

## **USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT: AN EVALUATION OF THE CANADIAN-US ARMIES RESERVE RELATIONSHIP**

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“Put a framework and structure in place that transcends the personalities of the participants.”

- Brigadier General Herb M. Petras<sup>3</sup> 16 Dec 03.

Canada is one of the oldest and most trusted allies of the United States. These two countries enjoy the world’s longest undefended border as well as the world’s largest trading partnership. <sup>4</sup> At 5,525 miles, the Canada-US border represents tremendous opportunities for international trade, travel, commerce, and tourism. <sup>5</sup> However, this

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<sup>2</sup> The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

<sup>3</sup> Brigadier General Herb M. Petras, Director General, Land Reserve (Canada) from August 2000 to November 2003, interview by author, 16 December 2003, Fort Frontenac, Kingston, Ontario, Canada. He is currently the Director General, Land Combat Development (Canada). Cited with permission of Brigadier General Petras.

<sup>4</sup> Government of Canada, *Canada-United States Accord on Our Shared Border: Update 2000*, (Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: Minister of Public Works and Government Services, October 2000), 2 ; available from <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/pub/border.pdf>; Internet; accessed 16 March 2004.

<sup>5</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, *CIA World FactBook*, “Canada,” last updated 18 December 2003; available from <http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ca.html#Geo>; Internet; accessed 16 March 2004. According to the CIA World Factbook, Canada and the United States share 8,893 km of undefended border, including Alaska and the 48 contiguous United States.

openness also leads to numerous unintended problems since crime, illegal immigration, and terrorists flow easier across a border without fences or walls. In October 2000, government officials from Canada and the United States declared that:

“Each year, hundreds of billions of dollars in goods cross the border and there are more than 200 million border crossings by individuals. Both countries benefit immensely from cross-border commerce, travel and tourism, . . . To protect these mutual advantages, . . . the two governments must continue to work together to combat shared problems.”<sup>6</sup>

One of these “shared problems” is homeland defense. This is not a new concept. Canada and the United States created the Permanent Joint Board on Defense in 1940 with the Ogdensburg Agreement. This is the longest standing defense forum still in existence in the United States. Since then, the United States and Canada have created a variety of defense organizations and agreements. In fact, there exist today more than “eighty treaty-level defence [sic] agreements; more than 250 memoranda of understanding; and approximately 145 bilateral fora in which defence [sic] matters are discussed.”<sup>7</sup> Each of these has a unique purpose. However, not one of them has served the unique and reserve-specific requirements of the United States Army Reserve and the Canadian Land Forces Reserve until the first summit of general officers from the Armies Reserve of Canada and the United States in September 1999.<sup>8</sup>

To date, this forum has held six general officer level meetings. Even though it is relatively new, it has already created several successful programs and enlightened the army reserve leadership of both nations about good ideas in each others organizations

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<sup>6</sup> *Shared Border: Update 2000*, “Introduction,” 2.

<sup>7</sup> Government of Canada, *Canada-United States Defence Relations*, “Discussion, para. 3,” (Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: Department of National Defence Policy Group, January 2002); available from [http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/eng/defence/ca\\_us\\_relation\\_e.htm](http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/eng/defence/ca_us_relation_e.htm); Internet; accessed 16 March 2004.

<sup>8</sup> The term “Armies Reserve” is meant to include all army or land reserve forces in the United States and Canada. This includes the Canadian Land Force Reserve, the United States Army Reserve, and the United States Army National Guard.

that may translate well across the border. There are also a number of additional initiatives that are in different stages of completion. This forum has no sponsoring agency. It was created as a joint initiative by the Chief, Army Reserve (US) and the Director General, Land Force Reserve (CA) with the approval and support of the Chief of Staff, Army (US) and the Chief of the Land Staff (CA). Although it began rather modestly at first, the forum gained a great deal of momentum from the events of 9/11, resulting in a high mark of Canada-US Armies Reserve relations in the Spring of 2002. The future looked promising and the forum was on the verge of becoming an essential element to progress in cross-border army relations, military training, and international cooperation.

But, the past two years have brought significant challenges and changes. The senior military leadership for the active and reserve components in both nations has changed. Tens of thousands of reserve and national guard soldiers in the US and Canada have been mobilized in support of Operations Noble Eagle (ONE), Enduring Freedom (OEF), Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and other stability and peacekeeping operations. With these challenges and changes, the momentum of this forum has slowed, the perceived utility for some has weakened, and the forum faces possible extinction. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the value of this relationship, describe some potential uses of these meetings, and to suggest an alternative sponsorship.

## **HUMBLE BEGINNINGS**

In September 1999, the first significant contacts occurred on the margin of the Pacific Army Chiefs Conference (PACC), which occurred in Singapore, at the same time as the Pacific Armies Management Seminar (PAMS). PACC was the first time that

those armies had met at the Chief of Staff level, and provided for an opportunity for GEN Eric Shinseki to meet with his Canadian counterpart. The Chief, Army Reserve (US) and Director General, Land Force Reserve (CA) were also in Singapore attending PAMS.

Through the good offices of Ms. Christine Shelly, then Political Advisor to the Army Chief of Staff (who had joined the Army Staff following three years as Political Minister-Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Ottawa), it was arranged for Brigadier General Ken Quinn, the Canadian Land Forces Reserve Director General to meet Major General Thomas Plewes, Chief of the U.S. Army Reserve. COL Karen McClellan, the U.S. Army Attache in Ottawa, also played a key role in the initiation of these first contacts. As Ms. Shelly later commented:

“It was apparent to me that the Canadian Land Force Reserve, even while much smaller than the USAR, was undergoing considerable transformation and was grappling with many of the same challenges as the USAR. I suggested to both BG Quinn and LTG (then MG) Plewes that they might meet in Singapore and consider whether it made sense to look at a means for cooperation between the two organizations. . . . I believe that both saw the value in this and it happened.”<sup>9</sup>

Ms. Shelly played a key role in the formation of this forum. She had extensive experience with the Permanent Joint Defense Board from her time in Ottawa and was struck by the absence of such contacts in the respective reserve organizations. She recognized the benefit in having the two reserve organizations meet and sought GEN Shinseki's concurrence for the idea. GEN Shinseki not only concurred, he directed Ms. Shelly to support MG Plewes wherever possible. She helped to shape the agenda and direction of the first few meetings. And she ensured that the Permanent Joint Board on

Defense and its Chairman were aware of these reserve meetings and informed the board on the progress and work that the reserve meetings accomplished.<sup>10</sup> Certainly, the meetings would not have been as successful without Ms. Shelly's direct encouragement and involvement, as well as her liaison with the Chief of Staff of the Army.<sup>11</sup>

As noted, Ms. Shelly's support, and the support of the Senior Army Leadership, was vital to the formation of this relationship. However, even before Singapore, there were already forces at work to bring the reserve forces of both nations together. Brigadier General Quinn had actually visited the United States a year and a half earlier in order to begin a dialogue with the US Army Reserve.<sup>12</sup> His initial visit was followed by a series of staff officer coordination visits and plans for a Canadian-US General Officer Summit in Ottawa in September 1999. The first meeting actually occurred a short two weeks after the introductions and coordination with Ms. Shelly in Singapore. Nevertheless, Ms. Shelly's meeting with the two reserve chiefs, and the subsequent approval of the Chief of Staff of the Army, served to provide legitimacy for the endeavor and encouraged the two generals to continue the relationship past the first meeting.

## **AN EVALUATION OF VALUE**

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<sup>9</sup> Christine D. Shelly, Former Political Advisor to the Chief of Staff of the Army, GEN Eric Shinseki, from June 1999 to June 2002, interview by author, 11 February 2004, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. Cited with permission of Ms. Shelly.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Major General Thomas S. Plewes and Brigadier General Herb M. Petras, "Army Reserve PJBD Brief (presented)," briefing slides with scripted commentary, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, Permanent Joint Board on Defense, October 2000. MG Plewes recognized Ms. Shelly's valuable assistance in his joint briefing to the Permanent Joint Board on Defense. Briefing in the author's possession.

<sup>12</sup> Petras interview. BGen Petras stated that BGen Quinn was originally looking for an ABCA link. This is in reference to the American-British-Canadian-Australian (ABCA) Armies' Standardization Program. He knew that his units enjoyed training in the United States and in Canada with US formations. He wanted to stop the "sneaking across the border" and institute formal cross-border training that would enhance morale and expand training opportunities. Also at this time, there was a shift in the Canadian

The Armies Reserve have met a total of six times in the ensuing years. The seventh meeting is planned for May 2004 in New Orleans. But, the individuals that started the meetings have moved on to new jobs or retired. The original purposes have either been forgotten or may no longer fit the present circumstances. Both sides agree that the momentum has waned. Times have changed and the United States is now a nation at war. The United States Army, Army Reserve, and Army National Guard are extremely busy with operational commitments around the world. Canada's Army and Army Reserve are also very busy supplying military forces to the Global War on Terror in Afghanistan and for a multitude of other peacekeeping and stability operations.<sup>13</sup> Do these meetings continue because they are necessary or do they continue from mere inertia? Are these meetings still important enough to warrant their existence or are the resources better used elsewhere? What value do they provide to the national security of both nations? How do these meetings fit into the larger strategic context? Should they? Should anything change?

This forum has already proven itself useful to the armies of both nations in a number of ways. This section will evaluate the utility of this relationship and look to prescribe ways in which both nations may derive greater utility in the future.

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Reserves from Combat Arms to capabilities more in line with the US Army Reserve. Therefore, he wanted to learn more about the US Army Reserve.

<sup>13</sup> A good discussion of Canada's operational tempo (OPTEMPO) can be found in an editorial by the Honorable John McCallum, Canadian Minister of National Defence, "Stepping Up to the Plate: Canada Makes Its Move to Help Afghanistan," *The Washington Times*, Thursday, 31 July 2003, p. A21.

## **DEFINITIONS AND TERMS**

Before beginning a dialogue on evaluation criteria selection and analysis, it is helpful to define some terms used in this study, discuss some of the most important facts bearing on the problem, and to propose some assumptions that may prove useful. This will help to establish boundaries for the study and provide a common operating picture. In this way, we may begin with a shared understanding of the meanings of terms, the relevance of facts, and the value of certain assumptions. Even though we may not agree on a particular definition.

### **Armies Reserve:**

The most basic definition inherent to the evaluation of the Canada-US Armies Reserve relationship is a definition of "Armies Reserve." By this, we mean the Canada Land Force Reserve (CLFR), the United States Army Reserve (USAR), and the United States Army National Guard (ARNG). Although the ARNG did not attend meetings prior to April 2002, it is included in the broader context since its participation in this forum is essential to insure success. It is not possible to discuss any reserve issue that affects both nations without including the ARNG. Furthermore, "Armies Reserve" must be understood at the operational level. These meetings bring together representatives from the Canadian Land Force Areas (CLFR), the States (ARNG), as well as the Institutional Training Divisions (USAR), Regional Readiness Commands (USAR), and Training Support Divisions (USAR) along the Canada-US border.

### **Relationship:**

For purposes of this study, "relationship" and "forum" are used interchangeably. What is meant by "forum" in this study is the series of meetings between general

officers from the army and land force reserves from Canada and the United States. Specifically, the meetings are held, a series of initiatives or outcomes are agreed to, the results are recorded, and a mechanism is put into place for the fulfillment and/or accomplishment of these initiatives/outcomes and a follow-up at the proceeding meeting. It means more than just “getting together.” There is work accomplished and measurable progress made. In addition, personal relationships are established and cultivated in a formal setting.

**Value/Utility:**

This is the essence of this study. The terms “value” and “utility” are also used interchangeably. For something to have value, it is worthwhile or useful. Of course, there are varying degrees of value. Something may have value; however, the resources necessary to realize the value – or the relative value gained as opposed to some other activity – may preclude its use or desirability. In addition, there is perceived value and intrinsic value. This study will discuss both perceived and intrinsic value, will try to differentiate between the two during the analysis portion of the study, and will try to evaluate the relative value of the Canada-US Armies Reserve relationship within the context of the defense of North America. The “value” of this relationship will be subjectively gauged as a) low, b) medium, or c) high.

a. Low value means that the forum does not fit into the broader national security policies or doctrine of one or both nations, does not provide a meaningful product, or does not carry the interest of senior army leadership. It should be abandoned.



b. Medium value means that the forum fits weakly with national security policies, its products are somewhat useful, and it is somewhat helpful to homeland security. Senior leadership perceptions and participation are lukewarm. In this case, a decision should be made by senior leadership as to whether the forum should be abandoned altogether, or strengthened, or transformed in order to create more value.

c. High value means that the forum is intrinsic to the national security policies and doctrine of both nations. It provides meaningful products that advance military cooperation, interoperability, personal relationships, and/or civil-military cooperation between the countries. It is essential to homeland security. It enjoys a noteworthy degree of senior army leadership participation. With an evaluation of high value, the forum must be maintained. It must be included in the family of international activities of a higher headquarters so that proper coordination may occur and strategic-level support may be provided.

**Inertia:**

Finally, this study would not be complete without clearly defining “inertia” and “momentum” as these words relate to this relationship. Inertia is the “status quo.” In physics, inertia is defined as a law that states that a body in motion tends to stay in motion until acted upon by some force. Inertia, as it applies to this forum, is the tendency to keep meeting year after year because “that is the way we’ve always done it.” The same issues are discussed year after year to more or less the same audiences without any progress being made. Inertia is calcifying and does not serve the requirements of higher levels of society. The same things are done in the same way,

regardless of the current utility of the exercise. Inertia breeds irrelevancy and is antithetical to momentum.

**Momentum:**

“Momentum,” on the other hand, is strictly defined as mass times velocity. As it relates to these meetings, momentum is a product of 1) the number and rank of participants (mass), 2) the perceived utility of senior leadership (velocity), and 3) the quality of what gets done (velocity as it relates to #2). Momentum and utility are directly correlated. Momentum is increased or decreased through an application of force – either internal or external. This could mean enthusiasm of participants, usefulness of the products of the meetings, directives or guidance from an outside source (usually higher headquarters), etc.

**FACTS**

Now that we have defined the most important terms for this study, let us now consider the following relevant facts. They are presented here without discussion.

- a. The US Army Reserve, the US Army National Guard, and the Canadian Land Force Reserve have the only military units present for the vast majority of the undefended border. (See Figures 1 and 2)
- b. The United States has created a new unified command for the defense of North America with a prime directive “to provide military assistance to civil authorities,

including consequence management.”<sup>14</sup> The US has also created a new Department of Homeland Security.

c. Canada has changed its Prime Minister. Initial indications are that Mr. Martin seeks to strengthen the Canada-US relationship, especially as it pertains to the military.<sup>15</sup>

d. The vulnerability of the Canada-US border to terrorist infiltrations has been exposed with 9/11 and subsequent terrorist interdiction events.

e. Both Canada and the United States adhere to the NATO Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The SOFA between the US and Canada has been expanded and enlarged with the “Smart Border Declaration” of 12 December 2001 and the “Canada-US Security Cooperation Agreement” of 9 December 2002. Military units from one country can now cross the border easier in the event of emergency, natural disaster, or bi-national threat.<sup>16</sup>

f. There are thousands of border crossings of military units and individuals each year. Only a fraction follow the necessary approval process through FORSCOM.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> United States Northern Command, “Mission Statement,” available from <http://www.northcom.mil>; Internet; accessed 16 March 2004.

<sup>15</sup> Colin Nickerson, “Canada: New Prime Minister Eyes Better US Ties,” *Boston Globe*, 1 January 2004.

<sup>16</sup> Government of Canada, *Smart Border Declaration*, (Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 12 December 2001;) available from <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/can-am/menu-en.asp?mid=1&cat=10>; Internet; accessed 16 March 2004 and the *Canada-US Security Cooperation Agreement*, (Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: Canadian Embassy, Washington, D.C., 9 December 2002;) available from <http://www.canadianembassy.org/defence/agreement-en.asp>; Internet; accessed 16 March 2004. There is also the *Canada-US Basic Security Document* that is classified. It is not important to this study to discuss its particulars.

<sup>17</sup> Larry LaChapelle [larry.lachapelle@us.army.mil](mailto:larry.lachapelle@us.army.mil), Homeland Security Division, Forces Command, “Canada-US Border Crossing Estimate,” electronic mail message to LTC Christopher M. Lamoureux [Christopher.Lamoureux@us.army.mil](mailto:Christopher.Lamoureux@us.army.mil), 4 March 2004. Specific information from Ms. Dorothea Daggett, FORSCOM G3. In 2003, Forces Command (FORSCOM) processed 390 requests. This included 288 Canadian units to the US (10,518) personnel and 102 US units to Canada (1766) personnel. Officials know that there are a lot more crossings each year; but, the units and individuals are not following procedures. Cited with permission of Mr. LaChapelle. Also, the former Army Attaché to Canada, COL Karen McClellan corroborates the fact that many US units disregard the requirement and cross the border without appropriate authorization. See Colonel Karen L. McClellan [Karen.mcclellan@carlisle.army.mil](mailto:Karen.mcclellan@carlisle.army.mil), former Army Attaché to Canada, “Canada-US Border Crossings,” electronic mail message to LTC Christopher M. Lamoureux [Christopher.Lamoureux@us.army.mil](mailto:Christopher.Lamoureux@us.army.mil), 2 March 2004.



FIGURE 1-THE ARMY IN CANADA (USED WITH PERMISSION)



FIGURE 2-THE NATIONAL GUARD IN US COMMUNITIES (USED WITH PERMISSION)

## **ASSUMPTIONS**

In addition to a consideration of these facts, the following assumptions are prudent and have a bearing on the discussion:

- a. Should military from one country be used by the other country in emergencies, disaster relief, etc., the likelihood of employment of reserve forces by the US Department of Defense is greater because of their proximity, availability, and civilian acquired skills.
- b. Many military individuals and formations have been crossing the border for years without formal authority. Many more will continue to cross the border for training and for other reasons regardless of authority or knowledge of higher headquarters.
- c. Even though the Armies Reserve are quite different from one another in structure, organization, mission, method of employment, and the federal and state/provincial laws that they follow, there are practical things that can be learned from one another.
- d. A much higher headquarters than any one of these reserve organizations is necessary for international Memoranda of Understanding/Agreement (MOU/MOA) negotiation and approval. None of the Armies Reserve have international MOU/MOA signing authority. A corollary to this assumption is that additional MOU/MOA's are necessary since there are none that address particular initiatives currently on the table. Examples of additional Memoranda of Understanding required are for a Reserve Officers Exchange Program and Expatriate Training.
- e. NORTHCOM is the lead agency for the US Department of Defense in bi-national defense planning and coordination. NORTHCOM is the lowest level of organization that

has the resources necessary to effectively coordinate joint, interagency, and multinational (JIM) issues.

f. On any given day, there exist large numbers of expatriate reserve soldiers in each country for reasons other than military duty – work, study, travel, etc.

g. These meetings will continue through inertia.

h. Many of the most promising initiatives that can be accomplished by this forum require a great deal of patience, staff coordination, and time. Continuity – both of personnel and issues – is essential for success in this international forum.

i. Without continuing self-assessment and adherence to higher objectives/priorities, these meetings will eventually become irrelevant. They will not provide any value to either organization as the same issues are discussed over and over again to a different audience each year without any resolution.

Now, having discussed some of the facts and assumptions that are pertinent to this study, and having defined the necessary terms, we will turn our attention to the selection of evaluation criteria.

## **CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION**

Any attempt at evaluating activities that center upon human interaction is fraught with uncertainty and subjectivity. Human behavior, by definition, is unpredictable. Unlike pure science where many variables can be controlled, political science is characterized by nuance, individual perception, and behavioral models for rational actors that attempt to inject some predictability to our understanding. Furthermore, ambiguity and uncertainty are especially prevalent in a study of international relations because

differences in culture, language, and values mingle and interact in unusual ways. This increases the unpredictability of behavior and makes it more difficult to evaluate the utility of a relationship. An evaluation of the Canada-US Armies Reserve relationship, therefore, must take uncertainty and subjectivity into account while trying to find or develop evaluation criteria that are as objective as possible. At the same time, these criteria must be meaningful. In other words, will the evaluation criterion actually or adequately measure “value?”

Fortunately for this study, the G3 of Headquarters, Department of the Army, (HQDA) has a guide for evaluating the utility of international activities. The guide is the “Army International Activities Plan: Fiscal Years 2005-2006 (AIAP).”<sup>18</sup> The AIAP links US policy documents such as the National Security Strategy (NSS) and The Army Plan (TAP) to goals and objectives for the establishment and/or the maintenance of Army international activities. It is a rational discussion of the national strategic intent (the ends), cross-walked to Army international activities (the ways), in order to compete for resources (the means).<sup>19</sup> All Army international activities are evaluated against this plan. This evaluation helps leaders on many levels determine the utility of an activity. The relative value of any given activity helps it to compete for resources among all other competing interests for the Army. The AIAP is a useful tool to use in this study of the value of the Canada-US Armies Reserve relationship.

In terms of the AIAP, the questions to be asked regarding the Canada-US Armies Reserve relationship are: Does this relationship support the National Strategic

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<sup>18</sup> Department of the Army, *Army International Activities Plan: Fiscal Years 2005-2006*, (Washington, D.C.: The Army G3 (DAMO-SSI), August 2003).

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 1.

Framework and the North American regional strategy of the US Department of Defense (DoD)? Of the Canadian Department of National Defense (DND)? Does this relationship fill a void in a higher level requirement or is it redundant? Is it coordinated, synchronized or integrated into the family of Army international activities at either HQDA or combatant commander level, i.e. NORTHCOM? Of these questions, the first two are the most important. If this relationship does not support the National Strategic Framework, the North American regional strategy, or is redundant, then it should cease. It is an expenditure of resources that is irrelevant to national policy and homeland defense. However, if it does support these strategies and is unique, we must then take the next step and evaluate its utility. If it has sufficient value to remain as an international activity, then this paper should be enough to publicize the forum in order to allow a higher headquarters to integrate it into its family of international activities.

Besides a determination of how well the forum fits within the national security framework, a further evaluation of value will depend upon the three factors mentioned in the definition of “momentum” above. These are:

a. How many people participated and what were their ranks? The purpose of this criterion is to determine the level of interest in the senior leadership of the participating organizations. In international relations, a great deal may be inferred from who comes to the party. Of course, everyone understands operational requirements. But, does the head of an organization continually participate or does the rank of the head of delegation wither as time goes on? Similarly, one may infer the importance placed upon a meeting by the quantity and quality of senior officers present – Colonel and above. Are they commanders or staff officers?



- b. What is the perceived utility for the senior leadership? This criterion is linked with c. below. The basis for this criterion is the level at which the work assigned is accomplished. Some initiatives require international agreements. Some require support from Senior Army and/or Senior Civilian leadership. Are adequate resources made available to accomplish the work that was directed?
- c. An evaluation as to the quality of work accomplished. This criterion deals more with how well the work of the forum fits into the stated goals and objectives of the AIAP and the larger National Strategic Framework. Is the work at the strategic, operational, or tactical level? Does it involve merely "sightseeing" activities or is the agenda filled with substantive, relevant, or even necessary issues?

Taken together, these three criteria determine the momentum of the relationship and its utility. The greater the utility, the more important it is to the greater strategic context of North American security. If the utility is weak, then senior army leadership at an appropriate level must decide if it continues to be worth pursuing.

Here it is important to note that "cost" is specifically omitted for several reasons. First, the cost of these meetings is relatively minimal. In the words of one financial budgeter in the Pentagon, it amounts to "POM dust."<sup>20</sup> Second, the primary cost is for temporary duty of the participants. These costs are fixed regardless of rank and are spread across the Armies Reserve in such a way as to make them insignificant for the larger organizations. Finally, as noted earlier in discussing the role of the AIAP, if an

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<sup>20</sup> The term "POM" stands for Program Objective Memorandum. Here it is used to mean the military budget process in its entirety. The budget of the Department of Defense and the services is so large, and the budget personnel work with such large numbers, that costs below a certain amount are infinitesimally insignificant. They refer to these costs as "POM dust." What is five or ten thousand dollars when you are working with billions?

international activity has sufficient value and fits into the larger strategic picture, resources will be forthcoming to ensure that it happens.

## **ANALYSIS – WHAT OF THIS FORUM?**

### **ANALYSIS AGAINST THE NATIONAL STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK**

From the beginning, the Canada-US Armies Reserve General Officer meetings had the following objectives:

- a. Forge Personal Relationships – There is no substitute for knowing the commanders on your right and left flanks.
- b. Data Mining – Improve the management of Reserve forces by sharing insights into acquisition, force structure, personnel management, and total force integration.
- c. Improve Interoperability – Train individuals and units in each other's organization and doctrine.
- d. Improve overall capabilities – Train Reservists in each other's core competencies.<sup>21</sup>

In October 2000, then Major General Thomas Plewes, Chief, Army Reserve elaborated further on the origins of this relationship in the following statement to the Permanent Joint Board on Defense:

“Recent experience highlights two trends in national security policy in both countries: Increased use of Reservists to support current operations, and increased Army participation in joint and coalition operations. This program aims to prepare Reservists on both levels, by making them more

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<sup>21</sup> Plewes and Petras, Slide 13 of 27. In addition, Lieutenant Colonel Christopher M. Lamoureux, Memorandum for Record, “CAR's Foreign Affairs Vision for the Army Reserve,” 24 October 2001.

technically competent and by giving them first-hand experience learning from and working with soldiers from a key ally. Additionally, both reserve forces are going through periods of transformation as they define new roles within their national military strategies. This initiative allows leaders to learn from each other in order to develop these opportunities and avoid pitfalls. In summary, we saw opportunities to improve the way we do business and learn from each other.”<sup>22</sup>

This *raison d'être* holds just as true today as it did three and half years ago. Especially when viewing this forum through a post-9/11 lens, the purposes of this forum are consistent with the national security policies and doctrine of the United States and Canada. Remember that in this analysis, we must first determine that the purposes of the forum are “consistent” with national security policies and doctrine. This does not mean that it must conform to every single national security goal or objective. Relevance to a single goal or objective is all that is required. A greater reliability that this forum fits within the national security framework is determined if the forum meets one or more of the goals or objectives of multiple national security documents. However, in simple terms, an evaluation that the Canada-US Armies Reserve relationship is consistent with national security policy merely requires that the forum meets the needs of at least one objective or goal in a primary national security document for both countries. The primary national security documents for the United States are “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America – September 2002” and the United States Defense Strategy as found in the “Quadrennial Defense Review Report – September 30, 2001.” The primary documents for Canada are the “1994 White Paper on Defence Policy” and the “Defence Planning Document 2001.”

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<sup>22</sup> Plewes and Petras, Slide 13 of 27, See the notes page.

The National Security Strategy of the United States lists eight objectives. Although the purposes of this forum can be rationalized to be consistent with as many as five of them, it fits best with the second objective, which is “to strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends.”<sup>23</sup> The Quadrennial Defense Review lists four US Defense Strategy goals. This forum logically supports the first goal of “Assuring allies and friends” and four of the seven strategic tenets: strengthening alliances and partnerships; defending the United States and projecting US military power; developing a broad portfolio of military capabilities; and transforming defense.<sup>24</sup> Furthermore, this forum fits the security policies of Canada. Chapter Five of the 1994 White Paper is about “Canada-US Defence Cooperation.” It lists four objectives for this relationship. The Canada-US Armies Reserve relationship is consistent with the first objective, which is: “maintain the ability to operate effectively at sea, on land, and in the air with the military forces of the United States in defending the northern half of the Western Hemisphere.”<sup>25</sup> In addition, the 1994 White Paper is specific as to the Canadian government’s intention for land cooperation. It states, in part:

“Cooperation between the land forces of Canada and the United States is focused on training. A 1968 Exchange of Notes sets out principles and procedures related to the cross-border movement of troops, enabling land force units from one country to have ready access to training facilities of the other. Additional agreements govern the temporary exchange of small

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<sup>23</sup> George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States*, (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), 1. *Army International Activities Plan*, 5 (footnote 3).

<sup>24</sup> Donald H. Rumsfeld, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, (Washington, D.C.: The Department of Defense, 30 September 2001), 11, 13-16. *Army International Activities Plan*, 6 (footnote 5, 6).

<sup>25</sup> Government of Canada, *1994 White Paper on Defence Policy*, “Chapter Five: Objectives” (Ottawa, Ontario, Canada: Department of National Defence, February 1994); available from <[http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/eng/doc/5117\\_e.htm](http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/eng/doc/5117_e.htm)>; Internet; accessed 16 March 2004.

land force units for training purposes, and to oversee bilateral training initiatives and exercises, . . .”<sup>26</sup>

More recently, The Defence Plan 2001 has three defence policy objectives. This forum is consistent with the first two objectives: defend Canada; and defend North America IN COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES [sic]. In addition, the Defence Plan 2001 states that “The Canada-US Basic Security Document provides for the coordinated use of both countries' maritime, land and air forces in the event of hostilities against North America.”<sup>27</sup> Clearly, the Canada-US Armies Reserve relationship fits within the national security framework of both nations.

Although this forum is consistent with goals and objectives in national security policy documents of both countries, it is also interesting to note that it is in harmony with subordinate organizations' missions, goals, and objectives as well. The US Department of Defense (DoD) has published the “DoD Security Cooperation Guidance.” In it, the DoD defines Security Cooperation as:

“activities with foreign defense establishments to: build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests; build allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and coalition operations; and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access and en route infrastructure.”<sup>28</sup>

The Canada-US Armies Reserve relationship corresponds with all three of these stated purposes. It is also consistent with Mission Statement for NORTHCOM and supports twenty-eight of the capabilities listed in “The Army Plan 2005-2020.” Furthermore, it is in line with the Canadian documents “Land Forces Reserve Restructure Strategic Plan –

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid, “Chapter Five: Cooperation on Land.”

<sup>27</sup> Government of Canada, *Defence Planning Document 2001*, “Chapter 2.1: Current Defence Policy,” para. 2.1.1, “Defending Canada” and para. 2.1.2 “Defending North America IN COOPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES,” (Ottawa, Ontario,

September 2000,” the “Defence Strategy 2020,” and the “Strategic Assessment - 2003.”<sup>29</sup>

This forum fits with every national security document of both nations, as well as, documents of subordinate organizations. Furthermore, it is unique. There is nothing else out there that accomplishes what this does. This was the reason that Ms. Christine Shelly encouraged the development of a standing forum and relationship instead of a single meeting. But, today, practically nobody in NORTHCOM or FORSCOM knows about it.

In August 2003 during the Army International Activities Program (AIAP) Back Brief Conference in Washington, DC, COL Michael DeMarco, Chief, Homeland Security Division, Forces Command (FORSCOM) presented a briefing in which he outlined international activities for FORSCOM. As the Army Component Command for NORTHCOM, FORSCOM’s primary focus for international activities is with Canada and Mexico. Fifth Army is responsible for military to military relations with Mexico. FORSCOM conducts a similar type of conference with Mexico called the Border Commanders’ Conference. This program seems to be robust and useful. But, besides approving cross border clearances, FORSCOM does relatively little with Canada.<sup>30</sup>

Other bi-national fora that either include the Army or are Army specific have pushed reserve matters aside, subsuming reserve issues into the greater “total force.” The Bi-National Planning Group, recently stood up at NORTHCOM, is tasked with

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Canada: Department of National Defence, 23 December 2002); available at <[http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/eng/doc/def\\_plan\\_2001/dp01\\_toc\\_e.htm](http://www.forces.gc.ca/admpol/eng/doc/def_plan_2001/dp01_toc_e.htm)> ; Internet; accessed 16 March 2004.

<sup>28</sup> *Army International Activities Plan*, 7. “DoD Security Cooperation Guidance,” 24 April 2003.

<sup>29</sup> See the respective publications listed in the bibliography.

<sup>30</sup> COL Michael DeMarco, Chief, Homeland Security Division, Forces Command, briefing slides with scripted commentary, Washington, D.C.: AIAP Back Brief Conference, 26-28 August 2003.

strategic planning and military support to civilian authorities coordination. At this time, their mandate is centered on maritime issues. The North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) is focused on aerospace defense. There is nothing to match the Canada-US Armies Reserve forum. And, it could be very useful to NORTHCOM when integrated with its family of international activities with Canada. Even if the priority of effort is on air and sea matters, this forum should be kept "warm" and developed to the mutual benefit of both nations.

## **AN ANALYSIS OF VALUE**

Now that we have shown that the Canada-US Armies Reserve relationship is consistent with national security policy, we need to evaluate its overall value using the three criteria mentioned earlier. These criteria are: who participates; the perceived value of senior leadership; and the quality of work accomplished.

### **Participation From Senior Leadership**

In September 2002, Brigadier Timothy Brewer of the New Zealand Territorial Defense Force said:

"As I hear the challenges and problems of the US National Guard with its 350 thousand soldiers and the US Army Reserve with its 200 thousand, and those from the reserves of Australia, Canada, and Great Britain; and as I ponder the challenges that I have with my own reserve force of some 3,500 soldiers, I am impressed that we all face similar problems. It is only a difference in scale."<sup>31</sup>

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
<sup>31</sup> Brigadier Timothy Brewer, (22) September 2003, Washington, D.C., During a meeting of the ABCA Reserve Chiefs Conference hosted by the US Army National Guard. Brigadier Brewer was the New Zealand Territorial Force Advisor. Cited with permission of Brigadier Brewer.

This may be an oversimplification because there are substantial difference in the Armies Reserve of Australia, Canada, Britain, New Zealand, and the United States. Nevertheless, there is some truth to it and senior leadership in these countries realize that there is a great deal that can be learned from each other. Likewise, from the outset, the Canada-US Armies Reserve relationship has been supported by Senior Army Leadership in all three US Army components, active, guard, and reserve, as well as the Senior Army Leadership in the regular and reserve components of the Canadian Defense Forces.

Figure 3 is a graphical representation of the numbers of senior officers and/or civilians that have attended the six meetings of the Canada-US Armies Reserve. Senior officers are in the grade of O6 (Colonel) or above. A senior civilian is a person in the Senior Executive Service (SES) or equivalent in Canada. Thus far, the only senior civilian that has participated is Ms. Christine Shelly, a two-star equivalent. As you can see, the numbers have remained steady over the course of the history of this forum. These constitute a small sample size because there have only been six meetings. The spike in the Fifth Conference is explained by two phenomena. First, this is the first conference post-9/11 when there was a great deal of momentum for Canada-US relations. Second, this is the first conference in which the ARNG participated. This is also the last conference that the Chief, Army Reserve attended.



## Senior Leader Participation



**FIGURE 3-SENIOR LEADER & COMMANDER PARTICIPATION**

**TABLE 1-RAW DATA FOR SENIOR LEADER PARTICIPATION**

Meeting		Commanders	Senior Leadership	% Cdrs	Head of Delegation
1-Ottawa	USAR	7	10	0.7	CAR
	CLFR	5	6	0.8333	DGLRes
2-Atlanta	USAR	5	10	0.5	CAR/POLAD
	CLFR	5	6	0.8333	DLGRes
3-Quebec City	USAR	5	7	0.7143	CAR/POLAD
	CLFR	5	9	0.5556	DLGRes
4-Fort Bragg	USAR	5	7	0.7143	CAR
	CLFR	4	8	0.5	DLGRes
5-Fort Dix	USAR	12	14	0.8571	CAR
	CLFR	4	10	0.4	PMO, LFRR/DLGRes
	ARNG	5	5	1	Cdr, 42nd ID
6-St. Johns	USAR	9	9	1	MG Cdr
	CLFR	3	5	0.6	PMO, LFRR/DLGRes
	ARNG	2	3	0.6667	Cdr, 34th ID

Table 1 shows the raw data. As you can see, the head of delegation for Canada has remained the Director General, Land Reserve (Canada) with the addition of the Project Manager, Land Forces Reserve Restructure, MG Ed Fitch as an invited guest. The ARNG has sent commanders from the 42<sup>nd</sup> and 34<sup>th</sup> Divisions to represent the

Director, Army National Guard. The head of delegation for the Army Reserve in St. John's was a two-star commander. For purposes of this study, an organization is credited with sending a commander if either the commander or his deputy attended the meeting. In Canada, the highest ranking generals are deputy commanders of an area. In the National Guard, a state adjutant general may be either from the Army or the Air Force. There is as much weight if a state sends the assistant adjutant general as the adjutant general himself. To be consistent, the same standard was kept for the Army Reserve. However, in almost all cases, the Army Reserve sent a commander and not a deputy.

In addition to the attendance at these conferences, senior leadership attendance at other international conferences demonstrates the importance of the Canada-US Armies Reserve relationship. In March 2002, there was an International Reserves Conference held at the University of Calgary. LTG Roger Shultz, Director, Army National Guard, and LTG Thomas Plewes, Chief, Army Reserve both attended this conference and gave presentations. A similar conference is planned for March 2004 at the University of Calgary. This time, Mr. Thomas F. Hall, Assistant Secretary for Reserve Affairs; LTG Edward G. Anderson, III, Deputy Commander, US NORTHCOM; LTG H. Steven Blum, Chief, National Guard Bureau; and MG Collis N. Phillips, Deputy Chief, Army Reserve will attend from the United States. Canada will send MGen Marc Caron, Acting Chief of the Land Staff; MGen Ed Fitch, Project Manager, Land Forces Reserve Restructure; BGen Dennis C. Tabbenor, Director General, Land Reserve (Canada); and the Honorable John Fraser, Chair of Minister of Defence's Monitoring

Committee on Change and Reform in the Canadian Armed Forces.<sup>32</sup> Clearly, there is support for the Canada-US Armies Reserve relationship from the senior leadership of both countries.

### **Perception of Utility of Senior Leadership**

This criterion is linked to the first and third. Whereas one can empirically demonstrate enthusiasm for an activity by counting heads and noting rank, it is not as easy to gauge whether or not senior leadership perceives an activity as valuable. Here, unfortunately, there is only anecdotal evidence that is able to give us some sense of their feelings. While the senior leadership of both countries support the overall concept with their attendance at major events, there is lukewarm support for this forum specifically, especially on the part of the senior leadership of the United States. Consider the following observations:

- a. Personnel at NORTHCOM and FORSCOM are unaware of this forum.
- b. The work of this forum is not coordinated with any other group or activity in the United States, even though HQDA, G3 is aware of its existence and has sent representation in the past. This forum is not included in the Army International Activities Plan.
- c. Whereas Canada has had the same individual responsible for the day to day care of the initiatives proposed by this forum, the United States has had five separate action officers at the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) since 2000 and has eliminated the position that was responsible for this forum at the Office of the Chief,

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
<sup>32</sup> See <http://www.stratnet.ucalgary.ca/reserves2004/index.htm> for a list of notable speakers as of the time of publication of this

Army Reserve (OCAR). Each new officer has had no experience in international matters or in working with HQDA in order to get international initiatives accomplished. Each has left just when they were getting somewhat knowledgeable in their job. Most of the initiatives proposed require long lead times to accomplish and a great deal of horizontal and vertical staffing and coordination. The continuity of personnel is critical to the success of these initiatives, and thus, the work of this forum.

d. The Chief, Army Reserve and the Director General, Land Reserve (Canada) briefed the Permanent Joint Board on Defense in October 2000. At that time, the PJBD directed the forum to report annually to the Military Cooperation Committee (MCC). The Canada MCC delegation ensures that the Canadian Land Force Reserve is invited to the MCC and makes its report. The US MCC delegation does not.

e. The Cross Border Working Group (CBWG), a subordinate forum to the general officer forum, appears to have lost steam and was a disappointment for the Canada delegation at the last meeting.

f. The work of the forum has not progressed in almost two years. The last substantive progress was the first exchange of full-time reserve personnel in the summer of 2003. But, this was the final action for work that was started more than four years prior. Even so, it was almost derailed at the last minute, after years of work, except for Canadian perseverance and the help of an American action officer who was no longer affiliated with the program, but had kept the historical records.



**FIGURE 4-PERCEIVED UTILITY OF CONFERENCES**

These are just a handful of the many indicators that suggest that the perceived utility of this forum for senior leadership has eroded.<sup>33</sup> In the beginning, LTG Plewes, Ms. Shelly, BGen Quinn, and then BGen Petras were able to move things along with their personal interest in the program. They were instrumental in having their staffs follow through with commitments made during the meetings and persevered with their senior leadership to help the initiatives succeed. Ms. Shelly even made a substantial effort to advertise this forum to the PJBD which resulted in the briefing by the senior reserve leadership already discussed. However, these personalities have transitioned and new leaders are in place without a framework and structure in place for the forum that is sufficiently strong to transcend personalities.<sup>34</sup> Therefore, this criterion is rated as medium since inertia continues most of the work. However, without a sustaining hand

<sup>33</sup> Major General E.S. Fitch, Project Management Officer, Land Force Reserve Restructure, interview by author, 15 December 2003, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada. MGen Fitch is credited with applying this classic scissors graph to the perceived utility of the USAR/ARNG and NORTHCOM. Used with permission of Major General Fitch.

from some higher headquarters in the United States, the perceived utility for the American leadership will continue to decrease and the work in progress will not proceed.

### **Quality of work**

Each conference is run according to Canada-US international protocol. Each nation supplies a Military Secretary (MilSec). The MilSec takes notes during the meetings and is responsible to produce the final Memorandum for Record (MFR) for the conference. At the end of each meeting, all general officers in attendance agree to the work accomplished, topics discussed and agreed upon actions, and future topics for discussion using a PowerPoint presentation. This is later reduced to the MFR which is signed by all heads of delegation. The MFR details in prose what was included in the PowerPoint presentation. The PowerPoint presentation is included as an appendix to the MFR.<sup>35</sup> Upon return from the conference, the MilSec is responsible to coordinate all work agreed to in the conference. This section will discuss only a portion of the work accomplished by this forum. Interested individuals should contact the current MilSec to get the most current status of initiatives.

There is so much going on between the Canadian and the United States military on any given day that it would be impossible for one person to comprehend it all. Personnel exchanges, small unit exchanges, meetings, consultations etc. constitute just some of the activities occurring on a daily basis. Part of the intent of this forum has been to try to capture the unofficial activities in some kind of reporting format and provide the

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<sup>34</sup> Recall the quote from BGen Petras at the beginning of this paper.

<sup>35</sup> For complete copies of the Memoranda for Record for each forum, please contact LCol S. Craig McQuitty at DLRes, National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1A 0K2; (613) 945-0359; McQuitty.SC@forces.gc.ca.

necessary command and control structures, as well as the legal framework necessary, in order to ensure success. The senior leadership of the Armies Reserve do not want to stifle interaction and training. But, there is a requirement, both legally and morally, to know what subordinates are doing. . . and to control it to the best of your ability. This is especially problematic with reserve forces and a free international border. In keeping with the spirit of the initial objectives agreed to by LTG Plewes and BGen Quinn, the work of this forum has centered around three broad categories: information sharing, personnel and unit exchanges, and command and control of training opportunities.

Information sharing is usually accomplished during the meetings themselves through presentations and discussions on topics of mutual interest. BGen Quinn came to the United States in 1998 looking to learn more about the US Army Reserve and its role in civil-military affairs. Consequently, in the first conference in Ottawa, United States Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) was directed to lead in assisting Canada in development of a Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) capability. USACAPOC is commanded by a US Army Reserve Major General. Ninety-four percent of the US civil affairs capability rests with the reserves. The Fourth Conference was held at Fort Bragg. This allowed the Commander, USACAPOC as the host to demonstrate many facets of the United States civil affairs and psychological operations capabilities. The Canadian Land Force Reserve used the information gleaned from the United States in the development of its own capability. It now has a fledgling CIMIC capability found exclusively in their reserves.

Another good example of the advantage of information sharing in this forum is with the restructure of the Canadian Land Forces. As stated earlier, both the USAR and

the CLFR are undergoing transformation. The Canadian government directed a complete study of the reserves that launched the Land Force Reserve Restructure (LFRR) project. MGen Fitch is the Project Management Officer. Canada does not desire to make a reserve force in the image of the United States. Nevertheless, there are many lessons that have been shared between these countries in this forum that have been implemented in each other's transformation process. Other information, such as the Civilian Acquired Skills Database used by the USAR, may be useful to Canada in the future. This forum has been very helpful for the exchange of information for the reserve forces, especially for the LFRR.

The final example for the benefit of information exchange has been the sharing of operational lessons learned as they apply to reserve forces. Canada recently completed ROTO 11, a deployment rotation to Bosnia. The Canadian reserves constituted twenty percent of all troops. Until ROTO 11, most reservists were deployed as individual augmentees. ROTO 11 was the first deployment for Canada with a company-level unit commanded and populated by reservists. In addition, the United States has shared its lessons learned from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. The sharing of this information has helped the pre-mobilization training and preparation of reservists in both countries.

Personnel and unit exchanges have several on-going initiatives that are successful. Canada and the United States currently exchange officer and NCO instructors for professional military education courses. They also exchange students in the Joint Reserve Command and Staff College (CA) and the Command and General Staff Officers Course (US). This forum provided valuable input to the HQDA G3 in



crafting the Reciprocal Unit Exchange Memorandum of Understanding (RUE MOU). The forum has developed a “boilerplate” for units that desire a “twinning” relationship with a unit from across the border. This boilerplate is a non-binding agreement between commanders that outlines their responsibilities to international law and protocol in the development of a relationship with each other. The first exchange of full-time reserve officers finally happened in Summer 2003. This initiative required a complete paradigm shift in the way HQDA and DND do business. This is the best example of the value of this forum and the requirement for patience, continuity in personnel, and having a strategic sponsor.

For example, a difficult initiative for this forum to complete is Expatriate Training. There are a number of reserve soldiers living across the border for a number of reasons – work, study, travel. Most of the time, the absence from their home country is temporary. The Expatriate Training initiative is an attempt to allow the reserve soldier to train in some manner with the formations of the host country and to receive credit and/or pay for completing this training. In this situation, there are a number of memoranda of understanding that are applicable. But, they do not address all of the legal particularities of each country. A new MOU/MOA is required. Legal opinions were prepared by the ARNG and the USAR and DND in 2002. Draft MOU's have been floated back and forth for staffing. But, without an action officer in the United States knowledgeable enough to work this issue, the process starts from the beginning with each transfer. This initiative would benefit both countries and all reserve services. It could set a precedent for Expatriate Training with many other countries, most notably, Australia, Great Britain,

and New Zealand (ABCA countries). It would be extremely valuable, but it requires a great deal of tenacity and patience and good, solid staff work.

Finally, the Armies Reserve of Canada and the United States would like to begin a Reserve Officer Exchange Program (ROEP). The United States has such a program with Germany and the United Kingdom. Formal international MOU's are already in place. This should be relatively easy to do, but the Armies Reserve do not have authority to negotiate international MOU's. In this case, draft MOU's have also been staffed in each country. But, the action died with the transfer of the International Programs Officer from OCAR.

From the outset, the senior leadership desired to exploit cross border training opportunities. Each year, there are a handful of major training exercises that are appropriate venues for coalition training. In addition, there are literally hundreds of opportunities for small unit training on weekends for formations on each side of the border. Some of these exercises were created by cross border personal relationships of commanders and have been going on for years without approval or knowledge of higher headquarters. Exercises such as KOOTENAY CASTLE in British Columbia is a good example. Conducted about every four years, it brings together regular and reserve Canadian forces, as well as guard and reserve forces from the Army and Marines of the United States for an engineering bridge crossing exercise. The entire exercise costs a mere \$150,000. This is dirt cheap by exercise standards and the training is world class.

One of the most exciting developments from this forum is the formation of the Cross Border Working Group (CBWG). This has the greatest potential to capture unofficial training and inject it into the established national training planning process of

each organization. The Canada-US Armies Reserve forum is the steering committee for this group. The group has an agreed Terms of Reference, a clear mission, tasks and mandate. Attendance at this meeting is at the “worker bee” level, with an O6 (Colonel) from each organization as a co-chair.<sup>36</sup> Its purpose is to capture training already planned and look for additional training opportunities. Especially interesting are opportunities that are multi-component, joint, and bi-national. The CBWG is to synchronize the training efforts, educate subordinate units on international protocols, and help the units obtain the appropriate funding. Then, the parent organizations should take this information and input this training into the established training planning processes for Canada, the Army Reserve, and the Army National Guard. The first meeting occurred in February 2003 and was a great success. But, not all of the required parties participated in the second meeting in November 2003. Although not a failure, it did not live up to expectations. There is a long list of bi-national unit and individual training that has taken place since the start of this forum. Granted that much of this training would have happened anyway, without the knowledge of the Armies Reserve. But, much more of this type of training has happened because of the opportunities publicized and developed in this forum. To name only a few, there has been KOOTENAY CASTLE, BLUE DEVIL, ACTIVE EDGE 03, PLATINUM WRENCH, and SEAHAWK. Upcoming opportunities include GOLDEN MEDIC, NEW HORIZONS 04, PATRIOT, PATRIOT WARRIOR 04, STALWART GUARDIAN 04, ACTIVE EDGE 04, and ARCON 04.

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<sup>36</sup> *Canada-United States Armies Reserve (CANUSAR) Cross-Border Work Group (CBWG) Terms of Reference (TOR)*. Agreed to at the Fifth Canada-US General Officer Summit at Fort Dix, NJ 2-5 April 2002.

This is only a small sample of the work that this forum has accomplished, as well as the work still on the table. To date, all of the work conducted has not been coordinated well with outside commands or agencies, either vertically or horizontally. There is tremendous potential, with the right leadership from a strategic headquarters, to guide this forum to do work that is most important to the national security of both nations. It should be a shining star within the family of Canada-US military activities. With proven products pre and post 9/11, the quality of work accomplished by this forum is rated as high. It is professionally run, the work has a profound impact upon the training, readiness, and structure of the Armies Reserve. And it has remained true to the initial objectives of the forum.

## **THE FINAL ANALYSIS**

This forum has only existed for about five years. By and large it has conducted its work outside the radar of higher headquarters, at least in the United States. However, its purpose, objectives, and conduct are consistent with national security policies and doctrine. It supports at least one major objective in all of the national security documents of Canada and the United States. It also support goals and objectives in many subordinate texts, plans and strategies. It is a unique forum. It is relevant. It is important in that it deals with military forces normally found along the border. Furthermore, it is a valuable forum. Very senior leadership – both active and reserve – from both nations support it. A notable company of senior officers and commanders attend the meetings. The quality of participation is high. And yet, the perception of utility by current leadership is medium, especially in the United States. But the value of the

work accomplished in the past, continuing today, and yet to be done in the future is high. Therefore, this forum is valuable to the national security of the United States and Canada. It should be preserved.

But, preservation for the sake of preservation is not sufficient. For this forum to be relevant in the future, senior leadership must support it wholeheartedly. There should be a formal Terms of Reference agreed to by the two countries. This would become the forum's official charter. Support must be given to the Cross Border Working Group and its work encouraged. FORSCOM must become more involved in the day-to-day work needed to accomplish initiatives and develop training opportunities. The Armies Reserve must each dedicate an officer with sufficient expertise to accomplish the tasks assigned to the armies. This individual must have at least three years longevity in the position to ensure continuity or there should be a civilian assigned to work the issues. In the United States, NORTHCOM should sponsor this forum. It only meets once a year for three days. A strategic sponsor is required for the multitude of reasons already discussed. But, the opportunity to shape the strategic horizon during these three days is the responsibility of a command such as NORTHCOM. Only with a strategic sponsor, can this forum transcend personalities and continue its momentum into the future for the benefit and national security of both Canada and the United States.

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