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Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Journal of Military and Strategic Studies
Corbett: A Man Before His Time
By Lieutenant Commander Ian C.D. Moffat
Introduction
The Lacedaemonians now sent to the fleet to Cnemus three commissioners—Timocrates, Brasidas, and Lycophron—with orders to prepare to engage again with better fortune, and not be driven from the sea by a few vessels; for they could not at all account for their discomfiture, the less so as it was their first attempt at sea; and they fancied that it was not that their marine was so inferior, but that there had been misconduct somewhere, not considering the long experience of the Athenians as compared with the little practice which they had had themselves. 1
Whosoever commands the sea commands the trade; whosoever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the world, and consequently the world itself.—Sir Walter Raleigh 2
From the advent of the first sea going vessel, ships have been targets for other rangers upon the sea. When governments went to war, it was an obvious extension of battle that the action would be extended to the sea between vessels of the belligerents. From the Greeks, and even before, the objective of navies has been to target the opposing side’s ships. This permeated the strategies of seafaring countries for centuries, and was chronicled in the histories written by sailors and politicians from Homer onward. The sailors in particular, when writing their memoirs, concentrated on great battles at sea and the tactics employed to attain the dramatic victories for which they had become famous.
The ancient historians who chronicled the history of empires were scholars or politicians whose martial experience, if any, was military rather than marine. Thus Thucydides in The History of the Peloponnesian War, Julius Caesar in his histories and Machiavelli, the father of modern strategy, in The Prince and The Art of War concentrate on the land campaigns and the Grand Strategy of the powers involved. This is completely understandable for it is on land that the final decisions of war are made. Nevertheless, histories which included naval contributions to campaigns tended to concentrate on the sea battles and the tactics so employed rather than on the Maritime Strategy of the warring factions. Maritime Strategy and its cousin Naval Strategy slowly developed as separate disciplines from Military Strategy but it was not until the end of the nineteenth century that historians started to write on the specific value and influence maritime policies had on the overall strategy of countries and empires. The two fathers of this discipline were Alfred Thayer Mahan, an American naval officer, and Sir Julian Stafford Corbett, an English naval historian.
Mahan was the first, and still the best known, author to write on Maritime Strategy. He published his famous book The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783 in 1890. Mahan developed the theory that history had been decided in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by the overwhelming strength of sea power held by the British. Other powers had lost their influence and empires because they failed to appreciate the necessity of sea power. His book was not only a history of the naval battles which had taken place in the period, it also drew lessons on why the victor was successful, based on the overall strategy of the governments involved. Influenced by his study of the results of the maritime conflicts, Mahan formulated a theory of what he considered was required to be a great power.
His book was widely published and translated throughout the world. It was hailed as the strategic credo to be followed if a country wished to become or remain a strong maritime power. Unfortunately, for many who read Mahan, the author was not the most meticulous historian nor was he necessarily able to articulate his points concisely and consistently. Thus, the influential people who read Mahan may have misinterpreted his concepts or more likely adopted those that supported their own ideas while not following Mahan’s complete lesson. Nevertheless, the accepted interpretation of Mahan’s strategy was that in war, a nation’s naval forces must attack the enemy’s naval forces to gain Command of the Sea and the strategic advantage. 3 According to students of Mahan, this was the sole raison d’etre of naval forces.
Writing in the same period was Sir Julian Stafford Corbett, a British historian. He was a meticulous researcher and became a leading maritime strategist to rival Mahan. Corbett complemented Mahan’s ideas while presenting a more logical and structured argument. His development of Maritime Strategy was a necessary complement to Mahan’s development of Naval Strategy. Corbett was more pragmatic and therefore, a more effective strategist than Mahan. He had studied Carl von Clausewitz and he adapted the Prussian’s military theories to the maritime environment. Corbett’s theories eventually became the accepted way of conducting maritime conflicts.
Unlike most military strategists and particularly naval strategists, Corbett was a civilian who never served in the military or the navy. He lectured for the Royal Navy at the British Naval College at Greenwich. He became the unofficial historical advisor to the Admiralty during the Dreadnought era and was a supporter of Admiral Jackie Fisher whose reforms changed the Royal Navy almost overnight. 4 Although educated and trained as a barrister, he never practiced law, but spent his time studying history and writing. 5
As a founding member of the Navy Records Society, Corbett edited a large number of documents on the Elizabethan Anglo-Spanish War. This study led to his first major historical work, Drake and the Tudor Navy, 6 which was considered exceptional based on the extensive research done to support the text. By 1910 Corbett had written four more “authoritative works on British Naval history including what is probably his best historical book, England in the Mediterranean. . .” 7
The meticulous research for his historical books and the editing of the Navy Records Society’s papers gave him insight into British Maritime Strategy and its evolution over a three hundred year period. This led him to write in 1911 his strategic book, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. This book was a culmination of his detailed study of the evolution of the Royal Navy and the application of Naval Power from the time of Queen Elizabeth I through to the Napoleonic Wars. However, it was not the first time he had drawn strategic conclusions in his writings. His history of the Anglo-Spanish War in Drake and the Tudor Navy and the companion work The Successors of Drake was not restricted to a recital of facts. It was an analysis of the strategy involved in the campaign which drew conclusions from its successes and postulated reasons for its failures.
Corbett theorized that Britain’s Maritime Strategy was based on commerce. Although Corbett points out in Drake and the Tudor Navy that there were three causes to the Anglo-Spanish war—religious, political and commercial—it was his view that commerce was the driving force. The British desire for expanded markets was the main reason for Spanish animosity toward England. The Spanish King, Philip II, could have ignored the political aspects if he had been able to resolve his problems in the low countries (now Belgium and Holland). However the commercial problems caused by the advent of English traders in the new world were what reduced Spain’s income from America. This prevented Spanish control from being re-established in the low countries through lack of money. 8 From this, Corbett concluded that commerce was the strategic reason for Spain going to war with England. The Anglo-Spanish War was also the first instance of Maritime Power manifesting itself in England and it showed the influence of commerce on strategic actions. Spain published an edict forbidding American colonies from trading with English ships in an attempt to restrict English sea commerce. This was the start of a series of provocations that eventually led to the war.
The most serious provocation was committed by the Viceroy in Mexico upon John Hawkins’ refitting fleet secured at San Juan de Ulua. Hawkins had secured himself at the aforementioned island prior to the arrival of the Spanish escort fleet that was sent annually to escort the silver fleet back to Spain. He held the tactical control of the anchorage and when the Spanish arrived he negotiated safe conduct in exchange for allowing the Spanish to gain the safety of the island. Once the Spanish had gained the safety of the anchorage, they turned on the English without warning and attacked the ships. 9 Only the superior weight of the English cannons saved them from complete destruction, but the treachery was one more factor which led to war. The treachery was dictated by the Spanish strategic policy of keeping all the American trade to itself and actively preventing any English ships from profiting from the riches in the West Indies and Spanish Main along the Northern Coast of South America. All this occurred after Philip had originally attempted to gain the use of the English navy as a weapon for Spain against the French.
Corbett showed that Spain wanted to control England in order to have the use of the English Navy. From the time of Henry VIII, England had a tradition of a government-controlled navy. Spain did not have anything to compare it to. It was Spain’s goal to control this navy as a weapon against France and, to this end, Charles V of Spain arranged the marriage of Mary Tudor to his son, Philip. 10 On Mary’s ascension to the throne, Philip sought to control the English navy but was resisted. When Mary died and Elizabeth I became queen, Philip lost the strategic ability to use the English Navy and sought to protect his source of wealth in America from English traders. The papal bull of 1570, which branded England and Queen Elizabeth as outcasts from Christendom, 11 gave Spain further reason to attack England and English ships, particularly in the new world. It also put a religious stamp on any conflict between the two countries. Moreover, it gave support to English Protestant views that Catholics, and Catholic Spain in particular, were the main enemies and England would have to fight for survival. This laid the groundwork for the evolution of English Maritime Strategy over the next three hundred years.
However, Corbett points out that this Anglo-Spanish War was not a foregone conclusion. Despite many provocations on both sides, Elizabeth’s cabinet was divided. Although some Privy Councillors called for war, others advocated the maintenance of trade with Spain as a means of preventing England from entering a very costly war—a war she was not guaranteed to win. In fact Elizabeth’s most loyal and ablest minister, William Cecil, Lord Burghley, was always against the war and worked diligently to avoid it. 12 Two opposing strategies were at work in Elizabethan England: one of peaceful trade with Spain and one of conquest of new markets using sea power as the weapon.
The requirement for and maintenance of a Royal Navy was also not universally accepted until about 1570, even though there had been some form of Royal Navy since Henry VIII. Corbett points out that at that time, the Catholic nobles in the north of England were plotting with the Spanish governor of the Netherlands to depose Elizabeth. Although the plot was discovered and put down, it was realized that the English Navy had deteriorated to such a state that it could not have prevented the Spanish from landing. As a result, Corbett notes, John Montgomery issued a pamphlet to the council and chief naval officers. This pamphlet stated the first strategic views of sea power that are recorded. These ideas parallel Corbett’s strategic views published later in his book Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. To summarize Montgomery, he did not call for absolute Command of the Sea, but rather a fleet strong enough to dispute command. This would be enough to protect England. Any invading force would be loath to attack for fear that their army would be weakened during the ensuing sea battle and would therefore be defeated by the defending force ashore. Barring a sea fight before or during the invasion, the English fleet would still be able to cut the invaders communications, isolating him without reinforcement or support. 13 Montgomery demanded what Corbett later called a defensive Maritime Strategy using a ‘Fleet in Being.’ 14 This was the first indication of this strategy and can be considered the basis for Corbett’s later strategic thought.
After 1570, England started to build up her navy from its previous deteriorated state, but it was the increase in commercial shipping that put the impetus on increasing England’s Maritime Power. Hawkins’ and Drake’s expeditions and the wealth they brought back stimulated others to seek exploration in the west. 15 So well did this militant commerce suit the new spirit of the nation that the old lawlessness of the seas had assumed a commercial expression and had begun to draw an increasing share of the unemployed capital of the country. 16
Although this new direction of commerce was provocative to Spain, Elizabeth and her peace-loving ministers were able to avoid war for the time being. Peaceful commerce was still more profitable to the nation as a whole and Spain had not been provoked enough to attempt invasion. Rather, Spain was content for the time to make individual reprisals and demand compensation from the English crown for the damage done to its commerce by what were officially considered private interests. It was only in 1585, with Drake’s voyage back to the West Indies, that the simmering situation broke into recognized war between the two nations. It was in open war where England’s Maritime Strategy began to solidify under the direction of Drake.
Through the study of Drake’s life Corbett demonstrated the birth of England’s Maritime Strategy. In his later historical works Corbett showed how it evolved from commercial necessity into a national method of imposing England’s will in the world.
Corbett continued the study of the development of Britain’s Maritime Strategy from a historical perspective in Drake’s Successors. This book established Corbett as an independent maritime thinker and demonstrated through historical study, the limitations of maritime power. The strategic conclusion brought forth in Drake’s Successors was that military and maritime strategies were intertwined. Corbett stated that “the real importance of maritime power is its influence on military operations.” 17 The resulting strategy was a combination of the political with the military and required great insight since it was a complicated interweaving of what were the goals of the nation and the means of obtaining those goals. 18 This was not entirely his own idea since he was reading Clausewitz and would later undertake an in-depth study of the German strategist’s work. This study would be reflected in his future books, particularly in England and the Seven Years War. 19 Corbett noted in this book that although sea battles are the goal of a fleet, these battles must be sought and obtained by the fleet’s “interference with the enemy’s military and diplomatic arrangements.” 20
England in the Mediterranean was an expansion of Corbett’s War Course lectures. The underlying theme of this book, which only dealt with England’s entry into the Mediterranean and the growth of her influence there, was the power of a naval presence in the absence of any great battles. The ability of England to maintain a fleet year round in the Mediterranean interposed herself on the French sea communications between France’s two seats of maritime power. This action “. . .proved that with a dominant sea power well placed in the Straits, her (France’s) Mediterranean Frontier was useless to her for offence, and that neither for her nor for any other power could the dream of the Roman Empire be revived.” 21 This showed the strategic significance of sea communications, which would be a major part of Corbett’s theories on Command of the Sea.
In this book his views on the efficacy of commerce protection came face to face with the fact that it was considered of major importance to the policy makers of the seventeenth century. Corbett explained this by saying:
Thus, although strategists, for the purpose of commending their views to the public and the Treasury, naturally wrote in terms of commerce, we must never forget that what they were really aiming at was command of the sea by the domination of the trade routes and acquisition of focal points as naval stations. 22
This was written in support of his own view that a trade war was not as important as gaining Command of the Sea. However, the seed was planted, based on his own research, and he would slowly come to the conclusion that trade war had its place in Maritime Strategy. Corbett eventually concluded that Command of the Sea was for the purpose of protecting trade.
In his next book, England and the Seven Years War, he developed his ideas of ‘Limited War’ and ‘strategy as a tool of policy’. He had been studying Clausewitz in depth and through his research he came to understand the English policy of containing a foe in one field while pursuing a limited objective in another. 23 By historical reference, Corbett showed the connection of military and political policy and in his narrative on the capture of Canada demonstrated the necessity and indivisibility of Maritime Strategy and Land Strategy. His sources were voluminous. Unlike Mahan, he did not make pronouncements and seek historical support but rather let history by its weight of evidence demonstrate the rule. 24
His book on Trafalgar was published in 1910 when he was well established as a naval historian and lecturer at the War Course. Unlike previous books about the battle, The Campaign of Trafalgar covered the whole campaign of 1805 and showed how policy was the driving force for England’s Maritime Strategy with a particular emphasis on the importance of the Mediterranean. Corbett explained that England, having broken the peace of Amiens, was on the defensive without allies. When William Pitt returned to power as Prime Minister his strategy was to go on the offensive. However, without allies and with a weak army he could only use his maritime power to do this.
The view that the Trafalgar campaign was defensive because of the threat of invasion was incorrect in Corbett’s estimation. The threat of invasion was a bluff so long as England commanded the English Channel. Knowing this, the Admiralty had disposed the fleet such that Napoleon’s navy could never gain enough control of the Channel to invade Britain. The Admiralty’s instructions to Cornwallis took in all possibilities of a French breakout and foresaw all eventualities, thus preventing the possibility of invasion. 25
England hoped for an alliance with Austria, Sweden, Prussia and especially Russia, which also saw Napoleon as a major threat. The negotiations with Russia centred on the Mediterranean and Italy since Russia had taken the Kingdom of Naples into its sphere of influence. Pitt wished the alliance to conduct an offensive against Napoleon.
Napoleon wished to conquer the Ottoman Empire and eject England from India. The control of the Mediterranean was key to both of Napoleon’s desires and Malta was the key to the Mediterranean. Russia also had designs on the Ottoman Empire and considered England’s possession of Malta as an obstacle to this. Although negotiations for a treaty had progressed between the ambassadors in each country and an agreement had been reached concerning Russian troops in Italy and English reinforcements from Malta to support the Russians, the Tsar refused to ratify the treaty if England retained Malta. Pitt was willing to compromise on many things but giving up Malta was not one of them. On this point he was adamant as shown by his own words: “So whatever the pain it causes us, and it is indeed great, we must give up the hope of seeing the alliance ratified, since its express condition is our renunciation of Malta. We will continue the war alone; it will be maritime.” 26 The Tsar was unconvinced of England’s intentions and pointed to the fact that the promised troops from Malta to Italy had yet to arrive. When they did arrive he was forced to reconsider since Pitt had already ratified the entire treaty with the exception of the Russian Malta clause. After months of delay the Tsar finally ratified the treaty as England wished and Malta remained in British hands.
This treaty was the impetus and the blueprint of the campaign. When first commenced there had been no strategic aim other than to defeat Napoleon. It was not known if the war would have England facing France alone or in an alliance with one or more of the great continental powers. The treaty with Russia gave substance to British strategy. 27
By this means England became a full participant in a continental war and did not restrict herself only to maritime operations. The fleet would support military operations wherever they occurred from the Mediterranean to the Baltic. Moreover, the tempo of the war was to be offensive, no longer waged to prevent invasion of England but rather organized to bring the battle to Napoleon with the aim of forcing him from Northern Germany and Italy. As Corbett noted:
To judge it [Trafalgar] as a defensive campaign, to regard Trafalgar as having been fought purely for security of these British Islands is to misjudge the men who designed it, and, above all, the men who fought it with such sure and lucid comprehension. For them, from first to last, the great idea was not how to avoid defeat, but how to inflict it. 28
From this Corbett showed his understanding that policy was paramount. All strategy was subservient to it and the men that implemented strategy had to understand policy and make strategy the tool that accomplished the political aims. This echoed Clausewitz completely.
The opening moves of the campaign were made by Napoleon who ordered his fleet to breakout and proceed to the West Indies. He hoped to wreak havoc in the colonies and even envisaged extending this war to India. However, only part of his fleet was able to escape and the portion under Villeneuve was forced back to Toulon by winter gales. The English operational squadrons did not think that the French goal was the West Indies and in fact Nelson, on station in the Mediterranean, thought Villeneuve might be attempting attacks on Sardinia or further east. Thus having missed his breakout from Toulon, Nelson did not give chase to Villeneuve but rather headed to Sardinia first, to be in a position to break up any invasion force. This was part of the strategic understanding of the policy as a whole. This policy considered that protection of the bases of operations was more important than a fleet action unless that fleet action was assured of success. A chase after Villeneuve could have missed him and left the bases in the Mediterranean open to attack.
This breakout by Napoleon’s fleet was only diversionary since the aim of Napoleon was to prevent a continental alliance against France and if that were not possible then to break up that alliance by force. His preparations for invasion of England were not convincing. He had let the harbours on the Channel deteriorate to the point where many of the vessels needed for the invasion could not navigate the silted channels when heavily loaded. The invasion fleet was in disrepair and not distributed to match the army units assigned to the invasion. His embarkation plan was not detailed and intimated the loading of one hundred fifty thousand troops in two hours—an impossible task. So his invasion was a loose attempt to occupy his troops and his critics while he organized his continental operations against the alliance. 29
While Napoleon was toying with invasion, Pitt had sent the forces from England to relieve Malta and have the seasoned Maltese garrison transferred to Italy. Despite the alliance with Russia and the aim of forcing Napoleon from Italy, Sicily was still the British government’s main concern as shown by the Secretary of War’s instructions to Craig, the commander of the British forces. Earl Camden wrote “It being of the utmost importance that Sicily should not fall into the hands of the French, the protection of that island is to be considered as the principal object of the expedition.” 30 The overall aim was to keep the centre of the Mediterranean in English hands. Thus the strategy of maintaining military pressure on Napoleon took precedence over the maritime aim of destroying the French fleet. This was understood by Nelson as Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean. Therefore, when Villeneuve broke out from Toulon again in April, Nelson’s first concern was again protection of Sardinia, Sicily and Malta. To this end he covered these islands and allowed Villeneuve to escape through the straits toward the West Indies. Although tactically a defeat, it was strategically correct and supported the overall policy. Corbett illustrated this with his description of the actions ordered by Lord Barham as First Lord of the Admiralty under Pitt and the covering of the English Channel by the blockading squadrons while supporting Nelson’s decision to follow Villeneuve to the West Indies.
Corbett traced all the strategic and tactical decisions up to and including the battle of Trafalgar. At the same time, he showed the policy decisions of the British government and the support it gave to various expeditions on the continent. The culmination of the British political strategy was the expedition to Northern Europe to free Holland and Hanover after the French departed for Austria. This threatened Napoleon’s flank, an action Pitt hoped would be decisive. Only Napoleon’s great military actions saved him and condemned this operation to failure. 31 Despite undisputed Command of the Sea, which Trafalgar had given England, Napoleon’s brilliant military actions and the victory at Austerlitz showed that Maritime Strategy alone could not produce a satisfactory end to a continental war.
From his historical works and the research required to produce them, Corbett slowly formed and evolved his theories of Maritime Strategy. He finally collated his extensive maritime historical knowledge and its strategic influence in his only non-historical book, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. In this book he expressed many of the basic ideas which had been espoused by Mahan and he adapted Clausewitz’ land-based strategic ideas to the sea.
The basic premise from which Corbett drew his theories and strategies was similar to Clausewitz’. In his opening chapter of Principles, he outlined his theory of war and boldly reiterated Clausewitz when he stated:
. . .military action must still be regarded only as the manifestation of policy. It must never supersede policy. The policy is always the object; war is only the means by which we obtain the object, and the means must always keep the end in view. 32
The ideas behind these statements were taken almost directly from Clausewitz’ On War, as can be seen from the following two excerpts:
. . . the political object which was the original motive, must become an essential factor in the equation. . . . . The political object—the original motive for war—will thus determine both the military objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires. 33
and
We see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means. 34
Thus, Corbett can be considered the maritime Clausewitz juxtaposed with Mahan as the Jominian sailor. Like Clausewitz, Corbett’s strategic theories remain applicable in today’s world as can be seen from an analysis of his book on Maritime Strategy.
From Clausewitz and his views on Offensive and Defensive War, Corbett advanced his theory of Limited and Unlimited War. His starting point was Clausewitz’ description of these types of war and the effort the belligerents would put forth to accomplish their aims. Corbett pointed out that where Clausewitz concentrated on continental aspects of war and their application to European strategy, the problem with Limited War was the usual progression to Unlimited War. 35 However, Corbett went beyond the continental outlook and showed that Limited War is the ideal type of war for a maritime power, especially one that is an island with frontiers not easily assailed and thus serve as a defence against territorial invasion. The object for the island nation in Limited War is to isolate the object of attack and at the same time to retain a home defence that bars an unlimited counter strike. 36 Corbett explained that attack against overseas possessions by the weaker opponent is the ideal Limited War scenario and used the conquest of Canada in the Seven Years War as the best example of the weaker belligerent attaining its end by this form of war. 37 His conclusion was that:
. . .limited war is only permanently possible to island Powers or between Powers which are separated by sea, and then only when the Power desiring limited war is able to command the sea to such a degree as to be able not only to isolate the distant object, but also to render impossible the invasion of his home territory. 38
The other part of Limited War, which formed much of England’s strategy, was the intervention in one field of battle in order to support the efforts in another field. For a maritime power this takes the form of coastal raids on enemy territory or even entire campaigns in distant territory waged to relieve pressure in the main theatre of operations. Corbett used several historic examples to show what forms of limited action a maritime power could undertake. 39 From the coastal raids employed against France in the Seven Years War to relieve pressure on Frederich the Great to Wellington’s campaign in Spain, Corbett illustrated Limited Warfare actions. Modern examples from the twentieth century that show the application of Corbett’s strategy are the Gallipoli campaign of the First World War and the African campaign of the Second World War. All these types of actions were undertaken, according to Corbett, as part of a Maritime Strategy to maintain action by the weaker opponent against the stronger. This is done in order to keep the stronger opponent off guard and prepare for either the weaker opponent to gain enough strength to achieve his aim or in support of a stronger ally who can attack the opponent while he is engaged in distant battles.
According to Corbett, the example of Wellington in Spain:
. . .was that in perfect conditions he [Wellington] was applying the limited form to an unlimited war. Our object was unlimited. It was nothing less than the overthrow of Napoleon. Complete success at sea had failed to do it, but that success had given us the power of applying the limited form, which was the most decisive form of offence within our means” 40
This statement also brings out Corbett’s main strategic thought concerning maritime power. Basically, Corbett said that sea power was limited in what it may accomplish. As powerful and important as maritime power is, it takes military (land) power to finalize and solidify any gains accomplished by sea power.
This theory that military power is necessary for the final successful outcome of war appears to be contradictory to Mahan’s theories of sea power. However, in the introduction to his book The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783, Mahan describes how the Romans defeated the Carthaginians by their ability to maintain sea lines of communication to transport troops in enough strength and time to where they were needed to win battles. 41
Mahan described the necessity of military action combined with sea power to accomplish the final objective of war in defeating the enemy. Thus, in the basics of Maritime Strategy, both Mahan and Corbett were in accord. It is in the detailed application of their theories where the two strategists diverge and converge at different times.
From his basic precept that Maritime Strategy required both military and naval power, Corbett explained his theories in detail. He first described what he viewed as Command of the Sea. Corbett stated, “The object of naval warfare must always be directly or indirectly either to secure Command of the Sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it.” 42 Command of the Sea is not a binary entity; that is, loss of Command of the Sea does not automatically mean that the opponent gains command. As Corbett pointed out, Command of the Sea is usually in dispute with neither party to a conflict in absolute control. It is in the dispute of Command of the Sea that Naval Strategy is primarily concerned while overall Maritime Strategy is tied directly to National Strategy. 43
In the context of war, Command of the Sea means control of passage either over, under or upon the sea. Having possession of the sea is a physical impossibility since to do so would require the stationing of ships in every square mile of ocean throughout the world and no nation can do this. Even today with satellite observation of the whole world, no nation can prevent the passage upon every ocean. Only control of choke points or control of specific areas can be accomplished by those in Command of the Sea. This was Corbett’s idea and it is still valid today. In war, Command of the Sea can mean control for only some limited period of time or of specific small areas. Only when one opponent or the other is militarily defeated can Command of the Sea be absolute. As Corbett pointed out in The Campaign of Trafalgar, though England had Command of the Sea after 1805, France still was able to disrupt sea commerce and Napoleon was able to achieve some of his greatest military victories. Absolute Command of the Sea did not exist and, without a military victory, Sea Power can achieve only limited goals.
The sea also acts as a barrier or defence. Command of the Sea removes that barrier for the belligerent who gains it and also retains that barrier as a defence against invasion. Even when disputed, Command of the Sea can be gained in a specific area or for a critical time. Command of the Sea in the English Channel in 1944 facilitated the virtually unhindered Normandy invasion. Yet at the same time, U-boats were still attacking convoys in the Atlantic thus showing that Command of the Sea was not absolute. Corbett stated:
Command of the Sea, therefore means nothing but the control of maritime communications, whether for commercial or military purposes. The object of naval warfare is the control of communications and not as in land warfare the conquest of territory. 44
This view withstands the test of time. In fact the Royal Navy’s current maritime doctrine states:
Maritime power in the broadest of sense is military, political and economic power exerted through an ability to use the sea. Maritime power has traditionally been employed to control sea communications for the general economic welfare or survival of sea dependant states. Military maritime power has also had a longstanding ability to influence events on land through amphibious and ship launched land attack operations. 45
It goes on to acknowledge Corbett’s view that Command of the Sea is normally in dispute. The Command of the Sea is an endeavour to control communications and whether it removes an opponent’s navy from the sea or strangles his trade, the object remains the same: to deny communication. This theory brought Corbett to the understanding of the use of blockade as it pertains to Command of the Sea.
Blockade for Corbett was a means of obtaining Command of the Sea. Either it prevented the enemy from using the sea for any use by bottling up his naval fleet and preventing commerce from using the sea lanes, or it provoked the enemy to engage an opposing fleet in an attempt to break Command of the Sea by the destruction of the opposing fleet. In either case, the aim of blockade was the exertion of pressure on the citizens and their collective life. 46 In Corbett’s view this was the way wars were brought to an end and battles, either sea or land, were only a means of producing this pressure. 47 Sea battles alone would not end the war but only pave the way for invasion. If a maritime nation’s strength was solely in her navy and she did not have the means to take the war militarily to a continental power, then the war would continue without a satisfactory conclusion.
Corbett theorized that pressure could be brought to bear by the disruption of commerce and the deprivation of a nation’s means of conducting business. This was also part of Command of the Sea. Thus blockade would put direct pressure on the citizens of a country by disrupting communications through the capture or destruction of the enemy’s shipping. In this way a preponderant force could be applied to disrupt national life. This alone may not end the war unless the nation under pressure is one that relies solely on sea lines of communication and the blockade is absolute; however, it is one means to an end. Corbett stated that wars are not decided exclusively by military and naval force but that the financial aspect had a major role in the conflict. When other things are equal it is the longer purse that wins. 48 In today’s world, with the extreme cost of weapons, the financial impact is even more devastating and the impact on commerce of Sea Power remains a major factor in any prolonged conflict. Command of the Sea, although usually disputed and not absolute, remains a strategic goal necessary to secure communications and to prosecute war successfully. The normal goal should be general Command of the Sea. This does not mean that
the enemy can do nothing, but that he cannot interfere with our maritime trade and overseas operations so seriously as to affect the issue of the war, and that he cannot carry on his means that own trade and operations except at such risk and hazard as to remove them from the field of practical strategy. In other words, it the enemy can no longer attack our lines of passage and communication effectively, and that he cannot use or defend his own. 49
The problem with gaining Command of the Sea is having the opportunity to achieve that goal. Mahan and others have always advocated that the strategic purpose of naval fleets was to engage the enemy’s naval fleet. Corbett did not dispute this axiom directly but stated that the weaker side will often avoid the major confrontation that the stronger wishes for. This strategy was to maintain the naval fleet and continue to dispute Command of the Sea. A “Fleet in Being” would occupy the stronger fleet while cruisers and other single ships and/or smaller flotillas ranged abroad to C1 actively dispute Command of the Sea and put some form of pressure on the commercial lines of communication. At the same time as the strong fleet was engaged in watching the opposing “Fleet in Being” it was not disrupting the enemy’s sea communications and enemy trade could continue in support of the enemy’s war effort. For this reason, the composition of a fleet directly affects the ability of a nation to have Command of the Sea.
With Command of the Sea usually in dispute, Corbett turned to the composition of the fleet for control of the sea. He saw the necessity of cruisers as the means of exercising control while battle fleets were the means of securing control of the sea. 50 Cruisers in previous eras were the eyes of the fleet and the independent corsairs which controlled sea communication—that is protected or attacked trade as the case may be. The cruiser, in Corbett’s view, was primarily concerned with sea communications; that is, exercising control of the sea. 51 In Corbett’s day and in all times previous, the cruiser was also used as the “eyes of the fleet”. Corbett was faced with the dilemma that the ships used for control of the sea were also the same ships the fleet needed as the eyes of the fleet for scouting. Since there was a finite number of cruisers, based on cost of production and the ability to produce them, each cruiser attached to the fleet as a scout was one less available to control the sea lines of communication. This problem has been overcome to a certain degree in modern navies. Corbett’s cruiser can now be equated to the attack submarine, which can be deployed on independent operations to control the sea lanes. The job of the “eyes of the fleet” can be relegated to aeroplanes from the Maritime Patrol Aircraft through to the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) planes and on up to surveillance satellites. His theory therefore has not changed from the basic notion of smaller independent vessels being used to maintain control of the sea while the battle fleet is used to secure control. Securing control entails the destruction or neutralization of the enemy’s navy, which was and is the task of the battle fleet.
Corbett’s theory for the composition of a fleet required a number of different types of ships which included lightly armed fast ‘cruisers’ for control of sea communications up to the battle ship fleet to gain initial Command of the Sea by destruction of the opposing fleet. In its basic form this theory continues to be valid when the modern fleet is analysed. As previously stated, the submarine can now be considered the ‘cruiser’ Corbett envisaged as the controlling entity and the modern aircraft carrier fleet as the battle fleet needed to secure Command of the Sea.
Having explained his theory of fleet composition, Corbett turned to its use. His theory explained the idea of concentration of force in a naval sense. He quoted Mahan who stated, “Such is concentration reasonably understood—not huddled together like a drove of sheep, but distributed with regard to a common purpose and linked together by the effectual energy of a single will.” 52 Corbett explained this as having a strategic centre around which naval forces are distributed. These forces are in communication and can be brought together quickly for a single purpose but until that is ordered are free to conduct normal operations. In Napoleonic times, England held three strategic centres; one on the Downs with distributed forces covering the North Sea and protecting the possible line of invasion, one centred off Ushant to cover the Bay of Biscay and the French naval ports and one centred on Sardinia to cover the Mediterranean. In this way ships and flotillas of the fleets could be dispersed to protect the merchant vessels approaching England or sent to watch a particular port, but could be quickly brought together on the ‘strategic centre’ if the whole fleet was needed to face the French fleet. This is what Corbett meant by flexible concentration. This dispersal around a strategic centre allowed for better control of sea communications when Command of the Sea was in dispute, while allowing for a consolidation of the fleet to fight a major fleet battle if the enemy presented the opportunity.
This theory appears to be in conflict with Mahan’s view never to divide one’s fleet, which was based on his study of the Anglo-Dutch war of 1666 where Monk divided his fleet to meet the perceived threat of the French coming to join the Dutch. The Dutch then sallied forth and fought a running fight with the English over four days. The English lost the battle and Mahan stated “There is no doubt that the English had much the worst of it, and that this was owing wholly to the original blunder of weakening the fleet by a great detachment sent in another direction.” 53 Upon this observation many naval officers believed Mahan advocated never dividing the fleet; however, in another book he stated the quote cited by Corbett above concerning distribution about a strategic centre. Thus, in this instance Corbett is supported by Mahan rather than being in conflict. Corbett goes on to show that strategic dispersal is the normal war time use of a fleet. Victories and particularly naval victories require work and this takes bold strategic combinations that entail at least apparent dispersal. This involves taking risks and the most effective risk is division. 54 Mahan’s comment on distribution shows that he was not against dispersal. The problem is knowing the limits of proper dispersal and not going beyond them. In fact, when Command of the Sea is in dispute it is necessary to disperse naval power to maintain control until such time as the enemy can be brought to the strategic fleet engagement. As long as he avoids this consummate engagement, Command of the Sea must be maintained by strategic dispersal.
Corbett then extrapolated and gave general principles for concentration and dispersal which are still valid. First, the amount of naval power dispersed is proportional to the enemy’s number of ports and the length of the coastline that separates them. 55 Watching these ports is easier and information is passed faster in today’s world as compared to the beginning of the 1900's but the principle is still the same. One must observe the enemy’s ports to anticipate and counter activity. This is particularly true if it is a period of tension or a limited war, which has been the norm in the latter half of the twentieth century. Concentration is the other part of the strategic equation. Concentration of force is needed to meet any attempt by the enemy to wrest or forcibly dispute Command of the Sea. The strategic centre of the dispersal area must be close enough to allow for a coming together of the battle fleet to prosecute every opportunity for a fleet action. Although Corbett talked about the Home Fleet concentrated in England, the strategic centre would depend on the area of operations. Corbett emphasized flexibility and summarized his theory by saying “The ideal concentration . . . is an appearance of weakness that covers a reality of strength.” 56
Having laid out his general theories of Maritime Power and Command of the Sea, Corbett turned to the specifics of Naval Strategy and the ways to conduct a Naval War or that part of a general war upon the sea. He first explained how the normal tenets of land warfare were inappropriate in naval warfare. The military strategy that saw the enemy’s military force as the main objective was not directly translatable to naval conflict. Striking the enemy fleet, although a strategic aim, was not always possible since the enemy could choose to avoid battle by remaining in port or escaping into the ocean to plague sea lanes of communication. Attacking his lines of communication, a basic strategic aim of naval warfare, was difficult since there is no topographic feature to the ocean except at specific geographic choke points. The enemy could choose to avoid these if desired. Finally, to concentrate one’s naval force to combat the enemy’s fleet left C2 sea commerce open to attack by the enemy’s cruisers. Therefore, concentrating a naval force for the defining battle must be tempered with the necessity of protecting your own sea lines of communication. As Sir Walter Raleigh noted in the quote at the head of this paper, commerce protection is paramount in order for the nation to maintain wealth. This wealth is absolutely necessary to prosecute war for any length of time. This view was a long time in coming for Corbett but the evidence he found in his research through history eventually forced him to recognize the importance of commerce. Although many Mahanian scholars deride naval attention to commerce and preach the aim of navies must be the fleet of the enemy, Mahan recognized the importance of commerce in the very elements that made a great sea power. In his fifth element, National Character, he states:
If sea power be really based upon a peaceful and extensive commerce, aptitude for commercial pursuits must be a distinguishing feature of the nations that have at one time or another been great upon the sea. History almost without exception affirms that this is true. 57
Thus, the two great naval strategists are in accord on the importance of commerce for sea power. Mahan’s declaration that the enemy fleet was the target of one’s own battle fleet is a method of ensuring protection of your commerce. Corbett agreed that as a principle there was no argument, but that as a strategic rule not to be broken it was impractical since the enemy may choose to avoid battle. Having forced strategists to accept the obvious, Corbett turned to forms of Naval Operations.
Two general objectives distinguish naval operations. One is to obtain or dispute Command of the Sea, and the other is to exercise such control of communications regardless of whether it is complete or partial. 58 Although operations can and do achieve both objectives in the execution of actions, one or the other is the main purpose of the operation when it is conceived.
Securing command or disputing command depends on the relative strength of the opponents. When in strength, securing command can be done by battle if the enemy presents himself or if he does not, then by blockade. In securing command the object must be to obtain a decision and that invariably means battle. However, the normal view of seeking the enemy is not always the correct strategy. Finding the enemy can be the biggest problem and therefore the idea of a strategic centre comes to the fore. If the fleet roams the ocean seeking the enemy it may not encounter the enemy and in roaming may leave the strategic centre vulnerable. Seeking the enemy may require waiting for the enemy to seek you out. “ What the maxim really means is that we should endeavour from the first to secure contact in the best position for bringing about a complete decision in our favour, and as soon as the other parts of our war plan, military or political, will permit.” 59
Blockade is the other method of securing Command. It is designed to keep the enemy fleet bottled in his harbours while at the same time cutting off his sea commerce. The blockade will thus force him to face your blockading fleet in battle, which will force a decision. Or if he does not leave his harbour his commerce will be strangled forcing a decision on the military or diplomatic front and achieving the policy aim of the war.
If the relative strengths are against you, either temporarily or permanently, the object is to maintain disputed command through an active defence. This means that operations are undertaken to prevent the enemy from securing or exercising control by use of cruisers to disrupt commerce and maintaining a “Fleet in Being” to occupy his superior fleet. These operations continue until situations change by strengthened forces or a decision is made outside naval action. The “Fleet in Being” only works “. . .where the enemy regards the general command of the sea area as necessary in his offensive purposes, you may be able to prevent his gaining such command by using your fleet defensively, refusing what Nelson called a regular battle, and seizing every opportunity for a counter stroke.” 60
Exercising command is basically using the sea lines of communication. Corbett gives three general operations which constitute exercising command. They are: first, defending against invasion, second, attack upon and defence of commerce, and third, attack, defence and support of military operations (what are now amphibious operations). 61
In his strategy for defence against invasion Corbett stated the obvious, noting that the target is first, foremost and always the enemy’s transports. Corbett drew from land strategy and pointed out that the object of defence against invasion by the navy was the opposing army. This is still a valid strategy for modern warfare. Whether the army is in a separate fleet or in company with the battle fleet, the object of all attacks must be the invading force and every effort must be made to avoid battle with the screening fleet until the army has been destroyed. 62
Attack and defence of trade is the second method of exercising control of communications. The key of course is sea communications. Trade follows set routes and even when the open ocean portion of the route is varied, the destinations and the choke points do not vary. For this reason the concentration of defence is at the normal constriction of the trade routes. Pelagic commerce attack, that is attack on the open ocean is a matter of ‘catch as catch can’ and is less profitable than concentration at the nodes of trade. Thus Corbett stated that defence of trade was easier than attack since the defensive force could wait at the nodes for the attacker. He also noted that when war on commerce was the object of the belligerent, it was usually because he was the weaker in naval power and did not wish to risk the decisive battle. Thus the defensive force has the advantage.
This is the area of strategy where Corbett is often criticized for his lack of vision in the use of the submarine. The submarine was in its infancy when he wrote his Principles and had a very limited range and endurance. However, even during the Second World War, the U-boat was only used because Germany had the weaker fleet and could not challenge the Royal Navy in a fleet engagement. The U-boat became the cruiser Corbett envisioned as the commerce raider. As for defence, it was lack of proper escorts for the merchant ships and inadequately armed escorts that gave the U-boat its ability almost to bring Britain to its knees. The basic strategy Corbett stated concerning attack and defence of commerce still stands. The proper vessel designed for commerce protection placed at the points where commerce congregates will answer the enemy’s attack on sea lanes of communication. Choke points are where it is easier to attack and also easier to defend commerce. So his basic strategy is still sound. Although he argued that war on commerce was not effective, modern history has shown that if commerce is inadequately protected then that type of war can be devastating against an island nation. It was very effective in the First World War until the convoy system was instituted and in the second it was almost decisive in the Atlantic against Britain. It was decisive against Japan. Corbett may have been correct based on the history he had studied and in part still is correct with respect to the effectiveness of attacks on commerce. If commercial attack is the only Maritime Strategy employed then an effective defence of convoys with properly armed escorts coupled with a concentration of force at choke points can still defeat this strategy. Corbett had noted that when England’s enemies had turned to war on trade it was from a position of weakness. They could not muster the naval strength to meet the Royal Navy in battle with any prospect of winning. Thus it was a method of disputing Command of the Sea. In the 16th to 18th centuries it was usually ineffective since they did not have adequate strength to make it hurt to the point where pressure from the English populace on its government to end the war was present. From the mid-19th century onward commerce war had the potential to be effective against England because it could no longer survive on only domestic production and industry became dependant on overseas supplies. As part of a greater naval strategy it is still an effective method of war.
His final strategic thoughts concerned naval support of military operations, what is now commonly called amphibious operations. His basic strategic thoughts stated that naval and military strategy could not be done in isolation and that all strategic plans had to take into account the overall policy of the government and its aims for the war. His basic tenet for supporting military or army operations stated that the navy’s task was to give full support and do whatever was required to ensure success of the operation. This does not mean subordinating the navy to the army but rather that the navy must ensure by its actions the successful completion of the military operation.
According to Corbett, the composition of an amphibious force was made of four parts: the army being transported; the transports and landing vessels; the escort ships with its supporting vessels used for inshore work; and, the covering squadron. Ideally, these four parts were separate entities with specific tasks that did not overlap. 63 However, as this amphibious force was a single attacking entity, invariably the four separate parts would do each other’s tasks during the operation. The main task of the commander was to recognize the primary task of each part and to ensure that the primary task was never abandoned. This was and remains particularly important in the case of the covering squadron that must protect the force from interference by enemy fleets. The aim of the operation must always be kept in mind. The covering squadron must not be so heavily engaged with direct support of the landing force that it cannot disengage to meet the threat of enemy vessels attempting to attack the operation. At the same time the covering force must not succumb to the temptation of seeking a fleet action when that would leave the military force open to attack from another naval force: “...its paramount function is to prevent interference with the actual combined operations—that is the landing, support and supply of the army.” 64 The aim of the covering force must be to gain local Command of the Sea and then to exercise that control in order that the operation can proceed unencumbered. Amphibious operations undertaken across a sea which one does not have command of are doomed to failure. “ Until his (the enemy’s) hold is broken by purely naval action, combined (joint) work remains beyond all legitimate risk of war.” 65
Corbett ended his strategic book as he began, emphasizing that naval strategy had to be considered with overall military strategy and could not be applied in isolation. However, he was more than an academic theorist and his work at the War College in addition to his strategic ideas had a lasting effect on the Royal Navy. His teachings and his theories still form a basis for the strategic plans of the Royal Navy as shown by the current Royal Navy doctrine.
Corbett was not only a theorist. He was in a position to have his strategic ideas influence Royal Navy doctrine. The Royal Navy War College became the only important centre in England for pre-war naval strategic thought and war planning. 66 Although Corbett and the new course director, Captain Slade, pressed Admiral Fisher to institute a proper naval staff within the Royal Navy, he only agreed to use the War Course as an ad hoc planning body. Thus the War Course, with Corbett as a primary contributor, became the de facto naval war planning staff from 1905 until Fisher’s fall in 1910. 67 In 1911, Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty, established the first naval staff by direction of Lord Haldane, the secretary for war. Corbett was in the confidence of the naval staff at this time and his work helped to bring a more realistic view to modern war. At the outbreak of war in 1914 the Admiralty sought a way to bring Corbett onto the staff officially. His appointment as official naval historian gave him the position to be an official advisor to the naval staff. In this way he was able to “. . .discuss strategy and draft memoranda embodying ideas of the Staff. . .” 68 In this way he was able to preach his “no risk” ideas which asserted that with control of the North Sea secure in British hands, and unless this control was deliberately challenged by the enemy, all consequent maritime benefits would accrue to Britain without fighting on a large scale. 69 A fleet action was not necessary unless it was instigated by Germany and Corbett was against any action which would endanger the Grand Fleet. This argument probably had an influence on Sir John Jellico, Commander of the Grand Fleet, and was used by politicians to defend themselves against attack, noting the author was well respected professionally and publicly.
Corbett was influential throughout the war and was listened to. However after the war, many in power in the Admiralty castigated his work as the official historian because he had been too accurate. They blamed him for the apparent lack of aggressiveness of the navy during the war which, to them, was against tradition. This criticism from the senior officers of the service he had helped to modernize caused him great anxiety and contributed to his death from a heart attack at age 69. However, his tenets succeeded him partly due to his student and confrére, Sir Herbert Richmond.
Richmond’s own book on Sea Power, Sea Power in the Modern World, echos many of Corbett’s ideas. Richmond followed Corbett’s example of using history to illustrate his ideas and, in so doing, maintained Corbett’s influence into the inter-war years. Even today, the Royal Navy recognizes Corbett as a major strategist upon which their modern Maritime Strategy is based. Thus Corbett has withstood the test of time and his impact on Maritime Strategy continues to this day.
Unlike the majority of military strategists, Corbett was unique in being a civilian academic who had no personal military experience. However, his in depth study of British maritime history gave him great insight into the development of Maritime Strategy. Through his historical work he became a well-respected and knowledgeable figure in naval affairs. As a contemporary of Mahan it was inevitable that his work would be compared to the American naval strategist. As a result many scholars interpreted their work as being in conflict; however, an in-depth comparison has shown that they were complimentary and that Corbett’s work supports and expands on Mahan’s strategic ideas. In particular, Corbett supported Mahan’s idea for decisive fleet actions but was more pragmatic in developing theories for Maritime Strategy when the enemy avoided the decisive fleet action.
Corbett’s influence went beyond the academic study of strategy. His publicly acknowledged expertise in naval affairs led to his appointment as a lecturer at the Royal Naval War College. His friendship with and support of Admiral Fisher’s naval reforms ensured that his ideas would be accepted in the Admiralty during the critical period of change. As a mentor to Fisher and as college lecturer, he was able to influence the education of Britain’s professional naval officers. During World War One his friendship with other senior naval officers, senior cabinet members and the head of the Imperial General Staff, coupled with the respect he enjoyed, ensured his appointment to the Naval Staff. As a member of the Naval Staff his ideas and advice carried great weight. The Royal Navy, to this day, acknowledges him as a basis for their current Maritime Strategy and his theories on Command of the Sea remain as the basis for the Royal Navy’s strategy.
Bibliography
Primary Sources
Corbett, Julian S. Drake and the Tudor Navy. London: Longmans, Green, and Co, 1899.
Corbett, Julian S. The Successors of Drake. London: Longmans, Green, and Co, 1900.
Corbett, Julian S. England in the Seven Years War: A Study In Combined Strategy. London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1907.
Corbett, Julian S. The Campaign of Trafalgar. London: Longmans, Green, and Co, 1910.
Corbett, Julian S. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. London, Longmans, Green & co, 1911.
Mahan, Alfred Thayer. The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660—1783. Boston: Little Brown, 1908 Republished New York : Dover Publications, 1987.
Clausewitz. Carl von. On War. Eds/trans Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: University Press 1989.
Richmond, Sir Herbert. Statesman and Sea Power. Oxford: Clarendon, 1946.
Thucydides. The History of the Peloponnesian War. Translated by Crawley R. revised by Feetham R. Pennsylvania: The Franklin Library, 1980.
Secondary Sources
Cleaver, Liam J. “The Pen Behind the Fleet: The Influence of Sir Julian Stafford Corbett On British Naval Development, 1898-1918.” Comparative Strategy. Eds Payne, Keith P., Baily, Kathleen, Lee, Sam, Gray, Colin S. Volume 14 Number 1, 40-55. Taylor & Francis, 1995.
Goldrick, James and Hattendorf John B. eds. Mahan Is Not Enough: The Proceedings of a Conference on the Works of Sir Julian Corbett and Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond. Newport R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1993.
Gray, Colin S. The Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage of Navies in War. New York: The Free Press, 1992.
Schurman, D.M. The Education of a Navy: The Development of British Naval Strategic Thought, 1867—1914. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965.
Till, Geoffrey. Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age. London: MacMillan Press, 1982.
The Defence Council. The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine. London, HMSO, 1995.
Endnotes
Note 1: Thucydides, The History of the Peloponnesian War, (Pennsylvania: The Franklin Centre Library, 1980), 122. Back.
Note 2: Julian S Corbett, Drake and the Tudor Navy Volume I (London: Longmans, Green, and Co, 1899), inside cover. Back.
Note 3: Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660–1783, (New York: Dover Publications, 1987), 539-540. Back.
Note 4: D. M. Schurman, The Education of a Navy: The Development of British Naval Strategic Thought, 1867–1914, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), 149. Back.
Note 5: Ibid., 147. Back.
Note 6: Ibid., 148. Back.
Note 7: Geoffrey Till, Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age, (London: MacMillan Press, 1982), 39. Back.
Note 8: Corbett, Drake and the Tudor Navy, 75. Back.
Note 9: Ibid., 115-116. Back.
Note 10: Ibid., 130-132. Back.
Note 11: Ibid., 152. Back.
Note 12: Ibid., 338. Back.
Note 13: Ibid., 345. Back.
Note 14: Ibid., 347. Back.
Note 15: Julian S. Corbett, Drake and the Tudor Navy, 2.
The Spanish ambassador continuously warned King Philip that “. . . England was becoming the great carrying power of Western Europe. ‘They are building ships without cessation’ , he wrote, ‘and they are thus making themselves masters of the sea’.” Back.
Note 16: Ibid., 2. Back.
Note 17: Julian S. Corbett, The Successors of Drake, (London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1900), vii. Back.
Corbett writes that “to enjoy the vantage ground of the sea you must have an army as mobile, as well organised, and as highly trained as your navy.” Back.
Note 19: Schurman. The Education of a Navy, 164. Back.
Note 20: Julian S. Corbett, England in the Seven Years War: A Study In Combined Strategy, (London: Longmans, Green and Co, 1907), 4. Back.
Note 21: Schurman, The Education of a Navy, 162. Back.
Note 22: Julian S. Corbett, England in the Mediterranean, quoted in D. M. Schurman, The Education of a Navy, 163. Back.
Note 23: Schurman, The Education of a Navy, 166. Back.
Note 24: Ibid., 169. Back.
Note 25: Julian S. Corbett, The Campaign of Trafalgar, (London: Longmans, Green, and Co, 1910), 12-15. Back.
Note 26: Ibid., 22. Back.
The three articles of the treaty required: first, that Russia would do all within her power to form a league of continental powers and provide an army of half a million men; second, the aims of the alliance were to free Hanover and North Germany, establish the independence of Holland and Switzerland, re-establish the King of Sardinia, secure the Kingdom of Naples and evacuate the French from the whole of Italy; and third, England would support the common cause with both her land and naval forces providing transports as required and financially support the war to the tune of one and a quarter million pounds per hundred thousand troops. Back.
Note 28: Ibid., 26. Back.
Note 29: Ibid., 38. Back.
Note 30: Ibid., 50. Back.
Note 31: Ibid., 410. Back.
Note 32: Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, (London, Longmans, Green & Co, 1911), 24. Back.
Note 33: Carl von Clausewitz, On War, translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: University Press 1989), 80-81. Back.
Note 34: Ibid., 87. Back.
Note 35: The progression from Limited War to Unlimited War was usually caused by one belligerent or the other determining that the object of the war must be obtained or defended with all means possible regardless of the view of the other belligerent. Back.
Note 36: Corbett, Some Principles, 54. Back.
Note 37: Ibid., 53. Back.
Note 38: Ibid., 54-55. Back.
Note 39: Ibid., 58. Back.
Note 40: Ibid., 62. Back.
Note 41: Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power, 20.
“The military situation which finally resulted in the battle of the Metaurus and the triumph of Rome may be summed up as follows: To overthrow Rome it was necessary to attack her in Italy at the heart of her power, and shatter the strongly linked confederacy of which she was the head. This was the objective. To reach it, the Carthaginians needed a solid base of operations and a secure line of communications. The former was established in Spain by the genius of the great Barca family; the latter was never achieved. There were two lines possible,—the one direct by sea, the other circuitous through Gaul. The first was blocked by the Roman sea power, the second imperilled and finally intercepted through occupation of northern Spain by the Roman army. This occupation was made possible through control of the sea, which the Carthaginians never endangered. With respect to Hannibal and his base, therefore, Rome occupied two central positions, Rome itself and northern Spain, joined by an easy interior line of communications, the sea; by which mutual support was continually given.” Back.
Note 42: Corbett, Some Principles, 87. Back.
Note 43: Ibid., 87. Back.
Note 44: Ibid., 90. Back.
Note 45: The Defence Council, The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine, (London, HMSO, 1995), 54. Back.
Note 46: Corbett, Some Principles, 94. Back.
Note 47: Ibid., 94. Back.
Note 48: Ibid., 99. Back.
Note 49: Ibid., 103. Back.
Note 50: Ibid., 113. Back.
Note 51: Ibid., 115. Back.
Note 52: Ibid., 131. Back.
Note 53: Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power, 125. Back.
Note 54: Corbett, Some Principles, 134. Back.
Note 55: Ibid., 150. Back.
Note 56: Ibid., 153. Back.
Note 57: Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power, 50. Back.
Note 58: Corbett, Some Principles, 164. Back.
Note 59: Ibid., 182. Back.
Note 60: Ibid., 226. Back.
Note 61: Ibid., 168. Back.
Note 62: Ibid., 238. Back.
Note 63: Ibid., 289. Back.
Note 64: Ibid., 291. Back.
Note 65: Ibid., 310. Back.
Note 66: Liam J. Cleaver, “The Pen Behind the Fleet: The Influence of Sir Julian Stafford Corbett on British Naval Development, 1898-1918,” Comparative Strategy 14: 1 (1995): 48. Back.
Note 67: Ibid., 51. Back.
Note 68: Ibid., 53. Back.
Note 69: Ibid., 53. Back.
Comments
Comment 1: The editor doesn’t like split infinitives and usually this is correct. However in this sentence the editor changed the sentence “. . . flotillas ranged abroad to actively dispute . . .” to “. . . flotillas ranged abroad actively to dispute . . .” I have changed it back since the word ‘actively’ is an adverb fir the verb ‘dispute’. The editor has made the sentence awkward to read, so I changed it back. Back.
Comment 2: Rob, I took out the word ‘certain’ here as it did not add to the meaning. Back.