THE Journal OF INTERNATIONAL Security Affairs

Number 10, Spring 2006

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From the Publisher

Something unfortunate happened on the way to the printer. Ariel Sharon, Prime Minister of Israel, suffered a major stroke. It is assumed that, as of today, Israel—and the world—has changed dramatically.

Sharon, like him or not, was a major player on the world scene. A man of strong convictions, he was a tough-minded soldier that ultimately emerged as a great figure in the pursuit of an enduring and lasting peace. This was a surprise to his enemies, who could never have imagined that this warrior's warrior could also be a politician's politician and even a negotiator's negotiator.

When Sharon came to power (again) five years ago, the world community connected him with the outbreak of the second *intifada*. By the end, these same people saw him as essential to any negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. This was truly a remarkable accomplishment.

Shakespeare wrote in *Julius Caesar*: "The evil that men do lives after them; the good is oft interred with their bones. So let it be with Caesar."

So let it NOT be with Sharon. In the weeks and months ahead, his enemies will breathe easier and recall ancient and trumped-up charges. But they will fail. What will remain instead is the understanding that he was a man of peace.

Another issue also looms on the horizon—that of Iran's reckless march toward nuclear weapons. The repressive theocratic regime in Tehran may have turned a deaf ear to world outcry. But why should Iran be concerned when the divided West has proven itself to be all bark and no bite? And if we are afraid now, what will happen after Tehran gets the bomb? Unfortunately, these are questions we may need to confront soon enough.

Hopefully, by the time this issue goes to press, new options will be pursued.



Tom Neumann
Publisher

The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs

Translating Ideas into Policy

Mission

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Editor's Corner

A year after September 11th, the world got its first glimpse of the Bush administration's grand strategy. The *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, released by the White House in September 2002, is sweeping in scope and breathtaking in its ambition. "We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants," the document announced. "We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent." This demanding agenda has led scholars such as Yale University's John Lewis Gaddis to dub it "the most important reformulation of U.S. grand strategy in over half a century."

Three-and-a-half years later, the Bush administration can claim progress on a number of these fronts. It has succeeded in uprooting the Taliban in Afghanistan, removing Saddam Hussein's brutal regime in Iraq, and substantially impairing the activities of al-Qaeda. It has forged new links to the states of Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Caucasus. And it has catalyzed movement toward pluralism in a number of unexpected places, among them Lebanon, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan.

But fresh challenges have emerged, and they necessitate new and creative thinking about how to promote U.S. interests and American security. With that in mind, this issue of *The Journal* offers a sextet of feature articles on future strategy. GWEST's Fred Cedoz lays out a bold agenda for U.S. energy security. J. Michael Waller of the Institute of World Politics takes a fascinating look at the linguistic front in the War on Terror. Former administration officials Frank Cilluffo and J. Paul Nicholas lay out the new challenges confronting the U.S. in cyberspace. Robert Pfaltzgraff of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis explains the centrality of space to future American security. Writing under the pseudonym Pavel Ivanov, a State Department strategist explains the need to focus on terror enablers in the criminal world. Last, but certainly not least, the National Institute for Public Policy's Keith Payne explains the new rationales—and requirements—for nuclear deterrence.

This issue also boasts sections dealing with America's two main strategic competitors. Stephen Blank of the U.S. Army War College takes a look at the thorny debate over U.S. policy toward Russia—and explains persuasively why democracy promotion must take precedence over "realism." Russia scholar Gordon Hahn provides a fascinating, and deeply worrying, glimpse into the effects that Vladimir Putin's anti-democratic policies are having upon Russia's sizeable Muslim minority. The final article on Russia, written by yours truly, outlines the changing nature of the Kremlin's strategic partnership with Iran, and explains why there should be reason for optimism that that relationship may soon become a thing of the past.

Then, on to China. The American Enterprise Institute's Dan Blumenthal provides an overview of China's growing power in Asia, and what regional countries

are doing about it. For his part, Frank Gaffney of the Center for Security Policy outlines China's widening quest for energy, and how it fits into the PRC's ambitious (and deeply anti-American) grand strategy.

In our "Dispatches" section, we offer perspectives on a trio of important topics: the state of the U.S.-Turkish relationship; the nature of the student democracy movement within Iran; and Italy's convoluted internal political scene. Rounding out the issue are reviews of four notable foreign policy books: Husain Haqqani's *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*; *Twilight in the Desert* by Matthew Simmons; Flynt Leverett's *Inheriting Syria*; and Pedro Sanjuan's *The UN Gang*.

In our last issue, we highlighted a number of geographic and ideological fronts where the future battles of the War on Terror are likely to be fought. In this one, we are proud to offer an array of perspectives on how the United States can do so successfully.

Ilan Berman
Editor

Thinking Beyond OPEC

Frederick Cedoz

Today, Americans are more aware than ever of energy issues. At the same time, American energy consumers are more vulnerable than ever to price volatility brought about by demography, geology and geopolitics. The costs of gasoline for our cars and SUVs, the diesel fuel that allows our truck drivers to move goods from ports to our doorsteps, and the home heating fuels that allow us to sleep comfortably on cold winter nights, have all seen dramatic increases in recent years.

So far, however, the debate over true "energy security" in the United States has been superficial at best. Railing against the dangers of imported oil may be a useful campaign tactic for politicians, but it has engendered little by way of real policy alternatives. It likewise has neglected a major strategic development—the effective demise of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the powerful price-fixing cartel that has steered the global oil market for much of the past half-century.

These changes beg a rethink of U.S. policy. They also underscore the pressing need for a real energy security strategy, one focused upon greater hydrocarbon production at home, new and safer suppliers abroad, and investments in the development of innovative energy technologies.

The perfect energy storm

The global energy scene is changing dramatically. For decades, world energy markets have been able to withstand a multitude of uncertainties.

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But never in recent times have so many factors weighed on the ability of producers to get oil to market, as well as the consumer's access to hydrocarbons and refined products, as in the last several years. These factors, and undoubtedly many others, began coming together in a "perfect energy storm" in early to mid-2003—just as the U.S. economy began to recover from the terror attacks of September 11th.

The impact of geopolitics on the oil markets has steadily increased over the last two decades, and particularly since September 11th.

One set of factors deals with demand. There was a time when an increase in demand could be met domestically by opening the chokes on the wells over the prolific fields of Texas, Oklahoma and Louisiana. Subsequently, when U.S. conventional oil production peaked in 1970,[1] American policymakers and the general public took solace in the fact that the Saudis could produce more from their massive oil fields. But today, things are different. Increased demand no longer refers solely to an increase in U.S. demand. Even though the U.S. still consumes some 23 percent of world oil production (roughly 20 million barrels per day), the most dramatic increase in demand is coming from emerging economies in Asia—most notably China and India. According to the U.S. Department of Energy's Energy Information Administration (EIA), worldwide oil demand grew by more than 2.7 million barrels daily in 2004. Of that, 1.9 million were attributable to growing Asian economies, with China accounting for more than 1 million barrels a day in demand growth.[2]

Another deals with supply. Finding and bringing new sources of crude oil to market often takes years or even decades. That length of time has increased in recent years, as the world's major oil producers have had to look in ever more remote locations for the crude to replace declining production from established fields. Energy investment banker Matthew Simmons has illustrated just how difficult it is to find giant and supergiant fields (those capable of producing 100,000 and 500,000 barrels a day, respectively), and that the chances for such great new finds in Saudi Arabia "must now be deemed remote."[3]

The supply-side problem does not stop there. Once crude is brought to world markets, it has to be refined. Increasing domestic demand for gasoline and other refined products is causing U.S. refineries to operate at maximum output. This has created a great degree of stress on the supply chain, reducing time available for routine maintenance, seasonal blending switchovers and the occasional unforeseen shutdowns (such as those that occurred in the wake of hurricanes Katrina and Rita).

The final variable is geopolitical risk. The impact of geopolitics on the oil markets has steadily increased over the last two decades, and particularly since September 11th. With the advent of the Global War on Terror, the political instability endemic to the majority of OPEC producers has taken on increased importance. Attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure, once just a remote possibility, now seem probable. The impact of this calculus is already being felt; political consensus among the United States and its allies is that it is just a

matter of time before a terrorist event removes significant oil supplies from the market.

Iraq is also an issue. The oil situation in the former Ba'athist state, which many policy planners hoped would provide the economic spark with which to rebuild the country after decades of mismanagement, seems to be worse than first thought. Iraq is actually producing less oil today (1.9 million barrels daily) than at the end of major combat operations in 2003—a decline attributable to repeated terrorists bombings of pipelines and other key points of the country's oil infrastructure.[4] And while hope remains that the insurgency will end and the country will become stable, democratic and economically prosperous, early indicators regarding the country's existing oil reservoirs are not cheery.

Geopolitical risk is not confined to the Persian Gulf, however. Russia, once thought to be an emerging swing producer (possibly joining Saudi Arabia as one of very few countries with excess production capacity), has turned out to be just as unpredictable as many third world oil producers. The de facto nationalization of the Yukos oil conglomerate—and the attendant political instability that has ensued in the country's energy sector—has transformed investing in the Russian oil industry from a potential bonanza into a game of roulette.

All of this, combined with nationalist chest pounding from Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, persistent theft, corruption and supply disruptions in Nigeria and even threats of oil worker strikes in prosperous Norway, have generated a "geopolitical risk premium" of between $10 and $15 dollars a barrel.

OPEC, RIP

Not all that long ago, the answer to such problems would have come from OPEC. Historically, the public statements that invariably followed the behind-the-scenes arm-twisting within the world's most powerful cartel were treated as gospel by global markets, and oil commodity futures prices reacted accordingly. For as long as anyone can remember, OPEC has been the glove outlining the invisible hand allegedly controlling the international oil market. And for just as long, consumers have benefited from the comfort of this controlling presence.

Today, however, the situation is quite different. Despite the cartel's best efforts, mounting evidence points to the fact that OPEC has become increasingly ineffective in reining in high oil prices. And with the disappearance of the preferred "price band" for OPEC crude ($28-$32 per barrel), some wonder whether the cartel still has any interest at all in bringing prices down.

This impotence derives from a confluence of factors. With estimates for crude oil demand steadily being revised upward, market fundamentals are working against the cartel. And with most of the additional supply to meet this demand projected to come from non-OPEC producers, the cartel is facing a dramatic diminution in influence. At the same time, political instability in OPEC's primary region, the Persian Gulf, is working against investor confidence.

Also at issue is the fact that the price of oil's impact on the world economy is smaller today than it was at the time of the oil shocks of the late 1970s. Even though analysts and pundits like to talk sensationally about "record-high oil prices," the U.S. gets more than double the GDP out of a

barrel of oil now than it did in the mid-1970s. As a consequence, oil's impact on the world economy as a whole is less now than it was at the height of OPEC's power.

Momentum also is having a tremendous impact on oil prices. While there are virtually no fundamental fiscal underpinnings for oil prices soaring above $50 a barrel, it is unlikely that any cartel could prevent prices from skyrocketing purely for psychological reasons.

Finally, there is the matter of organizational cohesion. In the past couple of years, there has been much internal debate among OPEC members on increasing production. Saudi Arabia, Nigeria and some other producers have been advocating for greater production, while the increasingly anti-American regimes in Iran and Venezuela want to hold the line. The result has been energy paralysis.

All of this begs the question: if OPEC can no longer bring stability to the world oil market and deliver its product at "reasonable prices," why does it still exist? And if it can no longer reliably set prices and calm markets, shouldn't we look to create some other mechanism that can?

A hemispheric approach to energy security

In fact, we do not have to look very far. You might not know it, but Canada and Mexico are already the top two suppliers of oil to the United States, respectively.[5] When combined with domestic production, imports from these two continental neighbors supply more than 50 percent of total U.S. daily oil consumption. More promising still, Canada recently vaulted to the number-two spot among the world's proven reserve holders (behind Saudi Arabia) with its classification of 176 billion barrels of economically recoverable oil from massive oil sands deposits, located primarily in northern Alberta.

Regardless of America's perception of Canada—and, indeed, sometimes even Canada's perception of itself—our northern neighbor is officially an energy superpower. The U.S. currently imports roughly 2 million barrels per day of Canadian crude.[6] Of that volume, approximately 800,000 barrels come from oil sands deposits. And with oil sands production projected to increase from 1.2 million barrels daily to as much as 4 million by 2015, we will be able to count on increased supplies even amid mounting interest in Canadian oil from countries such as China. In the next decade, Canada's total daily oil production will reach close to 5 million barrels a day,[7] over half of which (more than 2.5 million barrels daily) will likely flow to the U.S.

This oil trade would be more than simply an expansion of the largest commercial trading relationship in the world. Along with additional supplies of Canadian crude will come the need for American and Canadian jobs to produce the oil, and—just as important—expand the infrastructure to get that crude to market. Each barrel of oil we buy from Canada is a barrel whose profit doesn't end up in the hands of those who may wish us harm. And every job building a pipeline or expanding a refinery in the U.S. puts food on the table of Americans and tax revenue in our national treasury.

Mexico, on the other hand, has an uphill climb with respect to expanding its oil output, but the tools are all there. The Mexican government has allowed the nationalist sentiment that goes along with being

a major oil producer to impede its ability to reliably expand production to meet domestic demand, let alone produce additional crude for export. That said, the geology of the under-explored Mexican portions of the Gulf of Mexico is likely to be as prolific as the American waters of the Gulf have proven to be.

Expanded trade, properly managed, means expanded opportunities for Mexicans in the same way it means jobs and energy security for Americans. As such, the U.S. government should find ways to encourage those in the Mexican government who have expressed a willingness to reform PeMEX, the state-owned oil company that controls all domestic hydrocarbon production in Mexico. Allowing foreign companies to come in and operate fields in Mexico is not a diminution of a national asset. If anything, it bolsters that asset by applying the best technology along with the brightest geoscientists to produce more energy from Mexican territory. This means more tax revenue for the Mexican treasury and more high-paying jobs for Mexicans in the oil and gas industry. For its part, the Mexican government will need to meet foreign oil companies halfway, with assurances that their investments will not be nationalized.

Once these pillars are put into place, this strategy could be expanded to include Latin America and even West Africa. The United States has much to gain from such an expansion of energy-based trade. Our relationships with countries in Central and South America and West Africa have all but been abandoned in recent years. This is undoubtedly a dangerous development; left to their own devices, historical allies and trading partners in our own hemisphere will look to secure their economic futures by increasing trade with other global powers, like China, or fall prey to the destabilizing "blame America" nationalism that has bankrupted a once-vibrant Venezuela.

In essence, an expanded energy trade among the nations of North and South America and West Africa is the pivot for hemispheric economic development, energy security and combating the spread of global terror organizations to our own borders. An integrated hemispheric energy production and distribution market from Argentina to Alberta and from Ecuador to Nigeria could also form the basis for a new oil pricing and regulatory system that could supplant OPEC and provide a rational market basis to energy pricing.

The reasons for erecting such a construct are compelling. The "cheap oil" of the last four decades has come with a steep price tag of a different sort, one that does not register at the pump. But when you take into account the embargoes, hostage takings, suicide bombings, coups, wars, and defense expenditures that are part and parcel of obtaining energy from the Middle East, it becomes a much safer bet to get energy from the Western hemisphere, where the costs are more straightforward.

An expanded energy trade among the nations of North and South America and West Africa is the pivot for hemispheric economic development, energy security and combating the spread of global terror.

Yesterday's unconventionals... today's conventionals

America also can learn a thing or two from our neighbors to the north to help boost domestic production. Canadians have proven that, with patience, the brightest minds and a little bit of money can tackle the toughest energy challenges. Production from the Canadian oil sands began decades ago, but it only began to ramp up to levels that have made Canada an energy superpower once technology caught up. There were many lean years for those oil sands pioneers, particularly in the 1990s when world oil prices plunged to $12 a barrel. But with world oil demand surging ahead of projected increases in conventional oil supply, Canada has become a model for using technology to turn yesterday's unconventional deposits into the commercially viable conventional crude of today and tomorrow.

The only real way to a secure energy future for the United States is through diversification-both of our sources of imported crude oil and the types of energy we use.

For the United States, the Canadian lesson should be instructive. Americans have grown to believe that dependence on unstable foreign oil suppliers is necessary because we have no more oil to produce domestically. This is misleading; while it may be true that easy-to-produce conventional fields in California, Texas and Oklahoma are in irreversible decline, we have yet to tap the trillions of barrels of kerogen[8] trapped in shale deposits in the Inner Mountain West (Colorado, Utah, Wyoming, Montana and the Dakotas).

As with the Canadian oil sands, oil companies and private citizens have known about the existence of oil trapped in shale in this country for decades. Commercial production of oil (kerogen) from shale has never advanced because it has always been cheaper to produce conventional domestic supplies and to import oil from abroad. But now, with conventional U.S. production in decline, with massive political opposition to the prospect of developing hydrocarbon basins like Alaska's Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), and with seemingly perpetual geopolitical instability in major oil producing regions abroad, a reexamination of generating oil from domestic shale deposits has become a necessity.

Conservative projections of the oil recoverable from domestic shale deposits in the Green River formation of Colorado, Utah and Wyoming alone stand at 130 billion barrels.[9] Similar estimates indicate that there are over 2 trillion barrels of oil trapped in shale in place in the continental U.S.[10] By way of comparison, the total proven reserves of Saudi Arabia (which are only proven to the extent that the leadership of Saudi Aramco tells us they are there) are 263 billion barrels. And as technology makes the production of oil from shale deposits less expensive and worldwide demand for oil drives commodity prices higher, it is likely that commercial production of oil from shale could be profitable with per-barrel prices in the mid $30s.

Another unconventional source of crude oil lies in America's vast coal reserves. The process of heating coal and extracting a synthetic crude oil from the process goes back

to pre-World War II Germany. In the early 1920s, Professor Franz Fischer and Dr. Hans Tropsch, researchers at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Mülheim, discovered the method for converting coal into liquid petroleum products like diesel fuel. Simply put, coal is gasified or heated with steam to produce a synthetic gas (syngas) consisting of carbon dioxide and hydrogen that is then introduced to a reaction agent like cobalt or iron; this converts the gas into a synthetic crude oil which can then be cracked into various products like diesel fuel.[11] Subsequently, during the Second World War, Germany, which has almost no commercial oil deposits but boasts sizeable coal reserves, used the Fischer-Tropsch process to turn its coal into synthetic petroleum to fuel tanks and fighter planes as a way of circumventing an international embargo on oil supplies.

In this regard, the U.S. can take a page from the German playbook. Coal has long been a cornerstone of America's energy portfolio. It is as abundant in the United States as oil is in the Middle East. The U.S. Department of Energy estimates America's coal reserves at 275 billion tons—roughly one-quarter of the world total.[12] Moreover, the infrastructure to produce it is already in place and the methods for conveying it to market have been around for more than a century.

Until recently, however, the costs associated with coal-to-liquid (CTL) technology have conspired to keep a major coal energy initiative off the drawing board. But today's market conditions have changed all that. Most estimates agree that CTL processes can produce economically competitive products so long as the cost of crude oil remains above $30 a barrel.[13] Even factoring in the costs of designing and building sufficient CTL plants (projected at over $1 billion to produce 50,000 barrels of synthetic crude oil per day), at current market prices harnessing coal to meet our energy needs would begin to be economically profitable after just four years.

The lessons are clear. Turning our own domestic unconventional reserves into the conventional reserves of tomorrow shows us part of the path to greater energy independence and real energy security.

> In his day, President Kennedy provided a unifying spark with his challenge of landing on the moon; the technology and results soon followed. Unfortunately, when it comes to energy, our elected officials have yet to take concrete action to animate such a strategy.

The drive for diversification

The foregoing examples help to illustrate the point that the only real way to a secure energy future for the United States is through diversification—both of our sources of imported crude oil and the types of energy we use. Increased imports from Canada alone will not solve our problems. Conservation alone will not provide enough energy to meet the rising demand of an ever-expanding population. By itself, production from ANWR, or domestic unconventionals like oil from shale deposits or synthetic crude oil from coal, will not give us greater energy security. But taken together, they can help us find our way out of the political mess

engendered by our appetite for imports from unstable producers.

Underpinning all of these efforts, however, must be a sense of national purpose and unity. In his day, President Kennedy provided that unifying spark with his challenge of landing on the moon; the technology and results soon followed. Unfortunately, when it comes to energy, our elected officials have yet to take concrete action to animate such a strategy.

If diversification of energy sources is the key to a real energy security strategy, our policy planners also should encourage the development and commercial production of the next generation of transportation fuels through a modern-day Manhattan Project for energy. Today, our economic growth and national security are so inexorably linked to stable supplies of relatively inexpensive energy that the growing geopolitical instability in major oil-producing regions should provide the catalyst for us to free ourselves from the political whims of hostile suppliers.

Reaching for the stars

Today the U.S. stands at an energy crossroads. We have the opportunity to deal OPEC a crippling, and possibly fatal, blow by implementing a real energy security strategy—one that will make us less susceptible to wild commodity pricing swings and allow us to change the rules of the oil dependency game, lessening our demand for oil imports and becoming selective as to our imported energy partners.

These goals are not unrealistic. Nor are they unachievable. It is long past time for us to start.

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2. Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, *International Energy Outlook 2005*, July 2005 (http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/index.html).
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7. Mark J. Friesen and Steven I. Paget, "FirstEnergy Raises Its Long-Term Oil Sands Production Forecast," FirstEnergy Capital Corp. *FirstFacts*, December 5, 2005, 1.
8. Kerogen is an organic material that, when heated into a liquid, can be converted into a synthetic oil. World Energy Council, "Survey of Energy Resources: Oil Shale," n.d. (http://www.worldenergy.org/wec-geis/publications/reports/ser/shale/shale.asp).
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12. Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, "Coal Resources, Reserves, and Mine Sizes, U.S. Total," n.d. (http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/coal/statepro/imagemap/us4p1.html).
13. Hirsch *et al.*, 43.

Making *Jihad* Work for America

J. Michael Waller

In the "war of ideas," words matter. By accepting the enemy's terminology and adopting its definitions as our own, we cease fighting on our terms and place our ideas at the enemy's disposal.

We would never fight a military engagement under such conditions; we have highly trained personnel who know the enemy's order of battle and how to apply exactly the technologies, weapons and timing to ensure rapid victory at the lowest cost. We have doctrines for doing so. Yet we currently have no corresponding doctrine for public diplomacy and its action-oriented cousins.

This shortcoming has crippled the war effort. By not understanding the nature of the battle, and by not appreciating the meanings of words, we reward the enemy and demoralize our friends and potential allies. Such is very much the case with one of the terms central to today's debate on the war: *jihad*. These days, most Americans, including national leaders, tend to use the word as a synonym for terrorism. But speakers of Arabic and adherents of Islam are not at all in agreement about this definition, even—or perhaps especially—within the Muslim world.

Jihad, in short, may be defined in any number of ways. The terrorist enemy is using it effectively as a political weapon. It has redefined not only the word, but the idea embodied by it. When U.S. officials use the word, they should be certain about what the enemy takes it to mean, how the non-enemy (neutral, potential ally or friend) understands its American usage, and how the U.S. wants

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its target audience and the rest of the world to understand it. By doing so, we can make *jihad* work for us.

Americans and *jihad*

Muslim terms are relatively new to the United States. Most Americans first learned of *mujahideen*, or Islamic holy warriors, with the Soviet takeover of Afghanistan in 1979. They viewed the *mujahideen* as heroes, and with strong bipartisan majorities they funded and armed the Muslim fighters battling the Soviet invasion.

At about the same time, the word *jihad* entered the common lexicon, to an entirely different response. *Webster's* definition of the time shows how the public understood *jihad*: as "a holy war waged on behalf of Islam as a religious duty" and "a bitter strife or crusade [sic] undertaken in the spirit of a holy war."[1] *Webster's* updated the second definition, matter-of-factly and without irony, to mean "a crusade for a principle or belief."[2] Most recently, *Webster's* has preserved the holy war and crusade definitions and added a third: "a personal struggle in devotion to Islam especially involving scriptural discipline."[3] To most Americans, however, *jihad* is a horror committed by Muslim sociopaths.

In truth, the reality is a good deal more complex. Today, the meaning of *jihad* is so controversial, even within Islam, that some interpretations are irreconcilably opposed to one another. Among radical fundamentalists there are three levels of *jihad*, one of which is an obligatory armed struggle for a global Islamic order (as the Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington has pronounced in its Wahhabi interpretation).[4] For scriptural fundamentalists, *jihad* has substantially different meanings, and can refer to childbirth for women and a struggle for spiritual betterment. More traditionalist Muslims see *jihad* mainly as a struggle for personal moral improvement, but one that can include warfare on behalf of the faith when "necessary and appropriate." Reformist traditionalists, for their part, define *jihad* as a personal, moral journey; only in cases of life or death, or in case of attack or when the survival of Islam is at stake, does jihad become "holy war," according to a dominant view.[5] By contrast, Islamic moderates refer to *jihad* exclusively in terms of personal spiritual development. Secularists, meanwhile, tend to view *jihad* as a historical phenomenon in holy wars of old, and though they accept the term to refer to spiritual improvement they tend to avoid it because of its controversial underpinnings and overtones.[6]

With so many accepted meanings, both within and outside of Islam, the United States has the opportunity to decide how to make the word work for its national interests. Ironically, both Islamic extremists and the United States government currently are content with sharing the narrow, revisionist definition of *jihad* as terrorism, to the exclusion of the rest of the Islamic world.

But should they be? After all, which idea of *jihad* does the United States wish to see prevail: the benign and charitable idea of self-improvement and self-discipline, or the idea of total warfare against civilization? The extremists know what they want both Muslims and "the infidel" to believe. Indeed, among most Americans, they succeeded long before al-Qaeda ever surfaced.

Hijacking *jihad*

In the late 1970s, Yasser Arafat's Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) dominated the Middle Eastern terrorist scene. Secular-nationalist in nature, it included many non-Muslims

(and even an anti-Islamic Marxist-Leninist faction). But while members appeared not to mind the killing of those deemed to be collaborators, most Muslim members drew the line at the idea of murdering their co-religionists. Over time, however, new and more extreme groups carried the war beyond Israel to advocate the killing of other Muslims, including women and children, and developed an ideology to justify these tactics in heavily religious terms.

One of the most infamous called itself Islamic Jihad. Founded in Egypt in the late 1970s, Islamic Jihad dedicated itself to the establishment of Islamic rule by force.[7] Its founders chose the group's name purposefully, not to frighten Americans but to convince other Muslims of the holiness of their war, even though the methods were antithetical to the virtues that most believers valued. The name was a conscious effort to justify terrorism in the name of Islam, at a time when most "Muslim terrorists" were terrorists who happened to be Muslim.

In a manifesto entitled "The Methodology of the Islamic Jihad Group," written in the Turah Penitentiary in Cairo in 1986, Islamic Jihad "group leader" Aboud al-Zumur outlined the organization's semantic strategy.[8] "[W]e chose the term *jihad* to be part of our name and that people know us by that name, given the fact that 'to struggle' is an essential matter to our movement," Zumur wrote. Basing its ideology on the teachings of 13th century theologian Ibn Taymiyya (considered the inspiration of Wahhabi extremist thought), the group was careful to establish the religious justifications for its name and actions by getting religious leaders to approve what normal Muslims considered un-Islamic tactics of subversion and violence.

The document explained the Islamic Jihad ideology in careful and legalistic terms, citing archaic theological tracts that repeatedly call for subjecting oneself to "martyrdom," not merely by personal sacrifice but by "giving up one's life." Al-Zumur spelled out the group's ideology clearly, refuting traditional norms by stressing the un-Islamic methods the group embraced in the quest for political power. He broke some widespread taboos, arguing that Muslim fighters did not need the support of their spiritual leaders, that they could indeed attack non-Muslim civilians, that they could strike offensively and not just in self-defense, and that they could seize political power in foreign countries. In an assault on the sanctity of the family, the Islamic Jihad document said that young Muslims could join the fight against their parents' will and without consent of a duly recognized political authority.

Al-Zumur went even further, arguing that any person or authority who attempts to stop the rogue fighter is himself thwarting the will of God and, by implication, is an infidel who must be killed. The document prepared people that most members of the movement would be expected to die on their mission, either in combat or by suicide, and receive supernatural pleasures in return. The "jihad" would be permanent; it would break traditional discipline between young people and their families and spiritual leaders; it would slay Muslim political leaders whom the Islamic Jihad would deem insufficiently Muslim (the group had already assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat) and would install Islamist clerics in their place, under the moral authority of Shaykh Abu al-Tayyib, a 10th-century Muslim poet.

This new concept of *jihad* was radical. It rejected traditional beliefs about family authority and unity, as well as filial responsibility to parents and siblings, all the while using medieval militant Ibn Tamiyya as its source of moral authority. It demanded a permanent revolution "until the Day of Judgment" under an elite shock force to overthrow the established political and cultural order. "All Muslim scholars have agreed," the document claimed, that good Muslims should fight and oust present-day governments and "install in their place Muslim spiritual leaders."

The Islamic Jihad's methodology paper serves as a telling indicator of a bitter internal battle within the Muslim religion. That clash was a struggle for legitimacy between the extremism of a fringe group and adherents of traditional Islam. It was a battle that the extremists effectively won, shaping words for their own political purposes and creating a new belief system for an emerging generation of the faithful who would break from their families and the bonds of their established religious leaders to perform missions, mainly against fellow Muslims, that would result in their own physical destruction.

A decade later, Osama bin Laden would use the same terminology in his declaration of war against the United States.[9] Today's terrorists have adapted extremist medieval interpretations of *jihad* to suit their political agendas. In the process, they have hijacked the terms of religious discourse in the Muslim world. The resulting propaganda victory has silenced more moderate Islamic voices—and imposed a false definition upon American political discourse regarding the Middle East.

The results have been predictable. Without even realizing it, the United States began its post-9/11 counterattack at a political disadvantage, largely because the enemy had already framed the terms of the "war of ideas." In the four-and-a-half years since, the United States has only exacerbated this problem. It has undermined "moderate" Muslims who oppose but fear the extremists by effectively declaring that all practitioners of *jihad*—and not merely the extremists who had hijacked the word—were the sworn enemies of the United States. It has validated the enemy's ideological worldview by appearing to declare war on Islam (even as it has taken pains to stress the opposite). And it has given undue power and prestige to the enemy leadership, enhancing their reputations and inspiring more recruits to their cause.

Toward a new vocabulary

If not *jihad*, then what? If foreign terrorists are not, in truth, holy warriors but rather mass murderers, what do we call them, and what should our message to the rest of the Muslim world be?

True political warfare requires undermining the enemy and destroying its ideas—not merely refuting them or "competing" with them in an intellectual "marketplace." So far, the United States has fallen far short of this objective, contenting itself with trying to convince Muslims worldwide of its good intentions. Such an approach is profoundly self-defeating; the objective should not be to try and convince skeptical Muslims that the U.S. is not engaged in a "war against Islam," but to show, relentlessly and in the most vivid terms, that the extremists are un-Islamic and that the nations of the great Abrahamic religions are united against a common mortal enemy.

By necessity, the American political counterattack in the "war of ideas" should be geared toward depriving radical elements of the ability to dominate religious semantics and rhetoric. In so doing, the U.S. will be helping to destroy the image of the enemy as hero and martyr—a crucial mechanism currently fueling the fight against the United States and its Coalition partners.

Doing so means adjusting U.S. rhetoric so as not to hinder civilized Muslims in the recovery of their ideas. If the current idea of *jihad* as terrorism is offensive to the average Muslim, who sees the same word as a just and good action blessed by God, then the U.S. must find another word to describe its enemy and its deeds. Working with Muslim clerics, Arab scholars and regional experts, American policymakers should develop a new vocabulary that, if used boldly and consistently, could shift the terms of debate in the Arab-speaking and Islamic worlds and marginalize the terrorists from their support networks, diminishing their stature and their appeal to young prospective recruits and sowing uncertainty among recruits about one another and about their cause.

Such an approach would help our allies and would-be allies in the Arab and Muslim worlds. Carnegie Scholar Asma Afsaruddin, Associate Professor of Arabic and Islamic Studies at the University of Notre Dame, is studying the semantic content of *jihad*. She observes,

> The important battle of semantics is not about window-dressing but about reclaiming the true meaning of *jihad*—which refers to the noblest human "struggle" or "endeavor" to realize God's will for a just and merciful society on earth—from those who would willfully abuse it. The Qur'anic and classical notion of *jihad* signifies a continuing enterprise on the part of the religious to uphold what was good and resist what is evil: this enterprise, is, after all, at the root of every civilized society and thus ultimately conducive to true peace.[10]

The United States, then, must find ideas already in the Arabic language and Muslim culture that can be applied to describe Islamist terror. Fortunately, a thousand years of Islamic jurisprudence have already provided us with the proper word: *hirabah*. As Layla Sein of the Association of Muslim Social Scientists explains:

> Since the concept of *jihad* comes from the root word *jahada* (to strive or struggle for self-betterment from an ethical-moral perspective) and that of *hirabah* comes from the root word *hariba* (to fight, to go to war or become enraged or angry), an etymological and theological examination of these words provides a valid framework through which the religious legitimacy of suicide bombings in today's global community can be analyzed…
>
> To delve into a comparative study of these Islamic concepts is to expose how *hirabah* is being paraded by terrorist groups as *jihad*. By defining *hirabah* as *jihad*, such terrorist groups as al Qaeda and others promote their terrorist agendas by misleading young, religiously motivated and impressionable Muslims to believe that killing unarmed and non-combatant civilians are activities of *jihad*, and hence a ticket to paradise…
>
> If activities of fear and terror associated with *hirabah* are used to define the meaning of *jihad* in hopes of recruiting Muslim

> youth to undertake suicide bombings and other criminal activities, Muslim theologians need to define the nature of what is happening to stop the hijacking of Islam by terrorists.[11]

"Given the all too common tendency to employ *jihad* and terrorism as synonymous," says Antony T. Sullivan of the Center for Middle Eastern and North African Studies at the University of Michigan, "there is now perhaps no traditional Islamic concept that cries out louder for revival than *hirabah*."[12]

Hirabah would be more appropriate and useful, not only for public diplomacy or political reasons, but for the purpose of destroying terrorist networks. U.S. federal law enforcement officials refer to Islamist terrorists as "jihadis," as do the Armed Forces and counterterrorism strategists. This, writes University of Michigan Professor Abdul Hakim in an important article on terrorism, is a misnomer:

> *Hirabah* appears… to parallel the function of terrorism as an American legal category… *hirabah* actually goes beyond the FBI definition of terrorism, inasmuch as *hirabah* covers both directed and coincidental spreading of fear… *Hirabah*, as it turns out, is the most severely punished crime in Islam, carrying mandatory criminal sanctions.

Hakim writes that "the severest punishments… are explicitly outlined in Qur'an 5:33-34, virtually the beginning and end of all juristic discussions on hirabah." The punishments include execution, crucifixion, or amputation of hands and feet, the latter for humiliation in this life and for "grievous chastisement" in the next.[13]

One finds little doubt, then, that the idea of *hirabah* is a proper means of demonizing those we call "jihadis." Moreover, many Muslims, both those one would consider "moderate" and even some who have sympathized with those the U.S. considers extremist, readily accept the idea of *hirabah* as a proper means of demonizing "jihadis." Immediately after the September 11th attacks, Dr. Ezzeddin Ibrahim, the former chancellor of Al Ain University in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, made the point that:

> What occurred on September 11, 2001, is one of the most loathsome of crimes, which in Islam goes under the name of *al-hirabah*. *Hirabah* is the most abominable type of murder, in that it involves killing with terrorism and intimidation.[14]

Professor Akbar Ahmed, Chair of Islamic Studies at the American University, concurs:

> Properly understood, this is a war of ideas within Islam—some of them faithful to authentic Islam, but some of them clearly un-Islamic and even blasphemous toward the peaceful and compassionate Allah of the Qur'an … As a matter of truth-in-Islam, both the ideas and the actions they produce must be called what they actually are, beginning with the fact that al Qaeda's brand of suicide mass murder and its fomenting of hatred among races, religions and cultures do not constitute godly or holy "jihad"—but, in fact, constitute the heinous crime and sin of unholy "hirabah"… such ungodly "war against society" should be condemned as blasphemous and un-Islamic.[15]

Even some Saudi-associated Muslim organizations are in agreement about the use of the word. One such group is the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), one of the

most influential Muslim groups in the United States and Canada—and reportedly an important promoter of more fundamentalist, even extremist, forms of Islam, with extensive Saudi Arabian funding.[16] According to ISNA Secretary General Sayyid M. Syeed:

> The Qur'an and the sayings of the prophet emphatically distinguished the term *jihad* from *hirabah*, a destructive act of rebellion committed against God and mankind. *Hirabah* is an act of terrorism, a subversive act inflicted by an individual or a gang of individuals, breaking the established norms of peace, civic laws, treaties, agreements, moral and ethical codes… While as [*sic*] different forms of *jihad* are highly commendable acts of virtue, *hirabah* is respected as a despicable crime… *Individuals and groups indulging in hirabah are condemned as criminals, subjected to severe deterrent punishments under Islamic law and warned of far more punishment and humiliation in the life after life*.[17] (*Emphasis added*).

Syeed's statement is especially important. His organization is the largest supplier of Saudi-funded Islamic literature in more than 1,100 North American mosques, and the source of much of the ideologically extreme interpretations of Islam including the Salafist/Wahhabi interpretations of *jihad*.

"Think of the disincentive to young, hungry, cynical Muslims—angry at their own governments and angry at ours for bolstering theirs," notes Anisa Mehdi, a journalist who produced the documentary "Inside Mecca" for National Geographic Television. "If they heard 'hirabah' instead of 'jihad,' if they heard 'murder' instead of 'martyr,' if they heard they were bound for hell not heaven, they might not be so quick to sign up to kill themselves and a handful of so-called 'infidels' along the way."[18]

A linguistic offensive

It takes little effort and no money to change the rhetoric and the thinking about *jihad, hirabah*, and related Islamic terminology that shape and define ideas. There need be no bureaucratic restructuring, no congressional appropriations or approval, no turf battles; just awareness from public officials and a substitution of words.

To that end, the president and other senior officials can and should take the lead in changing the rhetoric of the War on Terror, generating headlines, controversy, and ultimately reflection around the world. They should also help to properly define *jihad* and *hirabah* in U.S. government glossaries and directories, and enforce such a rhetorical change throughout the United States government, including the Departments of Defense, State and Justice, as well as the counterterrorism and law-enforcement agencies within them.

Elected officials should also undertake to promote a similar transformation abroad. In particular, they should challenge the Saudi government and Saudi-funded entities like ISNA to renounce the pro-terrorist interpretations of *jihad*, revive the concept of *hirabah*, and then identify and marginalize practitioners of *hirabah* and those who support them. The U.S. is entitled to make this challenge because Saudi propaganda has fueled the justification of terrorism in the name of *jihad* around the world, and especially in and against the United States. Simultaneously, Washington should make a point of highlighting the works of journalists, commentators, clerics and others worldwide that denounce Islamist terrorism as *hirabah*—and promote similar steps among Muslims at large.

If we are indeed engaged in a global war of ideas, then words are the principal armaments. Words define ideas, and ideas govern how people think. The enemy has succeeded in redefining certain key words, and consequently changed much of the world's perceptions by warping the language of the Qur'an and of historical Islam. The results have provided the principal justifications for terrorists to murder innocents—mainly Muslims—in their war against society.

Yet the linguistic and cultural foundations of the societies in which terrorists are raised and operate offer powerful weapons that civilization can use against them. Islamic words, ideas, laws and customs can be the United States' best ally in the war, if only the U.S. would recognize and deploy them.

1. *Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged* (Springfield, MA: G&C Merriam Company, 1971).
2. *Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary* (Springfield, MA: G & C Merriam Company, 1979).
3. *Merriam-Webster Online, August 2005; Encyclopædia Britannica* adds, "In the 20th and 21st centuries the concept of jihad has sometimes been used as an ideological weapon in an effort to combat western influences and secular governments and to establish an ideal Islamic society." *Britannica Concise Encyclopædia*, retrieved August 17, 2005 from Encyclopædia Britannica Premium Service.
4. The Islamic Affairs Department of the Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Washington issued the following exhortation on *jihad* on its website (http://www.iad.org), in 2003: "Muslims are required to raise the banner of Jihad in order to make the Word of Allah supreme in this world, to remove all forms of injustice and oppression, and to defend the Muslims. If Muslims do not take up the sword, the evil tyrants of this earth will be able to continue oppressing the weak and [the] helpless." The wording no longer appears on the Islamic Affairs Department site, but the Middle East Media Research Institute preserved the wording for posterity. See Steven Stalinsky, "The 'Islamic Affairs Department' of the Saudi Embassy in Washington, DC," Middle East Media Research Institute *Special Report* no. 23, November 26, 2003.
5. Cheryl Benard, *Civil Democratic Islam: Partners, Resources and Strategies* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2003), 12-13.
6. Ibid.
7. U.S. Department of State, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, "Chapter 6—Terrorist Groups," *Country Reports on Terrorism 2004*, April 27, 2005 (http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/45394.htm).
8. Aboud al-Zumur, *Jama'at al-Jihad al-Islami* (The Methodology of the Islamic Jihad Group) (Cairo, Egypt: Turah Penitentiary, 1986). Translated by the U.S. Department of State.
9. "[J]ihad against the infidel in every part of the world, is absolutely essential," Bin Laden declared in his 1996 communiqué demanding the ouster of U.S. forces from Saudi Arabia. That mission, the terrorist financier said, was to be carried out by "my brothers, the *mujahideen*, the sons of the nation." Osama Bin Laden, "Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places," published in *Al Quds al Arabi* (London), August, 1996.
10. Asma Afsaruddin, letter to Jim Guirard, President of the TrueSpeak Institute in Alexandria, Virginia. Guirard solicited and collected quotations on *jihad* and *hirabah* from Arab and Islamic scholars, and is considered the principal figure behind taking back the language from the extremists. The author acknowledges and thanks him for providing many of the quotations used in this article.
11. Layla Sein, "Editorial," Association of Muslim Social Scientists *AMSS Bulletin* 3, no. 4 (2002), 2.
12. Antony T. Sullivan, letter to Jim Guirard.
13. Sherman A. Jackson (a.k.a. Abdul Hakim), "Domestic Terrorism in the Islamic Legal Tradition," *Muslim World* 91, no. 3/4 (2001), 293-310.
14. "Interview: Ezzeddin Ibrahim," *Middle East Policy* VIII, no. 4 (2001).
15. Akbar Ahmed, letter to Jim Guirard.
16. Matthew Levitt, "Subversion from Within: Saudi Funding of Islamic Extremist Groups Undermining U.S. Interests and the War on Terror from Within the United States," Testimony before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, September 10, 2003.
17. Sayyid M. Syeed, letter to Jim Guirard, cited by Guirard, "Properly Condemning the al Qaeda Blasphemy," *The American Muslim*, April 21, 2003.
18. Anisa Mehdi, "Let's Rescue a Once-Beautiful Word from Its Captors," *Star-Ledger* (Newark), December 29, 2004.

CYBERSTRATEGY 2.0

Frank J. Cilluffo and J. Paul Nicholas

Great minds have grappled with the manifestations of the information age for decades. Recently, however, it has been one of the information age's most loved and feared catalysts—the Internet—that has taken center stage in national security planning. Even as the Internet went public in the early 1990s, strategic thinkers were already wrestling with its potential implications for communications, commerce, and even conflict.

The power of the Internet derives from its characteristics. Open protocols and easy access make it "flat"; individuals, groups, and nations are somehow equals in the massive network of networks. As a mechanism for rapidly uniting global communities of interest, the Internet is also "sticky," possessing the ability to transmit ideas, information, and actions—power that can be leveraged and focused to create tremendous asymmetric capabilities that can be exercised without attribution.

Therein lies the threat. Individuals, organizations, or nation states with the capabilities to gather, assimilate, shape, project, deny and deliver information in a controlled way could cause nationally significant disruptions in the United States.

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The controlled delivery of information with the intent to exploit, disrupt, or manipulate an adversary's operations is what we term a *weapon of mass effect* (WME). A WME does not have to be a single damaging attack. Rather it could be composed of several smaller, and sometimes discrete, attacks (also known as "exploits") that culminate in a massive disruption. A WME, furthermore, may be triggered by either a person or a technology.

The potential threat of WMEs to the United States, its allies, and its global interests increasingly has been recognized in presidential directives and national strategies. The resulting policies have sparked important efforts in cybersecurity, homeland security, and national defense. Unfortunately, no matter how polished the prose, policy alone does not provide protection. Currently, the United States still lacks fundamental capabilities for discerning, deterring, and defending against sophisticated WMEs that threaten its national interests. Upgrading national security planning, programming, and operations to meet this challenge requires us to develop a richer understanding of the nature of WME threats, early indicators of them, and the means to deter and defend against potential attackers.

Meet the adversaries

Understanding the motivations and capabilities for the use of WMEs is essential for discerning, deterring, and mitigating attempted attacks.

Simply put, there are three broad categories of threats—those posed by individuals, by organized groups, and by nation states—and 13 identifiable sources of potential attack. These run the gamut from "script kiddies" (generally unsophisticated attackers using point-and-click attacks available on the Internet) to highly sophisticated nation state alliances that may employ subtle forms of WME to alter the balance of regional or global power.

In this matrix, individuals increasingly matter. Operators who learn how to harness the asymmetrical power of the Internet can employ that medium as a launching pad for attacks against systems or even people. This constitutes a major development; just a decade ago, only nation states had the technology, the communications tools, and the skill sets that are now commonly available to individuals. In 1997, the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection estimated that by 2001 there were likely to be 19 million people with the skills to execute various cyber attacks.[1] These estimates predated the Internet boom and the dramatic communications breakthroughs currently under way, and would likely be much higher if undertaken today.

The impact has been profound. Global computer problems and billions of dollars in damage have been caused to date by relatively unskilled coders. Individuals also increasingly can use the Internet to engage and recruit people to join their cause. Terrorist organizations have demonstrated particular sophistication in this regard, uniting people to act on ideas, no matter how extreme. The 2005 grand jury indictment and conviction of Ahmed Omar Abu Ali for conspiring with al-Qaeda in an assassination attempt on President George W. Bush, for example, found important connections with the Internet. The indictment highlights the important role the cell phone, laptop and portable digital media played in al-Qaeda security practices, video surveillance of American operations in Afghanistan and contacts with other al-Qaeda operatives.[2]

Table 1: Threat Categories, Actors, Motivations, Capabilities and Resources In Connection with the Use of Weapons of Mass Effect (WMEs)				
Threat Categories	**Actors**	**Motivations**	**Capabilities**	**Resources**
Individuals	Pawns/Zombies	N/A	N/A	Minimal
	Script kiddies	Thrill seeking, power demonstration, political	Low	Minimal
	Lone hackers	Personal, professional, financial, power demonstration, political	Variable	Minimal
	Spammers/ Phishers	Financial, power demonstration	Low	Minimal
	Virus/Malware authors	Power/skill demonstration	Variable	Minimal
	Botnet controllers	Power/skill demonstration	Moderate	Minimal to moderate
	Ideological recruiters	Power/skill demonstration	Variable	Minimal
Organized Groups	Criminal organizations	Financial	Moderate	Minimal to substantial
	Terrorist organizations	Power demonstration, influence decisions, intelligence collection	Moderate	Minimal to moderate
	Non-state organizations	Political, intelligence collection, influence decisions, power balancing, economic influence	Moderate	Moderate to substantial
Nation States	Foreign intelligence services	Political, intelligence collection, influence decisions, power balancing, economic influence	High	Substantial
	Military components	Political, intelligence collection, influence decisions, power balancing, economic influence	High	Substantial
	Integrated nation state capability	Political, intelligence collection, influence decisions, power balancing, economic influence	High	Substantial
	Nation state alliances	Political, intelligence collection, influence decisions, power balancing, economic influence	Moderate to high	Substantial

The wide deployment of broadband services and "always on" network connections likewise has created a new threat source: "pawns." These are machines that are controlled by entities other than the actual owner, and can be used to clandestinely attack other computers. They also can be tied together into a robot network, or "bot-net." In its 2005 *Internet Security Threat Report*, the security provider Symantec observed an average of 10,352 active "bot" network computers per day, and noted that "bot" networks and customized "bot" code were available for purchase or rent. The report also opined that financial incentives would likely drive attackers to "develop more sophisticated and stealthier malicious code that will be implemented in bot features and bot networks, some of which could attempt to disable antivirus software, firewalls, and other security measures."[3]

There is a distinct risk that, as individual "bot-net" and malware (malicious software) developers begin to be paid for their services by criminals, terrorists, or nation states, they will rapidly become part of "groups," the second category of threats. The assimilation of "bot" designers into criminal, terrorist, or political entities may foster the development of more precise "bot-nets"—ones that are aimed at accomplishing specific financial or political goals.

Indeed, non-nation state groups are growing in power and influence. The Bush administration's 2003 *National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace* identified the threat of "organized cyber attacks" as a primary national security concern. The strategy acknowledges that high technical sophistication is required to execute nationally significant cyber attacks, and warned that "the attack tools and methodologies are becoming widely available, and the technical capability and sophistication of users bent on causing havoc or disruption is improving."[4]

Such organized threat sources fall into three general categories: (1) criminal activities such as organized theft, fraud, and trespassing; (2) terrorist activities which may exploit WMEs to further political goals or enhance physical attacks; and (3) affiliations of non-state actors who may be using more subtle WMEs to influence politics or public opinion, gather information, or engage in espionage. And, while nation states still have the most resources to manage, operate, and fund long-term operations, these unique advantages may be diminishing. The U.S. intelligence community has warned that:

> The rapid pace of change in information technology suggests that the appearance of new and unforeseen computer and network technologies and tools could provide advantages in cyber warfare to either the defender or the attacker. Wildcards for the years beyond 2005 include the possibility of fundamental shifts in the nature of computers and networking, driven, for example, by emerging optical technologies. These changes could improve processing power, information storage, and bandwidth enough to make possible application of advanced software technologies such as artificial intelligence to cyber warfare.[5]

The third category of threats, nation states, generally tends to be viewed as a single homogeneous entity. In truth, however, particular elements within a nation state may have distinct and sometimes competing motivations. Some nations may possess strong capabilities for foreign intelligence but lack an inte-

grated national capability for exercising them. Compounding the threat, nation states can enter into partnerships with other countries to enhance their WME operations.

Under the radar

The precursors to crime, terrorism, and war have a certain rhythm and cadence. In general, well-executed incidents all employ planning, intelligence gathering, surveillance, and exercises. These same rhythms will likely be used in information-based conflicts or WMEs that result in nationally significant incidents.

The reason is that the characteristics of WME attacks argue against detection. Assembling the tools for information-based WMEs does not require a specialized infrastructure or unique footprint that can be monitored from satellites. Further, the raw materials needed to build health care databases or WMEs look very similar as they are shipped around the world. Just as the Soviet Union successfully hid a massive biological weapons program from the world by inserting its production infrastructure in civilian facilities and neighborhoods, countries can easily shield the development of offensive cyber tools and methodologies.

Furthermore, the volume of traffic and the constant demands on people and systems provide ample opportunities to test WMEs (or various elements of a single WME) with minimal risk of discovery. The numbers tell the story; between 1995 and 2005, the unique software vulnerabilities reported to Carnegie Mellon's Computer Emergency Response Team surged from 171 incidents to 5,990.[6] And the time from vulnerability to exploitation can take just a few days, while fixes or patches are liable to take much longer.

Likewise, such attacks are modular in nature. Once one is developed, large numbers of variants can also be created—each of which "represents a new, distinct threat … that is modular and customizable."[7] In some instances there can be hundreds or thousands of variants of an attack, each requiring modified defenses. This constant refinement can be attributed, in part, to the fact that some of these codes have been made public, greatly empowering individuals and criminal organizations to participate in the development of variations.

By watching and learning, aggressors—be they terrorists, nonstate groups, or national intelligence/military elements—can gather tremendous operational insights about the thresholds and responses of countries, infrastructures, and individual enterprises. Carefully observing how people, processes, and technology respond to certain types of attacks can help hostile actors to refine their plans and operations.

Here, terrorist groups warrant a special note. While they routinely exploit cyberspace for communications, planning, and operational coordination, they have not yet been detected planning cyber attacks or assembling elements for a WME. However, they have repeatedly demonstrated tremendous patience in planning for attacks, and the willingness to wait, watch and strike with great surprise. As the Global War on Terror erodes the physical capabilities of these organizations, cyber WMEs may yet become a new tool of assault.

Understanding the playbook

For almost ten years, the concept of an "indications and warning architecture" for cyberspace has received

intermittent attention from federal officials. In 1996, Congress called on the Clinton administration to develop a report on how it would detect and defend against a strategic attack on the nation's information infrastructure.[8] Two years later, the Clinton White House responded by issuing Presidential Decision Directive 63, a blueprint for critical infrastructure protection that included plans for "a public-private partnership to reduce vulnerability" to cyber attack.[9]

Subsequently, in 2001, the General Accounting Office recommended that the National Security Advisor ensure the development of capabilities for strategic analysis of computer-based threats and an overall indications and warning framework and methodology.[10] Later still, the 2003 *National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace* envisioned that the newly formed Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would assume the broad analytical challenges required for tactical and strategic analysis of cyber attacks.[11] DHS was subsequently tasked with developing a national "indications and warnings" architecture for both cyber and physical incidents—one that would facilitate the identification of indicators of an impending attack, and have the capacity for detecting and analyzing patterns of such potential strikes.[12]

Yet, over two years later, such a capability has yet to materialize. The threats, meanwhile, are mounting, as the skill sets, technologies, and tradecraft to project the asymmetrical power of cyberspace in a WME continue to proliferate. American planning, programming and operations need to respond to this fundamental shift by building the capabilities necessary to discern, deter, and defend against the spectrum of threats and WMEs that loom on the national security horizon.

Discernment

Fostering the capabilities necessary to detect subtle, sophisticated information attacks requires more than simply determining that particular systems have been compromised.

First and foremost, the U.S. must establish a program office to develop an "indications and warning" architecture for cyberspace. There is a clear federal role for helping discern and detect the precursors to WMEs. This is distinct from protecting computer systems. The protection of computers is the responsibility of the owner and operator of the system. But when there are sophisticated efforts underway with the ultimate intent of creating a WME, the federal government must support efforts to understand and neutralize such attempts with law enforcement or other appropriate tools.

Such an initiative should also be designed to work closely with industry. The federal government is certainly not the place to turn if you want "early warnings" about viruses or worms; there is a robust cybersecurity industry that responds to such needs. However, as attack tools and methodologies become more precise and controllable, attackers can penetrate deeper into particular systems, exacting more damage and achieving more strategic objectives.

The precursors to such events are often subtle and seemingly insignificant, including an occasional system anomaly or a benign incident with no direct consequences on operations. Studying such events can be costly and may not return any immediate finding of wrongdoing or result in a monetary return for private enterprises. This is a beautiful thing for the adversary,

because he/she is able to pursue their goals and remain undetected or at least insignificant to the operator. Successful WME developers are patient and willing to invest the time to gradually calibrate the complexity and intensity of their methods over an extended period of time.

Cyberspace is responsible for an unexpected convergence of human intelligence (HUMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT). The smoke-filled gin joints of Le Carré novels have given way to Internet relay chats (IRCs) where conversations composed of icons, acronyms, and hip lingo recruit supporters and cement agreements. You can't defeat an adversary if you can't speak the language. The federal government needs people who speak cyber. There is a compelling need for a new type of expert: part linguist, part sociologist/behaviorist, and fluent in IRC. Assembling this capability may mean we have to recruit or train people who might not otherwise be able to obtain a traditional security clearance.

The second priority, therefore, should be to foster specific analytical discipline and expertise for addressing the challenges related to information-based attacks. Analysts must not fall into the trap of "mirror imaging"—thinking that organizations contemplating using an information-based WME will follow a direct linear path or an "efficient" means of attack. Rather, discerning the potential targets of information-based WMEs requires public-private partnerships to investigate and analyze protracted and intensive intrusions into information systems where the intruder's motives are often obscure. Working together, government and industry can create an analytical framework for more rapidly discerning and detecting structured attacks or intrusions.

Deterrence

Deterring the use of information-based WMEs requires the development of visible and robust capabilities for two functions: (1) response and coordination capabilities, both domestic and international, and (2) the swift apprehension and prosecution of criminals.

Recognizing these needs, the Bush administration made the establishment of a National Cyberspace Security Response System a central component of its cyberstrategy. That system was intended to be a public-private collaboration between government and non-governmental entities for the express purpose of providing analysis, warning and management of incidents of national significance. Unfortunately, it is often easier for federal documents to call for public-private partnerships than it is to actually execute them. For example archaic legislation such as the Federal Advisory Committee Act, which governs how federal and non-federal entities collaborate, can hinder information sharing efforts that are central to responding to cyber challenges.[13] Even today, the development of an effective and efficient national cyberspace security response system and similar entities remains hamstrung by such bureaucratic red tape.

This represents a dangerous deficiency. Rapidly attributing cyber events is critical to both mitigating the attack and deterring future ones. Currently the forensic capabilities for attributing the creation of viruses and worms are still in their infancy. The complex suites of attacks that constitute a WME are at this point almost impossible to unravel. The situation is further complicated as one begins to chase the source of the attacks through multiple networks around the world. Even if a machine

is located, it can be difficult to prove who was the mastermind behind the keyboard.

Once the responsible party has been identified, swift apprehension and prosecution requires a proper legal regime that criminalizes such behavior. The U.S. maintains such laws, but many countries do not. To help promote a more harmonized legal approach to cyber-based attacks, the Council of Europe, with strong support from the United States, Canada, Japan and other countries, has crafted the first international agreement establishing common criminal policy and procedures for cooperation. Eleven countries, including Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Slovenia, Switzerland, and others have ratified the treaty. The United States signed the Convention in 2001, and forwarded it to the Senate for ratification in 2003. It was approved by the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the summer of 2005, but has yet to be ratified. Failing to do so will significantly limit U.S. capabilities for deterring non-state actors from pursuing and using information-based WME.

Defense

Establishing national capabilities for defending against information-based WMEs requires developing flexible organizations and tools that can be calibrated for response to the three general threat sources identified above.

In the case of individuals and groups, the U.S. is well on its way to establishing the right types of mechanisms for "managing incidents." For example, DHS has established the National Cyber Response Coordination Group (NCRCG), a forum of federal agencies that coordinates intra-governmental and public/private preparedness for large-scale cyber incidents. Depending on the nature of the incident, the NCRCG can be chaired by one of three departments: Homeland Security, Defense or Justice. Its role includes developing a common operational understanding of incidents of national significance and coordinating federal resources to support response and recovery. Simply put, the NCRCG is intended to help ensure that DHS analysis of, and warning about, an array of threats—and mitigating actions for them—are coordinated with law enforcement and defense.

Of these, organized groups may be the most challenging to defend against. They are the most difficult entities to identify, penetrate, and deter because they are politically motivated and there are few diplomatic channels for diffusing tensions. As well, surprise is essential to the effectiveness of their first-strike capability. Without a credible "indications and warnings" capability, the NCRCG would likely not be activated until after an information-based WME had already been initiated.

Currently, the relatively poor technical and forensic capabilities for attribution, coupled with the lack (as yet) of a cohesive international cybercrime agreement and a common criminal policy, significantly impede efforts to identify and apprehend responsible entities. These deficiencies fall into three basic categories: a lack of laws criminalizing cyber attacks; absence of common data retention policies; and no protocols for law enforcement and Internet service provider (ISP) collaboration. All of these deficiencies, coupled with slow law enforcement responses, provide organized groups with the opportunity to disappear, to launch additional information-based WMEs,

or to use cyber disruptions to cloak physical attacks.

Significantly, while possessing the most power to employ information-based WMEs, nation states are far more cautious about executing such operations. Nations may not want to demonstrate certain national capabilities, because they would rather use them later and surprise a potential adversary. States likewise may fear that if the information-based WME were traced to them, the target may respond with traditional military means. What is unknown is the extent to which individual elements *within* a state (such as clandestine military units or intelligence services) may be engaging in discreet low intensity efforts to penetrate and map information systems as precursors to an attack. Detecting such operations requires careful coordination among key federal entities in law enforcement, homeland security, and intelligence.

Rebooting national security policy

The price of entry is at an all-time low. The skills and technologies for assembling WMEs are widespread. Gone are the days when one needed to raise an army, build a command structure, train soldiers and purchase weapons to attack an adversary. The very efficiencies enabling governments and global enterprises can also arm a range of potential adversaries to execute unexpected disruptions.

American planners need to respond to this fundamental shift by building the capabilities necessary to discern, deter, and defend against the spectrum of threats and WMEs that loom on the national security horizon. Developing WME defenses and policies requires leveraging a troika of people, processes, and technologies. The flat, sticky powers of cyberspace are ultimately neutral. Imagination and innovation are the only limitations we face in harnessing the power of cyberspace to project and defend our national interests.

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The (Not So) Untouchables

Pavel Ivanov

In January 2005, President Bush used his second inaugural address to reaffirm America's commitment to an ambitious strategy built around the worldwide spread of democratic principles. "We are led, by events and common sense, to one conclusion: The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands," Bush told the assembled crowd that day. "The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world."[1]

Though he did not say so on that occasion, a central element of the struggle outlined by the President is the issue of corruption. There is an intimate connection between criminality and terrorism. Terrorism does not operate in a vacuum. It finds sustenance from regimes that support or tolerate it. Those regimes, in turn, tend to be despotic in nature, and more often than not degenerate into criminality.

These connections are part and parcel of the contemporary terror threat. Where a drug trafficking network exists, a WMD smuggling ring potentially does as well. Organizations that smuggle immigrants into the United States can easily do so with terrorist operatives. Syndicates that launder money earned from drug sales can make those funds available for a terrorist safe house. Corrupt regimes, meanwhile, have the capacity to sustain and profit from these activities. The possibilities are endless.

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The convergence between crime and international terrorism lies at the heart of the Global War on Terror, and it requires a new approach: one that treats organized crime syndicates, as well as totalitarian regimes that facilitate terrorism or otherwise undercut public order in democratic nations, as terrorists themselves.

Deadly collusion

The boundaries between today's criminal and terrorist worlds are fluid. Criminal groups can evolve into terrorist organizations, and vice versa. As intelligence analyst Jason Freier outlined recently in these pages, there are three main patterns of criminal/terrorist interface:

1. *Alliances for mutual benefit*, in which terrorists enter agreements with transnational criminals solely to gain funding, without compromising their ideology;

2. *Direct involvement* of terror groups in organized crime, removing the middleman but maintaining the ideological premise of their strategy; and

3. *Replacement of ideology* with profit as the main motive for operation.

The convergence between crime and international terrorism lies at the heart of the Global War on Terror, and it requires a new approach: one that treats organized crime syndicates, as well as totalitarian regimes that facilitate terrorism or otherwise undercut public order in democratic nations, as terrorists themselves.

Of the first variety, perhaps the best-known case is that of the world's preeminent arms dealer, Viktor Bout. A former Soviet air force officer, Bout has built a clandestine arms trafficking empire over the past decade-and-a-half, violating numerous international arms embargoes and aiding multiple genocides in Africa in the process. During the 1990s, as a major supplier to Liberian dictator Charles Taylor, among other sordid clients, the Bout syndicate took diamond concessions in exchange for supplying weapons in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars. Subsequently, Bout moved his operations to the United Arab Emirates, and found another theater in which to peddle his wares. Initially, his cartel provided arms and technology to Afghanistan's Northern Alliance, until one of his planes was intercepted by the feeble Taliban Air Force—an opportunity he parlayed into the cultivation of a business partnership with the Taliban and al-Qaeda.[2]

A similar case of criminal/terrorist partnership, this one much closer to home, involves the El Salvadorian gang Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13). Since its start as a vigilante group in Los Angeles in the early 1980s, MS-13 has grown into a ruthless nationwide criminal syndicate, one widely known for its trafficking in weapons and persons. Today, MS-13 is thought to operate in 145 law enforcement jurisdictions across 31 states.[3] And increasingly, it appears to have drifted toward an operational relationship with the al-Qaeda network. In September 2004, the *Washington Times* reported that a key al-Qaeda lieutenant, Adnan Shukrijumah, had made contact with the gang in Central America.[4] Since then, unconfirmed rumors of an al-Qaeda/MS-13 union have persisted—fueled by the group's trans-

national reach and its penchant for illicit smuggling activities.

Evidence of the second pattern—that of direct terrorist involvement in criminality—likewise abounds. Al-Qaeda operative Ahmed Ressam, following his arrest on the U.S.-Canadian border in December 1999, revealed that members of the Bin Laden terror network engage in theft and fraud as a means of funding operations or sustaining cell operations. Lebanon's Hezbollah has long been known to be involved in the global narcotics trade, using revenue from the cultivation of poppy in the Beka'a Valley to fuel its activities. Colombia's FARC similarly cultivates narcotics in order to fund its military and political operations. And the al-Qaeda-linked Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines is notorious for bankrolling its activities through kidnapping and extortion.

Finally, terrorist groups can and do devolve into criminal concerns. The Revolutionary Armed Force of Colombia (FARC), which began as a Marxist guerrilla outfit dedicated to violent political change, now resembles nothing so much as an organized drug-running operation. Over time, the FARC leadership traded in its ideological fervor for expensive cars and palatial haciendas. The FARC today has devolved into a drug cartel that happens to maintain an army, and which uses the entrée into Colombian politics provided by its Marxist ideology to acquire and retain power.

Gangster governance

Authoritarian regimes embody criminality of a different sort. Though they may differ vastly in political orientation and ethnic composition, states where certain actors, or even whole classes, are placed above the law all share a common characteristic: corruption. And because of the unaccountable nature of these regimes, they are less constrained from colluding with terrorist elements or rogue states.

The contemporary scandal over the abuse and mismanagement of the United Nations Oil-for-Food program provides a clear example of such unaccountable state behavior. Investigations have found that Syria, a leading state sponsor of terrorism, assisted the regime of Saddam Hussein in the illicit procurement of military material and other contraband items. This trade, in turn, both sustained and armed Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath Party. "Syria was Iraq's primary conduit for illicit imports from late 2000 until OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom]," the CIA's Iraq Survey Group concluded in its 2004 final report. "Most of Iraq's military imports transited Syria by several trading companies, including some headed by high-ranking Syrian government officials, who competed for business with Iraq."[5]

Another case in point is the official thuggery of the Kim Jong-il regime in North Korea. In April 2003, the Australian navy apprehended the North Korean vessel *Pong Su*, uncovering $50 million worth of pure heroin intended for sale in Southeast Asia. Lest there be any doubt about the officially sanctioned nature of this drug trade, an official of the Korean Workers Party was detained during the raid.[6] One month later, a North Korean defector testified before the Senate Government Affairs Committee that the DPRK has been in the narcotics business since the late 1980s.[7] More recently, North Korea has been implicated in counterfeiting and distributing U.S. $100 dollar bills, also known as "supernotes."[8]

Perhaps the best illustration, however, is the case of Hezbollah. The

radical Shi'ite militia, created and sustained by Iran, complements its subsidies from Tehran with profits from the drug trade. For their part, Iran's ayatollahs aid and abet this criminal conduct. The willingness of the Iranian regime to sanction this criminal activity—indeed, to empower it—is a testament to the corrupt, authoritarian character of their rule.

Before his untimely death at unknown hands in Moscow's gangland, *Forbes Russia* editor Paul Klebnikov eloquently outlined this corrupt political economy. "Iran has other lethal secrets besides its nuclear program, now the subject of prying international eyes," Klebnikov wrote. "Dozens of interviews with businessmen, merchants, economists and former ministers and other top government officials reveal a picture of a dictatorship run by a shadow government that—the U.S. State Department suspects—finances terrorist groups abroad through a shadow foreign policy. Its economy is dominated by shadow business empires and its power is protected by a shadow army of enforcers."[9]

Beyond "stability"

So far, American strategic thinking has been slow to account for these trends. For more than six decades, U.S. national security policy has been focused above all on the preservation of "stability." Over the years, this elusive quest has translated into unfortunate support for a bevy of corrupt governments, from Saddam Hussein's Iraq to that of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines.

During the Cold War, such a policy certainly made sense; the overarching threat of a nuclear exchange between the U.S. and USSR made preserving stability a valid primary concern. But the end of the Cold War ushered in a new period—one in which the bipolar U.S.-Soviet contest degenerated into fierce power struggles between states no longer restrained by their respective superpower patrons. A host of tyrannical regimes, which had been tolerated or even supported by the U.S. in its efforts to ward off Soviet ideology, suddenly found themselves free to consolidate power.

Yet, by and large, the Soviet collapse did not prompt a foreign policy rethink in Washington. In the name of stability, the U.S. during the 1990s sought a different sort of balance—one aimed predominantly at "containing" two of the Middle East's most menacing rogues, Iran and Iraq.

The faulty logic of this paradigm was tragically brought into focus on September 11th. Over the preceding decade, away from American attention, the terrorist threat had matured, fueled by the perception that the U.S., while able, was unwilling to enforce its vision of a benign world order. For Islamic radicals in the Middle East, this hesitance was seen as a sign of provocative weakness.

To its enduring credit, the Bush administration is now moving beyond this failed notion. In its September 2002 *National Security Strategy*, the White House declared its commitment to "the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity: the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property."[10] Since then, President Bush has been even more explicit. In his March 2005 address to the National Defense University, the President outlined the start of a new approach toward repressive states:

> By now it should be clear that decades of excusing and accommodating tyranny, in the pursuit of stability, have only led to injustice and instability and tragedy. It should be clear that the advance of democracy leads to peace, because governments that respect the rights of their people also respect the rights of their neighbors. It should be clear that the best antidote to radicalism and terror is the tolerance and hope kindled in free societies. And our duty is now clear: For the sake of our long-term security, all free nations must stand with the forces of democracy and justice that have begun to transform the Middle East.[11]

This formulation recognizes a fundamental truism. Meaningful democratic reforms create a climate that is hostile to both terrorists and the criminal class. More importantly, they directly challenge the entrenched elites of a regime intent on retaining power.

To be sure, democratization will not quell the repressive instincts of politicians who prefer ruling to governing. But it will limit their options, and ultimately make them accountable for their actions. It also will not prevent bad ideas from being discussed or entertained, but it will allow good ones to gain traction. Such change, moreover, is not beyond reach.

Next steps

For the United States, success in the War on Terror hinges on a more expansive vision of the terrorist threat. Today's terrorists do not operate in isolation. They interact with—and are supported by—a network of criminal syndicates and corrupt regimes. Confronting this sinister symbiosis requires forcing foreign governments and non-state actors alike to confront the fundamental choice outlined by President Bush in the dark days after September 11th: "If any government sponsors the outlaws and killers of innocents, they have become outlaws and murderers, themselves. And they will take that lonely path at their own peril."[12]

Today's terrorists do not operate in isolation. They interact with—and are supported by—a network of criminal syndicates and corrupt regimes.

- *Designating criminal groups as foreign terrorist organizations*. The worlds of terrorism and organized crime are remarkably similar, and their intended goals are complementary. Criminal cartels such as the arms network of Viktor Bout can and do cooperate with terrorist groups, and by doing so expand the harm that those groups can do the United States and American interests. Designation of such criminal syndicates as terrorist actors in their own right under U.S. law would send a powerful signal to the enablers of global terror that their activities are no longer immune from retribution. As a practical matter, it would also increase the economic and political tools available to American policymakers in shutting down the criminal/terrorist connection.

- *Getting tough with criminal regimes*. More and more, Washington is beginning to grapple with the fact that many of its international partners, particularly in the greater Middle East, are deeply deficient in the very political criteria that have emerged as

the centerpiece of U.S. strategy. Of late, the Bush administration has begun to push for greater pluralism and accountability in places such as Egypt and Uzbekistan (albeit with varying results). Unaddressed so far, though, are governments in that region and elsewhere who actively export their corruption through the perpetuation of criminal activities abroad. The list of culprits includes not only Iran and Syria, but regimes like that of Venezuela's Hugo Chávez and Fidel Castro in Cuba. These actors must be given a clear signal: if they persist in such conduct, they themselves will be treated as state sponsors of terrorism.

All politics is ultimately local, and proper counterterrorism strategy begins at home. But four-and-a-half years after September 11th, the United States national security decision-making structure remains archaic and poorly suited to dealing with contemporary "multi-vector" threats.

- *Revamping the domestic response*. All politics is ultimately local, and proper counterterrorism strategy begins at home. But four-and-a-half years after September 11th, the United States national security decision-making structure remains archaic and poorly suited to dealing with contemporary "multi-vector" threats. In order to properly address today's terrorist challenge, the United States must make blending law enforcement, military and intelligence capabilities a top priority. A good first step in this direction would be the creation of a dedicated directorate for organized crime at the National Security Council tasked with handling the delicate interface between various—and often competing—federal agencies in the consolidated War on Terrorism and international crime.

- *Refashioning foreign aid*. For far too long, American foreign aid has been perceived by its recipients to be a "free lunch." As scholar Yuval Levin lays out in his important study on the subject, "American aid to the Middle East is a tragedy of good intentions on a grand scale." "The stated purposes of aid—the service of American interests, the support of allies, and the establishment of peace—are sound, reasonable, and just," Levin recounts. "And yet, in the Middle East aid has proven to be counterproductive and even dangerous for the United States and for its closest ally in the region: Israel."[13]

Today, good governance may be a key element of the Bush administration's counterterrorism strategy, but reform of foreign aid has lagged far behind. With the notable exception of the Millennium Challenge Account established by President Bush in March 2002, U.S. foreign aid is still by and large not subjected to performance-based criteria. The results, not surprisingly, have been distinctly counterproductive to U.S. policy. A new take on foreign aid allocation is needed—one that conditions American assistance on transparency in recipient governments, and fos-

ters the eradication of the corrupt and criminal regimes that sustain the global terrorist threat.

As long as the nexus between terrorism and organized crime exists, free nations will be imperiled by it.

Strategic democratization

Democratic reforms are not instant or easy. Nor are they necessarily permanent. If not closely guarded, democratic gains can be reversed, as they were in Colombia in 1994, when the notorious Cali cartel bought the election of Ernesto Samper, touching off a series of events that sullied Colombia's international reputation and ensconced a threat to domestic stability that endures to this day.[14] Colombia should serve as a cautionary tale. As long as the nexus between terrorism and organized crime exists, free nations will be imperiled by it.

To those that seek it, President Bush has sent an unambiguous message: freedom is a universal value. It is also a principle whose promotion makes sound strategic sense. Severing the connection between terrorist groups, organized crime and corrupt regimes is a very good place to start.

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"Afghan Captivity Shaped My Feminism"

In the Winter *Middle East Quarterly*, feminist author Phyllis Chesler reveals her firsthand experience as a young wife held captive in Kabul in the early 1960s, recounting the horrors of her life there. She warns of the Islamist threat to Western values and to human rights, and cautions against the cultural relativism that pervades Western feminism. "The suffering of women in the developing world should be considered no less important than the issues feminists address in the West," she writes.

Bold, provocative, smart, the *Middle East Quarterly*, edited by Michael Rubin, published by Daniel Pipes, offers stimulating insights on this complex region.

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The Next Frontier

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.

Space is vital to America's future. The United States has a strong interest in securing the peaceful uses of space in support of its economic, political, and defense needs. It likewise requires unfettered access to space as an indispensable part of its national security. As such, the U.S. has a vested interest in formulating a modern strategy that is able, in the words of the 2001 Rumsfeld Space Commission, to "deter and defend against hostile acts directed at U.S. space assets and against the uses of space hostile to U.S. interests."[1] Yet, even though it is now well into its second term, the Bush administration has yet to set forth such a national strategy.

What are the future goals of the United States in space? How does space relate to overall American national security? And what space policies are necessary in order to assure national security, international stability, and economic benefit? Answers to all of these questions are essential to American prosperity—and, indeed, to its global status—in the Twenty-First Century.

Why space matters

The stakes are enormous. The United States already relies on space commercially and militarily more than any other nation, and that dependency will only grow in the years ahead, as global telecommunications networks and other technologies for civilian and defense purposes increase in use and in sophistication. Because the United States is more dependent than any other nation on

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space, the threat to and from space is greatest to the United States. U.S. space systems have numerous vulnerabilities, including strikes that could be mounted against ground stations, launch systems, or orbiting satellites. The implications would be potentially catastrophic, both in today's world and in the years to come.

In today's world, an adversary need not match the United States technologically in order to inflict catastrophic damage. The United States is already vulnerable to such attacks in space and on the Earth, and threats will only grow in the years ahead.

One such danger is an electromagnetic pulse (EMP). As the 2004 EMP Commission outlined in its authoritative study, a single nuclear warhead exploded at a high altitude above the United States (between 40–400 km) would generate an electromagnetic pulse sufficient to disable both space-based assets such as satellites and ground-based critical infrastructure, including telecommunications, energy, food supplies, hospitals, and financial institutions, among others.[2] Space systems similarly would be vulnerable to EMP effects from one or more nuclear detonations. Satellites in low-Earth orbit would be especially at risk from the collateral radiation effects resulting from an EMP attack. These satellites are vitally important to such governmental services as weather forecasting and communications, emergency response services, and military operations. Recovery from such an attack would be protracted, painful, and perhaps even impossible.

EMP, as well as similar efforts to disrupt the United States by attacking it in or from space, falls within the overall category of asymmetric warfare. In today's world, an adversary need not match the United States technologically in order to inflict catastrophic damage. The United States is already vulnerable to such attacks in space and on the Earth, and threats will only grow in the years ahead as we proceed with military transformation designed to take account of new technologies based on "net-centric" warfare. Such assets help to identify targets on the ground, just as space provides the navigational systems for military forces and civilian vehicles, including the cars that we drive equipped with GPS. Without space-based capabilities, the United States will be unable to deploy advanced military forces based on unprecedented levels of accuracy, flexibility, lethality, and mobility.

It has been repeatedly asserted that those who seek to defeat the United States in the future will attempt to attack at our points of vulnerability, not where we are strongest. Because the United States depends increasingly on space, its space-based capabilities as well as associated earth-bound technological infrastructures constitute attractive targets to existing and potential enemies. Those who seek to weaken the United States will develop their own space capabilities while discouraging the United States from maximizing its own potential in space, or by a combination of such strategies.

What is remarkable is the extent to which there presently exists a disconnect in U.S. strategy between emerging threats and the level of national commitment to space. Equally striking is the political oppo-

sition evident in many quarters to the full utilization of space by the United States. Such opposition includes those who seek to prevent the United Sates from dominating space, together with those who believe that, by an act of such abnegation, the United States can dissuade others from developing their own space programs. The results are paradoxical; the United States is being criticized for its alleged interest in "weaponizing" space at a time when the administration appears to have distanced itself from the basic recommendations set forth by the bipartisan Rumsfeld Space Commission.

Such arguments skirt a vital point: to the extent that capabilities, however rudimentary, currently exist to attack space systems, space already is becoming weaponized. Moreover, such capabilities are not likely to be eliminated by international treaties or by unilateral U.S. decisions to forgo certain types of weapons.

Changing course

In its January 2001 report, the Rumsfeld Space Commission spelled out in great detail the basic elements of a U.S. national space strategy. These include the development of space systems to hasten U.S. military transformation; the use of space to collect intelligence; shaping the legal and regulatory environment in ways that accord with U.S. national security interests and contribute to commercial competitiveness; and governmental and commercial investment to ensure that the United States has the most advanced space technologies. Among its basic findings is the assertion that, if the United States is to be successful in such a space strategy, leadership by the President and senior officials will be necessary: "Only the President has the authority, first, to set forth the national space policy, and then to provide the guidance and direction to senior officials that together are needed to ensure that the United States remains the world's leading space-faring nation."[3] Last but not least, the Commission called for efforts to develop a trained cadre of military personnel and civilians within the U.S. government to assure that the United States retains a dominant position in space.

One can only speculate as to the reasons why the Bush administration's commitment to space has so far fallen far short of this standard. Conceivably, the tragic events of September 11th distracted attention from space to the more immediate issues of fighting a global war against al-Qaeda and its affiliates—although the prospect that WMD will be acquired by states committed to our destruction or by terrorist groups prepared to use them only adds to the importance of space as a national security priority. Another plausible explanation is that the administration did not heed the admonition that space could become a national priority only if it had strong and continuing endorsement at the highest levels of leadership. Indeed, the White House has increasingly ceded day-to-day control over space technology and policy to career civil servants and bureaucrats.[4]

Fortunately, Washington still has the opportunity to reverse this drift. Conceptually, it should begin by acknowledging that space is already militarized. This process began in 1944, when, during World War II, the first German V-2 ballistic missile traversed the edge of space after launch toward its target in southern England. It continued with the launch by the Soviet Union of its first Sputnik in October 1957. Today, the militarization of space has become commonplace, insofar as a growing number of

nations have deployed assets such as satellites for commercial and military communications and reconnaissance.

The same holds true for weaponization. Historical evidence does not support the proposition that, by abstention, the United States will discourage others from space weaponization. China, for example, apparently views the development of "counterspace" technologies—that is, space-based weapons—as inevitable because they constitute an essential military capability. In its 2005 report to Congress, the Pentagon outlined that Beijing is developing a number of anti-satellite systems (ASATs) that it plans eventually to deploy. China also has a demonstrated space-launch capability, having placed 10 satellites in orbit in 2004, with a similar schedule through 2006 and an additional 100 satellites by 2020, the year in which Beijing also hopes to have a full space station operational.[5]

Today, the United States is the world's leading space power. But that state of affairs is not necessarily permanent. Indeed, a growing number of nations have increasingly begun to challenge American primacy in this theater.

Today, the United States is the world's leading space power. But that state of affairs is not necessarily permanent. Indeed, a growing number of nations have increasingly begun to challenge American primacy in this theater.

Reversing that trend requires using space for essentially two missions. The first is space control, including the protection of U.S. and allied space assets and, if necessary, possessing the means to attack enemy assets and the capability to deny our enemies access to space. In other words, space control capabilities may be offensive or defensive, designed either to deny an adversary access to space or the use of its space-based assets, or to provide the U.S. with the ability to defend its own space-based assets. The United States will need both types of capabilities.

The second revolves around space dominance. The importance of space to our national security and well-being dictates that if the United States is to remain a superpower, it must continue to dominate the high frontier of space. A space strategy would therefore need to include a range of capabilities designed to provide assured access to space, situational awareness in space, earth surveillance, global command, control, and communications, defense in space, homeland defense and power projection in, from, and through space. The goal of the United States should be to develop and deploy weapons that can operate in space, not only to defend assets deployed in space, but also to augment our terrestrial military forces. A national space strategy would also include space-based missile defenses capable of providing a global capability to destroy missiles in all phases of flight.

Looking forward

Given these demanding objectives, a space strategy for the United States would need to contain several essential components:

- *Space-based weapons systems to defend U.S. space-based assets and to support ground-based military operations.* This includes the use of space for missile defense and for strikes against targets in

the air or on the ground. A truly global missile defense to protect the United States and its forces that are deployed overseas, as well as allies and coalition partners, with capabilities that can track, intercept, and destroy missiles and warheads is necessarily space-based. It could be built with kinetic energy weapons, and subsequently could include high-energy lasers. A decade-and-a-half ago, the United States had already developed a robust, capable space-based kinetic energy interceptor known as *Brilliant Pebbles*. But the Clinton administration's decision in the early 1990s to abandon missile defense deployments prohibited by the ABM Treaty led to the demise of *Brilliant Pebbles*.[6] That technology could now be revived and modernized. Without the ABM Treaty and its prohibition on space-based missile defense, the United States can and should be building a missile defense architecture that includes space-based kinetic-energy interceptors as a key layer.

- *Strengthening our ability to collect intelligence about the capabilities and intentions of U.S. adversaries*. This includes an examination of the types of information that can best be collected from space, and the kinds of technologies that we will need to develop and deploy in space for this purpose. The Rumsfeld Space Commission noted that certain commercially available imagery from remote sensing companies can be adapted to meet official collection needs and should therefore be incorporated into the overall space intelligence architecture.

The U.S. must use space for essentially two missions. The first is space control, including the protection of U.S. and allied space assets and, if necessary, possessing the means to attack enemy assets and the capability to deny our enemies access to space. The second revolves around space dominance.

- *Shaping the space legal and regulatory environment*. Specifically, this means that the United States should participate as actively as possible in developing space regimes that accord with U.S. needs, including the right to defend its interests in and from space. Some other states pursue their interests by seeking international agreements designed to restrict access and thus to counter U.S. advantages in space. Where such agreements serve U.S. interests, they should be supported. Especially with the end of the ABM Treaty, however, the United States should oppose efforts to develop new regulations that are designed to limit our ability to deploy a space-based missile defense.

- *Maintaining technological leadership*. By necessity, this will require renewed emphasis on scientific and engineering skills in space-related fields. The existing workforce is passing from the scene, and will not be replaced in the absence of market incentives in the form of challenging career opportunities. A national commit-

ment to space, backed by necessary levels of sustained funding, would translate into the job market as well as academic specialties.

U.S. space hegemony would create tremendous dividends, both for ourselves and for our allies. Under American oversight, space, specifically low earth orbit, would become an arena for prosperity, open to economic and scientific development by foreign nations.

Indeed, the absence of a national space strategy is evident in the broader trends taking place in science and technology education. A decreasing percentage of Americans are pursuing degrees in science and engineering disciplines and fields. In its report on *Science and Engineering Indicators 2004*, the National Science Board of the National Science Foundation noted "a troubling decline in the number of U.S. citizens who are training to become scientists and engineers."[7] Moreover, foreign expertise is fast outpacing U.S. know-how. Foreign students now account for nearly half of the graduate students enrolled in computer sciences and engineering programs in the U.S. And, while the U.S. educational focus on science and technology has atrophied, the opposite is taking place abroad; between 1991 and 2001, science and engineering Ph.D.s in China and South Korea rose by 535 percent and 150 percent respectively.[8] Both for missile defense and for space more generally, the United States will need to make major new investments in science and technology education in the years ahead.

Likewise, if the United States is to remain dominant in space, new defense-industrial approaches are necessary. The aerospace sector's share of total national research and development investment has declined precipitously—from about 26 percent in 1987 to less than 4 percent in 2001.[9] Compounding this decline, U.S. companies are investing more heavily in efforts to win modernization contracts based on existing technologies, rather than investing in "leap ahead" technologies that would dramatically transform our space program. A concerted focus on technological innovation is needed to assure that the U.S. space industry can continue to produce systems that are at least one generation ahead of its international competitors.

Learning to love American space power

Because space control is vital to the United States, and because American space assets must be protected, Washington should not shrink from developing the means necessary to ensure space dominance. Specifically, this means developing and deploying capabilities designed to protect U.S. space-based systems and the use of space as part of a layered missile defense for the United States.

It often has been asserted by critics that our goal should be to prevent an arms race in space. Yet, it is highly doubtful that the United States, by abstaining from the military uses of space, can actually prevent such an

arms race. In fact, the opposite is likely to happen. Nature abhors a vacuum, and a strategic vacuum in space will naturally be filled by others.

U.S. space hegemony, on the other hand, would create tremendous dividends, both for ourselves and for our allies. Under American oversight, space, specifically low earth orbit, would become an arena for prosperity, open to economic and scientific development by foreign nations. In other words, just as great powers historically have asserted control over spatial domains such as the oceans in order to protect their national interest in peaceful passage, the United States should provide leadership in formulating and enforcing rules for space operations.

Whenever possible, the United States should work with other states that share our interests in developing and enforcing law and shaping the regulatory environment in space, while simultaneously extending the frontiers of knowledge and security into space. Such a goal, however, cannot become a reality until and unless the United States acknowledges the primacy of space in the broad context of its national security interests.

1. *Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization*, January 11, 2001, vii (http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/space20010111.pdf).
2. *Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack*, Volume 1: Executive Report, 2004, 4-7 (http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/congress/2004_r/04-07-22emp.pdf).
3. *Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization*, ix.
4. See, for example, "Space as a Vital National Interest," George C. Marshall Institute *Policy Outlook*, August 2005, 4 (http://www.marshall.org/pdf/materials/315.pdf).
5. Office of the Secretary of Defense, *ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: The Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2005* (July 2005), 36 (http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2005/d20050719china.pdf).
6. For a detailed history of *Brilliant Pebbles*, see Donald R. Baucom, "The Rise and Fall of Brilliant Pebbles," *Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies* 29, no. 2 (September 2004), 145-190.
7. National Science Board, *Science and Engineering Indicators 2004* (Arlington, VA: National Science Foundation, 2004) (http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind04).
8. Norman R. Augustine and Burton Richter, "Our Ph.D. Deficit," *Wall Street Journal*, May 4, 2005; See also Sharon Begley, "Slim Pickings: Behind 'Shortage' of Engineers: Employers Grow More Choosy," *Wall Street Journal*, November 16, 2005.
9. Extrapolated from *Aerospace Facts and Figures 2003/2004* (Washington, DC: Aerospace Industries Association, 2004), 104 (http://www.aia-aerospace.org/stats/facts_figures/ff_03_04/FF03P104.PDF).

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Nuclear Deterrence for a New Century

Keith B. Payne

Over the course of the Cold War, the majority of American strategic thinkers gravitated to the notion that mutual nuclear deterrence, built around survivable retaliatory capabilities on both sides, made strategic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union predictably "stable."[1] Both countries, the thinking went, would be deterred from highly provocative behavior by a mutual fear of escalation to a general war in which the level of nuclear destruction to the civilian infrastructure and population would far exceed any possible gain for either side. Consequently, each would avoid provoking the other in the extreme.[2] Over time, this vision of mutual deterrence stability became so widely accepted that it even garnered a popular moniker: the "balance of terror."

In the United States, general acceptance of this deterrence paradigm had concrete consequences: stable deterrence came to be defined as mutual capabilities for strategic nuclear retaliation against cities, and strategic forces were categorized based on their expected effect on the "balance of terror." Those forces compatible with *offensive retaliatory threats to cities and industry* were labeled beneficial and "stabilizing." Those capable of defending society against such threats, on the other hand, were deemed to be the opposite.

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This simplistic equation, known as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), became the prism through which many in the press, Congress, armed services, and Executive Branch thought about and judged strategic forces. It also turned into the organizing principle for U.S. arms control, which became oriented around eliminating bad, "destabilizing" systems, such as missile defense, while preserving a limited number of good, "stabilizing" offensive nuclear forces.

Over time, Mutual Assured Destruction became a comforting Cold War tautology—the lethality of our strategic nuclear threat ensured deterrence against all but the irrational because only the irrational would not be deterred by the lethality of our strategic nuclear threat.

False confidence

From the outset, however, extreme confidence in Mutual Assured Destruction required specific assumptions about human decision-making, the character of the United States and the Soviet Union, and the context of the Cold War itself. For MAD to work predictably, certain conditions in the U.S.-Soviet relationship had to exist: leaders would communicate in times of crisis well enough to comprehend their respective threats and thresholds for nuclear retaliation; they would conduct a well-informed, unemotional, and rational cost-benefit assessment of the potential consequences of brinkmanship and conflict; and they ultimately would prudently decide that the disincentives to taking provocative actions would outweigh any incentives to the contrary.

During the Cold War, each of these characteristics simply was assumed to exist in U.S.-Soviet deterrence relations. We chose to believe that Soviet leaders would be "sensible" and calculating after our own fashion, meaning that they would inevitably choose to be cautious in the face of a nuclear threat to cities; that caution was the only "rational" choice and guaranteed deterrence. By viewing Soviet leaders essentially as the mirror images of ourselves, we could take for granted the conditions necessary for stable deterrence, and conclude that it would function reliably.

Over time, this proposition became a comforting Cold War tautology—the lethality of our strategic nuclear threat ensured deterrence against all but the irrational because only the irrational would not be deterred by the lethality of our strategic nuclear threat. Former National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy expressed this view all too well in his classic 1969 *Foreign Affairs* article. "In the light of the certain prospect of retaliation there has been literally no chance at all that any sane political authority, in either the United States or the Soviet Union, would consciously choose to start a nuclear war," Bundy wrote. "This proposition is true for the past, the present, and the foreseeable future. For sane men on both sides, the balance of terror is overwhelmingly persuasive."[3]

Why? Because, according to Bundy, "…a decision that would bring even one hydrogen bomb on one city of one's own country would be recognized in advance as a catastrophic blunder; ten bombs on ten cities would be a disaster beyond history; and a hundred bombs on a hundred cities are unthinkable."[4] Nuclear deterrence thus was considered "easy" to under-

stand and to guarantee.[5] It became a simple function of balance. Mutual nuclear threats to cities ensured stable mutual deterrence, and such vulnerability was easy to orchestrate with nuclear weapons.

Viewing deterrence through this MAD prism led us to limit or reject supposedly "destabilizing" strategic forces, including imposing strict limitations on ballistic missile defense (BMD) development, testing and deployment, quantitative limitations on the deployment of *Minuteman* and later *Peacekeeper* ICBMs, and accuracy limitations on strategic ballistic missile warheads. In particular, missile defense became a long-term casualty of our confidence in MAD. Critics argued successfully for decades that because MAD could be made reliable through the balance of terror, BMD offered nothing of value and in fact could upset "stability" by threatening "the other side's deterrent." It came to be seen as the "enemy" of deterrence and U.S. arms control.

To be sure, we did not limit or reject these capabilities *solely* because our preferred deterrence paradigm deemed them "destabilizing." But, as Ted Greenwood concludes in his study of U.S. Cold War strategic force acquisition practices, its effect could be decisive.[6] During the Cold War, MAD was the "the supreme dogma of the ascendant branch of the defense and arms control communities,"[7] and it was solidly against BMD and other supposedly destabilizing strategic forces.

The Bush revolution

The comforting but now vapid Cold War refrain that deterrence will "work" reliably certainly continues to be heard today—a sort of all-purpose argument against new nuclear capabilities, and against missile defense. The confidence in deterrence that typified the Cold War now is presumed to apply to post-Cold War rogue threats—as if the dramatic changes in opponent and context are irrelevant. Thomas Friedman of the *New York Times*, for example, has written: "What deters them today is what will always deter them—the certainty that if they attack us with weapons of mass destruction their regimes will be destroyed. In other words, what is protecting us right now from the most likely rogue threat … is classic deterrence."[8]

> In the contemporary threat environment, the predictable functioning of deterrence is likely to be the exception, rather than the norm.

One of the most important developments in the Bush administration's thinking is a rejection of strategic planning based on unwarranted confidence in the predictability of deterrence. This more sober view of what to expect from deterrence is not predicated upon the simplistic assumption that rogues are somehow incapable of rational decision-making, or that deterrence must fail, as some have wrongly suggested.[9] Rather, it is based on a recognition that the characteristics we assumed to be in place in the U.S.-Soviet deterrence relationship, courtesy of mirror imaging, manifestly do not pertain to America's relations with rogue states. In the contemporary threat environment, there is quite likely to be a relative lack of mutual familiarity and understanding, leaders may not be well informed, communications may not be reliable, opponents may not calculate according to our defi-

nition of "sensible," and deterrence may not be a simple function of force balances. In these circumstances the predictable functioning of deterrence is likely to be the exception, rather than the norm.

Within the Bush administration and the armed services there is growing recognition of the fact that Cold War deterrence is *not* appropriate vis-à-vis contemporary opponents.

McGeorge Bundy and others asserted as a universal proposition that deterrence would work because, "a hundred bombs on a hundred cities are unthinkable."[10] By doing so, Bundy revealed far more about what he believed to be "unthinkable" than articulating any universally shared sensibility or value. In the past, leaders have been more than willing to run the risk of utter societal destruction in pursuit of their goals. Some, such as Adolf Hitler and Japan's War Minister in 1945, Korechiki Anami, welcomed the destruction of their own societies; Hitler actually promoted it. PRC Chairman Mao Zedong disparaged U.S. nuclear capabilities because, "Even if U.S. atom bombs… were dropped on China, blasted a hole in the earth or blew it to pieces, this might be a big thing for the solar system, but it would still be an insignificant matter as far as the universe as a whole is concerned."[11] Mao disdained the deterrent effect of U.S. nuclear forces, writing dismissively of potential Chinese losses, "All it is is a big pile of people dying."[12] A line from Mao's poetry reads, "Atom bomb goes off when it is told./ Ah, what boundless joy!"[13] The threat of "a hundred bombs on a hundred cities" may have been "unthinkable" to an American defense intellectual like McGeorge Bundy, but that tells us nothing about whether deterrence will or will not function reliably against others.

Within the Bush administration and the armed services there is growing recognition of this reality, and of the fact that Cold War deterrence is *not* appropriate vis-à-vis contemporary opponents. As President Bush emphasized on May 20, 2003:

> The contemporary and emerging missile threat from hostile states is fundamentally different from that of the Cold War and requires a different approach to deterrence and new tools for defense. The strategic logic of the past may not apply to these new threats, and we cannot be wholly dependent on our capability to deter them. Compared to the Soviet Union, their leaderships often are more risk prone … . Deterring these threats will be difficult. There are no mutual understandings or reliable lines of communication with these states… [14]

The typical threat now confronting the U.S. is that of regional rogue powers led by a variety of tyrants and dictators who may not be the prudent, attentive, well-informed leaders we assumed the Soviets to be during the Cold War. Rogue leaders have few shared characteristics except, as Ian Buruma has observed in *The New York Review of Books*, "they all have one quality in common: striving for absolute power consigns them to a world of lies."[15] The contemporary challenge facing U.S. strategic planners is to understand such leaders sufficiently well to establish tailored policies of deterrence that "work" more by design than by luck.

The difficulty of such an approach has been suggested by Mahdi Obeidi, the former director of Iraq's nuclear centrifuge program:

> …the West never understood the delusional nature of Saddam Hussein's mind. By 2002, when the United States and Britain were threatening war, he had lost touch with the reality of his diminished military might. By that time I had been promoted to director of projects for the country's entire military-industrial complex, and I witnessed firsthand the fantasy world in which he was living … sort of like the emperor with no clothes, he fooled himself into believing he was armed and dangerous. But unlike that fairy-tale ruler, Saddam Hussein fooled the rest of the world as well.[16]

We believed we had great insight into the thinking of the Soviet leadership, could communicate well with its officials, and that those leaders ultimately would behave in well-informed, reasonable and predictable ways. Consequently, we could be wholly confident deterrence would "work." But today, there is no basis for comparable faith with regard to rogue regimes.

In their day, early proponents of the Cold War balance of nuclear terror claimed with great confidence that the "principles that underlie this diplomacy of violence" are valid across time, place and culture.[17] More recently, journalists and editorials from prominent newspapers repeat the same Cold War mantra: "The logic of deterrence transcends any particular era or enemy."[18]

If that were so, deterrence truly could be easily understood and practiced. But such a comforting notion was coherent only with the mirror-imaging and unique conditions of the Cold War—and even then only barely so. Today, confidence in the predictable functioning of deterrence is well and truly a thing of the past. It no longer can be considered predictable with confidence, nor can old axioms from MAD serve as a basis for designing our post-Cold War security policies and forces.

This is certainly not a rejection of deterrence writ large,[19] but a lowering of expectations that traditional deterrence can be expected to function reliably and predictably and a rejection of the old "good" and "bad" force categorizations derived from MAD.

Because deterrence is less certain, defensive steps—such as deployment of missile defense—have new urgency to protect the U.S. population, territory, expeditionary forces and allies.

Moving beyond MAD

Just as confidence in MAD had the effect of undercutting the rationale for missile defense and various nuclear force initiatives, reduced confidence in deterrence increases the merits of those same strategic programs. Because deterrence is less certain, defensive steps—such as deployment of missile defense—have new urgency to protect the U.S. population, territory, expeditionary forces and allies. And precisely because deterrence is less certain today, steps to increase its effectiveness against a spectrum of potential opponents have fresh salience. These may range from seeking a better understanding of opponents to deploying a spectrum of capabilities aimed at improving the

probability that we can deter diverse opponents.[20]

The Bush administration—in contrast with its detractors—has adopted a policy position that is wholly compatible with the new threat environment. It likewise has taken steps to increase the effectiveness of deterrence across a spectrum of threats, and to prepare for its possible failure. These have included President Bush's decision to deploy a layered ballistic missile defense architecture, a Defense Department and Energy Department-requested feasibility study of earth-penetrating warheads, movement toward strategic non-nuclear weapons, greater freedom to examine very low-yield nuclear weapons, and the inclusion of nuclear and non-nuclear strike capabilities in the "New Triad."

Criticisms of the Bush administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and related administration strategic initiatives tend to be the predictable Cold War axioms about deterrence derived from MAD. Deterrence, this line of thinking goes, is reliable, so there is no need to deploy missile defense,[21] or to be overly concerned about the threat of a rogue nuclear, electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) attack.[22] And because deterrence is reliable, there is no need for new types of nuclear capabilities.[23] After all, deterrence will work, even against ruthless, eccentric leaders such as Saddam Hussein.[24] This perspective also logically opposes U.S. capabilities suitable for threatening an enemy's military forces, because under MAD, they were considered antithetical to "stable" deterrence.

In short, Cold War-like confidence in the predictable functioning of deterrence remains the all-purpose rationale for *not* revising our thinking about deterrence or our nuclear force structure, *not* preparing to protect ourselves against deterrence failure, and *not* moving away from our Cold War legacy nuclear arsenal. What appears to be unrecognized by most critics of the Bush administration is that the assumed conditions that permitted Cold War confidence in MAD no longer pertain. Under post-Cold War conditions, those who make confident predictions about reliable deterrence will be proven wrong; it is only a matter of time.

Overconfidence in deterrence has been a staple of the U.S. strategic community for almost two generations. It has been absorbed by an entire cadre of academics who address the subject, journalists who report on it, members of Congress who decide which military programs will or will not be funded, and civilian and military officials who seek funding for forces. The NPR and the Bush administration's strategic initiatives should be understood for what they are—attempts to keep pace with the dramatic changes that have taken place in the global security environment.

The Cold War deterrence paradigm was comforting and convenient. It is now obsolete. Moving beyond it is necessary if we are to adjust our thinking to new realities. But we should harbor no illusions; comforting and convenient beliefs are easily embraced, and given up only with great reluctance. Modernizing our thinking about nuclear deterrence will require a continuing effort to dispel the MAD adages about deterrence and strategic forces so deeply ingrained by our Cold War experience.

1. Notable exceptions to the prevailing confidence in the predictability of deterrence are the incomparable works of Herman Kahn, Fred Iklé, Alexander L. George, Richard Smoke, and Albert Wohlstetter. See Herman Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960); Fred Charles Iklé, "Can Deterrence Last Out the Century?" *Foreign Affairs* 51, no. 2 (1973), and "Nuclear Strategy: Can There Be a Happy Ending?" *Foreign Affairs* 63, no. 4 (1985); Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); and Albert Wohlstetter, "The Delicate Balance of Terror," *Foreign Affairs* 37, no. 2 (1959).
2. This type of "stability," born of mutual reluctance to run the risk of nuclear escalation, is at the heart of Thomas Schelling's brilliant conceptualization of deterrence during the Cold War. See Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).
3. "To Cap the Volcano," *Foreign Affairs* 48, no. 1 (1969), 9.
4. Ibid., 10.
5. As observed by Robert Jervis in "Why Nuclear Superiority Doesn't Matter," *Political Science Quarterly* 94, no. 4 (1979-80), 617-618.
6. Ted Greenwood, *Making the MIRV: A Study of Defense Decision Making* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988), 65, 148.
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The Great Russia Debate

Stephen J. Blank

In May 2005, *Newsweek* reported that the White House had decided to refrain from pressuring Russia over the expanding democracy deficit in the former Soviet Union because America needed Russian support against Iranian and North Korean nuclear proliferation.[1] The report served to underscore a line of thinking that has, quite unexpectedly, emerged to animate U.S. policy toward Russia: that the attainment of strategic goals should override the pursuit of Russian democratization.

That school of thought is known as Realism, and its emergence is both unexpected and alarming. It directly contradicts the Bush administration's own stated policy of campaigning for democratization throughout the world, and of formulating policies toward other states on the basis of their adherence to (or deviation from) a universal norm of democratic governance.[2] It also clashes headlong with the European Union's declared goals of fostering the integration of a democratic Russia.[3]

Proponents of the Realist approach describe their position as one of expediency. They argue that when values triumph over interests in U.S. foreign policy, policy cannot attain its strategic goals. But is such a stance truly desirable for Washington? Is there in fact a contradiction between strategic engagement in support of interests and values such as democratization, and does one need to be subordinated to the other?

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The Realist perspective

The main advocates of the new Realism find their home at the journal *The National Interest*, which is published by the Washington-based Nixon Center. Its luminaries—which include Nixon Center President Dmitri Simes, *The National Interest* editor Nikolas Gvosdev, Anatol Lieven of the New America Foundation and John Hulsman of the Heritage Foundation—advocate prudence in harmonizing the ends and means of foreign policy, with the accompanying idea that pursuing values beyond our capacity is neither sound policy nor moral. Instead, they propose a supposedly rational approach based on a hierarchy of interests and rooted in the understanding that not all global problems can be solved, least of all unilaterally by America. Pursuing moral values in foreign policy, therefore, must be justified not only on their merits, but also on the basis of their costs.[4] Therefore the criterion for evaluating U.S. or other policies is their results, not their motives.[5]

Much of this argument is insightful, incisive, even felicitous. When it comes to Russia, however, it stakes out an untenable, and deeply troubling, position—embracing major states and sacrificing the interests of smaller ones to that engagement.

For example, far from being critical of Russia's recent, anti-democratic drift, Realists have embraced it as a necessary prerequisite for stable governance. Lieven, for example, has argued that "[f]or the foreseeable future only a semi-authoritarian government such as [President Vladimir] Putin's can keep Russia moving in the right direction. If Putin weren't there we'd soon miss him."[6]

Indeed, the idea of Putin's "managed pluralism" is fêted as the appropriate and most beneficial regime for Russia and one that deserves American support.[7] Similarly, proponents of Realism argue that the United States should invest more in cooperation with Russia rather than heeding complaints by smaller states like Georgia about Russian imperialism. For, they hint darkly, new leaders like Mikheil Saakashvili seek to drive a wedge between Russia and America and encourage calls for democratization throughout the CIS, including Russia, with the goal of fostering a state of siege in Russo-American relations.[8]

Neither do they shy away from the logical culmination of this argument, namely that Russia should be recognized as the dominant power of Eurasia and be allowed to enforce its own version of that dominance there. Indeed, Simes and Gvosdev have written that,

> No matter what the pundits may say, neither the United States nor Europe is prepared to undertake the massive effort to displace Russia as Eurasia's economic and political center of gravity.[9]

Lieven goes still further and states that even if Russia were to integrate into the West, "it can only be integrated to a limited extent and well short of full membership."[10] Therefore, according to him, how Russia governs itself is less important than progress on the agenda of security issues between Moscow and Washington.[11]

Russian resistance

Quite understandably, such sentiments are music to more than a few Russian ears. After all, Russia claims for itself an exceptional role in world politics. The belief, advanced by many in Moscow, that state survival is tied to a neo-imperial reunifica-

tion of a post-Soviet economic, if not political, space eloquently shows that Russia and its elites still think of the Russian state as very much an imperial project.

Examples of this perspective abound. Anatoly Chubais, head of Russia's UES electricity conglomerate, has openly urged Russia to construct its relationship with the CIS on the basis of a program of "liberal empire," using energy as a tool. Without such dominance, Chubais has posited, Russia cannot remain a great power—or even survive as a state.[12]

President Putin and Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov have publicly embraced similar views. Ivanov, for one, has publicly stated that Russia reserves the right to intervene preemptively in the CIS to settle disputes that cannot be resolved through negotiation, or where Russian interests or the Russian diaspora is threatened.[13] Putin has taken a similar tack, declaring that, because pipelines carrying oil and natural gas to the West were built by the Soviet Union, it is in Russia's national interest and prerogative to maintain them even when they are beyond Russia's borders.[14]

In recent months, these views have been reinforced and amplified by a growing sense of geopolitical seige. The "Orange," "Rose," and "Tulip" revolutions in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan have generated a veritable hysteria in Moscow that the CIA, together with American and European NGOs, is launching a conspiracy against Russia's efforts to build a "sovereign democracy." For example, in the summer of 2005, Vladislav Surkov, Deputy Chief of Putin's presidential administration, gave a secret speech explicitly accusing the non-governmental organization Freedom House of essentially being an extension of the CIA.[15] Surkov, like other CIS leaders such as former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, clearly believes that democratic revolutions in CIS states are orchestrated conspiracies against Russia and threats to the stability of the Russian state itself.[16]

Russia, moreover, is translating these fears into policy. Recent evidence suggests that the Kremlin is mobilizing a decisive effort to gain allies and to compel a retraction of America's global influence, particularly in areas critical to Russia, like the CIS. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov has explicitly articulated an updated version of the Brezhnev doctrine's concept of diminished sovereignty for Central Asian states. From his perspective, "[t]he countries of the region are members of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)," and if they are "making a decision about hosting new bases on their territory, they should take into account the interests of Russia and coordinate this decision with our country."[17] Ivanov's counterpart, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, concurs. Lavrov has said that CIS regimes that are "disloyal" to Moscow could face the use of "every conceivable economic pressure tactic."[18]

The implications for cooperation with the United States are profound. Today, Washington and Moscow face a series of common challenges—among them terrorism, proliferation, and the rise of China. However, the drift away from democracy and toward an authoritarian (some would say neo-Tsarist, if not neo-Soviet) political model in Russia is by now universally acknowledged. And, since autocracy and empire have historically gone together in Russian history, this drift has aided and abetted an increasingly overt imperial concept of the state.[19]

That this model is inherently dysfunctional and sub-optimizing is clear. It cannot meet the most urgent challenges to Russian society: economic development, declining demography, and crises in health, including the HIV/AIDS epidemic. To be a secure, democratic, prosperous state that realizes its own self-proclaimed goal of being fully integrated into Euro-Atlantic structures, Russia must repudiate imperialism. It must do so for its own good, not ours. The continuing "lure of something exotic on the peripheries" endangers the security of Moscow's neighbors, Russian democracy, and Russia's own integrity and security. And, to maintain that imperial concept of a neo-Tsarist state, Russia must indulge in policies (in places like Ukraine and the entire former Soviet Union) that are ultimately unsustainable and destabilizing to its entire neighborhood.

Today, Washington must simultaneously engage Russia over Iran, North Korea, Ukraine, the Caucasus, Central Asia, Belarus, the Baltic states and the democratization agenda throughout the former Soviet Union. Pursuit of the latter goal should not be coercive and heavy-handed, but there are ample diplomatic tools for doing exactly that. While there will often be a tactical tension between strategic engagement and the pursuit of a values-based or values-influenced foreign policy, sound leadership can and should endeavor to overcome and reconcile those tensions.

Furthermore, the demand that states observe human rights is by now an acknowledged cornerstone of today's international order. It is a paramount strategic interest of any viable global system. Consequently, the demand for good governance is now embodied in a broad legal and political consensus recognized the world over.

The West's growing engagement with the Caucasus, Ukraine and Central Asia thus resides in moral and strategic interests that are inextricably tied to a generation of development of both the international order and international law. U.S. power intrudes ever more along Russia's borders both because of the security challenges posed by Russian imperialism and adventurism after 1992 and because of the shared threats that we, Russia, and those states all face. But that intrusion is also rooted in the internationally and legally recognized global demand for democratization based on a "good governance paradigm," making democratization a test of a state's legitimacy and sovereignty.[20]

Today, Russia cannot meet this standard. Indeed, it increasingly regresses from it, and resists it politically. Furthermore, by its policies it tries to ensure that the states that it wishes to dominate in the CIS follow suit.

The case for (Russian) democracy

The fundamental strategic problem with Russian foreign policy is Moscow's own unrealism in assuming that erecting an empire answers its security needs and is a sustainable (or even necessary) priority. Russia is even less ready, willing, and able than the West to undertake the reconstruction and development of the CIS. Instead, its policies entail exploiting and stunting the economic and political growth of these countries to preserve its exclusive sphere of influence—a reality regional leaders understand very well, even if Realist thinkers like Simes, Gvosdev, and Lieven do not.

As this imperialism competes against U.S. strategic interests and threatens to destabilize much of the former USSR, the unmistakable drift toward authoritarian and imperial modes of rule calls into question the fundamental rationale and justification for "Realism," which emphasizes strategic engagement over democratization. The problem with such a policy is that how Russia governs itself decisively shapes its foreign policy. Just as autocracy in Russia connotes a system of power that is not bound by law or institution, it also sketches a situation whereby Russia is not bound by its previous agreements (For example, to remove bases from Moldova and Georgia). Such a state need not answer to anyone for its foreign policy actions, and can conduct an imperial policy in its borderlands with an openly exclusionary bent. Realism thus accepts as a best case conclusion the fact that Russia is not a European power and will not abide by European "acquis" such as democracy and human rights, or truly free markets.

Indeed, the supposed benefits of this outlook are already evaporating. It has long been clear that whatever cooperation we achieve with Russia will be limited at best, and that Russia opposes more than it supports American international objectives. This fact alone calls into question the utility of a policy of silence concerning violations of the democratization agenda that Russia has committed itself to observing in international treaties and accords.

In fact, many recent Russian initiatives—selling arms to Syria, Venezuela, Iran, and China; providing nuclear reactors to Iran; supporting North Korea; and attacking Western military presence and support for democracy throughout the CIS—signify the persistence of a fundamentally anti-American and anti-Western policy orientation. Others may argue alternatively that on several issues crucial for Washington, Russia, whatever its objectives, simply lacks the capacity to render effective cooperation. If this is the case, we do nobody any favors (least of all Russia) by pretending that Russia is more significant and powerful than it really is. For that merely encourages more obstreperous neo-imperial behavior by Russian elites who then believe that their country's internal political structure, an inherently imperial one that drives it to subject its neighbors to that tendency, is unimportant to America.

"Realism" emphasizes strategic engagement over democratization. The problem with such a policy is that how Russia governs itself decisively shapes its foreign policy.

Given these realities, there is a legitimate basis for scrutinizing Russia's undemocratic practices and placing them on our—and our allies'—agenda with Moscow. Shirking those obligations, or proclaiming democratization for everyone except Russia and the CIS as a "non-negotiable" value of American foreign policy gains America nothing, while cheapening and compromising our good name and policies by exposing the administration to charges of hypocrisy.

The simultaneous pursuit of values and of interests must be based on real capabilities and, as regards Russia, on a common approach with our European and other allies. Securing the Caucasus and Central Asia is in both American and Russian inter-

ests. It also is in European interests, as both NATO and the EU have now acknowledged.[21] This recognition must be translated into a common agenda reflecting genuine consideration of Russian objectives and priorities.[22] But those interests cannot amount to the perpetual destabilization of regions whose importance for Europe and America are growing.

Ultimately, Russia can have security and prosperity, or it can have empire. It cannot have both. And if it really wants partnership with—and a real voice within—Western security organizations, it cannot have an illiberal empire cut off from Western influence.

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The Perils of Putin's Policies

Gordon M. Hahn

Since September 11th, Russia's role in the War on Terror has been a topic of considerable controversy. While cooperation has cooled over the past two years, Moscow's early assistance to the U.S. campaign against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, together with Russian President Vladimir Putin's acquiescence to the U.S. use of military bases in Central Asia, are often cited as examples of the Kremlin's positive contributions. Soon, however, Russia could play a very different role. For Russia is experiencing the beginning of an Islamist terrorist revolutionary *jihad*—one that has begun to spread from Chechnya to the five other titular Muslim republics of the North Caucasus (Ingushetia, Dagestan, Kabardino-Balkariya (RKB), Karachaevo-Cherkessiya (RKCh), and Adygeya) and perhaps even beyond.

At least three domestic causes have contributed to the rising Islamist threat to Russia. The first is the war in Chechnya, and the brutal prosecution of those hostilities by Russia's security and law enforcement agencies. The second is President Putin's authoritarian counter-revolution, which has radicalized the governments in the seven Muslim republics outside of Chechnya. The third is the Kremlin's assimilative policies, which have begun to fragment the delicate ethnic and social status quo in Russia's regions. Together, these trends are reproducing in Russia the conditions that have contributed to terrorism recruit-

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ment throughout the Muslim world: authoritarian rule, abject poverty, a sense of alienation, and ethno-religious separatism.

The Chechen quagmire

The bloody, grinding conflict that has consumed the breakaway republic of Chechnya for the past decade represents the primary cause of Russia's rising Islamist revolution. Vast areas were totally destroyed during the first Chechen war (1994-1996). The subsequent failure of the Russian and Chechen leaderships to reconstruct the republic during the inter-war years (1996-99)—coupled with further destruction in the second war (1999-present)—has rendered most towns, including the republic's capital of Grozny, virtually uninhabitable. There have been tens of thousands of casualties. Unemployment among young Chechen men remains nearly universal.[1] Meaningful reconstruction aid from Moscow has failed to materialize. Moreover, resources have often been stolen by federal and regional bureaucrats. These miserable socio-economic conditions have combined to create fertile soil for criminality, radical ideologies, and Islamist recruitment.

Today, political trends are reproducing in Russia the conditions that have contributed to terrorism recruitment throughout the Muslim world: authoritarian rule, abject poverty, a sense of alienation, and ethno-religious separatism.

Exacerbating this situation, horrendous atrocities continue to be committed by both sides. Russia's unreformed *siloviki* (the power ministries—Defense, Interior and Security—and their troops) have engaged in systematic abuses, including summary executions, mass security sweeps, torture, and rape. Moreover, units of the Russian Interior Ministry (MVD), the military, the internal security service (FSB), and military intelligence (GRU), which are constantly rotated through the region, increasingly have preferred to "outsource" security in the republic to criminalized and corrupt detachments of pro-Russian Chechen fighters, such as the the Presidential Guard, or *Kadyrovtsy*, headed by Ramzan Kadyrov, son of the former Chechen president. The *Kadyrovtsy*, in turn, conduct themselves much like an elite fascist unit, rampaging through villages, killing the elderly and children, and raping women at will.

The failure of the Russian government to "win the peace" has allowed the guerilla regime of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya (ChRI) and its fighters to survive and regroup. It has also facilitated the co-option of the ChRI by foreign Islamists. Rebel warlord Shamil Basaev and a number of other Chechen fighters had developed links with al-Qaeda as long as a decade ago—a connection that has helped to facilitate the intrusion into Chechnya of a cadre of foreign Islamists. Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Qaeda's second-in-command and ideological guide, sought to join the Chechen struggle against Russia in the late 1990s. So did Mohammed Atta, the ringleader of the September 11th attacks on the United States. In all, as many as 400-500 foreign jihadists are estimated to have fought with the Chechens at various times since the beginning of the second war.[2]

The resulting radicalization has taken place swiftly. In August 2002, a *coup d'état* of sorts occurred within the

ChRI; its constitution was amended to make *sharia* (Islamic law) the basis of Chechen statehood, and the Chechen government was replaced by an Islamic council, the Madzhlisul Shura, as the ChRI's highest organ.[3] In addition, a committed Islamist, Shariat Court Chairman Abdul-Khalim Sadulaev, was appointed ChRI vice-president, becoming the legal successor to relatively moderate ChRI President Aslan Maskhadov.[4]

These political changes were soon mirrored by a shift in goals. Chechnya's Islamists are now intently focused on the establishment of a local, or even regional, Islamic caliphate, to be governed by a harsh Salafist interpretation of *sharia* law. And the instrument of this transformation is the network of terrorist combat *jamaats* (communities) that has emerged across the North Caucasus and other Muslim populations in Russia—resulting in a rising wave of terror that is buffeting the Russian Federation.

In a recent public statement, Chechen warlord Basaev left no doubt as to his plans. "With Allah's blessing, we established the Caucasian front this year," Basaev declared. "Next year we will open fronts in Moscow, the Volga region, and Urals. Jihad is spreading. More and more oppressed nations understand they should unite their forces to liberate themselves from [Russia's] yoke."[5]

Putin's authoritarian counter-revolution

Since his formal assumption of the Russian presidency in May 2000, Vladimir Putin has placed the strengthening of the Russian state at the top of his domestic agenda. In the view of Putin and his closest associates, the successful modernization of Russian economy and society requires a turn toward soft authoritarian rule and expanded autonomy for the federal government. Putin therefore has subordinated legislative, judicial, and regional power—as well as much of the national media—to the federal executive branch. He has also exploited state resources to guarantee electoral victories for the pro-Kremlin "United Russia" party, and amended election laws to ensure hegemony for pro-government elements within Russia's political system.

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Moreover, these trends have only accelerated since the September 2004 Beslan tragedy. In the wake of the hostage-taking and massacre in the North Ossetian town, Putin has called for—and the Russian Duma has prepared—new legislation granting the Kremlin vastly greater police and security powers in the name of "counterterrorism."

Given the inherently anti-democratic instincts of Russia's security services, this new leeway has inevitably reinforced heavy-handed law enforcement practices. In mid-September 2004, for example, Moscow police conducted a series

of "counterterrorism" sweeps that resulted in the detention of more than 11,000 suspects.[6] Authorities in the Moscow Oblast rounded up about 2,500 unregistered people during similar sweeps.[7] Such tactics have been particularly aggressive in Russia's Muslim republics, exacerbating the alienation of Muslims from the Russian state.

Putin's authoritarian policies have allowed these already authoritarian and corrupt governments to become harsher, further alienating Muslims, especially young Muslims, from their respective governments and the Russian state as a whole.

Meanwhile, Vladimir Ustinov, Russia's Prosecutor-General, has publicly proposed the detention of the families of hostage-takers, noting the policy could be broadened to families of all "terrorists," however that might be defined. And, according to Ustinov, the round-up of family members of terrorists should be "accompanied by a demonstration to these terrorists of what might happen to (their families)."[8] This proposal has met with widespread approval in the Russian Duma. Russian authorities have also undertaken several assimilationist policies, including bans on ethnic and religious parties and on non-Cyrillic alphabets as well as an attempt to establish mandatory courses on Russian Orthodox Christian culture in schools. In this political climate, grassroots targeting of Muslims has predictably expanded, with cases of assault and harassment rising exponentially.

Putin's counter-revolution has reverberated among Russia's Muslims. Since the collapse of the USSR, Russia's seven Muslim republics (besides Chechnya) have been among the least democratized of the country's 88 regions. Putin's authoritarian policies have allowed these already authoritarian and corrupt governments to become harsher, further alienating Muslims, especially young Muslims, from their respective governments and the Russian state as a whole.

The republic of Kabardino-Balkariya (RKB) is a case in point. With the beginning of the second Chechen war, a group of radicals from the RKB migrated to Chechnya to fight against Russian forces, forming a special detachment under the training of ruthless warlord Ruslan Gelaev. The return of this force to the RKB in 2002 prompted rising fears among local government officials and touched off a series of countermeasures, including numerous mosque closures, detainments, house-to-house searches, and the banning of Koran readings in local universities.[9] These conditions have led one Muslim website to deem the human rights situation in the RKB to be "critical."[10] (As of August 2005, some 400 RKB residents have appealed to President Putin for permission to emigrate because of deteriorating conditions in the republic.[11])

These policies have driven many young Muslims in the RKB into the arms of Basaev and the increasingly Islamist Chechen resistance. In the summer of 2004, a new terrorist group, the "United Islamic Combat Jamaat 'Yarmuk,'" announced its presence in the republic through several clashes with *siloviki* and Internet postings warning against participation in the republic's "war" on Muslims. "Yarmuk" has committed numerous attacks on *siloviki*, and is believed to have taken part in Basaev's October

2005 raid on the RKB's capital city of Nalchik—an attack that claimed the lives of dozens of citizens and law enforcement officials and resulted in over a hundred injuries.

Kabardino-Balkariya is not an isolated case. In the Muslim republics of Ingushetia and Bashkortostan, growing authoritarianism nearly sparked "orange revolutions" in April 2005. In Ingushetia, current (Kremlin-appointed) president Murat Zyazikov has become the object of widespread opposition, blamed for a failure to stop, if not for connivance in, hundreds of kidnappings blamed on his brother's clan and allies in the security organs. On the eve of a May Day demonstration, which the opposition planned to rally into an orange-style revolution, opposition leader Musa Ozdoev was arrested and the demonstration was blocked by troops. Leader of the Youth Movement of Ingushetia, Rustam Archakov, noted that terrorism is the logical result of Ingushetian authorities' crackdown on peaceful protest.[12]

In Bashkortostan, meanwhile, President Murtaza Rakhimov's already authoritarian and pro-ethnic Bashkir policies have gotten bolder in recent years, coalescing Russians, Tatars, and even some Bashkirs in an opposition coalition. A would-be uprising was sparked by mass police brutality during the arrest of many as one thousand young men in the city of Blagoveshchensk in December 2004. The opposition's ensuing demonstrations mounted throughout winter and spring, but fizzled when the Bashkir FSB called in the movement's leaders and arranged a truce.

The dangers of de-federalization

The third domestic cause of rising radicalism in Russia is de-federalization. In his bid to strengthen the Russian state, Putin has also dismantled most of the asymmetrical federative system created by his predecessor, Boris Yeltsin. Putin's anti-federalist campaign has included:

- the creation of new, extra-constitutional districts as a means to facilitate federal interference in regional politics;
- new legal requirements rendering federal law supreme in all spheres of life that it addresses;
- a "federal intervention" mechanism allowing the president (with court approval) to remove a regional governor or republic president and call elections to a regional parliament should they refuse to follow court findings in cases of conflict between federal and regional law;
- the termination of power-sharing treaties between the federal government and individual Russian regions, effectively ending regional autonomy;
- reorganization of the Federation Council, the upper chamber of the Russian parliament, into a legislative body appointed by regional officials, half of whom are appointed by the Russian president;
- the re-centralization of budget revenues; and
- presidential appointment, rather than popular election, of regional governors and republic presidents (and possibly even city mayors and district heads).[13]

Perhaps not surprisingly, these steps have sparked greater nationalism in several Muslim republics. In the absence of democratic federalism, Russia's complex ethno-geography and administrative structure are likely to produce outliers. And in Russia's Muslim republics, those outliers tend to be Muslim ethnic groups, creating a pool of potential allies and recruits for radical Islamists.

In Dagestan, Putin's policy of harmonizing regional and federal laws—and his (re)interpretation of the Russian Constitution—has led to the dismantling of the republic's "consociational" political system, which had previously preserved inter-ethnic harmony among Dagestan's tens of small ethnic groups through pluralistic representation in the executive and legislative branches.[14] As a result, by 2003, Dagestan's two largest Muslim ethnic groups, Avars and Dargins, were on the brink of a major inter-ethnic conflict as a result of disputes over power-sharing within the region's ruling State Council.[15]

But Tatarstan and the Tatars are perhaps the biggest victims of Putin's anti-federalist policies. At 5.7 million, Tatars make up more than a third of Russia's 14.5 million Muslims, and are Russia's second-largest minority and largest Muslim minority. Following the collapse of the USSR, Tatarstan's nationalist elite had played a leading role in the formation of asymmetrical federalism in Russia. Tatarstan President Mintimer Shaimiev's legitimacy, and his success in isolating radical nationalists, was built largely upon his successful acquisition of broad political, economic, cultural, linguistic, and religious soveignty for Kazan from Moscow. But now, Putin's policies have discredited the Tatarstan model, and the Tatar intelligentsia is doing some soul-searching. There are signs of radicalization within the moderate nationalist All-Tatar Public Center, or VTOTs, which played a key role in Kazan's acquisition of sovereignty during the early 1990s. Its April 2005 congress elected a new, more radical chairman, Talgat Bareyev, who has thrown his weight behind a refrain not heard since the early 1990s: "full independence of Tatarstan from Russia."[16]

Radical Islam is also rearing its head in Tatarstan. The influential Tatarstan weekly *Zvezda Povolzhya*, which represents democratic nationalist Tatars, recently warned that nationalism among the young "now is taking on more of a Muslim color."[17] These worries are justified; Tatarstan recently has seen a minor spate of terrorist sabotage attacks, and an Islamist combat *jamaat*, the "Islamic Jamaat," has reportedly been uncovered in the city of Naberezhnyi Chelny.[18] Moreover, since the fall of 2004, security forces have arrested more than one hundred alleged members of the radical Hizb ut-Tahrir movement in at least eleven Russian regions. Most of those arrests (over 20) were made in Tatarstan.[19]

Muslim reactions

In response to these policies, official Islam in Russia has been politicized and, to a certain extent, unified in order to protect the official Islamic clergy and the broader community from state repression and public harassment. On the civic level, the past two years have seen the formation of an association for the defense of Muslim rights, as well as the creation of a legal hotline for Muslims who feel that their political, civil, or human rights have been violated. Cooperation and mutual defense among official Muslim organizations across regional jurisdictions has also increased, as

have calls for the creation of a unified Russia-wide council of *ulema* (Islamic legal and religious scholars) and a Russian vice-presidency to be set aside for a Muslim.

Less benign has been the theological and political radicalization that has taken place among members of autonomous, radical, and even officially registered Muslim communities from various ethnic groups—a trend that has created a stream of defectors to the Islamist cause. This is reflected in the continuing replenishment of Islamist ranks in Russia despite Russian forces' successes in killing hundreds and arresting thousands of radicals, real and imagined, over the last two years.

Most important has been the expansion of the ChRI's network of combat *jamaats* and the resulting wave of terrorism throughout the country over the past two years. Combat *jamaats* first appeared outside of Chechnya and remain most prevalent and effective in the eastern North Caucasus republics of Ingushetia and Dagestan. They have now spread to the ethnic Circassian- and Balkar-Karachai-dominated Muslim republics of the RKB, RKCh, and Adygeya, as well as North Ossetia and Krasnodar. Russian scholars estimate that there are currently ten or more combat *jamaats* in Dagestan alone.[20] In all, there are probably some 20 combat *jamaats* operating outside of Chechnya. Since these units usually include some 20-30 members, the national network of radical Islamist cells in Russia can be estimated to include some 4,000-6,000 terrorist-combatants—not counting facilitators providing safe houses, intelligence, and logistics, as well as several thousand Chechnya-based fighters.

The results have been dramatic. Between 1999 and 2003, terrorism in Russia increased nearly thirty-fold—from an average of 24 attacks annually to 561.[21] This upsurge, moreover, was merely the prelude to an equally precipitous escalation in the intensity and destructiveness of Islamist terror across Russia in the summer of 2004.

The locus of terrorist attacks in Russia is changing as well, shifting from Chechnya to the other North Caucasus republics. According to official MVD figures, in 2003 just 69 of the 561 terrorist attacks occurred outside Chechnya. The following year, that figure increased to approximately 90 out of just over 300 attacks. And, as of October 2005, there have been approximately 160 attacks outside of Chechnya, with some 110 in Dagestan alone.[22]

The challenge to Russia

The conflict in Chechnya no longer represents a national liberation struggle, if it ever did. It has instead become a radical religious movement committed to the separation of as much "Muslim land" from Russia as possible, and the creation of an Islamic caliphate in the region. Moreover, Russia's growing Chechen-led Islamist terrorist network has shown some ability to travel across ethnic and geographic lines—much like its global predecessor and model, al-Qaeda. This network has demonstrated considerable capacity to inflict damage to life and property throughout much of Russia, using a variety of tactics. Its capabilities are impressive, and represent a significant threat to Russia's national security and state integrity, as well as to its successful transformation into a functioning democratic market state.

Some analysts have cautioned U.S. policymakers about the "naive and simplistic supposition that the United States and Russia share a

common enemy of 'international terrorism.'"[23] In truth, however, there should be little doubt about the presence of foreign Islamists in Russia—and of the implications that this may have for global security and for American interests. The potential threats include:

- an enlarged recruitment base for the international jihadist movement from among Russia's Muslims;
- the potential emergence of a Russia-wide terrorist network of various Muslim ethnic organizations tied to international Islamist groups, and civil war across large swaths of Russia;
- with the Russian state's weakening or disintegration, the increased likelihood of acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by Russian Islamists, who in turn could become intermediaries for their transfer to international terrorists targeting the U.S; and
- the secession of one or more of Russia's Muslim regions, and the establishment of a single or multiple Islamic caliphates on their territory, offering a potential state base for the global jihadist movement.

The ideology of Russia's Islamist network reflects a strong antipathy toward the U.S. and its allies. Not only has the ChRI received money from Osama bin Laden, but Basaev has himself expressed admiration for al Qaeda's leader.[24] ChRI Emir-President Sadulaev similarly has condemned Western leaders for their friendly relations with Putin.[25] In the Chechen and Islamist culture, such transgressions justify death for the transgressor.

Finally, a rising tide of Islamist terrorism—and the Russian government's failure to hold on to large swaths of territory—could promote serious instability in Moscow itself. A regime that is perceived as having "appeased" or lost out to Islamist separatism would be more vulnerable to challenges from neo-Communist and/or hardline nationalist forces. It would also be inclined to continue recentralizing power and rolling back democracy to such an extent that it transforms itself into a dictatorship.

Indeed, the growing Islamist threat has provided the rationale for much of the backsliding in democracy, federalism, and economic reform that has taken place during the Putin era. Yet these policies are perpetuating the very challenge they are designed to address, with potentially devastating consequences not only for Russia, but for the United States and the international community as well.

1. On life in today's Chechnya, see Médecins Sans Frontières, *The Trauma of Ongoing War in Chechnya: Quantitative Assessment of Living Conditions and Psychosocial and General Health Status Among the War-Displaced in Chechnya and Ingushetia* (Amsterdam: MSF, August 2004).
2. See U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, *The 9/11 Commission Report* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 2004), 58-59, 64, 109, 125, 149, 160, 165-66, 191, 222, 233, and 524; see also Paul Murphy, *The Wolves of Islam: Russia and the Faces of Chechen Terrorism* (Washington, DC: Brassey's Inc., 2004) and Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), xl, xlvii, x1ciii, 13, 21, 35, 74, 55, 78-9, 85, 91-2, 119, 123, 142, 151-52, 154-55, 179-180, 278, and 285.
3. For brief summaries of this meeting and the constitutional changes, see Murphy, *The Wolves of Islam*, 171-75; see also Alek-

sandr Ignatenko, "Vakhkhabitskoe kvazigosudarstvo," *Russkii Zhurnal* (Moscow), September 4, 2005 (http://www.russ.ru/publish/96073701).

4. The holder of these posts reportedly becomes the automatic successor to the President. "Prezident ChRI Sheik Abdul-Khalim. Kto On?" *Kavakaz-Tsentr*, March 12, 2005 (http://www.kavkazcenter.com/russ/content/2005/03/12/31285.shtml).
5. "Shamil Basaev: 'U nas est mnogo, chto rasskazat' po Beslanu…'," *Kavkaz-Tsentr*, August 31, 2005 (http://www.kavkazcenter.net/russ/content/2005/08/31/37225.shtml).
6. *Moscow Times*, September 21, 2004, as cited in *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline* 8, no. 181 (2004).
7. RosBalt, September 20, 2004, as cited in *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline* 8, no. 181 (2004).
8. *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline* 8, no. 201 (2004); Syuzanna Farizova, "Khot' rodni vynosi," *Kommersant-Daily*, (Moscow), October 30, 2004, 1-2.
9. (Regnum.ru) as cited in "Za chtenie Korana studentok-musulmanok v militsii zastavili zadirat' yubki" (Islam.ru), April 20, 2005 (http://www.islam.ru/press/rus/2005-04-20/#7985). The Chechen militants' website, *Kavkaz-Tsentr*, did not fail to report this as well. See "Militsiya v Nalchike zastablyala muslimanok zadirat' yubki v otmestku za chtenie Korana," *Kavkaz-Tsentr*, April 21, 2005 (http://www.kavkazcenter.net/russ/content/2005/04/21/33024.shtml).
10. "Obstanovku v Nalchike mestnyie musulmane nazyvayut kriticheskoi" (Islam.ru), August 19, 2005 (http://www.islam.ru/press/rus/2005-08-19/#9038).
11. "Musulmane KBR v znak protesta grozyat emigratsiei iz Rossii" (Islam.ru), August 25, 2005 (http://www.islam.ru/press/rus/2005-08-25/#9109).
12. *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline* 9, no. 172 (2005).
13. For a more detailed account, see Gordon M. Hahn, "Reforming the Federation," in Stephen White, Zvi Gitelman, and Richard Sakwa, eds., *Developments in Russian Politics 6* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 148-67.
14. Robert Bruce Ware, "The Caucasian Vortex," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline* 8, no. 163 (2004); Ivan Preobrazhenskii, "Vybory po-Dagenstanskii" (Politkom.ru), March 17, 2003 (http://www.politkom.ru); Aleksandr Bezmenov, "Kampagn protiv Makhachkaly ne budet," *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* (Moscow), August 18, 2004, 1, 3.
15. Bezmenov, "Kampagn protiv Makhachkaly ne budet."
16. Itar-TASS (Moscow), April 2, 2005.
17. "Tam, za tumanom," *Zvezda Povolzhya* No. 1, January 13-19, 2005, 1-2.
18. See, for example, "Rossiiskikh talibov primeryayut k teraktu," *Kommersant-Kazan*, April 22, 2005 (http://www.kommersant.ru/region/kazan/main.htm?year=2005&issue=72), Orkhan Dzhemal, "Rossiiskii Andizhan," *Versiya* (Moscow) no. 21, June 6, 2005 (http://www.versiasovsek.ru/material.php?3927), and "V Moskve zaderzhan chlen 'Islamskogo dzhamaat'," *Regnum*, May 5, 2005 (http://www.regnum.ru/news/450313.html).
19. There were many in Bashkortostan and in other regions with large Tatar communities. See Gordon M. Hahn, "Hizb ut-Tahrir's Russia Invasion?" *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Russian Political Weekly* 4, no. 48 (2004) (http://www.rferl.org/reports/rpw/2004/12/48-161204.asp).
20. Emil Pain, Director of Moscow's Institute for Ethno-Political Studies, estimates there are ten. Emil Pain, "Moscow's North Caucasus Policy Backfires," *Central Asia–Caucasus Analyst*, June 29, 2005. The Moscow Carnegie Center's Alexei Malashenko claims "now there are more than ten *jamaats*" in Dagestan, as compared to two or three in the past. "Russian Analyst Sees 'Total Crisis of Power' in Dagestan," Interfax (Moscow), July 7, 2005. Dagestan was home to a number of radical and combat *jamaats* which served as a beachhead for the August 1999 invasion of the republic by Basaev and Khattab, the goal of which was the establishment of a base territory for an Islamist North Caucasus caliphate.
21. Nataliya Lopashenko, Director of the Saratov branch of the Center for Transnational Crime and Corruption at The American University in Washington, DC, provided this information in a presentation in Togliatti, Samara Oblast, in April 2004. Her report was excerpted in *Russian Regional Report* 9, no. 17 (2004).
22. Igor Dobaev, "Voina na Kavkaz: realii i perspektivy," *Novaya Politika*, October 26, 2005 (http://www.bovopol.ru/article3685.html); author's estimates.
23. See, for example, Janusz Bugajski, *Cold Peace: Russia's New Imperialism* (New York: Praeger/CSIS, 2005).
24. Interview, "Sh. Basaev: 'Nikto ne mozhet zapretit mne to, chto razreshaet Bog," *Kavkaz-Tsentr*, March 21, 2005 (http://www.kavkazcenter.net/russ/content/2005/03/21/32960.shtml).
25. "Prezident ChRI Sadulaev vystupil s obrasheniem," *Kavkaz-Tsentr*, May 9, 2005 (http://www.kavkazcenter.net/russ/content/2005/05/09/33702.shtml).

Tackling the Moscow-Tehran Connection

Ilan Berman

In the widening international crisis over Iran's nuclear program, no country is more important than Russia. For more than a decade, concerns over potential Islamic separatism in the "post-Soviet space" and a mutually beneficial arms trade have nurtured and strengthened the strategic ties between Moscow and Tehran. Over time, these contacts have also assumed a distinctly geopolitical dimension, with both countries viewing their partnership at least partially as a hedge against American interests and U.S. policy in the greater Middle East. Today, Russia serves as the Islamic Republic's chief strategic partner, and a key enabler of its atomic ambitions.

So far, Washington has had little success in severing this connection. Despite repeated American overtures over the past decade, support for Tehran still represents something of an article of faith in the corridors of the Kremlin. Indeed, against the backdrop of the War on Terror, strategic ties appear to have assumed a new significance for both countries.

Yet signs also suggest that Washington may soon find a much more constructive tenor to its long-running dialogue with Moscow over Iran. On a number of crucial strategic and diplomatic fronts, Russia and Iran have begun to drift apart. This divergence provides a hopeful opportunity for the United States, should it choose to seize it.

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Moscow's Faustian bargain

The Russo-Iranian entente traces its roots back to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Serious bilateral diplomatic contacts had begun during the mid- to late 1980s, but ties between Moscow and Tehran truly blossomed with the USSR's demise. The breakup of the Soviet Union unleashed a wave of ethnic and religious separatism in Russia's turbulent "southern rim": Central Asia and the Caucasus. Kremlin officials watched this development with deep apprehension, afraid that the emerging extremism could spill over into parts of the Russian Federation. Having seen Iran's domination of Lebanon in the early 1980s, and its global efforts to "export the revolution" thereafter, they also became justifiably worried about Tehran taking on a similar role on their periphery.

Over time, ties with Tehran have come to be seen in Moscow as a pivotal geopolitical alliance—and as an important hedge against America's perceived hegemony in the Middle East.

The resulting deal struck between Moscow and Tehran included a pledge of Russian sales of conventional arms (and later the sharing of nuclear know-how) to Iran in exchange for a tacit understanding that Tehran would steer clear of meddling in the Near Abroad. Iran was eager to comply; still struggling to reconstitute its regional standing and military might in the aftermath of its costly eight-year war with Iraq, the Iranian regime rightly saw Russia as a major potential arms supplier.

The Russo-Iranian entente may have begun as a marriage of convenience, but by the late 1990s it had become much more. In January 1996, President Boris Yeltsin replaced his docile, Western-leaning foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, with Yevgeny Primakov, the wily spymaster who headed Russia's foreign intelligence agency, the *Sluzhba Vneshnei Rozvedki* (SVR). The reshuffle marked the start of a new era in Russia's Middle East policy. In his day, Primakov had served as the chief Middle East specialist for the government of Leonid Brezhnev, and as the Kremlin's *de facto* point man on ties with Iraq, Libya, and the PLO.[1]

Primakov's ascendance repositioned Moscow as a geopolitical counterweight to Washington in the Middle East, and Russian attitudes toward Tehran underwent a corresponding change. Under Kozyrev, Russia had aligned itself with the U.S. in opposing Iran. This was not without good reason; at least some policymakers in Moscow saw Iran's potential to export fundamentalism to Russia's periphery as the cardinal threat facing the Kremlin in the post-Cold War era.[2] Under Primakov, however, these worries gave way to a more benign view of the Islamic Republic. Ties with Tehran have come to be seen in Moscow as a pivotal geopolitical alliance—and as an important hedge against America's perceived hegemony in the Middle East.

The strategic partnership nurtured under Primakov took on a new dimension in the last days of 1999, with Vladimir Putin's assumption of the Russian presidency. Far from breaking with his predecessor's embrace of the ayatollahs, Putin actually strengthened the Kremlin's tilt

toward Tehran. In November 2000, in a public show of support for the Iranian regime, Russia officially abrogated the 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin Agreement, under which Moscow had agreed to curtail new nuclear-related exports to the Islamic Republic. The importance of ties with the Islamic Republic also became a feature of the foreign policy blueprint issued by the Russian Foreign Ministry that same year.[3]

The partnership, post-9/11

September 11, 2001 and the ensuing War on Terror did nothing to dampen the Russo-Iranian entente. To the contrary, over the past four-and-a-half years, strategic cooperation between Russia and Iran has accelerated, as both countries grapple with America's intrusion into the "post-Soviet space."

For Russia, continued cooperation with Iran has become a partnership of perceived necessity. Initially, Washington's plans for a campaign against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan had met with the blessing of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Over time, however, the steady expansion of America's strategic presence in the "post-Soviet space" has fanned Russian fears of a long-term U.S. foothold in the region—and a corresponding diminution of Moscow's influence there.

Iran's ayatollahs have similar worries. The 2002 ouster of the Taliban, and the subsequent overthrow of Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime, may have eliminated Tehran's chief ideological and military adversaries. But in their wake, Iranian policymakers have grappled with how to deal with the new, pro-Western governments that have emerged in Baghdad and Kabul, and with the possibility that further Coalition successes could profoundly constrain their country's foreign policy horizons.

These common concerns have served to reinforce the Russo-Iranian relationship. At the outset of the U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan, Moscow and Tehran began discussions of a common political and security agenda for Central Asia and the Caucasus—one that was designed, among other things, to forestall the creation of a U.S.-backed government in Kabul.[4] Since then, the two countries have made substantial progress toward this goal, animated by mutual fears over the growing American strategic presence in Central Asia and the Caucasus.

Russian officials, for their part, have taken pains to support Iran's chief strategic priority: its atomic drive. In October 2004, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov paid a high-profile visit to Tehran, where he met with his counterpart, Kamal Kharrazi, and with Hassan Rowhani, the Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council. The meetings yielded mutual affirmations of the strong strategic bonds between Russia and Iran, and an important symbolic message from the Kremlin—support of Iran's inalienable right to nuclear technology.[5] Since then, Russian dignitaries like Federal Atomic Agency Director Aleksandr Rumyantsev and Federation Council Chairman Sergei Mironov have visited Tehran to confirm their country's commitment to ongoing atomic cooperation—and to a coordinated approach between the Kremlin and the Islamic Republic to "peace and security" in the Middle East.[6]

Turbulence ahead

Yet, despite these commonalities, the Russo-Iranian relationship is

now headed into uncharted territory. For, though it is still publicly committed to its long-running partnership with Iran, the Kremlin appears to be waking up to a set of alarming new strategic realities.

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Threat potential

The active proliferation of WMD-related technologies and know-how from Russia to Iran over the past decade has been driven in large part by the Russian notion that such activity was essentially a cost-free exercise. This is no longer the case; Tehran's substantial investments in its strategic arsenal over the past several years have dramatically expanded the threat the Islamic Republic now poses to Russia. As long ago as 2003, for example, Moscow's prestigious PIR Centre, a leading nonproliferation think tank, was estimating that by the middle of this year some 20 million ethnic Russians in the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and Ukraine could be at risk from a potential Iranian nuclear strike.[7]

Russian politicians are beginning to grasp this reality. High-profile policymakers like Andrei Kokoshin, the influential chairman of the Russian State Duma's Defense Committee (and a former Russian National Security Advisor), now speak publicly about the Iranian threat to Russia's security.[8] And, while strategic cooperation has continued, there are encouraging signs that Russia's contributions to its partnership with Iran have become more cautious. When Iran launched its first indigenously-developed satellite, the *Sinah-1*, in October 2005, it did so from the Baikonur space facility in Kazakhstan under Russian supervision and using a Russian-made booster.[9] The foreign launch was a telling hint at Russia's hesitance to provide Iran with the technological capabilities to carry out a space launch, thereby indirectly aiding the Islamic Republic's efforts to develop an intercontinental ballistic missile.

Regional radicalism

Worries over the possibility of Iranian support for radical separatism in Russia's turbulent "Southern Rim" were at the core of Russian-Iranian contacts a decade ago. Back then, Moscow moved quickly—and successfully—to secure Tehran's good behavior in exchange for arms and nuclear assistance. But the Russo-Iranian understanding over the "post-Soviet space" could soon become a thing of the past.

For one thing, telltale signs indicate that Iran is expanding its involvement in the spread of radical Islam in the region. In the first part of 2002, the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) uncovered new intelligence indicating that elements of Iran's clerical army, the *Pasdaran*, were secretly providing training and logistical support for insurgents from the radical al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).[10] Iran is likewise suspected of sponsoring the rise of radical religious and separatist movements in neighboring Azerbaijan over the past several years, and of using them as a means to desta-

bilize and pressure the Aliyev dynasty in Baku.[11] This troublemaking has led Russian media outlets to openly question the prudence of continued strategic alignment with Iran.[12]

For another, Iran remains a serious potential threat to stability in the Caucasus. Officials in Moscow understand full well that, despite Iran's historic abstention from sponsoring separatism in the "post-Soviet space," Tehran in the future could use support for Chechen insurgents (or other regional radicals) as a blackmail tool against Moscow if it feels threatened by Russia's strides toward the West, or as a means to blunt international pressure over its nuclear program. Indeed, signs of such activity are already becoming visible; in a November 2005 exposé, London's influential *Sunday Telegraph* reported that the *Pasdaran* has begun "secretly training Chechen rebels in sophisticated terror techniques to enable them to carry out more effective attacks against Russian forces."[13]

Diplomatic priorities

For years, Moscow has served as Iran's chief strategic partner, backing Tehran in its escalating disputes with the European Union and the United States. But amid the ongoing international stand-off over Iran's nuclear program, and Tehran's own, increasingly-evident atomic ambitions, cracks have begun to appear in the Russian foreign policy consensus over cooperation with Tehran.

Moscow's doubts have manifested themselves in an increasingly stern diplomatic tone. In an August 2005 communiqué, Russia's Foreign Ministry took the unprecedented step of criticizing its long-time strategic partner for its intransigence on the nuclear issue. "It would be a wise decision on the part of Iran to stop enriching uranium and renew cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency," the public statement urged.[14] More recently, Moscow has taken the initiative and proffered a compromise nuclear deal—as of this writing supported by the IAEA, Europe and the United States—that would permit Iran to retain limited uranium enrichment capabilities but transplant these processes to Russian soil.[15]

Other foreign policy priorities have begun to impact Russia's partnership with Iran as well. As Russian political scientist Ednan Agayev has pointed out, Russia's new role as chair of the G8, and its growing diplomatic dialogue with the European Union, necessitates a change in the Kremlin's stance toward Iran. In light of these considerations, Russia "must assume a leading role in putting international political pressure on Iran," Agayev, a professor at the prestigious Moscow State Institute of International Relations, told the *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* newspaper back in August. "Moscow should not send Iran false signals that the G8 can be split."[16]

Russia's new role as chair of the G8, and its growing diplomatic dialogue with the European Union, necessitates a change in the Kremlin's stance toward Iran.

Ending the affair

Can the strategic partnership between Russia and Iran be severed? So far, the United States has not seriously tested this proposition. Instead, for much of the past decade, it has contented itself with superficial (and ultimately self-defeating) discussions with the Kremlin about just one

aspect of the Russo-Iranian entente: Iran's nuclear program. Today, policymakers in Washington should be thinking deeply about a broader sort of dialogue with their Russian counterparts over Iran.

Today, policymakers in Washington should be thinking deeply about a broader sort of dialogue with their Russian counterparts over Iran.

Such a discourse would need to take into account Russia's legitimate security interests in the "post-Soviet space." Russia's recent revival of imperial rhetoric vis-à-vis the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus—and its deepening involvement in regional security constructs like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization—reflects a growing fear that America's new strategic presence in the "post-Soviet space" could turn out to be a permanent affair. This sense of siege, moreover, has only deepened in the aftermath of the "color revolutions" in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, and the perceived American connection to these events. Nevertheless, Moscow and Washington share congruent interests on a number of regional security issues, from preventing the growth of radical Islam to combating the rising tide of narcotics flowing from Afghanistan. Whether formal or informal, a Russo-American security arrangement that addresses Moscow's fears—and capitalizes on such commonalities—could help reduce Moscow's perceived need for strategic partners such as Iran to counterbalance the United States.

U.S.-Russian dialogue should also exploit Russia's enduring need for a sustainable economic partnership with the West. President Putin has made economic integration with Europe and the United States a major tenet of his economic program, pledging in his 2004 State of the Nation address to double national GDP by the end of the decade.[17] So far, Russia has managed to more or less meet these expectations, largely because of the high price of world oil, which has allowed the Kremlin to amass some $140 billion in hard currency reserves to date. But petrodollars cannot provide a lasting fix for Russia's macroeconomic problems, among them lackluster foreign direct investment and the absence of a long-term mortgage sector. For that, Moscow needs deeper economic cooperation with—and investment from—Washington and European capitals. The United States should exploit this opportunity to condition economic confidence-building measures on Kremlin cooperation vis-à-vis Iran.

It should do so confident in the knowledge that the long-term interests of Russian leaders—to say nothing of the Russian people—align much more closely with the United States and Europe than with the radical theocratic regime now in power in Tehran.

In his 2003 State of the Union address, President Bush made clear that every country in the world will need to make a choice between terrorist groups and rogue states and the governments that confront them. Notwithstanding its long-standing struggle with separatism in Chechnya and its brief assistance to the United States against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, Russia has so far not been forced to resolutely make such a choice. Addressing the Kremlin's alignment with the world's

leading state sponsor of terrorism is a perfect opportunity to test the depths of Moscow's commitment to lasting partnership with the West.

Ultimately, however, only Russia can decide whether it values true cooperation with the United States more than its strategic ties to Iran's ayatollahs. Washington's role should simply be to make clear that the Kremlin cannot have both—and to provide it with the incentives necessary to make the correct choice.

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2. John P. Hannah, "Evolving Russian Attitudes Toward Iran," in Patrick Clawson, ed., *Iran's Strategic Capabilities and Intentions* (Washington: National Defense University, April 1994), 56.
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

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Fear and Loathing in Asia

Dan Blumenthal

At the April 2005 "Shangri-La" conference in Singapore, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was in typically blunt form. "Since no nation threatens China, one wonders: Why this growing investment?" Rumsfeld asked the assembled conference participants. "Why these continuing large and expanding arms purchases?"[1] Why indeed. This question has reverberated in Washington and throughout capitals in Asia, as China's neighbors reassess their defense priorities in light of China's military strength.

Rumsfeld's rhetorical query was an accurate reflection of what could be called Washington's "summer of discontent" about China's strategic direction. His concerns are shared across the political aisle; Franklin Kramer, a former assistant secretary of defense during the Clinton administration, told the House Armed Services Committee in July that "there are good reasons to suggest that China has little need for a significantly enhanced military establishment."[2]

Also in July, the Pentagon's annual report to Congress confirmed the rapid growth in Chinese military capabilities.[3] The report pointed out that the weapons that Beijing has amassed to intimidate Taiwan—700 short-range missiles, a modernizing fleet of diesel and nuclear submarines, fourth-generation aircraft procured from Russia, increased operational tempo and sophistication of military exercises—also can be used against other regional powers.

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Other reports followed, including studies from the RAND Corporation, the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Congressionally-mandated U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission.[4] And, while there may be some disagreement about the specifics, there is consensus on the big issue: China's military modernization program is ambitious, rapid, successful, and opaque.

The Pentagon has estimated that China is spending three times what it says it spends on defense development—equaling about $90 billion a year, making it the third largest defense spender in the world next to America and Russia. The RAND Corporation and the Institute for International Strategic Studies in London also estimated that Chinese defense spending far exceeds its stated amounts.

While there may be some disagreement about the specifics, there is consensus on the big issue: China's military modernization program is ambitious, rapid, successful, and opaque.

Whatever the actual numbers, what is clear is that China is devoting great resources to becoming a military power, while masking its activity toward that end. Indeed, there is a profound anxiety in Washington over what has come to be known as "China's rise": China's dramatic economic growth, its remarkable increase in military power, and its more prominent role in international diplomacy, all underpinned by a one-party dictatorship with no political reform in sight.

But is this a peculiarly American obsession; the fear that the dominant Pacific player will lose its pride of place? The answer, simply, is no. Conventional wisdom has it that Asian countries do not want to "choose sides" between America and China, and so are remaining largely silent about what concerns they have, if any. Some may even be engaged in "bandwagoning" with China and adjusting to the new power equilibrium in Asia. Others argue that, in fact, Asian countries actually *prefer* Chinese dominance to American dominance—the Chinese "listen to their concerns," wield soft power more effectively, and are not as domineering. Yet there is no mistaking the fact that the major powers of Asia, and even some of the smaller ones, are all taking steps to check China's power.

While no country save Taiwan (and, increasingly, Japan) likes to admit it publicly, there is today a "great game" underway for primacy in Asia, and the nations in the neighborhood are learning how to play it. The region's two most powerful democracies—India and Japan—are clearly taking steps to modernize their militaries, as well as to deepen their bilateral ties with one another, at least in part as a check against Chinese power. The maritime Southeast nations—Singapore and the Philippines in particular—and Taiwan are trying to draw the American military closer in, even as they pocket what gains they can from China's economic growth. South Korea and Australia, for very different reasons, are opting out of the ongoing subtle balancing, although Australia itself is drawing closer to the American military as well.

At the macro-level, one can conclude that Asia-Pacific countries are

responding to strategic uncertainty characterized in large part by China's rise through the traditional way of modernizing their militaries and embracing America as the off-shore balancer. Indeed, if money talks, the fact that the Asia-Pacific countries constitute the largest arms market in the world should speak volumes.

American strategy in Asia

The U.S. defense establishment is well aware that it is the target of much Chinese military thinking. What dominates the Chinese military mind, at least in the short term, is maintaining the ability to conduct rapid, overwhelming coercive attacks against Taiwan while keeping the United States out of the fight. Beijing is thus focused on anti-access and area denial capabilities with an eye toward raising the costs of U.S. intervention in the Taiwan Strait.

The Chinese strategic concept revolves around ballistic and cruise missiles that can target American air bases in Japan; information attacks that can take advantage of American dependence on computer-generated intelligence and information; and diesel submarines and a host of multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) missiles that can be fired from submarines or destroyers. These priorities can pose serious problems for the workhorse of the American military in the Pacific: an aircraft carrier group. Raising the costs of intervention, the thinking in Beijing goes, will make America hesitate before acting, during which time China can accomplish its political and military objectives in Taiwan. Especially in a scenario in which China obscures its initial decision to attack Taiwan behind a diplomatic and political smokescreen, the United States may well be caught unprepared.

In an attempt to respond to this challenge, the United States has commenced a redeployment of its assets to and in the Pacific. The Pentagon has moved attack submarines and cruise missiles to Guam, and is forming on that island a strike force of six bomber aircraft and 48 fighters which have been redeployed there from continental bases. The U.S. Navy is also moving a second carrier to East Asia, and converting Trident ballistic submarines into platforms for stealth cruise missiles.

In addition, America is transforming its alliance with Japan. Among other things, the two countries have come to a basic understanding that a "peaceful resolution" of the Taiwan issue is in both of their national interests. In plain English, this means that the two sides have agreed to work together to deter Chinese use of force against Taiwan.

But a more equal alliance partnership with Japan does not solve America's problems of access to the region. Japan could contribute mightily to an anti-submarine campaign since its capabilities in that arena are particularly advanced. And advanced agreements to use Japanese airbases to sortie to the Strait add to U.S. capabilities in a Taiwan Strait crisis. But the alliance upgrade does not neutralize China's ability to hold Japanese airbases at risk and thus deny America the ability to respond rapidly and decisively to a conflict in the Strait.

America's greatest strategic need in Asia is more diverse access points into the region. While improved defense relations with the Philippines and Singapore are baby steps in that direction, the U.S. military is still a long way from taking the dramatic strides it needs to effect a counter-

area denial strategy, such as reestablishing an airbase in the Philippines.

Strategic planners should think about deployments into the region from China's west (India or Central Asia). Not only would that improve U.S. options in an actual crisis, it would also force China to allocate its defense resources more widely. At present, however, the PRC can invest virtually all of its resources in capabilities to coerce Taiwan and keep the U.S. from coming in through the southeast. A "western front" would force budgetary debates about scarce defense resources in China that could improve America's strategic position.

Japan's jitters

No Asian country has been as clear about its determination to check Chinese military power as Japan. In the context of its bilateral alliance with the United States, Japan is undertaking a serious defense transformation. Tokyo will invest upwards of $10 billion in missile defense by the end of this decade, a process that will necessarily draw it closer to Washington (through greater sharing of sensor, surveillance and targeting data, et cetera). In addition, as a result of the Defense Policy Review process, Tokyo has agreed to form a combined air operations coordination center at Yokota air base, and the Ground Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the U.S. Army are developing a similar organization at Camp Zama in Japan.

Tokyo is also developing the legal infrastructure for a more robust military. Its deployments of logistical support assets to Operation Enduring Freedom and humanitarian military assets to Iraq were given legal sanction through the passage of specific legislation. Now, the Japanese Diet has begun the thorny process of revising constitutional restrictions dating to the post-World War II period on engaging in "collective self-defense." If the ruling Liberal Democratic Party has its way, Japan will have a legally sanctioned military (no longer a "self-defense force") that will be able to assist the United States in its own defense and conduct out-of-area operations with more realistic rules of engagement.

While the North Korean ballistic missile program—particularly Pyongyang's launch of a *Taepo Dong* missile over Japan in 1998—has been the most immediate driver of a more muscular defense policy, Japan has been quite explicit that its long-term security concern is China. The anxiety over China has been brought home by the over thirty incursions by Chinese naval vessels into Japanese territorial waters over the last year. One such intrusion, by a nuclear submarine, drove Japan to give chase with assets from its Maritime Self-Defense Force.

The view from New Delhi

Today, India faces a host of security challenges that have pushed it to modernize its military, and China looms large in these calculations. Beyond the perennial issue of Pakistan, its support for anti-India terrorism, and the contested status of Kashmir, the Indian military is also concerned that the rapid growth of China's armed forces is changing the balance of power in Asia. India is seeing a more visible Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean, as manifested by China's "string of pearls" strategy, which is meant to increase Beijing's options for securing its supply of petroleum in the American-dominated seas.

New Delhi's concerns are well founded. China has forged military relationships with Burma and Cambodia, and established a limited maritime presence astride the Indian Ocean by building a naval port at Gwadar, Pakistan, and other facilities on the Coco Islands. In addition, China has indicated a measured commitment to establishing a blue water navy, as reflected in its upgraded nuclear submarine fleet.

While the Indian Army is most focused on Pakistan, it would be fair to say that its Air Force and Navy's biggest concern is China. In response to Chinese power, the Air Force is looking to modernize its fighter assets and will possibly purchase F-16s and F-18s from the United States to complement its fleet of Russian Sukhoi 30s. It likewise is improving its aerial targeting, refueling and ISR (intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) capabilities through the acquisition of Israeli-made Phalcon airborne early warning and control systems. The Indian Navy, meanwhile, is looking at developing sea denial and limited power projection capabilities with its upgraded fleet of submarines and the possible deployment of two aircraft carriers that will come into service between 2010 and 2015.

India has also expressed interest in aligning itself more closely with the United States. The two countries share a host of strategic interests, and preventing the rise of a hegemonic China tops the list. But the relationship will have to overcome obstacles born of decades of mutual suspicion. If China is indeed foremost on the minds of American and Indian policymakers, implementing "competitive strategies" would be the wisest course. Forcing Beijing to worry about defending its western flank from air attack would provide an advantage to the United States. Toward that end, aerial exercises and even a U.S. air presence in northern India should be the focus of strategic dialogue. In addition, more cooperation in the realm of sea-lane protection, and dissuasion of the pursuit by China of a blue water capability should be a starting point for the relationship.

Southeast Asia seeks security

China got the attention of Southeast Asian nations in startling fashion in the early 1990s when it codified into law the principle of the South China Sea as sovereign Chinese territory. Since a skirmish with the Philippines in Mischief Reef in the mid-1990s bloodied Beijing's public image, China has backed off from those claims. But simultaneously, it has strengthened its outposts in the region, chief among them the contested Spratley Islands.

None of this has been lost on Southeast Asian nations. While none are strong enough to counter Chinese power on their own, maritime powers in the region are working to expand their capabilities through a modernization of their militaries—and through closer relations with the U.S.

In 1999, the Philippines and the United States signed a Visiting Forces Agreement permitting U.S. forces to conduct exercises in the Southeast Asian state. Since then, these bilateral maneuvers have expanded in both frequency and scope, and the two countries now carry out anti-terrorist exercises as well as amphibious exercises near the Spratleys, which are claimed by both Beijing and Manila. In addition, the Philippines is now the largest recipient of

U.S. assistance in East Asia, and a major non-NATO ally.

Singapore likewise has been steadily modernizing its military in the face of an array of threats, including China. Its recently-completed construction of the Changi port facility, the purpose of which is to accommodate a U.S. aircraft carrier, as well as its first-ever hosting of the USS *Kitty Hawk* in March 2001, are indicative of a decision to ensure that the U.S. military maintains a presence. "It's no secret that Singapore believes that the presence of the U.S. military … contributes to peace and stability in the region," Singaporean Defense Minister Teo Chee Hean has confirmed.[5] Legendary former Singporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew has been even more explicit: "no combination of other East Asian economies—Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, ASEAN—will be able to balance China. Therefore, the role of America as balancer is crucial if we are to have elbow room."[6]

Turmoil in Taipei

Of all the countries in the region, Taiwan is the most concerned about China's ever-increasing military power. So far, however, Taipei's military response to this threat has been mixed. On the one hand, up until 2003 Taiwan was the second largest purchaser of U.S military goods and services in the world. Since President Bush approved the sale of a substantial arms package in 2001, Taiwan has purchased an advanced radar system, *Kidd*-class destroyers, and a C4ISR system. On the other hand, however, Taiwan's annual defense budget, though still larger as a percentage of GDP than that of most U.S. allies, has been decreasing over the past decade, and a supplementary budget to buy diesel submarines, the U.S. PAC-3 theater missile defense system and P-3 anti-submarine aircraft has languished in the legislature.

Through modernization and reform, the Taiwanese government wants to create a military that can engage the enemy offshore, away from civilian population centers. But this policy has faced a number of obstacles, chief among them the mini-crisis of political leadership now underway in the young democracy. The Kuomintang party (KMT), which had ruled the country for half a century, has not fully accepted its new status in the political opposition. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), for its part, was a once-outlawed group of dissidents, and does not fully trust the KMT. Positioning itself closer to China is a way for the KMT to stymie Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian's agenda, and opposing arms purchases is part and parcel of that strategy. Meanwhile, the Chen administration has not entirely consolidated its power over the erstwhile KMT-dominated national security bureaucracy, and has found many of its proposed defense reforms defeated.

Taiwan's political paralysis on questions of defense modernization should not be read as an unwillingness to defend itself, or as defeatism. Rather, the combined pressures of an ongoing Chinese campaign of intimidation and isolation and Taiwan's own democratic growing pains have resulted in less-than-optimal policy implementation. America appears to understand this; despite its frustrations and impatience with Taiwan, it has developed closer defense relations with the island at all levels. Taipei and Washington have both recognized and acted upon America's vital interest in deterring China from using force against Taiwan.

Canberra's calculus

Australia is in the unique position of being one of America's closest allies—indeed relations have probably never been better—but diverging from America's assessment of the troubling aspects of China's rise.

Since September 11, 2001, when Prime Minister Howard invoked the ANZUS Treaty for the first time in its history, the armed forces of Australia have participated in Coalition operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The American and Australian defense establishments have become more interoperable, are developing a combined training facility in Australia, and envisage working together on a host of security issues for the foreseeable future. Accordingly, Australia has shifted its defense strategy and procurement priorities toward the development of expeditionary forces that can conduct coalition operations anywhere in the world. These changes are marked by a growing agreement between Washington and Canberra regarding the global strategic situation—in particular, the need to aggressively fight terrorists wherever they are and to intervene militarily when necessary to deal with failed states.

The exception to this strategic convergence is China. Over the past few years, Australian Foreign Minister Downer has intimated that the ANZUS treaty does not extend to a U.S. conflict with China over Taiwan. Other Australian politicians similarly have stressed the soothing effects of the rise in trade with China.

This state of affairs should hardly be surprising; Canberra increasingly sees its economic future in China, and has greatly benefited from China's voracious appetite for natural resources.

On the other hand, Australia's long-standing security priority has been to prevent the rise of Chinese hegemony. If China's Australian charm offensive wears off, Canberra could pivot very quickly to a more hedged China policy. It certainly has the infrastructure in place to do so, given its close relations with both Japan and the United States.

Seoul goes soft

After a half-century of alliance relations built around deterring North Korea from making good on its declared policy of reunifying the Peninsula under Pyongyang's control, U.S.-ROK ties appear today to be fraying. The two sides no longer share a common view of the North Korean threat, as South Korea appears to be indulging delusions that peace is at hand or that peaceful unification can be accomplished with the current DPRK regime still in power.

Finding America unstinting in its concern that the rogue regime in North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, South Korea has drifted toward Beijing's sphere of influence, all the while toying with vague ideas of playing some kind of "balancing role" in the region. Along these lines, the ROK has articulated plans to become more independent militarily of the United States and to purchase capabilities to conduct deep strike air operations, early warning and surveillance and extend protection for sea lines of communication. It remains to be seen whether the ROK will fund such an expensive shift in defense policy. But such intimations, combined with a refusal to any longer characterize the DPRK as a major threat—as well as demands for operational control over ROK forces in time of war (as opposed to the traditional arrangement of a combined command led by

a U.S. commander)—have contributed to deep skepticism in Washington over the alliance's future.

America's biggest problem in deterring and defeating China in a potential conflict remains ready access to the fight, and U.S. policymakers have essentially concluded that the ROK will be of no help in such a scenario. This has led to further doubts about the future utility of the decades-old alliance between Seoul and Washington.

Given the long-standing and successful nature of the alliance, as well as China's potential to anger the ROK with its own intermittent atavistic claims on the Korean Peninsula, it would be a mistake to entirely give up on the bilateral relationship. But absent some form of shock therapy for Seoul, the alliance will remain in deep trouble.

Stumbling toward security

While the nations of the Asia-Pacific region have responded to China's military growth in varying ways, certain common themes can be distilled. All the major regional powers are modernizing their militaries at least as a hedge against China; and countries have seen it in their interest to upgrade bilateral defense relations with the United States.

What has been missing so far is a multilateral security framework that can act as a collective check on Chinese power. While America is experimenting with some informal multilateral networks—a trilateral security dialogue among Japan, Australia and the United States, and a defense policy focused on multilateral interoperability are two examples—America has not yet decided to form a more formal grouping.

The risks are clear. A formal security construct would generate more overt strategic competition with China, forcing nervous countries to take sides, and create constraints on unilateral action. But the risks of its absence are becoming equally evident. China is working to undermine America's bilateral alliances. And it is having some success with South Korea, as well as providing countries such as India with the opportunity to play Beijing and Washington off against each other or at least compete for their courtship. For the United States, preventing China from making further progress should be a central element of strategy in Asia.

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Power Play

Frank J. Gaffney, Jr.

Last summer, the American people and their elected representatives suddenly awoke to a startling reality: Communist China is hungry for energy and working aggressively to secure assured access to it all over the world. And, for a brief moment, it looked as though the United States might become seized of the larger thrust of Chinese strategy, of which the PRC's energy agenda is but one part. The precipitating cause was the proposed purchase of Unocal by one of the PRC's state-owned energy giants, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). In June 2005, the U.S. House of Representatives voted by a margin of 398 to 15 against the proposed deal, terming it a risk to national security. Two months later, CNOOC decided to drop its bid and Unocal was instead taken over by ChevronTexaco.

Unfortunately, the insights provided by this abortive transaction now seem as fleeting as the debate it inspired was super-charged. As a result, we are once again ignoring one of the most strategically ominous developments in the world today—and a possible source of conflict tomorrow.

There were three powerful reasons for objecting to China's play for Unocal, and these should inform our thinking about PRC behavior more generally. First, the proposed purchase would have abetted Communist China's effort to acquire *more* of the world's relatively finite energy resources. Second, it also would have

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advanced the PRC's efforts to dominate the vital supply of rare earth minerals. Finally, the deal was emblematic of China's larger, and increasingly threatening, strategic plan—one with grave implications for U.S. economic and national security interests.

Beijing's big thirst

At the risk of stating the obvious, no nation can afford its people the quality of life, let alone the economic and security benefits, associated with being an advanced 21st Century society without assured and cost-effective access to energy. Today, for the United States and most of the rest of the world, that means having access to reliable sources of imported oil.

Beijing is engaged in an ambitious effort to acquire legal title to energy resources, not only in the Western Pacific but literally around the world.

Such assured access will be made more challenging by the expected growth in demand, particularly in developing countries like China. In its *International Energy Outlook 2005*,[1] the Energy Information Administration (EIA) of the U.S. Department of Energy stresses that "[w]orldwide energy consumption is projected to grow by 57 percent between 2002 and 2025." Moreover, according to the EIA, the "strongest growth in energy consumption" will occur "among the emerging economies of the world, especially emerging Asia (including China and India), where robust economic growth drives the increase in energy use over the projection period." Particularly noteworthy is the EIA's expectation that "China's oil use is projected to grow by an average 7.5 percent per year from 2002 to 2010, before slowing to 2.9 percent per year for the remainder of the forecast."

China is evidently mindful of the lessons of the 20th Century with respect to energy insecurity. Imperial Japan's thirst for imported oil was a principal catalyst for its war with the United States. Fortunately, the PRC is, for the moment at least, neither able nor willing to emulate the violent seizure by Japan some sixty-four years ago of petroleum and other natural resources in East Asia. We ignore at our peril, however, the fact that Beijing is engaged in an even more ambitious effort to acquire legal title to energy resources, not only in the Western Pacific—where much of Unocal's reserves of 650 million barrels of oil are to be found—but literally around the world.

Chinese deals are being struck from Siberia to Venezuela, from Indonesia to Sudan, from Iran to Canada, and from Azerbaijan to Cuba. While the precise nature varies from country to country, these agreements often involve PRC investments in exploration, pipelines and other infrastructure and extraction in exchange for assured supplies of oil, natural gas and/or coal. Not infrequently, large numbers of Chinese nationals are dispatched to work in and, in some cases at least, provide security for, Beijing's operations and interests in-country.

China, moreover, is underwriting these activities in a manner that bears no resemblance to free market capitalism. As one astute observer of Beijing's machinations has noted:

> Unocal involved the provision of a soft loan from the Chinese government to the company. This is not like a commercial loan. The Chinese government protects

> its state companies at home and supports them financially overseas. But these companies are essentially expected to be *an arm of national foreign policy* in their foreign investment, rather than to create value.[2] (*Emphasis added.*)

What is at work here is more than simply an effort to secure energy to meet Chinese needs. In a world in which such resources are certainly finite, and possibly contracting, these deals also have the effect of removing energy assets from a global market upon which the United States is increasingly dependent.

Beyond petroleum

The proposed Chinese takeover of Unocal also has shed light on a no-less-worrisome aspect of the PRC's strategy: securing a similar, dominant position with respect to the world's precious metals and other strategic minerals.

As it turns out, the purchase of Unocal would have constituted a "two-fer" for Communist China. Not only would Beijing have gained control of the U.S. company's oil reserves, the PRC would also have become owners of America's only indigenous source of rare earth minerals known as lanthanides, including neodymium—the Unocal-owned Molycorp mine in Mountain Pass, California.

By now, the significance of such a purchase should be obvious. After all, back in 1999, the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China (colloquially know as the Cox Commission after its chairman, then-Representative Chris Cox) had noted that the "main aim for the civilian economy [in China] is to support the building of modern military weapons and to support the aims of the People's Liberation Army (PLA)."[3] The Cox Commission, moreover, determined that, in pursuit of that agenda, China considered "rare-earth metals" and "special-function materials" to be high-value "exotic materials" that are "the key areas of military concern."[4]

Since then, in a series of exposés, *Insight* magazine has called attention to the significance of China's two-fold strategy in this area: acquiring high-technology that exploits the unique attributes of rare earth minerals and cornering the market on such minerals.

An October 2002 *Insight* piece described how China stole one of the most promising military exploitations of metals derived from rare earth minerals—a product developed at considerable expense for the U.S. Navy, called Terfenol-D. According to the magazine, the Chinese company that is now marketing a comparable product has claimed that, when used in underwater sonar, this material "brought up the best quality ever with the detection range that can reach as far as 10,000 [kilometers, or 6,200 miles] and when applied to aircraft, this smart material makes a smart wing, which can be controlled much faster with enhanced reliability."[5]

> China is also securing a similar, dominant position with respect to the world's precious metals and other strategic minerals.

Another relevant tech-theft episode was documented in March 2003. Chinese "princelings"—relatives of senior civilian and military leaders—reportedly purchased an American manufacturer of rare earth magnets, Magnequench, and thus obtained critical technology

now being used to produce "neodymium-iron-boron magnets for servos used in U.S. guided missiles and smart bombs."[6]

These episodes, and others, highlight a consistent pattern. Over the past decade, as the importance of rare earth minerals has become more and more apparent, China has moved to dominate and control the supply of such materials. As one *Insight* investigation concluded: "The PRC acquisition of the rare-earth-magnet technology was part of a long-term campaign initiated by Deng Xiaoping, who ruled the PRC from 1978 until his death in 1997. In 1992, Deng acknowledged the value of the PRC rare-earth reserves in the Baotou region, saying, 'There is oil in the Middle East; there is rare earth in China.'"[7]

China has lately been making similar efforts to take dominant positions in other strategic metals. According to one analyst:

> A pre-emptive attack on North American properties has begun. China has tendered an offer to purchase Noranda Copper … . The [Chinese] have approached Silver Standard for equity ownership. They have also approached Australia and Brazil to secure supplies of minerals. Their tactics have become more clever, with humanitarian goals as well as strong-arm methods in the bidding process. This is a huge sequence of events which strongly indicates [an] intention by China to secure their supply chain.[8]

A glimpse into China's grand strategy

Communist China's play for assets like Unocal's oil reserves and rare earth minerals was no more an isolated incident than it was, as the Chinese insisted, a "purely commercial transaction." Rather, it falls into a pattern of PRC activity around the globe that is clearly deliberate, well-thought-out and ominous in its implications.

This activity is guided by a long-term strategy. It seeks PRC domination of strategic energy resources, materials and minerals and technologies, and involves buying up—or otherwise putting out of business—what is left of this country's productive and competitive industrial capacity. The purpose is to create a civilian economy that will, consistent with Deng Xiaoping's famous "16 Character" dictum, serve China's military needs.

Thus, in tandem with the energy acquisition efforts outlined above, the PLA's needs also are rapidly being advanced by the combined efforts of the most comprehensive espionage and technology theft program in the history of the world—involving untold numbers of overseas Chinese businessmen, students, tourists and others, as well as professional collectors. At the same time, China's requirements for an increasingly formidable, long-range and offensively oriented military are being satisfied thanks to the willingness of the Russian government and, to varying degrees, European, Israeli and even American companies to supply advanced arms technology and dual-use equipment, software and know-how.

Beijing is also pursuing a variety of asymmetric warfare techniques collectively known as *shashoujian*, the "Assassin's Mace." Much is still unknown about this strategy. But evidently, it is intended to permit China to decisively defeat the U.S. military through means such as a ballistic missile-delivered attack involving one or more electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) weapons.

China's plans extend as well to securing influence in and, if possible, control over strategic choke points and regions. Targets include not only the Far East and Western Pacific, but Africa, the Middle East, Siberia, South and Central Asia and Latin America.

Beijing clearly appreciates the strategic value of influence operations in the United States, too. It is securing such influence in many ways, including through the purchase of vast quantities of U.S. government debt instruments. The American economy can be profoundly affected by Chinese decisions to buy or sell billions of dollars' worth of Treasury bills, a fact well appreciated by policymakers in Washington—and in Beijing.

Similarly, U.S. producers of jet airplanes and other export products and American vendors of the ever-increasing array of Chinese-manufactured consumer goods can be relied upon to oppose policies that could cause Beijing to retaliate. Thus, unfair Chinese trade and labor practices tend to get a pass, even as they contribute to the decimation of what is left of our manufacturing base.

Powering all this, of course, is the immense wealth China is accumulating by dint of its many years of trade surpluses. It is an irony not lost on the Communist Chinese that they have done Lenin's putative dictum one better: We are paying for the rope they will use to hang us.

Answering the Chinese challenge

Fortunately, there are concrete things that the United States can yet do that may prevent China's hegemonic rise at the expense of American interests.

Encouraging change

Today, the PRC is in ferment. There is widespread unhappiness with the Chinese regime. The government-controlled press has acknowledged that there have been many thousands of demonstrations or other forms of public dissent against the regime (or its surrogates) in cities, towns, and villages all across China—and especially in rural areas. We can safely assume that there have actually been many more that have not been reported.

> The purpose of China's efforts is to create a civilian economy that will, consistent with Deng Xiaoping's famous "16 Character" dictum, serve China's military needs.

These trends could lead to the weakening or toppling of a Chinese government that is hostile to us. Toward this end, the United States should try to identify, encourage, and strengthen pro-freedom and democratic groups within China. That may mean, as it did during the Cold War, publicly recognizing those who have had the courage to resist the regime and who have been punished for it—dissidents, political activists, journalists, scientists, and so forth. Their story needs to be told throughout the Free World, as a powerful reminder of what is at stake in this war. By telling it often and publicly in the West, we can help save their lives.

The U.S. must also find ways of engaging in subtle but effective "strategic communications" with dissidents and their potential supporters. That will require expanded U.S. government-supported radio and television broadcasts and much more

intensive use of the Internet to communicate with the Chinese people. For this reason, among many others, we must keep control of the Internet out of the hands of the Communist Chinese and their ilk—something the UN is currently trying to arrange. We must also develop ways of penalizing U.S. companies that help China to shut down this remarkable instrument for the free flow of information and ideas.

The United States must also maintain its support for an independent Taiwan, which provides the best model for the sort of change that would make a real difference for the Chinese people, and for the rest of us.

Because China's energy quest is driven at its core by military considerations, the U.S. response must, by necessity, also possess a military dimension.

Deterring Beijing

Because China's energy quest is driven at its core by military considerations, the U.S. response must, by necessity, also possess a military dimension—specifically, a more formidable forward presence in East Asia. Components of such a posture should include the stationing of more military assets (ships, fighter aircraft, bombers, logistical units, et cetera) in, or rotating them through, Guam, Japan, Singapore, and other friendly nations. The U.S. must also put China on notice that the inevitable result of its continuing aggressive behavior and military build-up will be to drive other states in the region to acquire their own nuclear-deterrent capability. (This outcome will be all the more certain to occur—and sooner rather than later—if the United States does not take steps to restore confidence in its own nuclear deterrent.)

Equally important is encouraging Taiwan to provide more fully for its own defense, notably by increasing its spending as a percentage of GNP and initiating immediately the long-overdue modernization of its armed forces (including the purchase of weapon systems offered by President Bush in 2001). The U.S. can assist this transformation by increasing bilateral military-to-military ties with Taiwan and fostering three-way defense relationships and exercises with two of the Free World's most important outposts in the region—Japan and Taiwan. The U.S. military also should develop and exercise contingency plans for implementing President Bush's commitment to defend Taiwan, including the deployment of sea-based missile defenses.

To assist this effort, the Bush administration must encourage other democratic regional powers, notably South Korea and India, to join us in our commitment to prevent a successful attack on Taiwan. Australia, which has said it would not come to Taiwan's aid, should be encouraged—as part of a larger effort on the part of the Free World—to revisit that decision.

Simultaneously, we must build on the efforts made to date by the Bush administration in developing our mutual interest in countering the growth of Chinese power in Asia with the nation of India. This has been a particular priority for President Bush from the day he took office. Yet, although some progress has been made, both the United States and India have acted at times in ways that raise questions about the strength of their commitment to this strate-

gic relationship—the United States due to its dealings with Pakistan and China, and India due to its dealings with China and Iran. At the same time, care needs to be exercised about compromising U.S. security interests, for example, through dismantling sensible American proliferation safeguards or weakening this country's export control arrangements in pursuit of improved relations.

Moving toward energy independence

The prospect of a Sino-American confrontation over energy has added greater urgency to an initiative that former CIA Director R. James Woolsey, former National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane and a number of other national security practitioners, including this author, are advancing. It is a plan for energy security called the "Set America Free" blueprint (details can be viewed at http://www.setamericafree.org), and it offers practical steps that can be taken immediately to begin reducing our nation's need for imported oil.

Unless such steps are taken, it would appear that we will inevitably find ourselves on a collision course with Communist China, particularly if world-wide demand for oil approaches anything like the nearly 60 percent growth that is projected to occur over the next two decades. As a practical matter, such a Sino-American conflict in fact may be unavoidable *even if* we have substantially weaned our economy from its present dependence on foreign energy. It certainly behooves us in the meantime, however, to preserve, wherever possible, for our own use domestic and offshore oil reserves owned by American companies and others to which we have reliable access.

Using our economic leverage

For too long, the United States has failed to appreciate the *strategic purpose* behind China's economic and financial transactions. The congressionally mandated U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission is an invaluable resource and "second opinion" on China for decision makers and the public alike on this topic. Since its creation in 2000, it has been examining, documenting, and reporting on various ominous aspects of the PRC's military and economic agenda. The Commission now should be asked to assess the *cumulative* effect of China's unfair trade practices, investments, technology thefts, and diversions, as well as its acquisitions of long-range, offensive military capabilities and dominant positions in strategic choke points around the world and in key industries.

Simultaneously, the Commission should be empowered to develop policy options for responding appropriately in those areas. These might include:

- Urging U.S. investors to divest immediately their equity holdings of any publicly traded Chinese companies doing business in genocide-ridden Sudan and terrorist-sponsoring Iran. (This applies also to American holders of stocks of companies willing to partner with the brutal and dangerous North Korean regime);

- Encouraging businesses in the United States to diversify their international investments and overseas commercial partnerships with Indian and Southeast Asian entrepreneurs, rather than deal largely—still less, *exclusively*—with China;

- More closely monitoring China's activities in Central and South America, and crafting strategies to publicize and challenge China's predatory trade practices, strategic/political partnerships (particularly with respect to oil and gas contracts with terrorist-sponsoring states), and weapons-proliferation practices in these regions; and

- Making the Congress more activist in shaping U.S.-China policy, particularly in the areas of trade, acquisitions in our country, the defense of Taiwan, meaningful sanctions for proliferation abuses, and championing human liberties and the free flow of information.

Averting energy conflict

The United States hardly needs a new enemy at this point. It would be a mistake, however, to think that we can neutralize what is clearly an emerging adversary by choosing to ignore its ominous activities and their implications. We will not avoid a military conflict with Communist China simply by hoping that it will not occur—or, worse yet, by thinking that we can appease the PRC, in the energy sphere or any other.

The best chance for avoiding the impending conflict lies in using the sorts of strategies outlined above. In particular, we must help the Chinese people eliminate the danger their government poses both to them and to us by dispatching the regime that has brutalized and misruled China for nearly five decades, and which will pose a growing danger to the Free World in the years ahead.

Even under a new government, China's demand for energy will assuredly continue to grow. But a less dangerous government in Beijing can be expected to adopt more market-oriented approaches to resource competition. And this, in turn, will buy us precious time to reduce our current, dangerous dependence on foreign sources of energy.

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DISPATCHES

A Problematic Partnership

Sami Kohen

ISTANBUL, TURKEY—During the decades of the Cold War, relations between the United States and Turkey were close and robust, underpinned by shared interests and reinforced by mutual participation in NATO. Today, however, things are quite different; while Turkey and the United States are still allies, diverging interests on a number of fronts have made ties between Ankara and Washington increasingly difficult.

In today's Turkey, America is still seen as a major friend and ally. Strategic cooperation with the U.S. remains a top foreign policy priority, notwithstanding Ankara's efforts to join the European Union (EU) and establish closer ties with Russia and the Arab and Islamic worlds. The two countries likewise maintain cooperation on a range of defense and security matters, and Turkey is appreciative of Washington's backing in its bid for EU membership and such regional projects as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan energy pipeline. To a large extent, Ankara has even pinned its hopes for a settlement of the Cyprus issue on American diplomacy.

Increasingly, however, new regional priorities are creating strains in the once-robust U.S.-Turkish partnership.

Iraq is unquestionably the main "irritant." Back in early 2003, taking its cues from public opinion, the Turkish government—as well as the Turkish military—rejected U.S. requests for active support in the invasion of Iraq. The Turkish parliament's subsequent rejection of a bill that would have allowed the U.S. to use its territory for a "northern front" against Saddam Hussein's regime deeply angered the Bush administration, creating a lasting chill in the bilateral relationship.

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And, although the two countries are now working together to build a stable and democratic Iraq, the negative effects have lingered. Several incidents, such as the detention and hooding of several Turkish intelligence officers in northern Iraq by the U.S. forces in 2003, have added to growing hostility on the Turkish "street." The results are unmistakable; anti-Americanism in Turkey, reflected in both popular sentiment and the mass media, has reached heretofore-unseen proportions.

Another divisive issue is the looming question of the Kurds. Iraq's Kurdish minority has already succeeded in establishing an autonomous administration in the country's north, bordering Turkey. Recent statements by Kurdish leaders further suggest that their ultimate ambition is to achieve full independence. Such a possibility frightens the Turks because of the spillover effect it could have on the ethnic Kurdish population in southeastern Turkey—to the point that government officials (and the country's military) consider it a potential *casus belli*. Worse still, the perception in Turkey is that the United States has allowed Iraq's Kurds to maintain these aspirations, and at times has even empowered them. Some in Turkey harbor suspicions that the U.S. would be willing to countenance the creation of an independent Kurdish state in the Middle East.

Most damaging of all, however, is the perception in Turkey that America has not done enough against the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK). For nearly three decades, that radical group has attempted to destabilize Turkey through a range of terrorist activities, claiming more than 30,000 lives to date. Since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime, PKK insurgents have established camps and hideouts in northern Iraq, using it as a base for hit-and-run attacks across the Iraqi–Turkish border. Turkey has repeatedly appealed the U.S. to destroy these bases and capture the rebels, but to little avail. There is deep disappointment in many corners with this state of affairs. Moreover, in the absence of American action, some nationalist observers have suggested that the Turkish army should take matters into its own hands and enter Iraq—a course of action that could profoundly destabilize Turkish-American ties.

Another irritant is the new assertiveness that is now becoming visible in Turkish foreign policy. Increasingly, Ankara has refused to follow Washington's line, particularly when it comes to Syria and Iran. This is not because Turkey does not share some American concerns toward these countries. It does. But of late, normalization with both Damascus and Tehran has become viewed as being in Turkey's best interests (making possible a common front against the PKK and Kurdish separatism in Iraq, expanding bilateral trade and economic cooperation, et cetera). What's more, Ankara has persisted with these contacts despite U.S. concerns in part because, at least officially, it believes that this policy—which positions Turkey as a facilitator—benefits the U.S. and the West.

This kind of an assertive policy may not always correspond with Washington's wishes. But these are the new realities animating Ankara's attitudes toward the United States. And they are likely to continue to make U.S.–Turkish relations a problematic partnership.

The Urge for Democracy

Akbar Atri

TEHRAN, IRAN—Today's Iranian students, too young to carry the baggage of the 1979 Revolution, are not as ideological as their elders who stormed the U.S. embassy and founded the Daftar Tahkim Vahdat (Office to Consolidate Unity, or DTV). Back then, those students provided much of the ideological motivation for the Islamic Revolution. Today, it is left to their children to correct the mistakes of the parents. And a quarter-century after it was formed to support the rule of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Tahkim Vahdat, Iran's largest national student union, has become one of the most vocal critics of the regime in Tehran.

The DTV is made up of individual Islamic students' associations from over 60 of the country's universities. Within the organization, there are two factions. The minority faction, consisting of 5 to 10 conservative Islamic students' associations that prefer to continue operating within the current political system, claims to derive its legitimacy from the early days of the Revolution, and seeks to protect the Islamic Republic from what it sees as deviation.

By contrast, the majority faction, known as "Neshast-Allameh," consists of 50 to 60 Islamic students' associations and advocates a new democratic constitution based on the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights and its covenant. The majority faction no longer believes reform of the current Iranian system is possible.

This belief finds its roots in Mohammad Khatami's betrayal. When he met with university student representatives at the DTV headquarters in December 1996, the then-candidate had promised his audience that, if elected president, he would create a society based on the "rule of law." His appeal worked; student groups pledged their support, and they campaigned for him in their towns and on their campuses. When Khatami won the presidency in a landslide victory five months later with 70 percent of the vote, he owed much of his success to Iran's students.

During the first two years of the Khatami presidency, the country's youth supported his reformist agenda with high expectations for social and political change. This belief prompted university students to demonstrate July 8-14, 1999 in support of the very policies Khatami advocated. Their impetus may have been the closing of the liberal newspaper *Salaam*, a publication that represented freedom of expression, but their main motivation was hope for liberation from the cultural and political theocracy of the Iranian regime. But the student rallies were met with violent opposition and attacks by police, members of the right-wing *Basij* militia, the secret intelligence service and the *Ansar-e Hezbollah*, Iran's most prominent militant extremists.

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Thereafter, the question on students' minds became: where was the "rule of law" that Khatami had promised? By the time the rallies came to a halt days later, the students felt betrayed by the president they had worked so hard to elect. That was the beginning of the end for the reform movement in Iran.

Today, it is important to understand the desire of the Iranian people, especially the country's young population, for a democratic and secular government. The people of Iran, a non-Arab country, have been struggling to become a democratic society for over 100 years. During this period, they have experienced injustice and manipulation by foreign powers. It is in this context that, after experiencing 26 years of theocracy under the Islamic Republic, they are ready for non-violent regime change through a national referendum for a new constitution based on universally accepted principles of human rights.

But the Iranian opposition needs help. Democratic communities abroad, with the United States in the lead, must support the Iranian people's pursuit of democracy and human rights.

So far, this has not happened. Rather, over the past quarter-century, successive American administrations have attempted, unsuccessfully, to negotiate, barter or coerce the Islamic Republic into changing its behavior. Each has been roundly rebuffed. The Iranian regime is not a reliable and stable government to negotiate with in good faith. The main reason is that its identity, in large part, derives from opposition to the United States. "Dialogue," therefore, is not only futile; it is construed as a sign of weakness in Tehran.

Regime change is the only answer. The Iranian people are ready to do their part, if the United States and other democratic countries are ready to stand with them.

Up for Grabs

Amy K. Rosenthal

ROME, ITALY—Until late December, a political transformation appeared to be brewing in Italy. After almost five years in power, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's ruling center-right coalition seemed to have lost its grip on the Italian electorate. A recent poll in the Italian newspaper *La Repubblica* told the story; Italians believe that their country's economy has worsened, and that its politicians are increasingly corrupt. Moreover, many are critical of Berlusconi's policies, including his government's support of the war in Iraq, his pro-Israel and pro-U.S. positions, and his constant rhetoric in favor of liberal economic policies. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that polls were predicting a landslide victory for the center-left, led by former European Union President Romano Prodi, in the upcoming national elections in April.

Today, however, things are not so clear-cut. For the center-left, which has long paid enormous lip service to its "moral superiority" over Berlusconi and his political allies, is now itself embroiled in a major scandal. The crisis revolves around two leaders of the Democrats of the Left (DS), Piero Fassino and Massimo D'Alema, who are currently under investigation for their roles in the hostile corporate takeover of the Italian bank Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL). The fallout has been considerable; since the scandal became public, surveys have shown declining support for the center-left, putting its chances of an April victory at serious risk.

Still, some Italian analysts believe all is not lost. The DS may be the biggest faction of the "political family" that makes up the center-left, but it is not the only one. The coalition also includes two former communist parties (Rifondazione Comunista and the Italian Communists) on the left and the Catholic Margherita and Udeur parties on the right. Experts are therefore predicting that many center-left voters will simply opt to vote for one of the other parties that make up their preferred coalition.

As these shifts indicate, Italy is entering a season of political crisis similar to the early 1990s. Back then, the scandals that rocked the Italian political system saw the fall of its post-war political giants, the Christian Democratic and Socialist parties. Today, it is the DS that is in the hot seat, but it is still unknown to what degree it will be de-legitimized in the run-up to the April 8th elections. Neither, however, is the extent of the Italian electorate's continued support for Berlusconi clear.

The outcome could profoundly affect Italy's foreign policy orientation. If the center-right wins, Italy will remain on its current path: pro-U.S., pro-Israel and supportive of the war in Iraq. On the other hand, if the center-left wins, Italy's foreign policy will venture into the unknown. Part of the Italian left—in particular, the Italian Communists, the Greens and the left wing of the DS—has repeatedly called for an immediate withdrawal of all Italian troops from Iraq.

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These parties have also emerged as outspoken critics of the Bush administration's policies in the Middle East, especially the notion of democracy promotion. By contrast, centrist and right-wing forces within the coalition—including segments of the DS and the Margherita, Udeur, Italian Social Democratic and Radical parties—take a very different stand on all of these issues.

Opponents of the center-left have speculated that its victory would legitimize the "Islamization" of Italy, given Prodi's preoccupation with enlarging the EU to include a number of volatile Middle East states, among them Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon and Syria. Those less skeptical, meanwhile, have concluded that the left will not seek to alienate the United States or upset its efforts in the Middle East, and that Italian foreign policy will not undergo any significant changes, regardless of who emerges victorious.

In the end, much depends on the current political scandal. For now, the polls still project a center-left electoral victory in April. But the historic party of ethics and morality in Italian politics has clearly been damaged, perhaps irreparably so. Its mistake was claiming to be something it most definitely is not. And this might just be enough to sway the already disillusioned Italian electorate to back Berlusconi once again.

Book Reviews

The Pakistani Paradox

Shoshana Bryen

Husain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), 395 pp., $17.95.

If Husain Haqqani's excellent *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* contented itself with recounting and clarifying the convoluted relations among Pakistan's military, intelligence and religious strongmen in a highly readable fashion, it could already be considered an important work. Were it simply focused on the extraordinary and uninterrupted string of corruption that has warped Pakistan's political and economic development and paved the way for an unholy alliance between the military and radical Islamic leaders, it would still be worthwhile reading. Were it just a chronicle of Pakistan's tenuous early existence, it would nonetheless be a timely reminder of the forces shaping contemporary Pakistani policy. And if it only outlined the troubling reality that American military and economic aid has often strengthened Islamist and/or military power at the expense of civilian control, the opposite of its intended effect, it would constitute a useful policy tool.

But *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* does much more. Haqqani, a former policy advisor to three Pakistani prime ministers who now serves as a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, provides a cautionary tale for democratic nationalists, asking and *almost* answering the question, "What is the rationale for a nation and on what

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basis do people identify with it?"

America is based on its founding documents. An immigrant can, in time and with legal sanction, "become American." Place of birth, ethnic background, color and religion then become either the stuff of ethnic festivals or, more ominously, fodder for diversity training. On the other hand, to be German is a racial identity. And, as second and third generation Turkish-German (and North African-French) citizens have discovered, racial assimilation is not an option and cultural assimilation doesn't work too well either.

So how much harder is it if there is neither a single bloodline nor a workable founding philosophy? What if you are Pakistan—ethnically, linguistically, culturally and tribally diverse, with no *raison d'être* other than to be "not India"? How do you unify society? How do you create a founding myth that serves the people? Unfortunately for the Pakistanis, according to Haqqani, "the country was created in a hurry and without giving detailed thought to various aspects of nation and state building." Instead, nationalist leaders chose the lowest common denominators: pan-Islamic ideology and the threat of India, giving enormous power to religious and military elites who over time became intertwined and linked by their desire for power.

While the chapters in *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* are not entirely chronological, they are arranged sensibly for understanding Pakistan as an ideology with a country, rather than as a country with an ideology. The chapter on the "Afghan Jihad" is worth the price of the book alone, outlining as it does the British and Russian roles in the region during the 19th Century, and detailing how Pakistan and Afghanistan have worked to undermine one another from the time of Pakistan's birth to the present. Two other chapters, "From Islamic Republic to Islamic State" and "Military Rule by Other Means," describe the early entry into politics of religious power brokers and the creeping Islamicization of Pakistan's once adamantly secular military establishment.

In his conclusion, appropriately termed "From Ideological State to Functional State," Haqqani offers a prescription for Pakistan's ills, but the medicine is difficult to swallow. He calls for Islamabad to "redefine" its objectives and "focus on economic prosperity and popular participation in governance." In other words, to find a new rationale for the country, one not focused on either India or Islam.

But how does one set about doing so? The United States, Haqqani writes, should "demand reform of those aspects of Pakistan's governance that involve the military and security services," and "no longer condone the Pakistani military's support for Islamic militants, its use of its intelligence apparatus for controlling domestic politics, and its refusal to cede power to a constitutional government." And Washington should use money "as a lever to influence Pakistan's domestic policies." But "[b]oth Pakistan's elite and their U.S. benefactors would have to participate" in such a process, Haqqani counsels.

To the extent that the U.S. can leverage a country to do the right thing for its people, it should. But after 300 pages spent examining the depth of corruption and incestuous relations between the military and religious elites, it is hard to understand which Pakistanis will emerge as partners for any change in America's approach. In this, and in this alone, Haqqani falls short.

Smoke and Mirrors

Laurent Murawiec

MATTHEW R. SIMMONS, *Twilight in the Desert: The Coming Saudi Oil Shock and the World Economy* (Hoboken, NJ: J.W. Wiley and Sons, Inc., 2005), 448 pp., $24.95.

In *Twilight in the Desert*, energy investment banker Matthew Simmons lays bare several important—and disturbing—facts about Saudi Arabia's energy future.

The first deals with the complete lack of transparency of the Saudi oil industry. Simmons states, and convincingly shows, that what information is released by the Kingdom's oil authorities is carefully tailored to the perceived needs of the Saudi royal family and their interests, and bears little, if any, resemblance to reality. According to Simmons, Saudi authorities "refus[e] to provide credible data to support [their] claims about reserves, production rates, and costs." As a result, there is no reliable estimate of Saudi oil reserves. While the Kingdom claims to have 260-plus billion barrels, Simmons tells us that this assertion could "merely reflect the *competitive need* of an otherwise minor nation to remain at the top of the OPEC reserves pecking order," or serve as "an *optimistic best guess* as to how many barrels might ultimately be produced."

Simmons' second charge deals with the remarkable inability of the ARAMCO state oil company to make any major new discoveries over a very long period of time. "After 25 years of increasingly intense geological and geophysical efforts and equally intense exploratory drilling," Simmons writes, "Saudi Arabia failed to discover any significant new fields other than the series of complex, low-productivity, tight reservoirs in the Hawtah Trend." Indeed, what discoveries have been made fall far short of the size and quality of the super-giant oil fields upon which ninety-five percent of Saudi output relies.

The third claim made by Simmons is that Saudi oil output has already peaked, and whatever returns it now yields will be diminishing. His technical argument is that the major oil fields of Saudi Arabia—Ghawar, Safaniya, Abqaiq and Berri—are "now becoming mature," meaning that they have been in production for a period typically associated with maturing (peaking). According to Simmons, a too-high pace of oil recovery, and an excessive injection of water to boost pressure, has watered down reserves and led to too-rapid depletion of recoverable petroleum. As a result, he predicts that Ghawar (the so-called "King of Oil Fields") and other major fields are nearing peak production levels, and that the era of cheap Saudi oil is coming to a close. In the process, he sweeps away the absurd and comforting (and politically-biased) forecasts

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of an unlimited potential increase in Saudi capacities and output.

Simmons' conclusions are striking. "The twilight of oil that is approaching in Saudi Arabia and across the entire Middle East will certainly make oil products much scarcer and less affordable," he writes. "As twilight descends upon Saudi Arabia and other Middle East oil producers and they can no longer furnish as much oil as the world might need, energy planners and political leaders around the world must start preparing for the likely consequences of the growing scarcity and higher costs of the commodity that underpins modern society. Once Saudi Arabia's oil output does start to fall, whenever that may happen, it will signal definitively that the world's oil supply has peaked… To ignore the risk posed by this event any longer is foolish."

True enough. But predicting the end of Saudi oil is a bit like predicting the "Big One" in California. "Nothing is so useless as a general maxim," Lord Macaulay once wrote. In the end, knowing something without knowing the "when" is close to knowing nothing.

Simmons correctly warns that the oil data is fraught with malicious manipulation, and is therefore utterly unreliable: nobody can realistically base a policy on it. He also warns that there are problems in the oil industry in the Middle East at odds with the rosy picture painted by ARAMCO and by OPEC. Indeed, the fact that for the longest of times the Saudis have enjoyed a pass on oil information (as well as on just about everything else) is both alarming and unacceptable. It ought to be U.S. policy that genuine, verifiable information on such a key commodity is indispensable. And the corresponding pressures should be put on the Saudis to make that happen.

But in order to share Simmons' conclusions, we would have to be given more information. A comprehensive comparison between Saudi statistics and known data concerning geologically-similar and geographically-close oil fields in the rest of the Gulf would have helped to lift at least part of the veil of secrecy and obfuscation—and to buttress his assessments.

Another problem is present as well. Simmons' technical expertise and familiarity with his subject is undeniable. But when he ventures into the political history of Saudi Arabia and the Middle East, the results are nothing short of disastrous. Simmons undertakes to dispel what he calls "negative stereotypes… ignorance and prejudice" regarding the Kingdom and its rulers. But in fact, he buys into the mythographic versions of Saudi history dispensed by the royal family and their propagandists lock, stock and barrel. King Abdelaziz ibn Saud is thus described as being "acutely aware of the potential for political disruption and violence stalking his kingdom as a result of Zionist efforts to create a Jewish homeland in Palestine"—a ludicrous claim which smacks of the standard ARAMCO/State Department talking points, not to mention the violently-anti-Semitic hagiographies of Ibn Saud penned by Harold St. John Philby and other pro-Nazi converts to Islam. In this retelling, King Faisal is repeatedly exonerated, and his orchestration of the oil crisis depicted as post-facto punishment of the United States "for its support for Israel in the 1973 Middle East war." This line of argument is laughable: anyone with knowledge of recent Middle East history knows that King Faisal knowingly funded the war *preparations* of Anwar Sadat. He was one of the two main *causes* of

that war. A closer reading of history tomes (such as John B. Kelly's meticulous *Arabia, the Gulf and the West*, perhaps) would have given Simmons the political and historical perspective his book sorely lacks.

In 1973, a Congressional investigation into the Oil Crisis criticized the (then-American) ARAMCO companies for having been "blinded by a film of oil." We can thank Mr. Simmons for partially removing some of the smudge that has been deposited over the decades by the Saudi rulers. His book ought to spur Congress and public opinion to demand that the Executive Branch wake from its complacent slumber.

Assad's Apologist

Oubai Shahbandar

FLYNT LEVERETT, *Inheriting Syria: Bashar's Trial by Fire* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 286 pp., $27.95.

Writing a living analysis of a dictator and his reign is a tricky affair. All too often, in their quest for objectivity, experts end up singing praises of a misunderstood "man of vision" that are very much at odds with history. In his day, Stalin had his share of starry-eyed supporters in academia and government alike, both in the United States and in Europe. Hitler did as well.

When it comes to the Middle East, this failing can be particularly acute. For many that seek to carve out their niche as experts in regional affairs, rare access to authoritarian rulers can be a powerful narcotic. It is rendered even more potent when that access is granted during particularly trying times—say, the liberation of Iraq and a pivotal period of transition among one of the region's most important states.

Flynt Leverett, a one-time CIA analyst and National Security Council staffer who now works at the Brookings Institution's Saban Center for Middle East Policy, is no stranger to this problem. During his tenure in government, Leverett was entrusted with the task of overseeing the Syria portfolio—a responsibility that he now has attempted to leverage into an insightful glimpse into a dictatorial dynasty historically shrouded in secrecy and intrigue.

Leverett, however, comes up short. His interviews with high-ranking Syrian officials, including Syrian president Bashar Assad himself, are intended to provide readers with insights into the inner workings of the regime, and they do. But they also lack proper context. Instead of taking the regime to account for its substantial deformities (including support of terror elements in Iraq, Israel, and Lebanon, a burgeoning chemical weapon program and a vibrant missile trade with Iran and North Korea), *Inheriting Syria* paints Assad as a sort of reluctant prisoner, handicapped by a corrupt, non-functioning bureaucracy and an antiquated system of governance bequeathed to him by his late father. The young Syrian dictator, Leverett argues, must move cautiously—and sometimes against his own "reformist" instincts—because of the challenge he faces from an "old guard" that sees little reason to accept substantive changes to the traditional, corrupt political and economic system. He also stresses that Assad must deal with a tenuous geopolitical environment, including the rise of radical Islamist elements in other countries and a resurgence of Islamic conservatism in Syria itself.

In the process, Leverett makes clear that he is no fan of the Bush

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administration. He views its policies as too "black and white," and ultimately counterproductive. Instead, he proffers his own set of policy recommendations, all fundamentally predicated upon one common precept: that it is possible to work in good faith with the dictator in Damascus to achieve goals mutually beneficial to both Syria and the United States.

As Leverett sees it, engaging Syria strictly through a strategy predicated upon the promotion of democracy is a non-starter. If only the Bush administration would drop its aggressive talk of democratization and its insistence on a moderation of Syrian rogue behavior, a middle ground could be found between Damascus and Washington. In Leverett's eyes, U.S. and European demands toward Syria—which include political pluralism, a rollback of state support for terrorism, and accountability for the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri—are politically untenable for a new dictator who desperately needs to maintain a strong semblance of authority.

The picture that emerges is profoundly unflattering. Leverett has either fallen for Assad's wily attempt at what the Russians call *maskirovka*, or become a willing participant in it. A full six years after his ascension to the Syrian presidency, and despite copious rhetoric to the contrary, Bashar Assad has evinced absolutely no indication of reform or moderation, either at home or abroad. Instead, like his father Hafez before him, Bashar has been able to quite literally get away with murder, as well as the proliferation of mayhem far beyond his country's borders. His strategy for governance so far has been strikingly familiar; generating crises abroad, providing low-level support for an array of terrorist entities, and entering into strategic alliances with North Korea and Iran, all based on the belief that the West does not have the political will or the desire to seriously involve itself in Syrian affairs.

Yet, in Leverett's retelling, Bashar is a "Macbeth-like figure" and Syria under the Ba'ath can be a useful contributor to U.S. security aims. The hope that Bashar will prove himself a true reformer and good faith actor reverberates throughout *Inheriting Syria*, and informs much of Leverett's case for an American strategy of fatal half-measures. All the Bush administration has to do is accede to the point that the regime is central to achieving stability in the Middle East, and therefore should be preserved.

Intended as a primer on a country that is slowly starting to take center stage on the American foreign policy agenda, *Inheriting Syria* offers few insights. At a time when the region as a whole is desperately in need of new and innovative ideas for governance and pluralism, Leverett proffers only tired and failed ones. American policymakers—to say nothing of the Syrian people—deserve far better.

A Dangerous Delusion

Asaf Romirowsky

PEDRO SANJUAN, *The UN Gang: A Memoir of Incompetence, Corruption, Espionage, Anti-Semitism and Islamic Extremism at the UN Secretariat* (New York: Doubleday, 2005), 208 pp., $24.95.

Though the world has seen many acts of genocide, the actual term was only coined some sixty years ago. In 1944, international jurist Rafael Lemkin popularized the notion in the League of Nations of what he then termed as "barbarity" (the annihilation of an ethnicity) and "vandalism" (the destruction of an ethnicity's culture). Lemkin achieved his ultimate goal in 1951, when the League's successor, the United Nations, enacted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

Lemkin's timing could not have been better. In the post-World War II era, America and the world became painfully aware of Nazi efforts to systematically annihilate European Jewry. The resulting carnage was and remains so inexplicable that until one physically goes to visit the concentration camps, what took place during the years that Hitler governed Eastern Europe cannot fully be grasped.

This historical context is important if one seeks to fully understand the history of anti-Semitism in the global arena. Because, as Pedro Sanjuan's *The UN Gang* unflinchingly details, anti-Semitism lies at the very foundation of today's United Nations, the same body that in its day accepted Lemkin's definition of genocide.

The UN Secretariat, Sanjuan says, harbors a deep obsession with anti-Semitism, and a vocal ideological opposition to both Zionism and the State of Israel. Over the years, Arab foes of both have capitalized upon these neuroses, using the UN as a vehicle to sway Western "hearts and minds" by depicting Zionism in the same manner as other fashionable enemies, such as communism and fascism. The institutionalization of this trend took place on November 10, 1975, when the UN General Assembly, by a wide margin, adopted a resolution declaring Zionism to be a form of racism.

The eminent scholar Bernard Lewis has explained that, in the eyes of Islamic radicals such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Jews are all defined as "genetically and ontologically evil." Essentially the same categorical imperative drives much of the UN's thinking when it comes to Israel.

Not surprisingly, the Palestinian agenda—and sympathy for the Palestinian cause—has infiltrated every aperture of the buildings at Turtle Bay. It has engendered Arab and Western support for the delegitimation of Israel, and facilitated comparisons between Nazism and Zionism—a false linkage that bol-

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sters Palestinian claims of oppression. Secretary General Kofi Annan's recent appearance at a UN Palestine Day event which astonishingly featured a map of the Middle East that conspicuously omitted Israel is emblematic of the way in which the UN has transformed itself into a propaganda machine for such thinking.

This rot has penetrated into the UN's specialized agencies, such as the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). A unique institution with no parallel in the UN system, UNRWA is dedicated solely to providing assistance to Palestinian refugees. Terrorism does not exclude one from being a part of UNRWA. In fact, quite the opposite is true; UNRWA-overseen hospitals and clinics routinely employ members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.

Israel dominates not only discussions of the Middle East, but also unconnected matters. Within the corridors of the UN, Sanjuan tells us, Israel is widely viewed as the most delinquent nation when it comes to human rights, well ahead of China, Sudan or North Korea. Indeed, the comparison of Israel to Nazi Germany and apartheid South Africa is taken as a "fact." Israelis in the global arena are called brutal, racist and genocidal.

The UN's deformities are certainly not confined to anti-Semitism. Sanjuan chronicles that for many UN delegates, diplomatic immunity has become synonymous with fraudulent and scandalous behavior—conduct which does not have any consequences whatsoever. This status has allowed them to spread anti-American, anti-Semitic and jihadist rhetoric right here in America.

All of this has been greeted by profound disinterest, if not active support, from the UN bureaucracy. Sanjuan recounts the reactions of then-Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar when faced with news of jihadist meetings in the Delegates Lounge: "but that is a private social club, so to speak. Anyone has a right to meet there and talk about any subject. Even Nazis can meet there for all I care."

There is perhaps no better example of the deep, systemic deformities plaguing the UN than the recent acrimonious battle over the selection of John Bolton as U.S. envoy—a political tug-of-war that closely mirrored the choice of Jeane Kirkpatrick for the same post in 1981. Those who opposed Bolton's and Kirkpatrick's nominations objected in no small part to the manner in which they dealt with the anti-Semitic and anti-American rhetoric, or with the terrorist ties that many UN member states brandish openly.

President Woodrow Wilson's vision for the League of Nations as a forum of cooperation between nations was based upon the promotion of democratic and free market values. Instead, the UN has turned into a major repository of the disease called anti-Semitism. And, instead of looking for a cure, UN members are actively looking for ways of spreading this epidemic. Perhaps if more people read Sanjuan's scathing critique, the world will have a better chance of transforming the UN into an international body that is actually representative of the totality of the global community.

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