THE Journal OF INTERNATIONAL Security Affairs

Number 11, Fall 2006

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... and Adversaries

Response

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From the Publisher

As of this writing, the UN Security Council has passed a resolution calling for a "cessation of hostilities" in the war between Hezbollah and Israel. It is an extremely one-sided resolution that addresses the terrorist and the victim as morally equivalent.

By the time this issue of *The Journal* reaches your hands, the world will have turned twelve times over. It changes by the minute. Yet if we were to acknowledge the truth about our enemy, things might seem pretty constant.

Analysts pathetically verbalize answers and insights that are simultaneously complex and shallow. There is less to analyze if you face up to the fact that the enemy is pure evil and is driven by evil.

The Iranians like to call us the "Big Satan," and Israel the "Little Satan."

In his *Paradise Lost*, John Milton, the Puritan poet, quotes Satan as saying, "Better to reign in hell, than serve in Heaven." That is the way Iran views this conflict. After centuries of lagging behind the West, a sense of inferiority and anger has set in. They remember when they were the center of cultural gravity.

Iran's leaders resent not the dominance of America and the West, but its success. Our success is their definition of American evil. The G-d of Milton was not evil. It was Satan who was evil. Satan did not like the order of things; he wanted to be in charge. That was his failing. And so it is with al-Qaeda and Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Simply put, as with Satan, if you can't improve upon it, destroy it. This is the crux of the conflict.

We can look for complicated explanations, but there is no need. We are engaged in what biblically or mythologically has been called the struggle between light and darkness.



Tom Neumann
Publisher

The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs

Translating Ideas into Policy

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Editor's Corner

The War on Terror, it seems, will be with us for quite some time. The latest indication came shortly before this issue went to press, when British authorities foiled an ambitious terrorist plot to blow up as many as 10 airliners in mid-air. Had it been successfully carried out, that plan would have killed hundreds and caused damage on an unimaginable scale. Credit for thwarting the attacks rests primarily with British authorities, but a number of foreign nations—including the United States and Pakistan—provided valuable assistance in uncovering the plot, and exposing its inner workings.

August's abortive terror attacks underscore an unmistakable fact. Given the diffuse nature of today's terrorist threat, the United States simply cannot "go it alone"—if it ever could. In today's world, Washington needs reliable allies capable of complementing and augmenting its efforts on everything from counterterrorism to counterproliferation. It is therefore more than a little fitting that this issue of *The Journal* focuses on identifying exactly who America's main international partners—and its chief adversaries—will be in the years ahead.

Our first section deals with allies. Efraim Inbar, director of Bar-Ilan University's Begin-Sadat Center for Stategic Studies, outlines the strategic bonds, old and new, underpinning the Middle East's most durable alliance: the partnership between the United States and Israel. Peter Brookes of the Heritage Foundation takes a probing look at Japan's evolving threat perceptions—and how they are bringing Tokyo closer to Washington. The University of Georgia's Anupam Srivastava offers an incisive analysis of the principles underpinning the emerging partnership between India and the United States. Svante Cornell of Johns Hopkins University's Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, meanwhile, provides a comprehensive overview of the challenges and opportunities confronting the U.S. in Central Asia and the Caucasus. For his part, counterterrorism expert Olivier Guitta explores the quiet cooperation that is taking place, away from all the public discord, between Washington and European capitals. From there, we move to Australia, as the American Foreign Policy Council's Joshua Eisenman reviews the state of America's strategic alliance "down under." Closer to home, Rob Huebert of the University of Calgary sketches the contours of America's future defense relationship with Canada. Finally, Chuck Downs, a former Pentagon policy planner, gives us a worrying glimpse into the growing rift between the United States and South Korea, as Seoul continues its drift into Pyongyang's orbit.

The second deals with adversaries. For a cutting edge treatment of Iran, we turn to the synopsis of a recent policy roundtable convened by the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs. Then, Robert Rabil of Florida Atlantic University reviews the survival strategy of Iran's major regional partner: Syria. Sino-Russian expert Alexandr Nemets, meanwhile, gives a sobering review of the burgeoning strategic ties between Moscow and Beijing—and their likely consequences for the United States. For his part, Latin American expert Luis

Fleischman identifies the next great threat emanating from the Western Hemisphere: the radical, anti-American regime of Hugo Chávez in Caracas. Last, but most certainly not least, Walid Phares of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies examines the changing nature of terrorist threats to the United States and its allies, and the likely battlefields where the War on Terror will be joined in the years ahead.

Here at *The Journal*, our objective is to foster new and creative thinking about U.S. foreign policy, so it is our distinct pleasure to inaugurate a periodic new feature which allows experts to debate the ideas published in these pages. The first such "Response" comes from Nikolas Gvosdev of *The National Interest*, who takes issue with Stephen Blank's policy prescriptions on Russia from our Spring 2006 edition.

We also have dispatches on a variety of foreign policy topics from Mexico, Slovenia and Georgia. Rounding out the issue are reviews of four important books: Joshua London's *Victory in Tripoli, The Other War* by Stephanie Gutmann, John Yoo's *The Powers of War and Peace*, and *Hamas* by Matthew Levitt.

All in all, we think that you will agree that there is plenty of food for thought in these pages.

Ilan Berman
Editor

Israel
An Enduring Union

Efraim Inbar

The strategic partnership between the U.S. and Israel has been the object of substantial criticism over the years, and again of late. Opponents have blamed the strong ties between the U.S. and Israel for resentment of America in the Arab and Muslim worlds.[1] But the proposition that the U.S. would be better off not lending its support to Israel betrays ignorance of what the Middle East really is, and of the real causes of anti-Americanism both there and elsewhere.[2] In fact, negative attitudes toward the United States and the West are deeply rooted in Arab and Muslim culture, and have little to do with American aid to Israel.

Indeed, the case for supporting Israel—built around Israel's strategic location in the region, its political stability, and its technological and military assets—is almost self-evident. Nevertheless, even self-evident truths sometimes need enunciation.

The ties that bind

Since the mid-1960s, Israel has adopted an American orientation in its foreign policy. One of the chief proponents of such a policy direction was Yitzhak Rabin, then chief of staff of the Israeli Defense Forces. For the following three decades, Rabin remained a major force in Israeli foreign policy—as prime minister (1974-77), defense minister (1984-90), and again as prime minister (1992-95)—and so did his views about the prudence of partnership

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with the United States.[3] For Rabin, as well as for all of his successors, strategic coordination with Washington was of paramount importance. Prime Ministers Benjamin Netanyahu (1996-99) and Ehud Barak (1999-2001) intensively engaged the Clinton administration in trying to promote peace-making in the region. Even Prime Minister Ariel Sharon (2001-2006), long a skeptic of the merits of alliance with the U.S., quickly learned the need for strategic coordination with Washington. He and his successor, Ehud Olmert, made sure that their planned unilateral withdrawals were presented to Washington even before obtaining the approval of their own cabinets.

Israel is one of the few countries in the world that does not see U.S. primacy in international affairs as a troubling phenomenon. If anything, Israelis fear that the U.S. may succumb to isolationist impulses and as a result give up its activist posture in the Middle East and other parts of the world.

Similarly, the gradual increase in Israel's use of force, primarily against the Palestinians since September 2000, has been continuously calibrated to a level that the U.S. has been ready to tolerate, despite the fact that more muscular Israeli responses to Palestinian terrorism would have probably been more effective and less costly to all sides in the long run. (It can be argued that a more forceful response also would have better served American interests in the long run, signaling minimum tolerance of terrorist activities and demonstrating to the Palestinians the futility of the violent course of action that they have unambiguously adopted.)

Indeed, Israel reluctantly accepts its unequal status in its bilateral relations with the U.S., and is invariably sensitive to American preferences. Perhaps the best known example of this acquiescence was Israel's restraint in response to unprovoked missile strikes from Iraq during Operation Desert Storm in 1991—a decision which served to undermine Israel's deterrence.[4] Similarly, at America's request, Israel halted diplomatic overtures to North Korea in 1994, and canceled a planned $1 billion sale of Phalcon airborne early warning systems to China in 2000. The contours of the Gaza withdrawal in 2005 were likewise defined in the framework of Israel's initial dialogue with Washington.[5]

Bilateral relations between the two countries are occasionally marred by passing tensions stemming from differing perspectives on developments in the Middle East—and from a mismatch between Israel's regional agenda and America's global strategic calculus. Nevertheless, with the advent of the 21st century, Israel is one of the few countries in the world that does not see U.S. primacy in international affairs as a troubling phenomenon. Moreover, in contrast to much of the rest of the world, Israel is not preoccupied with how to tame American power. To the contrary, Jerusalem counts on the U.S. to fend off unbalanced European policies towards the so-called Middle East peace process, and looks to Washington for support (and compensation) for the risks it takes in attempting to make peace with its neighbors. If anything, Israelis fear that the U.S. may succumb to isolationist impulses and as a result give up its activist posture in the Middle

East and other parts of the world. The difficulties that the U.S. has faced in Iraq have reinforced such apprehensions. Simply put, the relationship with Washington has been and will continue to be a central pillar of Israel's national security orientation.

Israel's pro-American foreign policy orientation is also buttressed by cultural trends. Few societies in the world tend to consume American products of all kinds—from TV programs and films to cars and cuisine—so avidly. American sports are watched regularly in Israel. American English has penetrated Hebrew discourse, with little opposition. American politics are followed intensely with great interest and admiration, and American universities are preferred by Israelis seeking to attain higher degrees. In 2006, the United States was the top destination for Israeli tourists, while America became the largest market for Israeli exports a full decade ago. All of the above make democratic Israel the most stable and reliable ally in the region for the United States.

An overlapping strategic agenda

The alliance between Israel and the U.S. is not based on a defense treaty. Israel, in particular, has been reluctant to enter into a formal alliance, instead preferring to preserve its freedom of international action. Israeli leaders have emphasized that no American soldiers are needed to defend Israel, echoing Winston Churchill's refrain: "Give us the tools and we will finish the job." Rather, the current burgeoning strategic relationship is based on a common strategic agenda that has survived and transcended the end of the Cold War.

A preference for unipolarity

The unipolar nature of the contemporary international system where the U.S. holds a dominant position will probably end some day, when a powerful-enough competitor arises. Several major powers, including Russia, France, China and even India, eagerly await such a moment, preferring a multi-polar world where American influence is diminished and curtailed. Not so Israel. While it does not carry enough weight to make much of a difference in this calculus, Israel is highly unlikely to aid in the evolution of an anti-American alliance, either now or in the future. Jerusalem clearly prefers the current distribution of power in the international system, intuitively realizing that a competitor to American interests in the Middle East will in all likelihood seek to court the enemies of Israel. Israel also backs the American policy of limiting foreign power involvement in the Middle East, and rejects demands from European and other countries for a more active role in the peace process. In other words, *Pax Americana*, not only in the Middle East but also on the Korean peninsula and in Central Asia, seems to suit Israeli interests.

Common threats

Today, the major challenges to U.S. security—among them threats to the free flow of oil, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and Islamic terrorism—all originate in the Middle East.[6] Deepening American involvement in the region has reflected this fact. The U.S. invaded Afghanistan in 2001 in order to root out al-Qaeda, and overthrew the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq two years later in order to put an end to its quest for WMD and support for anti-American forces in the region.

Similarly, although actual American policy remains in flux, Washington's antagonism toward Iran reflects the understanding that Iran's deep support for Islamic terrorism, its pursuit of WMD, and its growing regional ambitions have put it on a collision course with the U.S.

Israel clearly shares both American goals and American perceptions on these issues. Thus, although Jerusalem had considerably less enthusiasm than the U.S. about the prospects for democracy in Iraq, Israeli officials strongly supported the war against Saddam Hussein on the grounds that it removed a major strategic threat to Israel and the West. Israel also shares the American objective of resurrecting a unitary Iraqi state that can serve as a balancing force against Iran in the Gulf region. For, while Iran constitutes a major international challenge for the U.S., it represents an existential threat for Israel.[7] And although Israel is pleased with the belated international realization that Iran's ayatollahs are after a bomb, it is skeptical that diplomacy or economic pressure can contain or end Tehran's nuclear dreams. Instead, Jerusalem, like most other capitals in the Middle East, ultimately looks to American determination to prevent the strategic nightmare of a nuclear Iran. Conversely, if Israel should find the need to undertake unilateral measures against this threat, officials in Jerusalem know that they can probably count on American indulgence and at least tacit support.

Shared concerns

Other areas of strategic commonality are also visible. Both countries are concerned about the stability of the Egyptian regime and hope for a smooth transition of power after the death of current President Hosni Mubarak. Both also hope that Egypt will play a positive, moderating role with the Palestinians, particularly in Gaza. Another regional power whose foreign policy has elicited some alarm in Washington and Jerusalem is Turkey, which under the proto-Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) has begun to drift away from cooperation with both countries.

Syria has become a similar point of convergence. The United States, deeply enmeshed in Iraq, has struggled with Syrian support for the insurgency there, as well as with the Assad regime's stubborn grip on Lebanon, which endures (albeit in altered form) in spite of the 2005 "Cedar Revolution." Israel, for its part, wishes to minimize the difficulties that the United States is experiencing in Iraq, and remains concerned about Syrian sponsorship of Hezbollah, Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. The two countries also obviously compare notes on the Syrian regime and its alliance with Iran. And while so far Washington has displayed caution about exerting pressure on Damascus, if and when the U.S. government chooses to do so, Israel could prove to be a useful tool.

Consensus also exists regarding Hashemite Jordan, which is seen by both Washington and Jerusalem as a reliable ally in fighting radical Islam and Palestinian extremism. In 2003, King Abdullah displayed self-confidence and political adroitness in supporting the American invasion of Iraq (in contrast with his father's performance under similar circumstances in 1991). For its part, Israel has traditionally played an important role in providing an insurance policy to the pro-Western regime in Amman.

Even the Palestinian issue elicits much mutual understanding nowadays. Washington is inching toward Israel's minimal territorial demands by accepting the incorporation of "settlement blocs" in the final, yet to be determined, borders of Israel. The need for a security zone along the Jordan River to defend Israel (and Jordan) is also accepted by American policymakers. Moreover, despite sporadic lip service to the "roadmap" and the "two-state" paradigm by some in Washington, the current Administration has made clear that its backing for any compromise is conditional upon the emergence of a Palestinian leadership willing to live in peace with Israel and establish effective control over its territory by dismantling the myriad militias that operate there today. But since there is little chance of Palestinian society producing such a responsible leadership in the near future, the U.S. has thrown its weight behind Israel's adoption of a conflict management strategy.[8]

National security doctrine

In the post-Cold War era, there is also greater compatibility between the U.S. and Israel in terms of national security doctrine. As a superpower, the U.S. has always had great freedom of action, but this latitude has been magnified by the unipolar state of the international system. America's perceived unilateralism has garnered criticism from many corners, but Israel has not been averse to this predilection. Indeed, America's increasingly proactive strategic posture is very much in tune with Israel's own defense doctrine, which stresses self-reliance and which is skeptical of the effectiveness of multilateral action.

The U.S. also has grown closer to Israel in terms of its approach to the use of military force. In 2002, the U.S. adopted military preemption as part of its official menu of policy options.[9] Such action has been an integral part of Israeli strategic thinking and policy since the 1950s. In the wake of 9/11, Israel's preemptive posture, once a source of tension in the bilateral relationship, is now met with better understanding in Washington. Indeed, the dilemmas involved in combating terrorists, particularly in urban settings with large civilian populations, are no longer academic questions for the U.S.

America's increasingly proactive strategic posture is very much in tune with Israel's own defense doctrine, which stresses self reliance and which is skeptical of the effectiveness of multilateral action.

The gap between Washington and Jerusalem has even narrowed on a traditional area of disagreement: nuclear posture. While the U.S. was and remains committed to the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), Israel has consistently opposed joining this international regime. To a great extent, Israel's nuclear ambiguity has helped to minimize tensions surrounding this issue. Nevertheless, the 1995 NPT Review Conference could have exacerbated relations by providing an opportunity for Egypt and its allies in the Third World to pressure the U.S. to force Israel into adherence by threatening not to support the Treaty's extension. Yet, the U.S. did not apply pressure on Israel to change its position, and by eventually securing the extension of the NPT, it actually lent legitimacy to Israel's exceptionalism on the nuclear issue.[10]

Strategic cooperation

Security cooperation between Israel and the U.S. goes back a long way, and much of it takes place away from the public eye. One such area is the exchange of intelligence; while American data collection capabilities are staggering, Israel itself excels in several areas, including eavesdropping and human intelligence (humint). It is a testament to Israel's security contributions to the bilateral relationship that strategic ties between the two countries have never been stronger.

On the military front, the U.S. armed forces have intensified joint training with Israeli air, sea and land units, and avail themselves of continuous access to Israeli military experience and doctrine. In particular, since the start of the War on Terror, Israel's expertise in Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) operations has been a boon to the U.S. military. So has Israel's vast combat experience and an array of weaponry specifically tailored for the situations confronting the U.S. today. Similarly, a greater American focus on homeland security has naturally intensified cooperation with Israel, a country that has coped with such threats for decades. In turn, Israeli agencies, experts, and manufacturers of equipment for counter-terror purposes have been happy to aid American efforts to improve homeland defense.

Another area of synergy is visible in the defense-industrial arena. While the U.S. dominates the global arms market in the post-Cold War era,[11] Israel enjoys a relative technological advantage in several niches—a superiority which American firms have capitalized upon. Moreover, most of Israel's home-made weapon systems are battle proven. Initially, Israeli firms entered into partnerships with American companies in order to penetrate the American weapon market. But these partnerships have proven beneficial—and profitable—over the long run. Among other positive aspects, such business alliances have enabled Israel to purchase arms based on Israeli technology from the U.S. using U.S. military aid funds. And American-Israeli industrial partnerships can sell weapons to third parties, expanding export opportunities for both countries.

Yet this collaboration is not without its creative tensions. In the shrinking post-Cold War arms market, Israeli and American firms often compete fiercely—a fact that has, on occasion, injected tensions into the larger relationship between Washington and Jerusalem. The U.S. opposes unrestricted Israeli arms sales to a number of countries for political-strategic reasons. For example, in the past it has vetoed Israeli arms sales to China and Venezuela. Neither does Washington hesitate to use its international leverage to promote its own military industries at the expense of those of other countries (including Israel), though not always successfully.

A partnership preserved

Over the years, the strategic ties between Washington and Jerusalem have survived changing international circumstances and many bilateral tensions. Throughout, the U.S., unquestionably the senior partner, repeatedly has had the option of ending or scaling down the relationship. But Washington has generally understood the advantages of having close ties with Jerusalem. Perhaps Dov Zakheim, a former senior Pentagon official who has been deeply involved in the bilateral relationship, put it best in a recent interview: "On balance, if the relationship was not

in U.S. interests, it would have been diluted years ago."[12]

Yet today, the alliance remains as vibrant as ever. The reason is clear; the Middle East is still a troubled neighborhood—one that will continue to generate sources of global instability into the foreseeable future. In confronting these challenges, the strategic bonds that bind the United States and Israel together have proven to be both useful and durable.

1. For a recent example of this phenomenon, see John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt's controversial paper on *The Israeli Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*, which is available online athttp://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP06-011.
2. See Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, *Occidentalism. The West in the Eyes of Its Enemies* (London: Penguin Books, 2004); Barry Rubin, "The Real Roots of Arab Anti-Americanism," *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 6 (2002), 73-85.
3. Efraim Inbar, *Yitzhak Rabin and Israel's National Security* (Washington: Wilson Center and Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 34-57.
4. Efraim Inbar, "Israel and the Gulf War," in Andrew Bacevich and Efraim Inbar, eds., *The Gulf War of 1991 Reconsidered* (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 67-89.
5. Author's private communication with senior Israeli official, June 21, 2006.
6. See Steven David, "American Foreign Policy towards the Middle East: A Necessary Change," in Efraim Inbar, ed., *Israel's National Security in the 21st Century* (London: Routledge, 2006, forthcoming).
7. See Efraim Inbar, "The Need to Block a Nuclear Iran," *Middle East Review of International Affairs* 10, no. 1 (2006), http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue1/jv10no1a7.html.
8. For the elements of such a strategy, see Efraim Inbar, "The Palestinian Challenge," *Israel Affairs* 12, no. 4 (2006, forthcoming).
9. White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002, 6.
10. Gerald M. Steinberg, "The 1995 NPT Extension and Review Conference and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process," *Non-Proliferation Review* 4, no. 1 (1996), 17-29.
11. Stephanie G. Neuman, "Defense Industries and Global Dependency," *Orbis* 50, no. 3 (2006), 429-451.
12. As cited in Barbara Opall-Rome, "U.S.-Israel Alliance Proves Demanding, Yet Durable," *Defense News*, May 22, 2006, 15.

Japan
Coming of Age

Peter Brookes

Arguably, the U.S.-Japan alliance has never been better. Building on efforts begun in the latter years of the Clinton administration—and accelerated on President George W. Bush's watch by a combination of unforeseen events and determined efforts on both sides of the Pacific—bilateral security ties between Tokyo and Washington have expanded beyond all expectations. As both Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and President Bush look back over the last five years, they can take satisfaction in knowing that they have taken bold steps toward developing the U.S.-Japan alliance into a truly global partnership, capable of addressing more international security challenges than ever before.

Of course, there are still challenges to be met, and areas in which the bilateral security relationship has room to grow. But the progress of the last few years will provide a solid foundation upon which to confront the inevitable troubles, political or otherwise, that rock any relationship. Moreover, it sets the stage for a future solidification of the strategic partnership, should both countries decide that it is in their best interest to do so.

The alliance since 9/11

It would not be an exaggeration to say that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, were a seismic event in Tokyo-Washington ties. In the days after 9/11, Japan took the unprecedented step of offering to deploy a flotilla of Japanese Mari-

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time Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) support ships to the northern Arabian Sea to provide fuel oil to U.S. Navy ships involved in military operations in Afghanistan against the Taliban and al-Qaeda—Japan's first out of area, non-peacekeeping operation in post-World War II history. The initial six-month operation approved by the Japanese Diet under a special anti-terrorism law was passed in record time, and included an additional appropriation of $100 million for fuel oil. The special legislation was subsequently renewed several times for additional six-month periods, and eventually included the deployment of an Aegis-equipped Kongo-class destroyer as well. This show of political will in support of Washington gave teeth to Tokyo's famous "checkbook diplomacy," overcoming the historic criticism of Japan for its lack of concrete involvement in the 1991 Gulf War.

In the years since, Japan has made other contributions to the War on Terror. Following the conclusion of major combat operations in Iraq, Tokyo contributed $5 billion to the reconstruction effort, and led an independent effort to pressure Persian Gulf states to match its donation. In 2003, Tokyo also dispatched Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces (JGSDF) to Samawah in southern Iraq for reconstruction duties. In all, some 5,500 Japanese soldiers in 600-man detachments participated in the two-and-a-half-year deployment, making it the largest overseas deployment of the JGSDF in its history. Fortunately for sensitive Japanese public opinion, the unit saw no military action in Iraq. And today, even as the JGSDF draws down its contingent, the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force's C-130 aircraft based in Kuwait will increase its operational tempo in support of multinational forces in Iraq.

There has also been significant progress between Washington and Tokyo on another area of critical importance: missile defense. Since North Korea's unexpected launch of a *Taepo-Dong* intercontinental ballistic missile over Japan in 1998, the Japanese government has been engaged in missile defense cooperation with the United States. But, when President Bush took office, that program was in serious trouble. The Japanese Defense Agency had become increasingly skeptical of Washington's long-term commitment to missile defense. The Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency was equally frustrated with Japanese foot-dragging on commitments beyond simply joint research. The joint research program was almost defunded by the Pentagon in 2001. Fortunately, strong political leadership on missile defense by President Bush, as well as robust military diplomacy on the part of the Pentagon, rescued the joint effort from the dustbin of history.

Missile defense cooperation, spurred by China's unprecedented military build-up and North Korea's expanding nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities, has intensified dramatically in recent years. Japan has agreed to move from development to deployment of anti-missile capabilities, agreeing to outfit its Aegis-equipped destroyers with SM-3 interceptors, placing an X-band missile defense radar array in Japan, and upgrading its theater missile defense units to the next generation of the U.S. *Patriot* system. In another first, in June 2006, a Japanese Aegis-equipped destroyer participated in a successful joint missile defense exercise off Hawaii, providing accurate surveillance and tracking for the American Aegis-equipped "shooter."

Shared threats

These monumental advances, moreover, are likely to be only the beginning. There can be no doubt that a strong desire exists on the part of both the Bush and Koizumi governments not only to preserve the gains made thus far, but to improve upon them. The June 2006 Bush-Koizumi summit held in the United States yielded a joint declaration identifying common interests and objectives for the partnership—and laying an ambitious theoretical basis for the alliance's future.

These days, perhaps nothing is driving Tokyo and Washington into each other's arms more forcefully than North Korea's rogue behavior, most recently manifested by the DPRK's July 4th launch of seven ballistic missiles of various ranges into the Sea of Japan (some of which reportedly landed within Japan's 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone). In fact, North Korea has been the principal motivation for a reinvigorated security relationship between Japan and the United States for over a decade. Over the years, events like the 1994 North Korean nuclear crisis and North Korea's 1998 *Taepo-Dong* launch have helped politicos and foreign policy elites in both capitals to rediscover the enduring importance of the post-Cold War American-Japanese alliance. Tokyo has come to fundamentally understand that Japan is as much in the cross-hairs of North Korea's nuclear and missile programs as are the United States and South Korea. In truth, considering Pyongyang's current inability to strike the United States and its probable reluctance to attack its brethren in South Korea, Japan may be the nation that is today most threatened.

North Korea is not the only reason for U.S.-Japanese convergence, however. The rise of China is also creating a new focus in Washington and Tokyo. While neither country is looking to make China its next enemy, both understand that the ascendance of a new power can be a disruptive occurrence. While Chinese strategic intentions, by some estimates, are ambiguous, the significance of Beijing's growing military capabilities is not. China now has the world's third largest defense budget, and while figures are inexact due to a lack of transparency in the Chinese military budget, the Pentagon estimates Beijing's defense spending to be in the $70-90 billion per year range, according to its 2005 *Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China*. Perhaps even more troubling is the rate at which Chinese defense spending is growing—10 percent or more a year for over a decade. Washington and Tokyo must be asking themselves what Beijing plans to do with the fruits of the world's fastest growing *peacetime* defense budget.

The issue of Taiwan has also come into focus on the Japanese security horizon. While Tokyo has long opted to remain low-key on the Taiwan issue for fear of upsetting Beijing, Japan has taken a public interest in stability across the Taiwan Strait. The deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations in recent years, coupled with the rise of Chinese political, economic and military power, has led to deep concerns in Japan about Chinese intentions.

The challenges ahead

But deepening the Washington-Tokyo relationship won't necessarily be easy. There are plenty of obstacles that both sides, but especially Tokyo, will need to navigate. At the top of the list is the upcoming change in leadership slated to take place in both coun-

tries. Japan's current Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi, will step down in September, and candidates are already lining up for the 2008 presidential race. These political changes could substantially alter the Japanese-American alliance. While Bush and Koizumi "clicked" from the very beginning, as evidenced by frequent meetings, playing catch at Camp David, and Koizumi's now-famous trip to Elvis Presley's home at Graceland, there is no guarantee that future Japanese and American leaders will have this sort of close personal—and working—relationship.

There could also be a shift in policy emphasis. Five years on, it is easy to forget how the Clinton administration viewed Japan during its tenure. While some, particularly in the Pentagon, saw Japan as critical to regional security, the Clinton White House opted to put China squarely at the center of its Asia policy. Naturally, relations with Japan soured. While the Bush administration's Asia policy has been firmly focused on Japan from day one, a change in the White House in 2009 could easily bring with it a similar shift in focus.

The basing of some 50,000 U.S. forces in Japan, especially on Okinawa, also continues to be a potential flashpoint. While Tokyo and Washington have tried to be responsive to Japanese locals over the years about the noise generated by aircraft and helicopters and the occasional crimes committed by American service members, the domestic outcry continues. Both the U.S. and Japan fundamentally understand the importance of the presence of American forces in Japan to the defense of Japan, a North Korean contingency and as a hedge against China's military build-up. But despite creative solutions proposed by both sides (such as the redeployment of 8,000 Marines and 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam), problems remain. In some cases, it is the local Japanese who are the problem. In others, it is U.S. congressional objections over financial "burden-sharing" and host nation support. And sometimes, it is Japanese domestic politics or tight purse strings in Tokyo that get in the way. Whatever the reasons, finding the right fit for a continued U.S. military presence in Japan will be a thorny subject for the foreseeable future.

A deepening of ties also is potentially hampered by Japan's pacifist constitution. Drafted in the aftermath of World War II by American occupiers, Article 9 of the Japanese constitution forbids Japan from using military force as an instrument of foreign policy to settle disputes, but allows the country to defend itself. By long-standing interpretation, Article 9 also prevents Japan from involving itself in collective self-defense. According to current views, Japanese forces may only be used in the defense of Japan, hence their non-threatening name. There is no Japanese army, navy or air force *per se*, but rather contingents of Self-Defense Forces. Currently, Japanese forces do not even have the constitutional authority to defend U.S. forces, unless doing so was seen as contributing to the defense of Japan. The U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty is not, in fact, a "mutual" defense pact, like NATO's formative document, the North Atlantic Treaty, where an armed attack on one is interpreted as an armed attack on all. Should the United States come under attack, Japan is under no obligation to come to America's defense. It might do so, but under current circumstances the Japanese parliament, or Diet, would have to pass legislation to allow Japanese forces to exceed their current con-

stitutional mandate. And in the past, with the possible exception of special anti-terrorist legislation passed in the aftermath of 9/11, this legislative process has been highly politicized and painfully slow.

Nevertheless, change may be on the horizon. While Japan largely considers itself a pacifist nation, the summer 2006 North Korean missile launches may have precipitated a significant shift in Japanese security thinking. In the days after North Korea launched its missiles into the Sea of Japan, several senior Japanese officials, including the government's leading spokesman, Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe, announced that Japan should look at its constitution to see whether it would allow for developing the military capabilities to launch a pre-emptive attack against North Korean missile facilities as an act of self-defense. Abe, the frontrunner to replace Koizumi as premier, has been a leading voice in Japanese conservative political circles to revise the constitution to allow Japan to build armed forces commensurate with Japan's political and economic role in the world. And Abe is not alone; the head of the Japanese Defense Agency, Fukushiro Nukaga, has also publicly supported such a re-conception of the use of force "if an enemy country definitely has a way of attacking Japan and has its finger on the trigger."[1]

Some analysts believe that conservative politicians like Abe may be seizing on the North Korean missile tests in hopes that public anger will increase support for revising the constitution. But while these comments are striking, they are not entirely unexpected. In recent years, Japanese government officials have begun openly discussing whether Japan should add offensive weapons, such as air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, to its military arsenal. In February 2003, Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba warned that Japan would attack North Korea if it had evidence Pyongyang was preparing to launch ballistic missiles, going so far as to indicate that Japan could regard the process of fueling a missile as the start of military attack, according to an interview with Reuters. Ishiba's statement, at that time absent a provocation similar to the July 2006 missile tests, may have sent tremors throughout East Asia, but, equally importantly, it was a telling indicator of Japan's growing frustration with—and worry over—Pyongyang's behavior.

In the driver's seat

Clearly, Japan is rethinking its security. Not everyone in the region will view Japan's efforts in the same way. While the U.S. may see Japan's desire to expand its contributions to international security in the context of the bilateral alliance as a net benefit, other Asian neighbors may view it as provocative, especially considering Japan's militarism during the 20th century. Despite the relatively small size of Japan's armed forces (which number some 240,000) compared with other regional militaries, outcry from China as well as South Korea could potentially slow Japan's efforts to become a more "normal" nation. While Beijing and Seoul cannot directly affect the pace of change in Japan's security policy, a desire to avoid public controversy over its past history may play a role in slowing the pace of change in Tokyo's security thinking.

And there is no doubt that there will be a significant debate within Japan about hitching itself more fully to America's wagon. U.S. foreign policy in Japan is not without controversy. While the invasion of Afghanistan after 9/11 was popular

and deemed to be fully justified, the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 received only mixed support. And the fact that the Iraq war has dragged on for over three years now has convinced the average Japanese that the United States is not omniscient—or omnipotent. While the United States and Japan share many similar values, because of the ongoing challenges in Iraq there is a healthy dose of skepticism among the Japanese public about being swept up in American "adventurism" overseas that may not directly benefit perceived Japanese interests. For instance, some Japanese scholars, while generally concerned about the rise of China, have no interest in getting involved in a Sino-American donnybrook over Taiwan's future, especially if Taipei mismanages cross-Strait relations. Of course, other Japanese security specialists realize that the disposition of Taiwan's future could have a serious effect on Japan too, noting that the island nation is a strategic piece of real estate connecting Northeast Asian and Southeast Asian sea lanes, on which Japan is heavily dependent, especially for its energy needs.

But there are a number of international security threats upon which the United States and Japan can certainly agree. Islamic terrorism, sea piracy and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are critical issues for both countries, and there has been notable progress in some of these areas, including Tokyo's accession to the Bush administration's premier counterproliferation partnership, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Yet, so far, these advances have been *ad hoc* in nature. In the future, both sides need to seek ways to build upon them by forging a durable, global partnership capable of advancing mutual interests.

It makes sense that two of the world's most powerful democracies, which share common interests and values such as economic and political freedom, should work together to advance stability, security and prosperity in Asia—and beyond. This won't necessarily be easy, but it should certainly be endeavored.

The U.S.-Japan alliance, while not perfect, is much more ready to face 21st century threats than it was just five years ago. There is still room for improvement in terms of bilateral coordination, planning and interoperability. Political constraints are also present; absent a crisis such as another North Korean provocation, it is unlikely that there will be much more progress in the bilateral security relationship while Japan transitions to new leadership. But the political transition to the post-Koizumi era won't last forever, and Japan will need to make some difficult decisions in the years ahead if it wants the bilateral security relationship to grow beyond the Bush-Koizumi legacy. For right now, Washington is a willing partner in this endeavor, and holds high hopes for further progress.

As such, the future of the bilateral security relationship by and large rests in Japan's hands. With appropriate attention, proper tending and enlightened leadership, the alliance has the potential to become the bedrock of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as a powerful force for dealing with both regional and global challenges. It is up to officials in Tokyo to make this vision a reality.

1. Martin Fackler, "Tokyo Talks of Military Strike on North Korea," *International Herald Tribune*, July 10, 2006, http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/07/10/news/japan.php.

India

Toward True Partnership

Anupam Srivastava

The horrific events of 9/11 re-ignited a long-running debate in the United States. Should America "retreat" behind its oceanic boundaries, or adopt a more muscular foreign policy to proactively shape outcomes to suit its interests? The Bush administration unwaveringly chose the latter. Its response to the attacks of September 11th marked the end of the "post-Cold War era"—a nebulous decade that had defied easy characterization. U.S. retaliatory strikes against Afghanistan in November 2001 signaled the start of the Global War on Terror (GWOT). The theater subsequently was expanded by American preemptive strikes against Iraq in March 2003. Unmistakably, a new era was in the making.

Three issues will be critical to the United States maintaining this momentum in the years ahead. The first is to control the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery, and to create new "coalitions of the willing" to do so. A second priority is to combat state and non-state sponsors of terrorism. The third objective is to promote democracy in governance—both to ameliorate the marginalization that gives rise to terrorism and to improve the accountability of state actors. To implement these objectives, the Bush administration has emphasized creating cooperative frameworks for regional security. This has entailed constructing strong, if bounded, partnerships with "pivotal states" in key regions of the world.[1]

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It is no wonder, therefore, that Washington has gravitated toward greater cooperation with New Delhi. India's size and location—a sub-continent-sized country with long maritime borders, situated strategically between the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Malacca—make it an indispensable ally for the United States in South Asia. And, while a host of reasons made them "estranged democracies"[2] during the Cold War, the revised priorities now animating U.S. policy discourse resonate strongly with India's new pragmatism and aspiration.

A reorientation in New Delhi

One of the biggest dividends of the economic reforms begun in New Delhi in 1991 was the gradual emergence of a new, less ideological and more pragmatic international posture. By the mid-1990s, this pragmatism had begun to animate India's security discourse. At the same time, the paradigm shift generated by the end of the Cold War underscored the importance of re-engaging the United States.

Conceptually, India's post-Cold War strategic frontiers can be divided into three concentric circles. The innermost ring represents South Asia (including Pakistan and Central Asia), the middle ring is Asia (including relations with Russia, China, and Southeast Asia), and the outermost circle is international (including other actors and factors).[3] While it evolved independent of Washington, New Delhi's strategic perceptions were similar to those of the United States—a congruence that has facilitated the deepening of bilateral ties on a number of fronts.

Proliferation

The United States today faces the challenge of retooling multilateral institutions to better address the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. Of the treaty-based institutions, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is the only one that seeks to eliminate an entire class of WMD. Its disarmament focus resonates with India, and although the country surprised many by declaring that it had developed a small CW arsenal, India and the United States are the only two countries that have met their scheduled CW destruction targets so far.

On the nuclear front, the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) remains the cornerstone of global non-proliferation efforts. But, unlike the CWC's mandate of comprehensive disarmament, the NPT is saddled with the division of countries into "haves" (the P-5) and "have-nots," with the former adopting a lackadaisical approach toward arms reduction. The effectiveness—and the legitimacy—of the NPT is further called into question by three states that have never joined (India, Pakistan and Israel) and three that are members in poor standing or who have withdrawn from the treaty (Iraq, Iran and North Korea).

Regarding the latter category, India contended that Saddam Hus sein's regime had not sufficiently reconstituted its WMD program to warrant preemptive military strikes, or that such a course of action would be prudent from the standpoint of Iraq's long-term stability. India's attitudes were informed by the existence of a large Indian expatriate population in the Middle East, and by the worry that involvement in the conflict risked radicalizing its large Muslim population at home. These issues were vigorously debated, and India ultimately decided not to send

troops to Iraq, although it has otherwise participated in post-war reconstruction efforts.

India's relations with Iran have recently been portrayed as the "litmus test" of its sincerity to partner with the United States. Indeed, India long has had close economic, social and cultural ties with Iran, given their proximity and civilizational bonds. But during the Cold War, New Delhi was repeatedly disappointed by the lack of support from Tehran when Islamabad tabled resolutions condemning the Indian "occupation of Kashmir" at various meetings of the OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference). Bilateral ties were strained further with the rise of radical Islam in Iran following the Islamic Revolution of 1979, and when India subsequently learned of a secret understanding that Iran would assist Pakistan in a future war with India.[4] Nevertheless, today, India's growing energy requirements have persuaded New Delhi to negotiate the construction of a pipeline to transport Iranian oil via Pakistan into India.

But cooperation is not collusion. New Delhi has made clear that it would not be in its interests if Iran were to develop or acquire a nuclear weapons capability. That is the reason why, in line with U.S. expectations, India has voted twice at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to refer Iran to the United Nations Security Council. And while India might have preferred to abstain, India's national interest ultimately coincides with U.S. desires to prevent Iran from making further progress toward an atomic bomb.

When it comes to North Korea, by contrast, there is no ambiguity in India's opposition to the DPRK's dangerous quest for a nuclear capability. India had long articulated its concerns over Pakistan's involvement in the funneling of uranium enrichment technology to North Korea in return for material assistance to bolster its missile capabilities.[5] This nuclear-missile "swap" made eminent sense for both countries, providing Pyongyang with a convenient route for fissile material production and allowing Islamabad to benefit from North Korean upgrades to its Chinese-origin medium-range missiles.

In addition to sharing concerns over these regional security challenges, New Delhi has demonstrated growing affinity for Washington's new initiatives to interdict proliferation: the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Container Security Initiative (CSI). The first is a coalition of over 65 countries that cooperate in real time to board ships in docks and territorial waters or on the high seas to interdict prohibited WMD-relevant cargo and personnel. India, like several other countries, is debating whether interdiction on the high seas constitutes an infringement of international law. The second is an effort to upgrade technical, procedural and personnel safeguards to improve security and verification of international-bound cargo loaded onto ships and aircraft. And, while still the subject of considerable domestic debate, India has begun to respond positively on both fronts.

Missile defense and nuclear energy

An important indicator that New Delhi will support Washington's attempts to restructure international security came in 2004. India was among the earliest supporters of the U.S. move away from the ABM Treaty and toward the deployment of a missile defense system. India's support was logical; it had itself been working for years to develop such a capabil-

ity, albeit on a much smaller scale. India's open-architecture, multi-layered system seeks to integrate Russian platforms (the S-300 PMU-1 for its army and S-300-V for its air force) and AWACS systems (using *Antonov* or *Ilyushin* aircraft) with the indigenously-made "Rajendra" radar and short-range missiles.

America, in turn, has begun to engage India on this issue. U.S. approval has paved the way for the integration of Israeli technology—namely the *Green Pine* radar and *Arrow* interceptors—into Indian capabilities. Washington has also offered India a customized version of the Patriot Advanced Capability theater missile defense system (PAC-2 or PAC-3), and allowed Indian scientists and military officers to witness live missile defense tests on U.S. soil on at least three occasions since 2003.

But perhaps the single most significant indicator of Washington's attempts to engage New Delhi is the proposed civil nuclear cooperation agreement between the two countries. This deal, struck in July 2005, in essence requires India to separate all of its civilian nuclear facilities from its weapons complex and place the former under the safeguards of the IAEA. In return, the United States has pledged to amend its domestic laws and international provisions in order to permit participation in India's civilian nuclear complex. The core rationale is to create a pragmatic mechanism to end decades of embargoes against India, a non-NPT member that first tested a nuclear device in 1974, and help it meet its growing energy needs.

Two significant wider benefits are associated with this so-called "nuclear deal." First, India currently produces 3,300mW of electricity through its indigenous nuclear program—barely 2.8 percent of its total energy requirements. If this deal comes to fruition, New Delhi has set the target of generating more than ten times that amount via nuclear energy by 2025. Even if this target is only partially reached, the deal will reduce the upward pressure on global oil prices because India is the 6th largest consumer of oil and the 10th largest economy in the world, and its economy is expected to continue growing at about 7-8 percent annually for the foreseeable future.

The second benefit is in the non-proliferation arena. Under this agreement, reaffirmed in March 2006 during President Bush's visit to New Delhi, the Indian government provided a blueprint to separate 65 percent of its nuclear complex—including power reactors, research facilities, and designated fuel fabrication and mining facilities—and place it under IAEA safeguards by the year 2014. In addition, this deal will bring a vast majority of India's currently unprotected fissile material, which accounts for over 50 percent of the world's total, under IAEA safeguards. At a time when an international consensus to negotiate a fissile material cut-off treaty remains elusive, this represents a significant interim development.

This "paradigm-shifting" deal has sparked an intense domestic debate in both countries, and elsewhere. Discussing the relative merits of those arguments is beyond the scope of this article,[6] but it is safe to say that this agreement represents a crucial success for the Bush administration, which recognized the need to move beyond America's historic predominantly sanctions-based dialogue with India. To be sure, India's strong export controls and its commitment not to proliferate beyond its borders might have continued, but until now

the international community had little direct leverage to ensure Indian compliance. The Bush administration's incentives-based approach matches rewards with correspondingly greater Indian obligations. The results have been unmistakable: India has already harmonized its nuclear and missile control lists with those of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime, and is improving its export control regulations.[7] India is also working to harmonize its dual-use control lists in the chemical, biological and advanced conventional weapons spheres with those of the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement.

Taken together, these multilateral export control regimes are critical to the success of global nonproliferation. And the nuclear deal forged between Washington and New Delhi has generated more cooperation from India vis-à-vis these regimes than two decades of inflexible dialogue had accomplished.

Counterterrorism and democracy promotion

The United States, as the world's most powerful democracy, and India, as the largest one, share the view that terrorism has to be fought simultaneously on two fronts: by fostering transparent, accountable institutions and destroying terror networks. Indo-U.S. cooperation, therefore, is most visible in their leadership of the Conference on Democracy at the United Nations, in which both sides have pledged substantial amounts toward the creation of a Democracy Fund.[8]

At the same time, Washington and New Delhi have intensified coordination and are pursuing a subtle "carrot and stick" approach to promote democracy in South Asia. They are cooperating to curb Islamic radicalism in Bangladesh by improving economic conditions and facilitating its integration into the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). At the same time, India in 2005 ensured that the United States was granted "observer status" within SAARC, facilitating U.S. trade, investment and broader economic cooperation with the region. Indo-U.S. technical cooperation, meanwhile, is focused on assisting Dhaka to disrupt the financial and logistical networks of terrorism in Bangladesh and their connections abroad.

Similarly, in Nepal, the festering Maoist rebellion has fused with broader dissatisfaction against the monarchy for its increasingly autocratic rule. The United States and India have conditioned further arms supplies to the regime of King Gyanendra on the provision of greater powers to the parliament, and linked closer economic cooperation to Nepal complying with its obligations under SAARC. Greater Indo-U.S. coordination is also visible in their efforts to address the festering Tamil-Sinhala struggle in Sri Lanka. Washington and New Delhi have expanded economic cooperation with Colombo but reduced their direct presence, instead encouraging the negotiated settlement mediated by Norway. At the same time, U.S. and Indian naval and intelligence teams have cooperated to intercept arms shipments to the Tamil separatists, while maintaining pressure on the government in Colombo to enter into a durable power-sharing agreement with the rebels and to strengthen democratic institutions in the provinces of the war-torn country.

The United States and India are also deepening their interaction on the maritime security front. Under a February 2001 agreement, the Indian

navy has escorted high-value U.S. commercial ships through the Indian Ocean up to the Strait of Malacca, and permits American ships to refuel at southern Indian ports, saving them a 1,700-kilometer detour to Diego Garcia. The 2002 signing of the Generalized Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) has facilitated real time cooperation against piracy and drug interdiction, as well as in search-and-rescue and joint patrol operations. The U.S. Pacific Command has conducted a series of increasingly significant naval exercises with India involving aircraft carriers, frigates and guided missile destroyers, and plans to deploy technical assets on Indian ships for improved coordination and execution of joint tasks. Securing the sea lanes between the Persian Gulf and Southeast Asia is a critical objective of Indo-U.S. cooperation, because over 45 percent of international maritime commerce transits through these dangerous waters, which are prone to drug and small arms trafficking and WMD-sensitive proliferation. The swift coordination of Indian, U.S. and Japanese naval assets within hours of the *tsunami* catastrophe in December 2004, including the de-mining of the Sri Lankan ports to expedite rescue efforts, was a concrete example of this growing effectiveness.

Transforming security cooperation

Although for different reasons, New Delhi and Washington increasingly agree on the value of diversifying India's military arsenal from its predominantly Russian-based platforms toward Western systems. To India, in the midst of modernizing the world's fourth largest military, such a step provides better terms-of-trade in defense cooperation. The benefits for the U.S. are also clear; India compares favorably in recent Pentagon assessments with other American allies in East Asia regarding the utility and cost of joint armaments production. From Washington's standpoint, therefore, enhanced cooperation will secure a larger share of India's defense procurement and facilitate greater military interoperability on a range of shared missions in Asia.

Bilateral defense ties between Washington and New Delhi received a big boost in June 2005, when Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Indian Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee signed a landmark 10-year agreement expanding defense cooperation.[9] The bilateral Defense Policy Group (DPG) remains the chief policy body overseeing defense ties, and under its aegis bilateral military contacts have expanded rapidly. The Indian and U.S. armies, air forces and navies have conducted over 20 increasingly complex exercises since 2002,[10] while collaboration in defense R&D, network-centric warfare, and technology co-production have all increased.[11]

These initiatives—and the lifting of U.S. sanctions—have enabled some major sales of U.S. technology to India. During 2004-05, India purchased counterterrorism equipment worth $29 million for its special forces, $105 million-worth of electronic ground sensors to contain militant infiltration in Kashmir, and spent $40 million of self-protection systems for aircraft that carry the Indian political leadership.[12] Current U.S. defense offers to India total well over $1 billion, and include maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft, multi-role combat aircraft (F-16s and F/A-18s), anti-missile systems (PAC-2 or PAC-3), and the offer to transfer the USS *Trenton* amphibious transport ship to India in early 2007.[13]

Through the looking glass

Today, the burgeoning ties between the U.S. and India are both bolstered and reinforced by complementary strategic outlooks. India is a "net revisionist" state that desires international recognition for its growing capabilities and track record of responsible governance. The United States, for its part, wants to reorder world politics so that it can respond more effectively to new challenges confronting the global community.

But is an alliance between the two feasible in the near term? The answer is no, for four key reasons. First, the absolute "power gap" between the two countries is so great that India currently lacks the requisite military resources and domestic political consensus to become a U.S. partner in missions other than humanitarian and preventive diplomacy efforts. Second, while both countries share concerns about the future behavior of China, Washington and New Delhi alike have opted to expand economic and diplomatic ties with the PRC. If Beijing's behavior becomes coercive or confrontational, India would be loath to enter into a U.S.-led coalition unless its interests were directly threatened.

Third, New Delhi and Washington sharply disagree on the means to be adopted to achieve their shared goals regarding Pakistan—assisting it to become a moderate Islamic state with greater democracy, at peace with itself and its neighbors. India contends that Pakistan's armed forces, in cooperation with the landed aristocracy and civilian bureaucracy, have consistently undermined democracy by dominating the country's economic, political and security arena.[14] Since the early 1990s, this *troika* has calibrated the use of radical Islamic groups to pursue its aggressive goals regarding Kashmir, at low cost to itself. As such, Kashmir is a violent manifestation of a larger anti-India agenda—one that will impede bilateral relations between the two countries even if a negotiated settlement of Kashmir can be achieved.[15] The July 2006 Mumbai blasts have reinforced these views in many Indian minds.[16] While Washington has belatedly begun to share a diluted version of this assessment, it has repeatedly subordinated its demands for Pakistani democracy and an end to the insurgency against India in favor of more pressing U.S. goals (such as counterterrorism cooperation in Afghanistan and Central Asia). As such, American policies toward Pakistan will continue to cast a long—and negative—shadow on U.S.-India ties.

Finally, while the senior leadership in Washington and New Delhi is committed to transforming bilateral ties, the legislatures and wider expert communities in both countries still retain a measure of Cold War era mistrust. While this has begun to change, it will still take time for the new paradigm of U.S.-India cooperation to be accepted and embraced.

All of this begs the question: is an alliance feasible, or even desirable, in the medium to longer term? The answer is that at least three factors will fundamentally reshape bilateral calculations so that the partnership will progressively yield benefits comparable to those of an alliance. First, the two economies are becoming rapidly integrated in a range of civilian and military sectors. Second, the two-million-strong Indian-American community will not only remain a powerful "human bridge" between the two countries, but become an increas-

ingly persuasive "policy bridge" as well, arguing in favor of Indian freedom of action abroad. Third, the old Communist adage reminds us that "one's class perception is a function of one's class position." As India moves to a higher position in the hierarchy of nations, its interests and behavior might converge more fully with those of the United States, and will serve to transform it into a valuable, if spirited, American ally.

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2. Dennis Kux, *India and the United States: Estranged Democracies* 1941 – 1991 (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1992).
3. For a detailed assessment using the concentric circle schematic, see Anupam Srivastava, "The Strategic Context of Evolving Indo-US Ties," in Satish Kumar, ed., *India's National Security: Annual Review 2002* (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2003), 88-114. A brief reference to this schematic also appears in C. Raja Mohan, "India and the Balance of Power," in *Foreign Affairs*, Special Section, "The Rise of India," July/August 2006.
4. Author's off-the-record conversation with a senior member of the Indian security establishment, April 13, 2006. For a recent report on this subject, see Willard Payne, "Crossfire War - Iran - Pakistan Increase Military Cooperation - Target India," newsblaze.com, July 19, 2006, http://newsblaze.com/story/20060719090849payn.nb/topstory.html.
5. David Sanger and William Broad, "Pakistan May Have Aided North Korea A-Test," *New York Times*, February 28, 2004
6. For a detailed assessment of the nuclear deal, see Anupam Srivastava and Seema Gahlaut, "The New Energy in US-India Relations," *Defense and Security Analyses*, December 2006, forthcoming. For specific accounts of non-proliferation related criticisms of the deal, see material available at www.ArmsControlToday.org. For a comprehensive technical account of the benefits of the nuclear deal, see Ashley J. Tellis, "Atoms for War? U.S.-Indian Civilian Nuclear Cooperation and India's Nuclear Arsenal," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Report*, June 2006, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/atomsforwarfinal4.pdf.
7. For a comprehensive detailed account of Indian export controls and related details, see Seema Gahlaut and Anupam Srivastava, *Nonproliferation Export Controls in India: Update 2005* (Athens: Center for International Trade and Security, 2005).
8. "Transforming India-US Relations: Building a Strategic Partnership," Address by Indian Foreign Secretary Mr. Shyam Saran at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., December 21, 2005.
9. For the full text of the agreement, see *Aspects of India's Economy* no. 41, December 2005, http://www.rupe-india.org/41/app5.html.
10. Ashley J. Tellis, *India as a New Global Power: An Action Agenda for the United States* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/CEIP_India_strategy_2006.FINAL.pdf.
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Eurasia

Crisis and Opportunity

Svante E. Cornell

In the wake of September 11th, America identified important interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus. In the short term, the focus was on planning and sustaining military operations in Afghanistan. With strategic access crucial to the prosecution of the war, the republics of Central Asia took center stage in the most important conflict to confront the United States in decades. Although less prominently covered in the media, the states of the South Caucasus were equally vital; situated between Iran and Russia, they were the only practical corridor connecting NATO territory with Central Asia and Afghanistan.

The resulting diplomatic and political effort was remarkable. Within weeks, Washington had not only secured transit, refueling and landing rights in most countries in the region, but had established a major military presence on the ground as well (in southern Uzbekistan and northern Kyrgyzstan, respectively). This achievement is not to be underestimated. The great powers of the region, mainly Russia and China, were adamantly opposed to an American military presence in what they viewed as their geopolitical backyard. Local states, meanwhile, were worried about the long-term consequences of allying with the U.S. The American withdrawal from the Afghan conflict in 1989 and its implications for Pakistan were still fresh in regional memory, while the results of the current conflict were by no means evident. Indeed, concerns regard-

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ing America's staying power were already potent factors at this stage, leading Uzbekistan to seek to put its relationship with Washington in writing in the form of a formal document on strategic partnership.

But if America's short-term goals in the campaign against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan were effectively achieved, the same cannot be said for its long-term interests. These can be roughly separated into three categories.

The first relates to "hard" security matters. Given the realization that America was engaged in a "long war," preserving strategic access to Central Asia and the Caucasus became an important strategic priority. Second, the United States has long worked for the westward export of the Caspian region's energy resources, and this gradually became an even more important issue as energy markets tightened and oil prices soared. Third, the U.S. sought internal reform in the mainly authoritarian countries of Central Eurasia. This objective was both a principled and a pragmatic one. Supporting democratization and human rights had become a moral element of Western foreign policy, shared by both the U.S. and the European Union. Moreover, democracy was increasingly understood as a way of tackling the perceived root causes of terrorism, namely socio-economic backwardness and political repression.

In the years after 9/11, U.S. policymakers have come under fire, both at home and abroad, for these priorities. Security concerns, critics say, have led Washington to once again ally with dictators, thereby ignoring human rights and democracy. But the governments of the Caucasus and Central Asia are not monolithic. In all of them, forces favoring reform coexist with those favoring authoritarian rule, the latter often deeply corrupt. Aware of the U.S. and European emphasis on democracy promotion, the corrupt forces are typically opponents of westward orientation and of Euro-Atlantic integration. They instead favor a closer relationship with Russia, which pays little or no attention to the domestic characteristics of government. On the other hand, advocates of reform are typically pro-western, seeing in western institutions the tools, assistance, and guidance for meaningful reform. In this situation, ignoring or shunning state institutions undermines the very progressive forces that are the best hope for gradual political and economic reform, and strengthens the hand of the autocratic forces that western policies are designed to counter. Isolation, exclusion and finger-pointing, which some in the west advocate as the preferred policy toward countries perceived to not comply fully with international standards, are the safest ways to ensure the victory of authoritarian-minded forces there. Instead, engagement and the development of broad relations in multiple fields provide the best course of action for the long-term strengthening of sovereignty, governance, and democracy.

Clearly, interests in security or energy should not be allowed to stifle democratic and institutional reform in the region. But neither should excessive demands for these countries to achieve overnight a level of democracy comparable to leading western states be allowed to suppress legitimate security and energy interests—or, for that matter, the development of trade relations. It is in America's interest to advance these three sets of issues simultaneously, not allowing one to take precedence over the other.

Seeing Eurasia straight

Western governments and international institutions alike have long seen the Caucasus and Central Asia as one and the same, failing to take into account the fundamental differences, both political and strategic, that exist between the two regions. Simply put, the Caucasus is both mentally and geographically closer to the European orbit than is Central Asia. However brief, all three countries in the South Caucasus—Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia—have prior histories of statehood. By contrast, the five states of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) emerged as sovereign nations for the first time in 1991. Prior to their creation as Soviet republics in the 1920s, no entities had ever existed with borders or names that approximated these five entities.

Since independence, Central Asia and the Caucasus have developed in diverging directions. In Central Asia, political pluralism and civil society have progressed slowly, finding roots only in the nomadic societies of Kyrgyzstan (and to some degree Kazakhstan), and prospects for democracy are limited. In the South Caucasus, by contrast, a true tug of war between equally strong forces favoring authoritarianism and democracy has developed. This is most obvious in Georgia, where the "Rose Revolution" of 2003 brought to power a new generation of political leaders committed to meaningful reforms. But also in Armenia and Azerbaijan, young, western-oriented forces exist alongside the older, Soviet *nomenklatura* in government, gradually replacing it in a measured and excruciating process.

The regions also diverge in strategic terms. Central Asia got most attention after 9/11 due its proximity to Afghanistan. Indeed, access to Central Asia will remain an important objective for the United States, given the reality of a long-term engagement in the War on Terror's first front.

Western governments and international institutions alike have long seen the Caucasus and Central Asia as one and the same, failing to take into account the fundamental differences, both political and strategic, that exist between the two regions.

Moreover, the ability to project power into the heart of Asia, a region surrounded by Russia, China, Iran and the Indian subcontinent, is crucial for the global role of the U.S. But the Caucasus plays a more complex—and arguably more important—strategic role. To begin with, the region is the corridor through which the West can access Central Asia. This was most obviously shown after 9/11, as virtually all Coalition flights destined for Afghanistan transited the Caucasus, given the unavailability of Iranian and Russian airspace. Secondly, as the eastern shore of the Black Sea, the Caucasus is part of an emerging Black Sea region that will form the southeastern corner of Europe—making the EU an increasingly involved actor there. Third, the Caucasus borders the Middle East, and its border with Iran is particularly important to American interests. Fourth, the completion in 2006 of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline and the accompanying South Caucasus natural gas Pipeline (SCP) makes the Caucasus an integrated part of European energy architec-

ture, a role that is only likely to grow in the future, providing Central Asian producers an independent export route to the West. Finally, the three states of the Caucasus are growing into increasingly solid components of European security through their burgeoning relationships with NATO.

These differences mean that Washington has different prospects in the two regions. In Central Asia, especially after the 2005 collapse of its relationship with Uzbekistan, the U.S. will be forced to work to preserve its presence and regain lost ground. This will require engagement, primarily with Kazakhstan and the smaller countries of the region, pending political change in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. In the Caucasus, on the other hand, American policymakers have far greater ability to work with friendly powers and leaders in order to secure the region, help resolve its conflicts, speed up and support reforms, and strengthen integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions.

The South Caucasus: quarreling allies

The South Caucasus poses a particular challenge for the United States. All states in the region have a stated Euro-Atlantic orientation and attach great importance to relations with Washington. Yet the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and the internal conflicts in Georgia—which have pitted the central government against Russian-supported secessionist minorities—are a greater security threat with each year that goes by without a resolution. Frozen along cease-fire lines since the early 1990s, these conflicts have hampered the development of prosperity and democracy.

The foundation of U.S. interests in the region is the pro-western policy pursued by Azerbaijan and Georgia. These two states have been among the most unequivocally independent and pro-American countries of the former Soviet Union and the wider Middle East.

Georgia's "Rose Revolution" was the spark that triggered the Ukrainian "Orange Revolution" and the Kyrgyz upheaval dubbed as a "Tulip Revolution." And whereas Kyrgyzstan has backtracked and Ukraine has stagnated since their respective revolutions, Georgia has continued to pursue a course of determined transformation. Reforms of the police force, public administration, justice system, and other sectors have brought meaningful, if at times difficult, change to the country. In this sense, Georgia deserves—and depends upon—the very clear support that President Bush has given it, expressed most recently during Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili's visit to Washington in July 2006. Georgia remains one of the few success stories of the Bush administration's Greater Middle East project, and the U.S. government—no matter which administration is in power—has invested substantial energy, money and prestige in Georgia's success.

Georgia will remain a key country for the United States in the wider Eurasian region for several reasons. First, its location on the Black Sea and on the Caucasian corridor to the Caspian Sea makes it a crucial player in energy security, as well as in access to Central Asia. Second, it is a country whose leadership, as well as the overwhelming majority of the population, is strongly pro-American and likely to remain so. Indeed, there are few countries in Europe and Eurasia where Presi-

dent Bush has been greeted not with anti-American demonstrations but with chants of support by thousands of locals, as happened in May 2005. Third, Georgia's reform process is symbolically important; it was the first democratic breakthrough in a CIS country, and the survival of Georgian democracy is crucial to America's wider regional objectives.

Azerbaijan is, if possible, strategically even more important than Georgia, though somewhat more controversial. The oil-rich country will pump a million barrels of crude a day to western markets by the end of the decade.[1] Given the state of global oil markets, the timing of the arrival of Azerbaijani oil to world markets could not be better. Its oil, supplemented by natural gas deliveries, will provide an important chunk of the projected increase of European energy consumption in the next decade. But Azerbaijan's importance is not limited to its energy resources. As the only country to border both Russia and Iran, it is the virtual key to western access to the Caspian Sea and Central Asia. Indeed, given current political realities, Azerbaijan is the only truly irreplaceable country in the East-West corridor linking Europe and Turkey to Central Asia. Moreover, being a moderate, secular Muslim country, with a potential to strengthen democratic institutions, Azerbaijan has an added symbolic value to the West—particularly at a time of great flux in America's relationship with Turkey.

But Washington has been much slower to embrace Azerbaijan. The reason has everything to do with the slower speed of democratic development in Baku. Concurrent with Georgia's "Rose Revolution," a similar transfer of power took place in Azerbaijan. As in Georgia, it brought to power a leader from a younger generation. But unlike Georgia, that leader was the son of the ailing incumbent President, Heydar Aliyev, and his election to power was disputed by an angry opposition that denounced it as "dynastic succession." Ilham Aliyev's election to the presidency was indeed controversial, yet during the election, it was clear that he was by no means unpopular—and equally clear that the bickering, unreformed opposition did not possess the popular support that Saakashvili did in Georgia. Although Aliyev's election was marred by recorded irregularities, there is little doubt that he actually won that election and would have done so without the interference of his satraps. And since coming to power, Ilham Aliyev has proven his credentials as a reformer. His coming to power coincided with the marketing of Azerbaijan's oil wealth and the world's highest GDP growth figures, with 26 percent recorded in both 2005 and 2006.[2] But he has also followed a consistent (though cautious) policy of incremental reform, most notably in the economy, bringing to positions of influence a new guard of younger, often western-educated professionals. The reasons for Azerbaijan's tentativeness are clear: Aliyev has to deal with deeply entrenched, regionally based power groups established during the Soviet period and his father's tenure, groups deeply suspicious of reform and which can only be marginalized gradually and incrementally.

That is not to say that all is well in Azerbaijan. Political reform is still proceeding more slowly than economic reform; the judiciary remains a sector where wholesale change is needed; corruption is widespread among the bureaucracy and key ministries, not least among important institutions such as the interior minis-

try, defense ministry and the customs service; and the country's record in elections as well as human rights protections remain questionable. Yet movement toward reform is palpable in Azerbaijan, all the more so given President Aliyev's clear ambition to bring his country greater respectability in the community of nations. Indeed, Azerbaijan has consistently shown itself to be a country ready to listen and adapt to western advice. All this makes Azerbaijan an obvious ally of the United States—a country that can serve an important purpose and which America can support and influence on its path of reform.

A tour d'horizon of Central Asia in 2006 provides the U.S. with no easy solutions.

The foreign policies of Azerbaijan and Georgia are not only complementary, they are mutually reinforcing. As analyst Vladimir Socor has noted, the two "stand or fall together."[3] This is most obvious in energy security, where the BTC pipeline connects the fates of the two countries—Azerbaijan providing Georgia much-needed energy and transit income, and Georgia providing Azerbaijan with an export route, and with the pipeline providing both with strategic value in the eyes of the West. It is therefore crucial for the U.S. to work to strengthen the positive interaction between Azerbaijan and Georgia, not least by facilitating their integration into NATO.

Yet America must also continue to cultivate its relationship with Armenia. Dependent on Russia to a great degree because of its conflict with Azerbaijan and its unsettled relationship with Turkey, Armenia has nevertheless in the past several years struggled to ensure that it is not left standing on the platform as the Euro-Atlantic train boarded by its two neighbors races off. It has upgraded its relationship with NATO and been even more careful to tend to its relationship with the European Union. It is thus important to keep working for Armenia's integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions and simultaneously seek to resolve the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, something the U.S. admittedly has invested substantial energies in, but so far to no avail.

Finally, as long as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict remains unresolved, the U.S. will face a divided Caucasus, a situation which serves the purposes of its Russian and Iranian rivals. Only if that conflict finds a solution will Armenia fully be able to realize its potential as a part of the Euro-Atlantic community and become a full member of the cooperative ventures developing in the South Caucasus. The opportunity cost of failing to resolve the conflict is high, given the potential gains of a solution and, not least, the horrible price the entire region will pay in the event of a renewed war.

Central Asia: partners, anywhere?

If the central problem in the Caucasus is the troubles among America's partners, the main impediment for Washington in Central Asia stems from regional perceptions of the United States. A *tour d'horizon* of Central Asia in 2006 provides the U.S. with no easy solutions. Until recently, Washington enjoyed a privileged relationship with the region's strategic pivot, Uzbekistan. But as a result of numerous factors—the Uzbek government's continued reluctance

to reform and the violent repression of an uprising in the eastern town of Andijan, America's distraction in Iraq and its consequent failure to fulfill the provisions of the strategic partnership treaty inked with Tashkent, and Washington's neglect of all issues other than human rights in Uzbekistan—the relationship went sour in 2005.[4] The consequences have been nothing short of catastrophic; after a decade of seeking to escape Russia's embrace, Uzbekistan has rejoined the Russian fold, practically cutting ties to the United States and expelling the U.S. military from the Kharshi-Khanabad base near the Afghan border. The prospects for a rapprochement between Washington and Tashkent are remote, and whatever trust existed in the constantly troubled relationship has evaporated. In the short term, the U.S-Uzbekistan relationship is unlikely to be repaired, but this should not prevent the United States from seeking to rebuild it, either with the Karimov regime, if possible, or with a future government that may have less baggage than the current one.

With Uzbekistan lost for the time being, Kazakhstan has emerged as America's best friend in Central Asia. Since 2000, it has become the region's economic powerhouse. If Uzbekistan provides the majority of Central Asia's population, Kazakhstan single-handedly provides the majority of its economic output. This is mainly related to the oil industry, scheduled to produce three million barrels a day by 2010,[5] but also to others that exploit Kazakhstan's rich natural resources. With impressive growth rates for a decade now, Kazakhstan has sped ahead of the rest of the region, and with it has come a feeling of independence, despite a troubled history and relationship with Russia. Indeed, 40 percent of the Kazakh nation was killed during Stalin-imposed collectivization in the 1920s, and the remainder was subjected to strong "russification" and the in-migration of Slavs, making Kazakhs a 30 percent minority on their own land several decades later. By the time of their country's independence in 1991, Kazakhs had recuperated somewhat, and out-migration of Russians ever since has led the Kazakhs to now form close to two-thirds of the population, spurring a revival of national pride and of the Kazakh language.

All this has enabled Kazakhstan to gradually stake out an increasingly independent foreign policy. Under the decade-long guidance of foreign minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev, Kazakhstan has embraced a balanced relationship to all three major powers in Eurasia—Russia, China and the United States. At present, it is the only state in the region to overtly chart such a policy, leaving room for long-term cooperation with the U.S. Thus, by default and also because of its economic and political development, an important pillar of any American role in Central Asia will have to be a deepening relationship with Kazakhstan.

Kyrgyzstan is by necessity the next country on the list of U.S. priorities, primarily because it hosts America's only remaining military base in Central Asia. Yet bilateral relations between Washington and Bishkek have seen better days. The so-called "Tulip Revolution" of March 2005 brought to power a weak oligarchy of deposed officials that quickly sought Russian support for their position, aware they could be unseated as easily as they had attained power. The new government, under strong Russian and Chinese pressure,

threatened to expel the U.S. military in Spring 2006, settling nevertheless to keep it in July, but extracting an exorbitant price (a yearly fee of some $150 million). More worrisome still is the fact that the sole justification for the facility is the conflict in Afghanistan. Once Afghanistan is pacified, the U.S. will lose its self-proclaimed reason to retain a presence in Central Asia—implying that these two important objectives are fundamentally at odds.[6] This leaves America vulnerable to renewed pressure from Russia and China. Meanwhile, Kyrgyzstan's polity has weakened considerably, amid increasing influence from organized criminal groupings and growing political instability. So far, the U.S. has done very little to help Kyrgyzstan stabilize. And, given the remaining tension in relations, it is unlikely to be able to do much in the near future. For the time being, America needs Kyrgyzstan, but the latter risks becoming a scene of almost permanent political instability, ensuring that the U.S. presence there will be controversial and problematic.

It has become exceedingly clear that in virtually all of its dealings with the Central Eurasian states, the U.S. will face the problem of a Russia emboldened by high oil prices and determined to minimize American influence in the region.

This leaves Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. The latter is strategically important, bordering Iran and the Caspian Sea and possessing some of the world's largest natural gas reserves. Yet it is run by the eccentric Saparmurad Niyazov, who turned this tribal land into one of the most reclusive and isolated countries on earth. As long as Niyazov is in power, the U.S. will have little opportunity for greater engagement. Yet this is no reason for America not to plan on engaging Turkmenistan in the future, should the opportunity arise. Tajikistan, for its part, is a more promising candidate. Recovering from a debilitating civil war, it is gradually rebuilding and has begun to seek a place in the region. While still under strong Russian influence, Tajikistan has shown a willingness to engage western powers. It is desperately poor, possesses few resources aside from abundant water that could be converted into hydropower, and deeply affected by the drug trade from Afghanistan. It is therefore no candidate for a direct role as an American ally in the region, but is nevertheless a country that could in time develop into a more independent actor—a process that Washington should support.

The problem with Russia (and China)

No analysis of America's relationship with the countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus would be complete without addressing the role of Russia and, increasingly, that of China. For a decade, the U.S. has sought to build relations with Moscow, seeking honestly to portray its role in Central Eurasia as benign and not directed at Russian interests. Indeed, American diplomats have advanced a vision of a win-win situation, whereby U.S. actions in fact benefit Russia. Stabilizing the South Caucasus, seeking to resolve its conflicts, and removing the Taliban from power in Afghanistan are only some of Washington's efforts that might be seen as useful in Moscow. Yet in

reality, Russian leaders, particularly since Vladimir Putin's ascension to power, have viewed U.S. actions in Central Asia and the Caucasus almost exclusively from a zero-sum perspective: as American encroachment on a Russian sphere of influence.

In response, Moscow has put pressure on Georgia for its NATO aspirations and pro-American policies, severely undermining that country's stability. It has continued to drag its heels on efforts to resolve the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan. It has worked hard to lock up Central Asia's oil and gas resources, which it buys on the cheap thanks to its de facto monopoly on regional energy. Finally, Moscow worked successfully to wrest Uzbekistan from its relationship with Washington, exerting major pressure to evict U.S. forces from the Kharshi-Khanabad airbase.

It has become exceedingly clear that in virtually all of its dealings with the Central Eurasian states, the U.S. will face the problem of a Russia emboldened by high oil prices and determined to minimize American influence in the region. A decade of seeking to engage Russia has not changed this reality, and Washington remains at a loss as to how to counter this problem. In all likelihood, the U.S. will be forced to adopt a tougher, clearer position regarding what its core interests are, and communicate these to Moscow while simultaneously leaving the door open for a constructive Russian role in the region and capitalizing on common interests if and when they arise.

As for China, Beijing has for the past several years appeared to forge a common front with Moscow on issues pertaining to Central Asia. Their joint efforts in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization are the most important example of this. Yet it is also clear that Moscow and Beijing view one another with suspicion. In the long run, Russia is a retreating power, with little to offer the region in economic terms and a deeply troubling demographic development. China, on the other hand, is a rising power, an economic powerhouse bent on establishing influence over Central Asia.[7] The resulting unease in Russian-Chinese relations is best observed in the energy field: China has spent substantial efforts to seek to avoid dependence on Russian energy, instead seeking to develop direct connections to Central Asian states.

This state of affairs provides the United States with an opportunity. While it has sought to engage Russia on Central Asian affairs, it has yet to make use of its broad economic and political dialogue with China as regards Central Asia. There is, indeed, room for an attempt by Washington to engage Beijing on Central Asian issues and forge both mutual understanding and a level of confidence about American intentions in the region. Such an initiative may be difficult to accomplish, but that will not be known unless it is attempted. Should the U.S. achieve even a modicum of success in such an endeavor, it would go a long way toward increasing its prospects of achieving a durable strategic presence in Central Asia.

Toward real regional engagement

As the past five years have shown, the underlying problem in America's relationship with Central Asia and the Caucasus has been the lack of a clear policy toward both regions. And in the absence of a coherent strategy, inertia and tensions have permeated U.S. policy toward Central Eurasia, with predictable results.

Moving forward, it is clear that the United States must refocus on

building partnerships with the key states of the region. In the Caucasus, it must pay equal attention to Azerbaijan and Georgia, while not neglecting to enlist Armenia in regional planning. Bringing about equitable solutions to the conflicts of the region likewise will remain a key task.

In Central Asia, meanwhile, the U.S. faces a different and more complicated set of challenges. Unquestionably, America's position in the region has deteriorated significantly in recent years. The bright spot in this otherwise murky picture is Washington's growing relationship with an increasingly independent and wealthy Kazakhstan—an emerging bond that must be cultivated. Additionally, nurturing ties with Kyrgyzstan will remain a major American priority. But none of these things will be as decisive as the fate of Uzbekistan. A stable, cooperative and prosperous Uzbekistan will mean a lot to Central Asia's other states, while an unstable and impoverished regime in Tashkent could seriously threaten the progress being made in Kazakhstan or elsewhere. America cannot afford to remain without influence in shaping Uzbekistan's future, and must work to regain a measure of the influence it once possessed.

Today, a lack of strategic clarity has muddled America's message to the region, confusing local leaders as well as policy planners back home. Yet U.S. interests in governance, energy and security need not be contradictory, and can be made mutually reinforcing. A policy that is clearly based on this understanding would provide Washington with new opportunities to develop its interests in this complex yet increasingly crucial area of the world.

1. For more on the economics of Azerbaijani oil, see Jonathan Elkind, "Economic Implications of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline," in S. Frederick Starr and Svante E. Cornell, eds., *The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Oil Window to the West* (Washington & Uppsala: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, 2005), 39-60.
2. 2006 estimates from the *Economist Intelligence Unit*.
3. Vladimir Socor, "A Tale of Two Post-Post-Soviet Countries," *Wall Street Journal Europe*, December 19, 2003.
4. See John Daly et al., "Anatomy of a Crisis: U.S.-Uzbekistan Relations, 2000-2005," *Silk Road Paper*, February 2006, http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/publications/0602Uzbek.pdf.
5. Official statistics from the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources of the Republic of Kazakhstan, http://www.minenergo.kz/.
6. See Stephen Blank, "Beyond Afghanistan: The Future of American Bases in Central Asia," *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst* 8, no. 15 (2006), 3-5.
7. See Niklas L.P. Swanström, "China and Central Asia: A New Great Game or Traditional Vassal Relations," *Journal of Contemporary China* 14, no. 45 (2005), 569-584.

Europe

Rethinking the Transatlantic Divide

Olivier Guitta

French President Jacques Chirac has put it quite bluntly: "I have one principle regarding foreign policy. I look at what the Americans are doing and I do the opposite. Then I am sure to be right."[1] On the other hand, Edouard Balladur, a close ally of Chirac and former French Prime Minister, sees things very differently: "Europe has no advantages in systematically opposing the U.S. Our fundamental interests are closely linked."[2]

These two perspectives—one antagonistic and one Atlanticist—encapsulate the tug-of-war now underway in Europe over cooperation with the United States. Unfortunately, for now, Chirac appears to be the rule and Balladur the exception. But the reality is a good deal more complex. While publicly, anti-Americanism may be not only fashionable but politically advantageous, when it comes to quiet cooperation (on intelligence sharing, counterterrorism, and other issues), Europeans dance to a different tune.

Behind the scenes

Germany is a case in point. Back in 2002, the administration of Gerhard Schröder was reelected on a vehemently anti-American and anti-war platform. But new revelations suggest that in reality, Berlin was not nearly as removed from the U.S.-led war effort against Iraq as Schröder liked to claim. "Despite the troubles in the relationship between Berlin and Washington, the political decision was made to continue the close relationship of the intelligence services,"

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an unidentified source from the BND told the public German television station ARD.[3] This collaboration, moreover, was approved at the highest levels, with Frank-Walter Steinmeier (Schröder's then chief of staff and current Foreign Minister) and Joschka Fischer, then foreign minister, signing off on continued intelligence contacts.[4]

That close relationship apparently involved the stationing of two German intelligence agents in Baghdad throughout the course of the entire Iraq war, even while Schröder and his coalition cabinet were officially maintaining strong opposition to Washington's actions. The German operatives allegedly helped American forces by identifying "non-targets" such buildings as embassies, schools and hospitals that should not be bombed. But they also went further, delivering assistance in the identification of high-value targets—including the April 2003 bombing in Baghdad's wealthy Mansur district aimed at Saddam Hussein and several top members of his regime. An additional German agent reportedly was stationed in Qatar in the office of General Tommy Franks, the U.S. commander of Operation Iraqi Freedom. And all three received the Meritorious Service medals from the United States for their assistance.[5]

Another unlikely ally has been France. One might even go as far as to say that, for all its public vitriol, the French government ranks as Washington's top counterterrorism partner. Former acting CIA Director John McLaughlin has described the relationship between the CIA and its French counterparts as "one of the best in the world" and termed French contributions as "extraordinarily valuable."[6] Indeed, in the days after 9/11, President Chirac advised his intelligence services to collaborate with their opposite numbers in the United States "as if they were your own service."[7] But the most significant example of Franco-American cooperation was revealed by the *Washington Post* in July 2005. Three years earlier, a top secret center called Alliance Base had been established in Paris by the CIA and French intelligence services. Its purpose was to analyze the transnational movement of terrorist suspects, and to develop operations to catch or spy on them. As such, it was a unique operation—one geared toward not simply sharing information, but actually planning operations.[8]

It should be quite telling indeed that two of the most visible and vocal opponents of American foreign policy are in fact extraordinary partners of the United States on counterterrorism issues.

Two steps forward, one step back

Germany and France are not alone. Before September 11th, intelligence services throughout Europe would complain about their lack of interaction with the United States. But no longer. Europeans now acknowledge that cooperation is much improved, with information flowing freely in both directions. This interaction, moreover, is facilitated by the fact that European and American cooperation is complementary in nature. The forte of European services—and especially those of France—is human intelligence and knowledge of Islamist terrorism, while America's strength lies in electronic intelligence gathering. The resulting synergy is beneficial for both sides of the Atlantic.

According to former CIA official Stanley Sloan, "U.S.-European coop-

eration has been one of the more successful aspects of post-September 11 efforts against international terrorism."[9] Sloan's comments ring true. Given that most of the planning for the September 11th attacks occurred in Hamburg, and that Europe has become a base for Islamist cells, America's national security is irrevocably linked to the Old Continent. And Europe needs America too; its defense capabilities (and budgets) fall well below those of the United States, and there is little probability that this will change. As such, neither side can afford political divisions to impede partnership.

But while cooperation has greatly improved, it has not been without bumps in the road. The first deals with designation. In December 2001, the European Union (EU) formulated an official list of terrorist organizations, but forgot to include al-Qaeda. Instead, twelve groups, including the ETA, the Real IRA, and Northern Ireland's obscure Orange Volunteers, were designated. And little has changed; the EU's most recent list, issued in November 2005, includes 47 groups, but still no al-Qaeda.[10] This glaring omission has been the product of a heated semantic debate in Europe about whether al-Qaeda's diffuse, atomized nature allowed it to be depicted as a unitary entity. European officials have claimed that since they are using the UN list designating al-Qaeda as a terrorist entity, there is no need to include it in their own list.

Likewise, perceptions about the scope of the current conflict differ greatly. Europeans categorically refuse to view the struggle against terrorism as a war. To them, a legal approach to combating terrorism is still preferred. In short, Europe wants to fight the war with arrest warrants, and never ever use force. Another aspect of the European approach is the priority given to human rights. Rhetorically, human rights have become the *leitmotif* for a whole generation of Eurocrats, even though most European anti-terror laws restrict civil liberties to a much greater extent than those passed by the United States. One such example is France, where authorities have the right to detain suspected individuals for six days without access to a lawyer, and where suspects can be held for up to three-and-a-half years in pretrial detention while the investigation against them continues.

Sticking points

In light of the European philosophy on the current conflict, Washington is perhaps right to be suspicious about the extent to which the EU, as a whole, actually has the stomach for a prolonged fight against terror—or more importantly, a real understanding of the magnitude of the problem. In response to a written questionnaire prepared by the European Parliament in 2005, Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner spoke of development work, poverty reduction, and education as the essential tools to fight terrorism. But, while combating the root causes of terrorism is an important long-term objective, the current conflict requires immediate and concrete policy tools—effective counterterrorism, intelligence sharing, extradition treaties, and cooperation on the basis of mutual trust and if necessary, force. And here, the EU has been unable to focus on a suitable role for itself to play in the War of Terror.

On occasion, Washington has given voice to its frustrations on this subject. As the U.S. State Department's 2005 *Country Reports on Terrorism* report notes:

> Efforts to combat the threat in Europe were sometimes hampered by legal protections that made it difficult to take firm judicial action against suspected terrorists, asylum laws that afforded loopholes, inadequate legislation, or standards of evidence that limited the use of classified information in holding terrorist suspects. The new EU arrest warrant encountered legal difficulties in some countries that forbid extradition of their own citizens. Germany found it difficult to convict members of the Hamburg cell of suspected terrorists allegedly linked to the September 11 attacks. Some European states have at times not been able to prosecute successfully or hold some of the suspected terrorists brought before their courts.[11]

Transatlantic cooperation has also stumbled over the issue of Iraq. More than any other event in recent history, the American decision to go to war against the regime of Saddam Hussein has badly damaged relations across the Atlantic, especially with France and Germany. This friction was unexpected; until January 2003, the government of Jacques Chirac in France had sided with the U.S., even going so far as to order the French army to begin preparations for war and expand coordination with U.S. forces. But things turned sour in February 2003, after then-Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin's now-famous speech at the UN raised the specter of a French veto to planned military intervention. Villepin went even further, embarking upon a lobbying tour to convince all the other members of the UN Security Council to vote against the U.S. Even Interior Minister (and presidential hopeful) Nicolas Sarkozy had qualms about France's zealous attitude.[12]

Some European countries, however, did step up to the plate. It is worth noting that 12 EU member states were part of the initial "coalition of the willing" in Iraq.[13] And eight European prime ministers—from Spain, Portugal, Italy, the UK, Hungary, Poland, Denmark and the Czech Republic, expressed their solidarity with the Bush administration on the pages of the *Wall Street Journal Europe*, outlining their commitment to "unity and cohesion: in the face of terrorism and proliferation."[14] This did not go over especially well with Chirac, who blasted the East European countries that had sided with Washington and ordered them to "shut up."

This incident in itself represents a ray of hope. Indeed, the former members of the Soviet bloc have emerged as staunch and faithful allies of Washington. So have Denmark, Holland, Britain and now Germany under Chancellor Angela Merkel. They, together with a new generation of pro-Atlanticist European politicians, are making a forceful case for a much closer transatlantic alliance.

Still, the U.S. has lost at least two faithful allies in recent years. In 2004, it was Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar who was overthrown by socialist challenger Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero. More recently, Italy's conservative prime minister, Silvio Berlusconi, lost to his center-left opponent, Romano Prodi, in the country's May 2006 elections. In both cases, the change of government brought to power forces far less amenable to cooperation with the United States than their predecessors.

The specter of anti-Americanism likewise looms large in transatlantic ties. In poll after poll, Europeans term the U.S. the biggest threat to world peace, ahead of Iran, Syria and North Korea. Indeed, in some countries, it has become a national sport to blame

America first—nowhere more so than in France. Such perceptions have only been reinforced in recent years by the emergence of Arab satellite channels, which influence large segments of Europe's Muslim population.

Which raises the issue of the Continent's large—and growing—Muslim population. With around 20 million Muslims living in Europe, and with a failure of regional government to integrate them, Europe is facing a profound crisis of identity. And against the backdrop of conflicts in the Middle East and the Israeli-Arab conflict, European politicians need to think about their constituents. For countries that were already traditionally favorably biased towards Arab regimes, this domestic dimension only serves to reinforce their ingrained positions.

A Finnish diplomat summed it up simply not too long ago: "In Europe political parties worry about the Muslim vote."[15] And the most worrisome country for the future of transatlantic ties is none other than our current greatest ally: the United Kingdom. British Muslims are the most integrated in Europe because of England's history of multiculturalism, which has made them the envy of their French and German counterparts. Nonetheless, British Muslims are by far the most radicalized and anti-Western of the European Muslim communities. This has been borne out by recent polls, which have found that 24 percent of Muslims in England supported the motives behind the July 7th London terror attacks,[16] 40 percent are for the installation of *sharia* (Islamic law) in Britain,[17] and 68 percent have a negative view of Jews.[18] Not surprisingly, the largest and most violent European demonstrations during the Danish "cartoon controversy"—and, more recently, openly supporting Hezbollah in its war against Israel—have taken place in the center of London.

Authorities in London are aware—and worried—about this threat. A 2004 British government report leaked in July 2005, after the London attacks, acknowledged that about 16,000 British Muslims are engaged in terror activities.[19] It is unfortunately not by chance that recent cases of homegrown terrorism, among them the 7/7 attacks and the recent foiled multiple airliner plot, have occurred in Britain. And this problem is poised to get worse; pressure on British officials is mounting from the Muslim community to rescind the country's historic close links with America, with tangible results. Politicians from the Labour party are already pushing Prime Minister Tony Blair away from Washington. This domestic pressure, moreover, coincides with a very long pro-Arab tradition in the British Foreign office, which has of late advocated closer links to Islamists and a departure from the Atlanticist tradition. This is not surprising, since the man in charge of Islamic affairs within the Foreign Office is an Islamist himself. In fact, Mockbul Ali has successfully lobbied to bring the notorious Muslim Brother Sheikh Yusuf Al Qaradawi, who is still banned in the U.S., to Britain. Unfortunately, if these efforts are successful, it may mean losing America's best political ally in Europe.

Indeed, the Muslim issue is already influencing foreign policy, in Britain and elsewhere. A case in point: in 2003, just before the outbreak of the Iraq war, France's rough equivalent of the FBI, the Renseignements Généraux, warned Prime Minister Chirac that were France to join the Coalition, it would have to face exten-

sive rioting and unrest in the largely Muslim-populated suburbs—creating major domestic pressure for Chirac, already indisposed toward cooperation, to keep his distance from U.S. efforts. And this trend is only likely to intensify in the future, as expanding Muslim populations among the countries of Europe generate increasingly pro-Arab policies.

Taking stock

All in all, transatlantic ties have seen better days, but they are still vibrant. The "behind the scenes" collaboration between Washington and European capitals is proceeding as robustly as ever. But on issues of defense and foreign policy, public dissensions are still numerous.

This does not need to be the case, however. Europe does not have to choose between the EU and the U.S.; it can have the best of both. Officials in Europe should be working to make their partnership with the U.S., in the words of Balladur, "an indestructible alliance."[20] The first step in this direction would be for Europe to realize that it is at war—but not with America. Rather, European capitals, like Washington, are at war with radical Islam. Until they recognize this fact, Islamist terrorists will have the ability to drive a wedge between Western democracies.

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Australia
An Ally Down Under

Joshua Eisenman

The U.S.-Australia alliance is one of the cornerstones of American regional security strategy in East Asia. Years of work by successive administrations in Washington and Canberra have forged both trust and synergy in the two nations' strategic objectives. Of course, no two countries share identical interests. But perhaps more then any other bilateral relationship in East Asia, America's partnership with Australia is rooted in common values and a common vision for the region.

The ties between Washington and Canberra run deep. The two countries boast decades of cooperation in both the commercial and security spheres. The U.S. is Australia's single largest investor, while Australia is America's eighth largest, and both see eye-to-eye on nearly all security-related topics. Through cooperation, interpersonal ties, and military interoperability, each has allowed the other to develop a stronger diplomatic position, project influence in East Asia, and respond quickly to challenges, whether natural, such as the 2005 tsunami disaster, or man-made, like the growth of militant Islam. In the process, the partnership between the two countries has become more than the sum of its parts.

The state of the affair

The contemporary U.S.-Australian alliance may be strong, but until the tenure of premier John Howard, it was by no means assured that Canberra would pursue a U.S.-based approach to securing its interests in East Asia. Rather,

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until recently, Australia's strategy for regional engagement oscillated between building alliances, regional ties, and multilateralism.[1]

To be sure, America has long occupied an important role in Australian foreign policy decision making. Since 1951, the two countries have been joined in a formal defense partnership via the ANZUS Treaty. Yet only during the last decade—and particularly since September 11th—has this relationship been truly institutionalized through practical measures, such as increased interoperability between U.S. and Australian forces, and shared objectives, ranging from the destruction of regional terrorist networks to supporting Japan's emergence as a partner in the security sphere.

Countering terrorism

The Indonesia-based Jemaah Islamiyah's (JI) killing of dozens of Australians in the October 2002 Bali bombings, and the group's subsequent September 2004 bombing of the Australian embassy in Jakarta, have left a deep impression on the Australian psyche and underscored the need for a regional approach to combating terrorism. These deadly acts, and Prime Minister Howard's coincidental visit to Washington during the September 11, 2001, attacks, have solidified the War on Terror as the United States and Australia's most robust bilateral security commitment.

Over the past several years, Australia has established itself as an inimitable counterterrorism partner for both the U.S. and countries in its immediate neighborhood.

Indeed, over the past several years, Australia has established itself as an inimitable counterterrorism partner for both the U.S. and countries in its immediate neighborhood. Examples of this new role abound. In May, Canberra announced that over the next four years it will provide nearly $70 million to Southeast Asian nations to combat terrorism. These funds will support increased information sharing, border controls, checks on chemical, biological, and nuclear materials, and efforts to counter terrorist propaganda.[2] By expanding the Australian Federal Police's (AFP) law enforcement, forensic and technical training of regional forces, the package will also supplement a variety of anti-terror initiatives Canberra has put in place since 2002.[3]

Canberra's efforts to combat terrorism in Asia are closely tied to Washington's. The U.S. government, through its Rewards for Justice Program, has put up millions of dollars for the capture of top JI leaders wanted in the Bali bombing attacks. And in December 2004, a study commissioned by the U.S. government concluded that terrorists operating in the South China Sea have the capability to blast a hole through the double hull of a liquified natural gas tanker. Every year, billions of dollars in Australian exports pass through the region's waterways, making this report—and a recent rise in piracy—cause for Australian leaders to redouble their efforts against maritime threats.[4]

These efforts have borne fruit, solidifying the bilateral security relationship while allowing both nations to build closer ties with individual Asian states. This has, in turn, affirmed both countries' continued influence and bolstered America's stabilizing presence in the region. Looking for-

ward, however, the challenge for both Washington and Canberra will be to maintain this momentum and continue working to build the capacity of regional security forces to uproot and counter Islamic militancy.

Mitigating traditional security threats

U.S. strategy in East Asia emphasizes bilateral and multilateral exercises with the armed forces of friendly and allied nations, Australia included. In addition to supplying its own forces to these maneuvers, Canberra also provides the U.S. and other allies with access to facilities as a way of ensuring preparedness and coordinated responses to regional crises. Such arrangements underscore the increasing importance of U.S.-Australia ties to regional security, as well as Canberra's commitment to a credible and potent U.S. presence in East Asia. During Mr. Howard's tenure, this commitment has been reaffirmed through a variety of agreements, including the 1996 Joint Security Declaration (also known as the "Sydney Statement"), which expanded combined exercises and joint training, and through Canberra's 2005 decision to host U.S. bombers. In all, there are now hundreds of defense-related bilateral arrangements in place between the United States and Australia.[5]

The historical basis for this partnership is sound. Australian and American forces fought together in both World Wars, in Korea, in Vietnam, and in the first Gulf War. Most recently, Australian forces have served in Operation Iraqi Freedom. U.S. and Australian forces regularly conduct joint military exercises, ranging from full-scale joint maneuvers to unit-level operations.[6] Joint training exercises sponsored by the Australian Defense Force Joint Operations Command and the U.S. Pacific Command have included a sea, air, and land mock battle, a computer-simulated war, paratroop and amphibious insertions, live-fire exercises, and anti-submarine warfare.[7]

In November 2005, the U.S. and Australia signed a joint agreement announcing the beginning of regular B-1, B-52, and B-2 bomber aircraft training in the Northern Territory. This agreement was executed in July, when the U.S. and Australian air forces held joint bomber exercises, codenamed "Green Lightning," at the Darwin Royal Australian Air Force base. The movement of bombers into the western Pacific began in 2004 and is intended to enhance the deterrence capability of the U.S. and its allies. Such drills are seen as "a key component of [Australia's] strong defense relationship with the United States."[8]

In addition to bilateral exercises, the two countries have forged ahead on another front: missile defense. Cooperation between the Australian Defense Science and Technology Office and the Pentagon Missile Defense Agency has seen substantial movement since July 2004, when the United States and Australia signed a MoU outlining future Australian participation in missile defense activities. That 25-year agreement commits Canberra to Washington's missile defense program, including cooperative development of advanced radar technology capable of providing early detection of hostile ballistic missiles.[9] This agreement was put into practice this July, when the Pentagon unveiled plans to sell about $1 billion worth of sea-based anti-missile systems to Australia as part of efforts to further integrate Canberra.[10] (Notably, however, Australia appears to have no plans to purchase the U.S. Patriot

Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) theater missile defense system.[11])

Integrating Indonesia

The 1998 East Asian financial crisis hobbled the Indonesian economy and weakened that country's ability to lead the region. In recent years, however, the world's largest Muslim country has reemerged as a diplomatic force that can again shape its own destiny, as well as that of its neighbors. For this reason, it is critical that the U.S. and Australia work to bring Indonesia into the fold and collaborate with Jakarta to combat threats both within and outside its borders.

One source of tension is Canberra's attempts to end fighting in East Timor. Despite the mission's humanitarian mandate, many Indonesians see it as a ploy by Canberra to gain control of the area's oil and natural gas deposits. For its part, Australia remains deeply concerned about the growth of Islamist-inspired separatism and militancy in Indonesia. The Indonesia-based—and al-Qaeda-connected—terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiyah has targeted Australians in the past, and in September 2005 a videotape mentioned Melbourne as a possible target. In the past, similar concerns prompted Prime Minister John Howard to threaten preemptive strikes against terrorist organizations based in other countries—a statement that was vehemently rejected by the Indonesian government.[12]

Such disagreements notwithstanding, Australia continues to play an important role in integrating Indonesia. The AFP and Indonesian police, for instance, are working jointly to disrupt JI's terrorist activities, arrest suspects, and build cases.[13] On the humanitarian front, meanwhile, the Australian government's rapid response to the December 2004 tsunami disaster helped foster goodwill among many Indonesians.

Australia has also nudged Indonesia toward greater partnership with the U.S. As Dennis Richardson, Australia's Ambassador to the U.S., has explained,

> We welcome Indonesia's direction in recent years, especially under President Yudhoyono. We also welcome the significantly increased U.S. engagement with Indonesia over the past twelve months. We believe, for instance, it was a proper recognition of real change when the United States recently restored military-to-military ties with Indonesia.[14]

Australia's attitude is understandable. Given its proximity to Indonesia, and the fact that JI has specifically targeted its citizens, Canberra has a vested interest in ensuring that the world's fourth most populous country and third largest democracy regains its place in East Asia and projects constructive influence into the region. And, Australia understands, such a transition will be catalyzed by closer consultations and coordination between Indonesia and the U.S.

Engaging Japan

In August, on a visit to Tokyo, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer clarified Canberra's vision for Australia-Japan security ties:

> [Because] our two countries share the same values and the same alliance relationship with the United States, in the same broadly defined region of the world, it's only natural that there should be some association between the Self-Defense Force and the Australian Defense Force.[15]

Australia has taken a lead in forging these bonds. In March, Mr. Downer hosted Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Aso and U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in Sydney for the so-called Trilateral Security Dialogue. Those talks culminated in a joint statement in which all three agreed to "support the emergence and consolidation of democracies," strengthen cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, enhance regional security planning, and "support Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the Security Council."[16] The statement was a reflection of the primary objectives of all three nations: promoting regional peace and stability through democracy, strengthening the American security architecture in East Asia, and ensuring Japan's gradual reemergence and incorporation into that framework. It was also an indicator of Australia's importance to this emerging trilateral partnership.

Today's U.S.-Japan alliance is simultaneously bolstered and undermined by the intense mistrust and suspicion towards Japan that lingers among the people of East Asia, who remember well Tokyo's aggression during the first half of the 20th century. This is particularly true in China, where anti-Japanese sentiment still runs high (as evidenced by anti-Japanese riots there just last year). Australia's support for Japan is critical to Tokyo's efforts to participate in its own security without raising the suspicion of its neighbors. As one Australian official has explained, while some observers say that letting Japan rearm is like giving drink to a recovering alcoholic, others argue that it is fine for Japan to drink—so long as it does not drink alone.[17]

Coordinating on China

Australia is also in a unique position among America's East Asian allies because of its friendly relations with China. For a middle power, Canberra enjoys disproportionately strong influence in Washington, but also believes "China's growth is unambiguously good for Asia and the United States."[18] For its part, in July 2006, Beijing's state-run press called the bilateral relationship between the PRC and Australia "an example of peaceful, mutually beneficial cooperation."[19]

Australia is also in a unique position among America's East Asian allies because of its friendly relations with China.

Australia and China share a robust trade relationship based largely on Australia's rich natural resource wealth and China's low-cost manufacturing. Last year alone, Australian exports to China rose 46 percent and imports rose 19 percent, with bilateral trade rising to $27.3 billion, a 30 percent increase over 2004 levels.[20] China, a developing country with a low per-capita GDP, purchases raw materials such as iron ore, uranium, and natural gas from Australia, a developed country with a high per-capita GDP.

This unique commercial relationship allows Canberra to leverage its political stability in its dealings with Beijing. Simply put, while China's investments in resource-rich rogue nations like Iran, Sudan, and Zimbabwe come with political costs, insecurity, and moral questions, its deals with Australia do not.

One recent example of this leverage was Canberra's insistence in April that Beijing provide written guarantees that future uranium purchases would not be diverted into nuclear fuel for weapons programs. With 40 percent of the world's known deposits of uranium and the political

stability to guarantee a dependable supply, Canberra was in a position to make such demands, and the Chinese government acquiesced. In return, beginning in 2010 Australia will export 20,000 metric tons of uranium to China per year.[21]

Yet although Canberra has accommodated Beijing economically—granting Market Economy Status and beginning negotiations on a free trade deal—there is a palpable wariness of China's military expansion among Australians that follow cross-Strait and Sino-Japanese relations. The result has been a diplomatic effort to mitigate possible conflicts and reassure Beijing that fears of a U.S.-Japan-South Korea-Australia axis are unfounded, and that it is in China's interest to have Japan engaged rather than isolated.

As a resource rich middle power boasting a close security relationship with the U.S., Australia today is in a historic position to affect stability in the Asia-Pacific region.

That said, Beijing's claims to Taiwan mean that Washington may need to count on Australian support in the unlikely event of a regional conflict over the island. Both Washington and Beijing know Australia's commitment in this scenario is uncertain, and thus, most coveted. Yet, both also know that if the United States recoils from its commitments to Taiwan, its predominance in East Asia and the Asian security architecture to which Canberra has entrusted its nation's defense may be irreparably damaged—a prospect that one U.S. observer writes should "horrify" Canberra.[22]

Such fears surfaced in 2004, when Foreign Minister Downer made statements on a trip to China that seemed to indicate his government would not automatically support America in a conflict over Taiwan. According to Downer's interpretation, the ANZUS Treaty would be invoked only if Australia or the U.S. were attacked and not in the case of "some military activity somewhere else in the world." In a response that underscores Washington's sensitivity on this subject, the Bush administration is now known to have sent no fewer than five diplomatic cables seeking Canberra's immediate explanation for the comments.[23]

But because in the short term a conflict over Taiwan is unlikely, both the U.S. and Australia will continue, as Ambassador Dennis Richardson said in June, to "want China to play by the rules."[24] This has led Canberra to support the White House's efforts to encourage China to accept policies supportive of current international institutions and frameworks through mechanisms like former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick's Senior Dialogue. The rationale of this approach is that greater cooperation from China is essential to the smooth functioning of the international system. To Australia, this means encouraging Beijing to move toward greater transparency regarding the pace and scale of its defense modernization. It also means continuing to work to improve Beijing's human rights practices and support rule of law and poverty reduction initiatives, all of which the U.S. also backs. Unfortunately, however, successes in these areas are notoriously difficult to measure given China's massive population and the Chinese Communist Party's recalcitrance.

Looking forward

As a resource-rich middle power boasting a close security relationship with the U.S., Australia today is in a historic position to affect stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Preserving this role in the years ahead will require Canberra and Washington to continue to work with Tokyo, integrate Indonesia, and coordinate regional counterterrorism initiatives and their policies toward China.

Development of the Canberra-Tokyo security relationship remains a critical priority. Foreign Minister Downer's August visit to Tokyo ought to be the start of a series of talks that strengthen the so-called "third leg" of the Trilateral Security Dialogue. Although upgrading the relationship to a full alliance may be premature (and could be perceived as threatening in China), efforts to integrate Japan into regional security plans should nonetheless be pursued, and explained to China as a necessary step to prevent Japan's isolation. Interoperability is a key component of these efforts, and Canberra would be well served to continue procurement of U.S. systems and joint training with the U.S. military and other regional forces. This is critical if Australia is to retain its unique status and influence in both East Asia and Washington.

Continued cooperation on counterterrorism is also important. Australians are well aware of the dangers of Islamic extremism in Southeast Asia. It is for this reason that the AFP has become a regional leader in counterterrorism training and intelligence collection. Expanding collaboration with Washington—and working closely with authorities in neighboring countries, particularly Indonesia—will be crucial to preserving Canberra's gains in this arena.

Finally, the United States must expand its commitment to East Asian security, and Australia's leading role in preserving it. Today conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan rightfully loom large at the Pentagon, but given the economic strength of East Asia, the commercial costs of militancy there are far greater and require continued attention. It would be wrong to allow the war in Iraq or a resurgent Taliban in Afghanistan to overshadow the very real gains made in East Asia.

New challenges will doubtless emerge on the horizon. But regardless of their nature, the foundation of the U.S.-Australia relationship remains strong because, as one observer recently noted, "We share values. We share ideals. We share a simple outlook about right and wrong in this world, and it brings us together."[25]

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Canada
Partnership in Flux

Rob Huebert

It has been said that Canada's biggest defense problem is that it does not have one. Sharing a continent with the United States has meant that any military threat to Canada is a threat to the U.S. as well. Ultimately, the United States guarantees Canada's security. What further simplifies Canadian defense requirements is the fact that the two countries share core values. While there are differences regarding some issues, Canada and the United States are both societies that are committed to the maintenance and promotion of democratic governance, the development of free market economies, the protection and entrenchment of human rights, and share a common cultural, linguistic and historical experience. Good relations are further protected by a shared but very complex economic partnership that is primarily (but not exclusively) based on the Canadian export of natural resources (including oil and gas) to the U.S., and the Canadian import of finished products.[1] The net result is that since the end of the Civil War, Canada has not needed to fear an attack from the United States, while it remains in the American interest to ensure that Canada is protected from external military threats.

Such circumstances suggest that Canadian political leaders may be inclined to simply "free-ride" on American military capabilities. In fact, however, this has not happened. It is true that there have been times when Canadian officials have

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not given defense issues the attention that they deserved. But today, Canada's security policy is centered on a small but robust military capable of serving as a force multiplier for the United States. And, because Canadian officials have long worried that if the U.S. feels Canada is not doing enough, the U.S. will take action on Canada's behalf, they have learned to anticipate—and be sensitive to—American security concerns.

The Cold War balance

Throughout the Cold War, Canadian defense policy was committed to three main elements: 1) the national defense; 2) the common defense of North America; and 3) collective security. While the defense of Canada always ranked as the most important priority, the bulk of Canadian spending and planning was ultimately dedicated to overseas operations in the name of collective security and peacekeeping. This was the result of the belief that Canada was best defended by meeting military and security threats as far as possible from its shores. But this approach was also bolstered by the reality that any direct threat to Canada would invariably be met by American capabilities.

The defense of Canada

The real physical threat to Canadian soil during this period was posed by the USSR and its nuclear missiles and bomber forces. Canadian defense planners quickly recognized that the best defense against an attack on Canadian soil was to deter the Soviets from attacking in the first place. Thus, Canadian planning focused on contributing to the common defense of North American air and aerospace, and to collective security in Europe. In both instances, homeland defense needed to be undertaken away from Canadian territory.

The common defense of North America

As the Soviet Union expanded its strategic arsenal throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the direct threat to Canada grew. Canadian cities were at risk of nuclear annihilation if war broke out. It soon became evident to Canadian and American military planners alike that there was a need for a common defense of North American airspace—both to defend against Soviet aerial capabilities and to deter against the missile threat from Moscow. The result was the creation of NORAD, the North American Air Defense Command (later re-named the North American Aerospace Defense Command), on May 12, 1958. Its original mission was to oversee the air defense of the North American continent against the possibility of Soviet bomber attack. But as the Soviets developed their missile capability, this role shifted to also include an early warning system for the maintenance of nuclear deterrence. Over time, NORAD became the central Canada-U.S. defense organization, and a cornerstone of the strategic relationship between Washington and Ottawa.

Collective security

Canadian officials led the effort to develop the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949. The reasons were practical: policymakers in Ottawa recognized that the growing Soviet threat was best met by collective security. They also wanted to create a forum where Canada's defense relationship with the United States could be balanced by the inclusion of other states. The military strength of the United States

may have been central to defending against the USSR, but Canadian officials also knew that a bilateral alliance would permanently relegate their country to the role of junior partner. In pushing for the creation of NATO, Canadians hoped simultaneously that the Soviets would be deterred from taking aggressive action and that Americans would not overwhelm Canada.[2] In turn, the Canadian contribution to NATO was substantial. From the 1950s to the late 1980s, Canadian land and air assets were stationed in Europe and its naval forces were tasked almost exclusively for anti-submarine duties against the USSR.

Over time, a secondary priority—peacekeeping—also emerged. Today, this role has become accepted by most Canadians as the main reason why Canadian forces exist. The fact that peacekeeping was something that Canada appeared to do without the assistance of the United States also appealed to those concerned about American dominance. Thus the mythology of Canadian peacekeeping was actively encouraged by successive Canadian governments, who found it a politically saleable concept.

These priorities had several important implications for Canada's security relationship with United States. On the positive side, they led to the creation of a well-trained, professional force with the ability to deploy worldwide. Membership in NORAD and NATO also meant that Canada was operating alongside the most advanced military powers in the world. Specifically, the Canadian partnership with the United States meant that Canadian forces were required to develop the means—and the technology—to cooperate with American forces on a day-to-day basis.

However, the Canadian commitment to a small but highly capable force for primary expeditionary purposes also carried several costs. Perhaps most problematic was the fact that the expeditionary nature of the forces meant that, with few exceptions, the Canadian military did not have a significant "footprint" in Canadian society. As a result, there was little political support for—or interest in—increased military expenditures. And, as the Cold War progressed, there was a tendency on the part of Canadian political leaders to reduce the funding provided to these forces. As well, over time, the overseas focus of Canadian defense policy led to the domestic misconception that the principal mission of these forces was for international peacekeeping, rather than collective security against the USSR—resulting in a lack of appreciation for their warfighting nature and ongoing difficulty in acquiring new and necessary equipment. As a result, by the time the Cold War ended a substantial disconnect existed between Canadian society and its forces.

A related problem was the reluctance to acknowledge the close ties between Canada and the United States. Cooperation between the two countries in the defense of North America and Europe occurred largely out of the view of the Canadian public. Greater public attention was instead given to peacekeeping operations that often did not include cooperation between American and Canadian forces. The outcome was that the Canadian public did not fully appreciate the closeness and complexity of what can best be termed a security partnership.

Closer, yet farther apart

The end of the Cold War created new circumstances that both confounded and complicated Canadian

defense needs. On the one hand, the collapse of the Soviet Union eliminated the most serious military threat to Canada. The danger of a nuclear attack by the USSR was gone, removing the need to station Canadian forces in Europe and greatly reducing the forces necessary for the aerospace defense of North America. But the expected peace dividend never arrived. While Canadian leaders had hoped that the end of the Cold War would result in a more peaceful international system, outbreaks of violence in the 1990s in Yugoslavia, Africa and Asia soon destroyed any optimism that there would be a peaceful and just "new world order."

The impact on the Canada-U.S. relationship has been profound. First, while policymakers saw an opportunity to reduce military expenditures and the size of Canadian forces, they also have increased the number of their country's overseas deployments. The nature of these deployments has also changed; while still committed to the support of NATO and the United Nations, Canadian forces increasingly are deployed on peacemaking and peace enforcement missions,[3] and on missions composed of a "coalition of the willing" rather than strictly those sanctioned by the UN or NATO. Second, challenges and irritants have begun to plague Canadian-American defense relations, even while U.S. and Canadian forces have moved to even closer interoperability.

Decreased funding, but increased and different deployments

Even before it was entirely clear that the USSR had ceased to exist, Canadian leaders were moving to reduce both the size and expenditures provided to the forces. From 1988 to 2001, defense spending was slashed by approximately 30 percent, from slightly over $15 billion (Cdn) in 1988 to just $11 billion (Cdn) in 2001.[4] It was not until 2005 that the country's military saw its first post-Cold War budgetary increase. The number of available forces has shrunk as well, from 90,000 in 1990 to a low of 62,000 in 2004.[5] The Canadian commitment to NATO was likewise reduced with the closing of Canadian bases in Germany.

At the same time, however, Canadian forces faced an increase in the number and operational tempo of overseas commitments. As it became clear that the new international environment was becoming more—rather than less—violent, Canadian leaders from both major parties stepped up the number of deployments, as well as providing these missions with increasingly robust rules of engagement.[6]

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, further accelerated this transformation. The Canadian government's support of the United States was manifested in two important ways. First, Canada agreed to send forces to assist in the war in Afghanistan. The naval commitment, authorized in October 2001, was sustained and substantial, ultimately involving almost all of the Canadian fleet (only Canada's maritime coastal defense vessels and submarine were not sent). In February 2002, Canada also announced that it had decided to send ground forces. Initially this deployment was based in Kabul, but in 2005 moved to the more dangerous region of Kandahar. Currently, with over 2,300 troops deployed, this operation has become a major Canadian commitment.

But even more telling is the nature of this effort. Canadian land forces are engaging the Taliban on a warfighting basis, targeting the enemy and being targeted in return.

This represents a paradigm shift for Canadian warfighting—and a concrete demonstration of Canada's commitment to the War on Terror. During the Cold War, while Canadian forces were targeted by the Soviet Union, no actual fighting took place, keeping the conflict out of sight and out of mind for the Canadian public. Today, with over 20 servicemen killed, Canada's commitment can no longer be ignored. While these human costs have generated some domestic controversy, at this point there is no sign that the current government is thinking about withdrawing. Rather, Ottawa has shown its determination to support and continue this mission, voting to extend it for another two years into 2009.

Canadian-American defense relations

Throughout the 1990s and into the 2000s, Canada-U.S. relations faced contradictory trends caused by the process described above. Operationally, Canadian forces have substantially improved their ability to cooperate with the American military. The U.S. and Canadian air forces have always enjoyed close cooperation via NORAD, but Canada's participation in the air offensive in Kosovo has further refined combat interoperability. Naval coordination has also increased. In 1998, Canada offered to deploy one of its frigates, the HMCS *Ottawa*, with an American carrier battle group following successful combined naval operations in the Persian Gulf.[7] This gave the Canadian Navy the opportunity to train with the world's largest and most advanced navy, while providing a supplement to U.S. capabilities. Since then, more than five additional deployments have allowed Canadian forces to share in American command and communications and fostered substantial American reliance on Canada.

Land forces have followed suit. While Canadian troops had previously trained with U.S. forces in Europe under the auspices of NATO, the end of the Cold War saw a substantial decrease in such training opportunities. The commitment of Canadian and American ground troops to Afghanistan changed all that; Canada's initial deployment took place in August 2003, with its troops placed under the authority of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Kabul. In reality, however, this meant that Canadian troops were operating jointly with American forces. And, as time progressed, both forces have begun conducting more numerous and complex operations together.

Politically, however, a number of governmental decisions have generated tensions between Washington and Ottawa. The first was the war in Iraq. As the U.S. government began to make its case for the invasion of Iraq, it was clear that officials in Canada were uncomfortable considering an invasion of that magnitude without the sanction of the United Nations. Canada had been a willing participant in the war to drive Iraq out of Kuwait in 1991, and had fully supported the subsequent oil and arms embargo against the regime of Saddam Hussein. Moreover, it was clear that successive Canadian governments disapproved deeply of the Iraqi regime's violations of human rights. But, as the Bush administration began to prepare for war in the fall of 2002, the Chrétien government began to send mixed messages about its commitment. When efforts to obtain a UN mandate collapsed and a U.S.-led invasion became imminent,

the Canadian government declined to participate. Yet, although Canada did not join in the conduct of the war, it still provided support to the American effort.

The Canadian-American defense relationship has been tested, and has always thrived. Their common commitment to democratic governance, human rights and free markets means that both countries will always share the same understanding of security.

Much more damaging has been the divergence between Washington and Ottawa over missile defense. Under the Bush administration, the United States has begun deployment of a national system to defend against the threat of ballistic missile attack. These steps have been seen by some segments of Canadian society as destabilizing for international security—and as potentially ominous moves toward the militarization of space. Some in Canada believe that if a successful anti-missile system is developed, nuclear deterrence will no longer constrain conflict between the U.S., Russia and possibly China. Secondly, while American efforts are currently focused on the deployment of ground-based systems, some fear that in time anti-missile capabilities will be placed in space. Thirdly, there were those who simply oppose the system because it is being promoted by the Bush administration.

The result has been an enormous lost opportunity. Initially, the minority government of Paul Martin gave indications that it would agree to participate. Ultimately, however, those opposed to participation were able to marshal enough political pressure to prompt the government to reject America's invitation to join in the development of the system.[8]

It is a decision with long-term ramifications. Faced with mounting threats from ballistic missiles launched by either rogue states or terrorist organizations, the United States has been left with the task of defending the entire continent if and when such threats develop.[9] This means Canada will truly be "free-riding" on the United States—a situation with negative ramifications for regional cooperation. Partly in response to Canada's choice, the United States has separated its Space Command from NORAD, and there are fears among some experts that the United States will continue to reduce the organization's importance because Washington no longer trusts the Canadian commitment to continental defense.[10] On a more positive note, however, the most recent NORAD agreement, signed in May 2006, includes an expansion into issues relating to maritime and land forces, suggesting that both the U.S. and Canada do see its continued existence as important. It is too early to tell, however, whether this represents an important new step or simply is a means of papering over the rift caused by Canada's decision on missile defense.

Lasting bonds

Canadian defense policy is now undergoing a profound transformation. The Canadian military is being used in a manner that few could have predicted when the Iron Curtain fell. Central to this transformation is the Canada-U.S. relationship. In some ways it has never been stronger. The ability of the Canadian Forces to operate with their American counterparts has never been more complete, and Canada continues to be an important

partner of the United States in many post-Cold War international interventions. But there are also important disagreements, with many Canadians opposed to the defense and international policies of the Bush administration.

Yet some perspective is in order. The Canadian-American defense relationship has been tested, and has always thrived. Their common commitment to democratic governance, human rights and free markets means that both countries will always share the same understanding of security. Differences can and do arise in how best to achieve it, but a military threat to the United States will be a military threat to Canada, and vice versa.

As such, Canada can be expected to continue working closely with the United States on defense issues both at home and abroad, not because it has to, and not because it is forced to, but because it remains in the Canadian national interest to do so. Exactly how this will happen, however, will be the interesting question.

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The Nonproliferation Review

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South Korea
Slouching Toward Submission

Chuck Downs

In the summer of 2006, two American allies faced clear and present dangers from terrorist forces armed with thousands of highly lethal, state-of-the-art missiles. Their respective enemies denied that these democratic societies had a right to exist, and pursued a long-standing, openly announced intention to wipe them from the face of the earth. Yet the similarities between Israel and South Korea seem to stop there.

Imagine that after its two soldiers were abducted by Hezbollah, Israel had called upon its neighbors to stop criticizing the terrorist group, urged the United Nations not to take action against it, advanced rationales for why Hezbollah might want to pursue more capable weaponry, dismissed its threatening rhetoric, and proposed to arbitrate from a position of neutrality between the United States and the terrorists. Imagine also that it criticized allies which came to its defense.

It is certainly true that each foreign policy issue is *sui generis*—possessing its own unique characteristics based on political, economic, and cultural factors. But what we have seen in the vastly different responses of these two American allies clarifies the depths of South Korea's crisis. In stark contrast to the way Israel has shown respect for, attention to, and dependence upon its partnership with the United States, the government of South Korea appears to be attempting to dissolve its strategic bonds with Washington. Seoul's response during the Korean missile crisis of 2006 will go down in history as a landmark case of an ally tearing down the foundations of an alliance at the very moment it faces significant danger.

Chuck Downs, a former Pentagon official and Congressional advisor, is the author of *Over the Line: North Korea's Negotiating Strategy* (AEI Press, 1999).

Going wobbly

Although an armistice officially limits hostilities between North and South Korea, the Korean peninsula has been in a *de jure* state of war since 1950, when Kim Il Sung tried to unify the peninsula under Communist control by invading the South. The United Nations came to the aid of the elected government of South Korea, which was declared to be the only "lawfully-established government" in Korea. Three years of bloody fighting ended in a standoff. After the Korean War, the Communist government in the North was propped up by the Soviet Union until the latter's demise in 1991, after which it suffered severe economic crisis, famine and institutional duress, but continued to send submarines and commando teams to the South on sabotage missions. South Korea's security, on the other hand, was guaranteed by the United States, enabling the country—in spite of the threat posed by Communism in North Korea—to make spectacular progress and become the economic powerhouse it is today.

In recent years, South Korean defense planners have grappled with how best to describe the threat posed by the communist regime in Pyongyang, against which so much of South Korea's military planning and alliance relations are based. Politically, however, the writing is on the wall.

From the start of the Korean War, the government of the Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea) understandably labeled North Korea, otherwise known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), as its "primary enemy." But the election of formerly imprisoned leftist opposition leader Kim Dae Jung to the South Korean presidency in 1997 ushered in a new era. In hopes of winning over his country's hostile northern neighbor, Kim launched a conciliatory approach (known as the "sunshine policy") built around economic inducements and reassuring strategic overtures. This policy remains very much in vogue today; Kim's successor and ideological protégé, current President Roh Moo Hyun, has expanded the "sunshine" policy into a "peace and prosperity policy"—one that attempts to engage regional players in developing the North's economy.

This policy shift has brought with it a substantial strategic reorientation. In recent years, South Korean defense planners have grappled with how best to describe the threat posed by the Communist regime, against which so much of South Korea's military planning and alliance relations are based. Politically, however, the writing is on the wall. In 2001, a few months after Kim Dae Jung visited Pyongyang for a well-orchestrated summit meeting, his administration announced that it "was examining a plan to use a different expression than 'primary enemy' in the official description of South Korea's relationship with North Korea."[1] The process proved so controversial that for three years South Korea's formative defense policy document could not be printed, until finally the term "primary enemy" was dropped entirely.

As stunning as this avoidance of identifying North Korea as its primary enemy may be, it has been accompanied by a series of policy pronouncements that has brought ever deeper confusion and embarrassment to the

alliance between South Korea and the United States. Such statements have included the informal remarks of ruling party security advisors visiting Washington that North Korea's nuclear developments are a long-term advantage for all Koreans. Following a chorus of Congressional condemnation, those remarks were repudiated, but President Roh's oft-repeated statement that South Korea should play a fair, balancing role between the United States and North Korea continues to guide South Korean policy. That this approach is contradictory is self-evident. As AEI economist Nicholas Eberstadt has pointed out, Roh's approach suggests that the government of South Korea can balance the interests of "a proven ally that has repeatedly defended South Korea's sovereignty and independence with those of an enemy that has consistently called for its annihilation."[2]

Indeed, while some changes in South Korea's approach to its alliance with the U.S. have occurred gradually, and could be chalked up to generational factors or popular mood swings, South Korea's denigration of the U.S.-ROK alliance has reached a dangerous level that cannot be confused with political maturity. Seoul, simply put, has become North Korea's most persistent apologist.

Stockholm syndrome in Seoul

The summer 2006 Asian missile crisis has brought this state of affairs into sharp perspective. While even North Korean ally China urged Pyongyang not to proceed with what American intelligence concluded were likely preparations for missile launches, South Korean President Roh took pains to explain that North Korea might have a legitimate need for such tests—for example, for peaceful space exploration. That notion was not an original idea; it had been the official North Korean line when the DPRK shocked the world in 1998 by launching a three-stage *Taepo-Dong* intercontinental ballistic missile over Japan into the Pacific Ocean. That demonstration proved that North Korea's missile capabilities far exceeded western intelligence estimates. It naturally also raised concerns about North Korea's recklessness; the missile could have sent debris into Japanese cities, but it was launched without even a routine notice to mariners fishing near the point of splashdown.

North Korea's objectives in the missile launches of July 4, 2006,[3] were similar to those of 1998. The *Taepo-Dong II* test in July, however, was a technical failure, with the missile exploding less than a minute after launch. To some degree, however, the failure was mitigated by an impressive series of mobile launches of *Scud* and *No-Dong* missiles (some with new characteristics).

The successful *Scud* and *No-Dong* tests could be described as posing a threat to Russia, China, and Japan, because parts of each country's territory lay within the missiles' range. Without a doubt, however, the greatest threat posed by these weapons is to South Korea, whose entire territory sits within range, and whose historical enmity can be presumed to matter. Back in June 2006, South Korea had joined diplomatic efforts to persuade North Korea not to carry out the missile tests. But, when push came to shove, the Blue House, the South Korean president's executive mansion, was hesitant to respond to the launches. In explaining why two hours had lapsed before President Roh was even informed of the

launches, Unification Minister Lee Jong-seok said, "Because these missiles were shot toward the East Sea, it was not thought they posed a direct threat to national security."[4]

In press briefings, South Korean officials also chose not to emphasize President Bush's statement that North Korea had taken "a provocative action," instead voicing muted concern that the missile launches might produce a "grave and negative impact on inter-Korean ties."[5] South Korean officials did make a show of declaring that meetings previously scheduled with North Korea might not be held and food aid to the North would be temporarily suspended. But simultaneously, they also pointed out reassuringly that South Korean-sponsored economic activities at North Korea's Kaesong industrial complex would be unaffected by the missile tests, because they were a matter for the private sector (even though South Korean taxpayers provide the official financial guarantees without which these activities would not be undertaken).

While some changes in South Korea's approach to its alliance with the U.S. have occured gradually, and could be chalked up to generational factors or popular mood swings, South Korea's denigration of the U.S.-ROK alliance has reached a dangerous level that cannot be confused with political maturity. Seoul, simply put, has become North Korea's most persistent apologist.

President Roh himself chose to make no statement on the North Korean action for a week, a silence that drew rebuke from South Korea's opposition party. Instead, a statement from officials at the Blue House declared that the situation was "not a national security emergency." The silence might have been justified if it were a tactic designed to allow the rest of the world to voice its alarm more effectively. But that was not the case. In a telling statement, the President's staff explained, "There is a reason for the president's silence. It would be foolish to take action that could throw national security into jeopardy by raising tension levels on the peninsula."[6] The message was clear: North Korea had succeeded in bullying the South Korean government into silence, even though stating a fear of self-defense is seldom an effective means of guaranteeing one's security.

Sensitive to South Korea's proximity and distaste for confrontation with the North, American officials welcomed the leading role Japan was willing to play in drafting and sponsoring a UN resolution reprimanding North Korea for the missile tests. The Japanese draft called upon member states not to provide materials to North Korea that could be used in manufacturing missiles and raised the possibility that stronger measures under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, including military enforcement and economic sanctions, could be authorized against the rogue regime. Japan backed up this proposal by taking immediate action to impose economic sanctions prohibiting Japanese companies from providing funds or military equipment to North Korea.

It might have been expected that South Korea would express quiet gratitude to Japan for carrying its water on this issue. Yet quite the opposite occurred. During the hiatus in presidential statements about the

missile crisis, President Roh's staff took the opportunity to declare that South Korea had "no reason to make a fuss about it like Japan did."[7] In fact, when President Roh broke his silence on the missile crisis, he did so to criticize Japan, whose attitude, he said, "may lead to a critical situation in the peace over Northeast Asia."[8]

In South Korea's topsy-turvy analysis, its own diplomatic efforts were focused on proceeding with North-South talks that had been scheduled before the missile crisis. Recognizing when they had a compliant hostage, the North Korean delegation attended these talks and pulled out all the stops. North Korean negotiator Kwon Ho-ung exclaimed that South Korea ought to provide assistance to North Korea in gratitude for Kim Jong-il's policy of putting the military first. Kim's notorious "military first" policy justifies starving North Koreans in order to develop nuclear weapons. Yet Kwon argued that it not only defends North Korea from imperialism but actually protects South Korea's real interests as well. The South Korean delegate demurred, saying such protection had not been requested.

Parting ways

Although it seemed not to notice, South Korea's approach was alienating it from neighbors while also making it vulnerable to abuse from its enemies. China and Russia, as expected, initially opposed the Japanese draft and proposed something similar to what had been done after the 1998 *Taepo-Dong* test—a letter from the President of the Security Council expressing concern over the North Korean action. That *de minimis* approach had South Korea's tacit approval, but fell far short of what Washington sought in New York. Even Russia had reason to take a harder stance than it had in 1998; some of the missiles from the July test now littered their Pacific fishing zone. But, in the week after the missile launches, a Chinese effort to reason with North Korea ran aground, and South Korea watched as China stiffened its resolve on North Korea's defiance of regional concerns. After the PRC's Vice Premier Hui Liangyu and its top nuclear negotiator, Wu Dawei, returned from Pyongyang without North Korean consent even to attend a new round of the Six-Party Talks, the official PRC statement told the story: "China is gravely concerned about the current situation and we have expressed our position to the North Korean side."[9] And China did not abstain on July 15th, when the UN Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 1695 condemning the North Korean test launches and demanding "that the DPRK suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile program."

Washington took action to put back in place economic sanctions against North Korea that had been lifted during the Clinton administration. Two days later, President Roh criticized American efforts to impose these additional financial sanctions on North Korea, and called Japan's role in the crisis "rash and thoughtless."[10] An aide called Japan "truly evil," in case there was any doubt how the Roh administration felt. President Roh then explained that in dealing with the United States, "since they are an ally, we cannot scold them, but we have to go at it with Japan."[11]

On July 19th, Roh summarized his government's distance from American objectives: "The missile launches were a wrong behavior and are feared not only to harm peace and stability on the Korean peninsula but also trigger a regional arms race … but the moves by some forces,

which create unnecessary tension, will not be helpful either for settling the problems."[12] The message was clear: South Korea had decided that the UN resolution would not hamper its sunshine policy toward North Korea. Economic projects with the regime would, it announced, continue unabated. Minister of Unification Lee Jong-seok explained that because the resolution was aimed at missiles and weapons of mass destruction, it does not require "sanctions on general economic exchanges."[13]

Luckily, the government of the People's Republic of China, North Korea's erstwhile friend, saw the situation more clearly. In late July, it froze North Korean bank accounts at the Bank of China—a move that won praise from the White House because it recognized the need to rein in North Korea's international illicit operations (including counterfeiting, drug smuggling, and proliferation) funded through external banking institutions.[14]

Off the reservation

As a month closed, it had become clear that whatever had been gained or lost by North Korea and its adversaries, the relationship between Washington and Seoul had suffered severe stress. Sometimes the murky, nuanced world of diplomacy becomes painfully blunt. In one such moment of clarity, when asked who he thought had pursued the most unsuccessful policy during this crisis, South Korea's point man, Unification Minister Lee, said that Washington's policy had failed the most. Lee's was by no means an isolated sentiment. When questioned by reporters, President Roh responded: "Do you think the United States is a country without fault?"[15] These veiled attacks on U.S. policy were met with widespread public outrage and calls for Lee's resignation from the opposition party, which has recently gained clout in local elections. The South Korean public seems to know who its friends are, even if its government does not. The U.S. State Department deftly answered the minister's comments by pointing out North Korea's policy has actually demonstrated the greatest failure.

The alliance between the United States and South Korea has withstood five decades against a persistent totalitarian threat. It is one of the closest and strongest military alliances the world has ever witnessed between people who speak unrelated languages. It is based on an extensive architecture of mutual defense activities, unique command structures that facilitate warfighting when necessary, and the deployment of tens of thousands of American troops in Korea, at a cost of about ten billion dollars annually. The alliance has shown tremendous resiliency, delivering success in war and prosperity in peace. And there is no question that in an alliance between sovereign states there will occasionally arise disputes and differences of opinion, and those may be centered on key questions of how the alliance addresses threats. In this instance, no one doubts that the government of South Korea has the right not just to hold a different view but also to state it. But when a nation faces an enemy that seeks its destruction, it is unwise for that nation to pander to the enemy and abuse its friends. Part of North Korea's objective in creating crises like the missile crisis of July 2006 is to drive a wedge between Seoul and Washington. For the moment, Seoul seems intent on helping it succeed.

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CAIR: Establishment Darling

The Council on American-Islamic Relations is often called on by government, media, and community organizations to be the voice of American Muslims. But in the Spring *Middle East Quarterly*, Daniel Pipes and Sharon Chadha reveal that there is much to object to in CAIR's history: links to terrorism; intimidation of its critics; foreign funding from Islamist supporters; and an insistence on Muslim supremacism.



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Iran

Confronting the Threat

Results of a JINSA Roundtable

On February 6, 2006, the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs convened a panel of leading experts to examine the emerging crisis over Iran's nuclear program and policy options available to the United States in confronting the Islamic Republic. Below is a rapporteur's summary of their remarks.

Iranian Capabilities

Ilan Berman
Vice President for Policy, American Foreign Policy Council

The U.S. government should brace for six concrete trends in the years ahead as a result of Iran's progress toward a nuclear bomb.

First, we will see—in fact, we are already seeing—an expansion of Iran's regional influence. In recent years, Iran has signed bilateral agreements with a number or regional countries, among them Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. These deals are an indication that the countries of the Middle East are preparing for a nuclear Iran, and that they do not expect the U.S. to stay in the region long enough to protect them.

The second trend that is likely to emerge in the near future is a new arms race in the Middle East. Countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia have already shown signs of seeking expanded strategic capabilities in order to counterbalance a potential Iranian bomb.

The third trend that we can expect is greatly expanded proliferation. Iran is already a major "secondary proliferator," and Iran's radical new president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has made clear that he is willing to provide nuclear technology to any Muslim states that come seeking it. Prudence dictates that we take him at his word.

The fourth trend is increased terrorism. Iran is already the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism, and if it has the nuclear muscle to back it up, Iran will be bound to feel greater freedom to export its radical revolutionary principles.

Fifth, we can expect an upsurge in strategic blackmail emanating from the Islamic Republic. Given its strategic location atop the Strait of Hormuz, Iran has the ability to virtually dictate energy terms to the United States and Europe.

The sixth trend is regime longevity. Iran today is in ferment, with rampant social discontent, unemployment and drug use. All of this, however, is likely to change if the regime acquires the bomb. The closer the Iranian regime gets to a nuclear capability, the more its leaders will feel that they can repress their domestic opposition without serious repercussions from the international community. An Iranian bomb, in short, will fundamentally alter the relationship between the regime and its population.

Since the extent of the Iranian nuclear program is not known, America must begin to develop a plan to deal with these six trends sooner, rather than later.

Kenneth Timmerman
Investigative Journalist

The threat from Iran is expanding. Iran first tested its *Shahab-3* medium-range missile in 1998. It is also believed to have tested a missile with an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) warhead. And Iran is known to have tested a short-range ballistic missile off a barge in the Caspian Sea, indicating that it may hope to use a low-tech delivery system in order to attack the United States from 60 to 100 miles offshore, where detection would be difficult.

There is much that we now know about Iran's nuclear capabilities. In its reports referring Iran to the United Nations Security Council for action, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) highlighted that Iran had a working relationship with A.Q. Khan, the father of the Pakistani bomb. The Iranian regime bought plans and equipment from Khan's network, indicating that the Iranian regime is not simply interested in nuclear power.

But what is not known about Iran's nuclear capabilities is just as troubling. IAEA inspectors have indicated that Iran's uranium (UF-4 and UF-6) is not of good quality, which makes enrichment much more difficult. What is not known is how much this complicates Iran's nuclear efforts, and how long it will take to resolve. It is also not known if Iran has used the centrifuges it received from the Khan network to enrich UF-6, imported from China. If it has, Iran may have enough enriched uranium for 20-25 bombs. The biggest unknown, however, may be the existence of a parallel program using the same technology and being perfected in sites that are buried and unknown to IAEA inspectors. This idea is supported by the fact that the Iranians have in their possession a technical 15-page description of how to make hemispherical shapes out of enriched uranium, a key element in constructing a nuclear bomb.

Western Policy Options

Helle Dale
Deputy Director, Davis Institute for International Studies, The Heritage Foundation

Public diplomacy toward Iran is a difficult task. The state media is very tightly controlled, newspapers are arbitrarily closed, the Internet is filtered, and private satellite dishes

are banned. But the Iranian people, especially the young people, have a great deal of discontent with the hard hand of the ruling classes. So much so that they will often defy the government in order to access outside news sources.

The U.S. can carry out better public outreach to Iran in several ways. First of all, a goal must be decided upon. *Radio Farda* today provides essentially the same news that Iranians can get from their state news agency. The content is repetitive and contains little analysis. If our goal were to simply broadcast news from a slightly different angle, this would be sufficient. But it is not. Incorporating Western values into news analysis could have a great impact on an Iranian public thirsty for thought-provoking debate.

Another problem is a lack of Farsi-speaking journalists. *Radio Farda* is thus forced to choose between people who simply speak the language but lack journalistic training or journalists who don't speak Farsi. They often do not have both, which hampers the effectiveness of our broadcasts.

The Voice of America's (VOA) Farsi television is also cause for concern. VOA, often criticized as a bloated bureaucracy, controls *Radio Farda* and has recently been cutting back *Radio Farda's* budget. This comes at a time when more funding than ever should be devoted to public diplomacy in Iran. *Radio Farda* should be divorced from VOA and placed under a more flexible working environment.

Ultimately, vast improvements must take place in our public diplomacy toward Iran. The U.S. government should provide support and encouragement to Iranians who seek to move their country in a more pro-Western direction. This includes enhancing public diplomacy by using broadcast facilities both to beam uncensored news to the Iranian people and to serve as "surrogate radio," telling people the news about their own country that their government does not want them to hear. The use of humor and satire is also effective, as are interactive programming, such as call-in radio where the telephone number is in an accessible third country.

These kinds of tactics could be very effective if properly funded due to the young age of Iranian society. There is a broad field of hearts and minds that could be won if we are smart enough to tailor our public diplomacy to reaching them.

James S. Robbins
Senior Fellow in National Security Affairs, American Foreign Policy Council

There is a body of opinion that nuclear weapons bring stability through deterrence. The thinking goes that if Iran becomes a nuclear state, somehow this would add to the overall stability of the region. After all, Israel is presumed to have nuclear weapons, and because the Cold War "balance of terror" worked so well, we can replay it on a smaller scale.

This is an extremely dangerous idea. It has only gained traction because its proponents focus on the high end of the conflict spectrum. But, as we learned during the Cold War, the deterrence model is based on many more variables than simply the assumption that countries will not employ nuclear weapons because if they annihilate a country, they will be annihilated in return.

One of the key assumptions in deterrence modeling, that of having rational actors on both sides, does not hold up well in the case of Iran. Maybe the Iranians are rational

actors, maybe not. If they are not, or if they are working under a rational framework that is based on a radically different view of reality, then all bets are off.

Another assumption is that each side has full information about the capabilities of the other; in other words, transparency. Also, both sides must have a presumed or demonstrable second strike capability, meaning that a country can absorb the blow from the other side and then respond with sufficient force to annihilate the aggressor. This is necessary to forestall a first strike "bolt from the blue" scenario. In other words, just to get to deterrence you would need an arms race. Yet another requirement is open communications.

Furthermore, these issues are only at the high-intensity end of the conflict spectrum. But there are other aspects to this that make deterrence even more sophisticated. The value of nuclear weapons is to enable conflict at other levels of the spectrum by engaging the fear of escalation. That is the reason we had proxy wars during the Cold War.

If Iran succeeds in acquiring nuclear weapons, therefore, the U.S. would have to stop talking about regime change, at least by force. Iran, on the other hand, would be able to employ a variety of force options.

The bottom line? Deterrence is working fine right now. It is working in Iran's favor. They are deterring us.

R. James Woolsey
Former Director of Central Intelligence

Is it possible to deter a nuclear-capable Iran, as we did with the Soviet Union during the decades of the Cold War? The simple answer is that Iran today is very different from the USSR. The latter was rigid and bureaucratic, which made their actions fairly easy to predict. We knew exactly what their military capabilities were and that their leadership did not want to go to war. In addition, by the 1950s, the Soviet Union was pretty much a non-ideological enemy. Iran, on the other hand, is unpredictable, fanatical and religiously motivated. Deterrence worked on the Soviet Union, but it will not work against Iran. We need in effect to set aside not only *most* but *all* of the mind-set that we had during the Cold War about how to deal with a country like the Soviet Union.

Iran's leadership is committed to an extremely aggressive, totalitarian worldview. Ahmadinejad has stated publicly that a world without America and Israel is possible and can be achieved. Ahmadinejad's chief of strategy, Hassan Abbassi, has similarly explicitly indicated his wish to destroy Anglo-Saxon civilization. This is not the stodgy old Soviet Union we are dealing with; this is al-Qaeda as a state.

Military options should not be used unless they are for the purpose of preventing Iran from obtaining or developing a nuclear weapon. But if military action is the only remaining option, the Greek axiom that "if you strike at the king, you must kill him," must be applied. All of the elements of state power in Iran, including its intelligence apparatus, must be completely destroyed.

Prior to the use of military force, however, a couple of things can be attempted. The U.S. must engage in targeted sanctions against Iran's investments and imports. Ahmadinejad must be named as an accused before a specially convened international tribunal for his violation of the Genocide Convention (public advocacy of genocide is a violation). The U.S. government should also consider tailoring sanctions against Iran to

areas with the greatest impact, including an embargo on the Iranian importation of refined petroleum products. The U.S. also needs to work with European allies in order to have them disengage economically from Iran. While this has not been successful in the past, the latest developments in Iranian behavior have increased the urgency of doing so.

The Military Option

IDF Representative
Name withheld for security reasons

Before analyzing the military option, it is necessary to talk about timetables. Here, the United States and Israel have some differences of opinion. For the U.S., the yardstick is how long it will take Iran to acquire enough fissile material for one nuclear device. Since the official assessment puts that point at five to ten years away, there is the perception that the United States still has time to deal with the problem. Israel, on the other hand, believes that once the Iranians overcome the technical difficulties they are currently facing, they could go underground, copy the enrichment capabilities in numerous other sites and operate a fully parallel clandestine program that would be much harder to uproot and destroy. Therefore, according to Israel, the critical time frame to try and stop the Iranians is within the coming year or so.

Does a viable military option exist? From an Israeli point of view, the only viable military option would be a one-time surgical air strike against Iranian nuclear sites. Israel has both the air capabilities and the munitions to carry out this kind of operation. It would not be without considerations and complications, however. Mid-air refueling would be necessary for all of the planes involved due to the geographic distance between Israel and Iran. Also of major concern would be the political implications of flying over states like Jordan, Turkey and Iraq. Another problem is that, unlike the Osirak reactor strikes in 1981, there are many targets, and some are deeply buried. One can assume, therefore, that Israeli strikes will not absolutely destroy the Iranian nuclear program. Rather, they would simply buy more time and make Iran's ability to reacquire certain components much more difficult. The issue of a violent Iranian response also complicates the decision to strike. Iran will likely respond against Israel with terrorist attacks, and may also choose to involve American targets.

These problems do not make the military option impossible, only risky and complicated. The military option, therefore, should not be taken off the table. If Iran thinks this option has been eliminated, it will only serve to embolden their defiance.

Lieutenant General Earl Hailston, USMC (ret.)
Former Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command

When it comes to military options against Iran, the United States has a long list of potential actions. From smart weapons and intelligence to special operations forces, the U.S. has the finest fighting force in the world. However, there is a great deal more to war than conventional forces. Iran is quite different from Iraq, both in terms of its size and in its terrain. Its population is four times that of Iraq. There are also accessibility problems; it may be politically difficult to access Iran from one of the bordering countries. Also, the coastline is very shallow, and it would be difficult to bring forces ashore. Overall, reaching Tehran would be much more challenging than reaching Baghdad.

There is also the question of defining the military's exact mission. In what state do we want to leave their nuclear program? Can we find everything that must be targeted? Many of the nuclear sites in Iran are deeply buried, and we will not destroy or incapacitate all of them with precision strikes. Are we looking to change the regime? And if so, what are some of the unintended consequences that may present themselves? You are not going to do it without boots on the ground. Yet with boots come the related, unintended consequences of an occupation force. We also have other global commitments to think about. The U.S. cannot abandon its missions in other countries and fronts. Another unknown is the commitment of our allies in this potential war. Are we going into this alone or with support from other countries? Concerns about U.S. national will and funding for this mission also arise. If we hope to succeed militarily, these are all questions that must be answered well before we take action.

Syria
Buying Time

Robert Rabil

For the United States, Syria has long represented something of a conundrum. Historically, Washington has preferred to maintain diplomatic relations with Damascus, in spite of Syria's prominent role as a repeat offender on the State Department's "terrorism list." But with the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the ensuing insurgency there, Syria has taken on a new and ominous role as an enabler of anti-Coalition insurgents and a source of regional instability.

So far, however, Washington has failed to formulate a coherent strategy toward Damascus. Central to this shortcoming is a lack of understanding about Syria's socio-political dynamics—and the nature of regional politics themselves. Yet such an analysis is crucial, because in the aftermath of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the regime of Bashar al-Assad has undergone a profound foreign policy transformation.

Internally, the regime has accelerated the process of "Assadization," suppressing dissent and shifting even greater power to the country's Alawite minority. It also has deepened its cooperation with Iran in an effort to solidify its most important strategic alliance. Most of all, however, Damascus is attempting to reassert its regional significance, especially in Lebanon, and in the process prevent the United States from forging a new, democratic regional order.

Dr. Robert G. Rabil is assistant professor and director of graduate studies in the political science department at Florida Atlantic University. He is the author of *Embattled Neighbors: Syria, Israel and Lebanon* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003) and *Syria, the United States, and the War on Terror in the Middle East* (Praeger, 2006). Research for this article was made possible by a grant from the FAU Division of Research, to which the author extends his deep gratitude.

Tension and ambivalence

Throughout most of their modern history, Washington and Damascus have had an uneasy relationship—one that, though marked by tension and apprehension, has rarely been confrontational. From 1946 to 1979, ties between the two countries were dictated by the geopolitics of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Cold War. And, although Syria moved headlong into the Soviet camp, the United States, believing in Syria's ability to influence events beyond its borders, maintained diplomatic relations with Damascus that were based above all on *realpolitik*. Washington, for example, mediated a disengagement agreement between Israel and Syria in the wake of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, and subsequently supported the entry of Syrian troops into Lebanon in 1976.

The advent of the War on Terror fundamentally altered the dynamics of the U.S.-Syrian relationship.

But Syria's complicity in terrorism, which landed the country on the U.S. State Department's terrorist list beginning in 1979, emerged as a source of friction with the United States between 1979 and 2000. Even at the height of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process (1991-2000), which helped thaw U.S.-Syrian relations, Washington's attitude toward Damascus remained unclear. Syria's participation in the U.S.-led anti-Iraq coalition during the first Gulf War was certainly appreciated, but not enough to exclude Damascus from Washington's official blacklist of countries supporting terrorism. The State Department's 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997 annual reports on terrorism, for example, found Syria innocent of the charge of terrorism, but nevertheless an accomplice to it.[1]

The advent of the War on Terror fundamentally altered the dynamics of the U.S.-Syrian relationship. Although initially ambivalent, Washington could no longer condone Syrian support for—or harboring of—terrorist organizations. Syria's initial assistance in the fight against al-Qaeda, which helped to foil terrorist attacks on U.S. targets in Ottawa and Bahrain, was outweighed by its persistent role as a terrorist enabler. Despite several requests, including one delivered in person by then-Secretary of State Colin Powell in May 2003, Syrian president Bashar al-Assad continued to allow a bevy of terrorist organizations, among them the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Hamas, to operate in Damascus.

Against this backdrop, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq sent shockwaves through Syria. It shattered the regional status quo around which the Syrian regime had built its reputation as the vanguard of Arab nationalism, and upended the security regime underpinning the authoritarian rule of the Ba'ath governments in the Gulf and Levant. Perhaps even more threatening was the Bush administration's concurrent initiative to spread democracy in the greater Middle East, which presented a threat to the very nature of the regime in Damascus. The results were dramatic; quite suddenly, the regional order onto which Syria historically had projected its power—and from which it drew its legitimacy as a nationalist state—had collapsed. As seen from Damascus, nothing less than regime survival was at stake.

Assad's survival strategy

The resulting approach adopted by the Assad regime has been essentially two-pronged. The first component involves turning a blind eye to *jihadi* infiltration into Iraq as a way of undermining U.S. efforts there. In the process, Syrian authorities have indirectly transformed what was once a disordered infiltration into an organized operation. Growing conservatism in Syria, coupled with lax governmental rules (such as no entry visa requirements for Arabs), has created a political climate that is conducive to insurgent activities. This trend, moreover, has been perpetuated by Syria's minority Alawite regime, which, in order to atone for its brutal suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1982, has embraced moderate Islam.[2]

The second is a deepening state of domestic repression in response to re-energized civil calls for political and economic reform. Before and upon his assumption of power in 2000, President Assad had pledged to introduce change into Syria's sclerotic political system. But as the so-called "Damascus Spring" began to spread, the regime backtracked on those promises. Under the pretext of the Arab-Israeli conflict and "national security," the regime has continued to harass, detain and allegedly liquidate reformers and/or dissidents.

At the same time, the Syrian regime has set about accelerating the consolidation of its rule. Since his assumption of power, President Assad has been trying to replace members of the old regime and officials whose loyalty is uncertain. This trend reached a crescendo during the Ba'ath Party's Tenth Regional Congress in June 2005, when nearly the entire "old guard" of the regime was forced into retirement.[3] Simultaneously, the membership of the Ba'ath Party's Regional Command Council, which wields significant power, was reduced from 21 to 14.[4] These steps were followed just weeks later by important changes to the leadership structure of the Syrian security forces.[5] Significantly, almost all of these changes localized power to Alawites close to the President, thereby narrowing the regime's base of political support.

The Congress served another crucial function as well: to reaffirm the dominant role of the Ba'ath party in Syrian politics. In his speech before the Congress, Assad asserted that the "role of the Ba'ath will remain essential."[6] Reformers were deeply disappointed by the outcome; they had believed that the regime, subjected to mounting international pressure, would introduce some reform to bring about national unity. But the Ba'ath Congress was a show of solidarity directed at the opposition, and the West. Its underlying message, in the words of one Syrian analyst, was that the Ba'ath was here to stay.[7]

Opening a new front

When the United States launched Operation Iraqi Freedom in March 2003, the Syrian regime did more than simply denounce the U.S.-led invasion and occupation of Iraq. Fearful of the impact of an American presence next door on its own internal stability, and wary of the possibility of military action migrating across the Iraqi-Syrian border, the Assad regime launched a concerted—and ongoing—effort to first support Iraq's army and subsequently fuel the insurgency that has emerged in the former Ba'athist state. As Syrian Foreign Minister Farouq al-Shara told the Syrian parliament on March 30, 2003, "Syria has a national inter-

est in the expulsion of the invaders from Iraq."[8]

This strategy took on a number of forms. The Syrian regime mobilized Muslim public opinion in an effort to encourage *jihadi* infiltration into Iraq. It did so by creating religious sanction for instability in Iraq, with Syria's senior cleric, Grand Mufti Ahmad Kaftaro, issuing a fatwa (religious edict) calling on Muslims "to use whatever means possible to defeat the [U.S.] aggression including suicide bombings against the Zionist Americans and British invaders."[9] Indeed, the Syrian regime made good on its policy by providing the Iraqi regime with military equipment including night-vision goggles and allowing *jihadis* to cross the border into Iraq to kill Americans.

Testifying before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia of the House International Relations Committee, John Bolton, then the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, stated:

> We have seen Syria take a series of hostile actions toward Coalition forces in Iraq. Syria allowed military equipment to flow into Iraq on the eve of and during the war. Syria permitted volunteers to pass into Iraq to attack and kill our service members during the war, and is still doing so.[10]

This dual policy—mobilizing Muslim public opinion while turning a blind eye to *jihadi* infiltration—was speedily capitalized upon by extremists throughout the Muslim world. A broad network of Sunni mosques emerged as the hub for organizing this infiltration, encompassing "almost every village and town from Damascus to Baghdad."[11] Efforts by American troops to stop cross-border infiltration resulted in clashes with Syrian forces. Under intense pressure from the U.S., the Syrian regime did take certain measures, such as increasing the number of troops in border towns, to monitor and prevent the ongoing infiltration. But reports of training camps and Syrian intelligence officials aiding insurgents cast doubt upon Syria's true intentions.[12]

Syria's unhelpful role has also ratcheted up tensions between Damascus and Baghdad. In mid-2005, Iraq's defense minister, Saadoun al-Dulaimi, criticized Damascus for ignoring Iraqi demands "to stop the infiltration of terrorists" and warned that "when the lava of the exploding volcano of Iraq overflows, it will first hit Damascus."[13] Al-Dulaimi's criticisms were well-placed; Syria's support of the insurgency, both direct and indirect, has greatly undermined the security environment in Iraq.

At the same time, the Syrian regime—once a staunch opponent of religious radicalism—has embraced an array of regional Islamists. The Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Hamas operate freely in Damascus, inflaming Palestinian public opinion against the U.S. and Israel and allegedly masterminding suicide bombings in Israel.[14] The Syrian regime has also expanded its support for Hezbollah in Lebanon; in addition to supplying the Shi'ite militia with arms, Syria has served as a key conduit for transferring missiles from Iran to the Islamist party.

The turn to Tehran

Deprived of its strategic depth in Iraq and its historic and geo-strategic backyard in Lebanon, Syria has also moved headlong into the Iranian camp. In February 2004, the two countries signed a key "memorandum of understanding" outlining an

expansion of bilateral defense cooperation—and codifying an Iranian commitment to protect Syria in case of attack by either Israel or the United States.[15] This partnership was further bolstered by the visit of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Syria in January 2005. The summit served to coordinate Syrian and Iranian policy and consolidate their alliance; Damascus backed Iran in its confrontation with the West over its nuclear program and both countries supported Hezbollah and Hamas in their resistance to Israeli occupation.[16] This alliance culminated in a defense treaty signed between the two countries in June 2006. Commenting on the treaty, Syrian Defense Minister Hasan Turkmani explained that "we [Syria and Iran] form a mutual front against Israeli threats." He asserted that "Iran considers Syria's security as Iran's security."[17] Since then, cooperation between Damascus and Tehran has increased, with both countries stressing the need for a joint approach to the American and Israeli threat.[18]

The reasons for Syria's interest in this alliance are clear. Both countries share concern over being targeted by the United States as part of the War on Terror, as well as a common belief that they must prevent the U.S. from creating a new, democratic regional order. In addition, Damascus sees partnership with Tehran as a necessary deterrent against the U.S. and Israel.

But whereas the Syrian regime is fighting for its survival, Iran is angling for regional hegemony. Cognizant of the current disarray in pan-Arab politics, Iran has begun to champion Arab causes, thereby forcing Arabs to toe its political line. No Arab leader has spoken as forcefully as Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad against Israel and for Palestinians, especially Hamas.

Damascus is the lynchpin in these plans. Because of its strategic location, Syria has the ability to extend Iran's reach into the Levant, as well as to serve as a foil to advance Iranian regional ambitions under the pretext of Arab nationalist causes. But Syria is also unquestionably the junior partner in this alliance. As Syrian troops left Lebanon, Damascus lost important leverage vis-à-vis Hezbollah and Palestinian groups there. As a result, Syria can no longer dictate its policies to these groups without making considerable concessions. In the words of former Syrian Vice-President (and current vocal regime opponent) Abdel Halim Khaddam: "Bashar Assad is not a strategic ally of Iran, but only a strategic tool."[19]

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Syria versus the "Cedar Revolution"

Lebanon has long occupied a central role in Syria's strategic calculus, serving as a patronage system for Syria's Alawite security chiefs and a proxy front against Israel. Over time, however, this situation became precarious as many Lebanese, encouraged by the collapse of the regional order, began efforts to reclaim their country from Syrian occupation. This represented a serious threat to

Syria. Since their entry into Lebanon in 1976, the Syrians, pursuing a divide-and-conquer strategy among the country's diverse Christian and Muslim denominations, had been able to impose their hegemony over most of Lebanon. The country was brought under complete Syrian control when Syria joined the U.S.-led anti-Iraq coalition in 1990-1991 and Washington returned the favor by giving Damascus the green light to attack the last bastion of Christian resistance to Syrian hegemony. Throughout the 1990s, as the peace process became the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, Damascus increased its support of the Islamist party, Hezbollah, enabling it to become an effective instrument to pressure Israel while at the same time relegating the Lebanese authorities to a supporting role. Hezbollah, in turn, capitalized on these developments, legitimizing itself as both a political party and a resistance movement in the eyes of many Lebanese.

The departure of Syrian forces from Lebanon has beeen succeeded by a cycle of violence, now over a year old, aimed at anti-Syrian politicians and journalists and showcasing a clear message: only Syria can prevent Lebanon from descending into chaos.

The dynamics of the Israeli-Lebanese-Syrian relationship changed dramatically with Israel's unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000. Israel's redeployment, which was carried out without first concluding a peace treaty with Syria, prompted immediate Lebanese calls for a similar Syrian withdrawal. After all, observers charged, Syrian troops were no longer needed to defend Beirut against Israeli aggression—something Syrian authorities had continuously trumpeted to legitimize their occupation.

Syria, in response, tried to further entrench itself in Lebanon. Its tool of choice? A pro-Syrian government that would be committed to stemming the rising tide of anti-Syrian political activities. Damascus directed its loyalists in Lebanon's parliament to extend for three years the term of its ally, President Emile Lahoud. But Syria's blatant meddling in Lebanese affairs caused a backlash, with former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri and Druze leader Walid Jumblaat realigning their loyalties in the direction of anti-Syrian forces, thereby potentially threatening the very nature of the country's fragile Syrian-imposed order. External pressure was mounting as well, with the United States and France co-sponsoring UN Security Council Resolution 1559 in September 2004 calling for Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon and the disarmament of Hezbollah.

In an attempt to nip this growing anti-Syrian campaign in the bud, the Syrian regime—in tandem with its underlings in Lebanon's security apparatus—is believed to have orchestrated the assassination of Hariri in February 2005. But this act backfired spectacularly, triggering a mass uprising intent on reclaiming an independent democratic Lebanon. On March 14, 2005, approximately 1.5 million Lebanese (over a third of the country's entire population), took to the streets to demonstrate for Syria's withdrawal.[20]

Buffeted by international pressure and stunned by this sudden "Cedar Revolution," Syrian troops humiliatingly evacuated Lebanon the

following month. But their departure has been succeeded by a cycle of violence, now over a year old, aimed at anti-Syrian politicians and journalists and showcasing a clear message: only Syria can prevent Lebanon from descending into chaos.

Hunkering down

Syria, in short, is acting from a sense of siege. The scope and breadth of domestic repression—coupled with the regime's subversive activities in Lebanon, Iraq and even Jordan, only serve to highlight the fact that Damascus remains governed by a criminal mind-set and ruled by the language of force.[21] And, although it is emerging as a weak link in the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis, Syria has the ability to play an essential role in it—extending this dangerous partnership to Palestinian radicals and other extremist forces in the region.

For the United States, these internal perceptions of weakness are likely to have concrete consequences. Humiliated in Lebanon and beleaguered by both internal and external threats, the Syrian regime is likely to find sanctuary in a continuation of its role as regional spoiler. Time and again, Syria has embraced terrorism as a strategic tool to counteract perceptions of its regional insignificance, and the conditions are ripe for it to do so again.

1. See the U.S. Department of State's *Patterns of Global Terrorism* for 1994 through 1997, available online at http://www.state.gov.
2. The regime has supported the building of some 80,000 mosques, over 22 higher-education institutions for teaching Islam, and many *Shari'a* (Islamic Law) schools. See Ibrahim Hamidi, "Dimashq Ta'lun 'an Khalaya Takfiriyah wa Da'awat ela Juhud Tanwiriyah… Suria al-'Ulmaniyah Tazdad Islamiyah" [Damascus Reports on Infidel (unbelief) Cells and Calls for Awareness Efforts… Secular Syria Grows Islamic], *Al-Hayat* (London), June 18, 2005. See also *Al-Hayat* (London), March 30 and May 3, 2006.
3. Among those retired as part of the reshuffle were Vice-Presidents Abdel Halim Khaddam and Muhammad Zuheir Mashariqa, former Prime Minister Muhammad Mustafa Miro, former Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas, and former Speaker of Parliament Abd al-Qader Qaddura.
4. Ziad Haydar, "Mu'tamar al-Ba'ath: Tawsiat Islahiyah Lam Takruq Saqf al-Tawaqu'at" [Ba'ath Summit: Recommendations of Reform That Did Not Pierce the Ceiling of Expectations], *As-Safir* (Beirut), June 10, 2005.
5. For example, Bashar's brother-in-law, Brigadier General Asef Shawkat, heads the regime's Military Intelligence, while his brother, Maher, is the commander of the Republican Guards. As well, Brigadier General Fouad Nassif, a close family friend, directs internal security in the Syrian General Intelligence Directorate. For more details, see Robert G. Rabil, *Syria, the United States, and the War on Terror in the Middle East* (Westport: Praeger, 2006), 192-193.
6. "President Bashar al-Assad's Speech to the Tenth Regional Congress of the Ba'ath Arab Socialist Party," SANA (Damascus), June 6, 2005.
7. Sami Moubayed, "Bashar Assad Ensured the Baath Was Here to Stay," *Daily Star* (Beirut), July 18, 2005.
8. Alfred B. Prados, *Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues* (Washington: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, October 10, 2003), 6.
9. "Hal Qararat Suria an Tu'aser 'ala al-Ahdath fi al-Iraq?" [Has Syria Decided to Influence Events in Iraq?], *Al-Quds Al-Arabi* (London), March 29/30, 2003.
10. Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John R. Bolton, Statement before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia, September 16, 2003, http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/24135.htm.
11. John Burns, "Iraq's Ho Chi Minh Trail," *New York Times*, June 5, 2005.
12. Tom Masland, "Syria: Jihad without Borders," *Newsweek International*, November 8, 2005.
13. As cited in "Attack on Iraqi Workers Kills 12," cnn.com, July 26, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/07/26/

iraq.main/.

14. For example, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Syria was reportedly behind a suicide attack in Haifa in 2003. See J. W. Anderson, "Israeli Airstrike Hits Site in Syria," *Washington Post*, October 6, 2003. Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal has been vocal in supporting the party's armed resistance against Israel. See "Mashaal Yad'ou ela Da'm Hamas bil-Silah wal-Rijal" [Mashaal Calls for Supporting Hamas in Arms and Men], *As-Safir* (Beirut), April 11, 2006.
15. "Defence Minister Says Syria a Part of Iran's Security," IRNA (Tehran), February 26, 2004.
16. "Syria and Iran Back Each Other Against All Comers," *Daily Star* (Beirut), January 20, 2006.
17. "Tehran wa Dimashq Tuwaqi'an Itifaqan Askarian" [Tehran and Syria Sign a Defense Treaty], *As-Safir* (Beirut), June 16, 2006.
18. Ibid.
19. Abdel Halim Khaddam, interview with United Press International (Arabic), as transcribed by *Al-Mustqbal* (Beirut), June 5, 2006.
20. The March 14th demonstration was also in part a response to an earlier, pro-Syrian march organized by Hezbollah. Approximately half a million people participated in that rally.
21. In addition to supporting and upgrading its relationship with Hamas against the wishes of the international community, Damascus has been accused of training and arming Hamas members. Jordanian authorities arrested twenty Hamas members in May 2006, who, according to Jordanian authorities, were planning to carry out terror attacks in the Hashemite Kingdom. Under interrogation, they revealed that they had been trained and armed in Syria. See Muhammad al-Da'meh, "Al-Mushtabah Fihum Biqadiat 'Hamas' fi al-Urdun Ya'tarifun Bitalqihum Tadribat fi Suria" [Those Suspects in the 'Hamas' Case in Jordan Confess That They Received Training in Syria], *As-Sharq al-Awsat* (London), May 12, 2006; and "Al-Urdun Ya'rud I'tirafat Nashiti Hamas" [Jordan Displays the Confessions of Hamas Activists], *As-Safir* (Beirut), May 12, 2006.

Russia and China

The Mechanics of an Anti-American Alliance

Alexandr Nemets

Conventional wisdom has it that China's expanding military capabilities, and Beijing's growing regional ambitions, will one day soon pose a challenge to the United States in Asia. Likewise, Russia under Vladimir Putin has shed any ambiguity about its post-Cold War direction, become increasingly assertive, powerful and anti-American.

Yet perhaps the greatest threat to U.S. interests and objectives in the years ahead will not come from Beijing or Moscow alone, but from the ominous alliance that is emerging between the two. It is a partnership that holds the power to reconfigure the balance of power in Europe, Asia and beyond—much to the detriment of the United States and American interests in those regions.

Genesis

Contemporary Sino-Russian relations can be traced back to September 1984, when the Soviet Union's newly-appointed deputy premier, Ivan Arkhipov, visited Beijing to meet his Chinese counterpart, Li Peng. Though no agreements were reached at the time, both leaders committed unequivocally to a major upgrade of the bilateral relationship, thereby kicking off a multi-year revival of the thriving partnership that had existed between the two countries before 1960.

Additional overtures soon followed. Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power in the Soviet Union in March 1985, and the improvement of relations with China

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became one of his top foreign policy priorities. The results were dramatic; just three months later, in June 1985, during a visit by Li Peng to Moscow, the USSR and China signed a major pact on economic-technological cooperation—the first such agreement in a quarter-century. That deal paved the way for Soviet assistance in the modernization of China's aging industrial sector, as well as a rapid expansion of Sino-Russian trade and extensive academic exchanges that led to a boom in science and technology collaboration.

Subsequently, in late May 1989, Gorbachev, as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (and the newly elected president of the USSR), visited China and met Deng Xiaoping, Li Peng and other Chinese leaders. The visit was hailed worldwide as the final normalization of Chinese-Soviet ties after three decades of hostility. In practical terms, this visit created an environment for even greater cooperation. This expansion was not marred in the least by China's brutal suppression of student protests in Tiananmen just weeks later. To the contrary, Soviet leaders recognized the new opportunities emerging from the resulting constriction of Chinese ties with the West.

By the time the Soviet Union began to crumble in 1991, contacts between Moscow and Beijing had become steady and robust, encompassing vibrant science and technology collaboration, ballooning bilateral trade and a thriving trade in high-tech Soviet arms (as Soviet defense firms, facing imminent prospects of cutbacks in military orders inside Russia, began to look to a new prospective customer: the PRC).[1]

The first half of 1991 saw growing chaos among the Soviet republics, and in Russia itself. But between Russia and China, the same period saw a rapid growth in strategic cooperation. Most notably, the Moscow visit of Jiang Zemin, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, in May 1991 yielded a new border agreement that transferred to China hundreds of small islands in the Amur, Argun, and Ussuri rivers, and granting Chinese ships greater docking privileges at Russian ports.[2]

A shifting balance

Jiang's visit showcased an important development. The balance of power between the USSR and China—previously squarely in Moscow's favor—had begun to shift significantly toward the latter. The Soviet Union and China were now equal partners in their strategic relationship. Moreover, China was actually becoming stronger in some (primarily economic) areas, though it still lagged behind the USSR in military technology.

By the end of 1991, the Soviet Union had ceased to exist and Russia became an independent country. The fledgling Russian government initiated radical economic reform, which resulted in great economic and political chaos and hyperinflation. By contrast, in January 1992, China's "paramount leader," Deng Xiaoping, proclaimed a "new stage of economic reform," which brought with it an annual rise of fourteen percent in China's GDP.

Yet, although the trends in the two countries were diametrically opposite, this state of affairs actually facilitated further cooperation. The new Russian leadership was desperately looking for economic partners to replace broken ties with Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics, while China had become interested as never before in Russian raw

materials and Russian markets for "thrifty" Chinese consumer goods. The mutual interests of the Russian defense industry and the PLA and Chinese defense industry were also on the rise.[3]

At the end of 1992, following a visit by new Russian president Boris Yeltsin to China, Sino-Russian relations reached a qualitatively new level with the signing of twenty important framework agreements—more than half dealing with cooperation between the People's Liberation Army and the Russian armed forces, Chinese-Russian military-technological cooperation and related spheres. The deals paved the way for a subsequent, multi-billion-dollar, five-year agreement on military exchanges and defense technology cooperation, one which would provide a major boost to China's military modernization during the mid-1990s. The writing was on the wall; Russia's top leaders had chosen a geopolitical partner, and despite Moscow's overtures toward Washington and European capitals, their choice was clearly Beijing.[4]

Expansion and solidification

The ascendance of Yevgeny Primakov to the post of Foreign Minister in 1996 provided new momentum to the unfolding Sino-Russian strategic partnership. That year, overt Russian weapons and arms technology deliveries surpassed $1 billion. And arms trade was not the only sign of progress; in the wake of a November 1996 visit by Primakov to Beijing, Russia and the PRC also enhanced their political coordination on a number of fronts—most notably, opposition to American plans for the deployment of ballistic missile defenses.

This warmth facilitated a major change in military posture on the part of both countries. Based on accords signed with Beijing in April 1996, Moscow launched a major troop redeployment, moving forces away from the 2,500-mile border shared with China to the Moscow and Leningrad military regions, close to NATO borders. China, for its part, shifted its best troops—at least 200,000 soldiers and a substantial amount of heavy weaponry—from the Russian and Kazakh borders (the Shenyang, Beijing and Lanzhou major military regions) to the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea coast.

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A new "Great Leap Forward" in Chinese-Russian ties was at hand, driven largely by Russian fears of Western encroachment. The geopolitical agenda of Alexei Arbatov, the influential chairman of the Russian Duma's Military Commission, was published by the Russian press at the very beginning of 1997. In it, Arbatov made clear that, if NATO continued its eastward expansion, Russia would have to do the same.[5] In short, Russia would form an alliance with China, as well as with Iran and India. This was, in effect, an ultimatum from Russia's political elite to America and the West.

Arbatov's manifesto was echoed in Beijing. At their April 1997 summit, presidents Boris Yeltsin and Jiang Zemin issued a joint statement

on "Multi-polarization of the World and Establishment of a New International Order," a document articulating the opposition of both countries to a world dominated by the United States and its allies. At the same time, Jiang was making new inroads in Central Asia. Over the span of several months in 1997, the Chinese president met with the presidents of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. These meetings resulted in a dramatic reduction of Chinese, Russian and Kazakh troops based near the former Chinese-Soviet border.

Moscow and Beijing also drew closer on regional security matters. By mid-1997, China and Russia, along with several of the former Soviet republics, had formed something akin to a unified "defense perimeter"—one encompassing Russia, China, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan—and had begun redeploying troops along that new border. As a result of the arrangement, Russia received additional military forces with which to oppose the U.S. and Europe, while China solidified its military potential for a possible conflict over Taiwan.

Progress was palpable on another front as well. A Chinese-Russian summit in Beijing in November of 1997 by and large resolved a long-standing border dispute over three large islands in the Amur and Argun rivers. Even more importantly, Jiang and Yeltsin signed the Sino-Russian Border Demarcation Treaty, which affirmed the border pact signed by Jiang and Gorbachev in May 1991. The Chinese and Russian media stressed after the summit that the two nations henceforth had "no unresolved problems, no differences in foreign policy goals." Russia and China were "pursuing the same ultimate goal: the creation of a multipolar world, with the diminished influence of the U.S."[6]

Economic realities were also working in the alliance's favor. In August 1998, the Russian government officially announced that it was bankrupt. This economic failure undermined Russian belief in a market economy, and the last friendly ties to the West unraveled. Yeltsin began expanding the political power wielded by Primakov, a tried-and-true friend of China, and the latter wasted no time in looking east for assistance. In late August of that year, China broke the *de facto* "financial blockade" of Russia that had emerged, providing Moscow with $540 million in financial aid. The move was greatly appreciated in the Kremlin.

International events, meanwhile, seemed to confirm the prudence of partnership. In December 1998, the United States and England launched Operation Desert Fox in Iraq—a move that generated angry protests from both Moscow and Beijing, and provided new impetus to Chinese and Russian discussions about the establishment of a joint air-defense network. During the same period, Primakov also proposed the idea of a Russian-Chinese-Indian strategic triangle aimed against the West.[7] The subsequent outbreak of hostilities in Kosovo in May 1999 only served to accelerate these trends.

In the midst of this burgeoning partnership, a new era dawned in Moscow with the elevation of Vladimir Putin to the post of Prime Minister in August 1999. But the corresponding transfer of power from Yeltsin's corrupt "family" to the Putin regime—based primarily on FSB/KGB structures—did nothing to dampen the intensity of Sino-Russian cooperation. Indeed, between August

1999 and July 2001, strategic cooperation between Moscow and Beijing ballooned, as exemplified by a new accord on weapons and technology transfer worth at least $2 billion, and by the initiation of joint military maneuvers between the Russian armed forces and the People's Liberation Army. During their first meeting in Dushanbe, Tajikistan on July 5-6, 2000, Putin promised Jiang Zemin that in the case of a conflict over Taiwan, "the Russian Pacific Fleet will block the path of U.S. naval vessels heading to Taiwan."[8]

Increasingly, Moscow and Beijing were also making regional plans. The summer of 2001 saw the formal expansion of the "Shanghai Five" with the addition of Uzbekistan. The resulting grouping—encompassing China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan—has emerged as Eurasia's premier post-Soviet security bloc, with both defensive and far-reaching offensive capabilities. Officially, the major function of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was the struggle against "the 'three forces' of separatism, terrorism and extremism."[9] In reality, however, Moscow and Beijing have harnessed the SCO as a geopolitical instrument to restrain the Western penetration into the Caspian region and all of Central Asia.

New horizons

Today, the Sino-Russian relationship continues to be animated by a number of factors. For China, these include maximizing influence over Taiwan and neutralizing U.S. influence there, as well as rolling back America's presence on the Korean peninsula, in the South China Sea, and throughout Southeast Asia. Policymakers in Beijing, cognizant of their country's growing energy needs, are also deeply interested in greater access to the hydrocarbon resources of Central Asia and the Middle East.

Moscow and Beijing have harnessed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a geopolitical instrument to restrain Western penetration into the Caspian region and all of Central Asia.

Russia, meanwhile, is intent on expanding influence in the "post-Soviet space," as well as complicating Washington's freedom of movement in its Near Abroad and in the Middle East. Officials in Moscow also fear that, unless confronted, America's regional presence in the "post-Soviet space" could lead to a final disintegration of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the "peaceful transformation" of Russia through "democratic reconstructions" and "color revolutions."[10] These efforts have met with considerable success, with Moscow contributing to Washington's forced strategic retreat from Uzbekistan (and quite possibly Kyrgyzstan in the near future). On the surface, American-Russian relations may still be quiet, but a fierce struggle is taking place underneath.

These objectives are complementary, and synergistic. It is therefore not surprising that bilateral ties between Moscow and Beijing are on the upswing. China and Russia are sparing no efforts to build a "multipolar world" in which the power of the United States is diminished.

In the future, these efforts are likely to take several concrete forms. For China, the first priority will be to ensure an electoral victory for the opposition Kuomintang party in

Taiwan in March 2008, a move that Chinese policymakers believe—with some justification—will pave the way for a formal agreement between Beijing and Taipei on Taiwan's eventual reunification with Mainland China. The end goal is the ambitious concept of a "Greater China" encompassing the Mainland, a politically and economically integrated Taiwan, and Hong Kong. A secondary goal is the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea and the unification of the peninsula under a *defacto* Beijing protectorate. PRC policymakers are also keen to establish direct control over most of the South China Sea, thereby cementing China's dominion in the region, as well as exerting greater pressure on regional rival Japan.

Russia, meanwhile, is intent upon establishing an "independent" (read anti-American) foreign policy in the greater Middle East—an objective that includes, in no small measure, the provision of assistance to the Iranian regime in its efforts at military modernization, as well as tacit support for Tehran's nuclear ambitions. The latter makes good strategic sense for Moscow; since the Islamic Republic is a major nuclear client, Iran's nuclearization would be a boon to Russia's nuclear industry, providing a showcase for Russian nuclear expertise to other aspiring atomic states. Russia will also remain intent on reasserting hegemony in the "post-Soviet space," and is likely to increase its efforts to influence—and destabilize—the fragile political systems of Ukraine, Georgia, and the Central Asian states. All of this sits well with China, which is interested in restoring Moscow's dominion over the entire "post-Soviet space" and, consequently, nullifying American influence there.

And Moscow and Beijing are making progress. In March 2006, Presidents Hu Jintao and Vladimir Putin endorsed a new long-term action plan for strategic cooperation between their two countries. This program—which envisions new levels of economic, scientific, cultural and political cooperation between Moscow and Beijing in the years ahead—sets the stage for a further evolution of the Sino-Russian alliance. It is a partnership with which the United States will be grappling for a long time to come.

1. For more on Sino-Russian military trade, see Alexandr V. Nemets and John Torda, *The Chinese-Russian Alliance* (independently published, 2002), 2-6.
2. Alexandr V. Nemets, *The Growth of China and Prospects for the Eastern Regions of the Former USSR* (The Edwin Mellen Press, NY, 1996), 59-62.
3. Nemets and Torda, *The Chinese-Russian Alliance*, 9-11; see also Nemets, *The Growth of China and Prospects for the Eastern Regions of the Former USSR*, 62-66.
4. Ibid., 12-18.
5. Alexei Arbatov, "If the West Continues the Expansion, Moscow Will Drive East," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* (Moscow), January 3, 1997, 3.
6. Nemets and Torda, *The Chinese-Russian Alliance*, 28-29; see also *Renmin Ribao* (Beijing), November 9-11, 1997; Xinhua (Beijing), November 9-11, 1997; *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* (Moscow), November 10-12, 1997.
7. "Russia's Primakov Urges 'Strategic Triangle' With China, India," Agence France-Presse, December 21, 1998.
8. Ibid., 51-52.
9. "SCO Defense Ministers Discuss Regional Security Issues in Beijing," Xinhua (Beijing), April 26, 2006.
10. "The Prospects of International Relations," *Liaowang* (Beijing), January 2, 2006, 52-54.

Venezuela

Anatomy of a Dictator

Luis Fleischman

A profound transformation is under way in Venezuela. Since taking power in 1998, strongman Hugo Chávez has imposed stricter controls on economic activity, reduced opposition political parties to near-insignificance, launched a series of legal attempts to limit the media, and rolled back individual liberties—all in the name of "social justice." As a result, Venezuela today is drifting towards a regime that is authoritarian in form and anti-capitalist, socialist and anti-American in substance.

These changes are not purely domestic. Claiming that his government represents a continuation of the work of those who helped liberate Latin America from Spanish domination, most notably Simón Bolívar, Chávez increasingly has come to view himself as a regional leader—and occasionally, as a global player as well.

In the process, Venezuela has become a strategic threat to the United States. From the provision of safe haven to radical Islamic groups to increased support for—and cooperation with—rogue states such as Iran, Caracas has emerged as a hub for anti-American activity in the Western Hemisphere—one that increasingly poses a challenge to the interests of the United States in its own backyard. It is a threat that Washington has so far not confronted resolutely.

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A constitutional coup

The anti-democratic drift taking place in Caracas is both sudden and alarming. After all, Venezuela is one of the few Latin American countries that did not suffer under dictatorship in recent decades. Instead, for most of the second half of the 20th century, Venezuela was governed by two parties, Democratic Action (Acción Democratica) and the Christian Democrats (COPEI), which monopolized political power and regularly took turns in the presidential palace.

Over time, however, this status quo became unsustainable. Economic and political malaise resulted in plummeting popularity for parties, generating disaffection and paving the way for the rise of a new political leadership, with Hugo Chávez Frias at its head.

Back in 1992, Chávez, a former paratrooper and army lieutenant colonel, had staged an abortive coup against the government of then-president Carlos Andres Perez. He was jailed for his efforts. But just six years later, Chávez would be elected president as head of a new political bloc, the Patriotic Pole, by the largest majority in four decades. Chávez' wildly-successful campaign—built on an anti-corruption and anti-poverty platform—was a direct repudiation of the political order that had dominated Venezuelan politics since 1958.

Once in office, Chávez did not waste any time consolidating power. Between April and July 1999, via referendum, he successfully orchestrated the drafting of a new national constitution, ushering in a new political era in Venezuela—one marked by the virtual death of political parties and institutional representative democracy. Chávez had managed to launch a revolutionary process that reduced the power of parliamentary politics in favor of grassroots populism.[1] Long-winded public speeches and television programs lionizing the new leader replaced parliamentary debate, and the national executive slowly but surely began to eclipse the legislature and judiciary.

Additional steps soon followed. Under pressure from supporters of the new populist president, the Venezuelan Supreme Court authorized the country's Constitutional Assembly to declare a "judicial emergency" and evaluate all existing judges. Chávez leveraged this opening into a lasting "state of emergency," and began the process of uprooting the country's old political institutions. By early 2000, a new constitution had been approved by general referendum. It extended the presidential term from five to six years, and allowed the president to stand for re-election once. It also eliminated the country's historic bi-cameral parliamentary system in favor of a one-chamber National Assembly.

Most significant, however, was the new constitution's provision of near-absolute power to the executive branch. In the name of "social justice," it imposed restrictions on the activities of private institutions and diminished the power of corporations while increasing government regulation and federal control of the economy. The constitution also provided new limits on the role of the traditionally-independent military. The results were unmistakable; under Chávez' watchful eye, Venezuela's constitution had become a political project aimed

at expanding the power of the state, diminishing the power of civil society, and subordinating the military to the political will of the executive.

Social engineering

What drives Chávez' efforts to expand control over the Venezuelan state? The answer can be found in the principles of the president's own peculiar social movement, called Bolivarianism. Named for the 19th century Venezuelan-born independence hero Simón Bolívar, it aims to destroy the old oligarchy and achieve full equality between classes and races. Even though Bolívar was a product of the Enlightenment and philosophically supported republicanism, when it came to Latin America, Bolívar backed a form of government in which legislative powers were relinquished to the executive as a way of making society more governable and orderly.[2] Chávez has embraced this part of Bolívar's complex thought wholeheartedly. "Previous rulers have sold the nation to foreign interests," Chávez has announced. "There is no solution to the poverty and misery of Latin America within the capitalistic system. To put an end to capitalism will take years, perhaps decades. The only way to finish off capitalism is to replace it with socialism."[3]

He has wasted no time putting this principle into practice. Since January 2003, in a policy clearly aimed at destroying the country's private sector, the government has halted foreign exchange sales and imposed import controls. Businesses have become forced to buy American dollars on the black market or close down entirely.[4] Assaults on private property have created a hostile environment for private economic activities that severely affect the work force. Only abundant oil dollars have enabled Venezuela to experience some degree of economic growth and provide for jobs with public expenditures. Over time, however, the private sector is likely to disappear from the economic future of the country.[5]

In keeping with his view of the armed forces as the backbone of social and political revolution, Chávez has also moved to monopolize and politicize the country's military. About 100 military officers were purged for treason while key posts were given to officers loyal to the Bolivarian Revolution. In the wake of an abortive *coup d'état* in April 2002, Chávez has also overseen the creation of elite parallel paramilitary forces, called Bolivarian Circles (Circulos Bolivarianos), overwhelmingly loyal to the presidency. These militias are also involved in expropriations of private property and other social projects promoted by Chávez.[6]

Chávez has likewise turned on the national media, accusing it of engaging in anti-regime propaganda and attempting to foment a political coup. The results have been dramatic; according to Human Rights Watch, today "journalists face physical violence and threats often by fervent civilian supporters of President Chávez."[7] The recently approved "Law for Social Responsibility in Radio and TV" empowers the government to control programs broadcast between 5:00 a.m. and 11:00 p.m.[8] By the same token, a recent overhaul of the country's criminal code has criminalized opinions "that affect public officials or that bring turmoil to the collective."[9]

The end result of these (and other) efforts on the part of Venezuela's strongman has been the rise of a "dual state," in which the rule of law and legal institutions have gradually given way to unfettered power in the hands of an increasingly unaccountable leader.

A Latin American Nasser

But Chávez' ambitions do not end at the border. Like his inspiration, the explorer Simón Bolívar, Venezuela's president desires a unified Latin America under a single government. Toward that end, Chávez is actively working to cobble together a new Latin American body politic—one modeled in his own image and with Venezuela at its center.

Not surprisingly, Chávez has aligned himself with Cuba's aging dictator, Fidel Castro. Early in his tenure, Chávez visited Havana on a bridge-building mission between Caracas and Latin America's last truly socialist state. Since returning home, in a gesture of goodwill, Chávez has thrown open his country's doors to Cuban doctors, teachers and other experts in a bid to improve Venezuelan health and education. In return, Venezuela has become a sorely-needed economic lifeline for Havana, much the way the Soviet Union was until the 1990s.[10] Most importantly, Chávez receives from Cuba strategic advice on how to consolidate his power, which, according to observers, "would not be what it is without the assistance of the Cuban intelligence apparatus."[11]

Chávez' ambitions do not end at the border. Like his inspiration, the explorer Simón Bolívar, Venezuela's president desires a unified Latin America under a single government.

Cuba is hardly the Chavista state's only regional ally. Chávez has registered his opposition to "Plan Colombia," the American plan aimed at dismantling the activities of left-wing guerillas linked to drug trafficking in Colombia, and allegedly has cooperated with the country's leftist rebels to stymie that policy. Press reports suggest that the National Armed Forces of Venezuela have entered Colombian territory in the past, allegedly in order to support the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a left-wing guerilla group supported by the country's drug cartels.[12] There have also been allegations that Chávez is logistically and militarily supporting the FARC with weapons purchased from Russia.[13]

Likewise, Chávez' ideological influence—and quite possibly his practical assistance—has been felt in Bolivia, where two army officials attempted to mobilize the country's military to carry out a *coup d'état* against the constitutional government of Carlos Mesa in June 2005. Following the same pattern, Chávez has expressed solidarity and support for indigenous and rebellious movements in Peru and Ecuador.

As this support for left-wing movements suggests, Chávez is cut from the same cloth as other revolutionary and transnational tyrants of the 20th century. Perhaps the strongman that Chávez most closely personifies, however, is Egypt's Gamal Abdel Nasser. Like Nasser in his day, Chávez seeks to foment a radical, anti-imperialist revolution—and to assume a position of both regional and global leadership.

Chávez has worked toward this goal in a number of ways. The "Bolivarian Circles" have established chapters in many countries in Latin America and beyond in order to help spread the Bolivarian message. Chávez has also launched a new television network, dubbed "Telesur," modeled after *al-Jazeera* and intended to promote historical personalities such as Bolívar,

Artigas, San Martin, Che Guevara, Sandino and other role models in Latin America to replace Superman, Spiderman and other Hollywood-type characters.[14] In other words, "TeleSur" is likely to become an instrument of anti-American propaganda.

Chávez's internationalism has a clear economic dimension as well. Venezuela's president has generated an economic vision for Latin America—one in which continental economies would make up for their deficiencies by complementing each other in a sort of "most favored nation" exchange system that avoids "monetarism" and the need for credit from international financial bodies.[15] Moreover, Chávez talks about the creation of a Latin American Central Bank or Federal Reserve (to be called "BancoSur") to develop independence from the International Monetary Fund. Another project, dubbed "PetroAmerica," seeks to integrate state-owned oil companies in Latin America and the Caribbean so that they can jointly invest in exploration, use and trade of oil and natural gas. The basic premise is that all of them together form a powerful unified bloc capable of dealing with the development of energy production.[16]

The enemy of my enemy

These policies have made Chávez a natural adversary of the United States. His anti-American rhetoric is hate-filled, loud and often delirious.

The reasons may be ideological, but they are also practical. Anti-Americanism generates solidarity with other regions of the world that share the same antipathy.

This particular obsession has led Chávez to make some strange bedfellows. Early in his presidency, Chávez reportedly wrote a personal letter to master terrorist Illich Ramirez Sanchez, better known as "Carlos the Jackal," calling him a "distinguished compatriot."[17] Chávez has also lauded Libya's dictator, Muammar Qadhafi, as a "hero" and declared that Libya (which until recently was considered a terrorist-sponsoring state) and Venezuela share the same mission and goals. Similar praises have been lavished upon the now-defunct government of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, which Chávez characterized as a "model" for Venezuela.[18]

More recently, Chávez visited Iran in July 2006 to demonstrate his support for the Islamic Republic's opposition to the West—and to agitate for confrontation with the United States. "Let's save the human race, let's finish off the U.S. empire," Chávez is reported as having told Iranian leaders.[19] Under the veil of technological cooperation with Tehran, Chávez may even be seeking nuclear weapons. As part of a deal signed between Venezuela and Iran in March 2006, the two countries established a $200 million development fund and signed bilateral deals to build homes and exploit petroleum. The Venezuelan opposition raised the possibility that the deal could involve the transfer to Iran of Venezuelan uranium.[20] And in a confirmation of the solidarity between Tehran and Caracas, Chávez has threatened to respond to international sanctions against the Islamic Republic over its nuclear program by providing Iran with embargoed petroleum products, and perhaps even by choking off gasoline exports to the United States.

Which brings us to energy. As part of Venezuela's plan to reduce American power, the Chávez government has signed agreements with China and India, and has been dramatically increasing the oil supplies to these countries at the expense of

U.S. customers.[21] According to oil analyst Roger Tissot, Venezuela wants to reduce dependence on the U.S. in order to position itself in the world's fastest growing markets.[22] But this is not merely an economic decision. Rather, it is driven by a clear political objective: to increase Venezuela's international influence at the expense of the United States.

Chávez, moreover, is positioned to accomplish just that. According to a recent study by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), a 6-month disruption of crude from Venezuela "would result in a significant increase in crude oil prices and lead to a reduction of up to $23 billion in U.S. gross domestic product." The report also states that, while a short-term reduction would be manageable for the U.S. economy, long-term curbs on Venezuelan oil production and exports should be "a concern for U.S. security, especially in light of current tight supply and demand conditions in the world market."[23]

Terror central

Back in 2003, General James Hill, Commander of the U.S. Southern Command, highlighted that a number of Islamic terrorist groups were active in the area of Isla Margarita (Margarita Island), a tourist destination and mountainous tropical Caribbean Island located off the north shore of Venezuela. Hill stated then that Islamic terrorist cells extended from Trinidad and Tobago (a country with a high Muslim population) to Margarita Island and that they represent a strategic danger to the United States.[24]

Hill's warning highlights a troubling fact: Venezuela under Chávez has become a safe haven and launching pad for radical Islamist activities in the Western Hemisphere. According to none other than General Marcos Ferreira, a former director of the Venezuelan National Guard's border control, the Chávez government has issued false identities and Venezuelan passports to a large number of terrorist operatives.[25] And news investigations have found that Middle Eastern terrorist groups—among them Hamas, Hezbollah, and Gama'a Islamiyya—"are operating support cells in Venezuela and other locations in the Andean region."[26]

Moreover, constitutional changes made on Chávez' watch have actually encouraged such complicity. Under the country's 1999 constitution, a Venezuelan citizen can now simultaneously hold two passports—a loophole that observers say Middle Easterners with ties to terrorism have begun to exploit.[27] Indeed, investigations by *U.S. News & World Report* and the *Miami Herald* have found that the Chávez regime has provided nationality documents to foreigners from countries such as Syria, Pakistan, Egypt and Lebanon, as well as to supporters from Saddam Hussein's ousted regime in Iraq.[28]

The goals of these activities? A show of solidarity with third-world radicals, as well as the formation of a sort of "foreign legion" that could protect the Chavista state against foreign threats, and potentially internal dissent as well.

Worse to come

Under Hugo Chávez, Venezuela has become more than just a repressive regime. Caracas today is a revolutionary state, with enemies both foreign and domestic. And its ability to harm the country that it sees as its chief adversary—the United States—is on the rise.

On the energy front, Chávez is pursuing politically-motivated policies that favor foreign nations such

as China and India at the expense of the U.S., and doing so despite the fact that they are not economically prudent. Meanwhile, his grandiose plans for regional unity—to say nothing of his attempts to influence the domestic politics of his neighbors—speak to a serious quest for regional power. Chávez has also emerged as a staunch ally of America's greatest Middle Eastern adversary, Iran, and as a supporter of terrorists seeking to harm regional stability and the United States.

As these moves indicate, Venezuela today is fast emerging as the most dangerous player in the Western Hemisphere. If it is successful in its efforts, the regime in Caracas could become one of the greatest strategic challenges facing the United States in the years ahead.

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

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Future Terrorism
Mutant *Jihads*

Walid Phares

The strategic decision to carry out 9/11 was made in the early 1990s, almost ten years before the barbaric attacks on New York and Washington took place. The decade-long preparations—and the testing of America's defenses and political tolerance to terrorism that took place before September 11th—were a stage in the much longer modern history of the *jihadist* movement that produced al-Qaeda and its fellow travelers. Decades from now, historians will discover that the United States, the West and the international community were being targeted by a global ideological movement which emerged in the 1920s, survived World War II and the Cold War, and carefully chose the timing of its onslaught against democracy.

Undoubtedly, the issue that policy planners and government leaders need to address with greatest urgency, and which the American public is most concerned about, is the future shape of the terrorist threat facing the United States and its allies. Yet developments since 2001, both at home and overseas, have shown that terror threats in general—and the *jihadi* menace in particular—remain at the same time resilient and poorly understood.

Defining the war

The *jihadi* war against the Soviet Union during the Cold War—and the struggle against the United States and some of its allies thereafter—are all part of a single continuum. Over time, *jihadi* Salafists and Khomeinist radicals alike

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have become proficient in selecting their objectives and infiltrating targets. Indeed, an analysis of the security failures that made 9/11 possible clearly demonstrates that the hijackers exploited systemic malfunctions at the national security level.

Learning these lessons is essential for better counterterrorism planning in the future. But the *jihadists* are also learning, and the advantage will go to the side which can adapt most quickly. If the *jihadists* learn to understand and anticipate their opponents, their tactics and strategies will mutate.

The jihadists are also learning, and the advantage will go to the side which can adapt most quickly.

The first strain of mutating Islamist ideology is that of al-Qaeda and its affiliates. In his now-historic April 2006 speech, Osama Bin Laden confirmed his commitment to global, total and uncompromising *jihad*. "It is a duty for the Umma with all its categories, men, women and youths, to give away themselves, their money, experiences and all types of material support, enough [to establish *jihad* in the fields of *jihad]* particularly in Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan, Sudan, Kashmir and Chechnya," Bin Laden has maintained. "*Jihad* today is an imperative for every Muslim. The Umma will commit sin if it did not provide adequate material support for *jihad*."[1]

Bin Laden's latest *risala* (message) is as important as his initial declarations of war and of mobilization, laying out his most comprehensive vision so far. As this "world declaration" makes clear, the global Salafi agenda accepts no truth other than radical Islamist dogma. All non-Islamist governments must be brought down, and pure, pious ones erected in their stead. Global *jihadism*, in its Salafi-Wahhabi form, is ideologically at war with the rest of the world. The conflict is universal in nature. It encompasses the entire West, not just the United States and Europe. Russia, India, and at some point even China, in addition to moderate Muslim governments, must be brought down. Like no other document to date, Bin Laden's speech outlines the final fantasy of the *jihadi* mind: world domination.

The second branch of *jihadism* is smaller, and concentrated in the hands of a single regime: the Islamic Republic of Iran. Since its inception, Khomeini's Islamic Revolution has seen itself as universal in nature. And today, flush with oil dividends, it is rapidly expanding its influence in Lebanon, the Persian Gulf, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Similar to its Salafi counterpart, the Khomeinist worldview seeks to erect Islamist regimes, launch radical organizations and expand its ideology. But unlike in Wahhabism, the chain of command is narrow and tightly controlled; Iran's Supreme Leader, the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is the unquestioned ideological head, while Iran's radical president, Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, decides the time, place and scope of the battles.

Future battlefields

By understanding the objectives of these forces, it is possible to extrapolate some theaters of likely confrontation in the years ahead.

Iraq

Today, U.S.-led forces in Iraq are battling al-Qaeda and other Salafi forces in the so-called "Sunni

Triangle." In the south, meanwhile, Coalition forces have engaged Iranian-supported militias, such as Muqtada al Sadr's Mahdi Army. U.S. and Iraqi forces will continue to battle on both of these fronts, in Iraq's center and south. The Salafi strategy will center on classical terrorist attacks, while Iranian-supported forces are likely to attempt to infiltrate and take control of Iraqi forces. U.S.-Iraqi counterterrorism cooperation will continue to expand, but a decisive victory for Baghdad cannot take place before Iranian and Syrian interference has receded—and that will not happen until both of those regimes are weakened from the inside. Hence, American support for democratic and opposition forces in Syria (and by extension Lebanon) and Iran is the surest way to ensure success in Iraq.

Afghanistan

The consolidation of the Karzai government in Kabul is essential to American strategy, both as a bridge to a younger generation of Afghans and as a counterweight to the appeal of the Taliban. Al-Qaeda is committed to preventing such a development. It has a vested interest in causing the country's post-Taliban government to fail, and in preventing a new generation of citizens from being exposed to non-Salafi teachings. U.S. and NATO forces therefore face a long-term struggle against *jihadists* in that country, both on the military and the socio-cultural level. Sustaining engagement there will depend on two factors: American public support, and the outcome of the struggle between fundamentalists and the government currently taking place in Pakistan.

Pakistan

Many of the components of the worldwide war with *jihadism* are concentrated in Pakistan. So far, Pakistan's radical Islamists have been able to block their government from taking back control of the country's western tribal areas and uprooting the fundamentalist organizations in its east. But potentially even more dangerous is the possibility that *jihadists* could take control of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. In this context, the most serious threat to the United States would be the collapse of the Musharraf government and the Pakistani military at the hands of radical Islamists. Should this happen, the U.S. would be under direct nuclear threat from a nuclear-armed al-Qaeda regime—one that would have tremendous control over many other Muslim countries.

Asia

A major shift in south Asia will not only impact Afghanistan and Pakistan, but is likely to spill over into Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the southern Philippines, with ripple effects on U.S. allies Australia, Thailand, and India. The U.S. will be deeply and adversely affected by the expansion of *jihadism* in Asia.

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Iran

While the Salafi threat is likely to extend east into Asia, Khomeinism is likely to expand westward, from Iran to southern Lebanon via Iraq's Shi'ite areas and Syria's Alawite-dominated regime. Since its inception, the radical regime in Tehran has had a vision of itself as a great power, and consequently perceives itself to be on a collision course with the "Great Satan": the United States. The imperial vision of a Shi'a Crescent from Afghanistan to the Mediterranean held by Iran's leaders mirrors the Sunni Caliphate envisioned by al-Qaeda and its followers—albeit one with a modern twist: nuclear weapons. Bolstered by its partnership with Syria and the strength of its proxy force in Lebanon, Tehran today envisions a global confrontation with the United States. As such, the Iranian regime represents a cardinal threat to democracies in the region and, by extension, to the United States.

Syria

Ever since Hafez al-Assad chose to permit Iran to expand its influence in Lebanon, a Syrian-Iranian axis has existed in the region.[2] During the Cold War, Damascus was able to outmaneuver the U.S. on a number of fronts, chief among them Lebanon. By 1990, the latter had been abandoned by Washington to Syria. The Ba'athist domination of Lebanon, in turn, led to the ascendance of Hezbollah. But America's post-9/11 *volte-face* brought the dangers of Syrian-occupied Lebanon into sharp focus. By 2005, Syria had been forced out of Lebanon, but Bashar al-Assad remains defiant. Today, in the aftermath of Hezbollah's war with Israel, Syria, like Iran, finds itself hurtling toward confrontation with the United States.

Lebanon

Since the 1970s, Lebanon has been a key battlefield between the forces of terror and the West. The country houses a dense conglomeration of anti-democratic forces, ranging from Hezbollah to pro-Syrian groups to extreme Salafists. Since the 1983 attacks on the U.S. Marine barracks, the United States has altered its strategy toward Lebanon several times, but today, Washington finds itself forced to contain a rising Hezbollah and support a struggling "Cedar Revolution."

Sudan and the Horn of Africa

All the indications suggest that al-Qaeda is planning to open a new battlefield in Africa. In the speeches of Bin Laden and other Islamist leaders, Sudan represents a central arena of confrontation with the infidels, and a major launching pad for world *jihad*. The *jihadists* aim to thwart the international community in Darfur and reignite a holy war in southern Sudan. In addition, fundamentalists are expanding their influence in Somalia, and conspiring against U.S. ally Ethiopia. Here again, the U.S. and other democracies find themselves on a collision course with radical Islamists, even though international engagement in Africa today is essentially limited to humanitarian assistance.

Europe

With the Madrid and London attacks, the many plots foiled in Great Britain, France, Germany and Italy, the violence in the Netherlands and Scandinavia, the French "intifada" and the "Cartoon *Jihad*," Europe has well and truly become the next battlefield. Transatlantic cooperation could give way to tensions between America and its European partners, as Euro-

pean *jihadis* become a danger to the United States. Indeed, *jihadi* penetration of Europe, particularly Western Europe, is expected to facilitate the infiltration of North America.

Russia

Since the 2002 Moscow theater hostage-taking and the subsequent Beslan school massacre, *jihadism* has engulfed Russia. Wahhabism has already taken hold in Russia's southern provinces, and *jihadists* are thinking beyond Chechnya, toward the dismemberment of the Russian Federation. Russian strategy, for its part, has been peculiar; while Moscow has confronted fundamentalists at home head-on, it nonetheless pursues a policy of support for Iran and Syria—and, by extension, Hezbollah. In doing so, Russia's foreign policy has become antithetical to its own national security. The U.S. and Russia have a solid basis for collaboration against international terrorism, but unless Moscow abandons its tolerance of Tehran's radicalism, the two countries will miss a strategic opportunity to defeat world terror in this decade.

Latin America

While the Soviet legacy has mostly dissipated in Latin America, with Fidel Castro's regime in Cuba the last ailing vestige of the Cold War, it has taken just one decade for new threats to emerge. The populist regime of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela not only poses a challenge to liberal democracies in the region, it also serves as a conduit for foreign *jihadi* threats. With an alliance with Iran in the making and with an al-Qaeda and Hezbollah presence in the country, Venezuela is facilitating the activities of a network of forces inimical to U.S. interests. Deeper in the continent, meanwhile, both al-Qaeda and Hezbollah have successfully put down roots in the Andes and the Tri-Border Region between Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina. With the long and porous Mexican-American border a major vulnerability, another future threat to the U.S. is brewing to its south.

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Canada

Finally, American security is also at risk from the north. Not only is Canada considered a passageway by which international terrorists can enter the United States, it has also become a site for the proliferation of *jihadi* groups. The arrests made in Toronto in the summer of 2006, and the coordination between U.S.-born radicals and their Canadian "brothers," are signs of a new era—one in which Islamists view the United States and Canada as one strategic arena for operations. Washington therefore will increasingly need to coordinate its counterterrorism strategies with its northern neighbor, despite the differences in political culture, institutions and attitudes.

The home front

For the United States, winning the War on Terror depends on two battlefields. The first is overseas, where Washington must confront *jihadi* forces and help allies to win their own struggles with terrorism. This

will require the United States to support democratic change abroad, both as a counterweight to *jihadist* lobbies and as a means of assisting Arab and Muslim democrats to win the conflict within their own societies.

The second, however, is closer to home. Homeland security planners must be thinking seriously about a duo of unsettling questions. First, are *jihadists* already in possession of unconventional weapons on American soil, and how can the U.S. government deter them? This crucial issue tops all other challenges, for a terrorist nuclear strike on the U.S. has the potential to transform international relations as we know them. Second, how deeply have *jihadist* elements infiltrated the U.S. government and federal agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, and various military commands, either through sympathizers or via actual operatives?

As the recent scandal over the National Security Agency's domestic surveillance program has shown, the answers are fraught with complications. Five years into the War on Terror, the U.S. has not fully made the transition from the pre-9/11 legal counterterrorism framework to one based on intelligence, prevention and robust police action. And, without a national consensus about the seriousness of the *jihadi* threat, America will lose its own war of ideas.

The future enemies of the United States will be a mutation of current and past terrorist foes. In confronting these forces, knowledge of their ideologies, objectives and determination will make all the difference.

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RESPONSE

A Dose of Realism on Russia

Nikolas K. Gvosdev

I would like to thank Professor Blank for his thoughtful comments and reasoned propositions ("The Great Russia Debate," Spring 2006). All too often, the "Russia debate" is characterized by personal attacks and ad hominem arguments. However, not surprisingly, I do disagree with a number of points raised in his essay.

First, let me object to the characterization of the "realist approach" as "one of expediency." *Expediency* is a loaded term, implying a lack of principles or consistency in one's approach to policy. Expediency as a guiding principle in foreign affairs fails Hans Morgenthau's own test that "a rational foreign policy minimizes risks and maximizes benefits and, hence, complies both with the moral precept of prudence and the political requirement of success."

It is in that spirit of morality and practicality that contemporary American realists assess policy towards Russia.

One failing in the U.S. debate over "what to do about" Russia is to confuse realistic assessments with desired preferences. Stephen Blank and others have a long list of very legitimate grievances about the way in which Russia is governed and how it conducts its foreign policy. Most American realists likewise have profound disagreements with many actions taken by Putin. But structuring the Russia debate around a clash between "Putin apologists" and his critics is counterproductive. My 2004 *National Interest* article, "The Sources of Russian Conduct," did not argue that developments in Russia were our ideal preferences, but rather posed the question: "Yet even with all these disappointments, is this a

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Russia with which we can live?"

One component of a rational, realist foreign policy is being able to draw a distinction between one's preferences and one's priorities. This is why, in answering the question I posed, I noted, "If Eurasia were the only item on the agenda, things might be different. But it isn't. 9/11 made sure of that."

Russia needs time, continued economic growth and further development of its civil society before it can sustain developed democracy. Under those conditions, managed pluralism seems preferable to an outright dictatorship of either the red or the brown variety.

Let's take the discussion about the Putin regime. Throughout this essay, Blank seems to work from the assumption that we have a viable choice between Putin's managed pluralism/soft authoritarianism and full-fledged, developed liberal democracy. I disagree. My so-called "ringing endorsement" for managed pluralism is based on my assessment—shared by noted Russian scholars and political liberals like Dimitri Trenin and Mark Urnov—that Russia needs time, continued economic growth and further development of its civil society before it can sustain developed democracy. Under those conditions, managed pluralism seems preferable to an outright dictatorship of either the red or the brown variety. It is also, in my opinion, better than the chaotic and unsuitable pseudo-democracies of the Yeltsin type which in abstract terms might be freer but leave the bulk of the population with no ability to exercise or enjoy these liberties. Yes, there are no guarantees, but the East Asian experience indicates that managed pluralist systems have better odds at transitioning to long-term, stable democracy than the repetitive cycle of democratic revolutions, coups and dictatorships that have characterized democratization attempts in Latin America and Africa.

And despite Western support, liberal democratic forces have steadily lost ground in Russia since the 1993 Duma elections. The 2005 Moscow city elections should have been a wake-up call. The liberals tried to make this ballot a "referendum" on democracy, yet, in the richest, freest, most liberal, best-educated city in the country, under conditions far less onerous than those in 1990, when the *demokraty* were swept into power, these forces received just one-fifth of the vote. It was not a particularly ringing endorsement of the notion that liberals are waiting in the wings, lacking only sufficient encouragement from Washington.

We must also avoid falling into the trap that being in political opposition to Putin makes one a liberal democrat. At the "Drugaya Rossiya" (Alternative Russia) conference held prior to the G-8 summit in St. Petersburg, plenty of criticism of the Kremlin was heard from anti-democratic and anti-American political movements, such as Viktor Anpilov's revolutionary communists and Eduard Limonov's neo-fascist National Bolsheviks.

Similarly, we should not confuse apples and oranges. From the U.S., British or German perspective, the Putin government is indeed "dysfunctional" and unable to address for the longterm the "most urgent challenges to Russian society." But compared to Yeltsin's pseudo-democracy

of the 1990s or Gorbachev's failed *perestroika* of the 1980s, the Putin regime has been quite successful at slowing, halting and even reversing some of the most damaging trends. Most Russians today have no difficulty in answering the question, "Are you better off today than you were eight years ago?" with a resounding affirmative. This, in turn, helps to explain the continued support Putin enjoys—including, significantly, a high approval rating among the 18- to 24-year-old demographic, Russia's first post-Soviet generation.

Blank also glosses over the very real challenge of how to move a society from embracing authoritarian solutions that provide short-term stability and a modicum of prosperity to a more open, pluralistic and law-governed country that guarantees much greater amounts of peace and prosperity for the longterm (a subject extensively examined by Ian Bremmer, president of the Eurasia Group, in his forthcoming work *The J Curve: A New Way to Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall*, and whose prescriptions for Russia are strikingly different than those put forward by Blank).

Blank dismisses Anatol Lieven's admonition, "If Putin weren't there we'd soon miss him," but never answers Lieven's challenge: "Putin may be an uncomfortable partner, but the West is unlikely to get a better one." Realists don't assume that the forces of history will automatically produce a better alternative, if only we encourage the Putin regime to go. Those who do are under an obligation to present real evidence supporting this contention.

What about the Russian role in the Eurasian space? Blank cites with disapproval my comment that "neither the United States nor Europe is prepared to undertake the massive effort to displace Russia as Eurasia's economic and political center of gravity." This, however, is the very crux of the debate. Yet he provides no answer at all.

If he disagrees with my assessment, there are two possible responses. The first is that it won't take a massive effort at all, only a relatively minor one on our part. But I think that the Kremlin called our bluff—in a very ham-handed, clumsy way—when it terminated a preferential price for Ukrainian consumption of its natural gas and demanded an immediate shift to the world market price. Against U.S. aid of $174 million to Ukraine in 2005 stood a Russian natural gas subsidy of $3 billion—slack the West was unprepared to take up.

Realists don't assume that the forces of history will automatically produce a better alternative, if only we encourage the Putin regime to go. Those who do are under an obligation to present real evidence supporting this contention.

Fine, then, the second response is that the West is now, or soon will be, prepared to undertake this effort. There is no evidence of this so far. Let's again take the case of Ukraine. I wrote in the November 26, 2004, issue of the *International Herald Tribune* that if the Orange Revolution were to succeed, a Yushchenko government "would have to demonstrate that [its] westward-oriented policies would generate results. And here the United States and the European Union would have to lay down clear benchmarks for facilitating Ukraine's closer integration with

the Euro-Atlantic world—and be prepared to commit real resources. Even if European leaders hold out the prospect of EU membership decades in the future, there is no reason that tangible benefits cannot be offered now—such as a free-trade agreement, or a guest worker regime that allows Ukrainians to live and work legally in Europe or in the United States." None of this happened. And even talk about eventually offering Ukraine a Membership Action Plan for NATO is no substitute for concrete aid. Why are we surprised, therefore, at the outcomes of the 2006 Ukrainian elections?

Given our commitments elsewhere, the goal of the United States ought to be to strengthen the states of the periphery to give them a greater degree of independence and leverage vis-a-vis Russia, rather than to hold out quite unrealistic expectations that the West is prepared to break them out of the Russian sphere altogether—or support them against Moscow in violent conflicts where the U.S. has little or northing at stake.

If fundamentally changing the geopolitical and geo-economic orientations of the states surrounding Russia is a task that the West is unable and unwilling to undertake—and Blank and others offer nothing to challenge this assessment—then why are realists taken to task for their stance that the job of government is to shape policy to what is achievable?

Blank argues that the American realist position—starting from a recognition of the reality of Russia's political and economic dominance in the region—is "music to more than a few Russian ears." Actually, it is not. American realists call for continued U.S. engagement in the Eurasian space, not total and complete withdrawal altogether, which is the real Russian preference. I argued in 2004 that "the United States can undertake a targeted, limited and successful intervention into the Eurasian space and obtain Russian acquiescence." This is a far cry from engaging in wholesale transformation of the region, and there should be no illusions about what we can achieve. Given our commitments elsewhere, our goal ought to be to strengthen the states of the periphery to give them a greater degree of independence and leverage vis-à-vis Russia, rather than to hold out quite unrealistic expectations that the West is prepared to break them out of the Russian sphere of influence altogether—or support them against Moscow in violent conflicts where the U.S. has little or nothing at stake.

Let me now turn to the case for (Russian) democracy. A consistent point that is raised is that "how Russia governs itself decisively shapes its foreign policy," and that a long list of less than desirable policy choices made by the Russian government is directly connected to Putin's soft authoritarianism—the implication being that a more democratic Russian government would make fundamentally different choices.

I see no evidence for this conclusion. As I wrote in the *Los Angeles Times* this past May, "It is difficult to conceive of any Putin foreign policy decision of the last several years that would have been reversed by a more democratically accountable Russian government"—a statement

based on careful assessment of opinion polls and what Russians say and write about foreign policy. Note here a deliberate choice of words: democratically accountable Russian government. It is very easy to find in Russia politicians and movements that use the label "democratic," and who espouse domestic and foreign policy prescriptions that would meet with our enthusiastic approval. But this does not mean that they could win elections or govern with a mandate from the people. How do we get around data that suggests that 60 percent of Russians see the United States as having a negative influence in the world and more than half believe that the U.S. is unfriendly to Russia?

Surely events in the Middle East and Latin America have disabused us of the notion that free and fair elections automatically produce pro-American governments! Democracy is not the antidote to an anti-American and anti-Western policy orientation in Russia (or anywhere else); I still believe Thucydides was right when he argued that "identity of interests is the surest of bonds whether between states or individuals."

But what about values? American realists have never argued that questions about democratic governance cannot be raised; no one I am aware of has advocated what Blank terms a "policy of silence." What we have consistently maintained, however, is that democracy promotion cannot be placed at the center of the U.S. foreign policy agenda. The Bush administration has opened itself up to charges of hypocrisy, but not because of what the realists have advocated. Vice President Dick Cheney's contrasting Vilnius and Astana speeches this spring were more than sufficient in that department.

I subscribe to the old Russian proverb that "if you chase after two different rabbits at the same time, you'll catch neither." This is why I do not have much faith in proposals that argue that the United States can somehow actively engage in opposition to the Putin regime while at the same time securing Russian cooperation on matters of vital importance to Washington. At some point, a decision has to be made—to overlook the blemishes in favor of cooperation, or to conclude that the costs of engagement outweigh what might be obtained.

In the case of Pakistan, for example, we are prepared to live with Pervez Musharraf's version of "managed pluralism," not only because of the benefits the U.S. receives (especially in the War on Terror) but also because we understand that what might replace this unelected general would be far worse, not only for U.S. interests but also for the promotion of our values. Does this stance irritate Pakistani democrats and their U.S. supporters? Most certainly. Yet I have no doubt that this course of action is both prudent and moral.

Blank says simply, "[S]ound leadership can and should endeavor to overcome and reconcile those tensions." My apologies, but that is a wholly insufficient response. This provides no operational guidance whatsoever. It is just like General Wesley Clark's stump speech in the run-up to the 2004 presidential primaries where he would claim that if he were president, he would have captured Osama bin Laden by now—empty words!

Is the Bush/Cheney tack of this past year an example of this "sound leadership?" I attended the G-8 summit in St. Petersburg as an observer. I saw nothing that indi-

cated any sort of "reconciliation" between these tensions in a way that concretely advanced both U.S. interests and U.S. values. Instead, this so-called "selective cooperation" approach has alienated and even irritated the Putin government without doing much to strengthen the cause of liberal democracy in Russia. It has undermined efforts to enlist more active Russian support for U.S. objectives vis-à-vis Iran and North Korea. The United States is neither safer nor are its values on surer footing because of this muddled policy.

Those who argue that we do not have to choose between our values or interests (or at least to assign priorities)—and who suggest that increased pressure on Russia both promotes our values and enhances our security—have to present compelling evidence that this strategy has a reasonable chance of success (or that the consequences will be minimal). Realists, of course, are being pilloried because they point out a number of inconvenient truths—the "democracy paradox" of Putin's authoritarian measures enjoying broad-based public support in Russia, making the likelihood of a neat and simple "color revolution" highly unlikely; that, in the absence of the United States and the European Union extending substantial amounts of aid, Russia remains the dominant power in the region, and; that forgoing Russian assistance in dealing with a number of intractable global issues raises the costs of action higher than the American public is willing to pay.

So why such a negative response to the realist call for a businesslike relationship with Russia that pursues cooperation wherever possible and tries to manage and minimize potential conflicts? Aren't enough strains being placed both on American resources and capacities in upholding our existing global responsibilities? Sure, a more democratic and friendly Russia would be wonderful. But a more confrontational approach with Russia can only be justified if this clearly serves the vital interests—not the hopes and dreams—of the United States.

Let the debate continue.

DISPATCHES

Calderón's Challenge

Fredo Arias-King

MEXICO CITY—Recently, former Irish prime minister John Bruton came to Mexico to speak of his country's rags-to-riches story. In between the lines of his stories about tax, trade, lean government, and education policies lay a subtler message: countries that want to make the leap out of the third world must stop playing the victim. Regrettably, Mexico still seems a way away from heeding Bruton's message, and may continue playing its favorite pastime. The recent re-election of the Right-Liberal National Action Party (PAN) to the presidency, however, gives hope of at least partially breaking the country's long history of inept leadership.

With nations as with individuals, incessantly alleging past abuse (real or imagined) is a way of provoking real victimization. In Mexico's case, this sense of victimization results in defensive nationalism, which means resource protectionism, corporatism and cronyism, resulting in what Sovietologists call "state capture" (oligarchs neutralizing legislators, judges, media and regulators with their cash). The results are poverty and bad governance, as well as a continuation of Mexico's notorious culture of dishonesty. The elites then blame Washington, even as they reap the benefits.

Vicente Fox was supposed to change all that after his surprise victory in 2000. But he essentially became part of the old system. Instead of breaking monopolies, challenging the growing spread of illiberalism in the Western Hemisphere or reducing bureaucracy, Fox found it more expedient to make the centerpiece of his presidency the demand (not request) that Washington legalize millions of present and future migrants, with the implicit undertone

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that Mexico is entitled to such concessions from its abusive northern neighbor. While appointing former communist agitators to the foreign ministry and loyalists of nefarious former president Luis Echeverría to head the domestic security agencies, Fox openly wondered why the country had not changed for the better, instead pinning all his hopes on a deal with Washington that did not materialize.

The new president-elect, Felipe Calderón, has the option of either continuing with Fox's ambivalence or of acting more in accordance with what the backbone of his party, Mexico's entrepreneurial and middle classes, expects. Although he's largely an enigma (it's his first elected office), the latter scenario is perhaps the more likely—if Calderón manages to escape some Mexican cultural pathologies that sabotage even sincere efforts at reform.

His first order of business, if he is up to the challenge, will be to encourage the breakup of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). In the short run, such a move will give Calderón's PAN a majority in both houses of Congress, and facilitate the passage of some key reforms currently languishing there. But most importantly, the elimination of the PRI will establish a two-party system and force the country's remaining political force, the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), to move to the center, perhaps even becoming a liberal party.

The second task facing Calderón is energy reform. Mexico could probably double its oil output and halve gasoline prices if it loosened state controls on oil, permitting private investment there as well as in energy production (only North Korea shares this prohibition). To break the stalled debate, instead of the taboo "privatization," Calderón could speak of genuine "nationalization"—such as providing half the shares of the national oil monopoly to the Mexican citizenry, with them eventually ending up in the stock market and in the hands of new (non-government) management.

A third task—and one which the new president-elect openly advocates—is replacing the entire entangled and disastrous tax system with a flat tax. Such a move has done wonders for its pioneer, Estonia, under the dynamic prime minister Mart Laar, as well as for a slew of countries that followed (Slovakia, Russia, Lithuania, etc.).

Today, the high price of oil, lower debt payments and the upswing in the American economy likely mean that Mexico is on the verge of another cycle of high economic growth, after essentially zero real growth during Fox's six years. But this is not necessarily good news. Mexico's elites do not reform unless they absolutely have to—usually after a crisis, either economic or political. And Mexico is unlikely to face either in the coming years. All this may reduce the government's sense of urgency to pass needed reforms, as well as prompting millions of unemployed to look northward.

Though another Bruton—or another Laar—is probably too much to expect, Calderón could provide that combination of good intentions, good management and legitimacy that Mexico has rarely, if ever, seen before. Just as easily, however, Mexico's new president could turn out to be another Vicente Fox, and his term another cycle of self-victimization.

Tackling the Next Pandemic

Iztok Podbregar and Teodora Ivanusa

LJUBLJANA—By now, the threat of avian influenza, also known as bird flu, has receded from the headlines. But the danger posed by the disease remains very real. There still is no definitive vaccine or remedy, and experts agree that if a human-to-human transmission occurs, millions of people will die and the global economy could dip into recession.

The first problem facing the international community is scientific. Bird flu is a deadly disease caused by the influenza type A virus. But, because all influenza viruses have the ability to change, scientists are concerned that the disease could one day mutate into a strain that could both infect humans and spread easily between people. Such antigenic shifts have happened several times over the past century: specifically, in 1918, 1957, 1968 and 1977. And, because these viruses do not commonly infect humans, there is little or no immune protection against them in the human population. Moreover, figuring out the exact mutation of the next avian influenza strain is bound to be difficult, and the associated degree of uncertainty makes pharmaceutical companies reluctant to produce mass stocks of drugs in advance of the flu season.

The second stems from the human factor. Limiting the spread of bird flu requires controlling vaccine production, distribution and access, as well as pricing. It also means improving control over open corridors related to civilian air travel, and stepped-up protection of industry sectors, namely poultry, against deliberate attacks.

In order to do so, we first need to identify high-risk avian influenza zones—or at least rank regions according to their risk of exposure. Second, airport surveillance should be increased in regions where the type A virus is most widespread. Closer analysis of past patterns of infection is also necessary; the first wave of the virus was recorded in Southeast Asia, infecting first poultry and later moving sporadically through the human population; the second was recorded in China. Finally by October 2005, avian influenza had reached Central Europe, with cases reported in Romania and Croatia. Additional security upgrades are thus urgently needed in airports across Southeast Asia. Medical records showing that the traveler is not infected with the flu should be required before a visa is issued to individuals living in countries where the risk of avian influenza is the highest. Because interrupting air travel indefinitely is impossible, the solution will have to be in better management of security along air channels and airports.

Bird flu has also shed light on a very different danger—that of economic terrorism and organized crime. Even if we manage to escape a human pandemic in 2006/2007, the lack of coordination in response to this global threat should be reason for serious concern. For, without good government planning and proper

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oversight, pandemic diseases like the bird flu could become a boon for terrorists and organized crime syndicates alike.

In fact, the upsurge in organized crime experienced by Southeast Europe this year was directly attributable in large part to the region's failure to formulate a coordinated policy for Tamiflu. With many seeing the drug as a remedy, demand increased exponentially as soon as the avian influenza scare engulfed Europe. But the availability of the drug, and its price, remained unregulated on the pan-European level. And with high demand, low and uncontrolled supply, the opportunity to make an extra buck by smuggling the drug across borders was soon seized upon by trans-Balkan criminal networks. The results were predictable; available on the Belgrade market for 45 Euro apiece, the drug came to be sold in Italy and other EU markets for over 100 Euro per unit.

Bird flu has also turned out to be a boon to the counterfeiting business. With demand for Tamiflu outpacing production, counterfeits—called "Tamiflu candies"—have flooded regional markets. This is more than just a criminal nuisance; it is also a serious impediment to governmental response. As countries begin to formulate defenses against the bird flu, they will be forced to grapple with counterfeit "medicine" sold at cut-rate prices and, worse still, with a false sense of security among those who have already purchased what they believe to be the cure.

In order to weed out organized crime from this field, governments must make three changes to their approach. The first involves public outreach; people need to be better acquainted with the Tamiflu drug, particularly with the fact that it may not be a one-stop cure. Better understanding of this reality could help stabilize market demand. Second, there is a need to better regulate the drug's availability and pricing. As long as the alert for avian influenza remains high, governments should coordinate to keep the price of Tamiflu and other remedial drugs more or less the same. By eliminating price differences between national markets of close proximity, it is possible to decrease the incentives for criminal groups to trade Tamiflu on the black market. Finally, Tamiflu should be made more readily available. As long as demand is sky-high, more of the drug should be produced and brought to market at a controlled price in order to eliminate the attractiveness of counterfeiting. This may also be the right time to consider making a generic version of Tamiflu—a move that would simultaneously knock down the price of the drug and make it widely available, particularly in regions classified as high risk.

Not least, there is a need to better guard against terrorists using the type A virus against commercial targets. Because avian influenza is typically found in birds, commercial poultry is particularly vulnerable. And if avian influenza is spread across livestock, sales will almost certainly drop. Poultry consumption across Europe has dropped drastically in recent months, with the sales of chicken at times dropping by more than 70 percent. This is just a foretaste of what is to come if this makeshift bio-weapon is exploited by terrorists.

Such steps are crucial. Even if science fails, there is a reasonable chance that we can control the spread of avian influenza if there is a strategy in place that allows us increased surveillance over civilian air travel, livestock trade, and gives us the means to better protect key economic sectors from terrorist attacks. The only certainty is that there are no certainties, and time is running out.

Back on its Feet

Irakli Mchedlishvili

TBILISI—For the Republic of Georgia, a new era is dawning. Some three years after the "Rose Revolution," Tbilisi is on the verge of real independence from Russia—and true integration with the West. But whether these trends continue largely depends on what transpires in the restive regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Not long after the disintegration of the USSR and Georgia's formal declaration of independence in April 1991, the country became embroiled in military conflicts with Abkhaz and South Ossetian forces. Yet, even though both regions were supported by Russia, these clashes were seen internationally as ethnic conflicts—a perception that served to diminish Western concern for Georgia's plight and deepen Tbilisi's isolation. Without international backing, it did not take long for the fledgling Georgian armed forces (at that point more akin to paramilitary units than a trained military) to collapse.

The results were devastating. The nascent Georgian government lost control of both conflict zones, and hundreds of thousands suffered. In Abkhazia alone, approximately 300,000 Georgians loyal to the central government were banished, and ten thousand were killed outright. Just as significantly, Georgia was no longer able to resist Russian political pressure, and acquiesced to membership in the Russia-supported Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), at the time seen as the framework for a reconstituted Russian empire to replace the USSR. In turn, Russian military forces were deployed to Abkhazia and South Ossetia under CIS mandate, ostensibly as peacekeepers. The deployment—coupled with the ongoing presence of Russian military bases in Georgia (whose withdrawal became linked to a settlement of the Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflicts)—provided an unmistakable impression: Georgia had lost independence to Moscow once more.

In the years that followed, the ramifications of Georgia's geopolitical quandary became apparent. Some observers argued that Russia would play a constructive role in their country, since it had legitimate interests in making sure that neither Abkhazia nor South Ossetia stimulated movement toward independence in its own North Caucasus republics. Others, however, believed Georgia had nothing in common with Russia, and perceived themselves (like Russia's Caucasus republics) to be suffering under aggression from Moscow.

The past decade has only served to validate the latter view. Georgian refugees remain displaced from their lands, and any attempts to remind the Russian government of its "peacekeeping" obligations results in new pressure. In 1998, for example, the Georgian government refused for a time to extend the mandate for Russia's peacekeeping contingent—only to witness the expulsion of the remaining pro-Georgian population of Abkhazia. By and by, it has also become evident that, separated from Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia have drifted

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into Moscow's geopolitical orbit—a reorientation that has included support for Russia's war in Chechnya.

Nevertheless, the past decade also saw a number of positive developments. Ten relatively peaceful years have enabled Georgia to strengthen its links with the West. Tbilisi has gained a better understanding of Western-style governance. The United States and Europe, meanwhile, have deepened their interest in the energy resources of the Caspian, and projects like the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline have given Georgia and the South Caucasus a measure of energy independence.

Georgia's cooperation with the West has also deepened on another front. Through its participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, Georgia has begun a gradual transformation of its armed forces. Border security has improved as well, thanks to the U.S.-funded Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) started in 2002. Tbilisi is even on track for NATO integration pursuant to its 2004 Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with the Atlantic Alliance.

This transformation has profoundly changed the country's approaches to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. From an initial reliance on Russia, Georgian officials have become convinced that settlement of both situations is only possible through cooperation with the West. As a result, Tbilisi has hardened its attitudes toward Moscow, and has begun pressing for the withdrawal of Russian military bases from Georgia pursuant to the 1999 OSCE Istanbul declaration, with some success. Under the latest agreement drawn up with Moscow, Russian military forces are slated to leave Georgia completely in 2008. The next to go will be Russian peacekeepers; pursuant to the latest decision of the Georgian parliament, Russian peacekeeping forces will be replaced with international peacekeeping troops in the near future.

The stakes are high. If realized, these steps could mean the end of the Russian era in the South Caucasus. The only thing capable of stopping this process is a new outbreak of violence in Georgia's regions, which will provide the pretext for Russia to retain its military and peacekeeping forces in the country. Tbilisi and its Western partners, therefore, should carefully monitor this process, lest Moscow and Kremlin-supported forces find a reason to maintain their foothold.

Book Reviews

Past as Prologue

Aaron Mannes

Joshua E. London, *Victory in Tripoli: How America's War with the Barbary Pirates Established the U.S. Navy and Shaped a Nation* (Hoboken, NJ: J. W. Wiley and Sons, 2005), 276pp., $24.95.

Faced with a choice of appeasing hostage-taking Middle Eastern despots or overturning the international order, the United States hems and haws as its prestige wanes—until finally, an outraged American public demands action. The European powers watch carefully, and maneuver to gain their own advantage. After marginal pinprick strikes, American forces mount a major campaign, receive rapid capitulation, and predictably fail to press their advantage.

The year was 1804.

In *Victory in Tripoli*, Joshua London tells the story of the first American Middle East crisis. For centuries, pirates based in the North African states had been extorting money from European governments. Shortly after America's independence, these bandits set their sights on the United States as well. The resulting hostage crises and plunder finally became so severe that the United States was compelled to construct a navy (indeed, the Barbary crisis effectively forced the debate towards those who felt the new nation should have a strong navy) and launch it against the Pasha of Tripoli. But the ensuing naval blockades and limited forays were mere pinpricks, and although the United States enjoyed some tactical successes, the Pasha became

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even more convinced that the United States lacked resolve.

Enter William Eaton, Revolutionary War hero and former U.S. Counsel to Tunis. Eaton proposed that the United States support Ahmed Qaramanli, the Pasha's deposed brother, in re-taking the throne. In late 1804, Eaton traveled to Egypt, recruited Qaramanli and raised a small force, including a single squad of eight U.S. Marines, some mercenaries, and a local band of followers. He quick-marched his tiny army across the desert and stormed Derna, the easternmost outpost of the Pasha of Tripoli's realm, in the spring of 1805. The expedition is commemorated in the famous refrain in the Marine Corps hymn: "… to the shores of Tripoli."

The Pasha, after failing to retake the city, became nervous and entered serious peace talks with the United States, eventually coming to terms of sorts with Washington. The United States, in turn, abandoned Derna, spiriting out its own personnel and the pretender Qaramanli (who died impoverished and exiled).

Victory in Tripoli is a page-turner that moves deftly between Washington machinations and naval maneuvers in the Mediterranean. London lets this terrific story tell itself, writing in a lean, effective style. A bit of explanation about diplomatic protocol at the turn of the 19th century, some decent maps, and perhaps a bit of background on naval warfare in the age of wooden ships (for those of us who don't know a schooner from a sloop) all would have been useful—but these are merely quibbles.

Most writers would have been tempted to play up the parallels with today's events. London, however, for the most part has wisely resisted this impulse, restricting himself to some wry descriptions. But the similarities between today's troubles with the Middle East and the war with the Barbary pirates are unmistakable: disputes between the diplomats and the military, a perfidious role by the European powers (Britain encouraged Barbary piracy against the Americans because it kept the United States out of the valuable Mediterranean trade routes), and a divisive domestic debate over the U.S. role in the world. As such, the underlying lesson contained in *Victory in Tripoli* is crystal clear: Middle Eastern despots change their behavior when faced with overwhelming force. Precision strikes, soft power, smart sanctions, and carrot and stick approaches are not sufficient.

But London's book is not a policy monograph; it is a work of history. Its great strength is in illuminating our present predicament by showing us the past. London's descriptions of the tendentious and erratic negotiation tactics used by the Barbary chieftains, and of the ubiquitous decay and weakness characterizing North African societies, could have been ripped from today's newspapers. In a chilling harbinger of today's megaterror, London shows us how the Barbary pirates were forthright in citing the Koran to justify their plundering ways as a form of *jihad*. This piracy was not merely a vocation; it was a religious duty.

To be sure, there are important differences between the crisis of today and the war against the Barbary pirates. The pirates were more akin to contemporary international organized crime networks than to the mass-murdering terrorists of today's Middle East. And the United States of 200 years ago did not have the confidence of its own democracy to dream of changing the Middle East. Nonetheless, the perennial issue remains

the same. Two centuries ago, as a diplomat in Tunis, Eaton wrote:

> … there is [no] … friendship with these states, without paving the way with gold or cannon balls; and the proper question is, which method is preferable.

As we again face this critical choice, a look back at the first American crisis in the Middle East has become increasingly valuable. London has done a great service in telling this tale, and telling it well.

The Palestinians' Best Battalion

Eric Rozenman

Stephanie Gutmann, *The Other War: Israelis, Palestinians and the Struggle for Media Supremacy* (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2005), 271 pp., $25.95.

The Palestinian Arabs—poor, dispossessed, yet bravely struggling to regain their rights. The Israelis—rich, occupiers, and thanks to American aid, able to suppress the Palestinians. Stephanie Gutmann's *The Other War* provides a timely, informative and entertaining review of how much of the foreign press corps reporting from Israel repeatedly presents variations on the above themes, broadcasting and publishing a two-dimensional morality play in which key attributes and actions of the lead characters—who's really intransigent, who wants to be accommodating, who's the aggressor, who the defender—are switched.

A former reporter for the *Los Angeles Times* and *New York Post* and freelancer for numerous other publications, ranging from *The New York Times* to *Playboy*, Guttman is no stranger to controversy. Her year 2000 book, *The Kinder, Gentler Military*, took on the corrosive culture of political correctness that she charged has progressively eroded the effectiveness of the U.S. military. *The Other War* should prove provocative, too.

Just what was the problem with reporting in the early years of the 2000–2005 Palestinian terror war against Israel known as the "al Aqsa intifada"? Gutmann quotes then *Jerusalem Post* editor-in-chief Bret Stephens: "The norm tends to be one of strict factual accuracy and routine contextual dishonesty." And she provides plenty of examples of such media malpractice, both glaring and subtle.

One is the infamous Mohammad al-Dura story: the deliberate killing, after 45 minutes of shooting, of a 12-year-old Palestinian Arab boy and the wounding of his father, ostensibly by Israeli troops in the Gaza Strip. The taped image became a world-wide anti-Israel icon. It worked its way into a speech by Osama bin Laden and reappeared as implied justification in the videotaped beheading in Pakistan of *Wall Street Journal* reporter Daniel Pearl. Yet as Gutmann notes, this image-seen-round-the-world was shot by only one of the many news cameramen on the scene that day, a Palestinian stringer for France TV 2. Bureau chief Charles Enderlin, who was not present, nevertheless added a dramatic voice-over. TV 2 made the tape available to others and "a number of reporters told the story in vivid terms as if they had been there themselves." "Mainstream" Palestinian spokesman obligingly accused Israel of "premeditated murder."

The often media-clumsy Israelis initially allowed that they might

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accidentally have shot the boy and his father in a crossfire with Arab gunmen. But a belated Israeli reenactment and a number of journalistic investigations cast doubt on the al-Dura "story." They suggest that, if a child was shot at all at the Netzrim crossing that day, he was hit by Palestinian fire, and perhaps not accidentally. But here the major media did not follow. Their original "story" fit preconceptions of victimized Palestinians, victimizing Israelis.

The Ramallah lynching is another case in point. Thirteen days after the al-Dura incident, on October 12, 2000, two Israeli reservists, in uniform but in a civilian car, apparently made a wrong turn and ended up in Ramallah in the midst of a funeral procession for another "beautiful little boy martyr." Palestinian Authority police detained the men. A mob followed, beat the Israelis to death, mutilated their bodies, and tossed one out a second story window for further mutilation. Hours later, Israeli helicopters fired on the police station and other PA facilities. Yet news reporters like ABC TV's Gillian Findlay "glossed over the precipitating event (the lynching) to focus on the retaliation," and did not inform viewers that the Israeli Air Force tried to target empty buildings. Overall, Guttman writes, the lynching "was only subsumed into a new media take on the second intifada emphasizing 'the cycle of violence'—a phrase suggesting, as David Gelernter put it, 'that Israelis and Palestinians kill each other as part of some sort of tiresome Punch and Judy show.'"

Then there was the Jenin "massacre." By now, that episode is well-known; after a series of suicide bombings and other terrorist attacks murdered more than 110 people and wounded hundreds of others in March 2002, Israel launched "Operation Defensive Shield," reasserting control over West Bank Arab population centers. These included Jenin and its adjacent refugee camp. In nine days of house-to-house fighting, 56 Palestinians, nearly all of them gunmen, and 23 Israeli soldiers were killed. Several blocks of the camp—really a permanent, if poor, neighborhood—were largely destroyed.

But early press accounts, including those in *The New York Times*, *Washington Post*, France's influential *Le Nouvel Observateur* and on CNN, relayed Palestinian claims of a massacre of hundreds, if not thousands, of non-combatants, and of hurried secret burials by the Israelis. Four months later, after even the United Nations reported no evidence of a massacre, chagrined foreign correspondents were forced to admit their mistake.

Yet so long as the news media view the larger Arab-Islamic conflict with Israel through the narrow, distorting filter of "weak but righteous Palestinians, strong and law-breaking Israelis," such mistakes will be made, and made frequently. They will be made because, as Gutmann touches on, open societies like Israel can't hide their flaws, but societies like that of the PA—simultaneously ruled by intimidation and awash in incitement—don't tolerate similar exposure. They will also be made because of the often corrupting use by foreign media of Palestinian "fixers"—translators, cameramen, stringers, drivers, and expediters—who often function overtly or covertly as "minders" in the manner of old Soviet KGB media "escorts."

And they will be made because Israel, rather than insisting on some sort of "pool" arrangement, tolerates a foreign media infestation of hundreds

of regularly assigned correspondents, with hundreds more "parachuting" in for crises. Rather than providing a worthwhile diversity of hard news, the journalistic pack all too often files superficial, derivative, anti-Israeli, and ideologically blinkered reports. It also dismisses or avoids stories such as the PA's widespread corruption under Arafat or the anti-Western (and anti-Israeli) nature of Islamic terror groups like Hamas.

Gutmann ends on a hopeful note, concluding that the Israeli government's fragmented, competing media shops have been getting their act together, and that alternative news sources, such as Internet weblogs—not to mention outside news media monitors—will help keep the press more honest. Meanwhile, as the decline in print circulation and broadcast audiences accelerates, and the last Gutenberg generation of news readers slowly yields to the first post-literary cohort of wireless, Podcasted information consumers, *The Other War* may prove to be both "old media" autopsy and "new media" marker.

Striking a Balance

Thomas Karako

JOHN YOO, *The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs After 9/11* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 378 pp. $29.00.

The title of John Yoo's masterful new book is perhaps too modest. *The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs After 9/11* deals with much more than simply war and peace. It tackles a wide field of foreign relations law and, particularly, "how the Constitution will adapt to the globalization of political, economic, and security affairs."

A professor of law at the University of California, Berkeley, Yoo is best known, even notorious, for the subset of foreign relations law dealing with war powers, on which he, while serving in the Justice Department, wrote a famous memo defending broad executive war-making power.

It is not surprising, then, that the first half of *The Powers of War and Peace* focuses on the proper distribution of war powers. Yoo sets forth an exceptionally bold understanding: presidents have the prerogative to initiate any hostilities, and to continue them until they run out of money. Yoo rejects the tired canard that the ceiling of presidential authority is his ability to "repel sudden attacks" unless actual invasion is "imminent." Instead, he argues that the most warlike president would be unable to move the nation to a state of "total war" because it is expensive to do so, and would sooner or later require supplemental funding. But Yoo's understanding is vulnerable to the practical objection that, with large standing forces, the commander-in-chief could embroil the nation in total war well before supplementary appropriations become necessary.

The second half of the volume, dealing with foreign relations powers other than those of war and peace, is less sensational but of equal significance. Because of his reputation for advocating broad executive war powers, one might expect Yoo to do the same with regard to treaties and international agreements. But although Yoo ably defends the executive's constitutional power to interpret, make, and terminate treaties at will, he also advocates unusually robust Congressional powers in the execution of treaties. Many reviewers exaggerate Yoo's celebration of executive power as bordering on monarchism, and so tend to miss that his *sine qua non* of legitimacy is in fact "popular sovereignty," meaning the popular will reflected as closely as possible.

The centerpiece of his approach is an emphatic rejection of the presumption that treaties are "self-executing," which means simply that a treaty may be enforced by the president once a supermajority of the Senate has con-

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sented and it has been ratified. Yoo locates the case for self-execution in the arguments of Alexander Hamilton and John Jay, but rejects them. Instead, Yoo argues for a presumption of "non-self-execution," meaning that the president may not enforce treaties without additional implementing legislation passed by a majority vote in both houses of Congress, either by statute or "congressional-executive agreement."

To analyze "self-execution," Yoo begins with the Jay Treaty debate of 1796, which centered on whether the House of Representatives, charged with passing laws for the treaty's domestic application, had the right to reconsider it "on its merits." James Madison famously defended the House's right to do so: "[T]his House, in its Legislative capacity, must exercise its reason; it must deliberate; for deliberation is implied in legislation." The issue was not whether deliberation was good, but rather who should deliberate about treaties. Hamilton's position that the Constitution made treaty law part of the law of the land was supported, Yoo says, by John Jay's argument in *Federalist* No. 64: "All constitutional acts of power, whether in the executive or the judicial departments, have as much legal validity and obligation as if they proceeded from the legislature." George Washington agreed, and refused to send Jay's negotiating instructions to the House.

One would expect Yoo to side with Hamilton and Jay (and Washington) since, when discussing war powers, he rejects as totally "unconvincing" Madison's reasoning in the 1793 debate with Hamilton about Washington's authority to issue the Neutrality Proclamation. Yet Yoo insists that Madison's arguments about treaty power be taken as gospel. He calls the interpretations of Jay and Hamilton "haughty" and "extreme," and less "evolved" theories of republicanism.

But his more "evolved" stance also seems more simplistic. Hamilton and Jay saw ratified treaties as having the "force of law," but Yoo explains this away by saying that because treaties are not passed by both houses, they are not law—and so are in fact purely executive. He shoehorns international agreements into two tidy boxes, the purely "executive" and the purely "legislative"—squeezing out what Hamilton in *Federalist* No. 69 called a "distinct department," and what John Locke termed the "federative" power.

Yoo's attachment to popular sovereignty is problematic. But the international environment today makes his position against self-execution, if not compelling, then at least salutary. As the degree of foreign involvement in the United States has increased since World War II, so too have international agreements. What once would have been considered extraordinary international connections have, with globalization, now become commonplace. The use of international agreements to circumvent the ordinary lawmaking process threatens to supplant the deliberation so vital to good government.

This makes some sense. But, to be clear, it also implies that the Framers' Constitution as interpreted by Jay, Hamilton, and Washington is inadequate to meet the requirements of the twenty-first century. Yoo's elevation of popular sovereignty also contrasts with *The Federalist's* theme that representatives must "refine and enlarge the public views," and that the departures from direct democracy are necessary for good government. John Dewey once famously remarked

that the remedy for the ills of democracy is more democracy; John Yoo prescribes more democracy for the ills of "global governance."

The Powers of War and Peace is nothing less than an effort to protect American self-government against increasing entanglement in the international system, certainly no small task. In the end, Yoo's remedy may be problematic. But his reasons for seeking one should be apparent to all.

Debunking the Hamas Myth

Glen Feder

MATHEW LEVITT, *Hamas: Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad* (Yale University Press, 2006), 324 pp., $26.00.

As Mathew Levitt was completing what he calls the "first open sourced book" on Hamas, the radical Islamist group won a surprising victory in the Palestinian Authority's January 2006 elections. In the aftermath, a debate quickly emerged among U.S. and EU policymakers about whether to continue funding the Palestinian Authority, now that a designated terrorist organization was running the show.

As such, the publication of Levitt's book, *Hamas: Politics, Charity and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad*, could not have been more timely. Through personal interviews, recently declassified documents, and court papers, Levitt debunks once and for all the myth that Hamas is composed of separate social, political and military branches.

Hamas, Levitt writes, has been able to maintain a "veil of legitimacy" by providing essential social services to the Palestinian people, which Hamas apologists argue are separate from its terrorism operations. By doing so, Hamas has been able to maintain its reputation, at least in some corners, as a legitimate alternative for the Palestinian people. But Levitt drills into the reader that Hamas' three "separate" branches are in reality intricately interrelated. He provides numerous examples of how charity committees, mosques, student unions, sports clubs and summer camps raise funds which eventually go toward terrorist operations, and indoctrinate and recruit many of the operatives themselves. Indeed, Levitt documents that senior Hamas leaders—including the late Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, Abdel Aziz Al Rantissi, Mousa Abu Marzook, Khaled Mishal, and Jamal Tawil—have all simultaneously played roles in the group's military and political wings.

The key to undermining Hamas, Levitt argues, is by understanding the secret of its success. Once a fringe group of Islamist radicals in a relatively secular society, Hamas gained prominence—and popularity—by providing much-needed social services, from hospitals and clinics to schools and mosques. Replicating the structure of its mother organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas has set up a social welfare and administrative branch (*dawa*) which has won the respect of many Palestinians by outpacing the corrupt and inefficient services previously provided by the secular Palestinian Authority government. Each year, state sponsors (such as Syria and Iran), charity fronts in the U.S., Middle East and Europe, and various money laundering schemes raise tens of millions of dollars to support this sophisticated social influence net-

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work. Much of this fundraising, moreover, has been made possible because Western policymakers remain under the illusion that the funds go solely towards providing social services to ordinary Palestinians.

Thus, while military action against active Hamas cells may be necessary, and could prevent future terrorist attacks, the permanent way to weaken Hamas is by displacing its social roots. Levitt offers a glimpse into how to do so. The first step, he says, is to freeze or otherwise put out of business those front organizations which support Hamas' social network. Once that lifeline is cut, the U.S., EU and Gulf states must step into the void and create a coordinated international aid effort to offer those services once provided by Hamas. The logic is clear; if the international community can provide transparent social services that are of better quality and more affordable than those of Hamas, it could create a rift between the group's moderates and radicals, since the former support it largely for its social services. And that, Levitt argues, will eventually lead to the organization's demise.

Yet these policy prescriptions come up short in several respects. Levitt himself admits that a renewed international aid effort is largely predicated upon cooperation with "a new moderate Palestinian government." Today, however, the Palestinian Authority is rapidly heading in the opposite direction. Furthermore, while an alternative to Hamas' social network would certainly degrade the group's power, state sponsors such as Syria and Iran are likely to remain loyal to their terrorist proxy. Finally, money may be important for preserving Hamas' popularity, but ideology plays a role as well. Levitt makes occasional calls for educational reform throughout his book, but his actual policy initiatives are largely concerned with stemming Hamas' financial growth, rather than curbing its radical worldview.

Nevertheless, Levitt has provided a major service. A debate over how to undermine a terrorist organization cannot even begin if one buys into the idea of separate social and political wings. *Hamas* definitively dispels this myth. More important still, Levitt has shown us that the general idea of such a construct did not originate within Hamas itself. Rather, it was inherited from the group's predecessor and inspiration: the Muslim Brotherhood. Only by seeing precisely how the Muslim Brotherhood and its more radical offshoots prey upon Western democracies through their mastery of the art of rhetoric and propaganda can we begin to truly understand them—and to confront them. Levitt's work brings us a bit closer to that goal.

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