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Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Editorial Comments -- Would Kipling Approve?
James F. Keeley and John R. Ferris
Full Text
Rudyard Kipling did not have a particularly cheerful view of British involvement in Afghanistan in the19th Century. That, none the less, is where Canadian forces – and Canadian diplomats – now find themselves deployed, in action, being wounded, and being killed. The realization that our involvement in the world is not risk-free seems to be something of a shock to sectors of the Canadian public, with one result being calls for a larger public discussion of the nature, extent and duration of our commitment to Afghanistan. The Conservative government has not committed itself to such a discussion as yet, though the opportunity may arise when our current commitment ends in the fall of 2006. Two items of interest might be noted in passing in this regard. First, the deployment and use of Canadian forces seems to be a prerogative of the Crown, thus of the government, and need not be subject even to Parliamentary debate as such, much less Parliamentary approval. Second, even some supporters of the current deployment seem to want a larger discussion.
The benefits of such a discussion are not to be discounted, particularly if they help to lead Canadians to a more mature, reflective and realistic view of the world, Canada’s stake and place in it, and the role of the military as an instrument of policy. For this to occur, however, a variety of arguments offered both against and in defence of our current commitment and activities in Afghanistan must be identified and addressed, largely to remove them from the table. Then we can consider what is left.
“This is an American war.” This argument seems to be basically a backwash from the war in Iraq, indicating, perhaps, a forgetting of the precise circumstances under which the US – and Canada, among others – got involved in Afghanistan. Our involvement followed from our NATO membership and the invoking of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty following September 11, 2001. Unlike the Iraq war, the US invasion of Afghanistan, and the subsequent multinational presence in that country, seem to have raised little or no strong international condemnation, including from the United Nations. Our presence in Afghanistan is tied to the objective of trying to create a stable national government, in control of the country, which can prevent it from being used again as a safe haven for terrorism.
“Our involvement in Afghanistan damages our international reputation as peacekeepers.” The evidence underlying this claim is hard to see, aside from the sentiments of those who support the statement. In fact, missions of this type have become more frequent even in respect to UN operations. In failed or failing states, the provision of public order and security in a context of internal conflict has been shown to be a vital element in any real restoration of peace. While it is true that forces in Afghanistan mean fewer resources available to devote to specifically UN operations, the implied argument that a UN commitment must necessarily take priority over other uses of our military in support of our national objectives is not clearly presented and defended.
“Don’t cut and run” A reputation for persistence is certainly an advantage: it tends to discourage others from testing you. However, persistence in folly is not a virtue. This argument depends implicitly on the underlying soundness of our presence in Afghanistan, and thus begs the question. It only makes sense if the national interest is being well-served by what we are doing. Otherwise, it is merely macho posing. “Support our troops.” Indeed, yes. But the best support for our troops is to use them wisely in support of feasible and rational objectives. Again, this begs the question. “We are helping the Afghani people – including particularly the women of Afghanistan. “ That the Afghani people have suffered dreadfully for decades is without argument. That Afghani women in particular suffered under the Taliban government in ways we find abhorrent, and that a good deal of this continues today, is without argument. Honesty requires us to admit, however, that neither of these considerations took us into Afghanistan, and neither would likely be sufficient to keep us there. Bettering the lot of the people of that country will be a necessary element of our strategy, and bettering the lot of the women of Afghanistan may be a desirable byproduct of our presence and of our hoped-for success. However, we are not there in a primary role as cultural transformers, and being too ambitious in this regard could make the task of establishing a stable and accepted government there, even a government relatively more modern in its attitudes to women, more difficult. Moreover, a sure fire means to inflame Afghan opinion against us and to support those fighting us is to promote a social revolution in the country. Does anyone really want to fight a liberal internationalist crusade in Kandahar, except for pro-war feminists?
There is at least one question posed by those who challenge our commitment to Afghanistan that is central, however: what makes us think that we can be more successful than the Soviet Union? What are we trying to accomplish? How are we trying to accomplish it? Is our approach feasible, at a cost we are willing to pay? And is the game worth the candle? These are questions worth asking. The answers, however, will not be found in simple terms or 30-second sound-bites. They require a focused, sophisticated, unsentimental and informed debate. That, in turn, poses another question: is the Canadian public up to that challenge?
James F. Keeley and John R. Ferris