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From the Publisher

Lincoln once declared, "A house divided against itself cannot stand."

Of course, Lincoln was talking about the division between the North and the South, an internal debate without an external enemy. Today, America is once again divided. This time, however, it is not a civil war, although it is a war fought with very little civility. And today, there is another element present—an external enemy that seeks our destruction.

Existentially, we are not vulnerable. America is still the greatest power on earth. Some may think that this is a bad thing, but it is not. Power only becomes bad when it is used as an instrument of evil, to harm others. And the United States is a righteous power if there ever has been one. Yet there are those who would have us believe otherwise, and that is the enemy's greatest weapon.

Our enemy has only one hope, and that is to turn Americans against each other. Unfortunately, there are many in this country that would gladly cooperate. I'm willing to wager that if you took all the ink used to vilify our President and weighed it against the amount used to vilify Osama bin Laden, the scale would overwhelmingly tip toward the former.

There is something very wrong with that picture. It is time to devote more ink, more time and more footage to defining the purpose of the war—and less time to self-flagellation.

This issue focuses on Africa, another area of crisis. But then, where in the world is there not a crisis today? It is a continent that faces starvation, terrorism, genocide, disease and massive poverty, and is the recipient of American largesse. To be sure, not enough largesse, but what other country is doling out anything significant and so selflessly in Africa? It's not the Russians. It's not the Chinese. And it is certainly not the wealthy Arab states.

Power can be used for good if it is in the right hands. And currently, it is. Let's use some ink to remind us of that. And let's use some ink to remind us that American power deserves to be protected from the evil that seeks to replace it.



Tom Neumann
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Editor's Corner

Africa. The word conjures up images of an impoverished continent, of great human suffering and unspeakable atrocities, a land that long languished on the margins of global geopolitics.

No longer. "Africa plays an increased strategic role militarily, economically and politically," General Jim Jones, Commander of the U.S. European Command (EUCOM), told the *Wall Street Journal* this past spring. "We have to become more agile in terms of being able to compete in this environment." If anything, Jones' words were an understatement. Today, EUCOM—traditionally the military command responsible for assisting safety and security throughout Europe—is estimated instead to spend some 70 percent of its time dealing with Africa.

Africa, in other words, is beginning to take center stage on Washington policy planners' agendas. Therefore, in this issue of *The Journal*, we take a preliminary look at the problems, and the prospects, that confront the United States there with a series of six articles. Former Maryland Lieutenant Governor (and current Africa hand) Michael Steele examines the energy potential of West Africa—and what the United States can do to harness it. James Madison University's J. Peter Pham outlines the likely shape of the Pentagon's new military command for the continent, AFRICOM. John Prendergast, one of the most recognizable Africa activists around, gives his thoughts about what a real "Plan B" to curb the genocide in Darfur would look like. Islam scholar Robert Spencer chronicles the short, unhappy reign of the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia—and the lessons to be learned from it. Then, Reuven Paz and Moshe Terdman of Israel's PRISM Center provide a bird's-eye view of Islam's inroads into the African continent, and likely future trouble-spots. Last, but most certainly not least, Claudia Rosett of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies provides a scathing critique of Africa's exploitation by the United Nations, the one international body believed to be most dedicated to its betterment.

Our second set of feature articles deals with new thinking on a quartet of seemingly intractable problems. Keith Smith of the Center for Strategic and International Studies outlines the threat to Europe posed by Russian energy pressure, and what the continent can do about it. The American Foreign Policy Council's Stephen Yates looks anew at the U.S.-China relationship—and the principles that can and should underpin the next president's China policy. Author Gordon Chang offers his thoughts on the reasons behind Washington's persistent failure to formulate a successful strategy against the Stalinist regime in North Korea, and how it can start to do so. And analyst Eric Rozenman provides a provocative examination of what comes next in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, now that the dream of an independent "Palestine" is well and truly dead.

This issue also boasts three "dispatches" from foreign experts. The Honorable Elmar Mammadyarov, foreign minister of Azerbaijan, explains his country's strategic priorities, and outlines his vision of a future regional role for the former

Soviet republic. French geopolitical expert Frederic Encel takes an early look at the changes that can be expected in his country's foreign policy, now that the baton has been passed from longtime premier Jacques Chirac to his young and vibrant successor, Nicolas Sarkozy. Finally, Hiroyasu Akutsu of Japan's Okazaki Institute assesses the evolution of the strategic ties between the U.S. and Japan, and gives his thoughts on the likely trajectory of one of America's most important international partnerships. Rounding out the issue are reviews of three important books: *The War of Ideas* by terrorism expert Walid Phares; *Überpower* by Josef Joffe, one of Europe's most articulate and ardent strategic thinkers; and *Second Chance*, former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski's latest controversial look at future U.S. foreign policy.

As always, we at *The Journal* welcome your comments, questions and responses. Debate is not just important to informed foreign policy, it is essential to it. And we are confident that this issue, like previous ones, will give its readers much to contemplate.

Ilan Berman
Editor

West Africa's Energy Promise

Michael S. Steele

In the summer of 2004, I had the privilege of leading a delegation of Maryland academic and business leaders on a trade mission to Ghana and South Africa. The first stop was a visit to St. George Castle and Elmina Castle, where hundreds of years before the journey for many Africans had ended in slavery. Standing there, I was struck by the realization that it would be the current generation that would lead Africa to emerge in this century as a global economic and strategic force.

During the course of my visit, I witnessed firsthand how the seeds of self-empowerment were being planted through market reforms across the continent. I gained a new appreciation for the kind of business climate that continuing market liberalization and privatization can create, and also for the positive support that U.S.-sponsored trade legislation can offer to such reforms. Measures such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the Southern Africa Customs Union Free Trade Agreement (SACU-FTA) are helping to make Africa more attractive to U.S. companies. These reforms and the partnerships which they foster will shape the economy of both continents for generations to come.

And then there is energy. Today, many factors have combined to make Africa strategically significant for American policymakers, but none more so than the geopolitical dynamics of oil. Not only is its crude of a higher quality than that of other oil-producing regions, such as the Middle East and the Cas-

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pian Basin, but its geographic proximity to U.S. ports makes Africa an attractive energy alternative. Moreover, African governments on the whole provide greater—and more predictable—opportunities to U.S. and multinational companies than do their Middle Eastern and Central Asian counterparts. Last, but certainly not least, the continent's governments have come to demonstrate an expanding appreciation for the benefits of Western-style democracy.

Washington has responded to this emerging market with the creation of a new military command structure for the continent. But other countries have also taken note of Africa's natural resource wealth and strategic potential. Leading the way is energy-hungry China, which already has become heavily engaged in a number of regional nations, chief among them oil producers Nigeria and Sudan.

With so much at stake, and with the lessons of America's involvement in the Persian Gulf playing out in the news on a daily basis, Africa—and in particular the energy-rich region of West Africa, which encompasses Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Cape Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo—holds out both promise and peril. If our strategic engagement is predicated upon a new dynamic aimed at securing peace, prosperity and economic growth, America's deepening links to the continent could yield major benefits. If handled improperly, however, the growing U.S. focus could exacerbate the economic inequalities, corruption and radicalism already prevalent on the continent. Consequently, the United States has an enormously important opportunity to see to it that Africa's natural resource wealth is harnessed properly—not for exploitation, but rather empowerment—and used to create economic opportunities, vibrant policies and civil societies that will endure long after the last tanker has set sail.

Africa's appeal

"Over the last forty years, we have seen significant energy production growth in Africa, especially in the Gulf of Guinea," U.S. Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman recently told a gathering of some of the world's top energy experts and traders. "Africa accounts for almost 12 percent of world oil supply and supplies approximately 19 percent of U.S. net oil imports. The Gulf of Guinea and other parts of Africa are projected to play a greater role in international energy markets and imports of African oil to the U.S. are expected to rise in the future as new fields are brought online."[1]

Secretary Bodman's remarks highlight an unmistakable fact: In the era of global terror, security of supply has trumped pricing of supply in the energy calculus. For decades, U.S. energy policy was based on the creation of a military defense umbrella around the Arabian Peninsula in order to guarantee the steady supply of crude oil from exporters like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Iran and Iraq. And while the warning signs of the problems inherent in this arrangement were plentiful—the Arab oil embargo of the 1970s, the Iranian hostage crisis, the Beirut embassy bombing, the nearly-decade-long Iran-Iraq war, and war between the United States and Iraq—it took an event like September 11th to focus the public's attention on our dysfunctional relationship with the region.

In his 2006 State of the Union address, President Bush declared that America is "addicted to oil" and outlined a goal of reducing our dependence on oil imports from the Middle East by 25 percent by 2020 through a combination of conservation and fuel diversification.[2] But the reality is that in order for our economy to continue to grow, America will need to remain reliant on oil imports for decades to come. It is prudent, then, for U.S. policymakers to put greater emphasis on diversifying the country's current set of energy suppliers, while seeking more secure and promising ones.

West Africa represents a bright spot in this policy calculus. Although few would use those words to describe the region, in actuality Africa is one of very few places where conventional crude oil production is increasing. Already, the oil producing nations of West Africa export roughly 1.8 million barrels per day (mbd) to the United States, accounting for 18 percent of U.S. daily crude oil imports.[3] If Nigeria weren't in the midst of various work stoppages, its full production would bring the percentage of oil supplied to the U.S. by West Africa to roughly 22 percent. By way of comparison, the U.S. currently imports roughly 2.2 mbd (also 22 percent of our daily imports) from Persian Gulf oil exporters—the largest of which, Saudi Arabia, accounts for 1.5 mbd.[4] And with major plans to expand production underway, West African proven reserves could swell to well over 40 billion barrels over the next several years.[5] Many analysts now predict that crude oil production from West Africa could more than triple by the end of the next decade. If these projections prove accurate, West Africa will provide more than 25 percent of America's oil imports within five years.

West Africa's strategic value is also enhanced by its proximity to the U.S. market. Crude oil shipments from Saudi Arabia take five weeks or more to reach the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port (LOOP). Shipments from Nigeria take half that time, or less. Since time truly is money in the global oil business, the geographic proximity of producers to consumers will dictate commercial engagements in coming years.

The quality of African crude is also a factor. Most energy security analysts can't give a speech without talking about the "fungibility" of crude oil. They talk about situations in which spare capacity somewhere will offset supply disruptions elsewhere, resulting in a more or less stable commodity pricing environment. In reality, however, not all crude oil is created equal. Only crude of like quality (and geographically proximate to consuming markets) is truly fungible. And much of the crude oil produced in West Africa is "light, sweet," the very high quality preferred by U.S. refiners. All of which means that, as conventional production of light, sweet crude continues to decline, oil from West Africa will become even more valuable to the United States.

Another of West Africa's strategic advantages is that it is mostly open to foreign investment, particularly from the United States. Other high-producing, highly prospective hydrocarbon regions either discourage foreign investment through domestic political machinations (Russia) or eschew foreign investment in favor of nationalization of natural resources for geopolitical purposes (Venezuela). Africa's comparative openness to a variety of strategic relationships has aided its oil-producing nations in creating greater opportunities for a

different kind of synergy built around the idea of investment, development and expansion—crucial ingredients for creating a "New Africa."

For those American firms with the patience and foresight, doing business with this "New Africa" can be extremely rewarding. In representing governments, parastatals, multinational corporations and privately-owned companies, banking and financial institutions, companies such as the one this author is affiliated with, LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae, have developed a wealth of real world experience and a genuine understanding of doing business in West Africa. They have done so by embracing the key rules of international business: meet face-to-face, learn about the customs and the culture of the country, experience firsthand the business environment and then establish a relationship. From structuring projects like Ghana's flagship West Africa Gas Pipeline to creating for the government of Mauritania innovative financing of its interest in the Chinguetti field in its offshore waters, to assisting in liquid natural gas (LNG) projects in Equatorial Guinea, the work of LeBoeuf, Lamb and other firms stands out as examples of the magnitude of the opportunities available as many African countries generally, and those in West Africa in particular, expand their energy generation, oil and gas, mining and infrastructure sectors.

The economic ties between the United States and West Africa run deeper than oil, however. The adoption of the AGOA in 2000 has led to increased bilateral trade between the nations of Africa and the United States. As Florie Liser, Assistant U.S. Trade Representative for Africa, noted recently, "from 2001 to now, we've had an increase in our two-way trade of about 150 percent. AGOA includes oil products. And so if you include all of the oil products, and you look at our imports from AGOA countries in 2006, it was up about 16 percent over 2005. Most of that was because of oil. But what's really important to watch is what happens with non-oil AGOA trade. That trade increased by 7 percent in 2006 over the 2005 period."[6] The economic relationship, in other words, is expanding every year and providing thousands of jobs annually for African citizens. This expansion reflects the fact that trade, in the words of U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab, "is the best tool we have to alleviate poverty and spur economic development, and AGOA is a key element in America's effort."[7]

When you contrast this multi-sector economic engagement with that of America and many Persian Gulf oil producers, you quickly realize that there simply is no comparison.

Taking notice

While many argue that it took American defense and energy policy planners too long to recognize West Africa's significance, no one can argue with the speed of the U.S. government's response once it finally did. On February 7, 2007, President Bush signaled America's acknowledgement of Africa as an area of vital strategic interest with the creation of a unified military infrastructure responsible for the entire continent (with the exception of Egypt). This new Africa Command (AFRICOM) "will strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and help to create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners in Africa," the Commander-in-Chief said. "Africa Command will enhance our efforts to help bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote

our common goals of development, health, education, democracy and economic growth in Africa."[8]

AFRICOM's first test once it comes online in 2008 will likely come from oil-rich West Africa, where shipping lanes are virtually lawless, unable to be patrolled by oil-producing nations that uniformly lack blue-water naval capabilities. And while it is unlikely that terrorists could interdict an ocean-going oil tanker at sea in a region without the strategic chokepoints present on other major oil transit routes, attacks on offshore oil platforms and FPSOs (floating production storage offshore vessels) are conceivable. Such an attack would be enough to send a collective shudder through the global oil markets that would be felt by every person on the planet.

AFRICOM's establishment thus signals Washington's growing understanding that the need to react to the military challenges of the 21st century requires a better preparedness for action in, and engagement with, African governments and military forces. According to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, the rationale behind AFRICOM is "to oversee security, cooperation, building partnership capability, defense support to nonmilitary missions, and, if directed military operations on the African continent." "This command," Gates has said, "will enable us to have a more effective and integrated approach than the current arrangement of dividing Africa between Central Command and European Command, an outdated arrangement left over from the Cold War."[9]

Of course, not everyone concerned is excited about this turn of events. Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi, for one, has been working behind the scenes in recent years to rebuild his relationship with Washington in order to preserve his own succession plan. "We told [the Americans] we do not need military aircraft flying over, nor do we need military bases," the Colonel is reported to have said. "We are in need of economic elements and economic support. If your support to us is military intervention, then we do not need you, or your help."[10]

If our strategic engagement in Africa is predicated upon a new dynamic aimed at securing peace, prosperity and economic growth, America's deepening links to the continent could yield major benefits. If handled improperly, however, the growing U.S. focus could exacerbate the economic inequalities, corruption and radicalism already prevalent there.

That the presence of the U.S. military on the continent in the first measurable numbers since World War II would give pause to African leaders like Qadhafi is no surprise. But U.S. defense officials are quick to say that the creation of AFRICOM is not designed to create a sizeable presence of forces on the continent. Still, there appears to be a policy disconnect within the government about the new command's actual purpose. Ryan Henry, the deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, has made clear that AFRICOM "is being stood up solely for the effort of enhanced counterterrorism," rather than for the purpose of securing "resources such as oil."[11] Yet, according to Vice Admiral John Stufflebeem, the Commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, the U.S. is interested in Africa for security and because of commerce, "and quite frankly, oil is one part of it."[12]

Whether these divergent remarks signal a significant disconnect between stated policy objectives and operational tactics or are merely a lapse in continuity of communication remains to be seen. But it underscores that America's emerging focus on Africa is still a work in progress.

Breaking the habit

"In West Africa, the scent of oil alone may be enough to produce corruption," says Joseph Bell, a Washington lawyer who serves as an advisor to the government of São Tomé and Príncipe.[13] Bell's assessment rings true; today West African governments—even those ostensibly interested in using their (future) oil riches for the betterment of their people—are confronted with the lure of massive infusions of capital, often with no strings attached.

The examples of Nigeria and São Tomé are instructive. The energy wealth (and great need for power generation) of the former makes it too great a prize for U.S. policymakers and multinationals simply to ignore. But after years of intensive international development, the problems of internal security, an immature regulatory regime and questions about transparency and the independence of its judiciary (not to mention official and private sector corruption) are so great that one almost doesn't know how to begin to address them. The latter, meanwhile, is virtually a clean slate, a fledgling nation whose modest energy potential has not yet begun to be developed. Yet already, prospective investors and speculators have made sure that once development does begin in earnest, the potential for corruption will be present there as well.[14]

If the United States hopes to break this vicious cycle, its political and economic involvement in West Africa will need to be about more than simply providing a security umbrella for corrupt dictators in exchange for oil shipments. Instead, policymakers in Washington should measure their engagement against a series of concrete and attainable goals.

Human rights—As a country founded by rugged individualists seeking freedom from religious persecution and a better way of life for their families, the United States ought to have as one of its guiding foreign policy principles that countries with which it has strategic relationships, and on which it spends its foreign aid, maintain the same respect for human rights that it does. If we are prepared to declare Africa an area of vital strategic interest to the United States, we ought to be able to show its nations the benefits of treating its people justly and with respect. There is nothing to be gained by American policymakers in being meek in such areas. Advances in human rights and standards of living should be monitored, with U.S. aid being tied directly to measurable advances in the quality of life of the people whose resources we are buying to fuel our economic growth.

The rule of law—Creating or supporting a system in which citizens are afraid of their own government just so that we have access to natural resources should not be acceptable. Governments receiving U.S. aid must be held to a high standard of governance, forced to create a system of laws that empowers their citizens to reach their individual and collective potential without fear of retribution from authoritarian regimes.

This is not nation-building. Nor is it forcing democracy down the throats of an unwilling people. Nei-

ther of those options has been proven to work, especially where vast natural resource wealth in the hands of a few is the basis for the new society. Rather, American policymakers can and should encourage independent decisions by the populations of the various countries with which the U.S. chooses to do business. The rule should be: "If you want our business, you had better conform to basic standards of respect for human rights and be a nation of laws."

Real property rights—Hand in hand with the two requirements above is the recognition that real property rights are the basis for any developing economy. In other words, who is going to take the personal risk in opening a small business if they can't be certain that their investment won't be taken from them arbitrarily later? Creating a system of property ownership rights would set the stage for the type of multi-sector economic development that could help break the "oil curse" that has plagued so many resource-rich areas, including West Africa, in past years.

Respect for the environment—Bringing the nations of West Africa into the 21st century through economic development and foreign investment shouldn't require the same mistakes made by other industrialized nations in the 20th century. We know much more about what proper environmental standards are required to maintain a sustainable, good quality of life than we did several decades ago. As such, we should require that those companies operating in West Africa operate in an environmentally sound manner, creating the smallest "footprint" possible and leaving the places where they operate better than they found them. Once technological advances supplant the need for fossil fuels, it will be feasible to talk about discontinuing their use. Until then, the United States should make it a priority to pursue their use judiciously and in environmentally responsible ways.

Many analysts now predict that crude oil production from West Africa could more than triple by the end of the next decade. If these projections prove accurate, West Africa will provide more than 25 percent of America's oil imports within five years.

Transparency and good governance—Just saying that you intend to spend money wisely for the betterment of your people should not be good enough to secure project financing through international financial organizations like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. When literally life-changing amounts of money are at stake, a framework should be established for complete transparency in how much oil royalty revenue is taken in and from whom, where it is spent and on what, and how the people have benefited as a result. This seems complicated, but it is really nothing more than what independent auditors do every year for publicly traded companies to prove to shareholders that the executives are discharging their fiduciary obligations properly. The American government, as well as international financial institutions and foreign oil companies, should be held to the highest standards of transparency and fair dealing in their operations in West Africa. Host governments must be held to the same high standard, because at the end of the day they will need the investment dollars of all

comers, not merely those who might not care how royalty money is spent.

Achieving Africa's potential

West Africa is indeed a region of vital strategic importance to U.S. energy and national security. But it is also a region of the world that has been neglected, marginalized or manipulated for centuries as a result of colonialism and Cold War geopolitics. Today, because of its vast wealth of strategic resources, Africa is finally beginning to come into its own on the world stage. However, if an African "Renaissance" is going to be more than simply a slogan or an aspiration, the U.S. has an obligation to recognize Africa as something more than simply an economic opportunity, the way China and India now do.

Instead of repeating our past mistakes of taking only what we need from resource-rich regions of the world, we need to proceed in our engagement with Africa from a more forward-looking and thoughtful approach. Such an approach needs to recognize that while West Africa is important to the U.S. because of its vast oil and natural gas reserves, the entire continent could easily become fertile ground for global terrorism—a safe haven for radicals who could eventually strike American targets on the continent or closer to home.

Most of all, the United States needs to proceed knowing that the strategic and economic decisions it makes today will affect generations of Africans and Americans alike for generations to come. We might as well try to get it right this time.

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Securing Africa

J. Peter Pham

On February 6, 2007, President George W. Bush launched a major evolution in American military posture when he formally announced that he had directed the Pentagon to establish a new unified combatant command, Africa Command (AFRICOM), by October 2008. Officially, AFRICOM's mission will be to "enhance our efforts to bring peace and security to the people of Africa and promote our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa" by strengthening bilateral and multilateral security cooperation with African states and creating new opportunities to bolster their capabilities.[1]

The President's decision, although anticipated by some astute observers, was nonetheless quite extraordinary. Back in 2000, then-candidate Bush had responded in the negative when asked whether Africa fitted into his definition of the strategic interests of the United States. "At some point in time the president's got to clearly define what the national strategic interests are, and while Africa may be important, it doesn't fit into the national strategic interests, as far as I can see them," Bush told PBS' Jim Lehrer.[2]

Bush's campaign remark may have offended Africanists, but it nonetheless reflected a foreign policy truism of the time; with the exception of Cold War era concerns about Soviet attempts to secure a foothold on the continent, American interests in Africa historically have been framed almost exclusively

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in terms of preoccupation over the humanitarian consequences of poverty, war, and natural disaster. Today, however, things are substantially different. While the moral impulses of Americans remain strong, since 9/11 a more strategic view of Africa has begun to emerge in Washington.

Broadly conceived, there are three major areas in which Africa's significance for America—or at least the recognition thereof—has grown exponentially in recent years. The first is Africa's role in the "Global War on Terror" and the potential of the poorly governed spaces of the continent to provide facilitating environments, recruits, and eventual targets for Islamist terrorists who threaten Western interests in general and those of the United States in particular. Indeed, in some regions, like the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, this has already become a reality. The second important consideration is Africa's abundant natural resources, particularly those in its burgeoning energy sector. The third area of interest remains the humanitarian concern for the devastating toll which conflict, poverty, and disease, especially HIV/AIDS, continue to exact in Africa.

Terrorism's trail

There is no denying that for the foreseeable future, irrespective of the results of the 2008 election, U.S. security policy will be dictated largely by the "Global War on Terror," the "Long War," or whatever the designation *du jour* for the fight against transnational Islamist terrorism happens to be. The Bush administration's 2002 National Security Strategy rightly acknowledged that "weak states… can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states. Poverty does not make poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders."[3]

With the possible exception of the greater Middle East, nowhere is this analysis truer than in Africa. There, regional conflicts arising from a variety of causes, including poor governance, external aggression, competing claims, internal revolt, and ethnic and religious tensions, all "lead to the same ends: failed states, humanitarian disasters, and ungoverned areas that can become safe havens for terrorists," the National Security Strategy notes.[4]

Over the past decade, al-Qaeda's 1998 terrorist attacks on the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya, and on an Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, and, simultaneously, on an Israeli commercial airliner in 2002, have hammered home the deadly reality of the terrorist threat in Africa. Perhaps the most eloquent reminder of the particular vulnerability of the continent to terrorism, however, comes from the terrorists themselves. In June 2006, a new online magazine for actual and aspiring global *jihadis* and their supporters, *Sada al-Jihad* ("Echo of Jihad"), featured an article by one Abu Azzam al-Ansari entitled "Al-Qaeda Is Moving to Africa."[5] In it, the author was remarkably frank:

> There is no doubt that al-Qaeda and the holy warriors appreciate the significance of the African regions for the military campaigns against the Crusaders. Many people sense that this continent has not yet found its proper and expected role and the next stages of the conflict will see Africa as the battlefield.

With rather commendable analytical rigor, Abu Azzam then proceeded to enumerate and evaluate what he

perceived to be significant advantages to al-Qaeda's shifting terrorist operations to Africa. These include:

- the fact that *jihadi* doctrines have already been spread within the Muslim communities of many African countries;
- the political and military weakness of African governments;
- the wide availability of weapons;
- the geographical position of Africa vis-à-vis international trade routes;
- the proximity to old conflicts against "Jews and Crusaders" in the Middle East, as well as new ones like Darfur, where the author almost gleefully welcomed the possibility of Western intervention;
- the poverty of Africa, which "will enable the holy warriors to provide some finance and welfare, thus, posting there some of their influential operatives";
- the technical and scientific skills that potential African recruits would bring to the *jihadi* cause;
- the presence of large Muslim communities, including ones already embroiled in conflict with Christians or adherents of traditional African religions;
- the links to Europe through North Africa, "which facilitates the move from there to carry out attacks"; and
- the fact that Africa has a wealth of natural resources, including hydrocarbons and other raw materials, which are "very useful for the holy warriors in the intermediate and long term."

Abu Azzam concluded his assessment on an ominous note:

> In general, this continent has an immense significance. Whoever looks at Africa can see that it does not enjoy the interest, efforts, and activity it deserves in the war against the Crusaders. This is a continent with many potential advantages and exploiting this potential will greatly advance the jihad. It will promote achieving the expected targets of Jihad. Africa is a fertile soil for the advance of jihad and the *jihadi* cause.

It would be a mistake to dismiss this analysis as devoid of operational effect. Shortly before the publication of the article, the Islamic Courts Union, an Islamist movement whose leaders included a number of figures linked to al-Qaeda, seized control of the sometime Somali capital of Mogadishu and subsequently overran most of the country.[6] While forceful intervention by neighboring Ethiopia in late December 2006 dislodged the Islamists, Somalia's internationally-recognized but utterly ineffective "Transitional Federal Government" has yet to assert itself in the face of a growing insurgency which has adopted the same non-conventional tactics that foreign *jihadis* and Sunni Arab insurgents have used to great effect in Iraq.

Meanwhile, another al-Qaeda "franchise" has sought to reignite conflict in Algeria and spread it to the Sahel, the critical boundary region where sub-Saharan Africa meets North Africa and where vast empty spaces and highly permeable bor-

ders are readily exploitable by local and international militants alike. Last year, the Algerian Islamist terrorist group Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (usually known by its French acronym, GSPC) formally pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, and began identifying itself in communiqués as "Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb." The link to al-Qaeda was confirmed by bin Laden's deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who, in the "commemorative video" the terrorist group issued on the fifth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, declared that bin Laden had instructed him "to give the good news to Muslims in general and my *mujahidin* brothers everywhere that the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat has joined [the] al-Qaeda organization."[7] Zawahiri hailed the "blessed union" between the GSPC and al-Qaeda, pledging that it would "be a source of chagrin, frustration and sadness for the apostates [of the regime in Algeria], the treacherous sons of [former colonial power] France." Results have not been long in coming; last April, al-Qaeda's new affiliate claimed credit for a pair of bomb blasts—one close to the prime minister's office, the other near a police station—that rocked Algiers, killing two dozen people and wounding more than a hundred, shattering the calm that the Algerian capital had enjoyed since the conclusion of the brutal civil war of the 1990s.

Perhaps most menacing, however, is an increasingly apparent willingness on the part of transnational Islamist terror networks to exploit the grievances nursed by some African Muslim communities, and to reach out to other, non-Muslim militants to make common cause against mutual enemies. While there is no shortage of violent non-Muslim groups in sub-Saharan Africa, the region has long been plagued by a number of indigenous Islamist groups like the Eritrean Islamic Jihad, Ethiopia's Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), and the Allied Democratic Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF/NALU). More recently, evidence has emerged that outside forces have been providing these groups with strategic guidance, tactical assistance, and operational planning. The ONLF, for example, has been battling successive Ethiopian governments for years with the goal of splitting the ethnic Somali region from the country. However, it was only within the last year that the group acquired from somewhere the wherewithal to mount the most spectacular attack within Ethiopia since the fall of the Derg dictatorship in 1991.

Terrorist groups have also profited from the weak governance capacities of African states, which have afforded them the opportunity to raise money by soliciting sympathizers, and to trade in gemstones and other natural resources as a means to launder and make money. Former *Washington Post* correspondent Douglas Farah, for example, has reported on how al-Qaeda procured somewhere between $30 million and $50 million worth of Sierra Leonean "conflict diamonds" through the good offices of then Liberian president Charles Taylor in the month before the September 11 attacks.[8] Similarly, Hezbollah is known to have used the extensive Lebanese Shi'a communities in places like Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea to make money in an illicit market estimated by the United Nations to be worth between $170 million and $370 million.[9] Thus, it is not surprising that the most recent iteration of the National Security Strategy goes out of its way to affirm that

"Africa holds growing geo-strategic importance and is a high priority of this Administration."[10]

The new Gulf

In his 2006 State of the Union address, President Bush called for the United States to "replace more than 75 percent of our oil imports from the Middle East by 2025" and to "make our dependence on Middle Eastern oil a thing of the past."[11] According to the Department of Energy's Energy Information Administration, America has already made significant progress in its effort, thanks in large measure to the abundant energy resources of Africa. This past March, Nigeria edged past Saudi Arabia to become America's third largest supplier, delivering 41,717,000 barrels of oil that month, compared to the Kingdom's 38,557,000. When one adds Angola's 22,542,000 barrels to the former figure, two African states now supply more of America's energy needs than Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates combined.[12]

This natural wealth makes Africa an inviting target for the attentions of the People's Republic of China, whose dynamic economy, averaging nine percent growth per annum over the last two decades, has created an almost insatiable thirst for oil and other natural resources. China is currently importing approximately 2.6 million barrels of crude per day, about half of its consumption. More than 765,000 of those barrels—roughly a third of its total imports—come from African sources, especially Sudan, Angola, and Congo (Brazzaville). Is it any wonder, then, that apart from the Central Eurasian region on its own northwestern frontier, perhaps no other foreign locale rivals Africa as the object of Beijing's sustained strategic interest?

Last year, the Chinese regime published its first ever official white paper on policy toward Africa. This year, ahead of his twelve-day, eight-nation tour of Africa—the third such journey since he took office in 2003—Chinese President Hu Jintao announced a three-year, $3 billion program in preferential loans and expanded aid for Africa. These funds come on top of the $3 billion in loans and $2 billion in export credits that Hu announced in October 2006 at the opening of the historic Beijing summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). Intentionally or not, many analysts expect that Africa—especially the states along its oil-rich western coastline—will increasingly becoming a theater for strategic rivalry between the United States and its only real near-peer competitor on the global stage, China.[13]

Yet, for all its global importance, the African littoral—especially the Gulf of Guinea, the Gulf of Aden and other waters off Somalia, and the "Swahili Coast" of East Africa—have seen comparatively few resources poured into maritime security. This deficit only worsens when one considers the scale of the area in question, and the magnitude of the challenges faced. Depending on how one chooses to define the Gulf of Guinea region, the nearly 3,500 miles of coastline running in an arc from West Africa to Angola, for example, are highly susceptible to piracy, criminal enterprises, and poaching, in addition to the security challenge presented by the area's burgeoning oil industry.

The International Maritime Bureau's *Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report* covering the first quarter of 2007, for instance, noted that while the number of reported attacks declined significantly compared to one year earlier, the figure

for incidents off the coast of Nigeria had doubled.[14] At the same time, the Gulf of Guinea's oil-producing states have long struggled with the practice of "illegal bunkering," the tapping of pipelines for oil which is eventually loaded onto tankers and sold to refineries elsewhere at a considerable profit. There is also an increasing drug trade through the subregion: Nigeria is the transshipment point for approximately one-third of the heroin seized by authorities in the United States and more than half of the cocaine seized by South African officials. European law enforcement officials meanwhile report that poorly-scrutinized West Africa has become the major conduit for drugs shipped to their countries by Latin American cartels.[15]

In response to these challenges, the *National Strategy for Maritime Security* issued by the United States in 2005 declared that:

> Assisting regional partners to maintain the maritime sovereignty of their territorial seas and internal waters is a longstanding objective of the United States and contributes directly to the partners' economic development as well as their ability to combat unlawful or hostile exploitation by a variety of threats. For example, as a result of our active discussions with African partners, the United States is now appropriating funding for the implementation of border and coastal security initiatives along the lines of the former Africa Coastal Security (ACS) Program. Preventing unlawful or hostile exploitation of the maritime domain requires that nations collectively improve their capability to monitor activity throughout the domain, establish responsive decision-making architectures, enhance maritime interdiction capacity, develop effective policing protocols, and build intergovernmental cooperation. The United States, in cooperation with its allies, will lead an international effort to improve monitoring and enforcement capabilities through enhanced cooperation at the bilateral, regional, and global level.[16]

Humanitarian impulses

While concern over terrorism and other potential security threats, as well as the growing importance of Africa's hydrocarbon and other natural resources, has amplified America's focus in recent years, the humanitarian impulses that motivated policy toward the African continent for so long have not been lost. If anything, they have acquired new importance as the United States reassesses and reconfigures its strategic engagement with Africa. Consider the following data points:

- Africa boasts the world's fastest rate of population growth. By 2020, Africans will number more than 1.2 billion—more than the combined populations of Europe and North America. And by then, the median age of Europeans will be 45, while nearly half of the African population will be under the age of 15.

- The dynamic potential implicit in the demographic figures just cited is, however, constrained, by the economic and epidemiological data. The United Nations Development Program's *Human Development Report 2006* determined that of the 31 countries found to have "low development," 29 were African states—more than half of the membership of the African Union.[17] While sub-Saharan Africa is home to only 10 percent of the world's population, nearly

> two-thirds of the people infected with HIV—24.7 million—are sub-Saharan Africans, with an estimated 2.8 million becoming infected in 2006, more than any other region in the world.[18]

Thus, while the 2003 *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* correctly argued that terrorist organizations have little in common with the poor and destitute, it also acknowledged that terrorists can exploit these socioeconomic conditions to their advantage.[19] President Bush confirmed this concern when he noted in his 2005 address on the occasion of the United Nations' 60th anniversary:

> We must defeat the terrorists on the battlefield, and we must also defeat them in the battle of ideas. We must change the conditions that allow terrorists to flourish and recruit, by spreading the hope of freedom to millions who've never known it. We must help raise up the failing states and stagnant societies that provide fertile ground for the terrorists. We must defend and extend a vision of human dignity, and opportunity, and prosperity—a vision far stronger than the dark appeal of resentment and murder. To spread a vision of hope, the United States is determined to help nations that are struggling with poverty.[20]

The Bush administration therefore has consolidated the comprehensive trade and investment policy for Africa introduced by its predecessor in the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) of 2000, which substantially lowered commercial barriers with the United States and allowed sub-Saharan African countries to qualify for trade benefits. It has also made combating HIV/AIDS on the continent a priority; 12 of the 15 focus countries in the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) are in Africa. Similarly, of the 25 countries currently eligible to receive funding under the Bush administration's Millennium Challenge Account, which provides assistance for programs targeted at reducing poverty and stimulating economic growth, 12 are in Africa.

Adapting to a shifting landscape

Given the looming nature of the terrorist threat, as well as the newly recognized geostrategic importance of Africa, it is not surprising that the U.S. military has taken the lead in America's new engagement across the continent.

To date, the largest commitment has been the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), a unit created by the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in late 2002 and based since May 2003 at Camp Lemonier, a former French Foreign Legion outpost in Djibouti. The approximately 1,500 military personnel, American civilian employees, and coalition forces who make up CJTF-HOA have as their mission "detecting, disrupting and ultimately defeating transnational terrorist groups operating in the region" of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia, and Sudan (as well as Yemen across the Gulf of Aden).[21] CJTF-HOA pursues its objective of enhancing the long-term stability in its area of responsibility (AOR) by a combination of civil-military operations and supporting international governmental and non-governmental organizations. The task force also undertakes more traditional military-to-military training and other collaborative efforts, including some which certainly enabled Ethiopian forces

to launch their offensive against the Islamists in Somalia last year. In certain exceptional circumstances when actionable intelligence was available, the physical proximity of CJTF-HOA to the frontlines has enabled the U.S. to quickly and directly engage high-value terrorist targets.

Parallel to the CENTCOM effort, the U.S. State Department has launched a similar multilateral program, the Pan-Sahel Initiative (PSI). This modest effort seeks to provide border security and other counterterrorism assistance to Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger using personnel from U.S. Army Special Forces attached to the Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) of the U.S. European Command (EUCOM). As a follow-up, the State Department launched the Trans-Sahara CounterTerrorism Initiative (TSCTI) in 2005, adding Algeria, Nigeria, Morocco, Senegal, and Tunisia to the original four PSI countries. The Sahel countries have also received support from State Department programs—especially the Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program and the Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP)—and other U.S. government agencies, including the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Department of the Treasury.

These efforts in the Sahelian subregion have already borne fruit. For example, Amari Saifi, a former Algerian army officer-turned-GSPC leader responsible for the daring 2003 kidnapping of 32 European tourists, was himself captured after an unprecedented chase across the open deserts of Mali, Niger and Chad involving personnel from seven countries. Saifi now serves a life sentence in the far-less-open confines of an Algerian prison.

While the United States has historically deployed naval forces to Africa only to rescue stranded expatriates, EUCOM's naval component—U.S. Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR)—has taken the lead in maritime engagement in the Gulf of Guinea. In late 2005, the dock landing ship USS *Gunston Hall* and the catamaran HSV-2 *Swift* conducted five weeks of joint drills with forces from several West African nations, including Ghana, Guinea, and Senegal. In early 2006, the submarine USS *Emory S. Land* deployed to the region with some 1,400 sailors and Marines as part of a U.S. effort to boost maritime security and strengthen regional partnerships. Currently, the *Whidbey Island*-class dock landing ship USS *Fort McHenry* is in the Gulf of Guinea on an extended six-month deployment as part of a multinational maritime-security-and-safety initiative to help eleven African countries build their security capabilities, especially maritime domain awareness.

Targeted grants from the State Department's International Military Education and Training (IMET) program have also been effective in building the capacities of America's African partners. During the 2007 fiscal year alone, some 1,400 African military officers and personnel are expected to receive professional development at U.S. military schools and other training assistance at the cost of some $15.6 million.[22] On a significantly broader scale, the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) aims at training and equipping 75,000 military troops, a majority of them African, for peacekeeping operations on the continent by 2010.[23] The five-year, $660 million GPOI program is especially important, not only because of the general reluctance of the American public to permit the deployment of troops to the continent absent explicit threats to U.S. interests, but also because it responds to African aspirations for

continental and regional peace and security institutions.[24]

Despite these not insignificant achievements, until the February 6th announcement of the creation of AFRICOM, U.S. efforts in Africa were handicapped by an antiquated structural framework inherited from times when the continent was barely factored into America's strategic calculus.[25] For defense planning purposes, most of Africa—42 of the continent's 53 countries[26]—fell under the aegis of the EUCOM, with the balance part of the AOR of CENTCOM[27] or even that of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM).[28] By contrast, the new command is slated to embrace all of Africa except Egypt, which will remain with CENTCOM. The goal, as EUCOM commander Army General Bantz J. Craddock noted in his confirmation hearing last year, is that AFRICOM "would provide better focus and increased synergy in support of U.S. policy and engagement."[29]

Pursuing the strategic imperative

The progressive establishment of AFRICOM represents the latest step in the evolution of the delicately-balanced geopolitical framework that the United States has carefully constructed in the wake of 9/11 to achieve its national objectives on an African continent that is increasingly of great strategic importance.

On the other hand, just as the humanitarian-only approach to Africa was insufficient, so, too, will be a purely military approach. The National Security Strategy of 2002 correctly observed that "America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing states." It is the latter that have given rise to the "ungoverned spaces" where terrorists can find safe haven, just as it will be the same which ultimately threaten the country's energy security via the vulnerability of West African supplies, particularly those in volatile Nigeria. Thus the Pentagon has designated "stability operations" as a "core U.S. military mission" which ought to "be given priority comparable to combat operations."[30] While traditional "hard power" operations remain a responsibility of the combatant command, the implication is that "soft power" instruments, including diplomatic outreach, political persuasion, and economic programs, are also part of the strategic package.

The new American security framework for Africa is still taking shape. However, it is already evident that the architecture is one that neither lends itself to quick fixes nor promises all that many immediate results. Rather, it calls for a steady approach and sustained commitment in the pursuit of a long-term strategic objective which will secure U.S. interests as well as African needs. But, given the high stakes involved, nothing less should be expected.

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2. George W. Bush, interview with Jim Lehrer, PBS *NewsHour*, February 16, 2000, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/election/jan-june00/bush_2-16.html.
3. *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, September 2002, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
4. Ibid.
5. Abu Azzam al-Ansari, "Al-Qaeda tattajih nahwa Ifrikya" ("Al-Qaeda Is Moving to Africa"), *Sada al-Jihad* no. 7 (2006), 27-30, http://www.sada-aljihad.ca.tc/. For a full translation of the article, along with analysis,

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6. On the Islamic Courts Union takeover of Mogadishu and the ensuing crisis in the Horn of Africa, see J. Peter Pham, Testimony before the House of Representatives Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights, and International Operations and Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, June 29, 2006, http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/archives/109/28429.PDF.
7. The video was posted to the http://www.alhesbah.org/ website on September 11, 2006. A partial translation of the transcript prepared by the Middle East Media Research Institute is available at http://memritv.org/Transcript.asp?P1=1269.
8. See Douglas Farah, *Blood from Stones: The Secret Financial Network of Terror* (New York: Broadway Books, 2004).
9. See J. Peter Pham, *Child Soldiers, Adult Interests: The Global Dimensions of the Sierra Leonean Tragedy* (Hauppage, NY: Nova Publishers, 2005)
10. *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, March 16, 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf#search=%22national%20security%20strategy%20united%20states%202006%20white%20house%22.
11. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, January 31, 2006, http://www.whitehouse.gov/stateoftheunion/2006/.
12. See "U.S. Total Crude Oil and Products Imports," Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration, May 27, 2007.
13. See J. Peter Pham, "China's African Strategy and Its Implications for U.S. Interests," *American Foreign Policy Interests* 28, no. 3 (2006), 239-253.
14. "IMB Piracy Report Notes Decline in Piracy," International Chamber of Commerce, April 25, 2007, http://www.icc-ccs.org/main/news.php?newsid=83.
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16. *The National Strategy for Maritime Security*, White House, September 20, 2005, http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/4844-nsms.pdf.
17. United Nations Development Program (UNDP), *Human Development Report 2006. Beyond Scarcity: Power, Poverty and the Global Water Crisis* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 283-286.
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19. *The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, White House, February 14, 2004, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/counter_terrorism/counter_terrorism_strategy.pdf.
20. President George W. Bush, Address to the United Nations High-Level Plenary Meeting, September 14, 2005, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/09/20050914.html.
21. Fact Sheet, "Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA)," United States Central Command December 2006, http://www.hoa.centcom.mil/resources/english/CJTF-HOA%20Fact%20Sheet%20(Dec%202006).pdf.
22. Daniel Volman, *U.S. Military Programs in sub-Saharan Africa 2005-2007*, Africa Security Research Project Paper, http://allafrica.com/resources/view/00010822.pdf.
23. See Benedikt Franke, "Enabling a Continent to Help Itself: U.S. Military Capacity Building and Africa's Emerging Security Architecture," *Strategic Insights* 6, no. 1 (2007), 1-13.
24. See J. Peter Pham, "African Constitutionalism: Forging New Models for Multi-Ethnic Governance and Self-Determination," in Jeremy I. Levitt, ed., *Africa: Mapping New Boundaries in International Law* (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007).
25. Until 1952, when North Africa was added to the European Command's responsibilities, no part of Africa was even included in *any* U.S. military command structure. Only in 1960, with mounting concerns about Soviet penetration of the continent, was the rest of the continent allocated to various commands.
26. EUCOM's AOR embraced Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, in addition to some fifty Eurasian countries.
27. CENTCOM's African AOR included Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Seychelles, Somalia, and Sudan, as well as the waters of the Red Sea and the western portions of the Indian Ocean not covered by U.S. PACOM.
28. U.S. PACOM's African AOR included Comoros, Mauritius, and Madagascar, as well as the waters of the Indian Ocean, excluding those north of 5° S and west of 68° E (which were in CENTCOM's AOR) and those west of 42° E (which were part of EUCOM's AOR).
29. Bantz J. Craddock, Testimony before the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services, September 19, 2006, http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2006/September/Craddock%2009-19-06.pdf.
30. "Directive 3000.05 on the Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations," United States Department of Defense, November 28.

Toward a New Strategy for Darfur

John Prendergast

On April 18th, 2007, President George W. Bush appeared at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum to make what was billed as a major announcement on U.S. policy toward Darfur. Holocaust survivor Elie Wiesel was invited to be with him, underscoring the gravity of the event. The speech was to be the culmination of months of Administration leaks concerning a new, tougher policy toward Khartoum.

But, instead of finally announcing what every activist and member of Congress has been demanding for the last three years—measures that would punish the regime for its orchestration of what the Bush administration repeatedly calls genocide—President Bush simply issued yet another set of dramatic warnings, another threat without a specific deadline for action. A month later, he imposed minor unilateral sanctions which had already been anticipated and discounted by the regime in Khartoum.

Barking without biting is the diplomatic equivalent of giving comfort to the enemy. In this case, though, it may be even worse. Each time the Administration has issued an empty threat over the past three years and then not enforced it, the Khartoum regime has been emboldened to escalate its destruction and obstruction in Darfur. Simply put, the Sudanese government no longer takes our speeches and our threats seriously, and will continue to flout international will until there are specific and escalating costs to their actions. The preponderance of the evidence shows that during the 18 years of its military rule,

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the regime in Khartoum has only responded to focused international and regional pressure—something that is sadly and shockingly missing from the international response to Darfur today, despite all of the stirring speeches.

Today, nearly everyone agrees on the ingredients necessary for the stabilization of Darfur: a peace agreement that addresses the remaining issues of the non-signatory rebels and broader Darfurian society, and an effective civilian protection force. The disagreement begins around how to secure these two critical peace and protection objectives.

A real plan B

Today, nearly everyone agrees on the ingredients necessary for the stabilization of Darfur. The first is a peace agreement that addresses the remaining issues of the non-signatory rebels and broader Darfurian society. The second entails an effective civilian protection force, the starting point for which is the "hybrid" African Union-United Nations force which the entire world supports, except the Khartoum regime. The disagreement begins around how to secure these two critical peace and protection objectives. Three things can help break the current political impasse:

1. Getting smarter

A significant amount of institutional inertia needs to be surmounted. With little support and cooperation from the CIA (which maintains close counterterrorism cooperation with the very same Sudanese officials who are architects of the Darfur policy), U.S. policymakers have largely been in the dark about how the Sudanese government carries out its commerce, and cannot identify many of the major Sudanese companies owned by regime officials that do business throughout Europe, Asia and the Middle East.

What is needed is an intelligence surge from the CIA and an enforcement surge from the Treasury Department. Such a two-pronged approach will at least bring the U.S. up to speed on who is doing what and how to effectively implement any punitive measures. And without a clear strategy of rapidly escalating pressure through a variety of economic and legal measures, the deadly status quo will no doubt prevail.

The point is not simply to punish for punishment's sake, although if the Bush administration's characterization of the atrocities in Darfur as genocide were meaningful, it would warrant punitive action in and of itself as a breach of the Genocide Convention. Punitive measures are essential to building the leverage necessary to gain Khartoum's compliance for a durable peace deal for Darfur and the deployment of an effective international force to protect civilians. Similar measures should be imposed against leading rebel commanders and political leaders if they are deemed to have committed atrocities or are obstructing real and balanced peace efforts, which so far do not exist.

2. Building coalitions

Any of the measures that the Bush administration is considering will be exponentially more effective if they are done multilaterally. The U.S. government already has strong unilateral sanctions in place against Sudan, which bar American companies from doing business with the National Con-

gress Party (though allowing U.S. businesses to work with the government of South Sudan), freezing assets in the U.S. of the Sudanese government and some Sudanese companies and individuals, and blocking financial transactions of companies registered in Sudan. When enacted by the Clinton administration back in 1997, these measures did have an effect on the calculus of the regime in Khartoum. Their potency, however, has long since faded, as Sudanese officials have become increasingly savvy in their business dealings, learning to circumvent U.S. institutions.

But applied multilaterally through the UN Security Council and expanded, these steps would have a much bigger impact on the pocketbooks of those responsible for crimes against humanity. Moreover, the government of Sudan will have a much more difficult time scoring propaganda points when the U.S. is not acting alone.

3. Greater "teeth"

A number of additional punitive measures should be implemented through the UN Security Council to buttress current efforts. These could be applied without major cost, but they require a strong diplomatic effort to rally multilateral support and significant increases in staffing and resources to ensure aggressive implementation.

Targeting Sudanese Officials. Impose UN Security Council targeted sanctions—including asset freezes and travel bans—against persons responsible for crimes against humanity in Darfur. The existing U.S. effort is confined to just three individuals. In order to be effective, that number must be much higher. Such sanctions have been authorized in previous UNSC resolutions, and called for in multiple reports from the UNSC Sanctions Committee Panel of Experts.

Targeting Sudanese Companies. Impose UN Security Council sanctions against the list of Sudanese companies already targeted unilaterally by the U.S., and establish a UN Panel of Experts to further investigate which companies are conducting the business necessary to underwrite Sudan's war machine.

International Financial Pressure. As is the case with Iran, American officials should engage with a number of international banking institutions to strongly encourage them to stop doing business with Sudan, with the implication that if such business continues, then all transactions by those banks with U.S. commercial entities (and those of other countries willing to work with us) would eventually be banned.

Support the ICC Indictment Process. Provide information and declassified intelligence to the International Criminal Court to help accelerate the process of building indictments against senior officials in the regime for their role in orchestrating mass atrocities in Darfur. The U.S. has the greatest amount of relevant intelligence, and should increase the flow of information to the ICC in support of additional indictments.

Such punitive measures are essential. As the world has learned all too well in recent years, the threat of consequences is a vital component of coercive diplomacy. Sudan is no different. Concrete punishments are necessary in order to demonstrate to those committing atrocities and those undermining peace efforts—

whether a part of the government or a rebel group—that there will be a cost for their actions, and that cost will increase with each major human rights or diplomatic violation. Only then will there be incentive for them to stop.

In search of a serious diplomatic strategy

It is not enough to have a part-time Special Envoy and occasional visits by high-level officials. The U.S. needs to have a team of diplomats working full time around the world to secure the prerequisite conditions necessary for Sudan's stabilization. These include:

- Support for the development of a common Darfurian rebel negotiating position;
- Support for the negotiation of amendments to the Darfur Peace Agreement that address the reservations of the non-signatory rebels and broader Darfurian civil society;
- Support for addressing the spillover impacts of the conflict in Chad and the Central African Republic;
- Support for the implementation of the peace deal that ended the north-south war, a deal that is increasingly put at risk by Darfur's deterioration;
- Support for negotiations to end the war between the Ugandan government and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which threatens to undermine peace in Sudan;
- Support for the international diplomacy (particularly with China, the EU, and the Arab League) necessary to see an effective civilian protection force deployed to Darfur, the starting point for which is the "hybrid" AU-UN proposal that Khartoum has not accepted.

Better coordination is also needed at home. If it hopes to be successful in its negotiations abroad, the White House needs to put forward a clear strategy and exert itself in the interagency process to improve cooperation between the government agencies that will have roles to play in implementing it. Intelligence officials must be put at the disposal of the peace efforts; Treasury Department officials must be given planning and staffing for expanding punitive measures; Defense Department officials must support the AU-UN hybrid as well as be engaged in accelerated contingency military planning with their colleagues in NATO, the EU and the UN; and the White House should be aggressively tasking various agencies and ensuring that the effort is taken as seriously as that of North Korea, Iran, and other important foreign policy priorities.

Needed: protective action

Until there is recognition that the current international strategy fails to protect civilians, Darfurians will have no hope of achieving security. To that end, pressure must be escalated on Khartoum to accept unconditionally the full deployment of the proposed AU-UN force, and the Bush administration's budget (and the budgets of other major contributors to UN peacekeeping) must include adequate funding to resource the mission at full

capacity. Finally, every effort should be made to strengthen the mandate of the existing and future mission to be one that prioritizes the protection of civilians.

President Paul Kagame of Rwanda, one of the largest troop contributors to the current AU force, suggested recently that the hybrid force could be effective if sufficient resources were provided with a clear mandate. Regarding civilian protection, he told the author in February 2007 that, "We would take on additional tasks if we had the resources and the mandate…. If we had more troops, the proper equipment, the right mandate, and a no-fly zone to paralyze the [Sudanese] air force, we could protect the civilian population of Darfur."

This is why the UN Security Council's financing of an enhanced Darfur deployment is essential. With a stronger mandate and more funding for the critical logistical and equipment gaps that currently exist, more African troops would be offered to the AU mission, and the force on the ground would be much more effective.

Simultaneously, the UN Security Council also should accelerate the deployment of protection elements to the border regions of Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR), with mandates to protect at-risk communities, internally-displaced person settlements, and refugee camps.

Military measures

Policymakers must understand that there is no military solution to Darfur and its spillover: a peace deal in Darfur is a prerequisite for a peacekeeping force to be effective, and genuine political dialogue in Chad and the CAR should accompany any deployment of international troops or police to those countries. Further, it is necessary to acknowledge that international troops or police in Chad and the Central African Republic will have little impact on the situation in Darfur.

The U.S. must move away from its current policy of constructive engagement without leverage toward a more muscular policy focused on walking softly and carrying—as well as using—a bigger stick.

Credible military planning should commence immediately for action necessary to protect civilians in the event of a rapid deterioration in the situation on the ground. The world must be prepared to act if death rates soar again as they did in 2003-04. This planning is both a practical necessity and a means to build and utilize leverage against the regime.

Doing better

The U.S. must move away from its current policy of constructive engagement without leverage toward a more muscular policy focused on walking softly and carrying—as well as using—a bigger stick. Unfulfilled threats and appeals should be replaced quickly with punitive measures backing a robust peace and protection initiative. We may not know the names of the victims in Darfur, but we know the names of the orchestrators of the policy that led to their deaths.

There is hope. The growing constituency in the U.S. focused on countering the atrocities in Darfur is expanding by the day, led by student, Jewish, Christian and African-American organizations. Elected officials who ignore this crescendo of activism—though not usually front page news—do so at their own peril.

Somalia: Rise and Fall of an Islamist Regime

Robert Spencer

Late in 2003, a Somali journalist named Bashir Goth wrote in the *Addis Tribune* about a group of Islamic clerics known as the "Authority for Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice." This group, Goth complained, was "trying to impose draconian moral codes on Somaliland citizens." He concluded: "It is time we have to speak out. If we don't do it today, we won't be able to do it tomorrow. Because there will be no tomorrow as our country descends into 7th century Arabia."[1]

That descent, when it came, was swift. Criticizing the warlords on Islamic grounds, and declaring Somalia's traditional Islamic culture to be not sufficiently Islamic, a *jihadist* group affiliated with al-Qaeda, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), began to make major advances in late 2005 and early 2006, particularly in southern Somalia and the Mogadishu area. "The existing government is not an Islamic one," explained Islamic Courts Union leader Sheikh Hassan Dahir Aweys in October 2005, "and we will be having our own Islamic faith and we will be very strong in influencing our people."[2] Later, while the ICU was in power in Mogadishu, the group's first vice chairperson, Ar-Rahman Mohomood Jinikow, declared: "We will only approve a constitution based on theology, because an Islamic constitution is the only one that serves all of us justly…. Secular constitution, whether it is democratic or any other, is never fair and right, and Muslims have only one constitution which is entirely based on Allah's Qur'an that will avail all Muslims in the world now and the Hereafter."[3]

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In April 2006, the Islamic Courts declared *jihad* against the country's warlords. At a Mogadishu rally, Sheikh Nur Ollow of the Courts declared that the warlords were "unholy elements" who were "serving the interests of non-Somalis who could not care less about our well-being, culture and religion"—a clear reference to the United States, which had noted the group's connections with al-Qaeda early on. "It is time to help those who want peace and harmony among Somalis and the teachings of the commands of Allah and the words of the Prophet," continued Ollow. "We will not be governed by a few warlords financed by the enemy of Islam."

Another Islamic Courts Union leader, Sheikh Mohamed Ibrahim Sulley, maintained at the same rally that fighting the warlords was a holy duty for Muslims: "As it says in the Qur'an, the fight against those who are promoting hostility and fighting against Islam is a holy war. Any war against the warlords is a holy war and a sacrifice in the name of Allah."[4]

By mid-2006, the Islamists had taken full control of Mogadishu. In subsequent months, they conquered most of the remaining pockets of organized resistance to their rule in the southern portion of the country.

The descent

In early 2006, the battle was joined in earnest, and by mid-2006, the Islamists had taken full control of Mogadishu. In subsequent months, they conquered most of the remaining pockets of organized resistance to their rule in the southern portion of the country. ICU forces seized the port city of Kismayo in late September, firing on demonstrators who turned out to rally against their regime.[5] In late November, the President of the northern region of Puntland announced that he too would henceforth rule according to Islamic law.[6] Aweys, who became the group's leader around the same time it began to gain significant power in Somalia, struck an explicitly anti-American posture and spoke of the Islamic Courts' effort to take control of Somalia as part of the global *jihad*, vowing to fight America and its allies "everywhere, in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia and Sudan."[7]

This was the Islamic Courts' consistent stance; in August 2006, at the height of the Israeli incursion into Lebanon, the Islamists organized a pro-Hezbollah rally in Mogadishu, which was attended by over two thousand people who chanted "Down with the enemies of Islam, wherever they are!"[8] More ominously, shortly thereafter the ICU opened a training camp north of Mogadishu for *jihadists*, featuring trainers from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Aweys told the trainees: "You will study military tactics, because you will defend your country with Islamic morality."[9]

For its troubles, the regime received an endorsement from none other than Osama bin Laden. In a message circulated on the Internet in late June, bin Laden exhorted Somalis: "You have no other means for salvation unless you commit to Islam, put your hands in the hands of the Islamic Courts to build an Islamic state in Somalia."[10] Meanwhile, foreign Islamists were hastening to aid the new regime in Somalia. The United Nations Security Council reported in November 2006 that the Islamic Republic of Iran was supplying weapons to the ICU in an attempt to obtain uranium in return.[11]

Meanwhile, the ICU appeared to bear out Bashir Goth's fears. The Courts forbade music (which is prohibited according to strict Islamic law), dancing and soccer within days of taking power.[12] Women began to don Saudi dress, which covered their faces, rather than traditional Somali garb, which did not. And ICU militiamen proved ready to enforce Islamic law with an iron fist: after banning all movies and television viewing, *jihadists* shot and killed two people who were watching a World Cup soccer match in early July.[13]

That September, Mogadishu youth gave a hint that the new Islamic regime was not popular with all Somalis. They responded to an ICU attempt to break up their viewing of another soccer match by burning tires and throwing stones at ICU militiamen.[14] But the implementation of the strictest *sharia* provisions remained high on the ICU's list of priorities both before and after this show of resistance. Raids in Mogadishu led to 60 arrests for the crime of movie-watching.[15] Women were forbidden to swim at Mogadishu's Leedo beach.[16]

The ICU also moved to muzzle the press, imposing 13 "rules of conduct" on journalists. These included a prohibition on the publication or dissemination of "information contrary to the Muslim religion, the public interest or the interest of the nation," as well as "information likely to create conflicts between the population and the Council of Islamic Courts." Journalists were required to reveal their sources, "must not serve foreign interests," and "must not publish or disseminate elements of a foreign culture contrary to Islamic culture or promoting bad behavior, such as nudity on film." Finally, "the media must not employ the terms which infidels use to refer to Muslims such as 'terrorists,' 'extremists,' etc."[17]

> The hostile takeover transformed Somalia's foreign policy, and the ICU became a voice in the international *jihadist* movement.

Conflict is joined

The hostile takeover transformed Somalia's foreign policy. The ICU became a voice in the international *jihadist* movement, joining those who called for the murder of Pope Benedict XVI after his remarks in Regensburg, Germany, in August 2006 were widely interpreted as an insult to the Islamic prophet Muhammad.

Tensions with Ethiopia, meanwhile, increased almost immediately after the ICU took power. The group's leader Sharif Sheikh Ahmed declared on July 2nd that "Ethiopians have been illegally crossing our border since earlier last month and now they are in some parts of our territory but, God willing, they will regret it." Calling Ethiopia "the enemy number one of the Somali people," he urged Somalis to fight back.[18] Ethiopia initially denied sending troops, but Ethiopia's Prime Minister Meles Zenawi stressed the new Somali government's ties to the al-Qaeda-linked *jihadist* group Al-Ittihad.[19] And by the end of July, Ethiopian troops were entering Somalia in significant numbers, with the Islamic Courts Union regime renewing calls for *jihad* in response.

The ICU responded with more threats. "We call on Ethiopia to withdraw its forces from Somalia, otherwise be ready for full-scale war," Aweys said in late August. "We say again that Ethiopian intervention in Somalia will never be accepted; no

one can dare divert us onto a path other than Sharia law."[20] The ICU also threatened the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which in late 2006 endorsed a plan to send Sudanese and Ugandan peacekeeping forces to the Somali border. The ICU's education minister, Fuad Mohammed Kalaf, stated that "our policy is to fight against countries in IGAD who are our foes," as he announced the opening of *jihad* warfare training camps.[21]

For its troubles, the regime received an endorsement from none other than Osama bin Laden. In a message circulated on the Internet in late June, bin Laden exhorted Somalis: "You have no other means for salvation unless you commit to Islam, put your hands in the hands of the Islamic Courts to build an Islamic state in Somalia."

Finally, on October 9, 2006, the ICU regime formally declared *jihad* against Ethiopia.[22] In doing so, Sheikh Ahmed asked for help from Somali expatriates: "I am appealing to all Somali communities… abroad to take part in the Jihad operation against the Ethiopian troops who want to occupy our land."[23] This call did not go unheeded: Somalis from as far away as Canada returned home, and after the ICU regime collapsed American, British, and Australian passports were found on the bodies of slain warriors.[24]

Just three weeks later, the ICU announced that it had accumulated 3,000 recruits. Sheikh Abdinur Farah, an ICU commander at a *jihadist* recruitment post south of Mogadishu, stated: "We have trained them to fight and that is a religious obligation. Ethiopia has made clear its intention: that is a war against us. So we are calling an open war against Ethiopia and every young fighter is welcome to join the jihad against the Ethiopian invaders."[25]

As peace talks broke down between the ICU and the remnants of the UN-recognized government in the northern part of the country, the ICU staged a rally in the southern Somali town of Jilib. While thousands demonstrated, ICU leader Sheikh Mohamed Omar Mursal reiterated that the ICU's struggle was a religious one: "We saw peace talks in Khartoum derailed by Ethiopia and its puppets. Our people are ready to protect their religion from the enemies of Allah. We are ready to fight you, Ethiopia."[26] Meanwhile, one of Yusuf's predecessors, Abdiqassim Salat Hassan, who had been the officially recognized President of Somalia from 2000 to 2004, lined up with the Islamic Courts regime, saying that defensive *jihad* against Ethiopian troops was "compulsory" for Somalis.[27]

On November 27th, as the *jihadist* regime deployed large numbers of troops on the border with Ethiopia, an ICU military commander, Sheikh Mohamed Ibrahim Bilal, declared: "War is imminent. There is no other alternative. Ethiopia declared war, so we will defend ourselves and protect our country and people."[28] Two weeks later the ICU delivered an ultimatum. The ICU's security chief, Yusuf Mohamed Siad, announced: "We are giving a deadline to the invading forces. If Ethiopian forces inside our territory do not withdraw after a week, we will not hesitate to launch full-scale attacks on them. From today on, all Ethiopians must start leaving

Somalia; if they do not they will be responsible for the bloodshed that will follow."[29] On Friday, December 15, ICU officials distributed sermons on *jihad* to mosques in Mogadishu preaching "holy war" against Ethiopian troops inside Somalia.[30]

Reversal of fortune

As war between Somalia and Ethiopia appeared inevitable, the U.S. State Department weighed in, emphasizing the ICU's links with al-Qaeda. "The Council of Islamic Courts," explained Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazer, "is now controlled by al Qaeda cell individuals, East Africa al Qaeda cell individuals. The top layer of the court are [sic] extremists. They are terrorists. They are killing nuns, they have killed children and they are calling for a jihad."[31] Former President Yusuf agreed, and saw wider implications in the ICU's activity: "Al-Qaeda is opening up shop in Somalia. This is a new chapter and part of the terror group's plan to wage war against the West."[32]

The fighting broke out on December 21st, with the ICU almost immediately declaring victory. "Our mujahedeen have killed 70 soldiers today... the Islamic courts are winning the war against Ethiopian invasion," declared Sheikh Sulley on the first day of fighting.[33] When Ethiopia launched large-scale airstrikes against several Somali towns three days later, Sulley was contemptuous: "They are cowards. They are afraid of the face-to-face war and resorted to airstrikes. I hope God will help us shoot down their planes."[34] The next day Sulley was proven wrong about the Ethiopians' fear of "face-to-face war," as Ethiopian troops, along with Somalis loyal to the Transitional Government, captured the border town of Belet Weyne.[35] Only a day later, the Ethiopians launched a three-pronged offensive, putting the ICU to a full tactical retreat.

By December 27th, Mogadishu was within reach of the Ethiopian and Transitional Government troops: "Islamic Courts militias are already on the run," said a spokesman for the anti-*jihad* forces, "and we hope that Mogadishu will fall into our hands without firing a shot."[36] ICU troops fled Mogadishu the next day; Ethiopian and anti-ICU Somali forces were greeted in the capital with cheers and celebrations.[37] Kismayo, the last significant ICU stronghold, fell several days later. On January 8th, the U.S. intervened directly, targeting al-Qaeda members in airstrikes against Afmadow and Ras Kamboni in southern Somalia, two of the ICU's last redoubts.[38] Ras Kamboni fell several days later, and the Islamic Courts regime came to a definitive end—although ICU partisans continue sporadic guerrilla attacks to this day.

Lessons left unlearned

The rapid collapse of the regime took many Western observers by surprise. The Western press had been remarkably hospitable to the ICU regime, praising it as the best hope for a recovery of peace and order in that anarchic land, and generally expressing the expectation that it would solidify its hold on power and bring long-lasting stability to Somalia. In June 2006, the BBC opined that the ICU's coming to power in Mogadishu "may prove… to be a turning point in the peace process." It warned that the real danger to peace was not the *jihadist* extremism of the ICU, but the Western characterization of that extremism: if the ICU were "treated with respect—as partners—they could turn into the group which delivers the capital to the government and

so end years of conflict." If, however, ICU strongholds were "viewed as a hotbed of Islamic extremism, that too, could become a self-fulfilling prophecy."[39] Subsequently, in late February 2007, the BBC lamented the end of the ICU regime: "Since the overthrow of the Union of Islamic Courts at the turn of the year, Somalia has been descending back into the violence and chaos seen in the previous 16 years…."[40]

Western analysts who saw in the ICU regime a new hope for the restoration of political order in Somalia were falling into the same mistake as did the 1930s journalists and analysts who praised the Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini regimes for the order they brought to their respective countries.

The *Times of London* went even farther. In his coverage, *Times* reporter Martin Fletcher waxed lyrical about the new, ICU-controlled Mogadishu: "For the first time in a generation Somalis can walk around safely, even at night. Children play football in the streets. Squads of Somalis in fluorescent yellow jackets emblazoned 'Employment for Peace' are removing mountains of garbage. Shops are painting brightly coloured pictures of their wares—mobiles, satellite dishes, radios—on their walls. The derelict port has been reopened, though every vessel must be unloaded by hand as there are no cranes, and children point excitedly at the sight of aircraft overhead." Fletcher quoted a local doctor who had worked in a London hospital: "It's like paradise compared to even one year ago. I'm feeling more safe here than in London."[41]

In light of the stories of ICU troops firing into crowds, imposing draconian punishments for offenses such as watching soccer games, and energetically working toward the Talibanization of Somalia, and in light also of the cheering crowds in Mogadishu that greeted the troops who toppled the ICU regime, such accounts have an ironic piquancy. The ICU's rigidity and harshness, and its rapid fall, makes it extremely unlikely that it could ever have enjoyed significant popular support. This is even more unlikely given the fact that the vision of Islam it was determined to impose upon Somalia was so at variance with the syncretistic cultural Islam that had hitherto prevailed in Somalia. Western analysts who saw in the ICU regime a new hope for the restoration of political order in Somalia were falling into the same mistake as did the 1930s journalists and analysts who praised the Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini regimes for the order they brought to their respective countries. By entering into Somalia so rapidly after the ICU's seizure of power, the Ethiopian troops may have spared Somalis years of suffering under an extremist, totalitarian, brutal regime.

Somalia still desperately needs a strong government that will finally restore stability to this troubled nation. But the Islamic Courts Union regime only offered Somalis a new hell in place of an old one.

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Islam's Inroads

Reuven Paz & Moshe Terdman

In recent years, Islam has been growing rapidly in Africa. The precise number of Muslims in Africa today is unknown; statistics regarding religious demography on the African continent are notoriously incomplete. Still, what is clear is that Islam is now the second largest religion in Africa, accounting for about 45 percent of the population. The remainder is made up by Christians (46 percent), atheists or adherents of African religions (less than 10 percent).

Geographically, African Muslims are concentrated mainly in the West African Sahel zone, the tropical zone along the Gulf of Guinea, the Sudanese Nile region, Ethiopia, the East African coastal strip, Somalia, and the Cape region. While the spread of Islam has taken a different path in each, the majority of these places appear to share two common features. The first is that Islam has not developed into an exclusive state religion. The second is that its interpretation, at the local level, has been more or less moderate. Up until now, at least.

All of that, however, is subject to change. Slowly but surely, Muslims in sub-Saharan Africa are becoming radicalized. Signs of this drift are everywhere;

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in the introduction of *sharia* law in twelve northern Nigerian states since 1999, the rigid adherence to *sharia* by Somalia's ill-fated Islamic Courts Union, and the extremist tendencies of Muslims in South Africa. These events underscore the fact that the process of religious radicalization among Africa's Muslims is dynamic—and gaining ground.

Slowly but surely, Muslims in sub-Saharan Africa are becoming radicalized. Signs of this drift are everywhere; in the introduction of *sharia* law in twelve northern Nigerian states since 1999, the rigid adherence to *sharia* by Somalia's ill-fated Islamic Courts Union, and the extremist tendencies of Muslims in South Africa.

Fertile soil

The drift under way throughout Africa is defined, above all, by one element: minority empowerment. In most countries on the continent, Muslims make up a minority of the population, one that has been disproportionately affected by the social and political changes of the past ten years. That is especially true in the coastal states of West and East Africa. In the former, democratization has removed Muslim leaders and their followers from power. In the latter, the social advancement of the Muslim minority has trailed that of the region's already low average.

Poverty, corruption and political alienation have all contributed to the spread of radical Islam in sub-Saharan Africa as well. Some analysts blame nineteenth-century European colonialism for re-mapping ethnic territories, marginalizing Muslims and, in some cases, leaving a legacy of inter-communal strife. They point out that Muslims in countries historically dominated by Christians, such as Ethiopia, do not wield political power relative to their large numbers. There, social inequality, alienation and isolation provide fertile ground for foreign extremists and their ideologies to gain local support.

And gain support they have. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the countries of the Persian Gulf have all made efforts to export Islamist ideas and values to the continent. These connections stretch back centuries; during the Middle Ages, many Black African Muslims carried out religious studies at al-Azhar University in Cairo, and made the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. More recently, some Black African Muslims abroad have been influenced by Wahhabi scholars and/or the Muslim Brotherhood, and have imported their ideas back to their places of origin.

Their outreach, in turn, has been amplified by Islamic charities engaged in proselytization, known as *Da'wah* (Islamic call), throughout Africa. These organizations, many of which are based in the Persian Gulf, have experienced considerable success in converting their beneficiaries to Islam—and from there to radical Islam. Thus, the African Muslim Agency, a Kuwait-sponsored aid organization based in Luanda, Angola, has established itself in most African countries and has been involved in the spread of Islam in the predominantly Christian countries of southern Africa, in particular Malawi and South Africa. The charities sponsored by Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states, meanwhile,

have been engaged in financing radical Islamic activities in East Africa and the Horn of Africa—especially in Zanzibar, where the radical Islamist organization Uamsho is active, and from where at least two al-Qaeda operatives have sprung. Similarly, in West Africa, an intensive Wahhabi-oriented proselytization effort sponsored by Saudi Arabia has caused a number of bloody confrontations between its adherents and traditional Muslim groups.

Internal influences are also at work. Largely unrecognized is the strong linkage between Sufis and *jihad* prevalent throughout the continent. The first African Sufi known to have waged *jihad* against his fellow Muslims was the Muslim scholar Othman dan Fodio, who succeeded in establishing the Sultanate of Sokoto in Nigeria, which was governed by *sharia* law at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Fodio's ideological influence extended far beyond Nigeria; until the beginning of the twentieth century, Sufis stood at the forefront of the *jihad* against the Europeans throughout the continent.

Governance, or the lack thereof, has facilitated these processes. There are more failing and failed states in Africa than in any other region in the world. But even in more or less functioning nations, such as Kenya and Tanzania, the government is incapable of preventing violence or even controlling the entirety of its territory. Border areas and the slums of big cities are de facto zones outside of the state's control. The training and equipment of local security forces are completely insufficient, and police corruption and official crime are widespread. The shadow economy of these crumbling states makes possible capital transactions and trafficking in weapons, raw materials, and consumer goods—activities without which terrorist networks would be unable to function.

Governance, or the lack thereof, has facilitated radicalization. There are more failing and failed states in Africa than in any other region in the world. But even in more or less functioning nations, such as Kenya and Tanzania, the government is incapable of preventing violence or even controlling the entirety of its territory.

Against this backdrop, news of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Western involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan has had a crucial role in creating a sense of strong antipathy to the United States and the West. For their part, radical Islamists, as well as other local terrorists, have taken advantage of these feelings to achieve their aims. At times, they do so using methods practiced in the Middle East. Such is the case of insurgents in Mogadishu, who have turned Somalia into a second Iraq by using suicide bombings, the downing of planes, artillery shelling, and so on.

Future trends

In the short term, it is highly unlikely that radical Muslims in sub-Saharan Africa will become an important or integral part of al-Qaeda. In contrast to North Africa, where the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat has become the terror network's latest recruit, membership further south is likely to be limited to

a few dozen individuals. An early indication of this was given in 2002, when al-Qaeda's call to African Muslims to join their cause following the Mombasa attacks met with decidedly more indignation than approval. Al-Qaeda's call on the *mujahideen* to come to the assistance of their Somali and Sudanese brothers likewise has not had great appeal so far.

The balance of power between radical and moderate Muslims in Africa is still tilted decisively in favor of the moderates. Yet, the possibility of the development of a genuine African variant of terrorism cannot be ruled out entirely. The necessary ingredients—the lack of economic opportunity, social privation, a loss of cultural identity, political repression, and dysfunctional government—are virtually omnipresent.

These developments highlight the fact that the balance of power between radical and moderate Muslims in Africa is still tilted decisively in favor of the moderates. Therefore, in the immediate future, the importance of Africa is likely to center on two factors. The first is the weakness of regional states, which provide excellent safe havens and opportunities for black market activities to local and/or foreign radicals. The second is the sorry state of local security forces, which create an attractive environment for planning and carrying out attacks.

Yet, the possibility of the development of a genuine African variant of terrorism cannot be ruled out entirely. The necessary ingredients—the lack of economic opportunity, social privation, a loss of cultural identity, political repression, and dysfunctional government—are virtually omnipresent in sub-Saharan Africa. But the potential for violence arising from the interplay of these factors is, for the most part, directed inward in the form of violent crime, civil wars, and plundering warlords. All that is needed is a mobilizing, unifying idea, such as the one offered by radical Islam.

In this sense, the threat of Islamist terrorism to the Republic of South Africa is very real. A number of indigenous Islamist networks now have the potential to either engage in serious acts of terrorism on their own or in conjunction with international terrorists. These networks include groups like Qibla and People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD), both of which have a growing radical influence in South Africa. The former was created in the early 1980s to promote the aims and ideals of the Iranian revolution in South Africa, and in due course transform South Africa into an Islamic state, under the slogan "One Solution, Islamic Revolution." The latter, a Qibla offshoot, although ostensibly a vigilante anti-crime group, has also been linked to the Islamic Republic.

The key question, of course, revolves around the likelihood of an al-Qaeda attack against Western interests in South Africa. So far, the South African government has hoped that its neutrality in the global war on terror, as well as its pro-Palestinian stance, will spare it the hostility of Islamists. The real threat, however, is directed against American and other Western interests in the country. In this respect, there is major cause for concern: high-value targets, including large embassies and

the headquarters of multinational corporations, abound. As a nascent democracy, South Africa is obsessed with protecting basic rights—a preoccupation which could be exploited by international terrorists working in tandem with local militants. This "rights-based" environment is compounded by widespread official corruption that makes it easy for skilled and experienced terrorists to operate without fear of detection. Moreover, the country has porous borders and large immigrant communities that can easily shelter terrorists, if so inclined.

Furthermore, since 1996, Islam has been spreading rapidly in South Africa's fastest growing ethnic demographic: its Black community. This trend is the result of proselytization by Muslim refugees, who arrived in the mid-1990s, following the collapse of the apartheid regime, from places such as Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Angola, and Malawi. This has not heralded religious harmony, however; to the contrary, the same period has seen growing hostility between the country's Black Muslim community and the established White Muslims there. The grievances of Black Muslims run the gamut, from racism and exploitation to the unfair distribution of *zakat* (alms). In response, institutions such as the Afro-Middle East Center have conducted reconciliation sessions, but divisive internal politics has hindered mobilization campaigns for international causes such as Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq, and so on.

This problem of racial tensions between Black and Arab Muslims is not localized to South Africa. After all, memories of an Arab-dominated continental slave trade are still comparatively fresh. But despite these feelings, Black Muslims have had no choice but to look to the Middle East for guidance. Along the way, at least some have been influenced by radical Islamic ideas originating in the Arab world, and may try to put them into practice in their countries of origin.

In the long run, the radical Islamic ideology that permeates the Arab world poses a threat not only to the West, but to moderate African Muslims as well.

In the long run, then, the radical Islamic ideology that permeates the Arab world poses a threat not only to the West, but to moderate African Muslims as well. Globalization and closer links with the Arab world—especially due to local financial difficulties and humanitarian disasters, which have spurred greater reliance on the role of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states as financiers—could bring with them changes in ideology. This process of adaptation has already begun, as witnessed by a growing unification among disparate radicals into a unified front. This process, which is in its initial phases, highlights the potential direction of Islam and Muslims in Africa.

Whither Africa?

Islam in Africa is at a crossroads. A degree of radicalization undoubtedly already has taken place, buoyed by Islamist infiltration and the conversion of Black Africans. Local Sufis have done their best to combat this phenomenon, but so far without success. Throughout the continent, one now can find radical Islamic enclaves in almost every country where there are Muslims. Yet, due to the differences between the brand of Islam prevalent in the Middle East and the

one prevalent in Africa (which also incorporates animistic beliefs), and due to the racism prevalent among Arabs toward Black African Muslims, the battle for the soul of Islam in Africa is still under way.

Islam in Africa is at a crossroads. A degree of radicalization undoubtedly already has taken place, buoyed by Islamist infiltration and the conversion of Black Africans. Yet, due to the differences between the brand of Islam prevalent in the Middle East and the one prevalent in Africa (which also incorporates animistic beliefs), and due to the racism prevalent among Arabs toward Black African Muslims, the battle for the soul of Islam in Africa is still under way.

In the future, we very well could witness the emergence of a unique brand of radical African Islam—one which will encompass African animism, the heritage of the *jihadi* Sufi movements, and methods and tactics imported from the Middle East. We also should expect al-Qaeda and its ideological affiliates to try and exploit tribal and social tensions as a way of expanding their influence throughout Africa, mainly in Somalia and the Horn of Africa, and above all in North Africa, where they already have a growing influence.

Africa serves as a bellwether of sorts in the West's struggle against radical Islam. The sociopolitical reasons for radical Islam's growing appeal in other regions—the Arab world, Europe, Southeast Asia—can also be found in Africa, and with much greater potency. Western nations need to understand this reality, and to do more to include Africa in their struggle against Islamist terrorism.

Bad Faith Actor

Claudia Rosett

In the pantheon of United Nations causes, Africa by many measures occupies a preeminent role. Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon has described "the African challenge" as "the highest priority on my agenda."[1] Africa is the main theater of UN peacekeeping operations, the poster-continent for UN aid appeals, the object of a long series of high-minded promises and home to a huge roster of lavishly funded UN programs, projects, offices, commissions and initiatives.

Nor does the interest run only one way. At the UN itself, African nations field a considerable presence and substantial voice. The previous two Secretaries-General, Kofi Annan and Boutros Boutros-Ghali, both hailed from African nations—respectively, Ghana and Egypt. African countries hold more than one-quarter of the 192 member seats in the UN's chief governing body, the General Assembly. When they band together, this gives them a regional voting bloc rivaled only by the Organization of the Islamic Conference—in which African nations in any event hold more than one-third of the seats.

True, Africa does not hold any of the five veto-wielding seats on the Security Council. But it has enough member states rotating through the ten non-permanent seats that the U.S., in seeking support for ousting Saddam Hussein in early 2003, ended up pleading for help from the governments of Guinea and Cameroon—then members of the Security Council. During the August 2006 Security Council deliberations over the war launched by Lebanon's Hezbollah

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militia against Israel, it was Ghana which that month held the chair.

But if all this intertwining of interests and influence sounds like the makings of a fortuitous UN-African partnership, think again—especially if the aim is peace and prosperity on the African continent.

There are plenty of reasons to question just how benevolent a force the UN really is in Africa, and how much trust we should place in its campaigns for peace and prosperity.

Many of us have been brought up, Halloween UNICEF can in hand, to regard the UN as a benevolent institution; unwieldy and bureaucratic, perhaps, but essentially loveable and devoted to the betterment of humanity. In the July 2007 issue of *Vanity Fair*, we find the iconic image of this approach: the guru of UN development strategy, economist and UN Special Adviser Jeffrey Sachs, sitting cross-legged under a tree, meeting with African village elders while on tour with a reporter to whom he is explaining that poverty in Africa could be wiped out if only the wealthy countries of the world would open their wallets much wider—say, $200 billion worth or so.

There are plenty of reasons, however, to question just how benevolent a force the UN really is, and how much trust we should place in its campaigns for peace and prosperity. Prime among the problems are the UN's long-standing penchant for dignifying dictators, as well as its current pursuit under various new labels—such as "Millennium Development Goals" and "national capacity-building"—of the old, ruinous formula of economic central planning.

Recent years have brought with them a host of scandals highlighting ways in which the UN harms some of the very people it purports to be helping. The UN Oil-for-Food relief program for the people of Saddam Hussein's Iraq turned out to be a global bacchanal of graft which, despite the UN's own sanctions, helped enrich and support the regime of one of the world's worst dictators. The long-standing UN policy of treating the Palestinians as a unique class of refugees, entitled for more than half a century now to an apparently unending flow of UN-channeled benefits, has helped foster an entitlement culture of permanently aggrieved UN clients—a disservice not least to the Palestinians themselves.

Out of Africa in recent years have come yet more glaring symbols of such UN perversions of what are supposed to be good works. For example, it has turned out that UN peacekeepers in countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Liberia, and Sierra Leone have been sexually exploiting some of the very people they are supposed to be protecting—including, in some cases, children.

On the broader human rights front, we have seen the "election" by the African regional bloc of Libya, one of the world's worst human rights violators, to serve in 2003 as chair of the UN Human Rights Council. Framed by UN officials as an exercise in African solidarity, this was a handy development for African dictators seeking to dampen criticism from the UN, not least Libya's Muammar Qadhafi himself. But for Africa's real champions of human rights, it was a disaster. As a young black member of Zimbabwe's embattled political oppo-

sition described it to this reporter at the time, it was "totally outrageous and revolting."[2]

The outrages do not stop. This year, Zimbabwe was chosen at the UN to chair the Commission on Sustainable Development. This raises alarming questions about what, precisely, the UN is hoping to develop. Under Robert Mugabe's long and ruinous rule, Zimbabwe has been reduced from the breadbasket of southern Africa to a basket case. With policies borrowed from China's cultural revolution, Mr. Mugabe and his circle of cronies have beggared much of the country's population, destroying homes and farms in order to sustain a regime that for many offers no hope of sharing in the kind of growing prosperity enjoyed by, say, neighboring democratic Botswana.

Cash cow

All this goes some distance toward suggesting that for the UN to focus on Africa as its chief challenge and prime beneficiary is no favor to most Africans. Nor is it a glowing prospect for the rest of us, if we are guided by the principle that the achievement of peace and prosperity on the African continent is important to the welfare and security of the free world.

To be sure, the UN has had some successes, in much the same way that even the mafia, in running its protection rackets, does deliver some services. Even Oil-for-Food, while ballooning into the biggest financial scam in history and a pillar of support for Saddam, did deliver rations in Iraq. The UN system, with its $20 billion annual budget, pours billions every year into its endeavors to help Africa, on top of, or in combination with, yet more billions doled out in the form of cheap loans, debt forgiveness, and so forth by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank. Within the UN system, one can find decent people, trying to do the right thing. Yes, there are cases in which the medicine arrives, the anti-malarial bed-nets help, and the parasitic Guinea Worm is cut out of the water supply.

But these achievements come in the context of broader UN activities that routinely undermine the real promise of the continent—supporting and dignifying some of the worst governments, while imposing elaborate, bureaucratically designed and managed schemes that too often range from peculiar to just plain ruinous. One of the best in-depth explanations of this problem comes from economist William Easterly, currently a New York University professor, this year on leave at the Brookings Institution. Mr. Easterly was railroaded out of a long-term job at the World Bank in 2001 after questioning publicly why decades of development aid have been on balance a colossal failure. In his most recent book, *The White Man's Burden*, Mr. Easterly, in deploring the patronizing attitude of development-aid planners, notes that the real successes come not from state (or UN) planners, but when people are allowed enough freedom to help themselves: "While Western planners were discussing whether to increase foreign aid by $50 billion for all poor countries, the citizens of just two large poor countries—India and China—were generating an increase in income for themselves of $175 billion every year."[3] An expert, in particular, on Africa, Mr. Easterly in an illuminating chapter title reminds us: "The Rich Have Markets, the Poor Have Bureaucrats."

The UN gives lip service to the vital role of markets, but both its poli-

cies and practices are mostly about reinforcing state bureaucracies, or even adding yet more layers of bureaucrats. The structure of the UN is such that whatever the real effects of these layers on the intended beneficiaries, the UN itself does very well out of the deal. More programs, projects and grand initiatives translate into justification for demanding more funding from member states and soliciting more support from private donors. In the UN's vast web of interlocking programs, UN agencies quietly charge percentage fees, usually ranging from one to seven percent, for handling funds on each other's behalf. And the UN itself has become an ever-expanding empire, a multilateral labyrinth, operating across borders, with little accountability and almost none of the transparency necessary to keep government institutions at least somewhat honest. Through this opaque UN maze flows a river of tax-exempt UN salaries, fat per diems, handsome perquisites and patronage opportunities for UN officials, families and friends.

All too often, UN activities undermine the real promise of the continent—supporting and dignifying some of the worst governments, while imposing elaborate, bureaucratically designed and managed schemes that routinely range from peculiar to just plain ruinous.

For instance, in the year 2000, the executive secretary of the UN's Economic Commission for Africa reported that "40 percent of the UN assistance currently goes to Africa."[4] But when asked for a more recent round number, a spokesman for the Secretary-General's office e-mailed back to a reporter "the very concept of 'aid' to Africa may be rather hard to define in the case of the UN." He suggested checking with various agencies "starting with UNDP, WFP, UNIDO, ECOSOC, the Peacebuilding Commission, etc." A query this July to the office of the Secretary-General's Special Adviser on Africa, set up by former Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2003 to help coordinate and keep track of UN operations in Africa, was met by the contact person for that office, David Wright, with the point-blank statement that he did not approve of articles written by this reporter about Mr. Annan and therefore would not provide any information at all.

In this setting, it becomes ever more complicated to track the real interests being served. It is probably no accident that the rash of bribery cases in the UN headquarters procurement division, which have resulted in three convictions over the past two years in New York federal court, all involved kickbacks for UN contracts to supply peacekeeping missions in Africa. That's where a big slice of the money is.

Smoke and mirrors

On the geopolitical level, the UN setup which treats all sovereign governments as equal—regardless of whether they are democratic or despotic—lends itself to exploitation by the least scrupulous. In finding a way to stop the genocide going on for years in Sudan's Darfur region, for example, it does not help that unfree China, while deep in oil deals with the Sudanese government, holds one of the five veto-wielding permanent seats on the Security Council.

In this UN universe of moral equivalency, strange priorities bubble up. A

classic example would be the bizarre op-ed on Darfur penned by Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon which appeared recently in the *Washington Post*.[5] In his article, Mr. Ban described genocide in Darfur chiefly as a product of that increasingly fashionable UN cause: climate change. Mr. Ban argued that the genocide was at root the result of drought, which he believes is caused by global warming. Whatever one's view of global warming—and there is plenty in the UN view to argue with—Mr. Ban's call for "teaming with the Sudanese government" skips right past the most basic problem: the glaring reality that Sudan is run by an Islamist dictatorship which has been abetting the genocide.

For all we know, Mr. Ban may have been moved to write his Darfur op-ed by nothing more sinister than an absurdly skewed view of the real priorities and interests at work in Sudan. But some of the UN undercurrents in which he swims are at least worth noting. At the UN, arrangements under the Kyoto Treaty to address the perceived problem of global warming have been tilted financially in favor of China. As a developing country, with special ties to Kyoto Treaty architect and long-time UN eminence Maurice Strong, China enjoys special breaks on the environmental front, despite being one of the world's worst polluters. And China, as noted above, is also one of the top international players doing big oil business with the government of Sudan, and has used its veto-wielding seat on the UN Security Council to resist any genuine solution to the genocide in Darfur. Whether Mr. Ban thought of it or not, a UN approach to Sudan that focuses on climate change for the planet, rather than on regime change in Khartoum, seems likely to suit Beijing just fine.

> The same governments whose misrule is the source of many of Africa's problems have become the direct partners of the United Nations Development Program in designing plans meant to fix those problems.

More broadly, but in the same spirit of "teaming" with governments, regardless as a rule of whether they are good or bad, the UN brings to its endeavors in Africa a central-planning model of development. In theory, this approach landed almost 20 years ago on history's junk heap with the collapse of the Soviet Union. But this is a mode toward which the UN—an institution made up of governments—naturally gravitates. It is a method of control which the UN in one form or another has been trying for some time to reprise, in the name of efficient good works. The biggest UN venture of this kind in the post-Soviet era was Oil-for-Food, in which the UN set out to supervise state rationing as the main mechanism for supplying everything from vehicles to sugar to soap.

In Africa, UN central planning comes in two interwoven guises. One is the UN's grand plan for "Millennium Development Goals," or MDGs—launched by Kofi Annan at the turn of the millennium, and peddled by Mr. Sachs and other UN top officials. The idea is that every developing country on the planet will, in collaboration with UN planners, set out a list of numerically measured targets with a specific timetable for such missions as halving poverty, reducing disease, increasing gender equality, and so forth, by the year 2015. The UN will then assist with resources and experts in monitor-

ing and achieving these goals. If that sounds laudable, the problem is that real development tends to proceed not by way of elaborate bureaucratic plans, but by way of setting out rules that allow people the freedom to decide for themselves what their priorities are, and what trade-offs they prefer to make in terms of timetables and goals.

The result is a sprawling, murky empire of UN plans and special interests, in which the boundaries of "aid" are almost impossible to define, and the goals are set by a UN bureaucracy that has its own tendencies to expand its turf and protect its interests, both financial and political.

Predictably, the UN's giant MDG enterprise is already failing, especially in Africa—though not for lack of interest by client governments. In April 2007, the UN Development Program reported that 40 of the 45 countries covered by its Regional Bureau for Africa had "embarked on MDG-based planning, with support from UNDP and in close collaboration with other UN agencies," and about 20 of these "have now put in place credible MDG-based plans."[6] But in a report issued just two months later, the UN reported that "[n]ot a single country in sub-Saharan Africa was on track."[7] The UN prescription? Calls from top UN officials to double the available funding. In other words, if it's not working, do more of it.

Last year, the original office handling the MDGs, known as the UN Millennium Project, was folded directly into the offices of the UN's flagship agency, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), which already had its own pernicious approach. The UNDP specializes in allying itself directly with national governments, usually at high levels, and collaborating in the design of specific development projects to which the UNDP then channels resources. In other words, the same governments whose misrule is the source of many of Africa's problems become the direct partners of the UNDP in designing plans meant to fix those problems.

For the press or general public, finding out what is really going on is nearly impossible. Details given are usually vague, and the budgets are almost never disclosed—and certainly not in any form that shows, say, actual nitty-gritty expenditure, as opposed to round sums for projected funding needs. The UNDP does not allow even its own 36-member governing body, the executive board, to see its internal audit reports.

The result of all this is a sprawling, murky empire of UN plans and special interests, in which the boundaries of "aid" are almost impossible to define, and the goals are set by a UN bureaucracy that has its own tendencies to expand its turf and protect its interests, both financial and political.

Inside job

The case of Kojo Annan, son of former Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and his green Mercedes is emblematic of this misrule. The story might never have emerged had not President Bush, against the wishes of Annan senior and the UN, invaded Iraq and toppled Saddam. That brought to light documents which broke wide open the Oil-for-Food scandal. That, in turn, led to Paul Volcker's UN-authorized inquiry into Oil-for-Food. And in

the course of looking at UN-related business dealings of Kofi Annan's son, Kojo, Mr. Volcker came across the money trail of a Mercedes SUV, which Kojo Annan had bought in Europe at a diplomatic discount and shipped duty-free into Ghana in 1998, falsely using his father's name and UN diplomatic status.

In the UN system, the UNDP country representatives often double as representatives of the Secretary-General. So, as described in Mr. Volcker's September 7, 2005, final report, it was the UNDP's representative in Ghana who handled the paperwork to bring the Mercedes into the country, duty-free, under the UNDP seal—at a savings to Kojo Annan of more than $14,000, many times the annual income of Ghana's most impoverished citizens who are in theory the reason the UNDP is in Ghana at all. The rep, Abdoulie Janneh, was promoted the following year to a job at UNDP headquarters in New York, where he ended up running the UNDP Regional Bureau for Africa. When interviewed in 2005 by the Volcker committee, Mr. Janneh gave a statement implying that he never got in touch with Kofi Annan either to confirm or to report the details surrounding the Mercedes which had arrived in the Secretary-General's name. This helped clear Kofi Annan of any knowledge of misconduct.

As with most things UN-related, one hand washes the other. Less than two weeks after the Volcker report came out, Mr. Annan promoted Abdoulie Janneh to serve as the executive secretary of the UN's Economic Commission for Africa, based in Addis Ababa, with a $65 million annual budget. The Mercedes itself was reported by Kojo Annan's lawyer to have been wrecked in an accident in Nigeria in late 2005, shortly after the Volcker report called attention to its curious history. In early 2006, more than seven years after the car arrived in Africa under false UN status, Kojo Annan finally offered to reimburse the government of Ghana for the unpaid customs duties—but paid no penalty. As of this writing, there has been no independent confirmation of the final fate of the car. But, writ small, the tale of that Mercedes speaks volumes about what the UN is really all about in Africa, and who benefits.

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
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A Bear at the Door

Keith C. Smith

Gazprom's January 1, 2006, cutoff of natural gas to Ukraine was a long-overdue wake-up call for the West. Belatedly, policymakers in Europe and the United States are coming to grips with Moscow's willingness to use its energy resources as political leverage in its relations with Europe. More recently, sharp increases in the price of the natural gas Russia provides to Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Moldova—and its increasing control over Europe's gas pipeline systems—have added to international worries over Moscow's economic policies and their security implications.

For the U.S. and its allies across the Atlantic, Russia's energy politics may be a comparatively new phenomenon. For many new EU member states such as Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and for new democracies like Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, they are decidedly not. Until quite recently, however, attempts by Central European states to raise the issue of Russia's energy clout in Western capitals have been brushed aside. Instead, the countries of "old Europe" have preferred a benign view of the Kremlin's energy plans, as the European Commission's rapid acceptance of the "Nord Stream" Russo-German undersea gas pipeline back in 2005 eloquently illustrated. As recent months have made equally evident, the concerns voiced by the Central Europeans should have been examined in detail in Brussels and other European capitals.

The slow response in Europe to Moscow's energy policies has been a boon to the Kremlin, giving Russian companies time to stitch together additional

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bilateral deals with Western governments anxious to gain an investment foothold in the Russian energy sector. For its part, the Kremlin, represented by the natural gas monopoly Gazprom, has capitalized on those overtures, confident that high energy prices and the instability of other producers (particularly in the Middle East) have strengthened its bargaining position vis-à-vis the EU.

Russia has managed to manipulate American attitudes as well. In some circles in the United States, there is an unrealistic expectation that Russian natural gas supplies from the Russian Far East or the Barents Sea will fill the gap created by declining domestic production and by political instability in Latin America, Nigeria and the Middle East. The reality, however, is that Russian oil and gas exports are not growing at the pace they were just three to four years ago. In addition, investment in Russian exploration and development has declined from the level that existed before the Kremlin's systematic destruction of Yukos began in 2003, and the Russian government's parallel efforts to centralize control over almost all national oil and gas resources.

Pipeline politics and Western vulnerabilities

Russian "pipeline imperialism" boasts a comparatively long history. It dates back to 1990, when Moscow interrupted energy supplies to the Baltic states in a futile attempt to stifle the independence movements in those countries. The "energy weapon" was again used against those countries in 1992, in retaliation for their demands that Russia remove its remaining military forces from the region. Then in 1993 and 1994, Russia reduced gas supplies to Ukraine, in part to force Kiev to pay for previous gas shipments, but also to pressure Ukraine into ceding more control to Russia over the Black Sea Fleet and its energy infrastructure. Even erstwhile Russian ally Belarus (and indirectly Poland and Lithuania) suffered supply disruptions in 2004 as part of the Kremlin's effort to take over the national gas pipeline system there. From 1998 to 2000, in an attempt to stop the sale of Lithuania's refinery, port facility, and pipeline to the Williams Company of Tulsa, Oklahoma, Russia's Transneft oil shipment monopoly stopped the flow of crude oil to Lithuania no fewer than nine times.

Russia, in other words, knows that its energy resources are a weapon, and is not afraid to use them. Today, Russia's Gazprom, with the help of Germany's Ruhrgas, exercises control over the gas facilities and pipelines in all three Baltic states, and has monopoly control of the domestic gas markets there. This has allowed the Kremlin to effectively control the energy contacts of these countries with the outside world.

Thus, Transneft has refused to allow Kazakhstan to supply oil to Lithuania's Mazeikai Refinery through the Russian pipeline system, even though Kazakhstan's oil company has the legal right to ship crude oil to the Baltic coast. Moscow, however, is determined to prevent any but a Kremlin-approved company from taking over ownership of Lithuania's facilities. Three years ago, Russia stopped all piped shipments of oil to Latvia in an effort to gain control over the oil port at Ventspils. Now, Moscow is again attempting to keep non-Russian companies from buying Lithuania's Mazeikai Nafta Refinery and the port facilities at Butinge, on the Baltic Sea.

This use of pipeline imperialism is generally ignored in the West, even though Latvia and Lithuania are members of both the EU and NATO. In fact, Russia's pipeline monopolies, Gazprom (natural gas) and Transneft (oil), have been given free rides in terms of the open-market requirements of WTO and the EU's own Energy Charter. The EU in effect has given Moscow's increasingly monopolistic pipeline and production companies carte blanche to avoid following accepted Western business practices.

Russia's conduct has everything to do with its internal politics. Former intelligence officers (known as *siloviki*) in the Putin administration and in Russia's energy companies play a large role in determining national energy strategy. The head of Rosneft, Igor Sechin, is a former KGB associate of President Putin who helped engineer the breakup of Yukos and his company's seizure of its most valuable assets. Former KGB and GRU officers sit on the boards of almost all the country's major energy companies. And most former intelligence officers view granting majority control to a Western energy firm as a danger to Russia's national security interests. The idea of a win-win investment strategy with Western firms—or of a cooperative energy strategy with the countries of the West—is difficult for them to fathom, and even harder to accept.

Western capitulation

So far, Europe has given Russia's aggressive energy policy neither the attention nor the response it deserves. Instead, the continent's energy relationship with Russia has, for the past several years, been directed by only a few of the larger member countries. All too often, the leaders of those nations have praised President Vladimir Putin's democratic credentials while ignoring Russia's backsliding on democracy and the coercive use of Russian energy power. At the same time, they have acquiesced to questionable commercial deals giving Moscow increasing leverage over Europe's energy—and political—future.

Today, for example, against both market economics and common sense, Russia is poised to greatly increase its market share in, and leverage over, Germany and the rest of Europe through the construction of the undersea Northern Europe Gas Pipeline (NEGP). An alternate route, running parallel to the Yamal I line that traverses Poland would have been a much cheaper alternative; the price tag for the NEGP is now estimated at $10.5 billion, while Yamal II would have cost just $2.8 billion. In addition, the enlargement of the Yamal line would have provided Central and Western European energy consumers with greater political and economic security. Instead, however, the EU is poised to build an overly-expensive energy route that will give Russia's state-run Gazprom a significant voice in German domestic energy policies, and indirectly over the gas markets in all of Central Europe.

Sadly, on this score, U.S. policy has proven to be little different. Until quite recently, policymakers in Washington have been far more eager to secure energy supplies from Russia than to pressure the Kremlin into reforming its economy. In the process, they have ignored the non-competitive and political aspects of Russia's energy export policies.

That this state of affairs is dangerous is clear. Relying on energy from an increasingly authoritarian government intent on expanding

its political influence in neighboring countries is deeply troubling. If, on the other hand, Russia's energy wealth were more transparently and competitively managed, it would dramatically increase domestic Russian living standards, bring Moscow real international respect and make Europe feel more unified and secure.

The importance of good relations between Russia and the West, and particularly between Germany and Russia, cannot be underestimated. Nevertheless, it is a mistake to give Moscow the impression that the West believes it needs Russian energy supplies more than Russia needs the oil and gas revenue that comes from Western markets. Nor is it wise to let the Putin government believe that its authoritarian domestic policies are acceptable to the West as long as the oil keeps flowing. Simply put, Russia will not be able to develop its vast energy fields in Siberia, the Pacific Coast and in the Barents Sea before the middle of the next decade without Western capital and technology.

Russia knows that its energy resources are a weapon, and is not afraid to use them.

Indeed, there are growing indications that Russia will be unable to meet European, Chinese, Japanese and American expectations for significant increases in energy imports unless it offers foreign investors significantly greater participation in the exploration and development of its energy. Russian gas exports to the West are already dependent on Gazprom's ability to monopolize and control gas exports from Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. This Russian dependency on Central Asia will increase over the next seven to ten years, until there are substantial gas flows from the Shtokman field in the Barents Sea, and from new wells in the Sakhalin and Siberian fields. In the past, Gazprom has not been known in the industry for either its innovation or its ability to increase productivity. With the company now under tighter control by the Kremlin, there are good reasons to question whether Gazprom and the increasingly powerful Rosneft will have the managerial skills, financing and technology necessary to meet Russia's export contracts through increased domestic production.

All of this is leverage that the West can and should use. Yet until now, there has been no coordinated push by either the EU or the U.S. to require Russia to open its energy market to foreign investors in the same way that Western companies and markets are open to Russian investors. Lukoil, for example, has been allowed to buy 100 percent of Getty Petroleum in the U.S., along with 1,500 gas stations. Yet according to Russian law, American energy companies can only own 49 percent of a Russian firm, and in practice 20 percent ownership appears to be the ceiling set by the Kremlin.

Instead of acquiescing to this model, the West should be using its considerable leverage to force Russia to play by the same transparent, competitive rules that guide business in the West. Such a strategy would help promote the kind of investment that would increase, rather than decrease, economic reform and more balanced growth in Russia itself. President Putin has compared the new Gazprom colossus to Norway's Statoil, but the latter has real domestic competition, its exports are divorced from foreign policy, and it is a totally transparent company. Gazprom, with its

interlocking ties to the Kremlin and its gas pipeline monopoly, cannot be compared to any Western firm.

More thought likewise should be given by Western governments to the potential power of Gazprom to control the gas markets in Central Europe following the completion of the Baltic pipeline system in 2011-12. Under the German-Russian agreement to construct the NEGP, Gazprom will be able to buy significant shares in Germany's gas companies. Will this allow Gazprom to veto shipments of gas from Germany to Poland if the Poles have a dispute with Gazprom over price or availability? Could the increased power of Gazprom be used to stop liquefied natural gas (LNG) receiving plants from being constructed in Poland, Latvia, or even in Germany? Moscow's political influence in Berlin can only be expected to increase as a result of Germany's growing energy dependency on Russia.

Indeed, Russian policies increasingly run counter to Europe's own energy plans. The EU has proposed that member states increase their levels of natural gas storage as part of efforts to attain a modicum of energy self-reliance. But this may become more difficult now that Poland and the Baltic states are being bypassed by the NEGP. Likewise, European states have signaled their growing interest in acquiring energy from Central Asia and the Caspian Basin. But Russian purchases of all gas from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan are designed to deny the West, including countries such as Ukraine, the ability to buy this oil and gas directly or at prices negotiated between producer and consumer, rather than by Gazprom.

The stakes are high. Among other things, there are real questions as to whether this coercive pipeline policy of the Kremlin is compatible with WTO membership. Considering the unfortunate experience of China's WTO compliance, there are good reasons to doubt that Russia will let up its monopolistic pressure on Central Asian gas shipments after it has been admitted to the WTO. Demanding more open and competitive energy policies by Moscow before its WTO accession would be wiser than repeating the China experience. Russia is also using energy to attempt to drive a wedge between "new" and "old" Europe. Gazprom, for example, is pressuring Bulgaria into breaking a binding agreement on gas price and availability that would be in force until 2010. It is prudent—and politically important—for the EU to support this new member. And yet so far, there is no sign that Brussels will intervene.

> All too often, European leaders have praised President Vladimir Putin's democratic credentials while ignoring Russia's backsliding on democracy and the coercive use of Russian energy power. At the same time, they have acquiesced to questionable commercial deals giving Moscow increasing leverage over Europe's energy—and political—future.

We have already seen a portent of things to come. The Russia-Ukraine "gas war" of winter 2006 may have been resolved relatively quickly, but it provided a telling glimpse into how Russia hopes to use energy to steer European politics. From the statements of Russian officials and their sympathizers in Kiev, Moscow's agenda was clear: to hammer home the real costs of then-

Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko's plans to move Ukraine closer to the EU and NATO. It is highly unlikely that Moscow would have demanded that Ukraine immediately pay "world market prices" for Russian energy imports if the country's pro-Kremlin candidate, Viktor Yanukovich, had managed to take power. And it should not have surprised anyone that the cutoff came in the middle of one the coldest winters in recent Ukrainian memory, and less than three months before the country's crucial parliamentary elections.

Seizing the initiative

Today, Europe should be taking a more active role in breaking Gazprom's stranglehold over Russia's monopoly pipeline system, and in helping Central Asian energy producers secure direct access to Western markets. It is clear that Europe has the economic and legal ability to create a more transparent and competitive energy relationship with Russia. The question is whether there is sufficient political will in Brussels or other European capitals to force Moscow to adopt more transparent, competitive and reciprocal energy policies.

If they choose to do so, the countries of Europe still have the ability to reorder the playing field in their energy relationship with Russia—at least for the moment. The EU can make greater investments in building a more secure network of electricity inter-connectors between the countries of Western, Central and Eastern Europe. It also could help marshal international banks such as the EBRD and EIB to take equity positions in the pipeline systems of Ukraine, Bulgaria, Moldova and Poland, thereby helping those countries modernize their pipelines and prevent them from being controlled by non-transparent Russian companies.

At the same time, the EU should actively enforce the Energy Charter Treaty it has signed with Russia—and which, though legally in effect, is honored by Russia entirely in the breach. It also should enforce the Rome Treaty's competition and anti-trust rules in cases of cross-border deals between Transneft, Gazprom and individual European states. The goal should be the creation of a "level playing field" for European and Russian investors in the energy sector—one in which the rules on both sides are clear, transparent and enforceable.

Because Kremlin dominance over Caspian energy is not good for business, European governments also need to do more to publicize the true costs to the continent's consumers of Russia's current de facto monopoly on Central Asian energy. In cooperation with the U.S., these governments also should provide more leadership in convincing the Central Asian states to supply gas and oil directly to the EU, without the use of Russian intermediaries. At the same time, Europe must collectively prevent its member states from reaching separate deals with Russia that undercut the viability of EU energy plans.

Such steps are essential if Europe is to preserve its economic and political freedom in the face of growing Russian energy pressure. But they are just as important for Russia itself. Without being held to account, Russia will remain a state that wields energy as a strategic weapon, rather than as a tool for closer ties with Europe and for the prosperity of its own citizenry. It is in everyone's interests that Russia be steered toward the latter course.

Getting China Right

Stephen J. Yates

American politics is entering a phase in which China is likely to increase in prominence, and where the fundamentals of U.S. policy toward the People's Republic are likely to be called into question. Over the next two years, the White House's approach is unlikely to change. But the Democrat-controlled Congress and presidential contenders alike can be expected to critique Administration policy and offer alternatives to it.

Many in Washington have experienced this "business cycle" in China policy before. Since the formal establishment of diplomatic relations with China in 1979, nearly every president has highlighted the need for fundamental adjustments in the U.S. approach to China during his campaign. Reagan questioned the end of diplomatic relations with Taipei; Clinton urged that human rights take a higher priority; and Bush challenged the "constructive strategic partnership" approach in vogue at the end of Clinton's tenure. Early on, each experienced tension with China, but over time all settled into a more businesslike or accommodating relationship. (George H. W. Bush is absent from this list, as he campaigned for continuity more than change in China policy and sustained a more accommodating posture toward Beijing.)

Many factors contribute to this normalization. Inevitably, the idealism of campaigns gets overtaken by the realism of governance. Powerful global or domestic developments supersede China-related priorities or recast a particular Administration's assessment. And, over time, presidents become more com-

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fortable in their command of foreign affairs and more confident in the personal relations established with their counterparts.

This state of normalcy is worlds away from the rhetoric of the campaign season, which is rife with criticism of existing China policy. Candidates are freer to posture, lacking the responsibilities of governance. Campaigns are also a season of intense, direct interaction with U.S. constituencies with economic, political, religious, and military concerns related to China.

Today, as was the case when Bill Clinton ran in 1992 and George W. Bush did so in 2000, we are in a period of opposition control over Congress, and the appetite to challenge the current administration's approach to foreign affairs is considerable. In the months ahead, a great deal undoubtedly will be said in Congress and on the campaign trail about the controversial elements of the U.S. relationship with China. After all, with a bilateral trade deficit of more than $230 billion, it is easy to appeal to American public sentiment by blaming an undervalued Chinese currency for the loss of U.S. manufacturing jobs and a major trade imbalance. But China's economic rise represents only one of the significant challenges that the next U.S. president will face in dealing with China.

An effective strategy for dealing with China should be informed by global U.S. priorities. Yet today, there is no agreed-upon, overarching agenda to organize and mobilize the world.

Defining American interests

An effective strategy for dealing with China should be informed by global U.S. priorities. Yet today, there is no agreed-upon, overarching agenda to organize and mobilize the world. President Bush, of course, has asserted that 9/11 "changed everything," characterizing the current era in terms of an existential struggle between modern civilization and violent religious extremists who aim to destroy it. In his second inaugural address, he proclaimed that "[t]he survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world."

Needless to say, not everyone agrees with President Bush's diagnosis or prescription. Candidates in both parties are struggling with the terms of this debate—especially the proper role of democracy (and its promotion) in the current era.

Consistent with the "Bush Doctrine," one might expect the promotion of democracy to be among the highest U.S. priorities in dealing with China. Yet current Sino-American relations are dominated by issues like North Korea's nuclear program, a potential conflict with Taiwan, the value of China's currency, and China's role in the United Nations and in key regions around the world. This is of course understandable; all are important and in some cases urgent. But taken together, they undermine the notion that the promotion of freedom for 1.3 billion Chinese is as high a priority as "the survival of liberty in our land."

Thus, the next president will need either to accept the "Bush Doctrine" and adjust its application to

China accordingly, or propose a new set of priorities to inform regional strategies, including those that apply to China.

As important, and related, is the shape and scope of future American engagement abroad. Given the scale of current U.S. involvement in the Middle East, and the intensity of the domestic reaction to it, national security issues can be expected to dominate the 2008 campaign to as great an extent as they did in 2004. Defining objectives for military capabilities and when to deploy them will be a major question for all the candidates. But so too are questions about defining and prioritizing challenges to U.S. interests like reliance on foreign oil, controlling the spread of the world's most dangerous weapons, and contemporary terrorism—overwhelmingly a manifestation of radical Islamist ideology.

China is not central to these concerns, but how it chooses to exercise its rising power will impact upon the current era of intense engagement and high risk in the Middle East. China's growing demand for energy, for example, is adding upward pressure to world oil prices. Resources from the Middle East are a key ingredient driving the engine of Chinese exports, on which many in the U.S. increasingly rely. China's approach to securing Middle East resources, meanwhile, shows limited signs of sensitivity to the need for clean, transparent, and responsible governance—as seen in its unconstructive stance toward multilateral pressure on Iran for its pursuit of nuclear weapons or its support for those who fight against the defenders of emerging democratic institutions (including the U.S. military in Iraq).

The Middle East is significant for China for another reason as well. U.S. preoccupation with that part of the world is likely to dominate the next administration's foreign policy as much as it has the Bush administration's. Massive military deployments, multiple terrorist movements, and the need to secure energy supplies will demand sustained attention from American leaders in the years ahead, whether they turn out to be Republican or Democrat. Such attention, however, is likely to come at the expense of American leadership in other regions. Just as military strategists have long struggled with the challenge of two-front wars, it is implausible to think that, in tandem with its involvement in the Middle East, the U.S. could simultaneously pursue objectives in other regions with equal vigor and resources (diplomatic, economic, and military).

The next president will need either to accept the "Bush Doctrine" and adjust its application to China accordingly, or propose a new set of priorities to inform regional strategies, including those that apply to China.

Since 9/11, this has led to risk minimizing or status quo policies in other regions, especially Northeast Asia. Thus, Washington increasingly has sought accommodation with North Korea over the latter's nuclear program and international intransigence. And it has failed to robustly address China's dramatic military modernization, or unequivocally to reaffirm its commitment to preserving peace in the Taiwan Strait.

With the war on terror the top foreign policy priority for most candidates, the next president will need

to reconcile the quantity and quality of regional objectives outside the Middle East with the sobering reality of limited resources and the need to manage risk. They should do so with the knowledge that enemies and competitors of the United States already have given thought to how best to use America's preoccupation to their advantage.

Knowledge gaps

Capabilities and intentions are two typical measures of the challenge or opportunity a particular country presents. When it comes to China, the international media, government, and academic discourse is filled with figures and judgments related to these factors. Yet, specialists from outside the field often are astounded by just how little evidence we have to defend assertions of what we know about China's plans.

Take China's population as an example. It is widely reported that the People's Republic of China has 1.3 billion citizens. With such large numbers, massive migration flows, and geographic challenges, how likely is it that this is a precise figure? Would it matter in either economic or political terms if an actual count were taken and China only had 900 million citizens (fewer than India)?

A more serious issue is the lack of independently verifiable data about China's economic figures and institutions. The United States and the world have invested unprecedented sums in China, anticipating continued rapid growth, stable governance, and (somewhat contradictorily) a transition to more liberal or democratic politics. But what do we really know about the solvency of China's financial institutions? How do we know that China's economic growth figures are comprehensive and accurate? How likely is it that China can continue its current rate of growth (and the international community's current level of investment) for the foreseeable future? What are the likely consequences of an economic downturn in China (even if it is just to "normal" growth rates)? These are but a few of the questions that cannot be answered with the confidence required for a typical company to do business in major U.S. markets. And yet, the U.S. has wagered much more on the presumption of China's continued economic success.

Last, and certainly not least, is the gap in our knowledge of China's military capabilities and strategic intentions. In recent years, estimates of China's military capabilities have repeatedly been revised upward in both quantitative and qualitative terms. In other words, experts have consistently underestimated China's military capabilities and the speed with which China is able to produce and deploy new capabilities. And that is just what we are able to see and measure. It is even more difficult to verify assumptions about China's strategic intentions. Why does China need an anti-satellite capability, a rapidly growing nuclear arsenal, and a significant submarine fleet? If a peaceful environment and economic development are all China seeks, then why don't the Chinese people receive more of a post-Cold War peace dividend, with the government transferring a greater percentage of domestic spending away from the military toward economic stimuli and social welfare?

When it comes to what China ultimately seeks in Asia and from the U.S., we know only what its leaders say (vague generalities) and what we can see (far from a complete picture). China's continued lack of democracy

makes it unlikely that we will have the degree of transparency on these subjects with China that we enjoy with other major powers.

It is possible, of course, that China will emerge as a peaceful and cooperative power in the years ahead. However, it is just as likely (or even more so) that it will not. The next president, like his or her predecessors, will be forced to grapple with this uncertain future. He or she also will have full knowledge of the shortcomings in our intelligence about what Beijing's leaders want, and how they set about to get it.

Dulcet tones

China's diplomats are very skillful. Their message is soothing: China's peaceful rise presents an opportunity for all to profit, and its growing international influence will be used to promote dialogue rather than confrontation (with Taiwan a profound exception). China also promises to be an advocate for multilateralism, a balancer of sorts to perceived U.S. unilateralism.

There is much in China's message with which a significant portion of the world can or already does agree. It fits very neatly with long-held assumptions that diplomatic engagement and economic development in China will over time lead Beijing to moderate its politics and emerge as a respected status quo power in the international system. It also is consistent with the widely held notion that the passage of time will ease resolution of the differences between the U.S. and China, as well as China's own problems with Taiwan.

But these assumptions, while plausible, are based on hope more than relevant precedent or current evidence. Given the gaps in U.S. knowledge and the lack of transparency with which China chooses to operate, it is only prudent that greater attention be paid to what China is actually doing, as opposed to what its leaders say or what we hope for the future to bring.

It is possible, of course, that China will emerge as a peaceful and cooperative power in the years ahead. However, it is just as likely (or even more so) that it will not.

China's actions abroad already leave a decidedly mixed picture. More than any other state, the PRC bears responsibility for North Korea's tragic existence. From the military intervention which resulted in the establishment of a separate Korean state to enabling the A.Q. Khan network's export of nuclear capabilities (of which the DPRK has been a major beneficiary) to the continued economic assistance that sustains one of the world's most brutal regimes, China should own today's North Korea problems. But what risks are they actually taking, and what level of resources are they expending, to roll back North Korea's nuclear escalation and steer the DPRK in a more moderate direction?

China in recent years also has significantly enhanced its security and economic engagement in Burma and Bangladesh. In both instances, Beijing's involvement has directly and indirectly empowered elements that support dictatorship and export violence. There are similar consequences to China's engagement in the Sudan, Zimbabwe and Venezuela, among others.

And when it comes to international organizations, China contributes far

fewer resources than its peers—conspicuously less than Japan, which lacks the permanent status China enjoys at the United Nations Security Council. And too often, China's objectives in multilateral fora are aimed not at advancing the mission of those entities, but at keeping Taiwan out or avoiding criticism of China's domestic or external conduct.

As the Bush administration did at the outset of its tenure, the U.S. would do well in the future to focus on the future shape of Asia, rather than centering too much attention on China alone.

In fact, except for its impressive run of high economic growth rates and commercial exports, China's international actions fall conspicuously short of the "responsible stakeholder" ideal put forth by the Bush administration. That concept properly notes that, perhaps more than any other nation in history, China has benefited from a secure and open international order that has allowed it to concentrate on its own economic development, and that now is the time for China to share the burden and responsibility for defending and extending this order.

The next president will need to craft a strategy to get China to do more in areas consistent with the responsible stakeholder ideal, and to dissuade or deter China from continued actions that undermine it. A failure to do so will call into question the dominant assumption that China's peaceful rise is good for American interests.

Thinking bigger

The next president will enter office with a full foreign policy agenda that stretches or exceeds the incoming administration's ability to deliver. Big questions will need to be answered. What are the very few top foreign policy priorities that define its global agenda? How do those priorities inform strategy for dealing with China? And just how much time and resources is the new president prepared to spend on Asia?

As the Bush administration did at the outset of its tenure, the U.S. would do well in the future to focus on the future shape of Asia, rather than centering too much attention on China alone. Washington and Beijing may have different ideas about what is best for China's future and the environment in which it lives. On this issue, however, there is a tremendous convergence of interests among the developed and developing democracies of Asia—one that translates into an agenda that the U.S. should strongly support. It is built upon, but not limited to, common values such as political reform, judicial transparency, and economic capacity-building. Such an effort to build a confident and secure Asia where democracies thrive is a worthy objective in its own right, but it also is a vital element to strategy for managing the potential consequences of China's uncertain future (whether external adventurism or internal instability). It is an investment in what we know works: responsive democratic government and true responsible international stakeholders.

Thus, when it comes to dealing with China, the new administration should adopt a dispassionate, results-oriented approach. It should avoid swooning declarations that pronounce ties with China to be "the best ever" or that bilateral relationship to be more important than all others. The incoming government should

give credit where credit is due, and be respectful. But it also should make perfectly clear that there are consequences when China falls short in terms of transparency or actions.

In support of these efforts, the new president should task his team with providing a comprehensive assessment of China's developing capabilities and intentions—identifying the limits of our knowledge, assessing the potential consequences resulting from these knowledge gaps, and proposing strategies for dealing with them. Informed by this assessment, the new administration will need to adjust its policy away from a status quo approach toward one that respects long-standing commitments but also recognizes that both China and the world are rapidly changing.

Such a shift may be inconvenient, but it is essential if we are to refocus on resolving tensions. For example, the Clinton administration ended on the right note in seeking that cross-Strait differences are "resolved peacefully and with the assent of the Taiwan people." The Bush administration, however, did away with the second part of that principle, opting instead for a formulation that supports any peaceful resolution acceptable to "the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait." That might be fine if China were a democracy, but it is not. If we are sincere in our interest in democracy for the Chinese people and a peaceful resolution of the cross-Strait issue, the United States will need to find a way to demonstrate that it trusts the people of Taiwan and believes in the democratic processes at work there.

A wide range of China-related issues will define themselves in the coming year. How does China choose to respond to the new president of Taiwan, who will be elected in early 2008? Is China dealing in good faith with representatives of the Dalai Lama in seeking true accommodation with the Tibetan people living in China? How does China handle the media, political, and environmental challenges associated with hosting the 2008 Olympic Games?

If we are sincere in our interest in democracy for the Chinese people and a peaceful resolution of the cross-Strait issue, the United States will need to find a way to demonstrate that it trusts the people of Taiwan and believes in the democratic processes at work there.

In the end, the most important advice for getting China right is the simplest: speak plainly while seeking evidence and results. The new administration should communicate clearly about the kind of relationship it seeks from China, what it expects in return, and what it is prepared to deliver, both positive and negative. What is needed is a more business-like approach, rather than the one that has prevailed for far too long, captive to diplomatic jargon that falls short of telling Americans, our friends, and even the Chinese themselves what the U.S. expects and is prepared to do to achieve it.

The Pyongyang Paradox

Gordon G. Chang

The United States is the most powerful nation in history. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, on the other hand, is a destitute and reviled state that has, for a little over a decade, needed humanitarian assistance from the international community just to get by. Yet for more than half a century, the regime led by the Kim family—first Kim Il Sung and now Kim Jong Il—has survived and even bested America in a series of contests, confrontations, and standoffs. This has been the tragic paradox at the center of relations between Washington and Pyongyang.

How has a weak Korea been able to hold off a strong America? If we can answer this crucial question about the past, we can perhaps devise a strategy for disarming Pyongyang in the future.

Neglecting Korea

There are two primary reasons for the consistent—and perplexing—American failure to prevail over the DPRK. The first is Washington's apparent inability to pay sufficient attention to the Korean peninsula. This failing goes back to at least the last months of the Second World War. Focused on reducing casualties in the Pacific, America urged Stalin's Soviet Union to open another front against Japan. Moscow finally declared war against Tokyo during the last week of hostilities, on August 8, 1945. Without firing a shot, the Red Army invaded the northern part of the Korean peninsula on the following day.

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Washington refused to permit a Soviet occupation of Japan, but could not stop the Soviets from settling into Korea. There were no American troops there, and to avoid a Soviet takeover of the whole peninsula the United States hastily proposed its division. As August 10th became the 11th in the American capital, two junior American Army officers, consulting a *National Geographic* map, picked the 38th parallel as the border for "temporary" occupation zones. The Soviets accepted, and honored, the proposed dividing line.

In different times, there might have been no consequence to the last-minute decision to split the peninsula into two. In the emerging global competition between Moscow and Washington, however, the stopgap measure took on significance. National elections, to be sponsored by the United Nations, were never held. Eventually, in 1948, each side established its own client state.

Defeating Kim Il Sung and his Chinese allies would have been expensive, time-consuming, and bloody, but the United States, with the world's strongest military, could have prevailed. Washington simply underestimated its ability to win.

Events since then have repeated this pattern of American neglect. Washington withdrew its forces from the peninsula by 1949. This permitted Kim Il Sung to invade South Korea in June 1950. Although it is not popular to say so now, the United States could have—and should have—defeated the DPRK. South Korea's leader, Syngman Rhee, wanted to vanquish his northern rival. At the time, he looked like a warmonger. In retrospect, Rhee was right: America could have avoided more than a half century of suffering and turmoil caused by North Korea. Moreover, Kim had dealt a setback to the United States in the war. He had, after all, managed to do something that even Stalin had not accomplished: at the height of U.S. power, he had dented the aura of American military superiority.

Defeating Kim Il Sung and his Chinese allies would have been expensive, time-consuming, and bloody, but the United States, with the world's strongest military, could have prevailed. China, which had joined forces with North Korea and had the desire to continue fighting, did not have the capacity to defeat the United States; the Soviet Union, which had a superb army, lacked the incentive to help Kim more fully. Washington simply underestimated its ability to win.

Thereafter, America ignored one North Korean provocation after another. Kim Il Sung, for instance, captured the USS *Pueblo*, a reconnaissance vessel, in international waters in January 1968. It was the first time that a U.S. Navy ship had been taken on the high seas in peacetime in over 150 years. In April 1969, the North Koreans shot down an unarmed Navy EC-121 reconnaissance plane in international airspace over the Sea of Japan. All 31 crew members were killed, resulting in the largest loss of U.S. servicemen in a single incident during the Cold War. Doing nothing after the loss of the plane was the safe play and President Nixon received praise for restraint, but Henry Kissinger, national security adviser at the time, admitted that Washington's response to the shootdown was "weak, indecisive, and disorganized." He wrote about the failure to respond,

"I believe we paid for it in many intangible ways, in demoralized friends and emboldened adversaries."

Today, the United States is continuing this pattern of neglect. The Pentagon is drawing down its troops on the Korean peninsula—they number about 29,000 at this time—to build up forces at the other end of Asia, especially Iraq, even though North Korea remains a threat. Moreover, the Bush administration since 2003—the year of the first Beijing-sponsored talks—has essentially subcontracted its Korean policy to China while it has been absorbed in the Middle East and Central Asia.

This is not necessarily a criticism of the broad goals of American policy. It is, however, fair to say that Washington must be prepared to accept the consequences of this prioritization of resources and attention. The past shows that each time America has put the DPRK on the back burner, the cost of achieving stability on the Korean peninsula has gone up. The United States did not retaliate for either the barbaric *Pueblo* or EC-121 incidents because America was distracted by the war in Vietnam. As it turned out, that conflict in Southeast Asia had almost no lasting geopolitical significance, but North Korea continues to bedevil the world today.

Mixed signals

The second major reason for America's consistent failing is a lack of consistency of policy. Due to the disparity of size, the United States could have prevailed over North Korea by this time through either hard or soft policies. By continually employing a tough approach, Washington could have starved the regime in Pyongyang into submission. By consistently adopting friendly policies, America could have bought off critical elements of the regime or even made North Korea an ally. Instead, the United States has accomplished neither objective. Instead it has, by frequently switching its approaches, kept a hostile regime in power. There have been many examples of this inconsistency, but the best come from the current administration, and its predecessor.

Due to the disparity of size, the United States could have prevailed over North Korea by this time through either hard or soft policies. By continually employing a tough approach, Washington could have starved the regime in Pyongyang into submission. By consistently adopting friendly policies, America could have bought off critical elements of the regime or even made North Korea an ally. Instead, the United States has accomplished neither objective.

The most glaring inconsistency in President Clinton's tenure involved the centerpiece of his Korean policy, the 1994 Agreed Framework. That agreement, we often forget, strengthened North Korea by providing the DPRK with an economic lifeline. More important, it signaled to Pyongyang's elite American acceptance of the regime's existence in the wake of Kim Il Sung's passing. By signing this document in Geneva, Washington instantly enhanced the DPRK's global standing and bought precious time for the one-man regime that, at that moment, had no man to run it.

Yet the midterm elections in 1994 resulted in a Congress that

questioned the wisdom of the relationship contemplated by the Agreed Framework. As a result, the Administration backed off some of its promises to Pyongyang. For instance, the United States did not give a specific no-nuclear-attack pledge, did not lift some sanctions, and ended others years late. The Agreed Framework also promised North Korea proliferation-resistant reactors, and the project eventually fell woefully behind schedule, which was primarily an American failing. Washington was also slow on its commitments to establish relations.

South Korean President Kim Young Sam publicly warned Washington not to provide aid to Pyongyang. But the Clinton administration ignored his commonsense advice, and saved the DPRK during its moment of greatest need since the end of the Korean War. And, by providing aid, Washington made it acceptable for others—especially Kim Young Sam's successor, Kim Dae Jung—to give crucial assistance just when the North Korean regime came closest to losing power in the post-war period.

These defaults, however, were minor compared to Pyongyang's brazen betrayal of the Agreed Framework by, among other things, maintaining a secret uranium nuclear weapons program. Yet Kim Jong Il has used American failures to create support for his rule among senior leaders of his government. Washington, as it turned out, was friendly enough to strengthen Kim's economy, hostile enough to increase the dictator's standing at home, and not threatening enough to actually endanger his regime.

Yet these two strategic mistakes—first signing the Agreed Framework and then not following through—might not have had any consequence. By the middle of the 1990s, the DPRK's economy was close to certain collapse. It had fallen into what economists call a "poverty trap," a cycle of accelerating disintegration from which there was no escape without external assistance. Although the regime proved surprisingly resilient immediately after Kim Il Sung's death, it is unlikely that Kim Jong Il could have survived the following complete and simultaneous failures of both agriculture and the civilian economy.

South Korean President Kim Young Sam publicly warned Washington not to provide aid to Pyongyang while the North Koreans concentrated their few resources on their People's Army. But the Clinton administration ignored his commonsense advice, and saved the DPRK during its moment of greatest need since the end of the Korean War. During this dire period at the peak of the famine, Pyongyang did not open its military storehouses, did not buy food for the dying, and did not, as far as we know, cut spending on its armed forces. America provided assistance nonetheless. And, by providing aid, Washington made it acceptable for others—especially Kim Young Sam's successor, Kim Dae Jung—to give crucial assistance just when the North Korean regime came closest to losing power in the post-war period.

South Korea started shipping aid in 1998, and thereby stabilized the

DPRK. At a time when the total economic output of the North's civilian economy was minuscule, Seoul provided $200 million in assistance. The effect of the South's aid was significant: North Korea's gross domestic product immediately started to show increases. Starting in 1999, when the country began its recovery, and continuing for at least a half decade thereafter, economic output grew from year to year.

The Bush administration, for its part, has pursued different policies, yet it too has failed to maintain a consistent approach toward the DPRK. In October 2002, the North Koreans admitted to visiting Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly that they were indeed running a covert uranium weapons program. Kelly's confrontation with Pyongyang started an unanticipated downward spiral in relations. After the United States that December stopped the shipments of heavy fuel oil required by the Agreed Framework, Pyongyang immediately ejected international weapons inspectors, announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty the following January, fired up the Yongbyon reactor shortly thereafter, resumed construction on two other reactors, and removed eight thousand fuel rods from Yongbyon's cooling pond for the purpose of reprocessing fuel for bombs. In short, the Agreed Framework fell apart, and President Bush rightly began a tough policy toward Pyongyang. He continued to talk to North Korea in the context of Beijing's six-party negotiations—which included China, Russia, South Korea and Japan—but refused to make concessions and insisted on complete, verifiable, irreversible disarmament, a policy that became known by its acronym, CVID.

Due to decades of neglect and inconsistency, the United States has lost the initiative on the Korean peninsula and most of its influence there. The current administration may think it has a plan to disarm Pyongyang, but it hardly matters whether it does or not. Chairman Kim, and not President Bush, is determining the pace and course of events, as can be seen from developments in the last few months.

Yet, like his overly flexible predecessor, President Bush suddenly changed course. In September 2005, in what was termed a "breakthrough," the United States agreed to a statement of principles with the five other parties to the Beijing talks. North Korea said it would give up "all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs," so the arrangement was theoretically "complete." Yet it was neither "irreversible" nor "verifiable." The statement, which was vague even for a document of its type, only contained a scant reference to verification and contemplated a peaceful nuclear energy program, which North Korea could turn into a generator for new fissile material (Pyongyang constantly maintained that its only working reactor at Yongbyon was part of a civilian program). The statement of principles also contemplated a normalization of relations between Washington and Pyongyang and the development of economic ties. At the same time, the Bush administration stopped talking about, and insisting on, CVID.

That same month, however, the Bush Treasury Department attempted to isolate North Korea from the international financial system by designating Banco Delta Asia, a bank in Macau, as a "primary money laundering concern." This act, which was essentially a sanction, had the effect of freezing approximately $25 million in North Korean funds. BDA had previously helped Kim Jong Il hide his money, distribute counterfeit American currency, and launder the proceeds of other state criminal activities. In the following months, North Korea found that financial institutions around the world began to shun dealing with it due to the American sanction and the Treasury Department's continuing efforts to isolate the DPRK.

Kim Jong Il's nuclear program makes him geopolitically relevant, ensures aid from foreign nations, and destabilizes archenemies South Korea and Japan. Without his atomic bombs, Kim would be just another ignored leader of one more failing state. With them, he is a fearsome autocrat and the center of the world's attention.

In short, the Bush administration tried to conduct two fundamentally incompatible policies at the same time: a policy of friendship, as embodied in the statement of principles, and a policy of hostility, as evidenced by the Banco Delta Asia sanction. Apart from the questionable wisdom of trying to implement both strategies simultaneously, the plan was unsustainable on its face. Not surprisingly, President Bush's policy has collapsed in recent months, and it has fallen apart in the worst possible way from America's perspective. Due to decades of neglect and inconsistency, the United States has lost the initiative on the Korean peninsula and most of its influence there. The current Administration may think it has a plan to disarm Pyongyang, but it hardly matters whether it does or not. Chairman Kim, and not President Bush, is determining the pace and course of events, as can be seen from developments in the last few months.

On February 13th of this year, the six parties to the Beijing talks came to an interim agreement to implement the September 2005 statement of principles. North Korea promised to follow a two-step plan to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. In the first stage, lasting just 60 days, the Stalinist state said it would shut down and seal its reactor in Yongbyon. International inspectors were designated to monitor this activity. In the second, the North Koreans will disable all of their nuclear facilities and disclose all nuclear programs. In return, the United States and Japan will lift some sanctions and start the process of normalizing relations. There is also a tangible benefit: the North will receive a million tons of heavy fuel oil or aid in an equivalent amount. There was no mention in the short agreement that the United States would lift its sanction against Banco Delta Asia.

Nonetheless, Pyongyang had refused to shut down Yongbyon until all "frozen" funds in BDA were returned, and China apparently took the side of its neighbor and ally. Washington, in a humiliating about-face, bowed to Beijing's démarche and ultimately accepted the transfer of the money back to Korea, even going to the extraordinary step of having the New York branch of the

Federal Reserve Bank involve itself in transferring the dirty funds. What once looked like a principled stand to clean up the international financial system now appears to have been a temporary tactic in negotiations with North Korea.

The dispute over the funds in Macau was never really about the money, a small sum even by North Korean standards. The dispute was Pyongyang's way of testing Washington's will. Having prevailed in forcing America to unfreeze the funds, Kim Jong Il has been pressing his advantage to the limit. In his latest victory, he maneuvered Washington into approving the delivery of part of the first installment of oil pursuant to the February agreement before shuttering the Yongbyon reactor. At this point, Washington is reacting to Pyongyang's moves and has been reduced to issuing statements that have almost no practical effect.

Now it is clear that, unless it uses military force, the Bush administration will not succeed in disarming North Korea. The first stage of the February agreement has been implemented—Pyongyang shut down its reactor in the middle of July, three months late—yet the next step appears to be out of reach. Even if the second stage is completed at some late date in the future, the task of disarmament will not be done. The February deal does not require North Korea to turn over one weapon or ounce of plutonium.

The secret to success

States such as Libya, Brazil, Argentina, South Korea, and Taiwan have all abandoned nuclear weapons programs and some (Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and South Africa) have even surrendered nuclear weapons. North Korea, however, does not yet appear to have made the strategic decision to yield its arsenal. As Kim Kye Gwan, Pyongyang's chief nuclear negotiator, said last December, "Do you believe we developed and sustained our nuclear weapons programs for so long just to give them up?"

Kim Jong Il's nuclear program makes him geopolitically relevant, ensures aid from foreign nations, and destabilizes archenemies South Korea and Japan. It provides an "aura of invulnerability" and thereby ensures the survival of his one-man regime. The weapons program is the only success he can point to in more than a decade of misrule. Without his atomic bombs, Kim would be just another ignored leader of one more failing state. With them, he is a fearsome autocrat and the center of the world's attention.

So what should the United States do to convince the militant nation to voluntarily surrender its most destructive weaponry? As an initial matter, Washington will have to decide whether it truly wants North Korea to disarm and how far it is willing to go to do so. Since the end of 1994, the denuclearization of Korea has been a low priority for American policymakers. And as we have seen from decades of history, the United States cannot expect success unless it puts Korea closer to the top of its list.

Equally important, Washington will have to decide on an approach and apply it consistently, perhaps over the course of decades. Some have speculated that only authoritarian states can maintain consistent foreign policies. If this is correct, then perhaps the United States will never disarm North Korea. This means that we will have to indefinitely live with a militant state armed with long-range missiles and nuclear weapons.

Some argue that we can do so. "What North Korea wants most is

oddly to be left alone, to run this rather odd country, a throwback to Stalinism," notes Harvard's Ashton Carter, a former Clinton administration official. Even members of the Bush administration privately talk about coexisting with Pyongyang's nuclear program. The hope is that, over time, North Korea will either fall apart or evolve into a more benign nation.

Moreover, many argue that the West can deter North Korea because it was able to deter the Soviet Union for decades. Moscow, after all, had a far larger—and much more capable—nuclear force than North Korea. The Soviets did not launch against the United States or its allies because they knew that the United States could launch against them. In short, they were deterred by the fear of horrendous casualties.

North Korea, however, cannot be contained. As an initial matter, Kim Jong Il is not about to leave the world alone, even if, as Ashton Carter suggests, he wants us to stay out of his affairs. His economic system cannot sustain itself without substantial foreign assistance because he has ruled out structural economic change. Therefore, he has little choice but to cause geopolitical turmoil—or to export strategic insecurity, as scholar Nicholas Eberstadt has termed it—to ensure inflows of aid. Moreover, Kim creates a sense of continual emergency to maintain control over an increasingly unstable society. Even assuming his nuclear threat were not imminent today, his "attack diplomacy" could make it imminent tomorrow. Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il, the only two leaders North Korea has ever known, repeatedly used violence to upset status quos that they found to be unacceptable. They have been able to do something that other communist leaders have not: they have institutionalized crisis for decades.

Their ability to do so sets North Korea apart from the Soviet Union. Despite tough talk, Moscow, after the initial stages of the Cold War, generally acted like a status quo power. North Korea, by contrast, is not. Last decade, Kim Jong Il adopted policies that could only result in the deaths of hundreds of thousands and perhaps millions of his fellow Koreans, and that is in fact what happened. He has shown an indifference to death that calls into question the applicability of the concept at the heart of nuclear deterrence, Mutual Assured Destruction. As long as Kim thinks he will personally survive, he might just decide to take the biggest gamble in history and risk the lives of his fellow Koreans. It is imprudent to underestimate any adversary, and especially one who relishes provocative acts. As Kim himself said, "If we lose, I will destroy the world."

Kim, unfortunately, now has the power to do exactly that. In April 2003 in Beijing, Li Gun, a North Korean diplomat, told James Kelly that his country reserved the right to sell nuclear weapons. North Korea, unfortunately, has a history of carrying through on its threats. It also has a history of merchandising everything it has been able to produce, from designer drugs to processed uranium. If we are to adopt a policy of containment, we have to be confident that we can, over the course of decades, either stop North Korea from exporting nuclear materials or prevent their importation into America and its allies around the world.

These seem to be impossible goals. For one thing, China has not cooperated with Washington's Proliferation Security Initiative to interdict the flow of dangerous materials,

and South Korea participates only in a limited fashion. Moreover, America has not been able to police its own borders and other countries have also failed with regard to theirs. Customs agents may catch shipments now and then, but all it takes is one failure to change the course of history.

The stakes could not be any higher. After all, North Korea is not just about Korea. North Korea is about Iran, Syria, Algeria, and every other country that wants the most destructive weapon in history. By its defiance Pyongyang is weakening the world's nuclear nonproliferation regime and inspiring other bomb builders. Iran's "atomic ayatollahs" are defying the international community at this time partly because they saw that Kim Jong Il did the same a few years ago and has, in a very real sense, gotten away with it, at least up to now. The North Koreans have been transferring missile and weapons technologies to the Iranians, and helping the Iranians evade International Atomic Energy Agency inspections. So whether Iran succeeds in nuclearizing tomorrow will depend in some measure on how the world deals with North Korea today.

North Korea, unfortunately, is emblematic of the challenges that the great powers face as the international order transitions to something new. If we choose to ignore Kim Jong Il today, we will only have to confront another militant despot with a nuclear arsenal, probably when the world is even less stable than it is now. Because containment is not a viable option for so many reasons, Washington needs to find a solution within the near future. What strategies should the United States follow?

First, virtually everyone says that the key to North Korea is China, but the key to China is South Korea. Beijing has been able to protect Pyongyang because Seoul has been doing the same. As a result, South Korea provides cover to China to act irresponsibly. Stripping Seoul from the Beijing-Pyongyang axis, therefore, should be Washington's most immediate tactical goal.

The key to winning over Seoul is influencing South Korea's almost evenly divided public. The election to pick President Roh Moo-hyun's successor will be held this December. Roh's approval rating has hovered around 10 percent for most of this year, and his Uri Party has lost most every election in the last two years. After North Korea's missile tests last July, and especially after the nuclear detonation in October 2006, the ruling party has looked adrift and has lost even more support.

There is a growing New Right movement in South Korea. Thus, the conservative Grand National Party, whose North Korean policy is more consistent with Washington's, can win the presidency next time. Between now and then, the White House can help the conservatives take over the Blue House by making Kim Jong Il look bad and thereby discrediting the so-called "progressive" forces in the South. America can do that best by ratifying the recently concluded free-trade agreement and consulting more with Seoul on North Asian policy.

If Washington can help South Korea reverse course, the Chinese will be alone in their support of Pyongyang and will, therefore, have to take a clear stand. They will have to choose between the future, cooperation with the United States, and the past, their alliance with North Korea.

Chinese foreign policy is, above all, pragmatic. Beijing's leaders know that the stability of the modern Chinese state depends on prosperity and that prosperity largely depends

on access to American markets, capital, and technology. They would not cross Washington if they thought America was serious about North Korea. Historically, the Chinese have almost always been accommodating once they were isolated. It is up to Washington to create the conditions under which they have no choice but to be responsible.

For decades, the Chinese have not been. On the contrary, they used proliferation of nuclear technologies to further their foreign policy goals. No country changes foreign policy quickly, but changes in China are particularly slow because of the cumbersome nature of its collective decision-making process. Today in the Chinese capital there are many academics and Foreign Ministry professionals who know that proliferation is not in China's long-term interest. Yet some, especially in the military, maintain close links with their counterparts in Pyongyang. Chinese views are generally moving in the right direction, but at this moment there is no consensus in Beijing to change long-held pro-proliferation policies.

The Chinese must do more than just *begin* a fundamental shift in their foreign policy. They must *complete* the process of both shedding their self-image as outsiders and ending their traditional role as adversaries of the existing global order. Such a change inevitably occurs when a rising power matures, but it only happens after internal perceptions have shifted over time. The problem is that today, China is not yet sure that it wants to be a responsible power.

With China, we must be prepared to make nuclear proliferation the litmus test of our relations and use all the leverage we have. The West has been patiently engaging the Chinese for decades, and now is the time for them to act responsibly. After all, what's the point of trying to integrate the Chinese into an international community that they are working to destabilize through proliferation of nuclear technologies and support of nuclearizing regimes? Unfortunately, the United States needs China's help at this time, not years from now when the international system, shaken by the spread of the bomb, has already come apart.

This January, Kim Myong Chol, often described as North Korea's "unofficial spokesman," told us that "Kim is now one click away from torching the skyscrapers of New York." This is surely an exaggeration, because the worst the North Korean leader can do at the moment is incinerate Anchorage or Honolulu. Yet, whatever his capabilities today, in five to seven years North Korea's Dear Leader will be able to destroy any spot in North America. The DPRK, in other words, has now become truly an urgent matter.

Au Revoir, Palestine

Eric Rozenman

Who killed Palestine? The answer to this question, asked by journalists, analysts and Palestinian Arabs after Hamas purged Fatah from the Gaza Strip this past June, is "no one." If by "Palestine" one meant an Arab state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with eastern Jerusalem as its capital, democratic and at peace with Israel—the vision articulated by President George W. Bush back in 2002—it was already dead.

A strong case can be made that Arab rejection of successive proposals to partition the land west of the Jordan River into two states, one Arab, one Jewish, meant "Palestine" was stillborn in 1937, when Arab leaders first dismissed a British "two-state solution." The region's Arab states (and the leadership of the Palestinians) would reject subsequent United Nations, American, Israeli, European and Jordanian initiatives either offering a "two-state" settlement (like the 1947 UN partition plan) or processes with the potential to lead to two states (like the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli treaty and its Palestinian autonomy provisions). Diplomatic apparitions, variations on this "solution"—including West Bank and Gaza federation or confederation with Jordan, and even an Israeli-Jordanian condominium occupied by autonomous Palestinians—were conjured up in 1985, 1993, 2000, 2001 and 2003, as part of repeated efforts to secure that most illusive of Middle Eastern mirages: an Israeli-Palestinian peace.

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But no more. *Wall Street Journal* columnist Bret Stephens, writing in the aftermath of Hamas' hostile takeover, put it this way: "Nothing has so soured the world on the idea of Palestine as experience with it."[1] Though Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Jordanian King Abdullah II and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak met and "threw rose petals at [Palestinian Authority President and Fatah leader Mahmoud] Abbas' feet," Stephens wrote, "the potentates of the Middle East will not midwife into existence a state the chief political movement of which has claims to both democratic and Islamist legitimacy. The United States and Israel will never bless Hamastan (even if the EU and the UN come around to it) and they can only do so much for the feckless Abbas." This means, according to Stephens, that "'Palestine' as we know it today, will revert to what it was—shadow land between Israel and its neighbors—and Palestinians, as we know them today, will revert to who they were: Arabs."

Some Palestinian Arabs themselves seem to concur. "What has come to pass in Gaza is embarrassing and shameful," says Rashid Khalidi, director of Columbia University's Middle East Institute. "You may be seeing the collapse of the Palestinian national movement. It might take us back an entire generation."[2]

Or even farther. After all, the most conspicuous thing about the "Palestinian national movement" throughout the years has been the glaring lack of one. PLO executive committee member Zahir Muhsein once told an interviewer for a Dutch newspaper that "the creation of a Palestinian state is only a means for continuing our struggle against the state of Israel for our Arab unity. In reality today there is no difference between Jordanians, Palestinians, Syrians and Lebanese."[3]

Muhsein's point was not original. The First Congress of Muslim-Christian Associations in Jerusalem in 1919, convened to choose delegates to the Paris Peace Conference, had declared that "we consider Palestine as part of Arab Syria, as it has never been separated from it at any time. We are connected with it by national, religious, linguistic, natural, economic, and geographic bonds."[4]

In 1947, when the UN was discussing the second partition of Mandatory Palestine, the Arab Higher Committee informed the General Assembly that "Palestine was part of the province of Syria" and "politically, the Arabs of Palestine were not independent in the sense of forming a separate political identity."[5]

Thus, if "Palestine" was dead, or never really animate, long before the Hamas-Fatah struggle, it was because Palestinian Arab elites did not want it. As *The New Republic's* Martin Peretz has observed, from the Palestinian aristocracy "that sold off its lands for Jewish settlement from the very beginning of the Zionist experiment" to the post-disengagement destruction of productive Gaza Strip greenhouses built by Israeli settlers, "though almost no Arab wanted Jewish sovereignty in any of Palestine, virtually no Arab seemed to crave Arab sovereignty, either."[6] Certainly not Arab leadership between 1948 and 1967, when Jordan occupied Judea and Samaria and renamed it the West Bank, and Egypt controlled the Gaza Strip, and barely a word was heard about a "two-state solution" including "Palestine."

Ends and means

Truth be told, although the usual news media, academic and diplomatic suspects were surprised by Hamas' purge and the blow it dealt

to the idea of a two-state "Palestine," President Bush's vision already had been fading fast. In his precedent-setting June 24, 2002 speech, the president anticipated the establishment of a West Bank and Gaza Strip polity—democratic and at peace with Israel, with leaders untainted by terrorism—by the end of 2005. Later, 2007 became the target. After his reelection in 2004, Bush forecast "Palestine" in 2009. But after meeting with Palestinian Authority President Abbas at the White House in October 2005, the president said only that he still advocated such a solution and would work for it in office or out. In his July 16, 2007, speech returning to the "two-state solution," Bush did not specify a timeline for establishing "Palestine." As Israeli commentator Nahum Barnea noted, "Comparison of the [2002 and 2007] speeches shows that peace in the Middle East is similar to the horizon: The closer we come to it the more it slips away."[7]

In backing off a date, Bush tacitly confirmed what German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer had said in condemning a Palestinian terrorist attack in Netanya on July 12, 2005. Back then, the dovish Fischer—himself certainly no friend of Israel—had declared that "terrorism will have no positive results, and there will be no chance to establish an independent Palestinian state as long as violence and terrorism continue."[8]

Abbas, for his part, hardly sounded like one who saw Palestine looming. In a televised speech in November 2005, he said, "A free and independent state is not beyond the realms of possibility, even if it is late in seeing the light of day." Sometimes late means never, and Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz had hinted as much a couple of years earlier. "The period of time it will take until the Palestinians achieve statehood, if they ever do, is a long way off."[9]

Though Hamas-Fatah fighting may have pushed the "two-state solution" over the precipice, none of the events upon which proponents of a Palestinian state had counted—the death of Yasser Arafat, Israel's withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, or even the endorsement by Olmert's Kadima Party of a "two-state solution"—had actually brought "Palestine" closer. That is because such a state is not the *raison d'être* of Palestinian nationalism in either its secular or religious guise. Rather, the movement's reason for being remains the destruction of the Jewish state.

The second *intifada* had begun in September 2000 after Arafat, with Abbas at his side, rejected an Israeli-U.S. offer of a West Bank and Gaza Strip with eastern Jerusalem as its capital, in exchange for peace. The Palestinian side refused to drop the "right of return" for millions of putative "refugees" and much-multiplied generations of descendants or to concede claims in Israel beyond eastern Jerusalem. This rejection disabused some Israelis sympathetic to Palestinian woes of the "new paradigm" invoked on behalf of the 1993-1998 Oslo process between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization.

During the Oslo years, many Israelis, their U.S. backers and others had termed outmoded the inconvenient fact that the PLO was founded in 1964—three years before the Jewish state gained the territories—in order to "liberate" what was then Israel. Achieving and managing a West Bank and Gaza Strip state was supposed to blunt Palestinian nationalism's anti-Israel motivation (just as Hamas' legislative election victory and then the "unity govern-

ment" with Fatah were supposed to blunt the movement's rejection of Israel on Islamic grounds). Thus, Israelis and Americans condescendingly described the Arabs' multiple rejections of the "two-state solution" as examples of the late Israeli foreign minister Abba Eban's famous adage that the Arabs "never miss[ed] an opportunity to miss an opportunity." But these alleged missed opportunities were such only if the Palestinians' goal was a West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestine coexisting with Israel.

If their strategic objective was and remains the elimination of the Jewish state, however, then those "opportunities" were traps. By rejecting them, even at the cost of short- and mid-term economic losses and significant casualties, Palestinian Arabs were upholding the central tenet of their national movement, of their Palestinian identity. That is, "Judaea delenda est," to borrow from Cato's perennial pledge against Carthage—Israel must be destroyed. In that case, Arafat was not being foolish and shortsighted, but principled and consistent. As he once told a Venezuelan newspaper, "Peace for us means the destruction of Israel. We are preparing for an all-out war which will last for generations.... We shall not rest until the day we return to our home, and until we destroy Israel...."[10] Twenty-five years later, the Palestinian leadership—now the head of what many believed was a Palestinian state-in-waiting, had not changed its views significantly. In his 2005 presidential campaign, Arafat's successor, Mahmoud Abbas, criticized the "militarization" of the second *intifada* not as illegal or immoral but as ineffective under current circumstances. And he, like Arafat before him, pledged not to waver on the "right of return."

Today, for all their apparent differences in style, Hamas and Fatah don't differ that much in substance. The latter recognizes Israel as a negotiating partner from whom serial concessions are demanded. Hamas spokesmen have conceded that the Jewish state currently exists, and some intimate that a long-term truce might be possible. But neither accepts Israel's legitimacy.

All of which goes a long way toward explaining the current, sorry state of the Palestinian Authority—a disarray for which both groups bear responsibility. If the end goal is not cohabitation but confrontation, then building civic institutions, economic prosperity and the foundation of civil society holds little intrinsic appeal. Raising and arming various militias with which to battle each other and Israel, conducting anti-Zionist and anti-Semitic incitement among the Palestinian population, and psychological warfare against Israel next door and throughout the West, however, does.

Provocative weakness

For Israel, and by extension for the United States, these realities have real consequences. Moshe Ya'alon, the former Chief of Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces, has emphasized that the steady handover of territory to an adversary committed to Israel's eradication is not a sustainable strategy. Rather, Ya'alon says, as paraphrased by an American Jewish newspaper, that "the Palestinian leadership, whether Hamas or Fatah, still strives to destroy Israel. Only when Palestinians give up the dream of reclaiming their pre-1948 communities inside Israel and recognize Israel's right to exist as a Jewish state will peace be possible. Until then, Israel must show strength... not reward terrorists or expose the country's volatile eastern border to attacks by withdrawing. It

will take at least a generation—probably more—for the Palestinian society to ripen for peace negotiations."[11]

Last summer's Israeli-Hezbollah war reinforced Ya'alon's thesis. Largely inaccurate rocket fire nevertheless rendered normal daily life in much of northern Israel temporarily impossible. More recently, smaller barrages from Gaza have caused one-third of the population of the southern Israeli town of Sderot (24,000) to leave. A massive barrage easily overflying Israel's West Bank security barrier into greater Tel Aviv, in synchronization with attacks from Lebanon, the Gaza Strip and perhaps across the Golan from Syria, might provoke a general Middle East war.

Forty years may have passed since the Six-Day War, but certain fundamental things remain the same:

1. The strip of land between the Mediterranean Sea and Jordan River rarely exceeds 45 miles in width. So too the airspace above it, meaning Israeli military aircraft must train by flying north and south, then banking westward over the Mediterranean to turn around, to avoid crossing into Syrian or Jordanian airspace.

2. Both the Jewish and Arab population is distributed largely on the western half, the seaward-facing slopes of the Samarian hills and coastal plain. So are important groundwater aquifers.

3. The Jordan rift valley, with only a few roads leading up and west through choke points toward Israel's population centers, puts the Jewish state's natural defense barrier on the far side of the Palestinians.

That is why, when the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff examined Israel's requirements for minimum strategic defense in the absence of peace, shortly after the Six-Day War, they recommended to the Johnson administration that Israel retain the western slopes of the hill country of Samaria and Judea, not to mention the Golan Heights, Gaza Strip, and Sinai Peninsula.[12] After the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the U.S. Army reviewed Israel's minimum defense in depth requirements, and Col. Irving Kett, the head of the study, came to the same conclusion the Joint Chiefs had reached six years earlier.

Retaining Gaza and as much of the West Bank as the U.S. recommended precluded a separate Palestinian state. To square the circle of attaining minimum strategic depth without annexing large numbers of Arabs, Israeli strategic thinking coalesced around the ideas of former chief of staff, then foreign minister, Yigal Allon. The "Allon plan" appeared in English in a 1976 *Foreign Affairs* essay. It proposed, among other things:

1. Annexing the Jordan Valley;

2. "thickening" Israel's 9-mile-wide coastal waist north of Tel Aviv and likewise broadening the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem corridor, only five miles wide just west of the capital;

3. annexing the Gush Etzion bloc adjacent south and west of Jerusalem; and

4. separating Gaza from Egypt with a strip of new Israeli territory.

Instead of becoming a Palestinian state—which no leaders in Washington, Jerusalem, Cairo or Amman were

calling for—the majority of the West Bank and most of its Arab residents would be returned to Jordan, the majority of the Gaza Strip to Egypt.

Allon's vision was meant to end Israel's topographic/demographic nightmare. Abba Eban, like Allon a Labor Party luminary and leading dove, put it this way in a 1969 interview with a West German magazine: "We have openly said that the map will never again be the same as on June 4, 1967. For us, this is a matter of security and of principles. The June map is for us equivalent to insecurity and danger."[13]

Israelis and Americans have condescendingly described the Arabs' multiple rejections of the "two-state solution" as examples of the late Israeli foreign minister Abba Eban's famous adage that the Arabs "never miss[ed] an opportunity to miss an opportunity." But these alleged missed opportunities were such only if the Palestinians' goal was a West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestine coexisting with Israel. If their strategic objective was and remains the elimination of the Jewish state, however, then those "opportunities" were traps.

Until the advent of the "peace process," this principle was enshrined in Israeli policy. During his 1974–1977 term as Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin—like Eban—insisted that Israel would never retreat to the vulnerable June 1967 lines. Competing against Shimon Peres for Labor Party leadership in 1980, Rabin repeated that vow. In 1992, he campaigned successfully on Allon plan essentials regarding the Golan Heights, Jordan Valley, Gush Etzion and Jerusalem.

Oslo, however, changed everything. In a 1992 Knesset address, Rabin stressed that with the Cold War over, Israel's American ally triumphant and the Arabs' Soviet patron gone, the Israelis and Palestinians had to jump on the international peace train before it left the station. In short, there was among Israelis and their U.S. backers, in Prof. Ruth Wisse's diagnosis—made in a Washington, D.C., talk attended by this author not long after the 1993 Rabin-Arafat handshake at the White House—"an epidemic of hope." Those stricken did not so much update the old security consensus as declare it passé. Surely Francis Fukuyama's "end of history," with Western-style democracy soon to be triumphant everywhere, or everywhere that counted, would include the West Bank and Gaza.

Over the past decade-and-a-half, in their self-destructive rejection of Israel (or what they saw as principled "resistance" to it), the Palestinian leadership, Hamas or Fatah, has done much to vindicate another view. It is that of Samuel Huntington, whose *Clash of Civilizations* noted about the same time as Fukuyama's *The End of History* the worldwide resurgence of religion as a prime factor of identity, and of the ability of "indigenous" leaders to use "modernization" to defeat "Westernization." Hamas and Hezbollah chiefs, among others, use this ability to gain democratic legitimacy while obstructing Western visions of democracy and peace growing hand-in-hand.

Gone too is the faulty assumption made by security-minded proponents of a two-state solution, who in their day asserted that even if a West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestine remained anti-Zionist, it would be demilitarized.

That illusion died quickly; by early in this decade, the Palestinian Authority hosted an estimated 85,000 armed men—40,000 lightly armed police, plus criminal gangs, terrorists, and those who moved between two or all three categories. Things only have gotten worse, as Hamas' ability to import money from Saudi Arabia, know-how from Iran, Syria and Hezbollah, and weaponry through Egypt, has demonstrated.

Reviving the "Jordanian option"

Where does all this leave Israel? With the failure of Oslo, the crumbling of Fatah, the rise of Hamas, Middle Eastern Sunni leaders increasingly concerned about growing Shi'ite power, and America tied down in Iraq, Jerusalem finds itself at a pivotal moment.

The longer Israel hesitates in defeating the Palestinian nationalism of Fatah, and that of its theocratic half-brother, Hamas, the more Israel's legitimacy may be undermined, and not only in Western Europe and American faculty clubs, but also through the slow demoralization of Israelis, Diaspora Jews, and Israel's supporters in Congress. Just as suppressing Arafat's *al-Aqsa intifada* was a necessary tactical victory, preventing Hamas from consolidating authority in Gaza and extending it to the West Bank will not be sufficient strategically.

Post-Oslo, many Israeli Arabs (now 20 percent of the population, up from 13 percent in 1967) came to identify themselves as "Israelis by citizenship, Palestinian by nationality." Unlike in the days before the first *intifada* (1987-1992) it is no longer unusual for Israeli Arabs to be arrested for aiding Palestinian terrorists. It is not that Israeli Arabs will want to go to "Palestine"; rather, many may expect "Palestine" to come to them.

The closer Israel retreats to the pre-'67 "green line"—the 1949 armistice lines—the more it yields minimum strategic depth, the more unified for purposes of morale, mobilization, and deterrence as well as national identity its population must become. Otherwise, it may finally, in effect, have lost the Six-Day War. When he was mayor of Jerusalem, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert referred to his city's two-thirds/one-third Jewish/Arab balance (down from three-fourths/one-fourth in 1967) and worried publicly about the capital's Jewish future. As deputy prime minister, he told the daily *Yediot Aharonot* that new borders different from the pre-'67 lines "will be based on a maximization of the number of Jews and a minimization of the number of Arabs inside the state of Israel."[14]

Two states for two people, as it turns out, is necessary but insufficient. "Two people in two states," commentator Sever Plotzker wrote, appears a more realistic aspiration than the "two-state solution."[15] Suppressed by the long-stale conventional wisdom about Israel and "Palestine," the two states already exist—albeit in unfinished form.

It's not that "Jordan is Palestine," as Ariel Sharon and Jordan's late King Hussein both used to say. Rather, Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Jordan *were* Palestine. After its 1948 War of Independence, Israel held 17.5 percent of the original territory of Britain's Palestine Mandate. Jordan constituted 77.5 percent. The West Bank and Gaza together accounted for the remaining 5 percent. If a majority of that territory and its Arab population were allotted to Jordan, and a strategically, religiously and socially important minority retained by Israel,

the resulting enlarged Arab Palestine would be capable of absorbing a significant number of Palestinian "refugees" from Lebanon, Syria and elsewhere, assuming they would want to come. Enlarged Jewish Palestine, for its part, ought to re-attract a good number of the 760,000 Israelis estimated to be living permanently abroad—more than half of whom emigrated after the breakdown of the Oslo accords. It also might draw more than a trickle of Western Diaspora Jews.

Such a vision is not fantasy. "Many Palestinian, Jordanian and foreign intellectuals say that the current weakened prospects for a two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has forced them to revisit the possibility of unity between the two sides of the river under one political system," writes commentator Samer Abu Libdeh. "The possibility is enhanced by several political and economic signals [from Jordan]."[16]

Jordanian officials are cognizant of this reality as well. Post-Oslo, former Jordanian Prime Minister Abdul Salam al-Majali floated a trial balloon about establishing a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation with joint and separate government institutions for the two banks of the Jordan.[17] More important than the details was the old/new idea: confederation.

Like war and the generals, "Palestine" is simply too important to be left to the Palestinians. Not Israel, Jordan or the United States can allow the Gaza Strip and West Bank to become a Near Eastern version of Waziristan, the barely-governable Pakistani border region in which al-Qaeda and the Taliban reportedly hide among sympathetic tribes. Rather, Israel and Jordan, with tacit U.S. approval and similar support, are likely to find that they have a common interest in a different kind of two-state solution: a cohabitation in which their previously unruly third-party boarder keeps most of his room but not the explosives, literal and ideological, that he'd stored there.

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DISPATCHES

Beyond Energy

Elmar Mammadyarov

BAKU—Today, the Caspian region has emerged at the forefront of global geopolitical discourse. It is many things to many countries. For the nations of Europe, the Caspian is an access route to Asia, and vice versa. For Russia, it serves as both a zone of economic interest and a geopolitical buffer. And for the United States, the region holds the promise of an important new source of energy at a time of great global upheaval.

The Caspian, in other words, is a strategic crossroads, and its importance to the world is on the rise. But in order to achieve its strategic potential, the countries of the region will need to work more closely and forge a coherent common vision of post-Soviet prosperity.

Azerbaijan is uniquely positioned to lead such an effort. Already, it connects the eastern and western coasts of the Caspian, serving as a key outpost for Caspian energy development. But in Baku we are thinking even bigger. Today, our government is formulating plans for a regional—and even a global—role.

The first dimension of Azerbaijan's strategy is economic. At 35 percent, Azerbaijan's economic growth was the highest in the world last year. Two primary factors contributed to this trend. The first was the completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which finally established a durable conduit to bring Azeri oil to world markets. Second, high world oil prices have helped make Caspian oil a valuable commodity, and Azerbaijan's economy has benefited. This state of affairs, moreover, is not likely to change. With oil prices projected to remain high, and with other important energy projects nearing completion, Azerbaijan's economic future remains bright.

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But this future hinges upon steady and secure access to European and international markets. Without it, Baku will not be able to serve as a reliable supplier of either energy or commodities. Consequently, one of the major objectives of our government is to upgrade the infrastructure connecting the Caspian with the European Union, and beyond. As a practical matter, this means Azerbaijan and other regional states need to invest in road and railway upgrades, increase the capacity of their ports, and improve security along these transportation routes and hubs.

The second aspect of Azeri strategy revolves around sustainability. Azerbaijan understands full well that its good energy fortunes may not last forever. And the government is responding, using our oil income to inject capital into the development of other sectors of the economy. Already, Azerbaijan's agriculture and tourism sectors are seeing serious and sustained attention.

The third element of Baku's regional approach deals with security. Like its economy and infrastructure, Azerbaijan's security doctrine is being modernized. In recent years, the Caspian has undergone a profound transformation. Although the risk of state-to-state conflict still exists, the probability is lower today than at any time in the past. At the same time, regional states are becoming bigger stakeholders in the global economy, and the price tag that would be attached to a potential conflict has become much greater.

Of immediate concern are the porous borders that permeate the region, and the lack of effective control over territory exhibited by local governments. These conditions make the Caspian states attractive to smugglers, organized crime networks and even terrorists. With our economic prosperity tied ever more closely to energy exports and foreign trade, enhancing territorial and resource security has become a shared imperative.

This makes resolution of the "frozen conflicts" in the South Caucasus a key priority. These long-running disputes are dangerous precisely because they help to sustain lawlessness and prevent effective governmental control over national borders. Today, there is no effective control over territories like Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, making them potential hubs for terrorism and organized crime.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict must be resolved promptly, and the region deserves full autonomy. But the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan is non-negotiable and must be respected. Armenia, therefore, should withdraw its forces from the occupied territories surrounding Karabakh.

A secure Caspian is likewise imperative. Azerbaijan is currently in discussions with both Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan regarding the possibility of extending gas and trade links across the Caspian, thereby linking the South Caucasus with Central Asia. This dialogue hints at the Caspian's potential as the center of an expanded Eurasian trade and energy zone. But in order to realize this potential, regional stability is required. Iran is a key player in this context, and should be included in the region's strategic discussions. An Iran firmly integrated into the Caspian trade and security flows could become a bigger stakeholder in the region's future, and thus a predictable international player with a positive regional role.

Security goes hand in hand with economic development. So too should democracy. Azerbaijan and the other countries of the region have decisively embraced this ideal, and all are now in different stages of democratization.

But democracy in the Caspian cannot function without economic stimuli. Nor should democracy be imposed from the outside. Rather, the necessary institution building needs to take place indigenously, and gradually. In Azerbaijan, democracy will flourish if the institutions that can support it exist, and if there is real economic development to nurture it.

With patience and strategic vision, the Caspian has the potential to develop into a new global center of economic development, innovation and cultural tolerance. Azerbaijan's strategic outlook is intended to ensure that the region achieves this goal.

A Breath of Fresh Air

Frederic Encel

PARIS—The Chirac era in French politics is over, and gone with it are long-held assumptions about French foreign policy. Today, the stagnation that typified foreign policy under Jacques Chirac is being challenged by a dynamic new Prime Minister with decidedly different ideas about France's place in the world.

Already, it is clear that Nicolas Sarkozy is not the darling of the French media. Some commentators have dubbed him too pro-American, too Atlanticist, and too much of an iconoclast on foreign affairs. But, it is equally evident that these skeptics are in a minority. If they were not, French voters would not have signaled their support for Sarkozy so strongly at the presidential polls back in May.

Those elections provided an important glimpse into an electorate in flux. Loudly and unequivocally, French voters backed a candidate who was openly Atlanticist and pro-Israel over his more conservative (in foreign policy terms) rival. Moreover, they did so in spite of the prevailing public discourse in Paris—one that vilifies France's Western allies and Israel. In the process, they roundly rejected the advances of the country's communists, Greens, and Trotskyites in favor of a more progressive foreign policy.

Thus, Nicolas Sarkozy's inaugural five-year term begins with a clear mandate for change. But just what can the world expect from the new inhabitant of the Élysée?

When it comes to foreign affairs, moving the French ship of state is a daunting proposition. Since 1960 and the advent of "Gaullism," French foreign policy has been typified by continuity rather than change. This was particularly true with respect to France's attitudes toward the United States, the Middle East and the Arab world. But Sarkozy clearly aims to change all of that, as demonstrated by his selection of pro-American diplomat Bernard Kouchner over the more unilateralist Hubert Védrine as Foreign Minister. Sarkozy's choice is not simply one of style, even though Kouchner will undoubtedly bring a more conciliatory stance with him to the Quai d'Orsay. Rather, it speaks volumes about the philosophical and diplomatic choices of the emerging Sarkozy government. When it comes to foreign affairs, they portend a reorientation of France's approach to relations with Washington, to its interaction in the Middle East, and to its stance on human rights.

Atlanticism—More than four years after the invasion of Iraq, the intransigent stance adopted by Chirac in the run-up to that conflict continues to color ties with the U.S. and Great Britain. Sarkozy, however, is taking a different tack. He has openly expressed his intention to mend fences with Washington, and already appears to be taking the first steps toward doing so.

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Middle East—Sarkozy also can be expected to chart a considerably different course in the Middle East than his predecessor. He likely will seek a more robust sort of dialogue with the state of Israel, perpetuating and accelerating the strengthening of diplomatic bonds that has taken place over the past several years. At the same time, however, France's established policy of support for a Palestinian state, its backing for greater Euro-Mediterranean partnership, and its endorsement of the pro-Western government of Prime Minister Fouad Siniora in Lebanon suggest that it can carry out a successful, multidimensional regional policy—something which the Sarkozy government is likely to do as well. As for Iran and Syria, France's new president appears inclined to adopt a firmer stance than his predecessor. With regard to the Iranian nuclear program in particular, he already has criticized the diplomatic efforts of the EU "troika" and called for more decisive measures.

Human rights—Last but not least, the new French president is likely to take a more assertive stance on the issue of human rights. Unlike his predecessor, who took a passive approach to Africa, the Caucasus and Sudan. Sarkozy is likely to be a more assertive champion of democratic values abroad, and on his watch, the Quai d'Orsay likely will adopt a more activist, and engaged, posture in these and other regions.

Structural changes are visible as well. As the recent establishment of the French national security council indicates, the new head of state intends to have greater autonomy and authority on pressing international issues. At the same time, his selection of a seasoned senior diplomat, former French Ambassador to the United States Jean-David Levitte, to serve as the head of this new body has ensured that the country's foreign policy course, though principled, will also be pragmatic.

The changes under way in France therefore offer a breath of fresh air—one which may make it possible to forget that all too often, when it comes to support for our allies abroad and addressing international wrongs, France has been conspicuously absent.

The New Shape of Asian Security

Hiroyasu Akutsu

TOKYO—Today, the U.S.-Japanese strategic partnership is poised on the brink of a major evolution.

Over the past several years, President George W. Bush and Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi presided over a significant expansion of bilateral ties, manifested through greater cooperation in Afghanistan and Iraq, and on counterproliferation matters. Since taking office in September 2006, Koizumi's successor, Shinzo Abe, has taken great pains to reinforce and strengthen these bonds. But he has also begun to think bigger, taking the tentative first steps toward extending the bilateral strategic partnership between the U.S. and Japan to include Australia and India as well.

These changes are a reflection of the new international security environment. The common threat once posed by the Soviet Union is long gone. Instead, the growing nuclear and missile menace of North Korea and China's economic and military rise have grown to dominate Asian security—and the ties between Japan and the United States. Since September 11, 2001, the global war on terror has also become a defining influence on bilateral relations.

The February 2005 meeting of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee, also known as the "2+2," served to confirm these changes, redefining the bilateral partnership as a "global" alliance with a number of common strategic objectives. At the broadest level, these include the promotion of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law; nonproliferation and counterterrorism; support for Japan's permanent membership in the United Nations Security Council; and the security of global energy supply. Regionally, meanwhile, both countries have committed to strengthening stability in the Asian-Pacific, supporting the peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula, confronting North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile threats, a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue, greater transparency in China's military modernization, and the normalization of Japanese-Russian relations, among others.

The subsequent "2+2" meeting, held later the same year, further solidified the transformation taking place in U.S.-Japanese relations, outlining the sharing of roles, missions and capabilities (RMCs) between the U.S. military and the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. It also provided a framework for possible multilateral cooperation between the Japan-U.S. alliance and other partners. Then, in May 2006, another "2+2" put forward a road map for dealing with the thorny issue of restructuring U.S. bases in Japan to better tackle the task of maintaining regional deterrence while reducing the burden on Japanese locals.

Other regional states are beginning to take notice. Australia, for one, has shown a growing interest in joining the fold. The latest "2+2" meeting took place in May 2007, on the heels of a joint security declaration signed by Mr. Abe and

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Australian Prime Minister John Howard. That agreement focused on expanding bilateral cooperation in a range of security fields, including counterterrorism, maritime security, and intelligence. And already, Japan and Australia have held *their* first "2+2" meeting, focusing on North Korea's nuclear and missile threat and trilateral security cooperation among the U.S., Japan and Australia. Now, expectations of Canberra's involvement in U.S.-led regional missile defense efforts are growing. The trend is clear; what was once solely a bilateral affair is increasingly becoming a mechanism for trilateral security cooperation among Japan, Australia, and the U.S.

A further expansion could also be on the horizon. The most recent, May 2007, "2+2" not only served to reaffirm the common strategic objectives between Washington and Tokyo, but also to highlight the importance of security cooperation with two other major global players: India and NATO. Although a direct linkage between the Japan-U.S. alliance and NATO is not likely anytime soon, a partnership with India may be more imminent; the three countries already have carried out a joint naval exercise, and more military cooperation is expected.

It remains to be seen if both Australia and India simultaneously establish direct military links to the Japan-U.S. alliance, realizing Mr. Abe's idea of cooperation among maritime democracies. At the very least, however, it is becoming clear that the bilateral bonds between Washington and Tokyo are becoming the basis for multilateral strategic dialogue among the liberal democracies of Asia.

To be sure, future domestic politics and differences in policy between the two countries could still constrain the pace and scope of alliance cooperation. But Washington and Tokyo should bank on regional realities' sustaining their partnership for the foreseeable future.

Explaining Iranian Holocaust Denial

Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and a host of fringe Western figures, including David Duke, are seeking to legitimize themselves, combine resources, and further hatred of Israel and Jews. In the current *Middle East Quarterly*, George Michael, an expert on right-wing hate groups, exposes Ahmadinejad's plan to make Iran the new center of Holocaust denial. His goal? To block rapprochement between Israel and conservative Arab states who could work together to contain an ascendant Iran.

Bold, provocative, smart, the *Middle East Quarterly*, edited by Michael Rubin, published by Daniel Pipes, offers stimulating insights on this complex region.

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Book Reviews

A New Weapon in the Arsenal

Jonathan Schanzer

Walid Phares, *The War of Ideas: Jihadism Against Democracy.* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 266 pp., $24.95. Hardcover.

In *The War of Ideas: Jihadism Against Democracy*, Professor Walid Phares' historical perspective on the growth of the modern *jihadist* ideology and its offensive against the West, America may have found a new weapon in the war for hearts and minds against radical Islam. This book has the potential to make an impact in the battle over how Islamism and *jihadism* are taught in America's institutes of higher learning.

The problem on American campuses is a well-documented one. Before September 11, 2001, America's professors predicted the emergence of a Middle East filled with non-violent Islamists. Their approach to Middle Eastern autocracies, violence and the systematic violation of human rights was one of apologia. After 9/11, they continued to insist that the threat of *jihadism* is overblown.

Needless to say, these academics appear to be agenda-driven. They prefer the old, corrupt regional *status quo*, and attack policies designed to combat radicalism and promote democracy. Worse still, they have inoculated themselves against outside criticism, and have shut out other academics who don't toe their line.

Enter Walid Phares, a professor of Middle East Studies at Florida Atlantic University for more than a decade. He is also a native of the

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Middle East (Lebanon) whose first language is Arabic. Phares thus is an insider—both in the Middle East and in Middle Eastern studies—and his writings cannot be ignored.

The good professor is not bashful about his beliefs. Much like his earlier works, Phares' new book is decidedly pro-democracy and anti-*jihadist*. As such, it stands in stark contrast to the writings of the multitude of academics and Middle East experts who, either knowingly or by default, have become apologists for radical Islam.

Phares' point is crystal clear. Academia is a vital battlefield in the struggle for hearts and minds now taking place in the larger War on Terror, and he attacks the academic enemies of democracy accordingly. For example, he hammers University of Michigan professor Juan Cole and University of California-Berkeley's As'ad AbuKhalil for spouting propaganda from the Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), a Muslim lobby group that defends Islamist figures and ideas. He likewise brands Georgetown University's John Esposito a *jihadophile* for his consistent apologetics for, and defenses of, Islamism. (Esposito, who runs Georgetown's Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding, received an award in 2003 from the Muslim Brotherhood-linked Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) honoring his contribution to the understanding of Muslims.) These and other ivory tower *jihadophiles*, according to Phares, treat "*jihad* as a benign spiritual tradition, like yoga." They insist that *jihad* is not a holy war, but a "spiritual experience."

Phares does more than simply attack those professors who are soft on radical Islam, however. His book is, at its core, a tireless and relentless attack on the ideology of *jihadism* itself. In a measured, judicious and decidedly professorial tone, Phares demonstrates that the adherents of *jihadism* are violent, ruthless, anti-democratic, and anti-Western. He makes a strong and persuasive argument that the goal of *jihadists* is to "defeat all other civilizations" and the "dismantling [of] centuries of human advancement." Phares also systematically and patiently demonstrates how *jihadists* eschew a host of widely accepted international principles, including human rights, gender equality, and religious equality. He also highlights the antipathy toward pluralism, political parties, an independent justice system, and self-criticism exhibited by Islamic moderates.

Throughout, Phares' masterful grasp of modern history helps the reader to put the ideological struggle between radical Islam and democracy into context. The first phase of this struggle, he outlines, was a period of relative dormancy that stretched from 1945 to 1990, when *jihadists* chose to wait out the Cold War and amass their strength for the coming battle. The second phase in the war of ideas, according Phares, was the period spanning 1990 to 2001. During this decade, the Middle East emerged as the region of the world most resistant to the global trend of liberalization and democratization heralded by the fall of Communism. The iron-fisted leaders of the Middle East tenaciously refused to liberalize or evolve, holding fast to the notion that no change should happen until the Arab-Israeli conflict was settled. The plight of the Palestinians is the most common excuse across the Muslim world for why the reform has been painfully slow or nonexistent. All the while, Salafism and Khomeinism, the primary Sunni and Shi'ite strains of *jihadism*, continued to

spread unhindered and unchallenged by democratic ideals.

The current phase of the war of ideas, Phares concludes, is the most overt, in which *jihadists* and democracy advocates openly clash over their interpretations of international relations, the notion of reform, and even the definition of terrorism. He lays bare how Islamic radicals and their supporters have made systematic efforts to numb the United States and its allies to the threat of radical Islam. They have done so by invoking the specter of Islamophobia, Guantánamo Bay, Abu Ghraib and other thorny issues to fool the public into thinking that America is in fact the aggressor.

The War of Ideas is vulnerable to attack on two fronts. First, Phares quotes his own published works and testimonies some fifteen times throughout the book. This does little for his credibility; simply because he said it does not make the argument correct. Moreover, although an Arabic speaker, he rarely cites Arabic sources. This is a serious error, since "native" news and analysis are seen as gospel within the discipline of Middle Eastern studies, and Phares' detractors will almost certainly use the lack thereof against him.

On the whole, Walid Phares has written an excellent answer to the glut of apologias that now permeates the field of Middle Eastern studies. *The War of Ideas* has an air of academic authority that exudes more credibility than works written by Beltway analysts which, although they may make many of the same arguments, can be dismissed all too easily as "alarmist." Not so with Phares' writings; given the power of its intellectual reasoning, *The War of Ideas* is destined to be a broadside that the ivory tower will not be able to ignore so easily.

The Advocate

Juliana Geran Pilon

Josef Joffe, *Überpower: The Imperial Temptation of America* (New York: W.W. Norton Co., 2006), 271 pp., $24.95. Hardcover.

It is big news when a scion of the European media, the publisher-editor of Germany's influential *Die Zeit* newspaper, defends American preeminence. Josef Joffe's *Überpower* stands in stark contrast to the self-flagellation so prevalent among assorted homegrown pundits. The book heralds America's new role as a unique superpower, declaring it an unqualified blessing for the whole world: "By default and self-definition, it is the United States that will have to look out for order beyond borders," writes Joffe. For, unlike previous would-be hegemons, who were mainly bent on conquest, "the United States, self-righteous and assertive as it may be, does not seek to amass real estate." Briefly put, "if the United States is an empire, it is a liberal one—a power that seeks not to grab but to co-opt."

At last, a welcome vote of confidence from the continent whose anti-Americanism has been reaching pathological proportions of late. How refreshing to hear a European say bluntly: "unlike Europe or Japan, No. 1 cannot huddle under the strategic umbrella of another nation. Nor can it live by the postmodern ways of Europe, which faces no strategic challenge as far as the eye can see. (Neither would Europe be so postmodern if it had to guarantee its own safety.)" *Touché*, as they say *la bas*.

Having emigrated to Germany from Lithuania as a child, Joffe grew up in postwar Berlin, when Westerns and Grace Kelly movies were competing favorably with European productions, and the American Forces Network was luring listeners by broadcasting forbidden rock ′n′ roll twice daily. American consumerism was still a thing of the future. "The only true American piece of apparel," reports Joffe, "was a pair of Levi's, prized all the more for being the real thing as opposed to the cheap German knockoffs."

It probably would have happened anyway, but having a recognizably Jewish name on the sexiest democratic garment on the face of the earth was bound to result in a convergence of anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism. And so it did. Joffe outlines the pattern of thinking: "Above all, the United States seeks domination over the rest of the world—which is also the theme of the anti-Jewish *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, recently revived throughout the Arab world, as well as in Japan, among other countries."

To be sure, "anti-isms" of every stripe tell far more about the society that breeds them than they do about the target or victim. Joffe reminds us: "Societies in crisis, as illustrated

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by the torturous encounters with modernity between 1789 and 1945, tend to succumb to anti-ism, whether of the American or Jewish kind." Not to mention both. And alas, they are indeed succumbing, with increasing virulence, as even relatively wealthy Western Europe struggles with stagnant or declining productivity, high unemployment, and low birth rates among native populations, coupled with rapid growth among immigrants, especially Muslims, whom these societies seem unable to absorb with anything even vaguely resembling the efficacy of the American melting pot.

Joffe's discussion of anti-Semitism is key to his thesis, which may be summarized as a defense of modernity against those who attack, with passion that defies all reason, the powerful but manifestly benevolent U.S. behemoth, which is mercifully both willing and able to underwrite world security and prosperity. Unlike previous empires, "the genius of American diplomacy in the golden age was building an order that would advance American interests by serving those of others." The United States, writes Joffe, generously guarantees the security of its allies and clients in the Middle East, from Israel to Saudi Arabia. It does the same in the Pacific, by "subtly balancing" China and Japan. Moreover, "by acting as [the] security lender of… last resort in Europe, America eliminates security competition on a continent that has seen history's worst wars." Indeed, just to twist the knife, he adds a specific example close to home: "after years of hand-wringing on the part of the EU, it was the United States that organized a posse against Serbia."

Which brings us to U.S. militarism. Here again, Joffe parts company with the handwringers and unequivocally stands up for Uncle Sam: "When violence wracks the Belgrade-Baghdad-Beijing Belt, or when revisionists like Iraq, Iran, or North Korea reach for nuclear weapons, most will be only too happy to call on the Great Organizer. Who else has the will and the wherewithal to do what others cannot achieve on their own?" The rhetorical question indicts all who condemn America without a viable alternative against global annihilation.

This is not to deny that America's "fabulous assets"—economic, military, and cultural—carry their own liability, since "the long shadow of its power instills fear, resentment, and hatred." Addressing these emotions requires effective global communication, for which the United States seems remarkably ill-suited. As surveys amply indicate, the U.S. has not been able to do a very good job of persuading the world of its benign intent.

Not that Joffe is uncritical of American foreign policy, let alone public diplomacy. It is precisely because of his avowed sympathy for the United States that he deplores its mistakes. His assessment of the second Iraq War is a remarkable blend of admiration, compassion, and incredulity. While he commends the United States for having "performed brilliantly in Iraq," he cannot deny that "it has yet to find a swift answer to the 'asymmetric warfare' exploited by Terror International and its Sunni allies." That asymmetry involves not only disparate military tactics but time itself, which ticks quite differently in the West and East—a truism recognized astutely by the late historian of statecraft Adda Bozeman. Joffe's verdict is that, "from a coldly strategic perspective, the intervention in Iraq was a war against the wrong foe at the wrong time. America had targeted the lesser evil."

It was no trivial gamble. Joffe estimates that the price of America's mistake was nothing short of "exorbitant." It involved the loss of legitimacy abroad as well as loss of trust at home, where the electorate became predictably restless as the war dragged on, as could have been anticipated.

But if Joffe accomplishes anything in his book, it is to make a solid case for America's positive contribution to the international community and the consistency of its good intentions. In this regard, he is very much in the minority among policy experts. Why is that, exactly? The answer to that question is far too complex for any one book to tackle. *Überpower* has done a magnificent job of starting the dialogue, and for that reason alone it is indispensable reading. But it will take much soul-searching and painstaking research to figure out why the United States is failing so miserably in presenting its case fairly and truthfully to the world community.

Try Again

Bradley A. Thayer

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, *Second Chance: Three American Presidents and the Crisis of American Superpower* (Basic Books, 2007), 240 pp., $26.95. Hardcover.

Almost 20 years have passed since the end of the Cold War, and contemporary international politics is defined not by U.S.-Soviet rivalry but by American empire. This new era has its own benefits and problems for the United States. But while some (ethnic conflict, civil war, globalization and proliferation, to name just a few) have been thoroughly examined by scholars, pundits, and analysts alike, a serious survey of others has been conspicuously absent. In his new book, *Second Chance*, former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski addresses one of the most important: American leadership.

Brzezinski begins his discussion with an evaluation of the stewards of American power since 1990: Presidents George H. W. Bush (Global Leader I), Bill Clinton (Global Leader II), and George W. Bush (Global Leader III). Each is graded on the eight issues Brzezinski considers the most important of the period: the health of the Atlantic Alliance; policy toward the "post-Soviet space," the Far East, and the Middle East; and responses to proliferation, peacekeeping, the environment, and global trade and poverty.

According to Brzezinski, Global Leader I had great tactical skill and handled well the end of the Cold War and the 1991 Gulf War, but missed opportunities in the Middle East, allowed Iraq to fester and ignored Afghanistan. His performance therefore merits a "B." President Clinton, for his part, had great promise. He brought stability to the Balkans and expanded NATO. But he failed to perform, particularly in the Middle East. For these deficiencies, he receives a "C." However, both do far better than Global Leader III, President George W. Bush, who gets an "F." On President Bush's report card, Brzezinski writes the comment: "A simplistic dogmatic worldview prompts self-destructive unilateralism."

Brzezinski believes that America has failed in its ability to lead the world thus far, but now has a second chance to do so. His solution is for the United States to forge a positive relationship with the European Union in order to create an "Atlantic Community" capable of engaging Russia and arresting proliferation, all the while ensuring solidarity in the face of rising threats, like China, that America should not address on its own.

But it is Brzezinski himself who should try again. Three major problems dominate his analysis. The first

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concerns his unbalanced assessment of the presidents. By any objective measure, the first President Bush dealt with the greatest crises of the three. It was he who managed the peaceful end of the Cold War, the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Gulf War, Germany's reunification within NATO—not neutrality, as the Soviets wanted—and the START treaties. It was he who built upon Reagan's plans for a credible missile defense for the United States and developed GPALS, all the while navigating America's relationship with China through dangerous waters following the Tiananmen Square massacre. His problems were the equal of Harry Truman's at the beginning of the Cold War, and, by any consideration, Bush mastered them far better than Truman did his.

The assessment of Clinton is fawning in its avoidance of obvious criticisms. Here is a President who inherited the post-Cold War world, and then proceeded to take a "time out." Clinton fiddled while the threat from Islamic terrorism burned. There is no mention of bin Laden's declarations of war against the American people in Brzezinski's book, or of the Bojinka terror plot and the Khobar Towers bombing. Other attacks, such as the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa and the year 2000 strike on the USS *Cole*, are passed over quickly. At other points—such as the discussion of the first attack on the World Trade Center in 1993—Brzezinski's narrative is rife with errors. These mistakes and oversights leave the impression that Brzezinski takes the threat of terrorism about as seriously as Clinton did.

Brzezinski's treatment of George W. Bush, on the other hand, is so harsh as to be cartoonish—a litany of grievances against a president who Brzezinski believes was too naïve, too unilateral and too aggressive to have ever been entrusted with the reins of power. Given his bias, one is compelled to remind Brzezinski that it was Bush, not Clinton, who took the battle to al-Qaeda, brought about the disarmament of Libya, and rolled up the clandestine proliferation network of A.Q. Khan. Perhaps most important, George W. Bush's recognition that the Cold War is, indeed, over has empowered dramatic changes in foreign and defense policies—among them the realization of a defense against ballistic missiles through the U.S. exit from the ABM Treaty. Instead, Brzezinski minimizes the contemporary terrorist threat, and makes hay out of the friction between some European states and the U.S. over Iraq. This makes for good copy, of course, but Iraq was not the first problem in the Atlantic relationship. Nor will it be the last.

The second major problem with *Second Chance* concerns the eight issues provided for comparison. No book can cover all topics, but Brzezinski's selection will strike many readers as odd. Not to consider the issue of terrorism, given its centrality during the 1990s and particularly today, is exceedingly odd. Other issues, meanwhile, are given disproportionate weight. Thus, Brzezinski believes that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is central to Middle East peace, and that it will only be resolved when Israel surrenders more territory and makes more sacrifices. To his credit, Brzezinski mentions the critical issue of demographics, and declining birthrates in the West for all but immigrant populations, particularly Muslims in Europe—a reality that will have serious consequences for his prospective Atlantic Community in the not-too-distant future. Unfortunately, though, he

does not explore the issue in the detail it requires.

The third deficiency in Brzezinski's work is his gross underestimation of the continuity of American power. His analysis is so skewed that readers might be justified in believing that America is on its last legs. There is no recognition that the real Global Leader, the United States itself, is going to be on top for years to come. And, when it comes to the future, Brzezinski's lugubrious tone neglects the tremendous good that flows from U.S. power.

In a work that considers America's role in the world and the ends for which the United States should use its power, one might expect recognition of the facts of life in international politics today and for the foreseeable future. Despite Brzezinski's lamentation about the fallout from Iraq, the reality is that countries want to align themselves with America. Of 192 countries in the world, 84 are currently engaged in some form of partnership with the United States. Never before in history has a nation had so many allies. America's adversaries, meanwhile, are few and far between. Presently, only five countries can be counted as directly opposed to the United States: China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela.

This alignment is logical; U.S. power makes the world more peaceful than it otherwise would be. During the Cold War, American leadership reduced friction among many states that were historical antagonists, most notably France and West Germany. Today, U.S. primacy helps keep a number of complicated relationships, such as the one between Greece and Turkey, from boiling over.

Finally, no discussion of American leadership can be complete without the acknowledgement that the U.S. is the world's last line of defense. The United States serves as the world's *de facto* police force, the global paramedic, and the planet's fire department. In fact, all of the key components of the current international order—free trade, a robust monetary regime, increasing respect for human rights, growing democratization—are directly linked to U.S. power and leadership.

In Brzezinski's calculus, those whose challenges were historic and whose efforts were Herculean, as were the efforts of the first President Bush, are graded by the standard of perfection—he left Iraq and Afghanistan untidy. At the same time, Clinton's foreign policy was Lilliputian in scope, particularly in his first term. He did not face the threats of the Cold War, and his feckless handing of al-Qaeda contributed to 9/11, but is fêted by comparison. The foreign policy of George W. Bush is simply demonized. Looking at the grades assigned, both students and readers should avoid Prof. Brzezinski for the same reason: He is anything but fair in his assessments.

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