continent, requires the ability to develop situational awareness on threats as far distant as possible in order to have the time to determine and implement the best response.

Given the reliance on US sources for the development of this situational awareness, there is a need to formalize the Canadian presence within the evolving NORAD/USNORTHCOM fusion centre in order to preserve the access to sources Canada would find difficult or impossible to recreate. Moreover, CanadaCOM must also ensure that appropriate linkages are established within Canada to exploit sources that can feed information of use to both CanadaCOM and also NORAD/USNORTHCOM.

Fusion Centre. In order to strengthen domestic and continental security and eliminate gaps in the North American security network that adversaries targeting Canadian and American vulnerabilities might exploit, CanadaCOM must synchronize its efforts with and provide support to its Canadian security partners, as well as work in close partnership with US defence agencies. Of particular importance to the impending NORAD renewal, preceding its May 2006 expiry, is the need to maintain the unique access to the integrated sensing and warning assets inherent in NORAD, as well as the coordination of effort and joint planning that are part of this long-standing bi-national defence organization. In the context of a NORAD that is poised to expand to include a maritime warning mission in addition to its current mission for aerospace defence and missile warning (see [Figures 1-3](#)), CanadaCOM needs a strong voice in the design and functioning of the intelligence fusion centre in order to ensure that issues of importance to Canada are not lost amongst those of its powerful ally.²⁴

²⁴ The author does not believe that these courses of action are likely to be palatable to the forces on either side of the border. They do, however, reflect the broad range of possible directions this fusion centre or centres might take. Maritime and Air

The Combined Intelligence Fusion Centre (CIFC) was originally designed to serve the NORAD command requirements – to provide air intelligence to NORAD. With the standup of USNORTHCOM, and the sharing of resources and staff between the two commands, the role of the CIFC has evolved. It currently conducts aerospace intelligence fusion for NORAD, and all-domain intelligence fusion for USNORTHCOM. The recent establishment of a USNORTHCOM Joint Intelligence Operation Centre (JIOC), which will absorb the CIFC, is likely the first step in the evolution of the fusion capability for NORAD/USNORTHCOM. At the time this paper was written, there were three CF officers operating under the Bi-national Planning Group (BPG) mandate working at both CIFC and the USNORTHCOM operations centre that brought together Canadian and US maritime awareness. For example, a CF maritime intelligence analyst from the Bi-national Planning Group (BPG) was attached to the NORAD/USNORTHCOM CIFC to provide the National Defence Command Centre (NDCC), which has largely been replaced by the CanadaCOM Joint Command Centre (JCC), with combined information on vessels of interest.²⁵ This effort, though laudable and essential to meeting the challenges posed by the security environment, has yet to be formalized and was essentially personality-driven.²⁶ In order to ensure that this relationship is not lost as the fusion centre evolves (see [figures 1-3](#) for potential options on how this might occur), a formalization of this relationship through a mutual

intelligence and operational information fusion will either be conducted largely separately, or in varying degrees of combination. Thus, the course of action decided upon will be a variant of these three broad thrusts.

²⁵ Lieutenant-General Rick Findley and Lieutenant General Joe Inge, "North American Defence and Security in the After math of 9/11," *Canadian Military Journal*, Vol. 6, No. 1, (Spring 2005), p. 14.

²⁶ Conversation between Dr. Brad Gladman, Mr. Bob Burton, and Major Alan Fitzgerald of the BPG on 9 September 2005.

agreement is required. Moreover, given the simultaneously rapid evolution of the CF command and control structure, there is a risk of losing what the CF and the Government of Canada take for granted – and would find difficult and expensive to duplicate – the access to intelligence gathered, analysed, and disseminated to the CF through the NORAD agreement.




Figure 1




Figure 2




Figure 3

The implications of failing to maintain and enhance the connectivity enjoyed by both countries are not difficult to envision. One of the greatest risks is the loss of preparation time to respond to potential threats. USNORTHCOM's area of responsibility (AOR) includes the air, land, and sea approaches and encompasses the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, and the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles. Moreover, USNORTHCOM has links to its adjacent combatant commands (USPACOM, USSOUTHCOM, and USEUCOM), and receives intelligence from these commands on vessels or aircraft of interest that may enter the USNORTHCOM (or indeed the CanadaCOM) AOR. Through this layered system of domestic defence, USNORTHCOM is able to receive early notification of aircraft or vessels of interest in time to ensure an appropriate response from either the military or civilian authorities, depending upon the circumstances. From the Canadian perspective, it is essential to develop a strong Canadian presence within the evolving fusion centre at NORAD/USNORTHCOM, complete with formalized relationships and operating procedures that ensure the swift transfer (in both directions) of intelligence of interest to both CanadaCOM and USNORTHCOM.

To illustrate the need for a formalized relationship, one need only envisage a vessel originating, for example, in the USPACOM AOR whose destination is the port of Vancouver. Although the vessel will enter the USNORTHCOM AOR, its final destination is of greater concern to CanadaCOM and its domestic security partners.

Without a strong Canadian presence at appropriate positions in the NORAD/USNORTHCOM structure, there is a risk that this intelligence may not reach the appropriate Canadian authorities in time to develop a suitable response. There is work currently underway to reorganize the intelligence positions in Colorado Springs to meet effectively the new operational requirements. [Figure 4](#) identifies the key CF intelligence functions required at Colorado Springs.²⁷




Figure 4

Moreover, the connectivity issues must be sorted out to ensure that this information can be transferred quickly to those who can act on it, mindful of security requirements and the need to protect sources.

There are a number of practical connectivity issues, both between Canada and the US and internal to the CF, that must be addressed to ensure commanders are able

²⁷ Department of National Defence, "Canadian Intelligence Presence In Colorado Springs Concept Of Operation," (Draft

to act decisively in a timely fashion to a variety of situations. The current Information Technology (IT) architecture is not adequate to permit access to Canadian information to execute all the new Canadian intelligence duties such as land/border, maritime, air, asymmetric threat, Counterintelligence and [as applicable] Law Enforcement information in order to properly support the NORAD and Canada COM mission in this new threat environment.²⁸

Moreover, there are some significant gaps in information sharing arrangements that have the potential to cause military responsiveness and effectiveness problems if not addressed. For example, the means by which Top Secret information can be shared between Canada and the United States is, at this stage, somewhat convoluted. As well, there are technical restrictions that hamper the legitimate sharing of Secret information between the two countries.²⁹

These connectivity difficulties are enhanced by policies that have numerous mechanisms to inhibit information sharing, but few facilitators, and organizational “cultures and negative inertia that nurture a “need-to-know” vice a “need-to-share” mentality.”³⁰ Compounding these problems is the tendency to incorrectly classify material, or use default classifications that for no good reason restrict the flow of

document v10, 8 Nov 05), p. 4.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Canada Command HQ OR Team & Major R. Leroux (J6), *Visualization of Military Networks Connecting NORAD/NORTHCOM to Canadian Sites of Interest*, (29 September 2005), slides 10-11; Bi-National Planning Group, *The Final Report on Canada and the United States (CANUS) Enhanced Military Cooperation*, (Peterson AFB, Colorado, 13 March 2006), pp. 18-20.

³⁰ Bi-National Planning Group, *The Final Report on Canada and the United States (CANUS) Enhanced Military Cooperation*, pp. 17-18.

information between Canada and the United States.³¹ The first step in overcoming these difficulties is a commitment by the political leadership of both countries for the authority to share. Once this is in hand, the Commanders of CanadaCOM, USNORTHCOM, and NORAD can “determine the optimal way to do it.”³²

Conclusion. This is an important moment in the long-standing defence relationship between Canada and the US. The challenges posed by the security environment have made new demands on both military and civilian authorities on both sides of the border, and are forcing a tighter association between both countries who are aware that their domestic security is contingent on the security of the continent. There is an opportunity to ensure that CanadaCOM builds upon and formalizes the long-standing defence relationship between the CF and NORAD/USNORTHCOM and its evolving fusion centre by demonstrating that the CF is reorganizing to meet more effectively its domestic defence and security responsibilities in the new security environment, and will be a strong and capable ally in the defence of North America. This will require the forging of new relationships with security partners across Canada and in the US, and at this stage there appears to be an appetite for such important changes in both USNORTHCOM and the wider US defence and security community, as well as amongst the key security partners within Canada.

The penalties for failing to evolve and formalize our linkages with our key ally, and with the security partners within Canada are significant. Apart from the

³¹ Ibid., p. 18.

³² Ibid., p. 21.

consequences of a failure to close the seams that exist in domestic and continental defence that could be exploited by clever and adaptive terrorist enemies who have targeted both Canada and the US, the CF simply cannot afford to recreate the intelligence and warning received from US sources.³³ Thus, it must formalize the Canadian presence within the evolving NORAD/USNORTHCOM fusion centre in order to ensure that intelligence and information of use to CanadaCOM will not be lost amongst the concerns of its powerful ally. At the same time, as a strong and capable ally, CanadaCOM must also ensure that appropriate linkages are established within Canada to exploit sources that can feed information of use to both CanadaCOM and also NORAD/USNORTHCOM. There is a significant role for the bi-national NORAD agreement to compliment the evolving bilateral relationship without compromising the sovereignty of either nation.

³³ Canadian Security Intelligence Service, *Canadian Security Intelligence Service 2003 Annual Report*, Part 1. This report is available at http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/publications/annual_report/2003/report2003.asp.