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Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Editorial Comments -- The Strange Case of The Dog That Did Not Bark in the Election.
Dr. Jim Keeley and Dr. John Ferris
Full Text
Canadians sometimes seem to sleepwalk through history. Certainly, their defence policy is formulated in the dark. The easiest way to handle defence issues in Canada is to act without talking about it, or while pretending to do something else. The biggest defence decision of recent years was the Martin government’s decision not to join the Ballistic Missile Defence system. Characteristically, this decision was accompanied by a redefinition of the NORAD Treaty, which gave the United States much of the information they claimed to need for BMD.
Defence affected the last election in a similar way. The Martin government, driven by American pressure and able ministers in DND and DFAIT, recognised the need to increase defence spending significantly, and began the biggest change the Canadian Forces had seen in a decade. That was the real story about defence in May 2004. Yet the main story during the news cycle were Liberal claims that Conservatives were war mongers, because they wanted to acquire transport ships to move our soldiers to foreign locales, instead of doing so the Canadian way, on aircraft rented from the Ukraine.
In this election, the story is different. A consensus about defence policy seems to have emerged, expressed by silence. Granted, the Conservatives have made defence a major plank of their platform, to their credit, although of course it has a political purpose. How better to deflect claims Conservatives are unCanadian, than by criticising the Liberals for failing to stop American challenges to our sovereignty in the Arctic? Again, some of the Conservative policy hinges on proposals to build up capabilities, especially in large warships, without explaining why, while other parts are similar to official plans. The recent Conservative statement that they would rebuild an Airborne Regiment in Petawawa sounds somewhat like the Canadian Forces announcement that it is creating a new Canadian Special Operations Regiment, 650 soldiers strong, on the same base.
The indicative point is how little criticism has been directed against Conservative proposals, or even Liberal ones. Some of this silence has political roots. Thus, Jack Layton also attacked the Liberals for failures to block American challenges in the Arctic, rather than assaulting the Conservatives for suggesting that Canada solve this problem by acquiring submarines. Presumably, this reflects a desire to stop Paul Martin from demonizing Stephen Harper and so sucking votes away from the NDP. Yet official NDP policy on defence issues is tough-minded by its usual standards, even more so Layton’s favourable comments on some statements by General Rick Hillier.
The fact that defence policy is not controversial in this election indicates that the declared policy of the Martin government is accepted, as a minimum or maximum position, by the leading political parties in the Rest of Canada. This means acceptance that military forces at perhaps 80% of their strength in 1989, along with an annual budget of $13 billion dollars, are the minimum ante for Canada to play at the poker table of power politics, certainly so long as the game remains Texas Hold’em. A small part of the electorate wants less, while a substantial part claims to favour more.
This is good. It indicates Canadians have learned some lessons during recent years from Colin Kenny, Bill Graham, David Pratt, and Rick Hillier. They might learn even more by discussing other aspects of defence policy during this election.
One is the future of Canada’s strategic relations with the United States, given our decision to stay out of BMD, the present renegotiation of the NORAD Treaty, the formal framework for our security as a whole, and the possibility of a clash between our interests. For example, the progression of global warming might turn our different definitions of ownership of the Arctic from an academic issue into a direct clash over sovereignty. These are real problems, for which Canada needs solutions; no party is openly addressing either part of the equation.
Another issue is Canada’s relationship with the rest of the world. The external policy defined last year by the Liberals can be criticized on many grounds, above all that it may never be exercised, since most of the projected defence expenditure lies four years away. Where the Chretien government aimed to turn soldiers into social workers, the Martin one wants to have soldiers do the work of boy scouts. Whatever its limits, however, the policy at least tries to correlate aims and means—to define Canadian interests and show how existing forces can further them. In a classic Canadian fashion, this policy defines the maintenance of a good and stable world order, supported by multilateral consent and power, as an interest, and our willingness to sustain it as a duty. The 3D policy aims to link the various components of Canadian power and influence, and use them to solve bite-sized international problems, by bringing Canadian force and values to bear on a failed state, for the benefit of all.
That sounds good—in fact, it states a consensus acceptable to most Canadians, one reason why defence is not a political issue in this election. Canada also has the means to act on that programme. Today, world conventional power rests on a combination of a blue water fleet and an expeditionary capability, in which the United States stands alone in its class, Britain and France punch above their weight, while Australia, Canada and India are the only bantams. Even today, and doubly so if our declared policy is enacted, Canada is one of the few states with a world reach, however small. The questions which emerge are: Why? What will Canadians do with these capabilities? Are they really willing to commit 1000 troops to nation building in a failed and faraway state for a decade, at the price of perhaps fifty soldiers dead? If not, what is the point of this policy?
Precisely these questions are raised by Canada’s presence in Kandahar. Few Canadians realise just how large a commitment NATO is making to stabilizing that country, or more precisely, to helping the government establish some presence outside of Kabul. Not merely are 800 Canadians stationed in southern Afghanistan, but 4000 British soldiers are moving there, along with troops from other countries. Canadians have walked in their sleep to their greatest military commitment to a combat zone since Korea. An election might be a good time to wake up and smell the coffee.
Dr. Jim Keeley and Dr. John Ferris, Co-Editors Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary