THE Journal OF INTERNATIONAL Security Affairs

Number 12, Spring 2007

The Bush Scorecard

Michael Scheuer on **counterterrorism**
John Wobensmith & Jeff Smith on **intelligence reform**
Andrew Davenport on **economic warfare**
Henry Cooper on **ballistic missile defense**
Henry Sokolski on **nuclear nonproliferation**
James Carafano on **homeland security**

Looking Ahead

Ilan Berman on **democracy promotion**
Dan O'Shea on **kidnappings in Iraq**
David Grange et al. on **Iran strategy**
Lawrence Haas on **a Democratic alternative**

Response

Stephen Blank on **Russian democracy**

Dispatches

Why the Caucasus matters for Moscow
Athens eyes Turkey's EU accession
Europe's flagging economic fortunes

Book Reviews

Mark Bowden's *Guests of the Ayatollah* ◊ *America Alone* by Mark Steyn ◊ Nir Rosen's *In the Belly of the Green Bird* ◊ *Dangerous Nation* by Robert Kagan

$7.95 US $12.50 CAN

0 74470 57882 6 71

THE Journal OF INTERNATIONAL Security Affairs

The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), Inc., is an independent, non-profit, non-partisan, non-sectarian educational organization established in 1976 to fulfill a two-fold mandate: To educate the American public about the threats and dangers facing our country and our global allies; to explain why a mobile, technologically superior military is vital to America's security; to provide leadership on issues affecting American national security and foreign policy; to explain to Americans and others the importance of U.S. security cooperation with like-minded democratic partners around the world and to explain the key role Israel plays in the Mediterranean and Middle East as an outpost of liberty, a linchpin of stability and a friend and ally of the United States.

The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, Inc., incorporated in the District of Columbia, is a tax-exempt organization under section 501(c)(3) of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code.

Manuscripts should be sent to: 1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Suite 515, Washington, D.C. 20036. The Editor will consider all manuscripts received, but will assume no responsibility regarding them and will return only materials accompanied by appropriate postage. Facsimile submissions will not be accepted.

Advertising: Please contact the Editor, Ilan Berman, at (editor@securityaffairs.org) for information on availability and ad rates.
Reprints and Permissions: Write The Journal of International Security Affairs, Reader Services, 1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Suite 515, Washington, D.C. 20036. Fax: (202) 667-0601.

Printed in the United States of America.

Editor's Note: The opinions expressed in *The Journal of International Security Affairs* (ISSN 1532-4060) are those of the author(s) alone and do not necessarily represent the opinions of JINSA.

THE Journal OF INTERNATIONAL Security Affairs

Number 12, Spring 2007

The Bush Scorecard

Response

Looking Ahead

Dispatches

Book Reviews

From the Publisher

As this issue goes to print, the war between al-Qaeda and the United States is beginning to take a back seat to the debate between the Administration and Congress. Unfortunately, the loser is America itself.

There is an audience out there watching this American debate. It is made up of al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Iran. It is also composed of Russia and China. And then there are those who have cast their lot with us. They too are watching, but for very different reasons.

Our internal bickering sends a clear message to both. It emboldens the former, and discourages the latter.

All of which begs the question: what would it mean to lose?

Every day, our media bombard us with images of death and carnage. Yet seldom is there a reference to the reasons we are engaged in this war. And never is there any mention of the potential consequences of our failure.

During the first and second World Wars, we had a clear understanding of the nature of "the Hun" and the Nazis, and we knew what would happen if they were to succeed. Not so now. It has become politically incorrect to portray the enemy as barbaric, even though the consequences of our failure in the fight against radical Islam would have consequences at least as grave as those posed by the "Huns" and even the Nazis in their day.

Yet how can we expect people to sacrifice if we don't put a face on what it is we are trying to prevent from happening? Once we do, we will learn whether America will rise to the occasion, or if we—not willing to fight for any reason—are well and truly doomed.



Tom Neumann
Publisher

The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs

Translating Ideas into Policy

Mission

To educate the American public about the threats and dangers facing our country and our global allies; to explain why a mobile, technologically superior military is vital to America's security; to provide leadership on issues affecting American national security and foreign policy; to explain to Americans and others the importance of U.S. security cooperation with like-minded democratic partners around the world and to explain the key role Israel plays in the Mediterranean and Middle East as an outpost of liberty, a linchpin of stability and a friend and ally of the United States.

Founded 1976

JINSA

1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW • Suite 515 • Washington, D.C. 20036
Ph: (202) 667-3900 • **www.jinsa.org** • F: (202) 667-0601

Editor's Corner

November 2008 may still be a year-and-a-half away, but the U.S. campaign season is already in full swing. A growing number of candidates on both sides of the political aisle have already thrown their hats into the presidential ring, and more are expected to join the race in the months ahead. Some of the names are well known; others are less so. But all of their debates, campaigns and policy positions will be profoundly shaped by the successes and failures of the current resident of 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue.

As such, it's not too early to examine the Bush administration's "scorecard" in foreign policy and national security. We do so with a sextet of articles analyzing everything from the war on terror to stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The first comes from former CIA analyst Michael Scheuer, who provides a grim review of Administration failures, conceptual and otherwise, in the War on Terror. Then, the American Foreign Policy Council's John Wobensmith and Jeff Smith examine the Bush administration's progress in reforming a segment of our government notoriously resistant to transformation: the intelligence community. Andrew Davenport, vice president at the Conflict Securities Advisory Group, explains how the White House is shifting its terrorism financing focus—from the terrorists themselves to the regimes that enable them.

Ambassador Henry Cooper, former head of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, follows up with an overview of the state of the current missile defense debate—and the work left to be done in truly defending the American people. Then, Henry Sokolski of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center outlines the remarkable early nonproliferation successes of the Bush team, and the dramatic turnaround that has taken place in the President's second term. Finally, the Heritage Foundation's Jim Carafano explores what is sure to become one of the bright spots of the Bush legacy: the Administration's holistic and effective homeland security strategy.

Moving on, we revisit the issue of Russian democracy in the second installment of our periodic "Response" feature, in which Steve Blank of the U.S. Army War College explains why democratic principles are essential for stable governance in Moscow.

After that, we shift gears and "look ahead" with a quartet of articles on future trends affecting the Middle East, and beyond. Yours truly examines the future of American democracy promotion efforts—and the lessons learned for democratization from the Bush years. Dan O'Shea, the former Coordinator of the Hostage Working Group in Iraq, outlines the strategic dimensions of the kidnapping crisis there and its implications for the larger U.S. effort in the former Ba'athist state. Then, we are pleased to reprint the final report of the Working Group on Iran's Global Influence convened by the American Foreign Policy Council and the McCormick Tribune Foundation, which offers some intriguing suggestions for U.S. policy toward Iran. Last, but most definitely not least, Larry Haas,

former communications director for Vice President Al Gore, details what the Democratic Party needs to do to seize the foreign policy initiative.

As always, this issue of *The Journal* offers a trio of "Dispatches" from foreign analysts and policymakers. Our insights this time come from Russia, Greece and the European Parliament. Finally, we are pleased to feature reviews of four important books: Mark Bowden's *Guests of the Ayatollah*, *America Alone* by Mark Steyn, Nir Rosen's *In the Belly of the Green Bird*, and *Dangerous Nation* by Robert Kagan.

Here at *The Journal*, we pride ourselves in going beyond the headlines to provoke real debate about American security policy. We think you will agree that with this issue, we have done just that.

Ilan Berman
Editor

What War on Terror?

Michael F. Scheuer

For all of its rhetoric to the contrary, when it comes to counterterrorism, the administration of President George W. Bush has closely followed in the footsteps of the Clinton and first Bush administrations. As a result, America is no safer today than it was on September 11, 2001—or, indeed, on the day Mr. Bush's father was inaugurated in 1989.

Why? The answer is because each of the three administrations has chosen to fight Islamist militancy without understanding the enemy. Instead, each has framed the war in its own terms—imagining that the enemy hates us only because of how we live and think—and therefore have fought an adversary that exists only in their minds. The current president's is the purest version of this doctrine, but it is a refinement of the policy established and pursued by his father and mimicked by President Clinton.

Recognizing this historical continuity is important. When U.S. political leaders finally come to understand the enemy's motivation—probably after another devastating terrorist attack, perhaps one involving weapons of mass destruction—it will help measure the length of the head start we have given the Islamists, as well as to assess how far behind the curve we actually are in meeting even minimal national security requirements.

Suicide by semantic stubbornness

The U.S. government had no idea of al-Qaeda's order-of-battle before 9/11,

Michael F. Scheuer resigned from the Central Intelligence Agency in 2004. The author of *Through Our Enemies' Eyes* and *Imperial Hubris*, he serves as an analyst for CBS News, an Adjunct Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University, and a Senior Fellow at the Jamestown Foundation.

and it does not have a plausible idea of the group's military priorities today. This is because it stubbornly refuses to acknowledge that al-Qaeda is an insurgent organization and not a terrorist group.

Such a classification is obviously problematic. All decent and loyal Americans must oppose terrorists, after all, but the word *insurgent* evokes a certain sense of freedom-fighting legitimacy in the minds of many people. During the American Revolution, for example, General Nathaniel Greene led insurgent forces so effectively in the Carolinas and Georgia that—while losing most battles he fought—he wore out British forces, motivated them to move north, and thereby helped provide occasion in Virginia for General Washington to deliver the *coup de grâce*. Insurgents therefore are often good guys battling tyranny, and so urging the destruction of insurgents—say, the al-Qaeda insurgents seeking to destroy the tyrannical Saudi police state—may not produce the domestic political unity guaranteed by a cry to annihilate terrorists.

This is not simply semantic quibbling. Rather, it goes to the heart of the terrorists' tactics and methodology. In the first place, insurgents always count on fighting an enemy vastly more powerful than themselves, and as a result devote much time and resources to preparing for steady losses in their organization's leadership cadre. This is the case with al-Qaeda; to date, the group has never sought to hide the apprehension or death of one of its major leaders. Indeed, each senior loss is generally announced in a few days along with the naming of a successor and some mention of the successor's résumé. Because of this planning, what Washington possesses today is a body count of the approximate number of al-Qaeda and other Islamist leaders U.S. forces have killed or captured. It does not, however, have a metric for gauging how degraded the organization's command-and-control actually is.

Why they fight

Compounding the dangers that flow from fighting an enemy we have not accurately named and gauged, the Bush administration—and its two immediate predecessors—has invited defeat by refusing to understand the Islamists' motivation. For this abject failure, one that is shared and amplified by most of America's generals, academics and pundits, there can be no plausible excuse. Not since Ho Chi Minh and General Giap has America faced a foe that has been as precise as Osama bin Laden in publicly describing why he and his followers fight, what they aim to achieve, and the means they are willing to use to do so. This list of motivations has been clear and consistent since bin Laden declared war on the United States more than a decade ago, in September 1996.

- The U.S. military and civilian presence on the Arabian Peninsula
- Unqualified U.S. support for Israel
- The U.S. ability to keep energy prices below market levels
- U.S. support for anti-Muslim powers: Russia, China, India, etc.
- U.S. military presence in Muslim countries
- U.S. support and protection for tyrannies across the Islamic world

No American, of course, must accept these points as legitimate grievances against the United States. Nor should anyone feel obliged to empathize with, or be sympathetic to, those that express them. But only a fool would ignore the importance these grievances hold for those who assert them—and who are eager to lay down their lives to rectify them.

For more than a decade, however, official Washington has chosen to do just that. Faced with an enemy who has helpfully detailed the reasons for which he is fighting, Washington's sages have chosen to fight a war that exists only in their own imagination: a war to save American society and, while they are at it, Western civilization. The Islamists hate us, this nearly twenty-year-old libretto goes, because of our freedoms, liberties, gender equality, elections, democracy, movies, and taste for Budweiser.

Now, some Islamic radicals certainly do hate America for these reasons. When he was alive, Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini railed against the degeneracy and debauchery of American society, trying to ignite a holy war against these cultural and political characteristics. Alas for the grouchy old mullah, very few Muslims gravitated to the *jihad* he wanted to lead. Even Hezbollah's spectacular successes in the 1980s against U.S. and French targets in Beirut—while justified and advertised using the Ayatollah's rhetoric—were grounded in a nationalist motivation: getting the foreigners off our turf. The most obvious and important lesson that U.S. policymakers and strategists should have learned from Khomeini's reign was that there was almost no support among Muslims for a *jihad* against the United States based on animosities toward its culture, politics, and social mores.

But U.S. leaders failed to take this lesson to heart, while bin Laden, his lieutenants, and their allies learned it by rote. In the corpus of his writings and speeches, which now span many hundreds of pages, bin Laden tips his turban to Khomeini in *pro forma* condemnations of U.S. society, but keeps a detailed, laser-like focus on the six grievances noted above. Bin Laden and his lieutenants clearly learned from Khomeini's failure, and have focused on issues that the Muslim masses perceive to be proof positive of premeditated and vicious U.S.-led attacks meant to destroy Islam and its followers. And, as always, perception is reality. Bin Laden is a multi-talented political leader and nowhere is his skill more brilliantly on display than in shunning the Ayatollah's failure and building an increasingly successful and widespread "defensive" *jihad* that is grounded in attacking the impact of long-standing U.S. foreign policies in the Muslim world. Genius is often accompanied by great good luck, however, and bin Laden could not have been any luckier than to have walked onto the world scene in 1996 alongside the increasing accessibility of the Internet and twenty-four-hour Arabic satellite television—the very tools necessary to spread his radical message and provide "proof" of his claims of malignant U.S. intent.

For more than a decade, polling from a variety of Muslim countries has invariably shown that bin Laden's focus on U.S. foreign policy is a *jihad* spreader and perhaps a war winner.

The results have been spectacular. For more than a decade, polling from a variety of Muslim countries

done by reliable Western firms, such as Gallup, Zogby, BBC, and Pew, has invariably shown that bin Laden's focus on U.S. foreign policy is a *jihad* spreader and perhaps a war winner. In Muslim countries, pollsters consistently find majorities, and at times large ones, that admire the striving of Americans for equity for all, as well as the ability of Americans to speak their mind, find work, and care for and educate their children—in other words, there is almost no market for a Khomeini-like, culture-based, anti-U.S. *jihad* in the Muslim world. These same surveys, however, continually find majorities of up to ninety percent believing that the same U.S. foreign policies cited by bin Laden and other Islamists equate to a war on Islam and Muslims. It is perhaps perverse poetic justice that a governing elite so focused on polls may end up losing a war because it discounts a decade or more of pertinent data about overseas opinion.

The complete deterrence of most transnational threats is not possible; this is particularly true of the Islamists. But a sense of certainty among America's enemies that Washington will use military force savagely to protect U.S. citizens and interests is a feeling that must be assiduously cultivated in the post-Cold War world.

No diversity recognized here

Inattention to foreign attitudes is not the U.S. government's only failing, however. The Bush administration, like the Clinton and George H. W. Bush White Houses before it, has been unmistakable in its "little brown brother" approach to the Muslim masses. Even a cursory review of contemporary Islamic civilization will show that it as diverse and fragmented as any other of the world's great civilizations, perhaps more so. Muslims are divided by millennia-old sectarian schisms, a wide array of different languages, multiple ethnicities, geographical dispersion, and a deeply engrained insularity and localism that the Internet, cell phones, and twenty-four-hour satellite television are only slowly breaking down.

Yet American rhetoric reflects none of these realities. Officials from President Bush on down consistently argue that "bin Laden and al-Qaeda have hijacked the Islamic religion" (a claim that has been taken up and echoed by most European leaders as well). In this simplistic view of things, far more than a billion Muslims are unable to speak for themselves about their faith, and have been transformed into a mass of homogeneous, unthinking automatons. This is, quite simply, false; many Islamist leaders have opposed bin Laden's methods and timing, but very few—even among the crowded stables of clerics owned, operated, and scripted by Mubarak and the al-Sauds—have disagreed with al-Qaeda's portrayal of U.S. foreign policy as a mortal threat to Islam. On the issue of Washington's foreign policy, bin Laden speaks for the Muslim world, and our governing elite's use of the hijacking explanation makes sense only as a political device that allows it to avoid admitting that an overwhelming majority of a very diverse Muslim world is united in hatred for the impact of U.S. foreign policies.

Equally absurd is the idea that a new, monolithic, and militaristic caliphate run by bloodthirsty Islamofascists is just around the corner. Is such a grouping a goal of bin Laden and other Islamist leaders? Of course it is. They talk of it regularly, but only in a lip-service sort of way. The establishment of a worldwide caliphate is the divinely ordained culmination of Islam's historical progress: Islam's end-state on earth, a world entirely Islamic and at peace. As revelation, the creation of a caliphate is the goal of all Muslim believers, just as permanent peace and the brotherhood of men is the Jesus-delineated goal of Christianity. But neither has a chance of being realized in any remotely foreseeable future. Quite simply, the diversity and fragmentation of contemporary Islamic civilization makes the creation of an effective, near-term, all-inclusive, Nazi-like caliphate a patent impossibility; a point hammered home by the sectarian strife between Sunnis and Shi'as now visible in Iraq. But even if it bears no resemblance to reality, the bogeyman of a looming caliphate is useful political kindling—which is why politicians from both political parties are bound to continue using it for political gain.

Ripe for catastrophe at home

Since the fall of the USSR in 1991 and the near-simultaneous rise of anti-U.S. transnational entities—terrorists, narcotics traffickers, WMD proliferators, organized crime, etc.—three great tasks have had to be accomplished by the U.S. federal government:

1. Controlling the northern and southern borders of the United States;
2. Securing the former Soviet Union's nuclear arsenal; and
3. Using the U.S. military in a manner that, by the devastation it delivered, made it credible and feared by both nation-state and transnational foes.

The complete deterrence of most transnational threats is not possible; this is particularly true of the Islamists. But a sense of certainty among America's enemies that Washington will use military force savagely to protect U.S. citizens and interests is a feeling that must be assiduously cultivated in the post-Cold War world. Each of the three most recent administrations has failed in these areas, but the current one has failed most spectacularly.

Border control is a national security issue of the first order, but political leaders in both parties have turned it into a human-rights/humanitarian issue in their cynical and unrelenting pursuit of votes. Moreover, the tens of billions of dollars that the federal government has spent since 9/11 to fill official border-crossing points with cutting-edge electronic detection gear will be effective only if the Islamist fighters are stupid enough to enter the United States via official checkpoints. Unfortunately, al-Qaeda and its allies have shown themselves to be anything but stupid. Carrying on the tradition of his father and Mr. Clinton, President Bush has allowed the borders to remain open, thereby ensuring that (a) all levels of U.S. law enforcement will be overwhelmed by a pool of undocumented aliens that grows every hour, and (b) there is no serious impediment to our Islamist foes' inserting operatives into the United States.

The Bush administration's failings on the counterterrorism front should be understood for what they are—part of a continuum of negative accomplishments stretching back more than a decade.

And when those operatives come across the border, there is every chance they will be carrying a nuclear device from the arsenal of the former Soviet Union. Although it defies common sense, the program introduced and untiringly championed by Senator Richard Lugar to facilitate U.S.-Russian efforts to secure the twenty-two thousand devices in the Soviet nuclear arsenal remains less than half complete in early 2007—sixteen years after the Evil Empire's dissolution. Indeed, the current administration and that of Mr. Clinton cut funding and manpower for the program. Juxtapose this criminal negligence with the fact that Washington has held definitive intelligence since late 1996 that bin Laden, in 1992, ordered his lieutenants to seek both the components for a nuclear bomb and to buy or steal an off-the-shelf nuclear device. As always, al-Qaeda began this two-track acquisition effort with prudence and intelligence, forming a special unit of hard scientists, technicians, smugglers, and engineers to increase the likelihood of success and try to limit the potential for being scammed. In essence, the past three administrations knowingly have presented al-Qaeda with a sixteen-year window for acquiring a nuclear device. Blessed with abundant funding, the essential expertise, negligence in Washington, easily crossed U.S. borders, and a *fatwa* sanctioning the use of nuclear weapons in the United States, so long as no more than ten million Americans are killed, bin Laden has more than enough motive, means and opportunity to eventually detonate a nuclear device in one or more U.S. cities.

As for the credibility of the U.S. military, President Bush has completed the process of making it a laughingstock that was begun by his father and Mr. Clinton. Clearly, the track toward destroying U.S. military credibility was well-marked in the 1990s. The first Mr. Bush refused to finish off Saddam in the 1991 Gulf War, promised but did not deliver military aid to the post-war Kurd and Shi'a rebellions against Saddam he himself had encouraged, sent U.S. forces to Somalia without tanks, and believed the mighty victory over Panama's Noriega would impress America's foes. Mr. Clinton ran from Somalia, responded to Saddam's attempt to kill the first president Bush through feeble strikes on Iraq's intelligence headquarters, and resolutely refused to follow through on multiple chances to capture or kill Osama bin Laden.

One would think that these negative military achievements are a hard mark to surpass, but the Bush administration has succeeded in doing so. Thanks to a catchy slogan—democracy!—but no achievable war aims, too few troops, and rules of engagement favoring the enemy and making U.S. soldiers and Marines more targets than killers, the Bush team is about to lose wars to Islamist insurgencies in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The credibility of U.S. military power will be extraordinarily diminished by these losses in the minds of both our Islamist enemies and those nation-states that harbor ill-will for America.

More importantly, the Islamists' victory in Iraq and their restoration of Taliban rule in Afghanistan will be

of historic importance, in fact a historical turning point. The contemporary Sunni *jihad* movement was born during the Afghans' decade-long war against the Red Army, and it became a worldwide movement thanks to the inspiration derived from and organizational networks built during that successful war. For the first time in several centuries, poorly-armed Muslims had defeated a modern Western military power in battle, and that victory has become a heroic legend which reverberates across the Islamic world to this day. In the aftermath of Moscow's defeat, Osama bin Laden and other Arab Islamist leaders argued that with one superpower scalp on their belts, the *mujahedin* should plan and prepare to defeat the United States, the second superpower. Whereas the Soviets were tough and ruthless fighters, the Islamists said, the Americans are soft, afraid to apply the full measure of their military power, and lack the will to fight a long, bloody battle against holy warriors. And through its actions, the Bush administration is about to make bin Laden and the Islamists appear to be prophetic visionaries.

When America's coming defeats are complete, the *mujahedin* will not only have vanquished the second superpower, but will have done so not just in Afghanistan—on the periphery of the Arab world—but in Iraq, the very heartland of Arab Islam. The victory in Iraq, moreover, will have been scored by Arabs, thereby validating bin Laden's claim that this generation of Arab *mujahedin* is, through a defensive jihad, capable of ridding the Muslim world of the U.S. presence and then moving on to its main goal of destroying Israel and the multiple U.S.-protected tyrannies in the region under which Muslims live. While the Afghan victory over the Red Army will always be revered as Islam's first modern military triumph, the Arab success of the *mujahedin* in Iraq—in terms of motivating power and historical salience—will be modern Islam's most important.

Worse to come

At day's end, then, the counterterrorism record of the Bush administration is resoundingly negative: two wars (nearly) lost, thousands of lives sacrificed, immense amounts of money spent, U.S. military credibility at low ebb, domestic political unity shattered, and an Islamist enemy more powerful and motivated today than on the day in 2001 that Mr. Bush swore his first oath of office. But the Bush administration's failings should be understood for what they are—part of a continuum of negative accomplishments stretching back more than a decade.

Unable to adjust to a world of lethal transnational threats and unwilling to square with Americans the reasons behind why Islamists are at war with us, the contemporary bipartisan governing generation has left the United States in a dangerous position. We are a country weary of war and its costs, and unprepared to accept that our war against Islamist militancy has barely commenced. At the same time, al-Qaeda, its allies, and an overwhelming number of the world's Muslims are about to be thrilled and powerfully motivated by the defeat of the second superpower on the Iraqi battlefield. Flush with victory, our enemies will then confront Americans with renewed vigor, fully supported by their only two indispensable allies—the Islamic faith and the U.S. foreign policy status quo.

Jimmy Carter's Problem with the Facts

In the current issue of the *Middle East Quarterly*, Kenneth Stein, former Middle East fellow of the Carter Center, offers an insider's exposé of the errors of commission and omission, falsified conversations, and invented facts in Jimmy Carter's new book. Stein lays bare Carter's long list of smoldering grievances against Israel and traces their growth over decades to the point that the former U.S. president allows ideology and opinion to trump history.

Bold, provocative, smart, the *Middle East Quarterly*, edited by Michael Rubin, published by Daniel Pipes, offers stimulating insights on this complex region.

SUBSCRIBE TODAY!

Individual rate: $45/yr.
1-717-632-3535 (Ext. 8168) • E-mail: Pubsvc@tsp.sheridan.com
Web: www.MEQuarterly.org

Reinvigorating Intelligence

John C. Wobensmith & Jeff Smith

Five-and-a-half years after September 11th, the United States finally appears to have acknowledged the necessity of effective intelligence to its national security in the 21st century. The Bush administration, inheritor of a deeply flawed institution at its inauguration, was forced to confront this reality after a string of intelligence failures and foreign policy setbacks that culminated in the Iraq war.

President Bush managed to harness momentum from the disaster of 9/11 to institute the most extensive overhaul of American intelligence in decades. The creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, and the signing of the Patriot Act alone, unprecedented in their scope and ambition, were designed to reinvigorate and reform a stagnant intelligence community. Hiring among the intelligence services has increased substantially, as has interagency cooperation and the technology available to agents in the field. And there is hope that Congress, relieved

John C. Wobensmith is Vice President for Development and Senior Fellow in Intelligence Studies at the American Foreign Policy Council. He has over 40 years of experience in the national security field, specializing in intelligence, emergency operations, communications and computer security, and technical, legislative, diplomatic and corporate liaison. He is a recipient of the National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal and the Secretary of Defense Meritorious Civilian Service Award.

Jeff Smith, a Research Associate at the American Foreign Policy Council, majored in Security and Intelligence Studies for his Master's of Public and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh. He has closely monitored the intelligence reform process and its implications for the Global War on Terror.

of its decades-old animosity toward an institution commanded by the executive branch, may finally restore the mandate, authority and funding it stripped from the intelligence community (IC) in the 1970s. Intelligence reform, in other words, seems to have finally begun to receive the attention it deserves.

Yet, in true Washington form, time, attention and effort is not necessarily an indicator of success. Indeed, the Bush administration's victories have been too few and far between, and its agenda for reform too susceptible to stalling or reversal. Momentum toward transformation likewise has been tempered by competing political interests and the inertia of Congress. The resulting track record has been mixed; the task incomplete.

It has become popular to vilify the Administration for its flawed record on intelligence gathering and intelligence reform. Less popular is the realization that the responsibility for America's recent intelligence failures has far more to do with this administration's timing—assuming responsibility for a flawed system on the eve of the enemies' offensive—than with its culpability.

The downward spiral

Today, it has become popular to vilify the Administration for its flawed record on intelligence gathering and intelligence reform. Less popular is the realization that the responsibility for America's recent intelligence failures has far more to do with this administration's timing—assuming responsibility for a flawed system on the eve of the enemies' offensive—than with its culpability.

Since the 1970s, a series of regrettable decisions—by many estimates, a conscious and coordinated campaign—has progressively handicapped the abilities of America's once-proud intelligence services. Early in that decade, Watergate (and the CIA's unofficial involvement in the incident) provided Capitol Hill with the public outrage it needed to constrict the powers of the executive branch over the government's "rogue" intelligence services. The witch hunt that followed left few aspects of the IC untouched. Indeed, it remains difficult, even today, to fully gauge the damage done by the Church and Pike committees that spearheaded this effort.

In addition to seizing control of the CIA's budget and imposing a congressionally-loyal Inspector General upon the agency, the Church committee "increased the number of CIA officials subject to Senate confirmation, condemned the agency for its contacts with unscrupulous characters, prohibited any further contact with these bad characters, insisted that the [U.S.] not engage or assist in any coup … and overwhelmed the agency with interminable requests for briefings."[1] In the process, it created what more than one historian concedes has become "just another sclerotic Washington bureaucracy."[2] As the decade proceeded, and the gutting of U.S. intelligence capabilities continued, the "community" saw its funding, mandate, and authority progressively whittled away by the Congressional vendetta. By decade's close, Jimmy Carter's Director of Central Intelligence, Admiral Stansfield Turner, by opting for technology-heavy collection methods, cemented the congressional hit-job by emasculating the CIA's most valuable and effective resource—its Human Intelligence (HUMINT) assets.

It took three decades and the events of 9/11 for policymakers to realize the extent of the damage done. Both sides of the aisle have finally come to understand that the Church committee's overextension of congressional authority created an environment of undue caution, bureaucratic paralysis and risk aversion in the intelligence community—collectively undermining the ability of America's spies to perform at the level expected by Congress and the American people. Intelligence officials in the CIA and a dozen other intelligence agencies had become "cautious bureaucrats who avoid the risks that come with taking action, who fill out every form in triplicate [and put] the emphasis on audit rather than action."[3]

Lawmakers were further surprised to learn that, largely under the radar, the Clinton administration had resumed the crusade begun in the 1970s. According to journalist and Bush critic James Risen, by the time the Clinton White House had finished with the CIA, "Morale [had] plunged to new lows, and the agency became paralyzed by an aversion to high-risk espionage operations for fear they would lead to political flaps. Less willing to take big risks, the CIA was less able to recruit spies in dangerous places such as Iraq."[4]

The Bush record, in context

Any scorecard of the Bush administration's intelligence record is immediately, albeit understandably, colored by the intelligence failures of 9/11 and Iraq. In nearly every respect, these events demonstrated what America's intelligence services lacked most: an effective HUMINT capability, sufficient foreign language capacity, infiltration (or even a basic understanding) of the global Islamist terrorist network, and experience with effective post-conflict reconstruction and insurgency tactics. The Administration and the policy community deserve credit for their swift identification of these shortfalls and the flurry of legislation that has followed, which was largely successful in plugging some of the most gaping holes in homeland security and intelligence.

The failure to anticipate the attacks of 9/11, and the inability to uncover Saddam's purported weapons program, is emblematic of a larger infection that has spread throughout the intelligence community. From Iran to North Korea, South America to Southeast Asia, America's intelligence services have continually demonstrated fundamental problems with structure and performance.

Yet entrenched deficiencies in the IC run deeper, and solutions will require far more nuance and complexity than the initial round of reforms has been willing to embrace. The failure to anticipate the attacks of 9/11, and the inability to uncover Saddam's purported weapons program, is emblematic of a larger infection that has spread throughout the intelligence community. From Iran to North Korea, South America to Southeast Asia, America's intelligence services have continually demonstrated fundamental problems with structure and performance.

Iran provides a prime example of these failings. There is simply no jus-

tification for allowing the world's foremost sponsor of terrorism to develop an underground nuclear weapons program, unhindered, for nearly two decades. But, either because of a lack of knowledge or a lack of political will, U.S. efforts to halt or reverse Iran's nuclear program have only just begun. And few would dispute that this late start has greatly diminished the chances for the sought-after diplomatic resolution to this standoff. Related, and equally unacceptable, has been the intelligence community's inability to provide verifiable, conclusive evidence of the military nature of this program, and of Tehran's blatant interference in Iraq's Shi'ite south.[5] With President Bush staking his credibility on these public claims, the intelligence community owes him the empirical evidence necessary to justify his position to skeptical international observers.

To outfit our intelligence agencies with the proper institutional, cultural and legal structure to be effective in the 21st-century international environment, reformers must be prepared to emancipate the intelligence services with the same intensity that drove their repression in the 1970s.

Iran is hardly the only place where American intelligence is falling short, however. A full indictment of the U.S. intelligence record must include the failure to adequately predict and prepare for a host of international transpirations—the post-war anarchy in Iraq; the election victory of Islamists in Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority and Egypt; the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan; the extent of Pyongyang's WMD capabilities; the existence of the A.Q. Khan nuclear cartel; the rise of anti-American populist socialism in South America; and the rapidity of China's military modernization. The picture that emerges is one of an intelligence apparatus derelict in its duty, and an institution ill-suited to meet the challenges of the 21st century.

Fixing intelligence

The reports of the Silbermann-Robb and 9/11 Commissions, along with volumes of testimony provided by retired intelligence officers and policy experts, have extensively outlined the most obvious structural deficits in the intelligence apparatus. A surprising number of these calls were heeded, and some of the most basic (and crucial) reforms were passed with the Patriot Act and correlating legislation. In some areas, the government has even moved to the second generation of "consensus" reforms—an expanded and better-defined mandate for the Director of National Intelligence, reversing the IC's "climate of conformity" and the presence of "groupthink," and eliminating the onerous interagency barriers to intelligence-sharing not covered in the initial round of legislation. The vast majority deserve widespread bipartisan support.

Yet even the effective and timely adoption of all of these initiatives will still leave an intelligence community ill-equipped to deal with the dynamic and constantly-evolving enemies now confronting the United States. To outfit our intelligence agencies with the proper institutional, cultural and legal structure to be effective in the 21st-century international environment, reformers must be prepared to go further, and emancipate the intel-

ligence services with the same intensity that drove their repression in the 1970s. This will require tackling issues that have continually evaded the mainstream debate.

Cultural barriers—Thus far, reform efforts by and large have focused on the technical side of the IC, revamping the community's institutional structure (through the creation of DHS and the DNI) and cutting through existing obstacles to information-sharing. This is indisputably important work, but another area—the intangible cultural barriers that complicate cooperation within the "community"—is in even greater need of attention. That a CIA case officer now has access to an FBI database is only the first step in the generational process required to integrate America's fiercely independent agencies into a cooperative, unified intelligence force.

With their emphasis on competition and organizational pride, intelligence agencies have a tendency to jealously guard from their peers information that may undermine their group's claim to any future successes or breakthroughs. They have long been loath to admit that this works to the detriment of both their agency and the country. Officials from different branches of the intelligence apparatus, working on parallel cases or regions, *must* be engaged in constant, open, and *voluntary* communication. The DIA case officer for Iran's nuclear program should be in regular contact with his counterparts in the CIA and NSA, exchanging sources, information and analysis, and—most importantly—he should be incentivized to do so. Simply removing a series of technical or structural barriers does little to actually change the behavior of actors firmly wedded to routine and tradition. It must become an entrenched mechanism of the institution that joint interagency efforts be applauded and rewarded, and competition discouraged.

If we are truly serious about making this round of intelligence reform *fundamental* in nature, nothing is more paramount than a reaffirmation, from the American people, of the basic purpose and role of the U.S. intelligence services in our nation's national defense.

Depoliticizing intelligence—Although by now the issue has gotten significant publicity in the national media, much of the debate over "politicized intelligence" so far has focused on the susceptibility of the IC to coercion or manipulation by the executive branch. Irrespective of the merits of particular accusations against the Bush administration, a serious risk has emerged that the IC's efforts to "correct" this perceived deficiency risks *re*-politicizing intelligence, rather than the reverse.

This drift can be seen in the intelligence community's attempts to compensate for its overestimation of Iraq's WMD capabilities by potentially downplaying those of its eastern neighbor, Iran. This type of misguided caution—attempting to marginalize the extent of Iranian interference in Iraq or unduly extend Tehran's nuclear timetable—doesn't help the IC to "get it right this time." Just as the Administration was wrong to predict in 2003 that Saddam's weapons program was as covert or extensive as it was in 1991, it would be equally erroneous to assume that Tehran's today are as limited or benign as Iraq's turned out to be in 2004.

Part of the depoliticization of intelligence involves tackling an equally dangerous trend that has emerged with alarming frequency under the Bush administration: the growing and steady leakage of vital, classified information. Uncharacteristically, the Administration has been hesitant to identify, pursue and prosecute those responsible for leaking critical national security information. Somehow, this trend has become accepted as part of the natural "give and take" between government and the media. It is actually nothing of the sort, nor has it ever been, in this or any country in the world where national security is taken seriously.

If the classification process is flawed or overly burdensome, concerned parties can propose legislation to amend the rules accordingly. In the meantime, any government official found guilty of leaking vital and classified information, including the legions of congressional aides and staffers who hold security clearances, deserve no exemption from the law. Already, the costs of some of these leaks have been significant; valuable programs have had to be restructured or eliminated altogether; sources have been compromised; covert agents have been put in danger. If this circus is allowed to continue, we risk vindicating those who claim democracies are, by nature, incapable of combating the dynamic, autocratic, and media-savvy enemies of the 21st century.

Public reckoning—If we are truly serious about making this round of intelligence reform *fundamental* in nature, nothing is more paramount than a reaffirmation, from the American people, of the basic purpose and role of the U.S. intelligence services in our nation's national defense. As it stands today, the public's commitment to an aggressive and effective intelligence network capable of fighting and winning the War on Terror is in serious question. In part, this is due to an effective public relations campaign by large swaths of the media inherently skeptical of greater autonomy and an expanded mandate for America's intelligence apparatus. Coordinated propaganda has been successful in framing the debate in terms that seriously exaggerate or distort issues that deserve a sober, transparent hearing in the public square. How many times have we been reminded of our Founding Fathers' warning that "those who sacrifice liberty for security deserve neither"?

The public deserves an equally energetic response from those who understand the importance of intelligence work to our national defense, and who have a much clearer understanding of our nation's history. The *accurate* quote from Benjamin Franklin—"They who would give up an *essential* liberty for *temporary* security, deserve neither liberty nor security"—appears fully consistent both with the needs of our intelligence community in the nation's defense and the average American's approach to this crucial trade-off. Most reasonable, properly-informed citizens would question the proposition that phoning suspected terrorists overseas was an enshrined or inalienable right of our Constitution. They recognize that Franklin's admonition referred to drastic, unconstitutional acts hastily designed to address a temporary security concern—such as the internment of Japanese during World War II—and not the essential, strategic maturation of our intelligence structure and legal framework demanded by rapidly-evolving threats and technology.

A perfect example is the "data mining" of *suspicious* and *international* financial transactions related to the obscure network of terrorist charities and foundations that exists today. The American public is perfectly capable of determining whether this practical step serves as an usurpation of *essential* liberty or a sober and necessary method of upholding national security with minimal intrusion into the lives of the average citizen. The Congress, the country, and particularly the army of largely demoralized intelligence officers deserve a reaffirmation of support for their work, not demonization through outlandish comparisons to the KGB or the Soviet gulags.

Revising HUMINT—Most experts and government officials have accepted two broad conclusions regarding the Human Intelligence capabilities of the IC: that HUMINT assets are absolutely critical to the Global War on Terror, and that our current capabilities are sorely lacking. Far less consensus exists regarding what concrete or productive reforms can produce the kind of meaningful change we all seek.

To begin, the HUMINT branches of our intelligence services deserve, without reservation, a substantial portion of any future increase in funding or resources provided to the IC. Due attention should be placed on building human capital (education and training), reestablishing and reinvigorating our depleted global network of operatives and "local agents" and, most importantly, overcoming our inability to penetrate terrorist organizations that have proven uniquely adept at evading infiltration. We should also understand that this process will not evolve quickly. When exasperated former CIA officials publicly concede that "[i]magining CIA nonofficial operatives penetrating Islamic radical groups even after 9/11 isn't possible,"[6] it is evident that *re*-developing our HUMINT assets will require a generational effort.

A large part of rebuilding a dynamic HUMINT capability will involve forging networks of local recruits and regional contacts. The dominant trend since the 1970s, paralleling the restricted mandate of field officers and growing emphasis toward technology-heavy intelligence methods, has been to reduce our exposure to, and cooperation with, potentially "unsavory" characters. Although not the first to question the CIA's relationships with these agents, President Clinton and his CIA Director, John Deutch, reportedly demanded a "human rights scrub" of foreign "employees" of the CIA, in effect making "terrorists, criminals and anyone else who would have info on [our enemies]" officially off-limits.[7]

By 2002, *Time* magazine had recognized that the CIA was no longer "recruiting dangerous characters who can act as spies and infiltrate terror networks such as al-Qaeda's…,"[8] even as it deterred potential recruits with invasive requirements and background checks. Indeed, the institutional regulations have become so ridiculous, and the restrictions so cumbersome, that Democratic Senator Bob Graham, former Chairman of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee, felt compelled to remind us that the rare foreigner who may actually possess information or insight into groups like al-Qaeda was "unlikely to be found in a monastery."[9]

This nation has always accepted that upholding national security sometimes requires cooperation with objectionable figures. World War II cemented this "lesser of two evils" principle both in the broad-

est strategic sense (as in partnering with Stalin), and on a pragmatic, tactical level (as in employing Lucky Luciano's New York mafia branch to guard docks from sabotage). In today's world, the nature and degree of the threat we face requires an even greater acceptance of this principle, not its rejection. Anyone familiar with intelligence work and the difficulty of obtaining critical information on shadowy, reclusive terrorist groups recognizes that the potential upside to cooperation with agents sympathetic to our cause, however murky their background, can be immeasurable. Even if our intelligence agencies get a curveball from nine out of ten foreign "operatives," the one whose tip turns out to be credible may hold the key to preempting a terrorist attack or uncovering a nuclear weapons ring.

Last, but no less important, is the need to address the gaping deficit of foreign language speakers. What is astonishing about this need is the ease with which it can be filled, even temporarily, by minor adjustments in the employment policies of America's intelligence agencies. Is it not possible to devise a system whereby uncritical or declassified material—like the thousands of jihadist websites, millions of public and untranslated Saddam-era documents, or the 95 percent of incoming and outgoing detainee mail that goes unread—can be translated by a CIA-sponsored Arabic or Farsi team under temporary contract, with limited clearance? Are there not a couple dozen "vettable" Farsi, Arabic and Urdu speakers out of a global pool of hundreds of millions? There are, of course, millions of native Arabic speakers who would cherish even the most unremarkable American salary. And thus there is no feasible explanation for such a dramatic divergence in supply and demand except for the structural inertia embedded in our vast intelligence bureaucracy. Reversing this affliction must become a top priority.

The attaché advantage—America's intelligence networks also would be better served by expanding the role and mandate of their worldwide network of defense attachés stationed in U.S. embassies around the world. Over time, the role of the military attaché has been gradually reduced relative to his or her peers from the State Department and CIA, much to the detriment of our intelligence capabilities inside both allied and hostile countries. Forgotten has been the reality that the defense attaché is in a unique position to initiate contacts with his counterparts in allied defense establishments, where relationships are often built on a more solid foundation than the politically-sensitive interaction between their diplomatic counterparts. Military-to-military connections are generally immune to the turbulence that inevitably affects the political atmosphere of even the closest allies. Our attachés should be more directly involved in the intelligence-gathering process, and more actively analyzing and relaying intelligence to their counterparts on the embassy staff. As well, they should be encouraged to engage in more information-sharing and cooperation with both the home-country attachés and allied attachés operating in hostile countries. In many cases, some basic (and humble) outreach, and a greater willingness to supply some of our own intelligence, can trigger a phase of expanding cooperation and increased intelligence-sharing and reciprocation.

A reason for optimism

Even with all the intelligence failures of the past term, and the incalculable work yet to be tackled, there are still a few encouraging signs that the Bush administration is finally adopting the type of flexible, strategically-oriented approach to intelligence required to wage, and win, the War on Terror. Before departing from office, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld left his successor the beginnings of a Strategic Support Branch; a group consisting of covert operations forces—among them members from Delta Force, Gray Fox, and SEAL Team Six—freed from the Byzantine legal restrictions placed on their counterparts in the CIA. The group's focus is to establish local spy networks and provide an asymmetric complement to the military's conventional operations. According to the *Washington Post*, the group is now believed to have operations under way in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, Indonesia, Georgia and the Philippines, at times employing just the kind of "notorious" characters the CIA has been long barred from engaging.[10]

Elsewhere, the *Boston Globe* has exposed details about the little-known Iran-Syria Policy and Operations Group, or ISOG, whose operations were so secretive that "several officials in the State Department's Near Eastern Affairs bureau said they were unaware it existed." Accessible to "less than a dozen people in the U.S. government," the ISOG is believed to be providing "covert assistance to Iranian dissidents," as well as raising "funding for transfers of military hardware to allies" and building stronger military ties with cooperative local agents.[11] Whether financing pro-democracy activities and dissident/reformist groups in Syria and Iran, or using "scientific exchanges and human rights conferences to learn more about what is happening inside Iran,"[12] the ISOG is an example of the type of approach that provides hope for those of us worried that the bureaucratic, politically-correct atmosphere which governs our intelligence services has become radical Islam's greatest ally and asset.

1. Stephen F. Knott, "Congressional Oversight and the Crippling of the CIA," George Mason University *History News Network*, November 14, 2001, http://hnn.us/articles/380.html.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. "Pulitzer Winner: Bill Clinton Decimated the CIA," newsmax.com, April 20, 2006, http://www.newsmax.com/archives/ic/2006/4/20/11545.shtml?s=ic.
5. For more on American intelligence failures vis-à-vis Iran, see John C. Wobensmith, "Getting Smart on Iran," in Ilan Berman, ed., *Taking on Tehran: Strategies for Confronting the Islamic Republic* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 5-14.
6. Reuel Marc Gereht, "I Spy with My Little Eye…," *Wall Street Journal*, November 9, 2005, http://www.opinionjournal.com/extra/?id=110007522.
7. Christopher Ruddy, "CIA Officials Reveal What Went Wrong—Clinton to Blame," newsmax.com, September 11, 2001, http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/9/11/232727.shtml.
8. Massimo Calabresi and Romesh Ratnesar, "Can We Stop the Next Attack?" *Time*, March 11, 2002, http://www.time.com/time/classroom/glencoe/ourworld2002/unit_7_1.html.
9. Bob Graham, "Searching for Answers: U.S. Intelligence after September 11," *Harvard International Review* 24, no. 3 (2002), http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1060/.
10. Barton Gelman, "Secret Unit Expands Rumsfeld's Domain," *Washington Post*, January 23, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A29414-2005Jan22?language=printer.
11. Farah Stockman, "U.S. Unit Works Quietly to Counter Iran's Sway," *Boston Globe*. January 2, 2007 http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2007/01/02/us_unit_works_quietly_to_counter_irans_sway/.
12. Ibid.


think.
there's a
new weapon
in the academic arsenal
The Institute of World Politics in Washington, D.C. is an accredited graduate school offering M.A. and Certificate programs designed to impart knowledge and understanding of the ethical use of all the instruments of power. Areas of special focus include:
• National Security Affairs
• Statecraft
• American Foreign Policy
• Military Strategy
• Comparative Political Culture
• Democracy Building
• Intelligence
• Counterintelligence
• Terrorism
• Counterterrorism
• Arms Control
• Public Diplomacy
• Political Warfare
• Political Economics
• Strategic Information Warfare
• Immigration
• Conflict Resolution
• International Politics
NEW
M.A. Program
in Strategic Intelligence Studies
A Graduate School of National Security and International Affairs
THE INSTITUTE OF WORLD POLITICS
1521 16th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036
202.462.2101 or 1.888.KNOW.IWP
www.iwp.edu

Draining the Financial Swamp

Andrew Davenport

The value of a robust financial front in the War on Terror has not been lost on the Bush administration and key members of the U.S. Congress. Through a variety of Executive Orders and legislative initiatives, the Treasury Department and U.S. law enforcement agencies are now empowered with greater authority than ever before to seize terrorist-related funds and blacklist individuals and organizations with terrorist connections.

Over the past five years, using new regulatory mechanisms, the U.S. has sought to discipline an international financial system all too easily exploited by terrorist groups and their sympathizers. To this end, the Bush administration has forged a tripartite financial strategy aimed at simultaneously crippling the financial resources of existing terrorist organizations by seizing assets and freezing bank accounts, exploiting the necessity of terrorist networks to raise and move money to learn the identities of key players and track their activities, and increasing the difficulty for terrorists to raise funds.

Only in recent months, however, has the U.S. government truly begun to target the most dangerous terrorist benefactors: state sponsors. Through their reliance on foreign investment and inefficient state-run economies, these states are perhaps the most vulnerable of all terrorist supporters to carefully crafted economic and financial penalties. In its final two years, it is incumbent on the White House to match the creativity and aggressiveness of its earlier moves on the finan-

Andrew Davenport is Vice President of the Conflict Securities Advisory Group. The views expressed herein are his own and do not necessarily reflect the views of his company.

cial front of the War on Terror—taking advantage of new opportunities to stem support for terrorists from these rogue governments.

Shifting focus

Early Bush administration initiatives properly focused on the immediate task at hand: freezing the accounts of known terrorists; establishing money trails to identify previously unknown terrorists; and, stopping the movement of terrorist money through formal and informal financial networks. The USA Patriot Act of 2001, renewed in 2006, extended unprecedented anti-money laundering powers to catch suspect transactions as they make their way through the financial system. Time and effort has also been spent encouraging other countries to enact similarly aggressive regulations. Increased resources were also applied for the purposes of identifying and naming terrorists and their organizations, front companies and supporters in order to provide such lists internationally to decrease the number of funding safe havens and unregulated financial channels.

Over the past five years, using new regulatory mechanisms, the U.S. has sought to discipline an international financial system all too easily exploited by terrorist groups and their sympathizers.

The Administration also has made several bureaucratic innovations, including the establishment of an Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence at the Treasury Department (consisting, for the first time in U.S. history, of an intelligence analysis unit at Treasury) and the creation of special provisions in the USA Patriot Act that empower Treasury to seize the assets held in U.S. correspondent accounts by foreign banks in response to overseas violations of U.S. money laundering laws. These initiatives have yielded some successes, despite the challenges posed by the wide variety of funding sources available to terrorist organizations—a list that includes individual donors, global Islamic charities, criminal enterprises, and others.

Over the past year, however, the Administration has turned its attention to a new target: state sponsors. This constitutes a signal development; the steps taken above are all important initiatives, but the threat of terrorism is two-pronged. The urgency the U.S. and its allies accord to fighting international terrorism stems in part from the possibility that terrorist groups will one day acquire chemical, biological or even nuclear weapons, and merge their murderous intentions with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). But, in order to be considered complete, the financial front of the War on Terror also must include the governments that facilitate these activities. And so far, little progress has been made in isolating these bad faith actors, or impacting their ability to contribute to terrorist organizations.

All of that is beginning to change. New Administration initiatives progressively have begun to put the financial squeeze on two of the world's leading state sponsors of terrorism: Iran and North Korea.

Blacklisting

In September 2006 and again in January 2007, the Treasury Department announced that two of Iran's leading banks, Bank Saderat and Bank Sepah, were being cut off

completely from the U.S. financial system.[1] That Iranian banks have to this point been allowed at all to benefit from the U.S. financial system is somewhat surprising. Nevertheless, existing sanctions had permitted U.S. banks—including U.S. branches of foreign-owned banks—to process certain fund transfers involving Iranian businesses. Up until then, sanctions guidelines had allowed certain exempted business transactions to be processed in the U.S. and, even more importantly, made possible so-called "U-turn" transactions—transfers where a U.S. bank processes dollar payments for Iran-related business, but where none of the parties directly receiving or delivering funds to the U.S. are Iranian entities.

The rationale for Treasury's tightening of the belt was the revelation that Bank Saderat had been involved in the transfer of hundreds of millions of dollars to Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations, and that Bank Sepah had facilitated Iran's missile procurement network. The measure, in turn, immediately reverberated throughout the business world, impacting the practices of many companies involved in Iranian trade via these banks.

These financial sanctions do not represent isolated incidents. A year earlier, the Treasury Department had demonstrated the utility of Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act when it formally designated Banco Delta Asia (BDA) as a "primary money laundering concern" for serving as a "willing pawn for the North Korean government to engage in corrupt financial activities."[2] The ensuing bank run on BDA, and the threat of formally shutting off the bank's correspondent accounts in the U.S., crippled BDA and had a ripple effect of scaring off other banks with ties to Pyongyang.

Divestment

Even more impressive have been the moves made by Treasury's Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence to explain to a number of foreign banks with extensive ties to Iran the full magnitude of the reputational risk that they assume by continuing their business relationships there. For years, this market risk has gone unnoticed and unmitigated by some of the world's leading companies. Yet today, a variety of European and Asian financial institutions and companies are being highlighted in the U.S. press for their ties to Iran. Further, there is a rising chorus of U.S. investors that are forswearing any investment of stock in these companies as a show of displeasure with their business operations in terrorist-sponsoring states. Companies are being divested by institutional and individual investors that are increasingly educated about the scope and implications of corporate ties to state-sponsors of terrorism.

New Administration initiatives progressively have begun to put the financial squeeze on two of the world's leading state sponsors of terrorism: Iran and North Korea.

This trend has only been accelerated by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's outrageous statements regarding Israel and the Holocaust, which have prompted Americans to try and better understand the nuances of America's relationship with Iran, and to identify the Iranian regime's sources of support. The connecting lines—being drawn, in part, by the press at local levels and by national cable news—are leading back to non-U.S. companies doing

business in Iran. The result is a very real market risk associated with business ties to such countries, one that is reflected in the reputation of these companies in the U.S. and in their share value internationally. Some U.S. companies are going even further, adding "terror-free" mutual funds—free of companies with ties to any terrorist-sponsoring states—to the 401k plans that they offer to employees.

These grassroots actions are being taken for both ethical and financial reasons. Corporate ties to terrorist-sponsoring states expose the reputations and share values of those companies to risk. It has taken a number of years, but these facts are finally being delivered to foreign capitals and foreign corporations by senior U.S. officials. The result has been striking; a number of prominent banks, including UBS, Credit Suisse, ABN Amro and Commerzbank, have committed either to closing their business ties to Iran completely or at least to curbing their willingness to engage in dollar transactions there. These moves have had a material impact on Iran's international trade.

Tightening the noose

The above initiatives, for the first time, have begun to leverage market-based risk factors to encourage corporations to be responsive to security concerns. But, although the Treasury Department is showing encouraging signs of broadening its financial strategy, U.S. efforts are not as yet comprehensive. Nor are they adequately aggressive. Greater action is needed to increase the transaction costs associated with those corporations, and their respective governments, that choose to carry out problematic business with rogue regimes.

In its final two years in office, the Bush administration has the ability to take the financial offensive in the War on Terror. It can do so in three specific ways. The first is to expand the Treasury Department's dialogue with banks and companies concerning reputational risk with respect to all terrorist-sponsoring states (not just Iran and North Korea). Second, it can expand the use of Section 311 of the USA Patriot Act and the application of "U-turn sanctions" to all financial institutions involved in money laundering or other means of handling terrorist accounts. Finally, it has the ability to adopt more project-by-project diplomacy with foreign governments to ensure that a deal abandoned by one country's company is not picked up and executed by that of another.

Self-policing

For corporations, especially those with exposure to the U.S., it increasingly is good business to self-police their activities to ensure that they are not exposed to undue "global security risk." At a minimum, those that choose to continue to do so might put in place a new layer of safeguards and corporate governance policies.

For example, companies should be aware that it is in their best interests to ensure—for reputational and share value, as well as legal, reasons—that their business does not involve the provision of dual-use equipment or technology to, or partnering with, front companies associated with the Iranian nuclear or other weapons programs. Such prudence may seem obvious to an outside observer, but many companies act without this kind of security-related due diligence. More often than not, corporate actions are driven exclusively by what is deemed legal by their respective governments.

The Bush administration has started to tap into market forces and educate non-U.S. companies of these risks. These efforts should be increased substantially to include companies outside of the financial sector (i.e., the energy, telecommunications and even metals and mining sectors that form the economic backbone of foreign countries). If the reaction of a number of major financial institutions so far is any indication, European and Asian companies are clearly ready to hear this message.

Expanding application of the Patriot Act

The success of U.S. financial action against Banco Delta Asia took many, even at senior levels of the U.S. government, by surprise. It also likely was quite a shock to officials in Pyongyang to discover that their regime was so vulnerable to this new form of financial pressure. The power of Section 311 lies in its threat to cut off correspondent banking accounts with the U.S.—accounts that are fundamental to the ability of banks to carry out business on behalf of their clients with the United States. Without this capability, the attractiveness of a bank diminishes substantially.

The initial announcement of the sanction against Banco Delta Asia only included the possibility that correspondent banking accounts would be shut down. That alone not only caused the bank to freeze its North Korean accounts, but also resulted in a run on the bank and brought about the resignation of the bank's board. A number of other banks then terminated their relationships with Pyongyang and prompted Macao to make progress in the implementation of money laundering regulations. Clearly, this is a powerful tool, even when used sparingly.

Expand sanctions on U-turn transactions

Bank Saderat was sanctioned because it "facilitates Iran's transfer of hundreds of millions of dollars to Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations each year," and Bank Sepah because it "is the financial linchpin of Iran's missile procurement network and has actively assisted Iran's pursuit of missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction."[3] But this is just the beginning; the predominately state-controlled economies in Iran, Syria, Sudan and North Korea are likely home to dozens more banks handling accounts and making transfers involving terrorist organizations or front companies. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), for example, controls significant segments of the Iranian economy and runs front companies that are directly involved in both military and civilian activities. It is unlikely that Bank Saderat and Bank Sepah are the lone Iranian banks with ties to such entities, nor is it likely that the Administration will stop there. Additional steps may be only a matter of time.

Greater action is needed to increase the transaction costs associated with those corporations, and their respective governments, that choose to carry out problematic business with rogue regimes.

Iran has at least four other prominent, state-run banks and Syria's mostly state-run financial sector so far has escaped such pressure completely. Moreover, which European and Asian banks are inadvertently processing transactions for IRGC front companies or, for that matter,

even semi-legitimate IRGC-controlled businesses? No doubt this question has been a key factor in the decisions of a number of financial institutions to reexamine their ties to Iran. Others still doing business there risk unwittingly, if not knowingly, engaging in business with these entities and placing themselves in the crosshairs of now existing U.S. anti-money laundering tools. Such banks should be targeted more often to demonstrate the seriousness with which the U.S. views these relationships.

For years, the U.S. has followed a principled policy of sanctioning certain countries, including Iran, to deny them the economic rewards associated with U.S. trade, finance investment and technology. Often, however, the U.S. has been alone in such decisions.

Project-by-project diplomacy

For years, the U.S. has followed a principled policy of sanctioning certain countries, including Iran, to deny them the economic rewards associated with U.S. trade, finance investment and technology. Often, however, as is the case with Iran, the U.S. has been alone in such decisions. With U.S. companies—except for those that have circumvented sanctions by using foreign subsidiaries—essentially blocked from these markets, foreign competitors have divvied up the spoils amongst themselves with the luxury of not having to compete with some of the strongest players in a variety of industries, notably energy.

With developments in Iran reaching crisis proportions, we are finally seeing some U.S. allies consider the idea that certain of Iran's most lucrative or specialized projects should be withheld due to the regime's intransigence. Yet a key factor impeding such moves toward the economic isolation of Iran is fear that restraint will simply lead to another foreign entity's taking over their contracts.

The case study for such concerns is Iran's mammoth Azadegan oil field. Initially, the contract for the field's development was awarded to Japan's INPEX Corporation, which was to hold a 75 percent ownership stake in the project.[4] With estimated reserves at some 26 billion barrels, Azadegan stood to serve as an important source of oil imports for Japan, a nation heavily dependent on such imports and highly sensitive to the need to ensure long-term supply. For Tokyo, Azadegan was a rare find.[5]

As important as the project was to Japan, it was at least as important to Iran. In fact, Azadegan was the largest oil field discovered in Iran in 30 years. The field, however, is reportedly geologically complex and requires advanced technology and expertise to mine successfully. The $2 billion project has the potential to generate some 250,000 barrels per day of crude oil by 2014 to 2015[6]—at today's prices, that equates to some $5.5 billion per year in state revenues.

Azadegan's importance to Iran was, of course, not lost on the Bush administration, which exerted significant pressure on the Japanese government to forgo the deal, citing Tehran's continued breach of its obligations under the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In an effort to retain Azadegan as a strategic asset, Japan and INPEX stalled for months in order not to commence development work against the wishes of the U.S. government. Their hope was that

the nuclear standoff would resolve itself prior to Tehran's losing patience with that company and canceling the contract. Alternatively, Iran hoped for international cover for its inaction via some form of multilateral—ideally, UN-administered—sanctions.

The worst-case scenario for Tokyo was that it lose the Azadegan contract for it merely to be picked up by another willing player. This, however, appears to be exactly what is taking place. In a welcome display of principled trade policy and a courageous show of sensitivity to U.S. security concerns, Japan refused Iranian ultimatums to begin development of Azadegan. Its reward? The slashing of its stake in the project from 75 percent to 10 percent and ongoing negotiations now taking place between the Iranian regime and unnamed foreign investors.

Azadegan is the example that proves the rule. The U.S. cannot continue to convince foreign partners to show the type of restraint displayed by energy-hungry Japan if there is no action taken to stem other foreign players from simply stepping in to take their place. If we expect the likes of Japan and other partners to stand with us on such matters, there must be some persuasive penalties for those that step in where other responsible parties have pulled out. Fortunately, there are a variety of means to do just that. An international working group within the framework of existing UN Security Council discussions could be convened to single out projects or oil fields as "off limits" until Iran complies with its UN obligations. Should this fail, the U.S. would be empowered to consider extraterritorial sanctions and other measures that target specific projects, rather than entire countries or industries.

Raising the costs

The final two years of the Bush administration will no doubt see the Treasury Department and intelligence agencies continue to work together to track down and freeze terrorist assets—and to urge international partners to do the same. Beyond that time frame, however, we will also likely see the security challenges represented by Iran, Syria, North Korea and Sudan become even more grave. It is high time to leverage the vulnerabilities of the economic and financial situations and inherent market risk exposures of these countries into a more sophisticated strategy—one designed to increase greatly the transactional and economic costs that are associated with their malevolent behavior.

1. News release, "Treasury Cuts Iran's Bank Saderat Off from U.S. Financial System," U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, September 8, 2006; News release, "Iran's Bank Sepah Designated by Treasury, Sepah Facilitating Iran's Weapons Program," U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, January 9, 2007.
2. News release, "Treasury Designates Banco Delta Asia as Primary Money Laundering Concern under USA PATRIOT Act," U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, September 15, 2005.
3. "Treasury Cuts Iran's Bank Saderat Off From U.S. Financial System," and "Iran's Bank Sepah Designated by Treasury, Sepah Facilitating Iran's Weapons Program."
4. "Japan Consortium Seeks European Partners," *Financial Times*, February 20, 2004.
5. U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, "Country Analysis Brief: Iran," August 2006, http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Iran/Background.html.
6. Ibid.

Making Missile Defense Matter

Henry F. Cooper

It cannot be denied that President George W. Bush has made significant contributions to ending America's vulnerability to ballistic missile attack since taking office in 2001. Far and away the most important is that he freed the United States from the Cold War constraints on missile defense development imposed by the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Since withdrawing from the Treaty in 2002, the Bush administration has spent about $60 billion on a limited missile defense effort aimed at addressing rogue state threats.

Yet, the resulting homeland defense capability is at best "modest"—a term President Bush himself has used to describe the current system. More could—and should—have been done without the constraints of the ABM Treaty, but the Pentagon has not taken advantage of that freedom to revive the most important programs from the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) era—which, by 1990, had provided the technology needed to build a truly effective global defense against ballistic missiles of all ranges.

The making of MAD

To appreciate the extent of the Bush administration's efforts thus far, as well as future possibilities, it is important first to understand their political context, which for over 35 years has dominated the debate over protecting the American people against ballistic missiles.

Ambassador Henry F. Cooper, currently chairman of High Frontier (www.high-frontier.org), was chief U.S. Negotiator at the Geneva Defense and Space Talks during the Reagan administration. He served as director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) during the George H. W. Bush administration.

The technical fundamentals needed for a capable defense have been well understood since 1960. Even though the anti-missile systems then considered for deployment used nuclear warheads, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) was already exploring the technology required to build kinetic energy interceptors that destroy their targets by direct impact—as well as the relative merits of employing various ground-based, sea-based, air-based and space-based components in a comprehensive layered defense concept.[1]

Initially, U.S. military planners sought to build a nationwide (or homeland) defense—manifested in such programs as the *Nike Ajax*, *Hercules*, *Zeus* and *Sentinel*. But in the 1960s, these initiatives were redirected toward the protection of our retaliatory nuclear forces and, as a matter of policy, all serious efforts to defend the American homeland ceased. Indeed, America's vulnerability to ballistic missile attack came to be seen as a benefit, adding to a stable standoff with the Soviet Union, so long as the Soviet Union also remained vulnerable.

The basis for this reorientation was a theory called Mutual Assured Destruction, or MAD, which quickly became the centerpiece of U.S. strategic policy. The basic premise was that the offensive nuclear forces of either the United States or the Soviet Union could destroy the other's society—even after absorbing a first strike attack by the other side. Each side's population therefore was hostage to the nuclear weapons of the other, leading to a situation in which neither side could gain by attacking first.

Defense Secretary Robert McNamara advocated this concept to Soviet Premier Kosygin during the summit in Glassboro, New Jersey, in 1968—and Kosygin rejected it. But U.S. leaders persisted and it was codified in 1972, when President Richard Nixon and Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev signed the ABM Treaty. That agreement—as amended in 1976—permitted development, testing and limited deployment of ground-based interceptors. The United States chose to protect *Minuteman* silos at a single North Dakota site with its 100 permitted interceptors. Soviet leaders opted to defend Moscow with theirs.

The impact on American strategic priorities was enormous. The Soviet Union began to violate the tenets of the Treaty even while it was being negotiated, and for the rest of the Cold War spent as much on developing and deploying nationwide air and ballistic missile defenses as on building offensive nuclear forces. The U.S., on the other hand, spent ten times as much on its nuclear forces as on defenses—and dismantled its nationwide air defense, as well as its single North Dakota missile defense site, in 1976, after only six months of operations. And, even though repeated studies showed that defenses could improve the survivability of U.S. strategic forces[2]—something that would be viewed as "stabilizing" in the MAD context—the U.S. made no serious effort to build strategic defenses for the decade after the ABM Treaty was signed. Such was the doctrinal commitment in Washington to the idea that defenses would undermine the MAD paradigm embodied in the ABM Treaty.

But while the United States slowed its strategic programs, there was no comparable restraint on the Soviet side. Whatever their words, the deeds of Kremlin officials were consistent with a diplomatic strategy aimed at retarding U.S. application of

its high technology advantages, while they themselves built both offensive and defensive forces as fast as their technology permitted. Thus the ABM Treaty, as analyst William T. Lee observed in his day, was founded on "the twin pillars of U.S. illusion and Soviet deception."[3]

Two steps forward, one step back

When Ronald Reagan was elected president in 1980, he caused a sea change in this mentality. Reagan thought that MAD was an immoral policy, and his 1983 SDI was directed to determine if modern technology could make it feasible to develop and deploy strategic defenses capable of truly protecting the American people.

While SDI provoked a firestorm of controversy among the political elites in both the U.S. and USSR,[4] it was very popular with the American people, who had never bought into the MAD doctrine.[5] More importantly, SDI quickly yielded results; by 1988, it had demonstrated that then-current technology was capable of building effective defenses, but not under the terms of the ABM Treaty. Many, including this author, believe that the SDI advances of the Reagan era played a major role in encouraging an early end to the Soviet Union because the Soviets recognized they simply could not compete with American technology.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, efforts to take advantage of a "peace dividend" led Congress to impose major spending cuts on SDI. But the *Scud-Patriot* duel that took place during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 made policymakers rethink this course of action, and solidified a commitment to building defenses against theater ballistic missiles and a limited defense against ballistic missile threats to the American homeland. Furthermore, the Bush-41 administration's strategic defense concept, known as Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS), gained substantial political support at home and abroad.[6]

As a result, the FY1992 Defense Authorization Act directed the Pentagon to build robust theater defenses against short- and medium-range missiles, deploy an initial ground-based site in North Dakota against long-range missiles as soon as possible, pursue a robust space-based interceptor technology demonstration program, and negotiate with the Soviets to secure amendments to the ABM Treaty that would enable more effective defenses.[7]

> The Bush-43 administration has effectively doubled its predecessor's rate of investment in ballistic missile defense, but it has not as of this writing revived the most effective defense concepts—precisely those precluded by the ABM Treaty because they offered the greatest promise.

Shortly thereafter, in his January 31, 1992, speech to the United Nations, Russian President Boris Yeltsin proposed that SDI take advantage of Russian technology, and that the United States and Russia together build a joint global defense to protect the world community against ballistic missiles. During the remainder of 1992, high-level U.S.-Russian negotiations made considerable progress toward amending the

ABM Treaty to permit deployment of such a global defense—including multiple ground-based sites, sea-based interceptors and perhaps even space-based defenses.

An effective global layered defense capability—one that provides the U.S. with multiple opportunities to intercept ballistic missiles along their trajectories—is needed as soon as possible.

But this growing joint interest in building ballistic missile defenses dimmed in January 1993, when the Clinton administration took office. When Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin met for the first time in their April 12, 1993, Vancouver Summit, President Yeltsin proposed to continue these talks, but President Clinton was unprepared to do so. Instead, the Clinton administration declared its preference for "strengthening" the ABM Treaty as the "cornerstone of strategic stability," withdrew previous U.S. proposals for jointly building effective defenses, and dismantled the SDI program. As Clinton Defense Secretary Les Aspin famously remarked, these decisions "took the stars out of Star Wars."

MAD was again alive and well, and the fallout was massive. The budget for ground-based defenses was cut by 80 percent, all space-based defense and associated technology programs were killed, and many of the SDI advances of the preceding eight years were lost. The Clinton administration even cut by 25 percent the budget of what was ostensibly its top missile defense priority: the Theater Missile Defense program.

Clinton was certainly not unopposed in his missile defense decisions. By the mid-1990s, Congress was pressing the Clinton White House to build a homeland defense against ballistic missiles. Providing major impetus for this attention were the unanimous conclusions of the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission[8] and North Korea's August 31, 1998, launch of its *Taepo-Dong* ballistic missile over Japan, nearly reaching U.S. territory. The decades-long debate over whether to protect the American people against ballistic missile attack again moved sharply to the affirmative, with an overwhelming majority in Congress declaring in its National Missile Defense Act of 1999 that:

> It is the policy of the United States to deploy as soon as technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack (whether accidental, unauthorized or deliberate).

In response, Clinton administration officials focused on a ground-based homeland defense concept—for which development, testing and a limited deployment (in North Dakota) was permitted by the ABM Treaty. They also considered amending the Treaty to allow the U.S. to relocate its permitted homeland defense site to Alaska for it to be more effective against North Korean missiles. But no serious thought was given to developing, testing or deploying air-based, sea-based, space-based or mobile land-based homeland defenses, which were banned under the Treaty.

Old wine in new bottles

On June 13, 2002, a year-and-a-half into his first term in office and six months after giving formal notice to the Kremlin, President Bush withdrew the United States from the ABM

Treaty. The move was a culmination of the 2000 presidential campaign, during which candidate Bush had promised to make building effective homeland defenses a major priority.

The demise of the agreement which had blocked even the development and testing of the most capable defense components for thirty years was unquestionably a watershed in U.S. strategic policy. In theory, it was the prelude to a massive upgrade of defenses. Ground-based defense concepts, previously under development by the Clinton administration, could now be improved through deployments at previously-precluded locations (Alaska, California and even Europe) to permit broader coverage, especially against North Korean and Iranian missiles. These defenses likewise could be augmented by mobile and forward-based sensor components to extend coverage and improve the ability to identify, track and intercept threatening warheads in space.

Pursuant to the President's December 17, 2002, missile defense directive, the Pentagon also pledged to be able "to intercept ballistic missiles in the first few minutes after they are launched, including during the boost and ascent phases of flight" by 2004-05.[9] But the Director of the Pentagon's missile defense programs, Lt. General Ron Kadish, was quick to clarify that the Bush Pentagon—just like its predecessor—would continue to limit the inherent capabilities of the Navy's missile defenses, using them solely to defend against short and medium-range ballistic missiles.[10]

And nowhere to be seen was any mention of space-based interceptors, the most effective of the SDI concepts developed during the Reagan and Bush-41 administrations. Thus, the Bush-43 administration has effectively doubled its predecessor's rate of investment in ballistic missile defense, but it has not as of this writing revived the most effective defense concepts—precisely those precluded by the ABM Treaty because they offered the greatest promise.

This omission is all the more astounding because the $30 billion invested in SDI during the Reagan and Bush-41 administrations (1984-1992) developed and demonstrated the key technology necessary to enable these most cost-effective types of defenses. That the Clinton administration cancelled these programs in 1993 is understandable; it favored the ABM Treaty over missile defense. That the Bush-43 administration so far has chosen not to revive these programs is not so understandable, given that it withdrew from the Treaty in order to better protect the American people from ballistic missile attack.

Over the longer term, the United States will need to focus its attentions upon another theater: space. Basing in space would maximize the ability of deployed defenses to successfully intercept enemy missiles in all three phases of flight.

Similarly, it is hard to understand why so little has been done to counter current and near-term threats to the U.S. posed by rogue states or terrorists. One such pressing threat is the "SCUD in a bucket." During his tenure as Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld reaffirmed several times the finding of his 1998 Commission: that SCUD missiles launched from ships are already a serious threat to the over two-thirds of Americans who

live near our coasts. Yet, during his six-year tenure, Rumsfeld did little to address this threat.

The main impediment to building effective space-based defenses is political: a long-standing elite bias against the so-called "weaponization of space." But if understood clearly by the general public, this political argument would not likely retain its potency for very long.

More recently, the 2004 Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack identified a second major societal threat: a nuclear detonation over the U.S., including from a SCUD fired from a ship near our coasts.[11] While such a detonation would harm no one directly, the resulting electromagnetic impulse would wreak havoc on the U.S. power grid, communication networks and other critical infrastructure—with major national and international economic consequences.

Ground-based sites in Alaska and California won't rectify either of these shortcomings for most U.S. coastal areas. Nor will any other missile defense program that has been outlined in the Bush administration's public plans so far.

Looking ahead

The issue of missile defense deserves serious debate in the months ahead. Rogue states—particularly North Korea and Iran—are working hard to acquire weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. America's traditional competitors, Russia and China, are expanding the sophistication of their strategic arsenals—including demonstrated capabilities to threaten the low earth orbit satellites that undergird the economic and military capabilities of the United States. And terrorist groups now pose a direct threat to our coastal areas with at least short- (and perhaps medium-) range missiles. The United States does not have the luxury of leisurely developing a defense against these threats.

An effective global layered defense capability—one that provides the U.S. with multiple opportunities to intercept ballistic missiles along their trajectories is needed as soon as possible. Today, the removal of ABM Treaty constraints has freed U.S. engineers and policymakers to fully exploit all three phases of flight: boost, midcourse and terminal.

We should begin countering existing threats by adapting ongoing programs, such as the Navy's Aegis program—which has amassed an enviable 7-out-of-9 successful test record with its Standard Missile-3, Block 1 (SM-3, Blk 1) interceptor, and in 2006 deployed six ships to the Pacific with a limited operating capability against short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. There will be 18 ships at sea with this capability by 2009; 16 in the Pacific and two in the Atlantic. Additional Aegis cruisers and destroyers can be deployed with eight SM-3 interceptors apiece for less than $100 million each. And for just $25 million, the Aegis system software can be modified to give the current interceptor the ability to shoot down a North Korean *Taepo-Dong* ballistic missile early in its ascent phase. For a similar investment, the Aegis software can be modified to enable the same interceptor, if mounted on ships near the U.S. coast, to shoot down a *Taepo-Dong* late in its midcourse phase. Including the needed

testing, both capabilities can be provided to the fleet within a year or so for under $200 million.

This program also can counter the threat from SCUDs launched from ships off our coasts, whether by terrorists or nation-states. For under $100 million, 100 SM-2 Blk 4 interceptors also can begin operating on ships near our coasts within a year to provide a limited defense, even while the needed numbers of SM-3s still are being deployed.

Over the longer term, however, the United States will need to focus its attentions upon another theater: space. Basing in space would maximize the ability of deployed defenses to successfully intercept enemy missiles in all three phases of flight. Such concepts were examined in detail during the 1980s and early 1990s, but abandoned in 1993 because they ran counter to the spirit—if not the strict terms—of the ABM Treaty.

In fact, space-based interceptors, called Brilliant Pebbles, employed the most effective of all the SDI technologies developed between 1984 and 1993, when their associated programs were officially canceled for political, not technical, reasons.[12] Based upon the technology available over 15 years ago—and space-qualified on 1994's award-winning Clementine mission to the Moon—such a space-based defense option could be revived and, under competent management, deployed within about five years for a fraction of the investment that has already been made in the single Alaskan ground-based site. This important system would by itself compose a layered defense that could protect all Americans at home and abroad, as well as our allies and friends around the world, from the full complement of short-range and long-range ballistic missiles—and our space systems from anti-satellite attack, such as China demonstrated in early January.

To be truly effective, America's missile defense program must be capable of dissuading would-be aggressors from costly investments in ballistic missile technologies, and make it impossible for any adversary to undermine U.S. decision-making in times of crisis or conflict through the threat of WMD-armed ballistic missiles. Today, the Bush administration's missile defense efforts fall short of this mark, but it is still possible to reverse course.

Directed Energy (DE) systems, such as lasers, also hold great promise. Today, the only DE systems being considered by the U.S. military are for theater defense applications (most directly, the Air Force's Airborne Laser (ABL) program). But comprehensive development of far more effective space-based laser (SBL) technology dates back to the late 1970s. This effort was continued throughout the SDI era, but has since been terminated. If a SBL program were revived and fully funded, current technology could support deploying a boost-phase defense to intercept ballistic missiles with ranges greater than about 70 miles within a decade. This system, by discriminating between lightweight decoys and heavier reentry vehicles, would also greatly improve the capability of midcourse defense systems, however they are based.

The main impediment to building effective space-based defenses is political: a long-standing elite bias

against the so-called "weaponization of space." But if understood clearly by the general public, this political argument would not likely retain its potency for very long.[13]

To be truly effective, America's missile defense program must be capable of dissuading would-be aggressors from costly investments in ballistic missile technologies, and make it impossible for any adversary to undermine U.S. decision-making in times of crisis or conflict through the threat of WMD-armed ballistic missiles. Today, the Bush administration's missile defense efforts fall short of this mark, but it is still possible to reverse course. A program that accelerates sea-based defenses, begins to exploit previously-developed space-based capabilities, and puts a premium upon educating the American public about the threat posed by ballistic missiles has the potential to fulfill the cardinal charge given to our government: defense of the American people. Everything else is just details.

1. Harold N. Beveridge, "Defender Introduction," in *A Review of Project Defender for the Director of Defense Research and Engineering*, July 25-29, 1960, as referenced in Donald R. Baucomb, "The Rise and Fall of Brilliant Pebbles," *Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies* 29, no. 2 (2004), 145-190.
2. For example, the 1980 Defense Science Board Summer Study demonstrated that a preferential defense called LoADS, for Low Altitude Defense System, was the least expensive way—by a factor of two—to improve the survivability of existing *Minuteman* silos.
3. William T. Lee, "A Short History of Soviet Missile Defense," *Washington Times*, March 15, 1995. Lee elaborated on these thoughts in *The ABM Treaty Charade: A Study in Elite Illusion and Delusion* (Washington: Council for Social and Economic Studies, 1997).
4. See McGeorge Bundy, George F. Kennan, Robert S. McNamara, and Gerard Smith, "The President's Choice: Star Wars or Arms Control," *Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1984/85, 264. Their arguments were mirrored by the Soviets in their negotiations.
5. Polls since the 1960s have consistently shown that most Americans support building such defenses—indeed, have consistently believed that the U.S. government was providing such defenses.
6. GPALS was intended to provide a worldwide layered defense against ballistic missiles of all ranges, launched from anywhere at targets anywhere else.
7. Actually, Congress directed that *Brilliant Pebbles*, the most advanced SDI program, be removed from its fully-approved Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) status and downgraded to a technology demonstration program—reflecting a bias against space-based defenses that continues to this day.
8. *Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States*, Pursuant to Public Law 201, 104th Congress, July 15, 1998.
9. The December 17, 2002, Pentagon press release associated with the President's statement that initial capabilities by 2004-05 included "[u]p to 20 sea-based interceptors employed on existing Aegis ships to intercept ballistic missiles in the first few minutes after they are launched, during the boost and ascent phases of flight." See www.acronym.org.uk/docs/0212/doc06.htm.
10. See "Missile Defense Deployment Announcement Briefing," Department of Defense, December 17, 2002, http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2002/t12172002_t1217missiledef.html.
11. *Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United Sates from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack*, Volume I: Executive Report (2004), http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/congress/2004_r/04-07-22emp.pdf.
12. For the record of this important program, see Baucomb, "The Rise and Fall of Brilliant Pebbles," 145-190.
13. For a thorough discussion of the history of this policy debate, see chapters 4 and 5 of the *Report of the Independent Working Group on Missile Defense, the Space Relationship, & the Twenty-First Century* (Cambridge, MA: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 2006).

Nonproliferation, By the Numbers

Henry Sokolski

Second presidential terms, it is said, make first terms look pretty good. A case in point is President Bush's efforts to block the further spread of nuclear weapons. Remarkable nonproliferation successes—including the nuclear disarmament of Libya and Iraq and the enforcement of nuclear export controls—occurred only 36 months after Bush took office. Yet, some of the most self-defeating nonproliferation actions (e.g., overly generous nuclear cooperation with India, weak sanctions against Iran, and winking at potentially dangerous nuclear programs in Egypt, Turkey, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Yemen, and the GCC states) all came after Mr. Bush's reelection.

Three things help to explain this about-face. The first is the international unpopularity of military action against Iraq. The second is the end of the enforcement-focused stewardship of John Bolton as Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. The final reason has to do with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's second-term promotion of "transformational diplomacy," a diplomatic approach that prioritized international foreign policy consensus over the strengthening of nonproliferation. Sadly, the Bush administration's most lasting legacy is likely to be the recent undermining of nuclear rules, rather than the remarkable nonproliferation accomplishments that characterized its first four years in office.

Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center in Washington, D.C., served in the Office of Net Assessment and as deputy for nonproliferation policy from 1989 through 1992 under then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney.

Enforcing enforceable rules

George W. Bush said little about reducing the threat of nuclear proliferation in his campaign for the presidency in the year 2000. Nevertheless, it was understood that in this arena, his victory would bring major change. His national security advisors—Paul Wolfowitz, John Bolton, Donald Rumsfeld, and William Schneider—all were sharp critics of the Clinton administration's "Collective Security," as part of which the U.S. had been willing to give Russia and North Korea, as well as international negotiations on nonproliferation and strategic weapons in general, the benefit of the doubt. Instead, these advisors called for a smaller but modernized American nuclear weapons force, termination of civilian nuclear assistance to North Korea, and withdrawal of the U.S. from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and from talks to conclude a binding inspections protocol for the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The overall theme of these recommendations was that the U.S. should stop promoting unenforceable agreements and instead promote U.S. security interests by enforcing only those agreements that were enforceable, even if this required the U.S. to act unilaterally.

It was true that the Bush administration was not eager to jeopardize its strategic freedom of action on any security matter by preemptively submitting to the judgments of other nations. At the same time, it was adamant that the U.S. should push the enforcement of whatever existing trade or security treaties were enforceable

Within 24 months of President Bush's first inaugural, virtually every one of these recommendations had been implemented. In January 2001, the Bush administration announced its plans to reduce the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads, but also to modernize America's nuclear weapons arsenal. That December, it gave notice that it intended to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and from talks to conclude a legally binding inspections protocol to the BWC. Twelve months later, it terminated heavy fuel oil shipments under the Agreed Framework with North Korea and called on South Korea and Japan to suspend further work on two promised light water reactors in the Stalinist state.

In conjunction with President Bush's rejection of the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change in July 2001, many political commentators concluded that the Bush administration had simply declared war against international agreements. This view, however, was both wrong and incomplete. It was true that the Bush administration was not eager to jeopardize its strategic freedom of action on any security matter by preemptively submitting to the judgments of other nations. If there was a way to promote U.S. security interests without seeking prior international consensus, that way should be tried first, the thinking went. At the same time, however, the Bush administration was adamant that the U.S. should push the enforcement of whatever existing trade or security treaties were enforceable. Indeed, this last point became a trademark of John Bolton, who had assumed the portfolio of Under Secretary of State for Arms Conrol and International Security. Thus, it was Bolton who oversaw the creation of a new

bureau at the State Department—the Bureau of Verification and Compliance—dedicated to monitoring and enforcing existing arms control and nonproliferation understandings. Bolton also was one of the first senior American officials to talk publicly about the need to identify violators, identifying several himself at the Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference.

Similarly, it was Bolton who argued that North Korea was in "anticipatory breach" of its international nuclear inspections pledges under the 1994 Agreed Framework. It also was Bolton who laid the foundation in 2003 for the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a set of principles by which nations could increase the level of information sharing and enforcement of their own national and international export control efforts—to give the controls of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) greater international enforcement teeth. In addition, his office made most of the key nonproliferation arguments for taking a tough stance against continued Iraqi and Iranian noncompliance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions and IAEA inspection requirements. He was particularly skillful in making economic arguments detailing how wasteful and unprofitable Iran's nuclear program was for generating electricity.

Bolton, however, did not simply serve as an Administration hit man. For example, when career diplomats at the State Department had given up trying to secure passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1540—an appeal that included getting nations to tighten their controls over nuclear materials and exports—Bolton personally took on the challenge and succeeded privately in persuading the Chinese and Russians to back the measure.

Although America's invasion of Iraq helped secure Libya's remarkable disarmament, it was politically costly for nonproliferation.

At about the same time, Bolton and the National Security Council staff also got the President publicly to back a series of new nonproliferation proposals. The most important of these was to tighten the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In a speech before the National Defense University in February 2004, President Bush complained that Iran and North Korea had "cynically manipulate[d]" the terms of the NPT by coming within weeks of getting nuclear weapons by claiming they were developing "peaceful nuclear energy."[1] Nations, he noted, could develop peaceful nuclear energy without making their own nuclear fuel. Twisting the NPT into an authorization to engage in this dangerous activity, Bush insisted, had to stop. In response, he proposed that all nations that did not yet have a commercial nuclear fuel-making venture allow those already making fuel to supply their needs. Only months later, the G-8 endorsed this idea, calling for a one-year moratorium on enrichment and reprocessing exports.

Finally, Bush's tough enforcement policy was made manifest in his approach to disarming Libya. At the time of America's 2003 victory over the Iraqi army, Muammar al-Gaddafi began negotiations with England and the U.S. to give up his chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons-making capabilities. Rather

than simply demand that he terminate these programs unilaterally, the Bush administration chose to use the modalities of the BWC and Chemical Weapons Convention, the NPT, and the MTCR. Libya, as a result, was able to give up its strategic weapons programs without appearing to be surrendering its sovereignty or honor: Gaddafi simply claimed that his country was living up to its international arms control obligations.

The cost of Iraq

Although America's invasion of Iraq helped secure Libya's remarkable disarmament, it also was politically costly for nonproliferation. The key public argument for invading Iraq—made by Administration officials at the United Nations and before the U.S. Congress—was that the regime of Saddam Hussein was defying UN demands for weapons of mass destruction dismantlement and inspection pursuant to UNSC resolution 687 (1991). Time, it was argued, was of the essence: Saddam already had chemical and biological weapons and in time would reconstitute his nuclear weapons and long-range missile programs. What also gave urgency to the use of force was the fear that Saddam might transfer his chemical or biological weapons to terrorists following the attacks of September 11, 2001.

This concern was fueled by more than idle conjecture. On October 11, 2001, the Central Intelligence Agency privately briefed President Bush on a credible intelligence report that al-Qaeda had smuggled a 10-kiloton nuclear weapon into New York City. President Bush took this report seriously, and ordered Vice President Cheney—along with several hundred federal officials—to leave Washington for a safe location to assure continuity of government if New York or Washington were hit. The president also directed the Department of Energy to send squads of nuclear engineers and scientists (known as Nuclear Emergency Support Teams) to New York to try to find the device. As it turned out, the report was a false alarm, but the worry was very real. And Iraq, in the eyes of the Administration, was the most likely future source of such technology.[2]

From then on, all intelligence on Iraq was viewed through this lens. As Vice President Cheney explained on national television shortly before the U.S. and the United Kingdom attacked Iraq:

> We saw on 9/11 19 men hijack aircraft with airline tickets and box cutters, kill 3,000 Americans in a couple of hours. That attack would pale into insignificance compared to what could happen, for example, if they had a nuclear weapon and detonated it in the middle of one of our cities… But we also have to address the question of where might these terrorists acquire weapons of mass destruction, chemical weapons, biological weapons, nuclear weapons. And Saddam Hussein becomes a prime suspect in that regard because of his past track record and because we know he has, in fact, developed these kinds of capabilities… We know he's out trying once again to produce nuclear weapons and we know that he has a long-standing relationship with various terrorist groups, including the al-Qaeda organization.[3]

Saddam's development of nuclear weapons, Mr. Cheney went on to explain, was the most important reason for invading Iraq. As for the assessment made at the time by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Mohamed

ElBaradei, that Iraq did not have a nuclear weapons program, Mr. Cheney was dismissive:

> I was told when I was defense secretary before the Gulf War that he [Saddam] was eight to 10 years away from a nuclear weapon. And we found out after the Gulf War that he was within one or two years of having a nuclear weapon because he had a massive effort under way that involved four or five different technologies for enriching uranium to produce fissile material. We know that based on intelligence that he has been very, very good at hiding these kinds of efforts. He's had years to get good at it and we know he has been absolutely devoted to trying to acquire nuclear weapons. And we believe he has, in fact, reconstituted nuclear weapons. I think Mr. ElBaradei frankly is wrong. And I think if you look at the track record of the International Atomic Energy Agency and this kind of issue, especially where Iraq's concerned, they have consistently underestimated or missed what it was Saddam Hussein was doing. I don't have any reason to believe they're any more valid this time than they've been in the past.[4]

At the time, all of these points seemed sensible. Certainly, Mr. Cheney and the Bush administration were concerned that the risks in assuming that the IAEA's assessment was correct were far greater than emphasizing U.S. intelligence analyses that suggested that Saddam's nuclear program was still active and could quickly be reconstituted. They also were anxious to enforce the UN resolutions that Saddam had defied on at least 17 separate occasions. For these reasons, the U.S. went so far as to have Secretary of State Colin Powell lay out what U.S. intelligence knew about Saddam's strategic weapons program before the United Nations Security Council. Subsequently, when Saddam again failed to comply fully with United Nations dismantlement resolutions, the U.S. and its partners went to war. For the first time in history, a major power led a coalition against a state to prevent it from acquiring strategic arms.

There was only one problem. After the war, firm evidence that Saddam had much of an active nuclear weapons program (or, for that matter any strategic weapons programs) turned out to be virtually nonexistent. These revelations, and the violence of the war itself, in turn, encouraged two very negative nonproliferation results. First, the admissions concerning Saddam's strategic weapons programs seriously undermined the credibility of all future nuclear proliferation reports from the U.S. or its closest partners. Indeed, after Iraq, few, if any, nations were willing to take U.S. proliferation intelligence as a call to action. Second, having seen what the U.S. was willing to do to stop states from going nuclear, several nations, including those having the most damaging proliferation intelligence, now had even greater cause to withhold what they knew.

These negative trends, unfortunately, were only strengthened by North Korea's surprise announcement in October 2002 that it had a covert uranium enrichment program. Its withdrawal from the NPT shortly before the invasion of Iraq, and America's subsequent passivity toward Pyongyang, only further fueled the international impulse to inaction against suspect proliferators.

Because the IAEA's charter requires the agency to inform the United Nations Security Council of

possible violations of the NPT, the IAEA Board of Governors sent a non-compliance report to UN headquarters February 12, 2003. The White House, however, was preoccupied with its war preparations against Iraq. As a result, Washington consciously chose to do little to encourage the Security Council to proceed on the IAEA report. And, in a step that would all but assure removal of the report from the Security Council's active agenda, Washington in April of 2003 announced three-party talks between the U.S., North Korea, and, China.[5] The net effect was to deprive the IAEA's reporting of much standing—leaving the agency demoralized.

The twelve months following Mr. Bush's reelection in 2004 saw two major changes that dramatically altered the Administration's approach to nuclear nonproliferation. The first was the emergence of a State Department effort at international consensus-building, called "transformational diplomacy." The process began with the departure of Colin Powell and his replacement as Secretary of State by Condoleezza Rice early in 2005. The second was the departure of John Bolton from the State Department in the fall of 2005 to serve as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.

This new pessimism on the IAEA's part was soon reflected in the agency's handling of Iran. In December 2002, an Iranian dissident group revealed the location of a large undeclared Iranian uranium enrichment site.[6] What followed were exhaustive IAEA inspections and revelations confirming that Iran had indeed violated its nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA and had done so repeatedly for nearly 18 years. Among the discoveries made by IAEA inspectors were that Iran had experimented with polonium and beryllium (materials critical to initiating a nuclear weapons device); covertly enriched uranium and separated plutonium (the two key materials needed to fuel a bomb); obtained drawings on how to cast the sphere necessary to make nuclear weapons; and lied to IAEA inspectors about the importation of uranium enrichment-related commodities (misleading the agency to believe that Iran's program was entirely indigenous when it clearly was not). Finally, Iran had kept IAEA inspectors from visiting suspect sites until after it had entirely dismantled the facilities.

But, rather than report these infractions to the UN Security Council, as it had in 1993 and 2003 with North Korea, the IAEA was much more hesitant. The agency's Director General and Board of Governors recognized Iran had breached its NPT safeguards obligations, but argued that it actually had a right under the treaty to make nuclear fuel. The IAEA board then went on to note that Iran's safeguards breaches were in the past and characterized them as "failures to report" rather than as clear safeguards violations. In any case, the IAEA Director General insisted that he had no proof that any special nuclear material in Iran had, in fact, been diverted to a nuclear weapons program.[7] Iran's past infractions and continuing lack of full cooperation with the agency, of course, warranted concern, but agency officials were optimistic that, with further direct

negotiations, such cooperation would be forthcoming.

Shifting gears

The twelve months following Mr. Bush's reelection in 2004 saw two major changes that dramatically altered the Administration's approach to nuclear nonproliferation. The first was the emergence of a State Department effort at international consensus-building, called "transformational diplomacy." The process began with the departure of Colin Powell and his replacement as Secretary of State by Condoleezza Rice early in 2005. The second was the departure of John Bolton from the State Department in the fall of 2005 to serve as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations.

The White House encouraged Powell to leave the State Department in part because of his perceived lack of enthusiasm for the war in Iraq. This complaint had merit; the Administration had asked Powell to go to the United Nations to make a number of claims about Saddam's weapons of mass destruction programs, each of which proved to be wrong. As the French, Germans and many other European allies harped on these errors, international support for the war and Iraq's reconstruction declined. Powell wanted out.

As the Spanish, Italians, Poles, Dutch, Hungarians, Ukrainians, Japanese, and New Zealanders all announced plans for troop withdrawals from Iraq in 2005, and the Iranian and North Korean nuclear headaches continued to grow, senior State Department officials redoubled their efforts to reverse American loses in Iraq in two ways. First, they were anxious to find some major new country that might back American policies. Second, they were eager to foster consensus with our Asian and European allies on disarming and sanctioning North Korea and Iran.

These ambitions were made manifest in several ways: a full-court press to offer India a series of inducements to "partner" with the U.S.; a clear willingness to show more flexibility in the Six-Party talks with North Korea; a major effort to "get to yes" with the European Union and Russia on sanctioning Iran; and a public effort to explain all of this as "transformational diplomacy."

In the case of India, the State Department under Bolton had traditionally resisted loosening missile and nuclear technology controls simply to improve U.S.-Indian relations. The Indians wanted the U.S. to approve the transfer of U.S. technology contained in the Israeli Arrow ballistic missile interceptor. The Arrow, however, was over the Missile Technology Control Regime range-payload limits. Indian proliferation controls were anything but tight, and there was no way to approve the transfer without igniting yet another round of arms demands from Pakistan. As a result, Bolton blocked the transfer.

Now, however, the administration was anxious to get New Delhi to send troops to bolster the coalition in Iraq. To this end, U.S. officials began official discussions in the late fall of 2002 with India on how the U.S. might increase India's access to controlled U.S. defense, rocket, and nuclear technologies. India would not bite. In July 2003, New Delhi officially opposed sending any of its military forces to Iraq and pledged only token amounts toward Iraq's reconstruction. Still, U.S. officials assigned to woo India pressed on. It was in America's interest, they argued, to keep India from getting any closer to Iran (India had signed a strategic

cooperation agreement with Tehran in January 2003, and was discussing several massive energy deals). They also argued that U.S. security interests would be served simply by having India grow as a strategic counterweight to China, and that the best way to secure this was to help India become a major power as soon as possible.

As the Spanish, Italians, Poles, Dutch, Hungarians, Ukrainians, Japanese, and New Zealanders all announced plans for troop withdrawals from Iraq in 2005, and the Iranian and North Korean nuclear headaches continued to grow, senior State Department officials redoubled their efforts to reverse American loses in Iraq in two ways. First, they were anxious to find some major new country that might back American policies. Second, they were eager to foster consensus with our Asian and European allies on disarming and sanctioning North Korea and Iran.

The net result was President Bush's January 12, 2004, announcement of a series of joint U.S.-Indian working groups designed to develop the "Next Steps in Strategic Partnership." Again, the key theme was to explore how the U.S. might make more U.S. defense, nuclear, and space-related technology available to India. What is stunning about President Bush's announcement was that it came without a demand for any clear *quid pro quo* from India. The talks, in short, had taken on a momentum of their own.

The culmination was the spectacular announcement made by President Bush and Prime Minister Singh on July 18, 2005, that the U.S. had agreed to allow India access to advanced nuclear, missile, and defense technologies. The statement also made it clear that the White House would do all it could to make a clear exception for India—a nation that had never signed the NPT, had refused to allow all of its nuclear facilities to be open to international inspection, had violated its bilateral pledges to the U.S. and Canada not to use civilian nuclear assistance to make bombs, had detonated nuclear weapons twice, and had allowed Indian entities to trade in controlled nuclear and chemical weapons-related goods with Iran. All of which raised the question: how might this be done without blowing a fatal hole through the very nuclear rules the administration had been so adamant about enforcing against Iran and North Korea?

The India nuclear deal, Administration critics argued, was deeply flawed: India, which never played by the rules or signed on to the NPT, was now being given all the benefits associated with states that had. Indeed, the U.S. appeared to be giving India privileges that even nuclear weapons states under the NPT did not enjoy.

Iran picked up on all of these points. Throughout 2005 and 2006, Iran noted that it was a member of the NPT, had opened all of its nuclear facilities to nuclear inspections, and had not acquired or tested nuclear weapons. Yet, despite this, the U.S. was trying to deny Iran its "inalienable right" to develop "peaceful nuclear energy." At the very least, Iranian officials complained, their country deserved to be treated as well as India.

The White House's rejection of Iran's complaint came swiftly, but was modulated by Secretary Rice's new diplomatic assignment to work with as many countries as possible, including our European allies, to promote democracy in the Middle East and beyond. Thus, as Secretary Rice explained to Congress, the two situations were very different; India was "open and free… transparent and stable;… [a] multiethnic… multireligious democracy that is characterized by individual freedom and the rule of law." In stark contrast, Iran was "unstable" and "non-democratic."[8] Also, Secretary Rice noted, Iran was in violation of its IAEA nuclear safeguards obligations, whereas India was allowing the IAEA to inspect more of India's reactors and "was increasingly doing its part to support the international community's efforts to curb the dangerous nuclear ambitions of Iran."

It was this same approach that the White House took in dealing with Russia, the EU and Iran. Before Under Secretary Bolton's departure from the State Department, the U.S. opposed Russia's completion of the large light water reactor at Bushehr. The reactor would require tons of fresh fuel to be on hand and would produce tons of spent fuel containing large amounts of weapons-usable plutonium. As a practical matter, leaving this material in Iranian hands for any amount of time meant Iran could accelerate a bomb program significantly. Unless and until the world could be convinced that Iran did not have any such plants or weapons development intentions, letting Iran bring Bushehr online was viewed as too risky.

The EU and Russia, however, did not agree. They were preoccupied with getting Iran merely to stop developing its one known enrichment plant at Natanz. If the U.S. were serious about "working with many partners," Russia and the EU made clear, the White House would have to give in on Bushehr.

The White House relented. Late in 2005, National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley awkwardly briefed the press about America's willingness to recognize Iran's right to operate Bushehr and make nuclear fuel, but wanted to give Iran an incentive to "give up that right in terms of its own territory" by having Russia serve as Iran's nuclear fuel supplier. Not long thereafter, the White House also announced that it would sell civilian aircraft parts to Iran and allow it to join the World Trade Organization as part of an effort to get it to freeze its nuclear enrichment efforts.

This effort, however, has gone nowhere. To date, Iran has frozen nothing and only weak international sanctions have materialized. Worse still, these measures have effectively grandfathered Russia's completion of Bushehr—a dangerous development. Iran's nuclear progress, meanwhile, has become something of a model for Egypt, Turkey, Yemen, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, and the GCC states (including Saudi Arabia), all of which have announced that they too now want to pursue development of "peaceful nuclear energy."[9]

What remains

This brief discussion of the Bush administration's efforts is hardly complete. Nothing, for example, has been said about President Bush's almost unbounded enthusiasm for subsidizing nuclear power. Mr. Bush sponsored and signed the nuclear provisions of the Energy Act of 2005, which provides for $10 billion in subsidies for the first four to six new U.S.

reactors. In 2006, the President also launched the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP)—a 30- to 50-year, $30-billion-plus U.S. initiative to create entirely new types of reactors and nuclear fuel-making and waste management processes. Both of these efforts have been controversial; GNEP, which endorses the reprocessing of nuclear fuels (a process that can bring nations within days of acquiring nuclear weapons), has been particularly contentious among nonproliferation proponents.[10]

All of this has undermined the economic arguments made by the White House during Bush's first term against Iran and North Korea's "peaceful" nuclear programs. It also has encouraged nations that did not have nuclear programs or nuclear fuel-making operations to announce their interest in developing them.

What will happen in the remaining months of the Bush administration remains to be seen. The key elements of Bush's nuclear proliferation legacy, however, are already clear. Certainly, the first term nonproliferation accomplishments of his Administration are already to be counted among the most notable in the history of America's efforts to curb nuclear proliferation. Unfortunately, his efforts to share nuclear technology and to "get to yes" with our allies over how to address the Iranian and North Korean nuclear threats are likely to be viewed as being at least as important.

1. President George W. Bush, Remarks before the National Defense University, Washington, D.C., February 11, 2004, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040211-4.html.
2. See Graham Allison, *Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe* (New York: Times Books, 2004), 1-4; see also Stephen F. Hayes, "The Connection: How al Qaeda's Collaboration with Saddam Hussein Has Endangered America," *Weekly Standard*, June 7, 2004, 37; and Bob Woodward, *Bush at War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 45.
3. Interview with Vice President Dick Cheney, *NBC "Meet the Press*," March 16, 2003, http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/bush/cheneymeetthepress.htm.
4. Ibid.
5. These talks would later expand into the six-party talks, incorporating Japan, South Korea and Russia.
6. John J. Lumpkin, "Iran's Nuclear Program Growing at Secret Sites, Rebel Group Alleges," Associated Press, August 14, 2002.
7. U.S. officials and the IAEA board of governors chose in 2004 and 2005 to use this same line of reasoning to decide not to forward reports of safeguards infractions by South Korea and Egypt to the UN Security Council. U.S. officials backed this position, arguing that it made little sense to report these cases to the UN if the IAEA board of governors were not yet ready to do so in the much clearer case of Iran. A minority of officials within the State Department, however, insisted that it would be much more difficult to get the IAEA to report Iran to the UN if it were not pushed to report Egypt and South Korea, since both of these nations were far less suspect in the development of a serious nuclear weapons option.
8. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Opening Remarks before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 5, 2005, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/64136.htm.
9. See Karl Vick, "Energy, Iran Spur Turkey's Revival of Nuclear Plans," *Washington Post*, March 7, 2006; "Egyptian President's Son Proposed Peaceful Nuclear Program," *International Herald Tribune*, September 20, 2006; Richard Beeston, "Six Arab States Join Rush to Go Nuclear," *Times of London*, November 4, 2006; "Yemen Seeks Nuclear Tech," *Al-Jazeera* (Doha), December 30, 2006.
10. See, for example, Edwin Lyman, "The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership: Will It Advance Nonproliferation or Undermine It?" Union of Concerned Scientists policy paper, n.d., http://www.npec-web.org/Frameset.asp?PageType=Single&PDFFile=20060700-Lyman-GNEP&PDFFolder=Essays.

Securing the Home Front

James Jay Carafano

In matters of strategy, thought should always precede action. To its credit, the Bush administration made drafting a homeland security strategy one of its first tasks in the wake of the September 11th attacks on New York and Washington. That made a difference; history will show that this effort did as much or more to shape how the United States will face up to the challenge of transnational terrorism as the long telegram and NSC-68 told us how to fight the Cold War. The result has been a national effort that has, for the most part, neither veered into indifference nor careened into overreaction. It has also made Americans safer.

There is, however, no cause for complacency. Today, America's anti-terror strategy is under assault. In all likelihood, the Administration's tempered, risk-based approach to safeguarding the nation will win out in the end. But that is cold comfort in many ways. The temptation to substitute responding to the danger du jour, wasting taxpayer money, or demonizing security has become an increasingly irresistible Washington pastime, and will likely continue for some time.

Present at the creation

Without much pomp or fanfare, the White House released its National Strategy for Homeland Security ten months after 9/11, in July 2002. Like any good

Dr. James Jay Carafano is Assistant Director, Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, and Senior Research Fellow for Defense and Homeland Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation in Washington, D.C. His latest book is *GI Ingenuity: Technology, Improvisation and Winning World War II* (Praeger, 2006).

strategy, it included the basics of ends, ways, and means—what's to be done; how will it be done; and what it will be done with. And, like any good strategy, it made some hard choices. For starters, it did not make comforting but empty promises like guaranteeing to stop every terrorist attack, all the time, everywhere. The strategy is more modest and realistic. All it promises is "a concerted national effort to *prevent* terrorist attacks within the United States, *reduce* America's vulnerability to terrorism, and *minimize* the damage and recover from attacks that do occur."[1] In doing so, the strategy acknowledges that failure is an option.

Making hard choices is not enough. Strategies also have to be appropriate for the task at hand. Long wars, whether against states or terrorists, require a special kind of strategy—one that places as much emphasis on keeping the state competitive as on getting the enemy.

The strategy was also realistic about what it would take to stop terrorists. It rightly eschews the notion that there is a single, "silver bullet" solution. Security would not be provided by any one initiative, whether strip-searching shipping containers, building walls, or denying visas to grandmothers. Rather, it would be found in the cumulative effect of all homeland security programs. For example, a terrorist might be discovered by an overseas intelligence operation while applying for a visa, during screening of an international flight manifest, during inspection at a port of entry, or during a domestic counterterrorism investigation. Likewise, if layers of defense don't stop the terrorists, other initiatives would be undertaken to reduce vulnerabilities (such as beefing up security at nuclear power plants), making key targets less susceptible to attack. Finally, if these measures fail, the strategy seeks to make sure there were resources in place to adequately respond to terrorist incidents. The picture that emerges is holistic; improving security requires ensuring that each layer of the system is sufficient to do its part of the job and that efforts are complementary. Picking the best tools for each layer would be done by risk-based, cost-benefit analysis—betting on the measures that provided the most security for every buck spent.

America's homeland security strategy also made a difficult fundamental choice about resources. Homeland security, it argued, had to be a shared responsibility. While the federal government focused on counterterrorism, state and local governments were tasked with providing for public safety within their communities. The private sector, which controls over 85 percent of the nation's critical infrastructure (from the electrical power grid to telecommunications), also had significant responsibilities in protecting the nation from the threat of terrorism.[2] Everybody was responsible. Everybody should pay. Washington wouldn't do it all—and it wouldn't fund everything.

Sizing-up strategy

But making hard choices is not enough. Strategies also have to be appropriate for the task at hand. Long wars, whether against states or terrorists, require a special kind of strategy—one that places as much emphasis on keeping the state competitive as on getting the enemy.

Typically, in long wars, as states become desperate to win, they pull power to the center, centralize decision-making, increase taxation, and limit liberties. Ironically, as they become garrison states, the effort to mobilize power makes them less powerful. Less innovative, less productive, and less free, their wars become wars of attrition where the states find themselves prostrate at the end of the struggle—even if they are the winners. One of the notable exceptions to this trend was the Cold War, in which the United States and its allies emerged from the conflict stronger, more independent, and more free than when the contest started.[3]

The reason America weathered the Cold War so well was that it followed the tenets of good long war strategy.[4] This included:

- *Providing security.* It was important to take the initiative away from the enemy and to protect American citizens. Therefore, the nation needed a strong mix of both offense and defense. Nothing was to be gained by seeming weak and vulnerable in the eyes of the enemy.

- *Building a strong economy.* Americans realized early on that economic power would be the taproot of strength, the source of power that would enable the nation to compete over the long term and would better the lives of its citizens. Maintaining a robust economy was a priority.

- *Protecting civil liberties.* Preserving a vibrant civil society and avoiding "the greatest danger"—the threat of sacrificing civil liberties in the name of security—was critical as well. Only a strong civil society gives the nation the will to persevere during the difficult days of a long war.

- *Winning the battle of ideas.* From the beginning, Americans believed that in the end, victory could be achieved because the enemy would abandon a corrupt, vacuous ideology that was destined to fail its people. In contrast, the West had a legitimate and credible alternative to offer. All America needed to do was face its detractors with courage and self-confidence.

The key to success was carrying out all four of these tasks with equal vigor, while resisting the temptation to trade freedom for security or truth for prosperity.

The United States could do worse than follow the principles of good protracted war strategy that it practiced in the decades-long standoff with the Soviet Union. And all the signs suggest that is exactly what is happening. There are more fundamental similarities than differences between Cold War and War on Terror strategy—and that is a good thing. It means that despite the trauma of a terrifying terrorist attack that killed over 3,000 people on U.S. soil, America is resisting the self-destructive impulse to seek security at the expense of all else.

By the numbers

America's homeland security strategy is not only sound; there is some evidence it is working. The number of terrorist attacks and the time between them do not of course tell the whole story. After all, it took five years to plan 9/11, and three years to set up the Madrid railroad bombings. Still, the numbers must

be telling us something. Since 9/11, there have been only a handful of deaths in the Western Hemisphere as the result of terrorism, none the product of al-Qaeda and its ilk. In addition, according to the U.S. Justice Department, at least 15 terrorist plots have been thwarted in North America during that time, and many of those were not methodically planned but almost "Keystone Cops"-type operations.

What the numbers suggest is that the West is not an easy target. Instead, transnational groups are turning to what terrorists have historically done: attacking the weak and avoiding the strong. And the weak are in the terrorists' own backyard. The Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism in Oklahoma City estimates that since 9/11 there have been 8,491 terrorist attacks in the Middle East and 16,269 fatalities—numbers that far exceed the losses in any other part of the planet.[5] In 2005 alone, the government's National Counterterrorism Center counted 8,223 victims of terrorism, including 2,627 deaths. South Asia, another region with large Islamic populations, runs second on the list with 5,401 total victims. In contrast, Western Europe suffered 339 victims and North America eight.[6]

Turned back by Western security measures, the terrorists have turned on the world of Islam, with terrible results. The numbers suggest that the West's defenses are working.

And it is not just the physical losses. By virtually every index, many countries that are losing ground in the march to peace, prosperity and justice are Muslim. Terrorism is a key reason why. According to The Heritage Foundation's *Index of Economic Freedom*, for example, Lebanon and Malaysia scored lower in 2005 than they did in 2004.[7] Countries such as Afghanistan and Somalia were so chaotic they couldn't even be scored. Other surveys tell a similar story. According to the rankings of the nonpartisan Freedom House, in 2005 only one country out of 18 in the Middle East was graded as "free" (Israel). The region trails all others in Freedom House rankings, and although modest gains were recorded in 2005 (most notably in Lebanon), even those have probably been wiped out now.[8]

Turned back by Western security measures, the terrorists have turned on the world of Islam, with terrible results. The numbers suggest that the West's defenses are working. They also argue that offensive measures need to do much better, not to save the rest of the world from the Islamic world, but to help the Islamic world save itself.

On the home front

Nor has the effort to protect the West against the threat of terrorism been an unbearable burden. In economic terms, the United States spends about one-half of one percent of GDP on homeland security. That is a pretty reasonable insurance policy. Homeland security spending by Washington represents about an eighth of what Americans spend on litigation every year. Nor is homeland security a significant drag on the economy; since 9/11, the United States has weathered a mild recession, recovered from the effects of one of the greatest natural disasters in its history (Hurricane Katrina—which by many estimates resulted in more than double the economic dis-

ruption caused by 9/11), watched the price of oil skyrocket, and borne the brunt of a costly war in Iraq. Yet, the U.S. economy is growing, inflation is low, and employment is high.

Where implementation of the strategy animates most critics is on issues of civil liberties. Since 9/11, there have been hysterical claims that every advance in security has come at the sacrifice of liberty. There are three factors animating fears about anti-terrorism campaigns. First, critics frequently decry the expansion of executive authority in its own right. They generically equate the potential for abuse of executive branch authority with the existence of actual abuse. They argue that the growth in presidential power is a threat, irrespective of whether the power has, in fact, been misused. These critics come from a long tradition of limited government, which fears any expansion of executive authority.

The second kind of criticism is stimulated by the "Luddite response"—a fear of technology. As the government begins to explore ways of taking advantage of the information age's superior capacity to manage data through new information technologies, there are rising concerns that it will use these means to dig into our personal lives. Information, the thinking goes, equals power. With great efficiency comes more effective use of power. And with more power comes more abuse.

A third theme underlying criticism is more blatantly political. Take, for example, the passage of the first major post-9/11 anti-terrorism law in the United States, popularly called the Patriot Act. Regardless of its true merits or laws, the Act has become a *cause célèbre* for raising money and energizing constituencies that are predisposed to be critical of the Administration's response to terrorism. Brand labeling has become a part of the political process.[9]

In economic terms, the United States spends about one-half of one percent of GDP on homeland security. That is a pretty reasonable insurance policy.

By and large, these fears are overblown. Criticisms of the government's new anti-terrorism practices miss important distinctions and often blur potential and actuality. To be sure, many aspects of the Patriot Act (and other governmental initiatives) expand the power of the government to act. Americans should and have been rightly cautious about any expansion of government power. Yet, by and large, the potential for abuse of new executive powers has proven to be far less of a real danger than critics have presumed. In 2004, for example, the Department of Justice's Inspector General (an independent investigative arm within the department) reported that there as yet had been no instances in which the Patriot Act has been used to infringe civil rights or liberties.[10]

Where opponents of the Patriot Act were equally wrongheaded was that their belief in the potential for abuse stems from a misunderstanding of the new powers that the government has been given by Congress to combat terrorists. In many cases, provisions of the Patriot Act simply apply tools we have used to combat other crimes, such as drug trafficking, to fighting terrorism.

More fundamentally, those who fear the expansion of executive power in the war on terrorism offer a bad alternative: prohibition. While we could afford that solution in the face

of traditional criminal conduct (allowing a thousand guilty men to go free to ensure that just one innocent person is not persecuted), we cannot accept that answer in combating terrorism. There is a better way. Vigilance and oversight (enforced through legal, organizational, and technical means) are the answer to deterring or preventing abuse. A watchful eye is necessary to control the risk of excessive encroachment. Paying attention to the problem is the best way of preventing the erosion of civil liberties. And that is a cornerstone of U.S. strategy.

The answer to fighting terrorists while preserving civil liberties and human rights is simple. It is not debating which is more important: It is simply doing both—and Americans have made a sincere effort to do just that.

It is incredibly unreasonable to expect that a new federal organization could be thrown together and at the outset get everything right. History argues for patience.

Shooting straight

The other most often-heard criticisms concerning implementation of the strategy are equally vacuous. Foremost among these is that the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, the principal instrument created after 9/11 to implement the strategy, has resulted in a disorganized, ineffectual mess—the gang that couldn't shoot straight.

Indictments of the department are most unfair where they are based on unrealistic expectations. It is incredibly unreasonable to expect that a new federal organization could be thrown together and at the outset get everything right. History argues for patience. The National Security Act of 1947 created America's premier Cold War weapons: what eventually became the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency. Yet it still took about a decade to figure out how best to fight the Russian bear and develop instruments like NATO, nuclear deterrence, and international military assistance, as well as the right concepts to guide how those instruments would be used. It required years of trial and error, experimentation, and bitter lessons to get it right. Arguably, the Department of Homeland Security is further along in getting its act together than the Pentagon was at a similar point in its history.

The two major black eyes the department has received, in fact, have very little to do with its efforts to combat terrorism. One of the most public censures was the withering criticism heaped on the department after an Arab-owned conglomerate announced it was buying a company that operated some port facilities in the United States. The sale of a British-based company which controlled cargo handling operations at a number of U.S. facilities—including six major U.S. ports—to Dubai Ports World, a government-owned company in the United Arab Emirates, raised many concerns, including nearly-hysterical rants from opportunistic members of Congress. The department was castigated for letting the deal go through. A review of the facts, however, suggested there were no serious security issues at stake.[11] Not only did DHS do nothing wrong, in a supreme act of irony they are now piloting a new security screening program at ports overseas (a program mandated by Congress) and

one of their chief partners is none other than Dubai Ports World.

The Dubai Ports World scandal might have been written off as just a bad "PR day" if it had not followed on the heels of another major blow to the department's credibility: the federal response to Hurricane Katrina. President Bush was absolutely correct when he labeled the national response "inadequate." When national catastrophes occur, the resources of the nation have to be mobilized to respond immediately. Equally important, Americans must remain confident that their leaders, at all levels of government, are in charge and doing the right things to make them safer. On both counts, after Katrina made landfall, the nation fell short. Heaping all the blame on Homeland Security and the department's leadership, however, missed the real lessons to be learned from the disaster.

First of all, the disaster response was hardly the disaster its critics make it out to be. Recognizing all the limitations of the national capacity to meet the challenges of catastrophic disaster, it is equally important to focus on the incredible achievements of America's responders. Several hundred thousand were successfully evacuated before the storm. If they not been, the death toll would have been unimaginable. Tens of thousands were rescued during and after the storm under harrowing conditions, including over 33,000 by the U.S. Coast Guard. Tens of thousands more, including those at the Superdome and Convention Center, were evacuated before they succumbed to dehydration, hunger, exposure, or disease. In the wake of the storm, many hundreds of thousands are being safely quartered by communities around the country. Likewise, media reports that New Orleans had collapsed into a living hell of chaos and murder, proved, on further investigation, to be wildly inaccurate.[12]

The good news is that Washington is not doing too badly. But that is also the bad news. The fact that America has actually done a fair job protecting itself from terrorists has actually made the politics of homeland security worse.

In comparison to the devastation reaped by the tsunami in Southeast Asia, the U.S. capacity to save lives in a similar disaster proved unparalleled. This didn't just happen; it resulted from the decisions of government leaders, volunteer groups, private sector initiatives, and the selfless actions of communities and individuals.

It wasn't all good news, however. Without question, Katrina also revealed the flaws in the department's ability to organize a federal response to a major catastrophe. That should have come as a surprise to no one. Following 9/11, the federal government invested only a modicum of effort in preparing for catastrophic disaster. The federal government was required to dole out grants at the state and local level, with scant regard to national priorities. Katrina showed the limitations of that approach. In the wake of the storm, all the fire and police stations in New Orleans lay under water, as did much of the equipment bought with federal dollars. Only a national system—capable of mustering the whole nation—can respond to catastrophic disasters.

To his credit, after his appointment as Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff understood

the problem and had a plan to fix it. Shortly after taking office, he initiated a department-wide Second Stage Review of DHS missions, resources, and organizations. The review recognized that the department had to place a lot more emphasis on preparing for catastrophic disasters, and that Secretary Chertoff's proposed reorganization would address many of the department's shortfalls. The plan, unfortunately, was released in July 2005, less than a month before the storm hit, and was overtaken by events before the department had any real opportunity to act on it. If not for Katrina, Chertoff might never have had to bear the criticism of one of the department's significant flaws.

A victim of its own success

So, the good news is that Washington is not doing too badly. But that is also the bad news. The fact that America has actually done a fair job protecting itself from terrorists has actually made the politics of homeland security worse. Many in Congress feel that the homeland security effort is a "free lunch" to push their personal agenda. As a result, in the last few years Congress has increasingly haunted the homeland security effort with all kinds of measures detrimental to real security. They include:

- *Checkbook security*—simply authorizing more homeland security spending on programs does not necessarily make Americans much safer. That is particularly true for measures intended to protect infrastructure like bridges, trains, and tunnels. Terrorists thrive on attacking vulnerabilities, looking for the weakest link. The United States is a nation of virtually infinite vulnerabilities, from high schools to shopping malls. Pouring billions of federal tax dollars into protecting any of them may please some constituents and vested interests, but it will not do much to stop terrorists, who will just move on to another "soft" target. The far better investment of federal dollars is on counterterrorism programs that break up terror cells and thwart attacks before they occur.

- *"Feel good" security*—these proposals sound compelling, but on closer scrutiny make no sense. Inspecting every container shipped from overseas is a case in point. There is no evidence that this would be a more cost-effective means to deter threats than the current cargo screening system. On the contrary, screening everything would be extremely expensive, and the technology is not very effective. But even if the available screening technologies were cheap, fast, and accurate, they would produce so much data (from peeking into the tens of thousands of containers bound for U.S. ports every day) that the information could not be checked before the containers' contents arrived in stores. Tax dollars should not be spent on what makes for the best election-year bumper sticker, but on initiatives that offer the most security for the dollar spent.

- *Checklist security*—legislation that simply demands more reports, adds more mandates, and sets more unrealistic deadlines might check the box that America has an activist Congress, but it would achieve little else. Any proposed

new security measures should be backed up by credible analyses of how they would diminish the threat of transnational terrorism, the likely costs of implementing them, and their suitability and feasibility. Few measures proposed in Congress these days pass muster.

- *False security*—clothing any political agenda that pleases stakeholders or promotes agendas under the false claim that these measures advance national security should be rejected outright. Unfortunately, these days they usually they are not.

Hijacking homeland security, in other words, is becoming more common. And it is becoming a bipartisan sport. In the last Congress, for example, members of both political parties pressed for building a wall on America's southern border, a simplistic solution that has little prospect for improving border security.[13] The 110th Congress started out with a bipartisan bill approved in the House that purported to further implement the recommendations made by the 9/11 Commission. It did anything but, and included measures to revise Transportation Security Administration (TSA) work rules and other provisions that had little to do with the Commission's report.

Efforts to hijack homeland security might be less worrisome if they were not impeding the capabilities of the Department of Homeland Security. Frequently, however, they do. In the wake of Katrina, for example, Congress mandated all kinds of changes in how the department organizes to respond to disasters. Many of them actually undermined reforms that Secretary Chertoff already had under way. Likewise, Congress has done much to stymie the department's effort to make homeland security grants more effective and efficient.[14] Indeed, many of the department's most serious challenges can be traced to unrealistic mandates and requirements imposed by Congress.

A war to be won

Meddling in homeland security should come as no surprise. It is part of how democracies fight wars. Americans will debate and question the value of what is being done before a war, during wartime, and for decades after. The odds are, however, that despite the distractions of Washington politics, the United States will stick to the fundamentals of good long war strategy, just as it did during the Cold War. After all, Winston Churchill was right: Americans always do the right thing—after they have exhausted every other option. In the War on Terror, the United States gives every indication of continuing this tradition.

1. *National Strategy for Homeland Security*, White House, Office of Homeland Security, July 2002, 2, http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book/nat_strat_hls.pdf (emphasis added).
2. Ibid., 63–65.
3. See, for example, Aaron L. Friedberg, *In the Shadow of the Garrison State: America's Anti-Statism and Its Cold War Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
4. Described in James Jay Carafano and Paul Rosenzweig, *Winning the Long War: Lessons from the Cold War for Defeating Terrorism and Preserving Freedom* (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2005).
5. Information derived from the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism's *Terrorism Knowledge Base*, http://www.tkb.org/Category.jsp?catID=318.
6. National Counterterrorism Center, *Report of Incidents of Terrorism 2005*, April 11, 2006,

http://wits.nctc.gov/reports/crot2005nctcannexfinal.pdf.

7. Marc A. Miles et al., *2006 Index of Economic Freedom* (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation and the *Wall Street Journal*, 2006).
8. Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2006*, n.d., http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15&year=2006.
9. In the run-up to the 2004 presidential election, for example, the moveon.org website offered a full-page ad reprinting excerpts of speeches by former Vice President Al Gore. It is no coincidence that many Democratic presidential aspirants garnered great applause with the "novel" suggestion that, if elected, they would fire Attorney General John Ashcroft. See Carl Matzelle, "Gephardt Talks the Talk Steelworkers Want to Hear," *Cleveland Plain Dealer*, December 7, 2003, A24, and Greg Pierce, "Inside Politics," *Washington Times*, September 23, 2003, A6. To the extent that criticism of the Patriot Act and related activities is purely political, the debate about these truly difficult questions is diminished. Thoughtful criticism recognizes both the new realities of the post-9/11 world and the potential for benefit *and* abuse in governmental activity.
10. See *Report to Congress on Implementation of Section 1001 of the USA Patriot Act*, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, January 27, 2004, www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/0401a/index.htm; see also "Report Finds No Abuses of Patriot Act," *Washington Post*, January 28, 2004, A2. This is consistent with the conclusions of others. For example, at a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing about the Patriot Act, Senator Joseph Biden (D–DE) said that "some measure of the criticism [of the Patriot Act] is both misinformed and overblown." His colleague, Senator Dianne Feinstein (D–CA), concurred: "I have never had a single abuse of the Patriot Act reported to me. My staff... asked [the ACLU] for instances of actual abuses. They… said they had none." Even the lone Senator to vote against the Patriot Act, Russ Feingold (D–WI), said that he "supported 90 percent of the Patriot Act" and that there is "too much confusion and misinformation" about the Act. See "Efforts to Prevent Terrorism in the United States," Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, October 21, 2003, Feingold.senate.gov/~feingold/statement/03/10/2003A22748.html. These views, from Senators outside of the Bush administration and from an internal watchdog, are at odds with the fears often expressed by the public.
11. James Jay Carafano and Alane Kochems, "Security and the Sale of Port Facilities: Facts and Recommendations," Heritage Foundation *WebMemo* no. 997, February 22, 2006, http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/wm997.cfm.
12. For examples, see Marvin Olasky, *The Politics of Disaster: Katrina, Big Government, and a New Strategy for Future Crises* (Nashville: W Publishing Group. 2006).
13. James Jay Carafano et al., "Better, Faster, and Cheaper Border Security," Heritage Foundation *Backgrounder* no. 1967, September 6, 2006, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Immigration/bg1967.cfm.
14. James Jay Carafano and Jamie Metzl, "Homeland Security Grant Reform: Congressional Inaction Must End," Heritage Foundation *Backgrounder* no. 1971, September 15, 2006, http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/bg1971.cfm.

RESPONSE

Russian Democracy, Revisited

Stephen J. Blank

Concluding his incisive essay on Russia in the last issue of *The Journal*, Nikolas Gvosdev stated, "Let the debate continue." So, with our editor's forbearance, let us discuss Russian policy again.

Gvosdev defends his brand of realism as a moral policy based on prudential calculations that seek to maximize benefits and minimize losses. In other words, while Russia is admittedly far from an ideal state, we can live with it as it is. But is this policy towards Russia realistic in Gvosdev's own terms? In fact, Russia's foreign policy is fundamentally adversarial to America and to Western interests and ideals. Moreover, thanks to Russia's domestic political structure, not only will this foreign policy trend expand if unchecked, it will almost certainly lead Russia into another war.

Russia's conduct in 2006 serves as a microcosm of this problem. Last year, Russia gratuitously provoked international crises by threatening Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and Georgia over energy. It showed neither the will nor the capacity to arrest or reverse proliferation in Iran or North Korea. It displayed its readiness to amputate Georgia by force and annex its former territories to Russia. It attempted to undermine the OSCE and block it from fulfilling its treaty-mandated functions of monitoring elections. It refused to negotiate seriously over energy and economics with the European Union. It recognized Hamas as a legitimate government, gave it aid, and sold it weapons. And it sold weapons to Iran, Venezuela, China and Syria, knowing full well that many of these arms will be transferred to terrorists.

DR. STEPHEN J. BLANK is Research Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. The views expressed in this article do not represent those of the U.S. Army, Defense Department, or any other branch of the U.S. government.

At home, meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin is widening state control over ever more sectors of the economy, including defense, metals, and the automotive industry. Foreign equity investment in energy and many other fields is increasingly excluded from Russia in favor of Kremlin-dominated monopoly. Russia is even seeking to convert the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) into an oil and gas cartel that supports its own interests, rather than those of other producers.

Russia's foreign policy is fundamentally adversarial to America and to Western interests and ideals. Moreover, thanks to its domestic political structure, not only will this foreign policy trend expand if unchecked, it will almost certainly lead Russia into another war.

Possibly, the United States can abide such a Russia. But it is clear that America's partners and allies, particularly those in Eastern Europe and the "post-Soviet space," cannot long live with a government whose policies seem essentially driven by a unilateralist quest for unchecked power. Russia's current objectives seem to be incompatible with any notion of world order based on the principles accepted by it and its partners in 1989-91. Russia evidently covets recognition as a great power or energy superpower free from all international constraints and obligations and answerable to nobody. As the political scientist Robert Legvold wrote back in 1997, Russia "craves status, not responsibility."[1]

It should come as no surprise that this irresponsibility still characterizes Russian diplomacy. After all, it is the hallmark of the Russian autocracy which Putin has restored with a vengeance. Autocracy logically entails empire, an autarchic and patrimonial concept of the Russian state that is owned by the Tsar, controlled by his servitors, and which survives only by expansion. Just as autocracy means that the Tsar is not bound by or responsible to any domestic institution or principle, it also means that in foreign policy, Russia does not feel obligated to honor its own prior treaties and agreements. The struggle to get Moscow to adhere to the 1999 OSCE Summit accords it itself signed—as well as its conduct during the Russo-Ukrainian energy crisis of 2006—fully confirms that point; whatever else happened in both cases, Moscow broke its own contract with the OSCE and with Kyiv.

These are far from anomalies. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov himself said not long ago that Russia refuses to be bound by foreign standards, or conform to them.[2] He has also insisted that the West respect Russian interests in the CIS, but shows no reciprocal respect for the treaties Russia has signed and since violated. Nor does he say that Russia must respect the interests of CIS governments themselves.[3] By doing so, Lavrov has confirmed the warnings of analysts like Dmitry Trenin of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, who caution that Russia does not want to *belong* to a larger institutional grouping.[4]

Under these conditions, as both Western and Russian firms are learning all too well, property rights are conditional—if not entirely absent. Property is the Tsar's to control, and he or his agents grant rents to their

subordinates in return for service, which tragically is generally inefficient, self- and rent-seeking, and utterly corrupt. Today, this formula is visible in Russia's pervasive official corruption, widespread criminality, and the absence of any sense of national interests among the country's new "boyar" class.

Such a system also entails an autarchic economy hostile to foreign investment and influence. Democratic and civilian control of Russia's multiple militaries likewise is absent, and critics of the regime or reformers are routinely killed or threatened by those forces. The most recent examples of this tragic phenomenon are the assassinations of former FSB agent Alexander Litvinenko and journalist Anna Politkovskaya, and the attempted poisoning of former Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar.

Russian and Western observers both recognize that the Tsarist model is back, albeit with some Soviet accretions. And true to this model, the Kremlin today operates largely by fiat and fear. Much of Vladimir Putin's popularity clearly derives from the state monopoly over a large swath of the national media, growing fear of the police among ordinary Russians, and the sense of prosperity provided by seven years of (largely energy-based) economic growth. Absent the official cult of personality and with a free media, undoubtedly things would be rather different.

All of which is to say that it is clear that, while the United States must engage with Russia, America cannot simply accept these deformities as the necessary price for doing business with Moscow. It is not simply a matter of "lecturing" Russia, as its elites have accused Washington of doing for decades. Genuine realism requires an engagement with Russia that respects its interests but which tells the truth and responds to its numerous violations of international obligations.

Such realism also requires understanding that the reversion to Russian autocracy is not merely a matter of Russia's sovereign choice, as Putin's ideologues pretend. It is a threat to all of Russia's neighbors because it inherently involves a quest for empire, since Moscow understands its full sovereignty to be attainable only if that of its neighbors is diminished.

It is deeply ironic that Russia can pursue such policies today largely because of the West. In order to maintain its empire, Russia must offer all kinds of hidden and overt subsidies in energy, weapons, or other forms of economic and political currency. It can only afford to do so by charging its European energy customers full market price, even as it refuses to do the same at home. Likewise, for all its benefits, U.S. funding for Cooperative Threat Reduction enables Russia to spend ever more on its armed forces, which it otherwise could not afford to do. By itself, Russia cannot pay for the rising outlays on its armed forces, its ambitious goals for re-equipping them and converting them into a power projection force beyond its borders, or their current, bloated size.

While the United States must engage with Russia, America cannot simply accept its deformities as the necessary price for doing business with Moscow.

Under the circumstances, a realistic Western policy cannot abandon the borderlands to Moscow. If it has reason to believe that it enjoys free-

dom of action there, Moscow will promptly extend its dysfunctional political system to those lands, either directly or indirectly. In either case, it will create security vacuums which are ripe for conflict and which threaten both its own and European security. Russia's inability to quell the Chechen uprising despite twelve years of utterly brutal warfare illustrates this quite clearly. Indeed, both wars with Chechnya (in 1994 and again in 1999) were launched to secure the domestic base of first the Yeltsin and then the incoming Putin regimes.[5] Since then, the fighting has engulfed the entire North Caucasus, putting Russia, thanks to its own misguided policies, at greater actual risk of terrorism.

It is precisely to avoid Russian expansionism and support for rogue regimes and proliferation that it is necessary to press Russia to return to the spirit and letter of the treaties it has signed and which make up the constitutional basis of Europe's and Eurasia's legitimate order. We should not pressure Russia because it is insufficiently democratic, but rather because it has freely given its word to treaties and conventions that must be upheld if any kind of international order is to be preserved.

Admittedly, this means that America must reorient its policies to stop seeking to extend or impose democracy. No matter how deeply held, the ideas of the current Administration enjoy no special legitimacy abroad, whereas international obligations do. Likewise, we must make clear that while the interests of the kleptocracy that passes for government in Russia are advanced by lawlessness and imperial predation, neither the interests of the Russian people nor the security of Eurasia is advanced by such policies. Quite the contrary; those policies entail long-term stagnation and war, not progress, peace, or security.

Thus a realistic policy towards Russia necessarily means realigning the values which we promote. They should be those of international law and of enhanced security for both peoples and states, not untrammeled unilateralism or that might makes right. But such realism also means fearlessly proclaiming and acting upon the truth that Russian scholars themselves know and admit: Russia today remains a risk factor in world politics.[6] This is largely because its domestic political arrangements oblige Moscow to pursue a unilateral and neo-imperial policy fundamentally antithetical to the security of Eurasian states, including its own.

Accountability is an important virtue for all states, but for Russia it is indispensable. Without it, the Kremlin could very well succumb to imperial temptation, at the cost of international catastrophe.

1. Robert Legvold, "The 'Russian Question,'" in Vladimir Baranovsky, ed., *Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 67.
2. "Lavrov: West Needs to Acknowledge Russia's Interests," Interfax (Moscow), November 11, 2005.
3. Ibid.
4. Dmitri Trenin, "Reading Russia Right," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace *Policy Brief* no. 42 (October 2005), 8 (italics in the original).
5. For more, see Stephen Blank, "The 18th Brumaire of Vladimir Putin," in Uri Ra'anan, ed., *Flawed Succession: Russia's Power Transfer Crises* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2006), 133-170.
6. Timofei Bordachev, "Russia's Europe Dilemma: Democratic Partner vs. Authoritarian Satellite," in Andrew Kuchins and Dmitri Trenin, eds., *Russia: The Next Ten Years* (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2004), 120.

The Death of Democracy Promotion?

Ilan Berman

What a difference a few years can make. In September 2002, less than a year after taking office, the Bush administration laid out a breathtakingly ambitious vision of American foreign policy. "The United States possesses unprecedented—and unequaled—strength and influence in the world," the newly-released *National Security Strategy of the United States* proudly proclaimed. "Sustained by faith in the principles of liberty, and the value of a free society, this position comes with unparalleled responsibilities, obligations, and opportunity. The great strength of this nation must be used to promote a balance of power that favors freedom."[1]

But less than five years later, that vision appears to be in full strategic retreat. In Iraq, mounting sectarian violence threatens to erupt into open civil war, undermining post-war reconstruction efforts and putting at risk the political progress made since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. In Afghanistan, the elected government of a vital American ally is under growing assault from a resurgent Taliban. And in the Palestinian Territories, popular elections have brought to power a radical Islamist movement committed to the destruction of its neighbor, Israel. Democracy, in other words, does not appear to be on the march, despite the best efforts of the White House.

Where and how did things go wrong? Some answers can be found in the common misconceptions about the mechanisms by which to foster—and, more importantly, to sustain—democracy abroad that now permeate official Washington.

Ilan Berman is Vice President for Policy at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, D.C., and Editor of *The Journal of International Security Affairs*.

Mission creep

The first problem that has plagued U.S. policymakers in recent years is confusion about whether the spread of democracy should serve as a tactic in a larger anti-terror strategy, or as the end goal of U.S. policy itself.

While "tactical democracy," if used selectively and carefully, can be a potent weapon against extremism, a policy that promotes democracy above all other values is at best counterproductive. At worst, it is downright dangerous.

The differences are enormous. As a *tactic*, democracy promotion can be an effective counterterrorism tool. After all, as Pavel Ivanov eloquently pointed out in these pages not long ago,[2] the character of individual regimes matters a great deal. Governments that are unaccountable to their own people are far more susceptible to corruption and radicalism, and are more likely to engage in criminal behavior. It is not by accident that the world's leading state sponsors of terrorism—Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Pakistan—are today all governed by deeply authoritarian, highly unrepresentative regimes. Democracies, by contrast, make better counterterrorism partners. Because an enfranchised populace becomes a stakeholder in a stable civil society, it is by its nature more sensitive to the threats posed by political radicals. And, since democracy demands a greater degree of transparency and accountability from its government, citizens are far less likely to allow their leaders to provide aid and comfort to fringe groups.

The adoption of democracy as *strategy*, however, is far more problematic. It makes the promotion of democratic processes abroad the single most important priority for U.S. foreign policy—a choice that, by necessity, wreaks havoc upon existing alliance structures and distorts the economics of American engagement abroad. For, while "tactical democracy," if used selectively and carefully, can be a potent weapon against extremism, a policy that promotes democracy above all other values is at best counterproductive. At worst, it is downright dangerous.

Early on, Administration officials showed encouraging signs of understanding this distinction. In the days after September 11th, the Bush administration launched its campaign in Afghanistan not because the regime there was undemocratic, a state of affairs that had persisted since the Taliban's seizure of power in 1996, but because of the latter's role in harboring and facilitating the activities of the al-Qaeda terrorist network. Upon the Taliban's ouster, President Bush threw his weight behind interim leader Hamid Karzai, in large part because he was committed to preventing his country from becoming a safe haven for terrorism—a goal Karzai sought to accomplish through the creation of a pluralistic governing system. In other words, the orienting principle of U.S. policy vis-à-vis Afghanistan was, and remains, counterterrorism, although the promotion of democratic principles represents an important part of that policy.

Very quickly thereafter, however, the Bush administration began to show signs of mission creep. The elevation of democracy to the status of grand strategy first became visible in the context of Iraq in February 2003, when the President himself

told the American Enterprise Institute in Washington that "[s]uccess in Iraq could also begin a new stage for Middle Eastern peace, and set in motion progress towards a truly democratic Palestinian state."[3] Since then, Administration officials have time and again emphasized the centrality of democracy in Iraq to their vision of a prosperous region.[4]

This conflation of goals belies a deep confusion about the dynamics of the Middle East. Although success in Iraq is important, it does not automatically ensure political transformation in the region as a whole. After all, Iraq is only one element of the exceedingly complex geopolitical picture of the Middle East; its resolution has little or no impact on a myriad of other issues, from succession in Egypt to the long-term stability of the House of Saud, which can and should also be on the plates of policymakers in Washington.

It also connotes enormous opportunity costs, economic and otherwise. Because, if in the eyes of the Administration, Iraq is indeed seen as the key to regional peace, then a failure to promote pluralism there is simply not an option. Indeed, as the President himself has clearly articulated, America's long-term commitment goes well beyond simply establishing security in Iraq, to incorporate the expansion of civil society and prosperity for the Iraqi people.[5] Such an approach will require major infusions of capital, greater numbers of troops and sustained political attention well into the foreseeable future—all carried out at the expense of other potential fronts in the War on Terror.

None of which is to say that the Iraq effort now under way is not worthwhile. Yet the importance of Iraq today rests in its ability to influence, either positively or negatively, America's larger strategic aims in the region. And, if the current scope of U.S. engagement there is any indication, plans for regional stability progressively have been subordinated to more "principled" considerations. Should it turn out that as a result the United States is no longer willing or able to prosecute the War on Terror in other regions or against other adversaries, the costs of toppling Saddam will turn out to have been high indeed.

The importance of Iraq today rests in its ability to influence, either positively or negatively, America's larger strategic aims in the region. Should it turn out that as a result of its engagement there the United States is no longer willing or able to prosecute the War on Terror in other regions or against other adversaries, the costs of toppling Saddam will turn out to have been high indeed.

Running the marathon

The second problem facing American officials has been the conceptual failure to understand that democracy is a process, not a destination. All too often, U.S. policymakers have lauded signs of movement toward pluralism in foreign lands, only to fail in providing the political and economic support needed to sustain such trends over time.

Ukraine serves as a perfect example of this attention deficit disorder. In November 2004, the elevation of former foreign minister Viktor Yanukovych to the country's presidency (in controversial elections blatantly

manipulated by Moscow) brought hundreds of thousands to the streets in an outpouring of protest that became known as the "Orange Revolution." The protesters succeeded beyond their wildest dreams; over the course of two months, the original results of the vote were annulled and a new election was held. In it, popular, Western-leaning Viktor Yushchenko handily defeated Yanukovych in what was widely seen as a referendum for a new national direction—one free of Russian influence.

In the West, the outcome was hailed as a major success for democratic forces. During the heady days of the "Orange Revolution," a number of American nongovernmental organizations (including the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute) had played a major—albeit quiet—role in organizing and sustaining the civic campaign against Yanukovych,[6] with tacit approval from the U.S. government. Yet, in the wake of Yushchenko's electoral victory, Ukraine's reformers suddenly found, much to their chagrin, that they had been forgotten. Official Washington, by all appearances, cared more about scoring a political victory against Moscow than securing the democratic peace that followed.

Today, the United States has unrivaled capability to support liberal democratic forces around the world. Such support, however, cannot be short-term. Neither should it be pegged to the attainment of any one particular political objective or goal.

This inattention proved fatal. Left to their own devices, Ukraine's various political blocs dissolved into bitter factional infighting. That disorder, in turn, allowed revanchist forces within the Ukrainian body politic, buoyed by a refocused Russia, to grow increasingly powerful. The culmination came in March 2006, when parliamentary elections abruptly swept Yushchenko's administration from office in favor of a coalition government headed by none other than his bitter political rival, Viktor Yanukovych. In less than a year-and-a-half, the "Orange Revolution" had suffered a near-total reversal of fortune.

The experience of Ukraine serves as a cautionary tale. Today, the United States has unrivaled capability to support liberal democratic forces around the world. Such support, however, cannot be short-term. Neither should it be pegged to the attainment of any one particular political objective or goal. Rather, it must be sustained in nature, and calibrated to empower not only the initial successes of reformers, but the preservation of these victories over time as well.

Real choices

The third challenge confronting American policymakers is the arduous task of political capacity-building. In order for democracy to thrive in the historically inhospitable soil of the Middle East, the people on the Arab and Muslim streets must perceive that they have real choices about exactly who governs them and what shape that government will take.

In principle, the United States has understood the need to inject new voices in the Middle Eastern political debate. In its public discourse, the Bush administration repeatedly has emphasized the importance

of reformers and political progressives to the creation of a new, more pluralistic order in the region.[7] As a practical matter, however, the past five years have seen precious little investment of this sort on the part of the United States.

Recent events in the Palestinian Authority are emblematic of this failure. The United States and its allies were taken by surprise when the radical Hamas movement abruptly swept to power in the Palestinian Authority in early 2006, but they should not have been. When Palestinians went to the polls in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in January 2006, they had been presented with just two choices, President Mahmoud Abbas' sclerotic Fatah party or its Islamist opposition, Hamas. The decision was not a difficult one to make.

After all, Fatah had enjoyed a virtual monopoly on power in the West Bank and Gaza Strip ever since Yasser Arafat's return to the Palestinian Territories in 1994. The following twelve years saw the institutionalization and expansion of the crony politics, corruption and authoritarianism that characterized PLO practices—all carried out at the expense of ordinary Palestinians. Hamas, meanwhile, stepped into the vacuum left by Arafat's rogue regime, expanding its role in Palestinian education, medicine and social services. In the process, it had positioned itself as a viable political alternative to the PLO. Thus, when it came time for Palestinians to choose, they invariably avoided the corrupt, secular government that had robbed them in favor of an Islamist one that they hoped would not.

None of this registered on Washington's radar. In the run-up to the Palestinian vote, American officials were quick to express their support for the beleaguered government of Mahmoud Abbas, and just as quick to warn of dire international consequences, from political ostracism to a cutoff of fiscal aid, should Hamas be elected. They did not, however, devote their energies to forcing Fatah to implement the kind of grassroots anti-corruption measures that might have shored up its flagging domestic popularity. Neither did the United States expend the time or effort necessary to foster serious political competition that could have served to supplant—or at least dilute—the appeal of Hamas. By failing to do so, Washington inadvertently helped to midwife the birth of a radical Islamist government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Selective engagement

Fourth, when Washington does choose to promote democratic principles abroad, it must be discriminating about where and how it does so. For, in order to be prudent and sustainable, democracy assistance needs to be judiciously weighed against other pressing foreign policy priorities involving the nation or nations in question.

Until now, however, the reverse has often been true, and nowhere more so than with regard to Russia. From early cooperation in the War on Terror, relations between Moscow and Washington have deteriorated into mutual recriminations and discord over Russia's domestic practices. As Vice President Dick Cheney remarked at the May 2006 Vilnius Conference, in Russia today "opponents of reform are seeking to reverse the gains of the last decade. In many areas of civil society—from religion and the news media, to advocacy groups and political parties—the government has unfairly and improperly restricted the rights of her people." Russia,

Cheney concluded, "has a choice to make. And there is no question that a return to democratic reform in Russia will generate further success for its people and greater respect among fellow nations."[8]

Cheney's concerns are certainly well-placed. Nor are they unique; over the past two years, a growing chorus of statesmen and politicians has raised concerns about the increasingly authoritarian, unrepresentative and repressive nature of Vladimir Putin's Russia.

But for the foreseeable future, the United States has neither the capacity nor the inclination to aggressively promote democratic processes within the Russian Federation. It does, however, desperately need Moscow's aid and backing to resolve a number of pressing international issues, chief among them the twin nuclear crises of North Korea and Iran. And such cooperation is far less likely to be forthcoming from a government that has been internationally vilified by the United States for its questionable internal conduct.

When it comes to democracy promotion, in other words, Washington must pick and choose its battles. If it does not, it runs the risk of alienating potential partners on any number of foreign policy fronts—making its strategic objectives all the more difficult to attain.

The emerging threat of a Shi'a political "awakening" is likely to be met by a wave of deepening repression in a region with precious little liberty to spare.

The Iranian challenge

The most immediate threat to American democracy promotion efforts in the Middle East, however, emanates from the Islamic Republic of Iran. Already, the Iranian regime's determined pursuit of a nuclear capability, and the apparent inability of the West to halt this atomic drive, has begun to have a ripple effect throughout the region.

A rising tide, the saying goes, lifts all boats, and Iran's successes have served to empower the Shi'a factions of the region, who now more than ever look to Tehran for strategic support and religious guidance. The summer 2006 war initiated by Hezbollah was an early manifestation of this trend. Since then, there have been others, among them the November 2006 seizure of parliamentary power by Bahrain's Shi'a minority, growing signs of restlessness among Saudi Arabia's Shi'ites, and, most visibly, the rise of a pro-Iranian, Shi'a-dominated government in Iraq.

Iranian officials are acutely aware of this trend, and greatly encouraged by it. As Mohammad Mirahmadi, commander of Iran's feared domestic militia, the *Basij*, recently told his followers, "[t]he spiritual influence of Iran… is becoming stronger and religiosity is gaining ground at an unprecedented rate not only in Iran but also in many countries of the region."[9]

The other governments of the region, however, are far less enthusiastic about these developments. In Kuwait, fears of Iranian influence have led the government of Prime Minister Nasir al-Muhammad al-Ahmad al-Sabah to step up surveillance of this tiny Gulf state's nearly one-million strong Shi'a minority.[10] Bahrain, for its part, has chosen a more direct route, banning entry into the country by all Iranians as part of its efforts to ensure "public order."[11] Meanwhile, in Riyadh, the House of Saud reportedly has authorized a massive military modernization plan worth up to $60 billion[12]—one that can be expected

to focus heavily on domestic security measures designed to quell any potential sectarian unrest.

These steps are likely only the beginning. The governments of the Middle East are overwhelmingly authoritarian in character, and respond to challenges to their rule in predictably autocratic ways. As such, the emerging threat of a Shi'a political "awakening" is likely to be met by a wave of deepening repression in a region with precious little liberty to spare.

In the days after September 11th, the Bush administration proudly announced its commitment to broadening the frontiers of freedom around the world.[13] It would be a sad irony indeed if it ends up leaving the Middle East more repressive and less free than when it took office, all because it has failed to formulate a coherent strategy for confronting Iran.

Taking stock

The last days of 2006 shone a ray of light into this otherwise gloomy picture. On December 30th, defying their many critics, officials of Iraq's fledgling government hung the dictator that had terrorized their country for a quarter-century. The execution, watched intently throughout the region, has been widely condemned for its controversial particulars, with some merit. Yet, whatever its flaws, Saddam's death also succeeded in sending a powerful message to the Arab masses: quite suddenly, the cruel, authoritarian leaders of the region are no longer "off limits."

Changing the political order of the Middle East requires that this powerful message of accountability be amplified and extended in the years ahead. It must also be coupled with the sort of initiatives—from capacity-building to selective, sustained grassroots engagement—required to ensure the steady expansion of political freedoms in the region, and beyond. Making that happen, however, will be the task for the next administration, provided it is up to the challenge.

1. *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, September 2002, 7.
2. Pavel Ivanov, "The (Not So) Untouchables," *The Journal of International Security Affairs* no. 8, (Spring 2006) 35-39.
3. President George W. Bush, Address to the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., February 26, 2003, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030226-11.html.
4. See, for example, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Remarks at Princeton University's Celebration of the 75th Anniversary of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton, New Jersey, September 30, 2005, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/54176.htm.
5. George W. Bush, Address to the Nation, January 10, 2007, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-7.html.
6. Matt Kelley, "U.S. Money Helped Opposition in Ukraine," Associated Press, December 10, 2004.
7. See, for example, President George W. Bush, Remarks on Winston Churchill and the War on Terror, Washington, D.C., February 4, 2004, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040204-4.html.
8. Vice President Dick Cheney, Remarks at the 2006 Vilnius Conference, Vilnius, Lithuania, May 4, 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060504-1.html.
9. As quoted by the Mehr News Agency (Tehran), October 28, 2006.
10. "Kuwait Finds Iranian Sleeper Cells," Middle East Newsline, October 19, 2006, http://www.menewsline.com/stories/2006/october/10_19_1.html.
11. "Iran: Bahrain Bans Iranians," Adnkronos International (Rome), January 23, 2007, http://www.adnki.com/index_2Level_English.php?cat=Politics&loid=8.0.379251229&par=0.
12. "Saudi Launches $60B Modernization Plan," Middle East Newsline, November 27, 2006, http://www.menewsline.com/stories/2006/november/11_27_3.html.
13. *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 3.

accenture.com

What are my enemy's movements?
Intentions? Do I have enough troops? Supplies?
How am I doing on fuel?

Knowing beats guessing.

High performance means getting the right information to the right people at the right time.

Committed to helping the Armed Forces integrate information and coordinate complex strategies across all components, Accenture brings long-term experience and knowledge guiding nearly two-thirds of the Fortune® Global 500 to new levels of high performance. To learn more about our consulting, technology and outsourcing services, visit accenture.com/knowing

• Consulting • Technology • Outsourcing

accenture
High performance. Delivered.

Countering Iraq's Weapon of Mass Effect

Dan O'Shea

More than three years after the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, pundits and military experts alike continue to debate the reasons why the United States so far has failed to defeat the insurgency and quell the sectarian violence there.

Arguments about the possible solution may run the gamut, but all experts agree on the central problem plaguing the former Ba'athist state: an acute lack of security. In its final report, the Iraq Study Group headed by former Secretary of State James Baker and former Congressman Lee Hamilton called for significant troop reductions as a way of reconfiguring the Coalition presence.[1] By contrast, President Bush's new Iraq strategy, outlined publicly on January 10th, centers on a "surge" of some 21,500 troops as part of a "clear and hold" plan whereby military units eliminate the threat in troubled areas and stay to provide security.[2] But, irrespective of whether the U.S. pulls out its troops or sends in more, there is one area where American policymakers should immediately focus their efforts. Kidnapping is the common link connecting all components of the security crisis that currently envelops Iraq.

Until now, however, hostage-taking incidents have largely been considered a symptom of the problem, rather than a contributing cause. This represents a serious error; unchecked abductions have been central to our inability to counter the insurgency and stop sectarian violence in Iraq. Indeed, the trend has become something of a metaphor for our failure to bring security, stability and governance to the country. It has hastened the exodus of tens of thousands of

Dan O'Shea is the founder of Daniel Risk Mitigation, an international personal security consultancy. From 2004 to 2006, he served as the Coordinator of the Coalition Hostage Working Group in Iraq.

educated, middle-class Iraqis, and resulted in more than a million internally displaced refugees. Kidnappings likewise have hijacked the previously promising reconstruction effort. And hostage takers have extracted strategic goals from Coalition partners, and reaped hundreds of millions of dollars in ransom—with much of this money funneled back into the insurgency that is killing soldiers and civilians alike.

Kidnappings in Iraq, in other words, have become a weapon of mass effect (WME). Although most hostage-taking incidents tend to be viewed as isolated, and tactical, their overall strategic impact is catastrophic. Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, more than 450 foreigners have been taken hostage, while domestic victims of such abductions have been more than tenfold that number. Rampant kidnappings have systematically eroded and undermined the original goals of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).

The challenge is clear. Our efforts to establish stability, to rebuild a viable society, to maintain Coalition solidarity, and to promote a functional Iraqi government require the defeat of this phenomenon.

Iraqi kidnapping 101

While the United States shoulders overall responsibility for the current state of Iraqi security, the roots of the kidnapping phenomenon stretch back long before the 2003 invasion. Kidnappings have been prevalent in the Middle East for generations, used as a common scheme to generate cash, embarrass enemies, and/or force political action. Since biblical times, Bedouin tribes have used hostage-takings as a means to acquire wives, obtain bargaining chips in tribal negotiations, and participate in the region's widespread slave trade. The Old Testament and Koran both make numerous references to kidnappings, reflecting the fact that hostage-taking has been a way of life for literally thousands of years.

This culture is deeply ingrained in modern-day Iraq. Under Saddam, state-sponsored seizures averaged more than 100 a day, although these abductions were rarely if ever reported.[3] In all, more than a million people disappeared during Saddam Hussein's 24-year reign (1979-2003). And on the eve of the U.S.-led invasion, Saddam again resorted to this tactic, albeit in a different fashion, releasing some 100,000 convicted criminals from Iraqi jails. By doing so, he flooded the Iraqi "street" with potential perpetrators equipped with the requisite skill-sets of a hostage-taker.

The post-invasion explosion of abductions in Iraq, therefore, should not have been unexpected. The collapse of Saddam's authoritarian police state and its occupation by a limited number of Western military forces created an environment ripe for exploitation by local criminal and insurgent elements. This state of affairs, in turn, has been perpetuated by a lack thus far of credible central authority.

The modern kidnapping crisis in Iraq began on April 9, 2004, when a thirty-vehicle supply convoy driving through the Abu Ghraib neighborhood west of Baghdad was ambushed by militants. That success quickly gave rise to other incidents; almost a hundred foreigners were taken hostage that month alone. Kidnappings in post-invasion Iraq previously had been unmonitored and virtually unreported, but the situation quickly escalated out of control.

The motive, as with kidnappings elsewhere in the world, is extortion, both economic and political. Hostages

are taken by both criminal gangs seeking purely monetary rewards, and by insurgent groups who only want to send a message of terror. The two types of hostage-takers coordinate with one another and adopt similar tactics. The security situation offers low risk and high return for the perpetrators. Anyone with a few friends, a car and weapons can set up a business where the earning potential far exceeds the $300 average monthly salary of a well-paying Iraqi job. A quick "snatch and grab" off the streets of Baghdad can net thousands of dollars within a week from desperate families willing to mortgage everything they own to save a relative or loved one. For foreigners, the asking price ranges from $500,000 to $12 million, with the amount determined by the victim's nationality and compounded by their country's reputation for acceding to terrorist demands.

But, unlike the rest of the world, where the end result is usually strictly financial, in Iraq terrorist-inspired kidnappings impact politics on a worldwide scale. Today, the enduring image of the security situation in Iraq has become that of a kneeling hostage, pleading for his life in an orange jumpsuit surrounded by armed *mujahideen* gunmen. This experience has put a new twist on the terrorist maxim: "Kidnap one, terrorize thousands...."

Beyond the tactical

In July 2004, shortly after the birth of the hostage-taking industry in Iraq, the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad established a Hostage Working Group (HWG) to handle the threat. The decision was a sound one; kidnappings were beginning to impact military operations and strain international partnerships in Iraq. In its day-to-day operations, the HWG brought to bear all of the elements of national and regional power: diplomacy, intelligence, law enforcement, and military force. It has been directly involved in every major kidnapping incident in Iraq, including those that have dominated the headlines.

The effort has undoubtedly had an impact. Within a year of the initial outbreak in April 2004, the numbers of kidnapping incidents had dwindled significantly, and by the spring of 2006 were in the single digits. What has been missing, however, is a broader view of the problem.

The kidnapping phenomenon in Iraq threatens more than just the lives of those it touches. It has become a leading source of income for insurgents, with the money used to finance further attacks, and effectively hinders the reconstruction effort. Conservative estimates now place the funds reaped from hostage-taking at more than $100 million annually.[4]

Similarly, it has intimidated the local population, causing educated Iraqis—doctors, engineers, and educators—to leave the country in large numbers. Those that have stayed have been cowed into silence. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) now estimates that up to 1.8 million Iraqis are living in neighboring countries, and that at least 1.6 million have been displaced internally.[5]

Equally significant, kidnapping has provided a major contribution to turning the tide of U.S. public opinion against the war in Iraq. Over the past three years, high-profile cases such as the January 2006 abduction of journalist Jill Carroll have captured the attention of the American public and hammered home the human costs of our engagement in Iraq. Indeed, it is possible to trace the decline of popular approval for the Bush administration's handling

of the situation in Iraq directly to the rise of the kidnapping phenomenon.

Hostage-taking, in short, has undermined everything the United States is purporting to do in post-Saddam Iraq. The U.S. and its Coalition partners desperately need a strategy for dealing with this threat, one that consists of three parts:

Accountability—Today, many officials in Iraq's Ministries of Interior and Defense are part of the kidnapping problem, complicit in the country's numerous hostage-takings and extortion rackets or at least aware of them.[6] These individuals must be identified and brought to justice, with their trials and sentences serving as examples to deter future corruption on the part of others. To this end, a Coalition-led investigatory team should be created and empowered at the highest levels of both the American and Iraqi leadership to track down and root out such activities on the part of Iraqi civil servants.

Targeting—The Coalition needs to take both the tactical and the political offensive against kidnappers operating in Iraq. The former can be accomplished through the creation of a dedicated U.S.-led Hostage Task Force with elements from the special operations, intelligence and law enforcement communities. This team would train, coordinate and take action against targets in conjunction with specialized Iraqi military and police units. The latter, meanwhile, is achievable by putting kidnapping gangs on notice that they are considered part of the insurgency, and will be targeted and eliminated by Coalition military forces.

Messaging—In order to be successful, a counter-kidnapping campaign will need to include outreach designed to win the "hearts and minds" of locals. Ordinary Iraqis must be reassured that the Coalition understands the scope of the problem, and is expending serious effort to take on hostage-takers and their enablers. Equally important, given the Administration's long-term plan to cede security to Baghdad, Iraqis need to have confidence that their government is becoming increasingly capable of dealing with this challenge independently.

The new counterinsurgency manual of the United States military declares that, "At its core, counterinsurgency warfare is a struggle for the support of the population. Their protection and welfare is the center of gravity for friendly forces."[7] Today, these goals require that the United States target the kidnapping epidemic in Iraq. Greater security and stability will surely follow.

1. See *The Iraq Study Group Report* (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), 61.
2. George W. Bush, Address to the Nation, January 10, 2007, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-7.html.
3. Statistics extrapolated from figures of Iraqi deaths and abductions obtained by the Regime Crimes Liaison Office established by the Coalition Provisional Authority in 2003.
4. Estimate derived from *Daniel Risk Mitigation Database on Foreign Kidnappings in Iraq*, April 2004-April 2006.
5. United Nations, Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, "The Iraq Situation: Growing Needs amid Continuing Displacement," n.d., http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/iraq?page=intro.
6. See, for example, Human Rights Watch, "Iraq: End Interior Ministry Death Squads," October 29, 2006, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/10/29/iraq14473.htm.
7. Department of the Army, FM 3-24: *Counterinsurgency (Final Draft—Not For Implementation)*, June 2006, 1-24.

Forging an Iran Strategy

Final Report of the Working Group on Iran's Global Influence

On August 15, 2006, the American Foreign Policy Council and the McCormick Tribune Foundation convened a group of experts and policymakers (group listing on page 86) to examine the contemporary challenge to American interests posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran, and policy options available to the United States. The resulting report, entitled "Forging an Iran Strategy," was released publicly in November 2006. It is reprinted here with permission.

Contextualizing the Iranian threat

The most far-reaching danger posed by the Islamic Republic derives from its nuclear program. By now, there can be little doubt that the Iranian leadership is intent upon acquiring nuclear weapons, and rapidly moving closer toward this goal. Over the past four years, the world has become aware of a massive, national nuclear endeavor on the part of the Iranian regime—one that has persisted despite mounting pressure from the international community. Moreover, despite the best efforts of the International Atomic Energy Agency, much of this program has remained hidden from public view, and Iranian officials have demonstrated a clear intent to deceive the West about the pace and scope of their nuclear work. Parallel to this effort, Iran has made serious advances in its development of ballistic missiles, which will serve as the principal means of delivery for this capability.

The likely impact of Iran's nuclear program will be profound. A nuclear Iran will have the ability to dramatically, negatively, and decisively alter the geopolitical balance in the Middle East. Through new diplomatic, economic, and security agreements with Tehran, states in the region, and well beyond,

can already be seen preparing for the emergence of a nuclear Iran—and for a corresponding retraction of American power. Thus, the consequences of a nuclear Iran are already being felt, even before Iran can actually demonstrate a nuclear weapons capability. All of the states that will be affected by Iran's acquiring nuclear capability have already begun to reassess, and in some cases to change, their strategies in anticipation that Iran will get the "bomb" and that no one, including the United States, will be able to stop it from doing so.

Iran's atomic advances also will almost certainly touch off a dangerous and destabilizing arms race, as states in the region—among them Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey—begin to look for strategic counterweights to the mounting threat from Tehran. Indeed, growing signs suggest that such discussions among the countries of the region have become increasingly prevalent as Iran has drawn closer to the nuclear threshold.

There is also the potential for the Iranian nuclear capability to be passed on to other hostile regimes or even to Iran's terrorist proxies; indeed, the Iranian leadership has already declared its intent to share such technology with the Muslim world. We should anticipate that Iran will share its nuclear capabilities with other state and non-state actors that support its positions and, thereby, extend its strategic reach.

At the same time, the Iranian regime will be emboldened to step up its support for terrorist activity worldwide, as well as become more active in the export of its radical revolutionary principles. Substantial environmental concerns also exist, since if Iran's nuclear technology is not handled properly the effects of an accident or malfunction would be catastrophic for the people of Iran, and for the region at large.

Yet, while Iran's nuclear capability should be the most immediate concern for policymakers, it is hardly the only one. Iran is the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism, and has been instrumental in fueling the activities of a variety of radical and insurgent groups. These include Palestinian rejectionist groups, such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Shi'a militias in Iraq. As the 9/11 Commission pointed out in its final report, the Islamic Republic also has had a tactical partnership with the al-Qaeda terror network since at least the early 1990s, and that relationship remains largely intact and active today. Iran's principal terrorist proxy, however, is Hezbollah. Since its establishment in Lebanon in the early 1980s, Hezbollah has emerged as a terrorist powerhouse—one responsible for more American deaths than any other group in the world except al-Qaeda. And, since 2000, Hezbollah's status in the Arab and Muslim world has risen dramatically, driven by the perception that the powerful Shi'ite militia was responsible for precipitating Israel's "retreat" from Lebanon.

The recent conflict between Hezbollah and Israel (July-August 2006) has only served to reinforce this view. The month-long war touched off by Hezbollah's kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers in mid-July has ended inconclusively, with the terrorist group retaining much of its political cohesion and substantial military capability. The conflict itself was a boon to Hezbollah's chief sponsor, Iran, deflecting international attention from the Iranian nuclear program. The outcome of the war has similarly bolstered Iranian stature, providing the regime in Tehran with greater

regional legitimacy for having faced down Israel—and, by extension, the United States—in a major proxy conflict. Indeed, Israel's failure to eliminate Hezbollah's capabilities has become viewed on the Arab "street" as a clear victory for Hezbollah and its Iranian backers.

Iran is also moving to expand its influence in the Middle East. Over the past several years, Iran has forged a robust strategic alliance with the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, as well as nudging a number of regional neighbors into alignment with its policies. It has launched a sustained military rearmament, courtesy of assistance from Russia and China. And, working through a variety of Shi'ite political and military factions, it has dramatically deepened its influence in post-Saddam Iraq. Since the fall of the Hussein regime in 2003, Tehran has emerged as a major contender for power in the former Ba'athist state, providing aid to segments of the Iraqi insurgency and deepening its influence among the country's various warring political factions. In the process, it has significantly impeded the establishment of peace and security inside that country, and complicated Coalition efforts to establish a stable democracy there.

Simultaneously, Tehran is expanding its military presence in the Caspian Basin, where it now possesses the region's second largest naval force. Iran is also actively engaging regional governments in an effort to craft an anti-NATO and anti-U.S. security bloc in the "post-Soviet space." At the same time, it has extended its support for terrorist elements in Russia's Near Abroad, providing assistance to groups such as the al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

Many of these efforts are underpinned by Iran's alliances with two countries: Russia and China. Both have provided major military, economic, and diplomatic support to the regime in Tehran over the past two-and-a-half decades, and continue to supply advanced military and WMD-related technology to the Islamic Republic despite the imposition of sanctions on numerous Russian and Chinese entities by the United States. These countries have also been instrumental to Iran's nuclear ambitions, since they wield veto power at the United Nations Security Council and have used this status to thwart any meaningful diplomatic consensus regarding the containment of Iran's nuclear ambitions.

Iran has also drawn support from a number of nations deeply hostile to the United States, most directly North Korea and Venezuela. The former has played a major, if not the primary, role in Iran's development and acquisition of ballistic missiles, which now provide Tehran the capability to strike Israel, India and southeastern Europe. The latter, meanwhile, has developed strong diplomatic, military and economic ties with Tehran, forging an anti-American alliance that has the potential to adversely affect the United States in the Middle East and in Latin America.

U.S. options

So far, the United States has failed to articulate a comprehensive strategy for dealing with this challenge. Since 2002, the principal focus of the White House has been to defuse Iran's nuclear ambitions, and its principal approach for doing so has been diplomatic. In the process, the Bush administration has wedded itself to a dangerous—and deeply flawed—United Nations negotiating

track, one that has disadvantaged the United States and bought valuable time for the Iranian regime to forge ahead with its nuclear program. Iran, for its part, has encouraged this dialogue, confident in the knowledge that the United Nations system will serve as a serious impediment to forceful international action.

Simply stated, the failure of international diplomacy can be attributed to the lack of a credible threat against Iran. The Iranian regime today strongly believes that, given ongoing difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as its own ability to unleash a worldwide wave of terror and manipulate the global oil market, the United States and its allies do not have the capacity or the motivation to enforce their demands. The result has been an emboldened Islamic Republic—one that has begun to draw the smaller, weaker countries of the region into its orbit.

Nuclear deterrence is not a viable solution to the current crisis. Many analysts have concluded that it would be possible to "live with a nuclear Iran." They contend that once Tehran has acquired an atomic capability, it would be bound by the same rules of Mutual Assured Destruction that governed the U.S.-Soviet "balance of terror" during the decades of the Cold War. Such an assumption is flawed, and potentially dangerous. Cold-War-era deterrence functioned effectively because a series of factors (good communications, understanding of the adversary, and a shared assumption that war should be avoided) were presumed to exist in both Moscow and Washington. None of these apply in the case of Iran. Since 1979, the United States has had little to no official contact with the Iranian leadership, and there is a great deal of uncertainty about our understanding of Iranian intentions or "redlines." Even more troubling is the fact that at least one segment of the Iranian leadership—the so-called "war generation" led by Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad—holds a messianic, apocalyptic worldview that actually encourages confrontation with the West as a way of hastening the return of the Islamic Messiah, or *Mahdi*.

Sanctions, on the other hand, if implemented forcefully stand at least some chance of success. Today, the Islamic Republic possesses a number of concrete economic vulnerabilities. These include high inflation, an aging and fragile energy infrastructure, a major gap between rich and poor, dependence on foreign direct investment, chronic unemployment, especially among young people, disproportionately large government control over the economy, and reliance upon imports of refined petroleum from foreign sources. By tailoring economic levers to exploit these "points of entry," the international community can slow Iran's nuclear progress and signal its opposition to an Iranian "bomb." If coupled with effective public diplomacy, such measures can also drive a wedge between the Iranian government and its people over the prudence of acquiring a nuclear weapon. However, relying on the United Nations to impose sanctions will virtually guarantee the emergence of a nuclear Iran, since two of the Islamic Republic's chief nuclear enablers, Russia and China, hold veto power over any substantive UN action. Instead, the U.S. government should focus upon two parallel approaches: the creation of an economic "coalition of the willing" capable of applying those specific measures most likely to alter Iranian behavior in the immediate future, and devising cost-

imposing strategies on Iran supporters like Russia and China that could make their cooperation with Tehran more reluctant or more expensive, or both.

Yet the possibilities of constraining Iran's regional and international freedom of action are declining. Iran's mounting power has catalyzed a wave of Shi'a empowerment throughout the region, which will increase dramatically if Iran possesses nuclear weapons. Today, Iran's radical proxies—from Hezbollah to Shi'ite militias in Iraq—are beginning to show alarming signs of boldness. Notably, however, this trend also has begun to generate serious concern among the Sunni Arab states of the Persian Gulf and Levant. Indeed, in a sign of their unease, countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan were among the first to take a forceful stand against Hezbollah in the recent conflict in Lebanon. This has created a major opportunity for the U.S. to forge a regional bloc to blunt Iranian power and curb its nuclear ambitions. As of yet, however, Washington has not seriously worked to develop strategies that bring together others who share our fear of a nuclear Iran. It should do so without delay.

Military action also must remain an option. President Bush has declared that the United States "will not tolerate" a nuclear Iran, and at some point the use of force may be necessary in order to prevent such an occurrence. However, given the domestic popularity of Iran's nuclear program, the consequent likelihood of a "rally around the flag" effect on the Iranian street, and ongoing American difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan, prudence dictates that the use of military force be viewed solely as a last resort. However, more limited intervention action linked with economic and political pressure (for example, against Iranian refineries or Iran's electrical grid) should be explored.

Recommendations

The Iranian threat is real, and it is mounting. How the United States responds to the challenge of a rising Iran will dictate the shape of American interests and U.S. foreign policy in the greater Middle East for years to come.

For the United States, the promotion of stability in the greater Middle East has emerged as an overriding strategic objective. Today, Iran's concerted pursuit of a nuclear capability, its interference in Iraq and its deep support for international terrorism constitute serious impediments to achieving this goal. In addressing the challenges posed by the Iranian regime, the U.S. faces three policy choices. First, it can decide to act immediately and decisively to end Iran's nuclear efforts through action that would be military in nature and almost assuredly conducted unilaterally. Second, it can choose to live with a nuclear Iran, and to manage its detrimental effects upon the international community. Third, the United States can work to delay the emergence of a nuclear Iran, while simultaneously isolating the Iranian regime and encouraging a fundamental political transformation within its borders.

It is our belief that this third option represents the optimal course of action. However, should such efforts fail, the use of military force will need to be an option. This approach can be pursued through a series of concrete and interrelated steps:

Expanding intelligence on Iran

Today, the United States and its allies still know far too little about the strategic capabilities of the Ira-

nian regime. By the admission of American officials themselves, U.S. intelligence on Iran, its strategic programs, and the internal correlation of forces within the Islamic Republic is virtually nonexistent. Such a state of affairs is unacceptable. Quite simply, the United States cannot afford to be "a day late" in its estimates about the maturity and pace of Iran's nuclear program. Neither can it afford to misjudge the extent of Iran's political activity in Iraq, the scope of its sponsorship of terror, and its likely political evolution.

To correct this critical deficiency, the United States must immediately embark upon a crash program to "get smart" on Iran. Such an effort must include identifying Iran as the number one priority intelligence target. Greater surveillance of the Islamic Republic, using all available sensors, as well as expedited work to rebuild America's once-robust HUMINT (human intelligence) network inside that country, is essential. In addition, the U.S. should encourage greater intelligence collection (both technical and HUMINT) by—and increased intelligence sharing with—all friendly countries in the region. The U.S. should also immediately assist those friendly countries in increasing their intelligence capabilities against Iran through funding, increased liaison and greater technical support. Such capabilities are critical for the U.S. to accurately gauge the time remaining for it to apply the recommendations that follow.

Delegitimizing, discrediting and marginalizing the Iranian leadership

Today, as a result of the recent Israeli-Hezbollah conflict, ongoing unrest in Iraq and its own nuclear advances, the Iranian regime is rapidly expanding its regional and international influence. In the process, it has catalyzed a wave of Shi'ite empowerment in the region, much to the detriment of U.S. allies there. Over time, Iran's growing power has the potential to force Sunni groups into alignment as well—a development that would dramatically reduce the number of "undecided voters" in the Arab and Muslim street. Diminishing the regime's international standing and domestic legitimacy should consequently be a major objective of the United States. One major area of concentration should be the regime's corruption. The current regime came into power promising to empower the Iranian people, allowing them to personally benefit from national wealth. To date, these promises have not been fulfilled. Iran's population today is no better off economically than before the current leadership was elected. This fact should be noted locally, regionally, and internationally, as a way of motivating opposition elements inside and outside of Iran to call for a change in leadership—and then to act upon that call.

The U.S. should also work to expose, publicize, and discredit the "Quds Force," the principal unconventional warfare unit of the Iranian regime's clerical army, the *Pasdaran*. Such a step is particularly important, given the role of the Quds Force in training paramilitary forces (like Hezbollah), transferring advanced weapons to Iranian proxy groups and carrying out acts of sabotage and subversion throughout the world. Other regime leaders and proxies, such as Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Hezbollah spiritual guide Hassan Nasrallah, should become the subjects of similar campaigns.

Imposing robust sanctions

Iran today suffers from severe economic vulnerabilities. It is deeply dependent on foreign supplies of refined petroleum, obtaining close to 40 percent of its annual gasoline consumption from abroad at a cost of billions of dollars annually. The vast majority of regime wealth is concentrated in the hands of a very small number of people, as well as in Iran's sprawling, largely-unregulated religious/social foundations known as *bonyads*. Iran's energy sector requires sustained foreign direct investment (some $1 billion annually to maintain current production levels, and $1.5 billion a year to increase capacity), and without such sustained capital the Islamic Republic could revert from an energy powerhouse to a net energy importer in the span of very few years. Targeted financial measures that take advantage of these weaknesses can substantially impact Iran's political priorities, as well as the pace of its nuclear program. "Smart sanctions" that target regime officials and their associates (through travel bans, asset freezes and similar measures) can profoundly impact both the decisionmaking and the legitimacy of the regime in Tehran. Pressuring Iran's suppliers of refined petroleum (such as India, France, Turkey and the Gulf states) to curb supplies to the Islamic Republic can create major economic and political disruptions inside the country. The U.S. should also exploit its existing trade relationships with Iran's economic partners by threatening to levy "second-tier sanctions" on those nations unless they reduce their financial dealings with Iran.

Such measures, however, should not be pursued through the United Nations. Rather, the United States should seek to create an economic "coalition of the willing" that is both ready and able to impose serious economic pressure upon the Iranian regime. In order to be effective, they must also be paired with robust public diplomacy designed to drive a wedge between the Iranian government and its people over the prudence of nuclear acquisition.

Severing links between the Iranian state and its terrorist proxies

The United States must degrade or deny the ability of the Islamic Republic to maintain its role as a state sponsor of terrorism in the years ahead. This will involve stepped-up interdiction of arms shipments from the Islamic Republic, as well as enhanced efforts to curtail contacts between Iran's clerical army, the *Pasdaran*, and the regime's terrorist proxies. The U.S. should also create a coordinated communications campaign aimed at fostering greater international awareness of Iran's role as a state sponsor of terrorism. In the wake of the recent Israeli-Hezbollah war, preventing the rearmament of Hezbollah also must become a major focus of the U.S. government and military.

A related priority should be military operations designed to capture or kill Iranian-supported radicals. By targeting Iranian proxies such as Hezbollah, the United States has the ability to substantially erode Iran's capacity to engage in future asymmetric warfare. There is substantial basis for such action; four Hezbollah members (Imad Mugniyeh, Ali Atwa, Hasan Izz-Al-Din, and Mohammed Ali Hamadei) are currently on the U.S. government's list of 20 most wanted terrorists, and have never been brought to justice for multiple crimes against America and Americans. By taking action against these killers, Washington would also provide an important cautionary example

to other radical elements in the region that their actions are not cost-free.

Improving strategic communications

The United States must improve the clarity and strength of its message to both the Iranian regime and the Iranian people. To the former, the United States must communicate clearly, both in word and in deed, that its continued rogue behavior will carry adverse consequences, up to and including the use of force. Simply put, diplomacy cannot succeed without a credible deterrent threat. Iranian leaders must clearly know American "redlines" on their nuclear program, their support for terrorism, and their regional troublemaking—as well as the likely consequences should they continue these activities.

To the latter, the United States must demonstrate its commitment to their urge for freedom, in deed as well as in word. To do so, it will be necessary to reform and retool the existing tools of American strategic communications, the *Voice of America's* Persian service and the *Radio Farda* component of *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*. Currently, neither is responsive to the core "marketplace": the Iranian people. Instead, their operations have degenerated into long sessions of music at the expense of proven approaches to shaping the strategic landscape through targeted analytical programming on history, culture, current affairs, society and ideas aimed at critical elites. These efforts should be reconfigured to better articulate support for opposition forces and political trends within Iran; help discredit the Iranian regime as the sole source of Islamic knowledge; highlight the corruption and human rights abuses of the country's leadership; and emphasize the dangers of the Iranian regime's current conduct, among other goals. As part of this effort, it will likewise be necessary to identify and enlist new and emerging forms of media, ranging from Internet weblogs to text messaging, as a way of amplifying outreach. At the same time, the United States must expand its attention to—and support for—existing non-governmental media outlets communicating to Iran.

Moreover, it is essential that all of these steps take place in the near term, since American public diplomacy toward Iran has a "time horizon." As Iran gets closer to a nuclear bomb, and as its influence in Iraq continues to grow, it will become increasingly difficult to engage those internal constituencies that will be instrumental to internal change, as well as to discourage and dis-incentivize the Iranian regime's troublemaking in the region.

Creating countervailing coalitions

In its efforts to contain and deter Iran, the U.S. has a potent ally in the moderate Arab states of the Middle East. These countries—among them Jordan and the six member nations of the Gulf Cooperation Council—have become increasingly concerned over Iran's quest for a nuclear capability, and the corresponding wave of Shi'a empowerment that is now sweeping through the region. These concerns have increased the possibility of forging new regional alliances against the Islamic Republic. Increased intelligence-sharing on Iran's strategic capabilities, stepped-up counterterrorism coordination against Iranian proxies, and greater military-to-military interaction will help to provide these nations with a measure of security against a rising Iran—and prevent them from striking a *modus*

vivendi with the Islamic Republic that is inimical to American interests.

Building defenses

Today, American politicians and scholars alike have become engaged in Soviet-era-style "mirror-imaging" vis-à-vis Iran. Despite the apocalyptic worldview of Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his supporters, and his clear commitment to acquiring a nuclear capability, many experts have concluded that a nuclear Iran would be a stable—indeed, perhaps even a stabilizing—international force. By making this unwarranted assumption, they run the risk of misreading both the capabilities and the intentions of at least one segment of the Iranian leadership, with potentially disastrous consequences.

Instead, the United States should be building effective defenses to combat the concrete capabilities that Iran is known to be acquiring. This includes accelerated deployment of theater and sea-based missile defenses as protection for U.S. allies and U.S. troops deployed in the region, as well as heightened homeland security screening for containers and commodities originating from—or transiting through—Iran. In addition, because the potential for low intensity and asymmetric warfare increases as Iran gets closer to the "bomb," the United States should put a premium upon hardening vulnerable targets (such as embassies and consulates abroad), expanding the activity of special operations forces directed against Iranian-supported entities, and identifying likely future arenas of Iranian troublemaking.

Countering Iran in Iraq

Over the past three years, Iran has emerged as a central player in the ongoing instability in Iraq. Tehran has provided political, economic and military support to Shi'ite militias such as firebrand cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's al-Mahdi Army, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq's Badr Organization, and the Wolf Brigade. It has also supplied sophisticated technology and explosives to Iraqi insurgents for use against American and allied forces. The U.S. must work to diminish this influence, and communicate clearly to the Iranian leadership that its interference will not be tolerated. It can do so by reinforcing and fortifying the Iranian-Iraqi border to better prevent infiltration, and by targeting known Iranian representatives in Iraq. The United States must also work to marginalize Iranian-supported Shi'ite militias and prevent them from becoming a "state within a state," in part by backing their Sunni counterparts who support territorial integrity and stability.

Mapping out military action

While aerial strikes or a bombing campaign against Iran's nuclear facilities carries substantial risks and should be seen strictly as a last resort, a range of other military contingencies is available. The United States has the ability to kill or capture Iranian agents already on the U.S. most wanted list. It can also restrict Iranian access to Iraq through greater border security measures and aggressive action against those operatives already "in-country." The U.S. should also work to deny and disrupt Iran's ability to resupply terrorist forces, including Hezbollah and Hamas. At the same time, the United States should consider carrying out "shows of force" designed to demonstrate its regional military dominance, up to and including naval maneuvers in the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman. Significant covert action can

also be taken against Iran's terrorist proxies, its ballistic missile and nuclear capabilities and—if necessary—its political leadership. At the extreme, however, the U.S. military has the ability to target and destroy Iranian ballistic missile sites and nuclear facilities, beginning with those situated in remote and uninhabited areas.

Working Group Participants

Co-chair
BG David L. Grange, USA (ret.)
McCormick Tribune Foundation

Tony Blankley
The Washington Times

Shoshana Bryen
Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs

Lester Crown
Material Service Corp.

Gen. Wayne Downing
United States Army (ret.)

Richard Friedman
National Strategy Forum

Bijan R. Kian
American Foreign Policy Council

Michael Muztafago, Sr.
United States Army (ret.)

Conference Coordinator
Andrea Jett
McCormick Tribune Foundation

Co-chair
Ilan Berman
American Foreign Policy Council

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis

James Phillips
The Heritage Foundation

James S. Robbins
American Foreign Policy Council

Claudia Rosett
Foundation for the Defense of Democracies

John Sirek
McCormick Tribune Foundation

John Wobensmith
American Foreign Policy Council

Rapporteur
Cameron Graham
American Foreign Policy Council

The Democratic Moment?

Lawrence J. Haas

Today, the Democratic Party has a golden opportunity to reclaim the leadership role that it played on national security for most of the 20th Century. But, to do so, the party must discard a damaging mind-set that has clouded its thinking since Vietnam—defensive about American ideals and history, standoffish (if not hostile) toward the military, and reluctant to use force. It must then develop a new vision for national security that is appropriate for the dangers we face, and that reflects a determination to do whatever is needed to confront them.

For at least a generation, Americans have consistently put their trust in Republicans over Democrats on matters of national security. But President Bush's fumbling of the war in Iraq has dramatically altered the political landscape of national security. Suddenly, in polls asking Americans which party is likelier to keep them safe, Democrats have pulled even.

The polls, however, reflect far less a newfound trust in Democratic thinking than a deep-seated public disillusionment with the management of the war and its aftermath. Simply put, more Americans say they trust Democrats on matters of national security because, in this season of discontent, they would trust *anyone* more than the current administration.

Iraq, in other words, has given the Democrats an opening—but only an opening, not a guarantee of future political success. As the 2008 presidential campaign approaches, Democrats must embrace and successfully navigate

Lawrence J. Haas is Vice President for Policy at the non-partisan Committee on the Present Danger. Previously, he served as Communications Director to Vice President Al Gore and, before that, as Communications Director to the Office of Management and Budget under President Clinton.

the new politics of national security. Gone, for the foreseeable future, are the days when Democrats could win, as they did in 1992, largely by shifting the national conversation to domestic issues on which they held a considerable advantage. Gone are the days when, also as in 1992, the GOP incumbent's greater comfort with foreign than domestic affairs (as President George H. W. Bush acknowledged about himself) could hurt him.

Iraq has given the Democrats an opening—but only an opening, not a guarantee of future political success. As the 2008 presidential campaign approaches, Democrats must embrace and successfully navigate the new politics of national security.

Today, at a time of terrorist threats and at the early stage of a generational war against militant Islam, Americans view national security in a new light. It is now an unavoidable political hurdle that a presidential candidate must clear. To win in 2008 and beyond, a candidate must convince Americans that he or she will keep them safe. Only then will the public seriously weigh the candidate's proposals to protect Social Security, expand health care, and improve education.

For Democrats, this is about something more basic than a strategy to confront militant Islam (a complex endeavor that will require an appropriate mix of military power, traditional diplomacy, grassroots outreach, covert operations, and economic and humanitarian assistance). Clearing the national security hurdle is about a change of mind-set, about discarding 30 years of post-Vietnam discomfort with the military, reluctance to use and sustain force, and cynicism about American ideals. It also is about assuming and exuding an eagerness about national security, about welcoming the solemn opportunity to fulfill the President's most sacred obligation—to keep America safe.

Democrats must seize the opportunity and adopt a mind-set about national security that reflects three basic themes:

1. a firm belief in the superiority of U.S.-style freedom and democracy over all other alternatives,

2. a clear-eyed understanding of the dangers that our enemies pose to our safety and well being, and

3. an eagerness to grab the reins of national security and serve as America's commander in chief.

Trumpeting America

"Let every nation know," the new President proclaimed on January 20, 1961, "whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty." John F. Kennedy was strident on that bitterly cold day because he knew that our cause was just, that our system of freedom and democracy was far superior to the Soviet model we were confronting around the globe.

Forty-three years later, U.S. troops were engaged in Iraq when a prisoner abuse scandal erupted at Abu Ghraib. Ted Kennedy, the slain President's brother and one of Washington's most influential Democrats, walked to the Senate floor to offer

his take. "Shamefully," he suggested, "we now learn that Saddam's torture chambers reopened under new management—U.S. management." Unlike his brother, this Kennedy could find no moral distinction between a regime that tortured its opponents as a matter of state policy and a nation that (notwithstanding the problems at Abu Ghraib) had sought to liberate its people.

In a sense, the rhetoric of the brothers Kennedy serves as bookends to the transformation of Democratic thinking about America, its place in the world, and the justness of its cause. Of late, in their rhetoric and behavior, too many Democratic leaders, strategists, and activists have portrayed America more ambiguously than clearly, with more hesitation than pride, and with more confusion than certainty. In doing so, they have raised public doubts about their willingness to defend the United States with all vigor necessary.

In his moral confusion, Ted Kennedy was not alone. As Democratic anger over the particulars of the Bush administration's war on terror and invasion of Iraq grew, some Democrats lost sight of the bigger picture. In mid-2005, the Senate Democratic Whip, Richard Durbin, compared the way American soldiers were treating captives in the War on Terror to the treatment meted out by "Nazis, Soviets in their gulags, or some mad regime—Pol Pot or others."

Moreover, Democrats have cavorted a bit too closely with those willing to blame America for the hostility of its enemies. In 2004, the party's congressional leaders attended the Washington opening of Michael Moore's "Fahrenheit 9/11," a docufantasy that painted Iraq as a happy playground that the United States ruined by overthrowing Saddam Hussein. (Whatever one thinks of Bush's decision to topple Saddam, or of America's mismanagement of the aftermath, no serious person could portray Saddam's Iraq in that way.) And, at the 2004 Democratic National Convention, former President Jimmy Carter invited Moore to sit with him for all the world to see.

Of late, in their rhetoric and behavior, too many Democratic leaders, strategists, and activists have portrayed America more ambiguously than clearly, with more hesitation than pride, and with more confusion than certainty. In doing so, they have raised public doubts about their willingness to defend the United States with all vigor necessary.

A year later, Democratic activists linked up with Cindy Sheehan, whose son died in Iraq and who, in her travels across the nation, said America "is not worth dying for," called Bush "the biggest terrorist in the world," and called the 2003 invasion of Iraq a secret plot to help Israel. Moveon.org, the on-line grassroots group on which Democrats have become so dependent, helped to coordinate her travels, while the Center for American Progress, a progressive think tank where many ex-Clinton administration officials work, publicized her exploits.[1]

If Democrats seriously want to recapture the White House, this will not do. Americans know better. They live in the United States by choice, not by necessity. They see America with clear eyes—as the free-est, most democratic, most open society in the world, and the one offering the

widest set of opportunities. They take note of the millions across the globe who seek refuge in America and, as reflected in their anger after September 11th, they will come to America's defense when necessary.

A Democratic presidential candidate who seeks a new way to approach national security might consider the recent work of progressives in Europe. In early 2006, twenty-five writers and academics penned "The Euston Manifesto," a robust alternative to prevailing liberal orthodoxy in Europe. "The United States of America is a great country and nation," the manifesto states. "It is the home of a strong democracy with a noble tradition behind it and lasting constitutional and social achievements to its name. Its peoples have produced a vibrant culture that is the pleasure, the sourcebook and the envy of millions."[2]

Inspired by the effort, a smaller group of liberals in the United States built upon these sentiments with a statement of their own in late 2006: "American Liberalism and the Euston Manifesto." Arguing that "[t]he long era of Republican ascendancy may very well be coming to an end," they added that "[i]f and when it does, we seek a renewed and reinvigorated American liberalism, one that is up to the task of fighting and winning the struggle of free and democratic societies against Islamic extremism and the terror it produces."

Of liberals in general, they wrote, "the passions of too many liberals here and abroad, even in the aftermath of terrorist attacks all over the world, remain more focused on the misdeeds and errors of our own government in Iraq than on the terrorist outrages by Islamic extremists."[3] Separately, centrist Democrats Will Marshall and Jeremy Rosner portrayed the thinking of the "non-interventionist left" this way: "[O]ne assumes that because America is strong it must be wrong."[4]

The next successful Democratic presidential candidate will be one who neither suffers nor enunciates moral confusion about America. He or she will hold, and articulate, a firm belief in the superiority of U.S.-style freedom and democracy over the authoritarian systems of our enemies. Like Harry Truman at the outset of the Cold War or Kennedy at its most precarious moments, the next Democratic president will lay America and its enemies side by side, explain the superiority of American ideals, and outline a vision to guarantee America's long-term security.

Seeing the enemy straight

In one sense, the global wars of the 20th century were easier for the United States to fight. Our people suffered far less confusion about the identity of our enemies (in World War I, Germany; in World War II, the Axis Powers; and in the Cold War, the Soviet Union) or what they sought (world domination). Today, we are confused about whom we are fighting, the source of their strength, the nature of their anger, and how to measure our progress.

Consider the progression of America's deeply polarized debate on foreign policy since 2001. From the days of broad support for the U.S. attack on Afghanistan to root out al-Qaeda, we moved to a bitterly partisan debate over whether to launch the 2003 invasion in Iraq, then to an even more bitter debate over whether to stay or retreat as we botched the post-Saddam stabilization effort. We have argued vociferously about Saddam's links to terror, the sources of

violence in Iraq, the military focus on Iraq as opposed to Iran and Syria, Iran and Syria's roles in stoking the fires of Iraq, and their potential to help us put them out.

Because confusion runs rampant, let us be clear. The United States and its allies face a global challenge from militant Islam (a.k.a. radical Islam or Islamic extremism) that openly asserts its plans to replace secular law with a strict interpretation of Islam, turn back the clock on modernity, reject pluralism, subjugate women, eradicate homosexuals, eliminate Israel, and impose this ideology of intolerance by all means necessary across the globe.

The challenge of militant Islam plays out on several levels. It provides the philosophical glue that binds terrorist groups across the world in a network of planning, cooperation, murder, and mayhem. It is the ideological engine that drove planes into the World Trade Center and Pentagon and destroyed buses in London, trains in Madrid, hotels in Bali, and cafés in Haifa. It also drives such important state sponsors of terrorism as the Islamic Republic of Iran, which provides funds, training, weapons, and other aid to Hezbollah, Hamas, and other groups.

Endangering the United States and its allies further are Iran's aggressive efforts to develop nuclear weapons, with which it could carry out threats of its president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, to "wipe" Israel "off the map" or create "a world without America." Now, the free world faces the frightening specter of a radical regime in Tehran using nuclear weapons itself or transferring them to a terrorist group, dedicated to death in service of Allah, that in turn would show no hesitation to use them.

To be sure, too many Americans of all political persuasions do not recognize the threat of militant Islam. Nor do they fully grasp the dangerous links between terrorists, their state sponsors, and the pursuit of nuclear weapons. But the problem is particularly acute in Democratic circles, where hatred of President Bush, reluctance to make value judgments about different cultures, and confidence in the rationality of man blinds Democrats to the reality of this danger.

The next successful Democratic candidate will be one who moves beyond Bush hatred and the niceties of political correctness to, in the words of the left, "speak truth to power." The candidate will articulate a clear-eyed view of the world, defining the nature of our enemies, their underlying ideology, and their long-term goals in words that ring true to average Americans.

In Washington and across the country, Democratic leaders, strategists, and activists are seized by an almost obsessive anger at the President, leading too many of them to discount, if not dismiss, everything with which he is associated. Rather than merely critique Bush's war on terror (as they would his economic policies), too many Democrats discount the very idea of such a war. Rather than see an enemy committed to our destruction, driven by a unifying ideology of hatred, too many Democrats view the war as a political tactic of Karl Rove and the

very idea of an enemy as a tool for whipping up fear.

In their confusion (or willful blindness), leading Democrats are aided mightily by the Bush-hating leftist bloggers to whom they pledge their allegiance by speaking at their national convention, meeting with them informally, and monitoring their writings. Even those who know better say privately that, politically speaking, they can't challenge the anti-Bush orthodoxy that blinds Democrats to the very real threats that America faces.

And when a Democrat tries to rise above partisanship in the interest of national security, to ensure (as Senator Arthur Vandenberg counseled in the late 1940s) that politics should stop "at the water's edge," the left reacts with fury. Enraged by Democratic Senator Joe Lieberman's support for the war in Iraq and his caution against weakening the President too much during wartime, the left rallied behind Ned Lamont, who upset Lieberman in Connecticut's Democratic primary. (Lieberman later won the general election by running as an independent.)

September 11th awoke us to the dangers that had been mounting for decades. Now, with a new reality must come a new political line, one that resonates with people in their living rooms and at their dinner tables, addressing their hopes and fears.

Nor, in this age of rampant political correctness, are Democrats particularly anxious to explore the cultural or religious ideologies of our enemies. Rather than acknowledge the theological underpinnings of anti-Western terrorism, too many Democrats explain terrorism as the logical response to legitimate grievances—e.g., American imperialism around the world, economic inequality in terrorist-producing nations, or Israeli settlements in the West Bank.

Such ill-informed explanations of terrorism lead, almost inexorably, to ill-suited solutions from a bygone era. Seeking a new national security strategy for today, some Democrats point proudly to the "containment" strategy that their party leaders devised after World War II and suggest that we merely need to reinvigorate the strategy and strengthen the machinery with which the United Nations, NATO, and the Western alliance implemented it.

But containment was rooted in the "rational actor" theory of international relations, a belief that leaders act rationally when making decisions about the use of force. Related to the "rational actor" theory was the theory of "mutual assured destruction," or MAD, the idea that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union would launch a nuclear attack against the other because each had the nuclear capacity to fully destroy the other with a counter-strike. As R. James Woolsey, Clinton's former CIA Director who now co-chairs the nonpartisan Committee on the Present Danger, put it recently, MAD could work because Soviet leaders cared more about living the good life in their dachas than risking it all in a nuclear war.[5]

Unfortunately, this concept may not apply to our new enemies; those (like Ahmadinejad) who are driven by radical theology and who threaten to obliterate sovereign nations just may mean it (as Hitler meant it when he presaged his war against the Jews in *Mein Kampf* and elsewhere).

These enemies may be willing, even eager, to risk nuclear war, for they seek not just victory in a war with the West but death as a glorious end in itself. "Is there art that is more beautiful, more divine, and more eternal than the art of martyrdom?" Ahmadinejad has mused. "A nation with martyrdom knows no captivity. Those who wish to undermine this principle undermine the foundations of our independence and national security. They undermine the foundation of our eternity."[6]

Confronted with such rhetoric, too many of us are quick to dismiss it as tactical, designed for a rational purpose. Ahmadinejad, we speculate, is seeking to strengthen his political hand at home by "playing to his base" or to build his profile in the region by thumbing his nose at the United States and Israel. And, inferring rationality, too many Democratic leaders suggest a strategy that reflects it, such as negotiations to convince Iran to end its pursuit of nuclear weapons or an updated version of "containment" to deal with a nuclear Iran.

But we infer rationality at our peril. Ahmadinejad subscribes to a radical strain of Islam that anticipates the return of the "12th Imam" or "Mahdi," a messianic figure from the 9th century whose arrival supposedly will signal the end of the world. Ahmadinejad reportedly seeks a violent confrontation with the West to help speed the Mahdi's return. His pursuit of nuclear weapons is consistent with such theology.

Do not scoff. Ahmadinejad is confident enough about the Mahdi's return that, as Tehran's mayor in 2004, he ordered an urban reconstruction project in anticipation of it. As Iran's President, he has allocated nearly $20 million to a mosque from which the Mahdi supposedly will emerge. "Today," he told religious leaders in late 2005, "we should define our economic, cultural and political policies based on the policy of Imam Mahdi's return."[7]

The next successful Democratic candidate will be one who moves beyond Bush hatred and the niceties of political correctness to, in the words of the left, "speak truth to power." The candidate will articulate a clear-eyed view of the world, defining the nature of our enemies, their underlying ideology, and their long-term goals in words that ring true to average Americans.

Prioritizing national power

After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, President Kennedy invited former Vice President Richard Nixon—the titular leader of the Republican Party—to the White House for a briefing. Chatting in the Oval Office, Kennedy turned to his former adversary and mused about the importance of such matters. "It really is true that foreign affairs is the only important issue for a President to handle, isn't it?" Kennedy asked. "I mean, who [cares] if the minimum wage is $1.15 or $1.25, in comparison to something like this?"[8]

Kennedy's insight reflected a mind-set about national security that was shared by Democratic presidents as far back as Truman, if not FDR and Wilson. They viewed national security as central to their presidencies, recognizing that security abroad was a prerequisite for progress in domestic affairs, and that only a robust foreign policy would ensure safety.

For at least the last three decades, however, Democrats mostly have held a far different view. What began as perhaps an understandable reac-

tion to the debacle in Vietnam grew into a far broader, and more insidious, discomfort with all things military. Rather than embrace foreign policy, Democrats sought to avoid it. They viewed it as a necessary but unpleasant part of any presidency, almost as a policy-making cross to bear.

The historical evolution is striking. In 1960, Kennedy ran to the right of Nixon, charging (inaccurately) that the Eisenhower administration had allowed a "missile gap" to develop with the Soviets. In his inaugural address, he spoke barely a word of domestic policy, instead making clear why the nation must "pay any price [and] bear any burden" in its fight against the Soviets. Sixteen years later, in the shadow of Vietnam, America elected Democratic Jimmy Carter, who scolded Americans for their "irrational fear of Communism." Sixteen years after that, they elected Democrat Bill Clinton, who had promised to focus "like a laser beam" on the economy.

Clinton's domestic focus was understandable, reflecting the times in which America was living. The Soviet Union had collapsed, a noted scholar suggested the world had reached the "end of history," the "Washington Consensus" envisioned that spreading free market capitalism would spread peace with it, and the United States wondered who would emerge as its next major threat.

Then, September 11th awoke us to the dangers that had been mounting for decades. Now, with a new reality must come a new political line, one that resonates with people in their living rooms and at their dinner tables, addressing their hopes and fears.

For Democrats, that means a wholly new mind-set, one that elevates national security rather than changes the subject and that eagerly tackles issues that touch upon America's role in the world, its responsibilities as (in the words of former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright) the world's "indispensable nation," and the threats and challenges that it faces.

This is no small thing. It requires not just a change in rhetoric, but in gut feeling. Politicians joke that their key to success is "sincerity—if you can fake that, you've got it made." Amusing, but recent history has shown that, in political terms, you can't "fake it" on national security.

You can't, for instance, run successfully for President on the basis of biography rather that vision. Desperate to offset President Bush's wartime leadership, Democratic insiders in 2004 rallied in great numbers behind former NATO Commander Wesley Clark. Once he flamed out, activists moved in enough numbers to help secure the nomination for Vietnam veteran John Kerry.

In 2004 and after, Democrats complained bitterly that the "Swift Boat Veterans for Truth" deliberately distorted Kerry's Vietnam experience and legislative record. Fine. But, as I wrote shortly after his defeat, "they didn't put words in Kerry's mouth. They didn't vow to convert terrorism into a public 'nuisance' that's akin to prostitution, talk of a 'global test' for the U.S. to pass before it takes military action, vow to do what it takes to win in Iraq while setting timetables for withdrawal, promise to respect the views of allies while terming those who sent troops to Iraq as the 'coerced and bribed,' or talk about the war as a colossal mistake while vowing to bring more nations to the effort."[9]

Having nominated a decorated veteran and orchestrated a political convention in which he was sur-

rounded by other veterans, party leaders figured they had cleverly "checked the box" on national security. When that didn't work, they blamed the war rather than themselves, as Pennsylvania's Democratic governor, Ed Rendell, did right after the election when he suggested that, if not for September 11th, Kerry would have won.

If you can't "fake it," neither can you avoid the issue of national security, as party leaders also have sought to do. For too long, Democrats have tried to turn the focus of national political debate to what Democratic activists call "the issues we want to talk about"—the economy, health care, and education. In a sense, they have tried almost to avoid reality; to insist, as their national chairman did in early 2004, that even with the nation at war the "bread-and-butter" issues of domestic policy would determine the election.

Moving forward, Democrats must discard their "either/or" approach to politics—either the public focuses on domestic issues, where Democrats are strong, or on national security, where Democrats are less comfortable. The next successful Democratic presidential candidate will be one who views both foreign and domestic issues as integral to his or her presidency because, more and more, foreign and domestic issues are two sides of the same coin.

As a successful Democratic candidate will make clear, America must gain control over the exploding costs of domestic entitlements (basically Social Security, Medicare, and Medicaid) not only because they will crowd out other domestic spending but because they threaten funds for defense and diplomacy. As the scholar Michael Mandelbaum writes in *The Case for Goliath*, a fiscally-strapped America will lack the resources to play its current role as a kind of "world government," with a frightening potential for global chaos as the result.[10]

The successful Democrat will recognize not just the economic but also the national security dangers presented by our soaring budget deficit. As our debt grows, its purchasers enjoy the leverage over us that any creditor holds over its debtors. They can wreak havoc with our economy merely by threatening to dump their dollar holdings, sending interest rates higher and possibly even generating a "run" on the currency. The growing debt held by foreign central banks, such as that of China, present a particular problem for America, for their economic leverage could force the United States to back away from a national security challenge, such as a confrontation with China over the fate of Taiwan.

Moving forward, Democrats must discard their "either/or" approach to politics. The next successful Democratic presidential candidate will be one who views both foreign and domestic issues as integral to his or her presidency because, more and more, foreign and domestic issues are two sides of the same coin.

The merging of domestic and foreign policy, however, is less a burden than an opportunity for a Democratic candidate—a way to differentiate oneself from the incumbent Republican president. The fact is, this melding of national and economic security apparently has escaped Bush's notice.

Indeed, when historians write about the Bush presidency, they will criticize nothing more harshly than his failure to bring these issues, and the country, together after September 11th. With Manhattan and the Pentagon still smoldering, Bush could have sought a national effort to wean America from foreign oil (and stop underwriting hostile regimes in the Middle East) and ensure our long-term fiscal health (and stop sacrificing our sovereignty to an emerging and increasingly bold China). In such an effort, he could have attracted not just Republicans and Democrats but subsets of both—environmentalists on the left, fiscal conservatives on the right, and everyone in the middle who wanted to contribute to a true national war effort, to play a role on the home front while our young men and women went to war. The next successful Democratic candidate for President will need to see both sides of the security coin.

Seizing the initiative

Iraq continues to deteriorate, with the triumph of 2003 becoming the tragedy of 2007 and beyond. Americans are increasingly angry at this turn of events, and are laying the blame squarely at President Bush's doorstep. For Democrats, who desperately want to regain the White House, the political opportunity is obvious.

But the path to victory lies in seizing the issue of national security, not avoiding it. It also rests in articulating a coherent and convincing vision, not simply putting forth a biography. The next successful Democratic president will proudly trumpet the superiority of U.S.-style freedom and democracy, clearly define the challenge of militant Islam, and convince the American people that he or she is eager to grab the reins of power in order to protect their safety and security.

1. Lawrence J. Haas, "Caution to Democrats: Sheehan May Be Hazardous to Your Political Health," *Public Affairs Perspective*, September 9, 2005, www.larryhaasonline.com.
2. "The Euston Manifesto," www.eustonmanifesto.org.
3. "New American Liberalism," www.newamericanliberalism.org.
4. Will Marshall and Jeremy Rosner, "Introduction: A Progressive Answer to Jihadist Terror," in Will Marshall, ed., *With All Our Might: A Progressive Strategy for Defeating Jihadism and Defending Liberty* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006).
5. R. James Woolsey, Remarks at the American Foreign Policy Council conference on "Understanding the Iranian Threat," Washington, D.C., November 15, 2006.
6. Newt Gingrich, "Lessons from the First Five Years of War: Where Do We Go from Here," Speech before the American Enterprise Institute, September 12, 2006, http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.24891,filter.all/pub_detail.asp.
7. Ilan Berman, "Understanding Ahmadinejad," American Foreign Policy Council *Iran Strategy Brief* no. 1, (June 2006), http://www.afpc.org/IFI/UnderstandingAhmadinejad.pdf.
8. Richard Reeves, *President Kennedy: Profile of Power* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 100.
9. Lawrence J. Haas, "Election '04 and the Democrats: Let the Bloodletting Begin," *Public Affairs Perspective*, November 5, 2004, www.larryhaasonline.com.
10. Michael Mandelbaum, *The Case for Goliath: How America Acts as the World's Government in the Twenty-First Century* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005).

DISPATCHES

The Centrality of the Caucasus

Sergei Markedonov

MOSCOW—Since 1991, the South Caucasus has been a strategic priority for Russia. As the successor to the USSR, the Russian Federation has consistently claimed a special historical and political role in the geopolitics of the Caucasus. But, contrary to what many in Europe and the United States believe, Russia's interest is not motivated by an urge for "imperial revival." Rather, it reflects the fact that stability in the former Soviet republics of the Caucasus is a basic requirement for security within Russia itself. It is also a precondition for Russia's territorial integrity.

After all, Russia is a Caucasian state, just like Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Seven constituent republics of the Russian Federation are located in the North Caucasus, and three neighboring regions are situated in the Caucasian Steppe. And, as a practical matter, the ethno-political tensions that have arisen in Russia's regions have been closely connected with conflicts under way in the Caucasus. The Georgian-Ossetian conflict (1990-1992), for example, had a substantial impact within Russia itself, spiking tensions between the republics of North Ossetia and Ingushetia. The fighting resulted in a stream of refugees from the former South Ossetian autonomous province—and from internal areas of Georgia—into North Ossetia. Those refugees subsequently became embroiled in the Ossetian-Ingush ethnic conflict (1992), which culminated in the withdrawal of the Ingush from the disputed Prigorodny (Suburban) district of North Ossetia.

One ethnic purge encouraged another. The Georgian-Abkhazian conflict promoted the consolidation and radicalization of ethno-nationalist movements

DR. SERGEI MARKEDONOV is the head of the interethnic relations issues group at the Institute for Political and Military Analysis in Moscow.

in the Russian republics of Kabardino-Balkariya, Karachaevo-Circassia and Adygea. The Caucasus Confederation of the Mountain Peoples, created and led by them, became one of the main actors in the military clashes between Georgia and Abkhazia (1992-1993). Meanwhile, the withdrawal of the Avars (a Dagestani ethnic group) from the Kvareli district of Georgia in the early 1990s led to the creation of new conflict zones in the north of the Russian republic of Dagestan. The exodus of ethnic Russians was a direct consequence.

The security of the Russian Caucasus, in other words, is inseparable from stability in Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan—and impossible without it. All of which goes a long way toward explaining why, ever since the Soviet collapse, the Russian Federation has undertaken the burden of geopolitical leadership in the South Caucasus. And peacekeeping operations have become one of Moscow's more effective instruments of influence. Since July 1992, Russia has policed the Georgian-Ossetian conflict. Since July 1994, it likewise has provided security for the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict. By doing so, Russia managed to prevent military clashes and bloodshed, and subsequently to "freeze" those conflicts. Russia also stopped the civil war in Georgia in 1993, and its diplomacy played a significant role in securing the 1994 cease-fire between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh.

These activities, however, have not been received warmly in Georgia, Armenia or Azerbajian. While in Armenia, Russia's military presence is more or less accepted as contributing to national security, in Georgia it is perceived as an occupation and annexation effort. Russia has been responsive to these concerns; in November 1999, at the OSCE's Istanbul Summit, Moscow and Tbilisi came to terms regarding the withdrawal of Russian military units from Georgian territory, and in 2006 the final stage of this withdrawal began. Nonetheless, today the Georgian leadership has made the withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from the region's "frozen conflicts" a major priority.

The Russian military presence at Azerbaijan, by contrast, is minimal. There is only one object of true strategic interest: the radar station at Gabala. Located on the southern slope of the Caucasian ridge, the station has played a significant role in ensuring the security of Russia's southern borders. Russian forces therefore remain ensconced there, pursuant to a 2002 agreement signed by the presidents of both countries.

Yet Russia's regional posture is changing. In the early 1990s, their common Soviet past still united Russia's officials and businessmen with the leaders of the Newly Independent States, and the assumption in Moscow was that the former Soviet republics would remain indefinitely pro-Russian in orientation. Since then, however, this geopolitical advantage has gradually receded, with more and more states in the region trending away from Russia. Given Moscow's need to shape the security environment there, the results have been predictable: an increasingly heavy Russian hand in the politics of the region. It is a dynamic that shows no sign of abating.

The Limits of "Europeanization"

Andrew N. Liaropoulos

ATHENS—In 2006, relations between Turkey and Europe became increasingly complex, non-linear, and volatile. In December, the European Commission decided to "freeze" negotiations on Turkey's accession to the European Union. This move was justified on the basis of Ankara's refusal to open its ports and airports to vessels and airliners from Cyprus.

The decision was not unexpected. The European Union Progress Report released a month earlier had been highly critical of Turkey on practically all matters dealing with accession negotiations. According to the report, Turkey failed to abide by its 2004 commitment to open its ports and airports to Greek Cypriot vessels, and has made no progress in normalizing its relations with the island. The report also recommends that Turkey reform its penal code, especially article 301, which has allowed several court cases against writers and journalists on the grounds of "insulting Turkishness," and to permit greater freedom of speech. Finally, the report urges Turkey to offer full protections to its religious minorities and to end the military's involvement in civil society.

Not surprisingly, there is now a chill in the air. Although officially, Ankara remains committed to its European accession bid, it is showing signs of growing irritation over Europe's persistent doubts concerning the desirability of its integration. Part and parcel of this new turbulence is the fact that Turkey is undergoing a complex sociological evolution, in which modernity and pro-European trends merge with the return of Islam as a socio-political force—and with a resilient nationalism that makes it difficult for Ankara to deal with Brussels' requests. Keeping in mind that in 2007 both presidential and parliamentary elections will take place in Turkey, it is hard to expect any progress.

As a result, the initial euphoria after the EU's commencement of accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005 has been replaced by great skepticism in many European capitals, including Athens. Although Turkey is just entering its second year of negotiations with the EU, the record so far is not promising at all. Turkey appears to be unwilling to fulfill its obligations towards Cyprus, and there has been no improvement in its bilateral relations with Greece. In this context, Greek politicians are increasingly asking themselves: has their decision to "Europeanize" the Greek-Turkish disputes paid off?

The realization that all is not well on the Turkish front has certainly been a disappointment. In recent years, Greek foreign policy has made a major U-turn, with Athens initiating a policy of rapprochement with its historic adversary. Since the EU Summit in Helsinki in December 1999, Greece has acquiesced to Europe's granting of candidate status to Turkey, and endorsed the opening of accession negotiations between Turkey and the EU. The rationale behind this decision was clear; if Turkey became engaged in the European integration

Dr. Andrew N. Liaropoulos is a senior analyst at the Research Institute for European & American Studies, based in Athens, Greece.

process, this would trigger gradual stabilization and democratization, making Ankara more flexible and less likely to use military force.

So far, the rapprochement has focused on "soft" issues, such as the avoidance of double taxation, bilateral commercial agreements, confidence-building measures and cultural exchanges, eschewing more complex topics (i.e., the delimitation of the continental shelf zone in the international parts of the Aegean). But Ankara's reluctance to adjust to European norms is evident in a lack of progress even in matters like Christian minority rights, the acknowledgment of the Orthodox Church of Constantinople and the role of the Ecumenical Patriarch. This has been something of a shock for Athens, which expected that the prospect of EU accession would make Ankara more flexible—and to see gestures of goodwill in response to Greece's lifting of its objections to Turkey's EU candidacy. Aggravating the situation, the Turkish Parliament's 1995 decision that an extension by Greece of its territorial waters to twelve nautical miles would constitute a *casus belli* is still in effect, despite the alleged improvements in Greek-Turkish relations.

This is not to suggest that the "Europeanization" of Greece's foreign policy has been a mistake, or that Athens should stop supporting Turkey's EU membership. But it serves as a reminder that it is too risky to put all of one's eggs in a single basket. Today, Athens seems to have invested too much in Brussels, at the expense of an alternative plan should EU-Turkish negotiations fail.

Simply put, relying solely on the EU to force Turkey to change its foreign policy towards Greece is simply unrealistic. There are certain things that Brussels is willing and obliged to do. But ultimately, it is up to Greece and Turkey to solve their problems themselves. And if Greece really intends to alter the status quo, a more active policy is needed. Athens needs a parallel approach that encourages Ankara's goal of European accession while simultaneously planning for the possibility that it will fail. Such an approach should focus more on long-standing disputes in lieu of secondary issues like trade, environment and tourism. Only then will Athens really be able to test the effect that European norms of behavior will have on the Turkish elite.

The Economics of Marginalization

Chris Heaton-Harris

LINCOLN—As Thomas Friedman tells us, globalization is flattening our world. Advances in technology, commerce and communication are breaking down national boundaries and leveling the global economic and political playing fields. Alas, Europe is becoming less and less competitive in this flat world.

The numbers tell the story. According to statistics from the OECD and the World Bank, administrative procedures in Germany, Belgium and Holland are over 50 percent more restrictive than in the U.S.; Japan has twice as many top patents as the EU-15; both the United States and Japan spend more on public and private research and development work than the entire EU-15 combined; Italy, France and Germany have some of the most over-regulated markets in the developed world, and some of the lowest female employment rates; and it is twice as difficult to set up a new business in Poland, Greece, Hungary, Slovakia or France than it is in Britain or the United States.

What does all this mean for the EU? The answer is simple. Europe's historically powerful economic position has caused it to become complacent. As a result, the Continent is now completely unprepared for the globalized world. According to the European Commission's own forecasts, by 2050 the EU's share of world GDP will have almost halved. That, moreover, is a conservative estimate; independent reports anticipate that the EU's share will plummet from 35 to just 15 percent in the not-too-distant future—all because of the factors outlined above.

All of which makes sound economic sense. If you make it more difficult to start new businesses, then people will either not start them or, worse still, start them somewhere else. This is happening right now all over Europe; the flat world means that people in Beijing can have access to the same knowledge base and the same information superhighway as people in Brussels, but to much cheaper labor.

A rational person is likely to conclude that the answer to this problem lies in more competitive economic practices. Not so the EU. The majority of Europe's politicians truly believe that Europe is strong enough to resist the onslaught of globalization and can protect its precious "social market" by legislating, regulating, and otherwise attempting to handicap emerging competitors. The EU has raised tariffs, retained agricultural subsidies, and pursued trade wars with the flat world on everything from beef (with the U.S.) to textiles (with China). But there will only be one loser in this economic war.

Nor does Europe appear remotely ready to change course. That trade policy in the EU is still decided in secret by the Orwellian "Article 133 Committee" speaks volumes about Europe's ability to move into the modern age. China is set to become the biggest economy in the world by 2050—the same year that the

Chris Heaton-Harris is a British Conservative Member of the European Parliament, and a founding member of the Campaign for Parliamentary Reform (CPR), which exposed waste, fraud and corruption in the European Union.

EU's share of GDP hits the new low of 15 percent—and intra-European trade is growing more slowly than the rest of the world economy. If the EU continues to stand still, the world's "largest trading bloc" will soon disappear from the rear-view mirrors of the Chinese, Americans (North and South) and Indians.

Europe, in other words, has to join the flat world if it wants to avoid being flattened by it. Outdated protectionism has to be abandoned in favor of liberalization and free markets. Europe can succeed in this environment; countries like Britain and Germany have historically built their economies on innovation, and the Eastern European countries are now some of the most productive anywhere in the world. If the EU's archaic approach to free trade is jettisoned, then innovation and productivity can be unleashed.

It is hard to envision that this will ever happen, however. The President of the European Commission continues to defend the Common Agricultural Policy, and last year's attempt by French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin to make the country's employment laws more favorable to businesses was defeated by an ignorant opposition and a brainwashed public. Sensible people talking about the need to accept globalization and free trade are being drowned out by scare-mongering about "outsourcing" or "the rise of China."

Historically, the countries of Europe have always benefited when they have engaged with the world economy. We have absolutely nothing to fear from competition while we are pioneering economically, fiscally, politically and socially. However, when we chose to rest on our laurels, Europe slides backwards and innovation moves on to more ambitious lands. If we don't encourage these entrepreneurs and innovators, they will simply go elsewhere, and Europe will be the poorer for it.

Columbus was right when he sailed for the Far East: Europe is no place to be in a flat world.

Book Reviews

Reading Iran Right

Gary Metz

Mark Bowden, *Guests of the Ayatollah: The Iran Crisis, the First Battle in America's War With Militant Islam* (Atlantic Monthly Press, 2006), 704 pp.

It is increasing clear that America's credibility as the leader of the free world hinges upon how it confronts the challenge from the Islamic Republic of Iran. Do we ignore its continuing threats of destruction made against Israel, the U.S. and Western civilization? Do we act unilaterally? Do we seek direct negotiations? Do we seek to support an internal regime change in Iran?

The problem is hardly a new one. Clear answers have been eluding successive U.S. administrations for the past twenty-eight years. And in his book *Guests of the Ayatollah*, Mark Bowden eloquently sets the stage for the disarray that has permeated American policy toward the Islamic Republic ever since the 1979 takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and 444-day crisis that followed.

Bowden's tale is a cautionary one, a case study in dealing with Islamic radicals in what he terms "the first battle in America's war with militant Islam." In 700-plus pages, he skillfully explores the mechanics of the hostage crisis through firsthand interviews with both hostages and captors. The result is an intricate picture of the thinking of the Iranian radicals who took the Embassy staff hostage, and of the astonishment of U.S. diplomats, who felt that they had been working diligently in support of the new Islamic Republic.

Gary Metz is writer and editor of the pro-democracy website RegimeChangeIran.com. He can be reached at iranazad@cox.net.

But *Guests of the Ayatollah* is valuable for another reason as well. America was surprised on 9/11, just as it was by the events of the Iranian hostage crisis more than two decades earlier. Bowden's book is an attempt to ensure that we are not surprised again.

The value of history, they say, is that it can help us avoid repeating the mistakes of the past. Today, a careful reading of Bowden's book would greatly help U.S. policymakers unravel what has become known as "the Persian puzzle."

The first lesson of *Guests of the Ayatollah* is the failure of Americans to comprehend the true nature of the regime in Tehran. As Bowden writes, the acting American Ambassador at the time of the takeover, Bruce Laingen, was perplexed by the assault on the Embassy. After all, Laingen believed, from a pragmatic standpoint, "Iran was clearly hurting itself more than the United States."

Laingen was not alone. American diplomats and even President Jimmy Carter apparently could not conceive that the new Islamic Republic of Iran would be both willing and able to violate international norms. What they failed to grasp was that the agenda of this new regime was not to integrate into the community of nations, but to overturn it.

The regime in Tehran came to power as a religious alternative to the liberal Western political and economic system. Its very *raison d'être*, therefore, is to replace the present order with its own. All of which illustrates why negotiations with the regime are so difficult. For, if it were to negotiate a place in (or a peace with) the West, the Islamic Republic would be betraying its very ethos. We should no more expect the Iranian regime to betray its mission than we could imagine the "materialistic" West compromising its core values in dealing with the Islamic Republic—no matter how tempting the offer.

The second lesson is that the United States desperately needs to understand the Iranian people, and to engage them in the marketplace of ideas. During much of the 20th century, modern-day Iran was manipulated by the great powers—first Britain and later the United States. Not surprisingly, conspiracy theories in Iran are not the exception, but the rule. When Iran's ayatollahs swept to power, they did so in part by taking advantage of widespread frustration among the Iranian people over this foreign interference. But the solution most Iranians were seeking after the fall of the Shah was very different from the one ultimately imposed by the regime. Many Iranians sought a greater sense of self-determination and assumed a benign role of religion in the new regime. Unfortunately, the faction that systematically took power needed an evil to explain the hardships the Iranian people were experiencing, and they found it in the United States.

None of this is to say that the Iranian population is anti-American. Quite the contrary; rampant disillusionment with the Islamic Revolution has made the majority of Iranians predisposed to American ideas and values, despite (or because of) official regime rhetoric. But the United States has failed to press this advantage. Even today, the number of non-Iranians in the U.S. government that know the Persian language remains pitifully small. As a result, our understanding of the Iranian population, its perspectives and its desires, is woefully inadequate. By extension, our attempts at outreach are at best poor and at worst damaging to our image and cause on the Iranian "street."

Such a state of affairs is simply unacceptable. Now more than ever, the U.S. desperately needs to make the case to ordinary Iranians that their regime is leading them to disaster—and that the path towards integration with the community of nations holds great opportunities and promise.

Ultimately, our battle with Iran is one of ideas. Polls indicate that the Iranian people distrust the regime and are longing for freedom. The depth of their discontent is perhaps best described by Bowden in his closing pages. "Some of the [hostage takers] have gone into exile and taken up arms against the religious rulers," he writes; "others have been harassed, denounced, beaten or imprisoned for advocating democratic changes. In some cases they have been persecuted by their former colleagues. 'None of us in the revolution believed Iran would have an autocratic regime again,' said Mohsen Mirdamadi, a leader of the [hostage takers] who is today a controversial reform politician…. 'Yet here we are.'"

It is up to the United States to seize the opportunity.

CROWN FORUM

UPDATED WITH A BRAND NEW CHAPTER

COUNTDOWN TO CRISIS

THE COMING NUCLEAR SHOWDOWN WITH IRAN



NOBEL PEACE PRIZE NOMINEE

KENNETH R. TIMMERMAN

AUTHOR OF THE *NEW YORK TIMES* BESTSELLER *THE FRENCH BETRAYAL OF AMERICA*

Demography as Destiny

Christopher Brown

MARK STEYN, *America Alone: The End of the World As We Know It* (Regnery, 2006), 256 pp.

In his book *America Alone*, Mark Steyn has accomplished an impressive feat of mental gymnastics: taking what is perhaps the most boring, albeit important, topic in the arena of international affairs and making it both fascinating and engaging to expert and novice alike. Unfortunately, the warning contained in the subtitle, "The end of the world as we know it," is an appropriate foreshadowing of the future—one that is increasingly unavoidable unless the fundamental issues raised by Steyn are addressed in the very near future. It isn't that demography is the only force at work in the world today. But it is undoubtedly one of the most fundamental. As Steyn puts it: "Demography doesn't explain everything, but accounts for a good 90 percent."

Yet *America Alone* is hardly an endless retelling of dry facts and figures. Far from it. Statistics are thankfully kept to a minimum. Instead, Steyn focuses on the implications that the demographic trends now under way worldwide will have upon the United States.

The results are sobering. Throughout the course of the book, Steyn illustrates what is in effect the death of one society and the potential ascendancy of another. On the descent is an advanced society, possessing all of the technological, economic and social advantages that should enable strong growth, continuing development and pre-eminence. Ascendant is a society underpinned by a shared retrograde ideology more in tune with the 7th than the 21st century.

This paradox is further exacerbated by the very institutions and ideas that the governments of the West have developed in their efforts to benefit society. One of the more interesting absurdities highlighted in Steyn's analysis is that of social entitlements. These institutional demands by the public, which are the most pervasive in the "nanny states" of Europe and Canada, have created a proverbial economic house of cards based on a dependency on population growth, low birthrates, and a socialized entitlement base.

Originally, these entitlements were sold as a way that society—through socialist political and economic policies—could assist in the development of strong and educated families. Over time, however, in countries where they have been applied, these policies have had the unintended effect of creating economic disincentives for the middle and working classes to have children, while at the same time handicapping their respective economies. The resulting decline in birthrates has created

CHRISTOPHER BROWN is currently the Director of Education and Research Programs at the American Security Council Foundation. He is an expert on China, terrorism and Islamist ideology.

a shortfall in the number of workers available domestically to provide the economic basis for these entitlement policies. Until now, Europe has supplemented this discrepancy through the importation of workers from North Africa and the Middle East. Unfortunately, once inside the European system, these alien populations take full advantage of the entitlement programs offered by host governments, even while refusing to even try to assimilate.

To add injury to insult, these alien populations have higher birthrates than the local European populations. This, in turn, gives these alien, mostly Muslim, populations growing economic, social, and—perhaps most worrisome—political power within those nations which have traditionally been America's allies.

Although Steyn spends a great deal of time on the European vector of this "death spiral," he makes clear that this is not a uniquely European problem. Rather, it is a nearly ubiquitous concern throughout the developed world, and in such potentially strategic places as Russia. This crisis, moreover, is only made worse by the growth and spread of radical Islamist ideology, both within the Muslim World and in the West. This corrosive ideology, combined with the global explosion of technology, has enabled the creation of a decentralized supernational identity that is openly hostile towards the Western world in general, and the United States in particular.

At the same time, one of the most intriguing indictments offered in Steyn's analysis is the West's own complicity in this crisis. The apologetic nature of today's discourse vis-à-vis modern economic and political institutions—and the corresponding ignorance and near pathological disdain European and American society now holds for the cultural, religious, and historical foundations of its success—both undermines the existing order and encourages the spread of the Islamist ideology. As Steyn puts it: "… if (as Europe has done) you marginalize religion, only the marginalized will have religion."

Perhaps the most dramatic part of Steyn's clarion call, however, is the picture that emerges of the world that the United States will face years hence—as its many allies continue down their self-imposed demographic and cultural downward spirals. Unfortunately, more likely than not, his warning will fall upon deaf ears. Today's elites are far too arrogant and sure of their rectitude to consider the possibility that the very social contracts they have so willingly embraced could hold the seeds of their own destruction.

Belly of the Beast

Eric R. Sterner

NIR ROSEN, *In the Belly of the Green Bird: The Triumph of the Martyrs in Iraq* (New York: The Free Press, 2006), 288 pp.

Nir Rosen is a brave man. A native New Yorker who speaks Arabic with an Iraqi accent, he has spent years traveling in and out of Iraq, both with U.S. military units and on his own outside the relative safe haven of the Green Zone in the heart of Baghdad, where U.S. diplomats and senior military leaders have hunkered down since 2003. In a country where kidnapping has become a source of revenue for criminal gangs and insurgents, and where both tend to view outsiders with suspicion, Rosen has traveled widely as freelance author, photographer, and filmmaker. In particular, he set out to record Iraqi perspectives on their country after Saddam Hussein's ouster.

But Rosen is not like other reporters. Most, such as the *Washington Post*'s Anthony Shadid (*Night Draws Near*) and the late freelance journalist Steven Vincent (*In the Red Zone*), have sought to understand and chronicle the experience of the majority of Iraqis. Rosen's objective is different: to explore the motivations of those who seek to advance their agendas through the barrel of a gun, more often than not one aimed at their fellow Iraqis.

Rosen's Iraq is populated with thugs from top to bottom. His tour guides are angry Iraqis engaged in fighting the Coalition, suppressing democracy, imposing their religious views on others, or feeding the rumor mill that exalts their cause at the expense of rationality. He witnesses adolescents being celebrated for their skills with a sniper rifle, and Islamic courts inflicting arbitrary punishment on Iraqis insufficiently committed to the court's view of Islam. In the process, Rosen accurately captures the brutality of war waged by irregulars.

But Rosen's strength, that he reports what he hears and sees, is also one of his greatest weaknesses. Rosen's narrative is principally told through the eyes of those fighting Americans, the Coalition, and the Iraqi government. He accepts their worldview without assessing its veracity or context. And, since people either engaged in the insurgency or sympathetic to it serve as his primary sources, their views and conclusions come through loud and clear.

Other problems abound, including poor editing, factual errors, and, occasionally, intellectual inconsistency. But the main thrust of *In the Belly of the Green Bird* is unequivocal and clear. Quite simply, Rosen identifies with the insurgents who use terrorist tactics, inflicting greater casualties on their fellow Iraqis than

ERIC R. STERNER SERVED in the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 2001 to 2003, and as a senior staff member of the House Armed Services Committee from 2003 to 2006. The views expressed here are his own.

on the Americans they profess to fight. His work presents a romanticized image of "resistance," much as John Reed portrayed the Bolsheviks as reacting to the heavy hand of an authoritarian Tsarist regime. The Iraqis suffering at the hands of insurgents and terrorists are almost invisible in Rosen's narrative. He justifies this failing by declaring his belief that those who were "silent" will not play much of a role in determining Iraq's future. Fair enough, but the vocal Iraqis now working to build a better future, one in which violence is not the currency of political dialogue, are also absent from Rosen's discourse.

This is a glaring omission. These Iraqis are not merely future victims waiting for the insurgency to triumph. They are armed and empowered, fighting back for a future in which violence will not be a way of life. Through August 2006, Coalition forces had trained and equipped some 277,600 Iraqi security forces. Roughly one-third of the company-sized security operations conducted in Iraq during the third quarter of 2006 were carried out independently by Iraqi forces. Indeed, between October 2005 and August 2006, Iraqi forces assumed lead responsibilities for providing security in the majority of Iraq's provinces.

Of course, there are problems with the Iraqi security forces. Corruption, general lawlessness, unprofessionalism and sectarianism are all apparent and widely reported in the West. Heroism, sacrifice, and dedication are also apparent, but not so readily reported outside of Iraq.

To the degree that it reflects what the insurgents see and believe, *In the Belly of the Green Bird* may help us to better understand Iraq's insurgency. But unfortunately for both the reader and the Iraqi people, the picture that emerges from Rosen's depiction is twisted and distorted, as far removed from the reality as the reflection one sees in a fun-house mirror at a second-rate carnival. The real martyrs in Iraq are those willing to sacrifice all for the promise of a better future. It is a shame that Rosen has them confused with the thugs with whom he associates.

Continuity, not Change

Mackubin Thomas Owens

ROBERT KAGAN, *Dangerous Nation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 544 pp.

It is generally accepted today that George W. Bush's foreign policy—especially his doctrine of preemptive war and his emphasis on the promotion of democracy—represents a radical break with the American past. According to the conventional narrative, U.S. foreign policy was originally based on the principle of non-intervention; the American Founders are often invoked in support of the claim that the default position of U.S. foreign policy is isolationism. Who has not heard the argument that Washington's Farewell Address counsels opposition to foreign attachments, and that the Monroe Doctrine represents a ratification of this "isolationist" principle?

But, the narrative continues, while isolationism and non-intervention prevailed during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, circumstances required the United States to abandon this posture at the beginning of the twentieth century. But even then, America did so only reluctantly, as a response to threats to vital national interests. Thus, with the exception of the failed effort by Woodrow Wilson to base U.S. foreign policy on idealistic principles and George W. Bush's quixotic effort to impose democracy on the Middle East, the United States has normally adhered to the principles of foreign policy "realism," a theory based on the idea that the driving force in international politics is national security, which can be ensured only by the possession of sufficient power relative to other states.

A number of authors have recently demonstrated the falseness of this conventional wisdom. In *The Savage Wars of Peace*, Max Boot explains that Americans have hardly been isolationist when it comes to the use of military power. In *Surprise, Security and the American Experience*, John Lewis Gaddis demonstrates that the statesmen of the Early Republic, usually portrayed as concerned with avoiding foreign entanglements, in fact were more than willing to engage in preventive war to defeat a threat before it became imminent. And in his indispensable *A Special Providence*, Walter Russell Mead identifies four American "schools of foreign policy," some more interventionist than others, which have vied for dominance as the United States has confronted the challenges of the international system.

And now, in his remarkable new book, *Dangerous Nation*, Robert Kagan drives a final stake through the heart of the "pervasive myth of America as isolationist and passive until provoked." Kagan goes beyond Boot, Gaddis, and Mead, linking U.S.

MACKUBIN T. OWENS is an associate dean of academics and professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island.

foreign policy to American political culture and, perhaps more importantly, to the principles of the American founding. He demonstrates the degree to which American foreign policy has been driven not only by interests, in the narrow realist sense, but also by a belief on the part of Americans and their leaders that the principles upon which the republic was founded were right and true. An implication of Kagan's argument in *Dangerous Nation* is that there is a lineal progression from the Declaration of Independence to President Bush's attempt to midwife the creation of an Iraqi democracy.

Kagan, like Mead, argues that U.S. foreign policy cannot be understood in terms of the two dominant schools of international relations theory: realism and liberalism. The former stresses the importance of power and military security in international affairs and is most concerned about maintaining stability and a peaceful balance of power. The latter contends that the goals of actors within the international political system transcend power and security to include peace and prosperity. Kagan, however, outlines a third way—one that melds power and principle. America's westward expansion and rise to global power, he explains, have been inextricably linked to the idea that liberal democracy is the best form of government, not only for the United States but also for the world at large.

Kagan likewise demolishes the conventional narrative that portrays the legacy of the American Revolution as anti-imperialist. Indeed, Kagan shows that much of the problem between the colonists and Britain can be traced to the fact that the former had imperial designs of their own that the latter constantly thwarted, as for instance, in the case of the Proclamation of 1763 that attempted to curb trans-Appalachian settlement. Of course, in the eyes of the Americans, the empire they envisioned was not to be based on conquest, but instead, in the words of Thomas Jefferson, an "empire of liberty."

Perhaps the most interesting part of *Dangerous Nation*, however, is its treatment of the antebellum period, when the debate over slavery became the central issue in American politics. As Kagan shows, this debate affected foreign policy as well. On the one hand, advocates of slavery favored expansion and the creation of a vast slave-holding empire into Mexico and the Caribbean. On the other, anti-slavery Americans were not opposed to expansion on principle, but their support for the growth of the United States was tempered by their fear that American expansion would mean the expansion of slavery. "Mexico will poison us," lamented one anti-slavery opponent of the Mexican War.

During this period, it was difficult for the United States to portray itself as the defender of universal human rights. The reason was well articulated by Abraham Lincoln in his 1854 speech condemning the repeal of the Missouri Compromise, which had effectively blocked the expansion of slavery into most of the territories carved out of the Louisiana Purchase.

> I hate [slavery] because of the monstrous injustice of slavery itself. I hate it because it deprives our republican example of its just influence in the world—enables the enemies of free institutions, with plausibility, to taunt us as hypocrites—causes the real friends of freedom to doubt our sincerity, and especially because it forces so many really good men amongst

> ourselves into an open war with the very fundamental principles of civil liberty—criticizing the Declaration of Independence, and insisting that there is no right principle of action but self-interest.

But with the triumph of the North in the War of the Rebellion, the logic of liberty that Lincoln discerned in the Declaration of Independence could be extended to foreign policy as well.

For instance, the stated desire of the United States to free Cuba from a despotic Spain, which helped to bring about the Spanish-American War, can be traced to another speech by Lincoln that illustrates the logic of liberty. In his speech on the Dred Scott Decision of 1857, he said, "I think the authors of [the Declaration of Independence] intended to include all men, but they did not intend to declare men equal in all respects. They did not mean to say that all were equal in color, size, intellect, moral developments, or social capacity. They defined with tolerable distinctness, in what respects they did consider all men created equal—equal in 'certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.'"

He also argued that the Founders

> did not mean to assert the obvious untruth, that all men were then actually enjoying that equality, nor yet, that they were about to confer it immediately upon them. In fact they had no power to confer such a boon. They meant simply to declare the right, so that the enforcement of it might follow as fast as circumstances should permit. They meant to set up a standard maxim for a free society, which should be familiar to all, and revered by all; constantly looked to, constantly labored for, and even though never perfectly attained, constantly approximated, and thereby constantly spreading and deepening its influence, and augmenting the happiness and value of life to all people of all colors everywhere.

Cannot the logic of this argument be applied to the liberation of Iraq?

Some have suggested that Kagan has set up a straw man; that he overstates the extent to which contemporary Americans imagine U.S. history to be thoroughly isolationist. But consider this statement from the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, an organization created to oppose the alleged "imperial" foreign policy of the Bush administration: "the American people have not embraced the idea of an American empire, and they are unlikely to do so. Since rebelling against the British Empire, Americans have resisted the imperial impulse, guided by the Founders' frequent warnings that republic and empire are incompatible."

Now, reasonable people can disagree with the Bush Doctrine. But while everyone is entitled to his or her opinion, they are not entitled to make up their own facts. Kagan shows that the Founders and the statesmen of the Early Republic were not isolationist, and that the U.S. national interest long has been concerned with more than simple security—it has always had both a commercial and an ideological component.

Kagan reminds us why despots and tyrants in particular have considered the United States to be a "dangerous nation." Before the American founding, all regimes were based on the principle of interest—the interest of the stronger. Inequality, whether between master and slave or between aristocrat and commoner, was simply part of the accepted order. But the

United States was founded on different principles—justice and equality. No longer would it be the foundation of political government that some men were born "with saddles on their backs" to be ridden by others born "booted and spurred." In other words, no one had the right to rule over another without the latter's consent. While the United States has not always lived up to its own principles, it has nonetheless created the standard of justice in both domestic and international affairs.

We owe a debt of gratitude to Robert Kagan for making this point so clearly.

THE Journal OF INTERNATIONAL Security Affairs

www.securityaffairs.org
1779 Massachusetts Ave., NW • Suite 515 • Washington, D.C. 20036