

‘MOUNTING OFFSHORE OPERATIONS USING THE RESERVE FORCES AND HOW IT IMPACTED ON HOMELAND DEFENCE AND SECURITY - THE UNITED KINGDOM EXPERIENCE’.

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Aim

The aim of this paper is to analyse and evaluate the impact of mounting offshore operations with the support of the UK Reserve Forces and its impact on homeland defence and security.

Introduction

The author has been asked to provide an insight into the continuing evolution of the UK’s experience in mounting offshore operations using reservists and its impact on homeland defence and security. Reserve service in the UK has traditionally been strong. It has attracted individuals who view membership as part of their vocation in life or, their ‘own time’ activity, in addition to maintaining a full-time job / career / family. The voluntary nature of their service and their level of commitment makes them stand out within their peer groups and provides the UK Armed Forces with reservists who not only serve the country in their civilian capacity but, individuals who also train to serve on operations in support of the Regular Armed Forces.² This enthusiasm mirrors the

¹ The author completed his tour as Deputy Inspector General Territorial Army in April 2003. He continues to serve in the reserves and in November 2003 attended the Defence Strategic Leadership Programme at the Defence College, Shrivenham. He is currently undertaking a PhD at the Aberdeen Business School on; ‘*Corporate Strategy, Identity and Image – Its relevance to the UK’s Armed Forces?*’.

² See Barry Strauss’s very interesting article on “Reflections on the Citizen Soldier” for the experience in the United States of America based on his own experience and family, Parameters, Summer, 2003.

sentiment of the Head of the Charity Commission in the UK who said; “passion lights up the soul of an organisation”. Their dual training and employability creates added value and depth in all phases of war, from high intensity operations through to peacekeeping and reconstruction where the synergistic effect of the reserve’s dual capability has been ably demonstrated in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and, most recently, in Iraq.

The inherent civilian education and training of reservists, their diverse backgrounds and origins make them well suited to post-conflict operations and homeland defence and security. The UK is utilising its regional infrastructure and its reservists to support the civil authorities and regular forces in a homeland defence and security role. The use of reservists for homeland defence and security was declared operational on 31st December 2003. In this paper, the author will give a personal view of the concept of Civil Contingency Reaction Forces (CCRF) within the UK, its impact on reserve service and a reflection through lessons learned from the UK mobilising reservists in support of offshore operations primarily using the Army in context.³

Approach

The context for this paper has been provided from a wide source of journal articles and reports that have been written by non-UK authors. This broad perspective allows the author to place the UK experience in the context of the global experience of responding to international terrorism and the consequential need for the use of reservists for offshore operations and homeland defence and security.

³ Offshore Operations are often referred to as Overseas Operations within the UK.

The author will also use his own knowledge and experience of reserve service to reflect on the growing use of the UK's Reserve Forces to mount offshore operations across the full spectrum of military operations from low to high intensity. He will also try to highlight some recent examples of reserve service as individuals and formed sub-units to explain or clarify his observations. In compiling the evidence to support this paper and to provide a degree of objectivity, the author has consulted the findings from the ABCA Reserves Forum (September 2003), the available information on SDR New Chapter and the Future Army Structure in the UK, the considered views of a selective but representative sample of TA Commanding Officers who are actively involved in providing support to offshore operations and the implementation and delivery of CCRFs, published information and data provided by the Directorate of Reserve Forces and Cadets in the MOD⁴, the National Employer Advisory Board (NEAB) and the Reserve Forces and Cadets Association (RFCA).⁵

Trying to produce a short paper on such a wide ranging, complex and dynamic subject is not easy. The author will therefore try to develop a number of interconnected issues and an over-arching theme that will help to illuminate the topic and highlight a number of the lessons learned from a UK perspective.

⁴ The UK has now created a senior reserves appointment at 2* level. Maj Gen The Duke of Westminster KG OBE TD DL will become the first Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Reserves & Cadets) on 1 April 2004. He will be based at the MOD in London.

⁵ Information contained within this paper was verified at the RFCA AGM held on the 18th March 2004 in Edinburgh where Maj Gen The Duke of Westminster and a TA CO presented on a national and commanders perspective and experience of mobilising reservists on the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq.

Historic Perspective

In recent times, the UK's Reserve Forces have witnessed significant change in keeping with the strategic development of the UK's Armed Forces to be able to meet current and future operational needs and threats. In recent times, Defence in the UK has been heavily committed at home and overseas. This is a costly business and, although Defence does not have shareholders to satisfy, it does have stakeholders who have the authority and who exercise the power in terms of the commitment of the UK's Armed Forces and the level of Defence spending necessary to meet those commitments. Options for Change in the early 1990s signalled the first stage of this strategic shift in terms of the country's strategy and structure of the UK's Armed Forces. There was a reduction in the size of the Armed Forces, both regular and reserve but perhaps the biggest change in size was made to the regular forces; albeit, there were also some significant changes made to the size, roles and tasks of the reserves.⁶ Faced by change in both the regular and the reserve components of the UK's Armed Forces produced a degree of uncertainty. The Reserve Forces at this time remained a 'reserve of last resort'.

The Strategic Defence Review (SDR) followed in 1996. This review had a greater impact on the UK's Reserve Forces. The Territorial Army (TA); for example, was reduced from 59,000 to 41,204 personnel, a reduction of approximately 30 per cent.⁷ The military impact of the change was to the size, role and structure of the TA and was intended to improve the military capability and output of the UK's Reserve Forces. The

⁶ The author commanded 105 (Scottish) Air Defence Regiment (Volunteers) during this period and was tasked to amalgamate 105 (Scottish) Air Defence Regiment (Volunteers) and 102 (Ulster) Air Defence Regiment (Volunteers) based in Northern Ireland to form the 105th Regiment Royal Artillery (Volunteers) with Batteries in Scotland and Northern Ireland.

re-shaping of the reserve component to compliment the required military capability in support of the regular forces on operations produced a leaner and fitter reserve but for a time failed to recognise or appreciate the intangible strengths of a truly voluntary force. It helped to improve some of the tangible or perceived weaknesses in military capability and operational effectiveness of the reserve components. It did not fully recognise the inherent benefits and added value of many of the intangible elements that form part of a voluntary organisation and its ethos or *raison d'être*.⁸ The UK possessed a rich resource that was not fully appreciated or valued for the totality of its potential contribution to defence in the UK.⁹

SDR signalled a step-change in the use of the UK's Reserve Forces and the need to create a mobilisation culture within the UK's Reserve Forces. The reserves in the UK had been viewed as a 'reserve of last resort' to be used in the eventuality of a national crisis or emergency although individual reservists had volunteered to serve in support of the regular forces at home and on operations overseas. SDR provided the will and the impetus to make the reserves more useable, more relevant and more integrated. The evolution of the mobilisation culture within the UK's Reserve Forces and the ongoing development of the concept of a more useable, more relevant and more integrated reserve led to the government's SDR New Chapter. It encompasses the experience of the wider use of reserves and the many lessons learned from the voluntary and compulsory mobilisation of the UK's Reserve Forces in support of enduring operations worldwide. The reserve component of the UK's Armed Forces is

⁷ This establishment figure included 3,500 cadets within the 19 Universities Officer Training Corps within the UK. The cadets are not deployable as Category C trainees. The true Category A deployable strength of the TA was therefore 37,704 personnel.

now a 'reserve of choice' and is essential to the mounting of all operations involving the UK's Armed Forces.¹⁰

Issues

The increased utilisation of reserves by the UK's Armed Forces raises a number of strategic issues that have helped to inform this paper and influence the author's approach to trying to address the conference theme and his specific topic at the conference. The emerging issues appear to be:

- the utility of the reserves;
- integration of the reserves;
- justified use of the reserves;
- developing sustainable relationships with the reserves, their families and their employers;
- over-stretch of reserve capability or availability;
- the measured and sustainable use of the reserves;
- the effective support and compensation to all stakeholders involved in the use of reserves; and,
- effective communication of intent, justification, fairness and equity between the various partners (MOD, reservists, families, employers, community).

Overarching Theme

The over-arching theme linking these issues is the justifiable and sustainable use of the UK's Reserve Forces for offshore operations and homeland defence and security while maintaining the full support of all the relevant stakeholders. The author in developing this theme recognises the finite limit of available resources, time and

⁸ The author is referring to the off-balance sheet value of goodwill, enthusiasm, commitment, transferable knowledge, skills and experience that the reservist possesses. In general, these attributes are over and above the expected role he / she has been funded and trained for within the reserves.

⁹ The author served as a Divisional TA Colonel and advisor to the General Officer Commanding during SDR.

members of the Reserve Forces to meet the future demands and challenges of a markedly changing environment.

Greater use of reservists, their relevance and integration will necessitate a wider definition of its consequences in terms of capability. The reservist will not only have to be capable in terms of military competencies and capability but will also need to be capable of being mobilised in terms of being ready, available, confident in their preparation and training for operations; and, more importantly secure in terms of family and future employment.

Offshore Operations

UK reservists had not been called-up in strength since the Suez Crisis. Reserve service was considered by the public and the media in the UK to be 'Weekend Warriors'. This image did not reflect the reality of the changing face of the UK's Reserve Forces. The Conservative Government of the 1980s considered using reservists for the Falklands War but in the end adjudged it not to be necessary.¹¹ However, they were used in the Gulf War as individuals and selected formed units; for example, a TA Field Hospital was deployed as a formed unit with its own command structure.¹² At this time, there was no infrastructure in place to facilitate the mobilisation of reservists. This resulted in a less than efficient mobilisation process and hampered the effective integration of the reservists into theatre to join their receiving units. In the early stages of

¹⁰ This is a publicly endorsed view and is fully supported in the Reserves Section of SDR New Chapter (2003).

¹¹ Individual specialist reservists were mobilised but not formed sub-units / units.

¹² A TA Field Hospital [205 (Scottish) Field Hospital (Volunteers)] was deployed as a formed unit.

the wider use of reserves, it could have been handled better. Many lessons were learned from the experience of the Gulf War and they have now been used to inform the UK's thinking, structure and process for mobilising its Reserve Forces.

More recently, voluntary mobilisation has been used extensively in Bosnia and Kosovo where 10 per cent of the force has consistently been made up of reservists.¹³ Towards the end of the 20th century, the UK began to consider the use of composite TA sub-unit deployments in more benign environments for peacekeeping and reconstruction roles where the synergistic benefits of the reservists civilian and military skills and expertise could be fully utilised. This has allowed regular forces to be re-deployed for higher intensity operations or for the effective roulement of regular troops within and outwit each theatre of operation.¹⁴ To be able to deliver this step-change in the use of reserves, the UK made a strategic decision to establish a dedicated Reserve and Mobilisation Training Centre (RTMC) in Nottinghamshire.¹⁵ This strategic initiative was vital and provided the tangible bridge between reserve service in the UK and the operational theatres where reservists were likely to serve.

The RTMC has demonstrably justified its role and purpose in that it is now a Tri-Service organisation that has been recognised as a Centre of Excellence. It is also used to prepare an ongoing supply of regular troops and reinforcements to theatre, the majority of reservists and more recently government employees involved in the military and operational environments both in the UK and overseas. A TA Commanding Officer and his Regimental Sergeant Major recently deployed to Iraq to visit their officers and

¹³ UK Director of Reserve Forces and Cadets published statistics. Both Regular Reservists and Voluntary Reservists.

¹⁴ The current UK contingent in the Balkans consists of 15% reservists and in Iraq the figure is 14% as of March 2004 (ACDS (Reserves & Cadets) 18th March 2004).

soldiers and both were required to be processed through the RTMC as part of their deployment. The Commanding Officer was later to comment:

“ The process at RTMC is very slick and my view was echoed by all I spoke to on the subject including the Deputy Commander London District who I met on the return flight The kit issue went very well and it is clear that there are no more lingering issues related to kit and that there are no complaints about kit from soldiers on the ground as it matched exactly that which was issued to the Regular Army. This is a major step forward from a morale perspective.”¹⁶

The increased utilisation of reserves and the establishment of the RTMC was a defining moment for reserve service in the UK. Politicians and commanders were more likely to ask the questions ‘when’ and ‘how’ rather than ‘if’, they should use the reserves. Having risen to the challenge of an increased likelihood of service with the regular forces in support of enduring operations at home and overseas, the next defining moment for reservists was the 11th September 2001. The aftermath produced a shockwave around the world and a reality check on the national security of all nations and within the international environment.

The UK had experienced terrorism in Northern Ireland for over 30 years but this new emerging threat was from International Terrorism from both identified and unidentified groupings.¹⁷ The UK, like most of its allies, reassessed its policies and procedures for Homeland Defence and Security in the light of the horrific events of September 11th in America. In the UK, there was the political will to contemplate the strategic use of the UK’s Reserve Forces as ‘a reserve of choice’ and a fully integrated

¹⁵ The RTMC is located in the middle of the UK with good road, rail and air links as well as in the centre of an existing military establishment and chain of command.

¹⁶ The CO and RSM deployed to Iraq in February 2004 and the unit has provided reservists to support a regular unit and is due to deploy further troops in the near future.

part of the UK's response to the aftermath of the events of September 11th. SDR New Chapter contained a section on the UK's Reserve Forces and its role in support of enduring offshore operations and homeland defence and security.

Homeland Defence and Security

As part of SDR New Chapter, the UK developed the concept of Civil Contingency Reaction Forces (CCRF) that was announced by the Ministry of Defence (MOD) in October 2002. They are designed to enhance the Armed Forces ability to support the civil police and other civil authorities during Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) type operations. The CCRFs are drawn from the full range of Reserve Forces in the UK and are commanded from within the Chain of Command at national, regional and local level.

These forces are Tri-Service and therefore represent a joint approach to the delivery of the concept using all of the UK's Reserve Forces. The TA Infantry has been given an enhanced role and will provide the backbone of the CCRF concept due to their geographic coverage and links to the civil community. There are 14 CCRFs in the UK, all of whom will be capable of deploying at short notice in support of the civil authorities to assist at the scene of an incident or emergency. The CCRF will not necessarily be the only source of military aid that would be available to support the civil authorities. They would be deployed depending on the nature and scale of the incident or emergency. In all instances, Regular Forces would provide the immediate support on

¹⁷ The author served as a Platoon Commander in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s at the time of the Internment Riots.

the request of the civilian authorities followed by the CCRFs who would be on a lower readiness state.

The intention is to use the CCRF to provide general duties support; for example, reconnaissance, access control, assistance with the management of displaced persons, limited first aid, temporary accommodation management, manning of feeding and water points and the management of command, control and communication mechanisms. Specialist operations would be provided by the civil emergency services and where necessary they would be augmented by regular forces with the necessary skills and expertise.

The fundamental principal for the CCRF is that of a flexible but measured response. The reinforcing nature of reserve service allows the CCRF to gain the unique advantage and strengths of the reserves who live and work in the local community and therefore possess local knowledge, experience and a network of relevant contacts within the local authorities and the civil community. Flexibility also implies that a CCRF can be used to support an incident or emergency in any part of the UK where they would come under command of the regional or local commander. In essence, the MOD has created a pool of volunteers, nationally, who could be called upon to help across the UK. The Government has made available additional resources such as money, equipment and established manpower to allow the CCRF concept to be developed and implemented.¹⁸

¹⁸ The system and process for contingency planning and for providing MACA has been seriously tested in recent years with the Foot and Mouth Epidemic and more recently the Fireman's Strike where Commander Regional Forces was given the responsibility for providing support to the Civil Authorities throughout the UK. This experience and lessons learned helped to formulate the CCRF concept and Strategy.

The CCRF was declared fully operational on 31st December 2003. Headquarters Land Command has the overall responsibility for delivering the operational capability and authority has been devolved to the Commander Regional Forces (CRF) who is a 3* Commander. Each of the 14 CCRFs across the UK is commanded by a 1* Commander who now has a reinforced headquarters consisting of Tri-Service reservists acting as Liaison Officers, Watchkeepers, Staff Officers, Signallers, Clerks and General Duties (catering and drivers).¹⁹ The available pool of CCRF manpower from within the UK is greater than the requirement. The concept is strengthened and given added depth and security by virtue of the flexible nature of the pool of CCRF trained personnel and their ability to be deployed as and when necessary within the UK. To-date this new concept has not been tested for real. However, the declaration of operational readiness has required all aspects of the proposed structure, procedures, process, practice to be tested and adjusted with the associated appraisal of the allocation of resources necessary to deliver the operational capability.²⁰

Lessons Learned

With the benefit of time and hindsight, the use of reserves in the UK has been evolutionary rather than revolutionary. The successive reviews have produced structural change and a change in emphasis for the reserve component within the UK's Armed Forces. The result is a smaller, leaner and fitter reserve that is delivering increased levels of military and operational capability both at home and overseas. This smaller

¹⁹ Each CCRF has a planning figure of 500 personnel; primarily, imbedded in the TA Infantry Establishment but if necessary augmented by All Arms support within the brigade area; for example, London.

²⁰ The CO of the 52nd Lowland Regiment confirmed this to the RFCA AGM on the 18th March 2004. He commands the local CCRF in the Lowlands of Scotland.

pool of reserves and its increased utility and support to the operational capability of the UK's Armed Forces has necessitated the development of the 'intelligent mobilisation concept'. It recognises the value and 'sensitive nature' of this additional capability.²¹ The use of Intelligent Mobilisation and Cap Badge Champions has enabled the Armed Forces to manage this delicate process and to minimise both the mobilisation and operational risks of calling-up the UK's Reserve Forces.

The establishment of a dedicated Centre of Excellence to accept, confirm and transfer reservists from the home to the operational environment has built the necessary bridge which has helped to develop greater trust and confidence in the reliability, delivery and care of reservists who either volunteer or are compulsorily mobilised for ongoing and enduring offshore operations. The demobilisation process is equally important and over the years the UK has consistently developed its policies and procedures to extract reservists from theatre and to return them safely and considerately to their families and civilian employment.²² This is an area where the UK will continue to evolve and share best practice with its allies.²³ The type and nature of the operation may in future require more detailed analysis of the requirement for a period of 'normalisation' as practised routinely by the USA and Canada.

The philosophy and process of greater integration between regular and reserve has gained momentum through the wider use and deployment of reservists as individuals and composite sub-units. This has changed the perception of both the

²¹ 'Sensitive' in that the UK's Reserve Forces remain a voluntary organisation, which needs to be sensitive to the needs of the individual reservist, their family and their employer. Time and availability are precious commodities to the reservist, the Armed Forces and the employer. Intelligent Mobilisation and the use of Cap Badge Champions help to manage this sensitivity and its inherent risk.

²² The MOD and DRFC continue to reflect and consider how this process can be further developed and refined to best support reservists.

reservists and their regular counterparts. The units consulted by the author confirmed that reservists are now viewed as an integral part of the operational environment and are recognised individually and collectively for military and complimentary civilian skills; especially, in theatres of operation involving peacekeeping and reconstruction.²⁴ The very skills that make the reservists suited to the homeland defence and security role and tasks is being replicated during offshore operations.

The demonstrable use of reservists has raised their profile politically, militarily and within the community. In a way, this could be considered to be a double-edged sword as it could in time beg the question from families and employers as to the legitimacy of using reservists for offshore operations such as Afghanistan or Iraq. Indeed, research of UK employers identified that some employers would extend the above question to peace enforcement / peacekeeping and reconstruction operations.²⁵ This increased transparency and awareness of the use of the Reserve Forces in the UK and feedback from employers has led the MOD to consider further the need or otherwise to routinely notify employers that they have a member of the Reserve Forces employed within their workforce.²⁶

The wider use of the reserves and the use of compulsory mobilisation for certain operations has led the MOD to re-evaluate the need to inform employers as part of the MODs intent to build trust and an ongoing relationship and dialogue with the UK's

²³ The ABCA Reserves Forum highlighted areas of 'Best Practice' from the USA and Canada, which has been conveyed to the MOD via the Army.

²⁴ Examples exist of members of the Reserve Forces advising on the civil infrastructure projects; for example, law and order, transport system, sanitation, education, power supplies etc.. Some complete their tour of duty and return in a civilian capacity under a contract to help with the reconstruction.

²⁵ Research carried out on behalf of the National Employer Liaison Committee (now National Employer Advisory Board) by Taylor Nelson (Research Consultants), 2001/02.

employer community. During the operations in Iraq, support from employers in the UK has been excellent and it will be very important in the future to continue to develop an on-going dialogue and relationship with this very important stakeholder to consolidate their understanding and support for the wider use of the UK's Reserve Forces.²⁷ There is little doubt that the support of the UK's employers is critical to the continued use of reservists for enduring operations and homeland defence and security. Winning and maintaining their support will require the MOD and the reservists to explain clearly to their employers and families the benefits and the compensation available to them on the mobilisation of the reservist. Sustaining a mobilisation culture within the UK's Reserve Forces will necessitate a careful balance between a number of key issues concerning reservists, their employers and their families:

- fully utilising the resources, competencies and capability of the Reserve Forces without over-using them;
- justifying the use of the Reserve Forces in support of Regular Forces as opposed to using them as non-justifiable substitutes for regulars on roles and tasks which bring Defence into conflict-of-interest with employers, families and the local communities who may well depend on the same skills and expertise that is required by the Armed Forces; for example, medical.
- gauging the risk of alienating employers and families when weighed against the cost and benefits of utilising reservists on offshore operations and their potential use for homeland defence and security.
- danger of haemorrhaging the goodwill and voluntary nature of reserve service in the UK; and,
- looking carefully at the ongoing nature and extent of integration of the Regular and Reserve Forces within the UK.

²⁶ A HQ Land Command survey of the Territorial Army in 2002 using a representative and statistically valid sample of TA officers and soldiers indicated that approximately 93% of the TA had already informed their employers of their membership of the TA. Based on this evidence, routine notification was deemed by the Army to be unnecessary.

²⁷ Confirmed by ACDS (Reserves & Cadets) during his presentation on the 18th March 2004, Edinburgh.

The above strategic issues are being explored as part of SDR New Chapter and the work currently being carried out at the MOD regarding the Future Army Structure. At this point in time, the recommendations have been endorsed by the Executive Committee of the Army Board but they have yet to be announced publicly. The author can only surmise that there will be a clearly laid down UK policy on the future use of reservists by compulsory mobilisation in support of deliberate intervention operations and the continued use of voluntary mobilisation of reservists for enduring operations up to medium scale when the idea of harmony within a country has broken down.

The author dares to enter into the realms of management speak in the context of a military topic. Nevertheless, the emerging evidence points to the need for the Armed Forces to build strategic partnerships / alliances particularly within the public sector to be able to deliver some areas of capability and its intention to make more use of specialist reservists. Innovative approaches will require inter-departmental agreement within Government and a Tri-Service approach to be able to deliver some aspects of military capability; for example, medical and logistical support. The need is to be able to deliver clearly defined and previously agreed capability where there exists commonality of purpose, need and delivery. The research in the UK indicated that the Public Sector employed a significant number of reservists and therefore the Armed Forces were competing for a share of the same skills and expertise.²⁸

²⁸ At the Director Royal Artillery Conference in January 2004, the Commandant of the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst highlighted the fact that he was obliged to agree to three members of his staff being mobilised. Many in the audience assumed that he was referring to military personnel. He was in fact speaking as an employer of three members of his academic staff who were member of the Reserve Forces.

Future Research / Developments

The author has alluded to a number of areas which might require further development; namely, the refinement of intelligent mobilisation, the evolution of demobilisation and the requirement for a period of normalisation after mobilised service, the continued development of the CCRF concept within the UK, a re-evaluation of the need for routine notification to employers and the development of strategic partnerships / alliances between the Government, military and key sectors or employers. Having created a mobilisation culture within the UK's Reserve Forces and utilised compulsory mobilisation for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is timely to reflect on this experience by carrying out quantitative and qualitative research on the impact on the Reserve Forces as an organisation, the reservists and their future employment prospects, their families and their employers. This scientific evidence will help inform future discussion and debate on the key question posed in the author's over-arching theme, that of the sustainability of using the UK's Reserve Forces for offshore operations and homeland defence and security while maintaining the full support of all the relevant stakeholders. The justifiable reasons why (qualitative) are as important as the what (quantitative). This balanced approach will make it much easier to formulate future policy on how the UK makes full use of its Reserve Forces in a realistic, feasible and acceptable way.

It is too early to judge the real impact of the Reserve Forces providing the infrastructure and Tri-service personnel for the CCRF to deliver the tasks outlined earlier in this paper. Their principal role is to support the civil authorities and the Regular Forces in homeland defence and security of the UK. At this stage, it appears that the

available manpower and flexibility allows for the ongoing eventuality that members of the CCRF could also be mobilised for offshore operations.²⁹

Conclusions

This short paper may appear to pose more questions than it answers but this merely reflects the dynamic nature of current operations and the strategic thinking that is necessary when considering the wider use of reserves in support of offshore operations and for homeland defence and security. In the current operational climate, the UK Reserve Forces may have come of age but it is less certain whether they have reached their full growth potential. In the case of individual reservists, the parties who have a vested interest in their growth and development are wider than parental or family groups. The government, departments of state, society, employers, families and the Armed Forces all appear to have a stake and vested interest in the future role and use of the UK's Reserve Forces. SDR New Chapter imbedded that future as an integral component of the UK's Armed Forces and one that is essential to the UK being able to mount future offshore operations and, to be able to provide support to the civil authorities for homeland defence and security through the recently established CCRF concept.

'Trained in peace for war and homeland defence and security' focuses the mind on the main theme of the justifiable and sustainable use of the UK's Reserve Forces in support of offshore operations and homeland defence and security. The UK's Reserve

²⁹ According to Hansard (26th January 2004), it appears that 765 (10%) of the current members of the CCRF are mobilised overseas or on active service in the UK. This is not deemed to be critical as the available national and regional manpower is well above requirement.

Forces have become a key element or stakeholder for the UK in terms of support to the civil authorities and the Regular Armed Forces. Their impact to-date has been significant in terms of mounting offshore operations and it is likely that the strengths in depth of the UK's Reserve Forces will be fully utilised to support the civil authorities and their regular counterparts for homeland defence and security. The resurgence of the term a 'citizen twice' strikes a cord with the current management concept of creating 'added value' or perhaps more accurately 'value for money'.

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