

MILITARY CORRUPTION AND ORGANIZED CRIME IN EASTERN EUROPE AND THE CAUCASUS

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INTRODUCTION

Governments rely on their military for a basis of continued sovereignty and authority. This relationship however can become weakened when a military becomes corrupt and is influenced by organized crime. Linkages between governmental institutions and organized crime undermine the very nature of a democratic society, as officials no longer follow the will of the people but private interests. This can have disastrous effects on society. Many European countries; especially those in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, have had a very difficult transition from socialism into democracy, and are currently experiencing the effects of corruption and organized crime on a massive scale in their societies and institutions. This can have severe consequences across Europe as European countries are closely tied economically as well as geographically. Further, European Union governments in particular are leading the way in the trend of globalization and the relaxing of economic restrictions on the trade of labor and goods. This trend has an effect on both military and its role in society and the rise of organized crime. Any corruption within one institution has a profound effect on all governments.

ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN SOCIETY

Firstly it is important to clarify the role that a military has in society and why corruption within the military is so dangerous. Professor Gregory Foster of the Industrial

College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University in Washington DC, identifies that, "The subject of corruption- its causes, effects, and implications- is one that is central to the growth and preservation of democracy everywhere."¹ This subject is particularly important when we look at the role militaries play in legitimizing the moral authority of governments in society. This being said, "how does an inherently authoritarian institution (the military) that employs violence on behalf of the state, subscribes to an ethos of obedience, cloaks itself in secrecy, and demands exclusivity achieve legitimacy?"² Citizens in a democratic society must expect three things from its military. First the military must be professional and employ operational competence.³ A military must be able to protect the sovereignty of its nation, and enforce the nation's interests; particularly to secure social order and democracy for its citizens. Secondly a nation's military must be politically neutral.⁴ It is imperative that an institution such as a military, which is capable of extreme force, be above partisan politics, and free from the influence of individual parties. Lastly, a military must be viewed by society as a whole as being socially responsible.⁵ There must be checks and balances in place for accountability and transparency within the armed forces. Society and government must be in a position to identify and correct impropriety if and when it occurs. It is therefore vital that the military be under the firm control of a responsible, popularly elected civilian democracy.

The problem we are faced with however is that in many countries around the world; the military is seen as a coercive, corrupt influence in society rather than an

¹ Gregory Foster. Ethics, Government and Security. The Humanist (May/June 2001). Pg.6.

² Ibid, Pg.7.

³ Ibid, Pg.7.

⁴ Ibid, Pg.7.

instrument of social stability. The tools needed by the military to empower them with authority are often turned against the very people they are meant to protect. Indeed many militaries have the notorious distinction of being the terrorizers, not the protectors. In countries where citizens are under martial law, this problem is intensified. In these countries, many are often left feeling vulnerable to the whim of violent military authorities. Unscrupulous military members can arrest without warrant, detain without due process, and coerce the population at their pleasure. This problem is intensified greatly when organized crime and military members work together for profit and gain.

INTRODUCTION INTO CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR

The changing nature of organized crime since the fall of communism in the early 1990's and the rise of extreme Islamic terrorist organizations with their world wide religious contacts is becoming increasingly problematic for police and other governmental bodies. The German Federal Intelligence Service has identified that organized crime; with a focus on economic crime, has become the world's largest growth area, with estimated global profits of some 500 billion dollars.⁶ Criminal groups in the past, which have tended to form around clan-based, family groups, have morphed into trans-national criminal organizations. In addition, the rise in prominence and influence of many Muslim extremist groups who increasingly use profits from drug trafficking and sales has changed the nature of organized crime. The end of the Warsaw Pact-NATO cold war confrontation and the emergence of a single European market have resulted in fewer trade barriers, and an allowance for the rise of illegitimate

⁵ Gregory Foster. *Ethics, Government and Security*. The Humanist (May/June 2001). Pg.7.

⁶ Ian Davis, Chrissie Hirst and Bernardo Mariani. *Organised crime, corruption and illicit arms trafficking in an enlarged EU*. Saferworld. (December, 2001). Pg.4.

as well as legitimate economic activity.⁷ As Ian Davis, Chrissie Hirst, and Bernardo Mariani explain in 'Organized crime, corruption and illicit arms trafficking in an enlarged EU,'

"Post-soviet organized crime has grown and extended its operations into foreign countries through "the exploitation of the new freedoms available to former Soviet citizens to travel freely outside the Eastern bloc" and through increased contact and co-operation with foreign international companies conducting business in Russia and Eastern Europe."⁸

Criminal organizations have profited greatly from the sale of illegal narcotics; particularly from Asia and Afghanistan, the sex trade and the sale of sex slaves from Eastern Europe and Asia into the west, and the trafficking and sale of illicit arms within Europe. With the end of cold war policies, Eastern European countries have been left scrambling to privatize public industry and move to a market driven economy. This shift has been anything but smooth and many countries are seeing resurgences in authoritarian regimes. The total collapse of societal structures in an effort to reform countries have allowed criminal organizations to flourish and rapidly expand to fill the power vacuum left by the ruling communist party. These criminal organizations have corrupted and coerced many government officials. Radical Islamic organizations; previously ignored or repressed under strict Soviet policies, have now found fertile ground from western Europe to the Pacific rim in which to spread their message of Jihad funded by an unending supply of Afghani and Asian heroin. Current law enforcing agencies have become unable to keep up with the changing dynamics and unprecedented growth of organized crime. Ian Davis, Chrissie Hirst, and Bernardo Mariani explain further;

⁷ Ian Davis, Chrissie Hirst and Bernardo Mariani. Organised crime, corruption and illicit arms trafficking in an enlarged EU. Saferworld. (December, 2001). Pg.4.

⁸ Ibid, Pg.16.

“These new threats have rendered traditional countermeasures inadequate. Traditional institutions and policies, the separation between military, intelligence and law enforcement agencies for example, are now inappropriate to combat security threats that cannot be categorized along these lines. New institutions, and more crucially in the short term, cross-agency collaboration, have been slow to develop. The sophistication of the ‘new order’ of transnational organized criminals has now been recognized, and demands a more comprehensive approach to the problem than those currently employed.”⁹

Criminal organizations are also more likely to collaborate with already existing entrenched criminal groups from different countries or ethnic backgrounds to facilitate their activities abroad.¹⁰ The authors explain further that, “Links between the Italian and Russian mafias, and Estonian and Polish groups, have grown as borders eased between Western and Eastern Europe.”¹¹; the authors believe this is due to 2 main variables. They explain;

“Organised crime is today encouraged more by mobility and economic disparity than ethnic affinity. The new concept of ‘Transnational Organized Crime Risk’ is based on the general assumption that organized crime groups move into other countries, or become transnational, ‘because of two main variables, maximizing opportunities and minimizing ‘law enforcement risk’. As restrictions have lessened between international borders, co-operation between organised crime groups has increased; “global networks” of criminals have developed, allowing “organised crime groups to greatly increase the profits of their operations and their methods of evading local governments as they share information, skills, costs, market access and relative strengths.”¹²

There is also an ever-increasing threat of transnational expansion by these criminal organizations themselves. No longer content with the favorable conditions in poorer Eastern European and Euro-Asian countries; and unwilling to take a back seat to local groups through sub-contracts, organized crime is pushing through traditional boundaries

⁹ Ian Davis, Chrissie Hirst and Bernardo Mariani. Organised crime, corruption and illicit arms trafficking in an enlarged EU. Saferworld. (December, 2001). Pg.5.

¹⁰ Ibid, Pg.13.

¹¹ Ibid, Pg.13.

and muscling out entrenched gangs. There has been a systematic move of these groups from their traditional base into rival territory, ousting already existing groups. The authors continue;

“Similarly, the “dangerous dynamic” of transnational expansion is a “common feature” among criminal organizations in South Eastern Europe and has facilitated their expansion from traditional bases in Eastern Europe and Asia into Western Europe. Albanian criminal groups for example, have “disrupted organised crime in Italy, ousting the traditional Mafia from Milan within the last two years”, and have expanded so effectively that British law enforcement is concerned that they will try to establish themselves in the UK.”¹³

Unfortunately for British police, Balkan gangs have indeed become a major problem since 2001. On the 25 of November 2002; just 1 year after the writing of the above two articles, BBC News identified in their article “UK warring over Balkan gangs’ that the authorities were already playing catch up to control the influx of organized crime from the former Eastern States. David Blunkett; British home secretary, told the BBC News and others at a conference on organized crime from the Balkans “Balkan crime gangs operating in the UK were more organized than the police.”¹⁴ He continued;

“We can only outwit and track down organized criminals by working ever more closely with the Balkan countries. Closer co-operation is particularly vital in the current climate, with the heightened threat we all face from international terrorist networks. Organized criminals co-operate across national borders and so must we.”¹⁵

The federal research division of the Library of Congress in the United States also supports the findings of the authors of ‘Organized crime, corruption and illicit arms trafficking in an enlarged EU’. They explain;

¹² Ibid, Pg.13.

¹³ Ibid, Pg.13-14. Note: Ian Burrell; writing as home correspondent for London’s ‘Independent’ also in 2001 identified that, “Around 70 percent of the sauna/massage parlors in London’s Soho district are now controlled by Albanian/Kosovars.” And further, “Twelve months ago, Albanian organized crime was not an issue for the UK. Their infiltration has been very swift.” Ian Burrell. Albanian mafia takes control of Soho vice scene. Independent. (18, June, 2001)

¹⁴ BBC News. UK warring over Balkan gangs. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2509811.stm>. (25, November, 2002).

“In the past decade, the activities of criminal groups have found fertile ground in most of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and a substantial amount of terrorist activity has occurred in parts of the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia. Such success has resulted from two sets of factors. First, the overall globalization and increased versatility and sophistication of criminal organizations (and, to a lesser extent, terrorist groups) have improved their ability to take advantage of weak customs systems, poorly guarded borders, corrupt officials, poverty-stricken national economies, and well-established shadow economies. Second, geopolitical and domestic conditions have provided such groups an increasing range of such favorable circumstances. Intense poverty in countries such as Moldova and Belarus creates a supply of women for transnational traffickers, and social mores prevent those women from returning to a normal life. The collapse of a major empire (the Soviet Union) has left large, poorly guarded arsenals of weapons in countries desperately needing money.”¹⁶

All these factors have lent themselves to a situation where even well intentioned governments are having an extraordinarily difficult time dealing with overwhelming criminal corruption within their ranks as well as society itself.

INTRODUCTION INTO RECENT POLITICS IN EUROPE

Due to the overall structural collapse of communist governments and the ensuing societal chaos, organized crime has had a unique opportunity to make inroads into governmental and non-governmental power structures. Russia is one such country that is reeling economically because of immense criminal activity in its economy. Ian Davis, Chrissie Hirst, and Bernardo Mariani elaborate on Russia’s criminal problem;

“In addition to their control of funds, Russian criminal groups have control over key individuals in financial institutions and businesses. The mafia-style murders of several dozen Russian bankers support the assertion of Russian Interior Ministry experts that “95 percent of Moscow banks and their affiliates are controlled by the criminal kingpins”. Throughout the country, Russian police have estimated that 41,000 companies are now

¹⁵ Ibid, pag.2.

¹⁶ Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. Nations Hospitable to Organized Crime and Terrorism. (October, 2003). Pg.88.

run by crime groups, together with 50 percent of the banks and 80 percent of joint ventures involving foreign capital.”¹⁷

Indeed senior officials to President Vladimir Putin have conceded that there is corruption up to the highest levels of the Judiciary, and that, “we don’t have an effective mechanism to identify corruption.”¹⁸ Transparency International; a non-governmental organization created to track and fight against corruption has created a yearly corruption perceptions index (CPI) which outlines the level of corruption on average for 102 countries. As can be seen in figure 1.1, the level of corruption in former communist countries is quite alarming.

¹⁷ Ian Davis, Chrissie Hirst and Bernardo Mariani. Organised crime, corruption and illicit arms trafficking in an enlarged EU. Saferworld. (December, 2001). Pg.17.

¹⁸ Ibid, Pg.17.

figure 1 1



Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2004

This table was compiled at the University of Passau on behalf of Transparency International. For information on data and methodology, please consult the frequently asked questions and the framework document at www.transparency.org/surveys/cpi or www.icgg.org

Country Rank	Country	CPI 2004 Score*	Confidence Range **	Surveys used***
1	Finland	9.7	9.5 - 9.8	9
2	New Zealand	9.6	9.4 - 9.6	9
3	Denmark	9.5	9.3 - 9.7	10
	Iceland	9.5	9.4 - 9.7	8
5	Singapore	9.3	9.2 - 9.4	13
6	Sweden	9.2	9.1 - 9.3	11
7	Switzerland	9.1	8.9 - 9.2	10
8	Norway	8.9	8.6 - 9.1	9
9	Australia	8.8	8.4 - 9.1	15
10	Netherlands	8.7	8.5 - 8.9	10
11	United Kingdom	8.6	8.4 - 8.8	12
12	Canada	8.5	8.1 - 8.9	12
13	Austria	8.4	8.1 - 8.8	10
	Luxembourg	8.4	8.0 - 8.9	7
15	Germany	8.2	8.0 - 8.5	11
16	Hong Kong	8.0	7.1 - 8.5	13
17	Belgium	7.5	7.1 - 8.0	10
	Ireland	7.5	7.2 - 7.9	10
	USA	7.5	6.9 - 8.0	14
20	Chile	7.4	7.0 - 7.8	11
21	Barbados	7.3	6.6 - 7.6	3
22	France	7.1	6.6 - 7.6	12
	Spain	7.1	6.7 - 7.4	11
24	Japan	6.9	6.2 - 7.4	15
25	Malta	6.8	5.3 - 8.2	4
26	Israel	6.4	5.6 - 7.1	10
27	Portugal	6.3	5.8 - 6.8	9
28	Uruguay	6.2	5.9 - 6.7	6
29	Oman	6.1	5.1 - 6.8	5
	United Arab Emirates	6.1	5.1 - 7.1	5
31	Botswana	6.0	5.3 - 6.8	7
	Estonia	6.0	5.6 - 6.7	12
	Slovenia	6.0	5.6 - 6.6	12
34	Bahrain	5.8	5.5 - 6.2	5
35	Taiwan	5.6	5.2 - 6.1	15
36	Cyprus	5.4	5.0 - 5.8	4
37	Jordan	5.3	4.6 - 5.9	9
38	Qatar	5.2	4.6 - 5.6	4
39	Malaysia	5.0	4.5 - 5.6	15
	Tunisia	5.0	4.5 - 5.6	7
41	Costa Rica	4.9	4.2 - 5.8	8
42	Hungary	4.8	4.6 - 5.0	12
	Italy	4.8	4.4 - 5.1	10
44	Kuwait	4.6	3.8 - 5.3	5
	Lithuania	4.6	4.0 - 5.4	9
	South Africa	4.6	4.2 - 5.0	11
47	South Korea	4.5	4.0 - 4.9	14
48	Seychelles	4.4	3.7 - 5.0	3
49	Greece	4.3	4.0 - 4.8	9
	Suriname	4.3	2.1 - 5.8	3
51	Czech Republic	4.2	3.7 - 4.9	11
	El Salvador	4.2	3.3 - 5.1	7
	Trinidad and Tobago	4.2	3.6 - 5.2	6
54	Bulgaria	4.1	3.7 - 4.6	10
	Mauritius	4.1	3.2 - 4.8	5
	Namibia	4.1	3.5 - 4.6	7
57	Latvia	4.0	3.8 - 4.3	8
	Slovakia	4.0	3.6 - 4.5	11
59	Brazil	3.9	3.7 - 4.1	11
60	Belize	3.8	3.4 - 4.1	3
	Colombia	3.8	3.4 - 4.1	10
62	Cuba	3.7	2.2 - 4.7	4
	Panama	3.7	3.4 - 4.2	7
64	Ghana	3.6	3.1 - 4.1	7
	Mexico	3.6	3.3 - 3.8	11
	Thailand	3.6	3.3 - 3.9	14
67	Croatia	3.5	3.3 - 3.8	9
	Peru	3.5	3.3 - 3.7	8
	Poland	3.5	3.1 - 3.9	13
	Sri Lanka	3.5	3.1 - 3.9	8
71	China	3.4	3.0 - 3.8	16
	Saudi Arabia	3.4	2.7 - 4.0	5
	Syria	3.4	2.8 - 4.1	5
74	Belarus	3.3	1.9 - 4.8	5
	Gabon	3.3	2.1 - 3.7	3
	Jamaica	3.3	2.8 - 3.7	6

Country Rank	Country	CPI 2004 Score*	Confidence Range **	Surveys used***
77	Benin	3.2	2.0 - 4.3	3
	Egypt	3.2	2.7 - 3.8	8
	Mali	3.2	2.2 - 4.2	5
	Morocco	3.2	2.9 - 3.5	7
	Turkey	3.2	2.8 - 3.7	13
82	Armenia	3.1	2.4 - 3.7	5
	Bosnia and Herzegovina	3.1	2.7 - 3.5	7
	Madagascar	3.1	1.8 - 4.4	4
85	Mongolia	3.0	2.6 - 3.2	3
	Senegal	3.0	2.5 - 3.5	6
87	Dominican Republic	2.9	2.4 - 3.3	6
	Iran	2.9	2.2 - 3.4	5
	Romania	2.9	2.5 - 3.4	12
90	Gambia	2.8	2.2 - 3.4	5
	India	2.8	2.6 - 3.0	15
	Malawi	2.8	2.2 - 3.7	5
	Mozambique	2.8	2.4 - 3.1	7
	Nepal	2.8	1.6 - 3.4	3
	Russia	2.8	2.5 - 3.1	15
	Tanzania	2.8	2.4 - 3.2	7
97	Algeria	2.7	2.3 - 3.0	6
	Lebanon	2.7	2.1 - 3.2	5
	Macedonia (FYR)	2.7	2.3 - 3.2	7
	Nicaragua	2.7	2.5 - 3.0	7
	Serbia and Montenegro	2.7	2.3 - 3.0	7
102	Eritrea	2.6	1.6 - 3.4	3
	Papua New Guinea	2.6	1.9 - 3.4	4
	Philippines	2.6	2.4 - 2.9	14
	Uganda	2.6	2.1 - 3.1	7
	Vietnam	2.6	2.3 - 2.9	11
	Zambia	2.6	2.3 - 2.9	6
108	Albania	2.5	2.0 - 3.0	4
	Argentina	2.5	2.2 - 2.8	11
	Libya	2.5	1.9 - 3.0	4
	Palestinian Authority	2.5	2.0 - 2.7	3
112	Ecuador	2.4	2.3 - 2.5	7
	Yemen	2.4	1.9 - 2.9	5
114	Congo, Republic of	2.3	2.0 - 2.7	4
	Ethiopia	2.3	1.9 - 2.9	6
	Honduras	2.3	2.0 - 2.6	7
	Moldova	2.3	2.0 - 2.8	5
	Sierra Leone	2.3	2.0 - 2.7	3
	Uzbekistan	2.3	2.1 - 2.4	6
	Venezuela	2.3	2.2 - 2.5	11
	Zimbabwe	2.3	1.9 - 2.7	7
122	Bolivia	2.2	2.1 - 2.3	6
	Guatemala	2.2	2.0 - 2.4	7
	Kazakhstan	2.2	1.8 - 2.7	7
	Kyrgyzstan	2.2	2.0 - 2.5	5
	Niger	2.2	2.0 - 2.5	3
	Sudan	2.2	2.0 - 2.3	5
	Ukraine	2.2	2.0 - 2.4	10
129	Cameroon	2.1	1.9 - 2.3	5
	Iraq	2.1	1.3 - 2.8	4
	Kenya	2.1	1.9 - 2.4	7
	Pakistan	2.1	1.6 - 2.6	7
133	Angola	2.0	1.7 - 2.1	5
	Congo, Democratic Republic	2.0	1.5 - 2.2	3
	Côte d'Ivoire	2.0	1.7 - 2.2	5
	Georgia	2.0	1.6 - 2.3	7
	Indonesia	2.0	1.7 - 2.2	14
	Tajikistan	2.0	1.7 - 2.4	4
	Turkmenistan	2.0	1.6 - 2.3	3
140	Azerbaijan	1.9	1.8 - 2.0	7

Peter Eigan; chairman of Transparency International explains;

“While some countries in transition from communism- most notably Slovenia, which has a cleaner score than EU member countries Italy and Greece- are perceived to be increasingly less corrupt, many countries in the former Soviet Union remain ridden with corruption. “The recent steps by President Vladimir Putin to introduce tax reforms and new laws fighting money-laundering are beginning to show the prospect of a lessening of perceived corruption in Russia.” But the CPI 2002 indicates that Russia has a long way to go and remains seriously corrupt, together with Uzbekistan, Georgia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Moldova, and Azerbaijan, all of which score less than 3 out of 10.”¹⁹

From these statistics, one could come to several conclusions about the alarming nature of events that could transpire when organized crime has access to sensitive government knowledge and material. Ian Davis, Chrissie Hirst, and Bernardo Mariani continue;

“There are obvious security implications of partnerships between civil servants and organised crime, which have resulted in “lapses in public safety, border control and internal security”. Threats from economic espionage, increasingly a target for Mafia-FSB (successor to the KGB) collaboration, are heightened when the problem of trafficking in nuclear materials is considered.”²⁰

Corruption in the FSB (Successor to the Soviet KGB) and military structures has become a major reality for Russia and other former communist countries struggling to come to grips with poverty and unemployment.

CORRUPTION IN THE ARMED FORCES OF EASTERN EUROPE AND THE CAUCASUS

Corruption; as we will see often pervades all areas of the armed forces and governmental departments in many former eastern bloc countries. Central to this

¹⁹ [Http://www.transparency.org](http://www.transparency.org). Transparency International Corruptions Perceptions Index, 2002.Pg.2-3.

²⁰ Ian Davis, Chrissie Hirst and Bernardo Mariani. Organised crime, corruption and illicit arms trafficking in an enlarged EU. Saferworld. (December, 2001). Pg.17.

²⁰ Ibid, Pg.18.

Figure 2.1



Map of the Black Sea region.

corruption is the regular movement of narcotics from the Golden Crescent up through the Caucasus and central Asia into Russia. From here it then moves through the porous borders of the Ukraine and on to the rest of Europe. Going the other way, the steady flow of illicit arms and weapons trafficking out of Central and Eastern Europe. These arms typically end up in the hands of rebel Islamic Chechens; Afghani drug lords; militant Croat, Serb, or Bosnian forces fighting in the former Yugoslavia; or in some cases, the hands of Iraqi freedom fighters²¹. Geographical location in addition to the breakdown of efficient boarder controls and corrupt officials allows this to occur. See figure 2.1. The Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress explains this situation in further detail in their report, 'Involvement of Russian Organized Crime Syndicates, Criminal Elements in the Russian Military, and Regional Terrorist Groups in Narcotics Trafficking in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Chechnya.'

"Because of its geographic position between the major narcotics producing region of the Golden Crescent (Azerbaijan and Pakistan) and the major narcotics markets in Russia and Europe, the Caucasus has become a major narcotics corridor. An additional factor is the weakness of law enforcement agencies in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. As narcotics have passed through, the rate of addiction also has increased in those countries...Georgia, experiencing a collapse of law enforcement, a civil war on its northern border, and an alarming rate of state corruption,

²¹ Katherina W. Gonzales. Good Fences Make Good Neighbors. Problems of Post-Communism, 51.1. (January/February, 2004). Pg.44.

has provided traffickers the most favorable conditions of the three countries."²²

Georgia has become the most important land route transit country for Heroin originating from Afghanistan through Central Asia, Iran, and Azerbaijan and into Russia. Additionally Georgia's Black sea ports provide valuable access for trafficking towards the west.²³ Georgia is also experiencing heavy trafficking of illegal drug shipments into Turkey. With as much as 54% of their population living below the poverty line²⁴ and over 17% unemployment, a large portion of military boarder officials have now decided to take advantage of their geo-economic position in the heroin route and turn to crime. The report continues;

"In the 1990's, a variety of illegal smuggling and trafficking activities, including narcotics trafficking, appeared along routes from Georgia into Turkey. Those activities were based on channels of shuttle trade that profited from corrupt Georgian border authorities and cheap transportation into Turkey. In this way, Georgia became a corridor for illegal transit from many points in the former Soviet Union into the West. According to a report in April 2002, drug trafficking through Georgia has reached the level of US\$1 billion per year, a sharp increase from previous years."²⁵

Much of the concern for the country lies within its northern region, bordering with the war-torn province of Chechnya. This area; especially that of the Pankisi gorge pass; a region notorious for its Wild West atmosphere, is littered with corruption and terrorist activity.²⁶ This area; which is used as a repackaging depot for illicit drugs destined for Europe, is also a sore point for Russian officials who claim that the gorge has been

²² Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. Involvement of Russian Organized Crime Syndicates, Criminal Elements in the Russian Military, and Regional Terrorist Groups in Narcotics Trafficking in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Chechnya. (October, 2002) Pg.3.

²³ Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. Involvement of Russian Organized Crime Syndicates, Criminal Elements in the Russian Military, and Regional Terrorist Groups in Narcotics Trafficking in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Chechnya. (October, 2002). Pg.4.

²⁴ Central Intelligence Agency. The World Fact Book-Georgia. <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/gg.html>.

²⁵ Ibid, Pg.4.

²⁶ Ibid, Pg.5.

used as a staging area and safe zone for Islamic militants. The library of Congress explains;

“This activity has been promoted by chronic corruption in the Georgian government, diversion of that government’s attention to ongoing demands for autonomy by three of the country’s component regions, and the ineptness of Georgian military and Police forces...In March 2002, general Tengiz Epatashvili of the Georgian Armed Forces alleged that Georgian boarder guards and law-enforcement officials have become rich from bribes paid by Chechen militants.²⁷

This situation has become such a major problem for the Georgians that the United States has had to step in and provide extra training and funding for the Georgian military in order to try and curb the rampant corruption of military members. The aid from the United States is a direct attempt to secure a safe oil and gas pipeline from the resource rich Caucasus through this region. This venture has become impossible however because of current political, social, and military conditions acting in opposition to US involvement. Ironically for Georgia; who are receiving pressure from the Russians, and who are appealing to Georgia to stem corruption on its border, is the involvement of the Russian military in the movement of illicit narcotics originating from Afghanistan and elsewhere.

The Library of Congress has discovered that Russian security forces embedded in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and central Asia run criminal enterprises, racketeering, and extortion of the populous with local criminals in exchange for protection. Most surprisingly is the fact that they are also directly involved in the transportation of drugs from the Tajikistan/Afghanistan boarder into Russia. The Library of Congress clarifies;

²⁷ Ibid, Pg.7.

“Members of the Ministry of the Interior’s security forces, the Federal Security Service, and private security services (collectively called the “police mafia”) began to utilize their positions of authority to extort protection payment from legitimate businesses and bribes from criminals such as narcotics traffickers. The continued presence of such Russian security cadres in Chechnya, Armenia, Georgia, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan has made them able to offer protection that yields a share of narcotics profits.”²⁸

The corruption of military boarder guards also continues on through Armenia and Azerbaijan where impoverished Russian conscripts; disillusioned with low wages, deplorable conditions and the Chechen conflict, succumb to the irresistible temptation of bribes from drug traffickers. Involvement in Chechnya has allowed the fraternization of Russia military with Chechen drug lords who have become the new dominant criminal organization in Russia and central Asia. An ever-increasing amount of narcotics trafficking into Russia is occurring through these groups who use military transport to traffic the drugs into Russia.²⁹ This new trend of organized criminal activity and bribery by militant Islamic Chechens and other Islamic groups presents a new threat for security officials. These groups have made significant inroads into society through their message of jihad combined with promises of a better future funded on the sale of narcotics. These groups rely on the common bond of religion, spread through Islamic contacts around the globe to expand their network. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) are two such organizations.

Founded in 1998 by Uzbek guerrilla fighter Juma Namangani (originally Jumaboy Hojiyev), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’s (IMU) ultimate goal is to capture the

²⁸ Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. Involvement of Russian Organized Crime Syndicates, Criminal Elements in the Russian Military, and Regional Terrorist Groups in Narcotics Trafficking in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Chechnya. (October, 2002). Pg.24.

²⁹ Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. Involvement of Russian Organized Crime Syndicates, Criminal Elements in the Russian Military, and Regional Terrorist Groups in Narcotics Trafficking in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Chechnya. (October, 2002). Pg.21.

Fergana Valley; the economic and natural resource centre of Central Asia, and create an Islamic caliphate³⁰. Funded heavily in its infant stages by Al-Qaeda, the IMU has established strongholds in the region where Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan meet. These strongholds and Namangani's Afghani drug lord connections have allowed his organization to flourish in the narcotics trafficking business. Although; as regional expert Martha Brill Olcott points out, the IMU has lost many of their connections in Afghanistan because of the decimation of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda³¹, they still control a large percentage of the opium and heroin shipments moving through Central Asia and still have solid connections with the Chechen guerrillas. The Library of Congress continues;

“The IMU is known to control opium movement through these Central Asian routes, including as much as 70 percent of the opium trade entering Kyrgyzstan. As a result of the narcotics route from Uzbekistan's border with Afghanistan across Uzbekistan through Bukhara and Urgench to Nukus in the western province of Karakalpakstan and thence into Kazakhstan and Russia, the volume of narcotics traffic into Kyrgyzstan increased significantly after 1999.”³²

Additionally the IMU is reportedly also to have set up heroin refining laboratories in Tajikistan around 2001. Here in Tajikistan the IMU; according to authors Svante Cornell and Regine Spector; is paying off Tajik officials and members of the Russian military to provide safe transport for their drugs into Europe. It is here in transportation of narcotics from Tajikistan to Russia that military corruption appears front and centre. In 'Central Asia: More than Islamic Extremists,' Cornell and Spector Explain;

³⁰ Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. Involvement of Russian Organized Crime Syndicates, Criminal Elements in the Russian Military, and Regional Terrorist Groups in Narcotics Trafficking in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Chechnya. (October, 2002). Pg.12.

³¹ Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. Involvement of Russian Organized Crime Syndicates, Criminal Elements in the Russian Military, and Regional Terrorist Groups in Narcotics Trafficking in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Chechnya. (October, 2002). Pg.14.

³² Ibid, Pg.14.

“The movement of narcotics through Tajikistan is facilitated by paying off Tajik officials and members of the Russian military. Reportedly, military vehicles returning to Moscow from supply missions in Central Asia are used to transport narcotics to that major centre of international trafficking. Reports also say that military helicopters and other forms of military transport are used to move large amounts of narcotics from Tajikistan to population centers in Russia.”³³

The IMU however is not the only drug runners that the Russian military chooses to deal with. As the Library of Congress and Russian journalist Yuriy Spirin indicate, the Russian military also has connections with another extreme Islamic militant group, the Hizb-ut-Tahrir.

As the Library of Congress clarifies, Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT) is a radical Islamic group founded by Palestinians in Jordan and Saudi Arabia; adhering to the doctrine of jihad in Central Asia, has become the most widespread underground Islamic movement in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan in the trafficking of heroin.³⁴ The HT has an estimated 60,000-membership core operating in Uzbekistan, and a further 20,000 each in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.³⁵ Not surprisingly the HT has also set up cells successfully in Europe, including the United Kingdom, Germany and Denmark. Russian journalist Yuriy Spirin captures an insight into the very size and scale of their operation through a 2002 interview with one of the Tajik drug runners. The interviewer explains;

“This individual, who operates from northern Tajikistan, receives his heroin from dealers in the south (identified as members of the Kulyab clans), who have smuggled it from Afghanistan. In the summer the heroin moves from southern to northern Tajikistan over mountain passes; in the winter, the

³³ Svante E. Cornell and Regine A. Spector. Central Asia: More than Islamic Extremists. The Washington Quarterly, 25.1 (2002). Pg.5.

³⁴ Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. Involvement of Russian Organized Crime Syndicates, Criminal Elements in the Russian Military, and Regional Terrorist Groups in Narcotics Trafficking in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Chechnya. (October, 2002). Pg.16.

³⁵ Ibid, Pg.17.

smugglers use small airplanes or military helicopters to cross the mountains that divide northern and southern Tajikistan.”³⁶

Spirin’s informant draws an alarming picture, showing a calculated and coordinated operation between Russian and Tajik military members with drug dealers from Afghanistan. This detailed account of the drug smuggling operations from central Asia to the Eastern Bloc shows the continually changing dynamics of organized crime. The once greatly feared Russian mafia seems to have been pushed out of the drug business altogether in its own territory. Vasiliy Sorkin; chief narcotics officer in the Moscow Administration for internal affairs, confirms this stating, “that an Afghan-Tajik group of about 1,500, is responsible for bringing about 90 percent of the heroin that arrives in Moscow from Afghanistan.”³⁷ The fact that they are aided by the joint effort of two militaries is even more alarming.

“Officers of the Tajik armed forces, he said, provide Russian weapons to Afghan warlords in exchange for narcotics, then sell the narcotics to the Russian military. Russian military aircraft then move the drugs from the Afghanistan-Tajikistan boarder directly into Russia. The source estimates that such military shipments total ten times the amount moving along ground routes, which the source estimates at 21 tones per year...A major transit point on the air route between Tajikistan and Moscow is the Chkalovskiy military airfield near Moscow, but military shipments also fly to other cities in Russia.”³⁸

This corruption of military boarder guards has also spread like a cancer to other key border areas in central Europe. Ukraine is one such country under siege from the lure of money through the trafficking of narcotics. The strong connection between illicit criminal behavior and radical Islamic terrorist organizations is also having an effect

³⁶ Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. Involvement of Russian Organized Crime Syndicates, Criminal Elements in the Russian Military, and Regional Terrorist Groups in Narcotics Trafficking in Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Chechnya. (October, 2002). Pg.19-20.

³⁷ Ibid, Pg.22.

³⁸ Ibid, (October, 2002) Pg.21.

here. Much like Georgia; which is saturated with organized crime, the strategic geographic nature of Ukraine between Russia and the industrialized heartland of European Union makes it an alluring target. Katherina W. Gonzales, author of 'Good Fences Make Good Neighbors- Ukrainian Border Security and Western Assistance' elaborates on this problem.

"Situated between the NATO countries and Russia, Ukraine has become a paradigm for the vital border security and control problems confronting the United States and the members of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the war on terrorism. Porous borders affect Iraq, Afghanistan, and Ukraine in Similarly dangerous ways. Countries located in the very heart of Central and Eastern Europe are highly vulnerable to the illicit border activity linked to terrorism."³⁹

The nature of Ukraine's corruption problems has evolved from the very moment Ukraine became an independent nation in 1991. At that time, the huge arsenal of Ukraine's inherited nuclear weaponry was at the top of western security problems. Little attention was paid during this time with the strengthening of Ukraine's borders to prevent corruption from taking root. Katherina W. Gonzales continues;

"When Ukraine became independent in late 1991, it received a hefty inheritance of military hardware and nuclear materials from the Soviet Union. Although these were substantial assets, the responsibility of guarding and maintaining them was a considerable burden for the new state's budget and institutional capacity. The fall of the Soviet Union also left Ukraine to defend its own borders, a task that initially fell to its newly created military forces...Security assistance, border guards, and boarder fortifications were secondary, if not tertiary, concerns for the assistance providers, and therefore for Ukraine, which could hardly afford to revamp its military and civil service to create a separate border guard force. Border protection continues to be quite undeveloped after a series of false starts over the last seven years."⁴⁰

³⁹ Katherina W. Gonzales. Good Fences Make Good Neighbors. Problems of Post-Communism. (January-February, 2004). Vol.51, no.1, Pg.43.

⁴⁰ Ibid, Pg.45.

Currently little has changed. All of the military guards tasked to the protection of borders are still draftees. This has created significant problems; as in Georgia, where soldiers are chronically underpaid, and the allure of bribery can be too much to pass up. The domestic politics of adjoining countries such as Moldova where poverty has reached all time highs and whose Gross Domestic Product has shrunk by over 60%⁴¹, has caused severe illicit border problems with Ukraine. The Library of Congress adds;

“Because Transnistria adjoins Ukraine and has poor customs controls, the province is a weak link in the country’s anti-trafficking efforts. The large amounts of arms and munitions that remain in the region after its long post-Soviet occupation by Russia’s 14th Army are attractive targets for arms dealers. In 2002 the Ministry of Defense of Moldova was implicated with criminal organizations in a scheme to use smuggled oil to purchase arms in Transnistria, then sell the arms to Chechen rebels.”

In addition to the movement of arms in and out of the Ukraine from Moldova, Ukrainians have also had a severe struggle with drugs emanating out of Moldova’s border province, seizing ten times more cocaine, heroin, and opium in 2002, then in 2001 alone⁴². The border adjoining Russia is no better as the constant narcotics shipments from Euro-Asia continue their never ending trickle across Ukraine’s porous border. What’s more, although Ukraine destroyed the last of their nuclear missiles at the end of 2001, they still have all their nuclear equipment and material; including enriched weapons grade Uranium-235. This material poses a great security concern when adequate measures are not in place. Indeed as Katherina W. Gonzales goes onto explain, several separate disturbing incidents have demonstrated the gaps in Ukraine’s nuclear security program.

⁴¹ Library of Congress. Federal Research Division. Nations Hospitable to Organized Crime and Terrorism. October, 2003. Pg.

⁴² Katherina W. Gonzales. Good Fences Make Good Neighbors. Problems of Post-Communism. (January-February, 2004). Vol.51, no.1, Pg.48.

“In 1993, several kilograms of nuclear fuel were stolen from the Chernobyl complex. In August 1994, Ukraine was the suspected trans-shipment point for 363 grams of plutonium seized in Germany. In December 1994, according to a leaked German intelligence report, a Colombian arrested in Germany was working on an illicit deal to ship 4 grams of plutonium from Kyiv to Munich in several batches.”⁴³

And perhaps more distressing is another case of Russian military corruption;

“In 1995, two Russian military personnel arrested in Kyiv were in possession of nuclear fuel for atomic submarines. In 1999, three Russians tried to smuggle 20 kilograms of processed natural uranium to the west.”⁴⁴

Because of all these incidents, the European Union has stepped in to aid the Ukrainians in beefing up their security measures. The European Union has created joint projects and initiatives; which among other things, aims at strengthening border security.

Katherina W. Gonzales continues;

“The EU routinely disburses funds to Ukraine for the express purpose of providing border guards with the resources they need to counteract border crime. All of these initiatives are products of the larger framework of the Ukrainian Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). The PCA discusses, at least in general terms, the need for cross-border and regional cooperation on Ukrainian security issues as they relate to regional economic interests.”⁴⁵

Additionally Ukraine has also joined the Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS).⁴⁶ This group; established in 1996, allows Ukraine to receive money for regional cooperation initiatives that focus on border concerns. A sub-grouping of TACIS, the Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia initiative (TRACECA) has also provided Ukraine the ability to harmonize European border procedures.

Katherina W. Gonzales clarifies;

⁴³ Ibid, Pg.49.

⁴⁴ Katherina W. Gonzales. Good Fences Make Good Neighbors. Problems of Post-Communism. (January-February, 2004). Vol.51, no.1. Pg.49.

⁴⁵ Ibid, Pg.51.

⁴⁶ Ibid, Pg.51.

“The TRACECA Harmonization of Border Crossing Procedures technical-assistance project trains Ukrainian border guards in practices pertaining to documentation, fees, and international standards regarding transparency and customs procedures”⁴⁷

The United States has also seen the need to increase assistance to Ukraine in their border needs, and has provided both money and technical support. In particular they have given 4 million dollars in aid for increased security along the Ukrainian border with Moldova and radiation detection equipment.

REASONS WHY

It is important to remember that the armed forces like any institution of the government within a country is made up of workers who are shaped and influenced by the events transpiring within their country. The politics and the socio-economic conditions of the day thus have a profound effect on how departments are run. This can be precarious when we remember the role that militaries have in the legitimization of government. Professor Gregory D. Foster builds on this role of the state and what problems can occur if this role has been tainted by corruption. In his paper, ‘Ethics, Government, and Security- The Democratic Imperative’ he addresses three strategic aims of a democracy. These strategic aims are; assured security, the prevention of disruptive, resource-consuming crisis, and finally the preservation of civil society- or the interconnecting institutions and societal values that give democracy meaning and enable it to function properly.⁴⁸ When one remembers the fall of communism brought about the breakup of the Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc nations such as Yugoslavia, it is clear that all of these aims have been compromised. It is also clear

⁴⁷ Ibid, Pg.51.

⁴⁸ Gregory Foster. Ethics, Government and Security. The Humanist (May/June 2001). Pg.7.

from these strategic aims that assured security can only occur when a military is under the firm control of a responsible, democratic, civilian authority. This also has been severely compromised when Eastern Europe saw the transition politically from Communism to Capitalism. Because of this sudden rupture in political ideologies and the break-up for example of a single Soviet army into some 15 new, independent ones, the task of reorganization has been enormous. The decay of certain portions of the armed forces into corruption because of the chaos seems only natural. This has in many ways allowed the military to become a hindrance to social stability. Professor Foster explains;

'A military that, in providing for the common defense, creates injustice or denies civil liberties to the citizenry or diverts valuable resources from the general welfare diminishes rather than contributes to national security. Such a military thereby fails both ethically and strategically to fulfill its end of the social contract."⁴⁹

It is out of this political, economic and social chaos that we begin to understand why corruption occurs. ECCO the European group representing conscript army organized countries builds on this explanation of corruption within the armed forces. They explain in part;

"Corruption in the armed forces can not be separated from corruption in society as a whole, because it is related to the social-economic situation and the mentality of citizens. Corruption is likely to prevail in conditions of weak control imposed by the government and senior officials, and in countries that go through a social-economic crisis. Corruption is also likely to occur more in countries where civil servants and military personnel have low wages, which do not permit them to provide reasonable living conditions for themselves and for their families. This does not imply that corruption does not occur in economically highly developed societies, but it is likely to be less of a problem there than in economically less developed countries."⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Gregory Foster. Ethics, Government and Security. The Humanist (May/June 2001). Pg.7.

⁵⁰ ECCO. Theme 1- Corruption in the armed forces. (19, 20 October, 2000).

Unfortunately for many countries in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, all these conditions have occurred. Low wages, ill treatment and the alluring pull of black markets has allowed whole military company units to degenerate into corrupt behavior. One need only look at the wages paid by many of these countries per month as compared to their Western European counterparts on figure 3.1 to see clearly why soldiers often turn to corruption. It appears that for many of these conscript countries, they provide food and lodging for their conscript soldiers but little else in the way of a wage. This can be especially difficult for a family when the main income provider is drafted into military service for extended periods. The comparison between a country like Austria and the Czech Republic or Belarus is most striking.

figure 3.1

Salaries of Conscripts in Different European Countries by Rank

Data written in blue are not officially confirmed by the partners of ECCO

private	land force	air force	navy	ministry of interior	other
Austria	420 DEM	no conscripts	no navy	no conscripts	no conscripts
Belarus	6 DEM				
Bulgaria	7 DEM				
Czech Rep	23 DEM	23 DEM	no navy	no conscripts	no conscripts
Denmark	1750 DEM				
Finland	200 DEM	200 DEM	200 DEM	no conscripts	no conscripts
France	20 DEM				
Germany	405 DEM				
Georgia	7 DEM	7 DEM	7 DEM	7 DEM	no conscripts
Hungary	30 DEM				

Italy	180 DEM				
Latvia	29 DEM				
Lithuania	18 DEM				
the Netherlands	No conscription				
Norway	550 DEM				
Portugal	77 DEM				
Russia	5.3 DEM	5.3 DEM	5.3 DEM	5.3 DEM	5.3 DEM
Slovakia	23 DEM				
Slovenia	32 DEM				
Spain	25 DEM				
Sweden	307 DEM				
officer	land force	air force	navy	ministry of interior	other
Austria	500 DEM	no conscripts	no navy	no conscripts	no conscripts
Czech Rep	36-45 DEM	36-45 DEM	no navy	no conscripts	no conscripts
Finland	205 DEM	205 DEM	205 DEM	no conscripts	no conscripts
Georgia	no conscripts	no conscripts	no conscripts	no conscripts	no conscripts

Additionally ill treatment and human rights abuses of these conscript soldiers by older recruits or their officers are a continuing problem. This was indicated by the office of the Commissioner for Human Rights most clearly when the Commissioner and the Commission of the Council of Federation on International Affairs of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation met in Moscow in December 2002 to discuss human rights in the armed forces.

The Commissioner explains;

“The prohibition of all treatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR is absolute but it appears that cases of ill-treatment are still commonplace in numerous European armies. These chiefly involve bullying of new recruits

by older recruits, which is tolerated or even encouraged by officers to harden up youngsters and break them in. It has been practiced in France, Spain and the United Kingdom but poses a problem above all in central and eastern European countries, especially Ukraine, Poland and Russia, where it is known as “dedovchina”. Humiliating chores, harassment, abuses of authority, cruelty to the point of torture, and suicides are frequent.”⁵¹

The Commissioner went on to say that the prevention of such abuses is the sole responsibility of military commanders. Independent supervisory bodies, not subject to direct military hierarchical control such as the Polish Ombudsmen, must be put in place to receive individual complaints of corrupt behavior or human rights violations⁵². Also proper rehabilitation and psychological counseling is necessary after such cases have occurred. The Commissioner clarifies;

“Military commanders bear sole responsibility for the application of laws, including those protecting the human rights or health of conscripts. The “legal literacy” of officer corps, the raising of awareness of human rights issues among officers and soldiers, the review of training programs for conscripts and improvements in soldiers’ living conditions, must be constantly examined.”⁵³

Proper funding of regional and sub-regional agencies to provide oversight and direction in military affairs however has remained a constant problem within the framework and overall structural re-organization of Eastern European and Caucasus governments. Most governments simply do not have the proper resources, or manpower necessary to combat these abuses, or the influences of other negative factors like transnational criminal organizations. Corrective efforts on the part of government becomes even more challenging when one takes into account the blurred

⁵¹ The Commissioner for Human Rights. Seminar On Human Rights and the Armed Forces. Moscow, (5-6 December 2002). Pg.11.

⁵² The Commissioner for Human Rights. Seminar On Human Rights and the Armed Forces. Moscow, (5-6 December 2002). Pg.11.

⁵³ Ibid, Pg.11.

lines between legitimate and criminal behavior that takes place within their country. The lack of trust that citizens have in their governments and military who they view as corrupt is a major hurdle that must be tackled. Citizens feel both alienated from their leaders and unaware as to their enhanced rights in a democratic society. Living for so many decades under the tyranny of communism, there is a psychological block on the part of the masses as to how to properly combat corruption. Many simply expect corruption within government and the armed forces as a way of life. As Christopher A. Corpora points out in his intriguing article on the clandestine political economy of the former Yugoslavia, entitled, 'The Untouchables', there are two issues that must first be addressed before changes can occur.

“First, active measures need to be taken to address the systematic lack of accountability, from the international community down to the individual citizen. Improvements will come through institutional reform, genuine oversight, and public education. Legal and institutional effectiveness is built on a foundation of public trust. Without this trust in place, the rule of law will be largely unenforceable.”⁵⁴

He continues;

“The second issue, following directly from the first, is the need for deeper, sustained, and better-coordinated public education. The rights and duties of democratic citizenship are unevenly communicated and understood in the region...The lack of clear, consistent international-community programs stands out as a key illustration of perceived complicity in the problems.”⁵⁵

Clearly, it is evident that continued structural changes are in order within governments. Not only is there a need to create better accountability and transparency within government, but also more innovation and funds are necessary if governments ever hope to keep pace with, let alone curb the rising dominance of criminal organizations.

⁵⁴ Christopher A. Corpora. The Untouchables. Problems of Post-Communism. (May/June 2004). Pg.66.

⁵⁵ Ibid, Pg.66.

Gregory Foster agrees with the assessments of both the Commissioner for Human Rights and Christopher A. Corpora. He explains;

“For ethical propriety to thrive, there clearly must be enforceable and enforced laws and regulations that proscribe impropriety and provide for appropriate penalties.”⁵⁶

Towards that end, Gregory Foster identifies three preconditions that are absolutely necessary for the effective management of militaries. The first and most basic of these is the already mentioned need for transparency. He explains;

“The opening of government to public scrutiny through the various mechanisms experience has shown necessary for the purpose: mandatory reporting of public expenditures and political contributions, an independent judiciary, a free press, unfettered nongovernmental watchdog groups and the like.”⁵⁷

The second precondition necessary is leadership. That is, “the consistent practice by those in authority of exemplary behavior, of walking the talk of virtue and thus demonstrating one’s worthiness for the emulation by others.”⁵⁸ This is vital, as individual soldiers must have role models from which they can draw strength and who they can approach if corruption occurs. This however can only occur if soldiers have the proper knowledge to first identify then react to corrupt behavior. This is where the final condition fits in. This last precondition is proper education and training⁵⁹. Foster concludes;

“Ethical conduct isn’t something that can be imposed, nor is it something that can be acquired or adopted as a result of infrequent mass lectures on standards of conduct. It is a conditioned mode of critical thinking that has to be regularly and constantly instilled, exercised, and tested through rigorous inquiry, reflection, and dialogue.”⁶⁰

⁵⁶ Gregory Foster. Ethics, Government and Security. The Humanist (May/June 2001). Pg.8.

⁵⁷ Gregory Foster. Ethics, Government and Security. The Humanist (May/June 2001). Pg.8.

⁵⁸ Ibid, Pg.8.

⁵⁹ Ibid, Pg.8.

⁶⁰ Ibid, Pg.8.

CONCLUSION

Militaries have a vital role in legitimizing government and protecting the civil liberties of citizens in a democratic state. This relationship must be held up to constant scrutiny, and the members of the armed forces must maintain the highest caliber in actions and deeds. Any involvement between the military and organized crime can affect the very stability of the state. Adding to the complexity of controlling corruption and organized crime is the changing nature of criminal organizations. The growth, complexity, and militancy of organised crime is creating an environment where governments are failing to keep pace with criminal activity. If the past decade is any indication of future trends, the ability of law enforcement to enact meaningful disruptions on criminal behavior is bleak.

In the countries of Eastern Europe and Caucasus who have seen severe disruptions politically as well as economically over the past decade, the challenge of controlling organized crime is great. Organized crime has taken advantage of social turmoil in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus and has in many countries corrupted civilian as well as military beurocracies. The only way governments can hope to halt corruption in the armed forces and curb the alluring pull of illicit behavior is to improve the living conditions and wages of military members. Above all governments must also improve co-ordination, legislative reform, training and restructuring, accountability, and finally transparency if any lasting change can occur. For the fledgling democracies of Eastern Europe and the Caucasus who are struggling to balance civil rights against extending detainment and surveillance powers, this task is an enormous one. There is no other alternative however. Georgia's Rose Revolution in November 2003, Ukraine's

Orange Revolution in 2004, and Kyrgyzstan's Tulip Revolution in 2005 are proof that citizens now demand better from both their militaries and from their government.

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