Knud Erik Jørgensen

Towards A Six-Continents Social Science: International Relations

From Prague to Istanbul

When delegates met in Prague in 1938 to discuss the teaching of International Relations, it was the end of a decade-long League of Nations-sponsored attempts to address international issues academically and from a global perspective (Zimmern 1939). Whereas previous meetings had dealt with substantive issues like international political economy, security, sanctions and neutrality, the agenda for the Prague meeting was different, 'the very problem of a definition of the discipline was, it seems, taken up for the first time' (Amstrup 1989:35).[1] However, the World War II and subsequent divisions of the world into "the East" and "the West" and "North" and "South" turned the League of Nations project into a non-starter.[2] Nonetheless, for our understanding of the genesis of the discipline the League committee seems to play an important role. Yet, in textbooks it plays no role whatsoever and is absent from all foundational myths about the origin of the discipline.

When, in 2005, the first conference organised by the WISC (World International Studies Committee) is to convene in Istanbul, it will be the first opportunity ever to continue the Prague conversations.[3] For the first time in almost seven decades, a truly global conference will take place, sponsored jointly by numerous national and regional professional associations (ISAs). In this article I want to address two key issues this global enterprise will raise. First, for a discipline such as International Relations (IR) the label "a truly global conference" sounds intuitively right, perhaps even self-evident. Why should a discipline such as IR not be truly global? But, as is widely recognised, evidence from seven decades strongly suggests that it is not self-evident. The article's first aim is therefore to account for contending views on the current state of affairs — diagnoses — defining the problem so to speak, and to thereby point out the rationale for the conference. Second, diagnosing problems leads in turn to expectations about cures. In other words, which kind of cures can

make the problems go away? In this context we should remember that the objective of making the discipline truly international could prove to be a goal that can only be reached if we are willing to take several risks along the road. Put differently, the path will be equipped with more tripwires than seem necessary for turning the project into a failure. Hence, the article's second objective is to identify cures and consider the tripwires. Finally, I conclude and outline some perspectives.

THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS: SEVEN DIAGNOSES

ANY DIAGNOSIS OF THE CURRENT STATE OF AFFAIRS CARRIES WITH IT IMAGES OF THE PAST AND VISIONS FOR THE FUTURE. It is therefore no wonder that diagnoses are essentially contested, albeit some more than others. In the seven most important diagnoses, keywords at one level include domination, hegemony, and disciplinary power; at another level, diversity, cosmopolitanism and parochialism. Each diagnosis leads to a distinct set of questions to discuss and opportunities for action.

POWER

The first diagnosis is perhaps the easiest to describe. It takes its point of departure in the observation that some kind of direct relationship seems to exist between political power and discipline. Smith (2002) has always been very explicit on this relationship, using the subtitle *Hegemonic Country, Hegemonic Discipline* for one of his studies of the United States (US) and the discipline. This is an intriguing issue, particularly because it seems to have wider applications. Thus, during the time of Pax Britannia British liberals began pleading for university chairs and specialised institutes, the contours of a

discipline in fact emerged. After the World War II, and parallel to the rise of US hegemony, IR began to flourish in the US. IR became an American social science or rather, following Hoffmann (1977), IR was launched in the image of social science as understood in the US. Even the special relationship of the United Kingdom (UK) with the US and the awkward relationship with continental Europe seem to be reflected in the British IR community's relations with US and European IR communities, respectively. Holsti (1987) represents a variant of the diagnosis, arguing that the discipline is ruled by an Anglo-American condominium. Also supporting the diagnosis is the fact that, within the Soviet sphere of influence, IR *sovieticus* was taught at universities. In short, power seems to determine discipline. If this analysis is correct, it has at least two important consequences. First, in the debate on internal *versus* external approaches to writing disciplinary history, external approaches seem vindicated. Second, if the relationship between power and discipline is as close and unidirectional as these observations suggest, it is easy to predict a continued US intellectual hegemony, perhaps even an empire (*cf.* Hassner 2002). In this scenario, the function of the Istanbul meeting will — within IR — be similar to the current function of the United Nations (UN) within international relations, *i.e.* either legitimise the interests, standards and values of the empire or simply become irrelevant. It will be a meeting of the "brand-owner" and the "franchise owners" (to use Brown's words, 2001). Or, it will be cancelled, accompanied with the advice: join the American Political Science Association (APSA) and International Studies Association (ISA). In any case, because disciplinary developments are determined by power, there is little we can do.

Self-images

Stories about the origin of the discipline and how it has developed show considerable variation. Some emphasise "the great debates". Others highlight "epistemological plateaus", happily pointing out — Panglossian style — that the contemporary plateau is the best of all plateaus. Still others underline an endless conversation among three traditions: the Machiavellian, the Grotian and the Kantian. However, the second diagnosis highlights professional identity and self-images. Smith (1995) identifies ten self-images of the discipline. Combined, it is a rich but also very subversive image, particularly because it emphasises the relative merits of each image and thereby hints at their boundaries. I think Smith (1995:1) is successful in achieving his unsettling aim of showing, 'how the history of international theory, and specifically the ways in which international thought has been categorised, has created privileged, that is to say primary and dominant, understandings and interpretations.' Nevertheless, let me point out two important limits. The first limit is the view that self-images of a discipline can be analysed entirely by investigating the main divisions and categorisations of IR theory. Knowledge about international relations and world politics sometimes assumes the form of theory and sometimes, in some places, it does not. Privileging the theoretical form necessarily carries with it an unfortunate silencing of other forms of knowledge, which also could be a valuable foundation for self-images. The second limit we find in the title of Smith's essay (*The Self-Images of a Discipline*). Though writing about self-images, he has a very narrow conception of the "self" in question. The problem is that all ten self-images have been cultivated exclusively within the Anglo-American IR community and, thus, solely by British and American

scholars. Ironically, though Smith creates his tableau by drawing on continental European social theory, he hardly reflects on work by scholars from the rest of the world (the same applies for the volume of which Smith's essay is part). In this way, Smith reproduces the Anglo-American self-image of the discipline.

Hegemony

Holsti's (1987) study of IR theory has been a standard reference for more than a decade. The subtitle, *Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory*, neatly summarises Holsti's conclusion that hegemony reigns and diversity is limited. However, the hegemony in question is an Anglo-American condominium and not US hegemony. Eleven years later, Wæver (1998) concludes that the discipline is, 'a not so international discipline.' He predicts that American hegemony is likely to persist. Smith (1985; 2000; 2003) has consistently argued along the same lines, just as Crawford and Jarvis (2001) frame their project along the hegemony-diversity axis, concluding that hegemony remains the name of the game. In summary, the discipline lives under American hegemony and this is likely to endure. It should be noted though that Wæver predicts that contemporary American obsessions with rational choice is likely to change the current state of affairs and, inadvertently, contribute to a multipolar global IR community. This qualification notwithstanding, the scenario is that we should expect that tomorrow will look like yesterday.

Social Science Inc

Outlining the research design for the path-breaking *The Culture of National Security*, Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein are eager to emphasize that contributors employ comparison, 'in ways now standard in social science.' When they attempt an explanation, they engage in,

Knud
Erik
Jørgensen

'normal science with its usual desiderata in mind' (Jepperson, Wendt and Kaztenstein 1996:65). Similarly, Moravcsik explains why a volume fails to deliver what he thinks it should: 'The near absence of two critical elements of social science, each designed to put conjectures at risk: (1) distinctive testable hypotheses, (2) methods to test such hypotheses against alternative theories or a null hypothesis of random state behaviour' (Moravcsik 2001:177). Finally, for Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner the "social science enterprise" functions as the axis separating critical constructivists from postmodernism. The former acknowledges 'the possibility of a social science' (Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner 1998:677), whereas 'postmodernism falls clearly outside of the social science enterprise' (Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner 1998:678). These quotations represent a very strong and deeply embedded conception of what social science is considered to be. There is a very strong path-dependency operating here. In this context, note that Hoffmann (1977) characterised IR as an American SOCIAL SCIENCE. Similarly Smith has consistently, and in my view rightly, pointed out that the social science in question is a peculiar version, primarily developed in the US where it is regarded as the only proper social science (Smith 2002; also see Alexander 1997:65-89). Indeed, his analysis is an obvious point of departure for analysing the costs and benefits of putting IR on such a social science footing — as well as the costs and benefits of accepting broader versions of social science.

Worldwide, relations between IR and its disciplinary environment show considerable variation. At least four models can be identified. In the US, IR is typically part of a political science department. As a background variable, the social science canon is in place and ready for employ-ment whenever needed. A set of distinct meanings of key concepts provides the software for analytical action. In the UK, there are independent IR departments, alongside departments of politics, sociology and history, though we also find the political science/IR combination. In France, political science is not conceived of in monistic terms, meaning that French scholars talk about the political sciences (in the plural). Elsewhere, all sorts of combinations can be found, sometimes IR is part of departments of Law, Sociology, History or Philosophy. If context matters, we should expect IR theorising to reflect the environment in which the theorising takes place. Smith (2002) claims that the disciplinary configuration in the UK leads to greater intellectual pluralism, *i.e.* a lack of monistic theoretical orthodoxy. Likewise, distinct Japanese and French settings have been analysed (Inoguchi and Bacon 2001; Giesen 2004), though described in less rosy words than Smith's. But, generally speaking, systematic studies analysing the deeds (and vices) of relations between IR and different disciplinary environments are very rare indeed.

After Hegemony

Groom and Mandaville are very upfront in their challenge of the view that hegemony characterises the discipline, asking, 'What hegemony? ... There is now a nascent "European IR community" that is alive and well and living, for the most part, in the EU. ... There are ... no hegemonies, something that may also be true beyond the confines of the EU and North America' (2001:163). Concerning the continental part of Europe, in Jørgensen (2000) a similar conclusion has been reached. What about Latin America and Japan? Concerning Latin America, Tickner (2003) reports that although US influence is strong in terms of defining what IR theory is (when taught), it is,

KNUD
ERIK
JØRGENSEN

curiously enough, the IR theory of yesterday that enters syllabi. Post-positivist IR theory does not travel easily from the US to Latin America and the same applies to rationalism, even in its softer versions. When it comes to research, US influence has been minimal. According to Inoguchi and Bacon (2001), US influence has also been weak in Japan where most of the "great debates" never arrived (except in the form of far away echoes) and where three out of four research traditions are home-grown.[4] Even Smith, who for decades has been criticising American hegemony, cannot resist pointing out — somewhat contradictory to the main line of his diagnosis — that key features of American IR are not dominant elsewhere,

> *That picture is not found in the rest of the world, where IR is a far more pluralist subject, with no one theoretical approach dominant. In most of the rest of the world, certainly in Europe and Australasia, IR remains sceptical of the merits of both positivism and the associated belief that there is one standard to assess the quality of academic work: a much wider range of work is seen as legitimate than in the mainstream U.S. literature. This results in a far more lively, vital and exciting IR community, one that can offer a variety of responses to the major problems and features of the contemporary global political system* (Smith 2002:81).

Within a British context, Smith concludes a comparison of UK and US IR communities by claiming that, 'the UK IR community is ... in a far healthier state than is the profession in the United States' (Smith 2000:398; also see Dunne 1998; and Buzan 2001). In summary, though I do not pretend to have conducted a comprehensive review, it seems as if "hegemony" is a grossly misleading notion of the current state of affairs. If this is the

case, more studies of cross-IR community comparisons — *e.g.* along the lines suggested by Holden (2004), Inoguchi and Bacon (2001) and Smith (1985, 2000; also see Crawford and Jarvis 2001) — should be conducted in order to make inter-community communication feasible and meaningful. In any case, the image of hegemony seems to be a self-inflicted condition.

Whether "after hegemony" should be welcomed or not obviously depends on what is likely to replace hegemony. Above we have seen a number of enthusiastic diagnoses. But is that all there is to it? Is it not possible to also imagine a scenario of fragmentation, *i.e.* the creation of global islands of different disciplines, theories and concepts? In this case, the existence of many local truths is likely to lead to less than fruitful encounters. Therefore, witnessing the rise and (now) fall of an IR community great power, the plea for diversity and multiple global "voices" may actually lead in the wrong direction. Though the "after hegemony" diagnosis can be regarded as a disquieting scenario of fragmentation, one might critically ask if the scenario does not describe precisely what we already have. When we read "discipline" we just have the habit of understanding "Anglo-American discipline", when in fact the discipline is currently practised worldwide in many different ways. Different IR communities exist and cultivate the field in ways that make sense to them. In other words, mutually acknowledged conceptions of discipline have crucially important boundaries and "mutuality" has proven to be a fairly flexible phenomenon.

THE POSITIVE DIAGNOSIS

Contrary to a common tendency, it is argued here that the American IR community has a strong cosmopolitan dimension. It shows in different ways. In terms

Towards
A Six-
Continents
Social
Science:
International
Relations

of organisation, the ISA functions as a quasi-global organisation, serving the interests of a worldwide membership. Together with the BISA, the ISA is among the most open professional organisations in the world. Serving in the executive committee is possible for all members, and ISA presidents have regularly been non-Americans. Further, the ISA expands ties with colleagues outside North America and cultivates links with partner organisations worldwide, bilaterally as well as multilaterally (within 15 years, three times in Europe). By contrast, European professional organisations look fairly introverted, having narrow national or European horizons. In terms of professional communication, the ISA owns several of the top journals in the field. Finally, a very strong belief in academic cosmopolitanism characterises the US discipline. If the US IR community constitutes a scholarly great power, and if one of the functions of great powers has been the establishment and maintenance of hegemonic stability, for instance in terms of setting agendas (research programmes), defining the rules of the game and the standards for what "counts" as good theory and, in general, provide collective "good" goods for the rest of us to use, then, perhaps, there is no reason for alarm. In short, it is possible to meet the argument that, contrary to all the fuss, the problem is not really a big thing.

Boundaries of Universalism

When we address the issue of diversity, cosmopolitanism and parochialism, the diagnosis still concerns domination or hegemony but operates in a different key. Brown (2001:216) pointed out that, 'the dominant mode of thinking in the modern discipline is profoundly *cosmopolitan* ... the intellectual predispositions of the American discipline are universalist, committed to denying the privileging of any

particular *national* viewpoint — indeed to denying the very idea that a national viewpoint could have any intellectual validity.' Similarly, Valbjørn (2004) concludes that the discipline has been culture-blind for decades yet risks becoming culture-blinded. He emphasises that IR theories have never had a strong, if any, focus on culture. Theorists have even been blind as regards the culture in which their theories are embedded. On the other hand, with the growing awareness of culture — the cultural turn — IR theory risks becoming culture all the way down. No matter how the diagnosis is phrased, it is easy to see how the cosmopolitan mode of thinking defines inter-IR community comparison and communication as irrelevant. One dominant but nonetheless local conception of discipline regards itself as universal and therefore cannot possibly recognise the presence of other conceptions. Instead, foundational myths and trajectories of development are reproduced by means of standard operating procedures. Generation after generation of students are socialised in the image of their professors. Universalism defines the game, the players and conditions the outcome. A research agenda like the one proposed by Holden (2004) would be considered irrelevant. When combined with the peculiar narrow conception of social science, it becomes a very powerful package which shifts the strategic burden of argument to its contenders.

Six Cures: On Theory and Three Practices

Having outlined seven diagnoses of the state of IR affairs, it is time to consider possible cures. I address the treatment issue while having my focus on relations between theory and practice. Most contributions assume the relation-

KNUD
ERIK
JØRGENSEN

ship concerns (academic) theory and state practice (which equals policy). In this regard, a tribute to Arnold Wolfers illustrates a common ideal: '[He] has excelled in making theory relevant to policy and in making the analysis of policy yield insights that further refine theory' (quoted from Thompson 1992:48). Certainly, such an interactive relationship is better than a non-interactive but should theory always be relevant to policy and, a closely related question, whose policy are we talking about? Similarly, is the relationship necessarily a zero-sum game (Wallace 1996)? In the following, I would like to avoid these classic problems. Hence, I operate with a distinction between three kinds of practice. The first kind of practice is the well-known practice of states (policy-making); the second practice concerns practices in society concerning international affairs (*e.g.* political action and international thought); the third practice is the practice of academics, no matter whether they theorise, analyse empirical issues or engage in critical self-reflection. Such a wider notion of practice logically enables more encounters between theory and practice. I even claim that the wider concept makes more fruitful encounters possible.

To most readers the first cure appears harsh, perhaps reminding some of certain anarchist notions of modernisation: in order to build something new, everything has to be destroyed first. In any case, Brown (2001:218) prescribes the following treatment: 'If we truly wish to promote diversity in international thought, it may be that a crucial first step will be to contribute to the work of dismantling "International Relations" as an academic discipline.' The reasoning behind Brown's cure is that, 'the very idea that one actually needs a discipline of IR may be tied up with a particular worldview' (*ibid.*). He is not alone in having this idea. Griffiths and

O'Callaghan (2001:188) think that 'The idea of a discipline of IR is little more than a thinly disguised parochialism masquerading as a global field of study.' They therefore hope for 'the end of International Relations.' In my view, it is definitely a harsh cure but it looks like a suitable treatment. It may even alleviate two problems in parallel. On one hand, the cure could reduce the kind of cosmopolitanism that makes masquerading possible. This is often the objective of critics of the discipline. On the other hand, the treatment may also improve scholarly self-recognition outside the Anglo-American condominium. The cure will foremost have an impact on the theory side but because concepts help us find what we are looking for, new concepts are likely to improve our understanding of both state and society practices.

The second cure is less harsh, yet requires considerable time and manpower resources. In other words, huge funding seems indispensable. The cure could be called, "thoroughly reconsidering the history of the discipline." One of the prime achievements of Schmidt's *The Political Discourse of Anarchy* (1998) is its convincing argument that histories of the discipline have been coloured by what Schmidt calls presentism, *i.e.* histories have been told from somewhere (the present) in order to present a progressive development ("now we are here, in the best of all possible worlds"). In this way, presentism is regarded as a disease which can be cured by proper medication (the internal approach advocated by Schmidt). I think Schmidt's criticism is convincing and his version of the story represents "the better argument". But there is a problem. According to Smith, there is "no view from nowhere" (2003) and, according to Holden (2004), presentism cannot be avoided, "stories have to be told from somewhere." Because both arguments

sound convincing we have a dilemma. One solution would be to acknowledge that we are in a necessarily contested field in which there are different stories about the origin, development and future of the discipline. But that would be to celebrate difference for its own sake and therefore unsatisfactory. A more satisfactory solution would be to agree with Schmidt's analysis but disagree with his conclusion. In other words, agree that stories are marked by presentism (which is unavoidable) but disagree that it is possible to develop a neutral approach describing *"Wie es eigentlich gewesen."* Schmidt should therefore be encouraged to think harder about his own Archimedean point (his own presentism) — and Smith and Holden should be encouraged to think harder about the criteria by which we determine which kind of presentism is the better one? For instance, both Smith and Holden seem to agree with Schmidt that the first debate (idealism *vs.* realism) is a pseudo debate, invented to serve specific purposes.

Once this problem has found its solution, we will be able to take the next step. Schmidt has developed a methodology for the historiography of International Relations and applied the approach in a study of American IR (1998) as well as suggested it is applicable worldwide: 'An internal as compared to an external focus may well help to account for the distinct national differences in how the field has developed' (Schmidt 2002:16). Compared to the widespread Whiggish approach to the history of the field, Schmidt's approach represents an important complementary analytical device, even though it could be methodologically sharpened, as suggested by Holden (2004). Further, his invitation to write internal stories also seems attractive in the case of exploring national differences in Europe, Asia and elsewhere. Needless to say that would be a huge

undertaking. Consider the European case, comprising more than 30 countries and several linguistic communities. Imagine a disciplinary history of International Relations in Germany written on the background of the sources mentioned in Bleek's, *Geschichte der Politikwissenschaft in Deutschland* (2001) or a similar study on British IR, written on the background of the sources mentioned in Hayward, Barry and Brown's *The British Study of Politics in the Twentieth Century* (1999). Even more challenging is the task of writing the internal story of Russian IR, developed under Czarist, Soviet and post-Soviet political cultures. In this context, it is important to note the fact that investigating the relationship between political science and International Relations would often be insufficient because many IR practitioners work within departments which are not political science but Law, Sociology, Philosophy or History. This cure is for internal consumption, in particular because it concerns the relationship between theory and critical self-reflection.

Following the third cure requires that we engage in a systematic programme comparing IR communities. At one level such work has been done previously, for instance within the sociology of science literature (Ford Foundation 1976; Dreyer and Margasarian 1989; Wæver 1998; Friedrichs 2002). Such work has generated solid knowledge of diversity and differences in terms of how the discipline has developed in different national settings. Similarly, it has been popular to engage in bilateral comparison. Hence, the US has been compared to Britain (Smith 1985, 2000; Crawford and Jarvis 2001) and Germany (Zürn 1996). However, it is possible to dig deeper into differences. Brown (2001) highlights very well how the unit of the international system, the state, is understood very differently in conti-

Towards
A Six-
Continents
Social
Science:
International
Relations

KNUD
ERIK
JØRGENSEN

nental Europe and in an Anglo-American context. In the former context, 'the state is an institution that brings meaning into the lives of individuals, giving them a sense of their worth as equal citizens, a function that the institutions of civil society cannot perform alone' (Brown 2001: 209). In the Anglo-American context, the state is regarded in an instrumental fashion as a problem-solving institution. Holden (2004) analyses the role and understanding of Habermasian Critical Theory within German and UK IR communities, concluding that both function and understanding show considerable difference. On that basis he hypothesises that intellectual constructs travel with great difficulty across national and linguistic boundaries. Brown and Holden demonstrate how research on basically all key concepts and theoretical frameworks could be done. If such studies offer more than a voyeuristic comparison but engage in further developing the concepts and frameworks, they will prove to be a very efficient cure. In turn, the cure may even trigger increased communication among IR communities. The comparison cure need not only be synchronic. It could just as well address the problem called "presentism", *i.e.* the feature Hoffmann once characterised with the following words: 'Because we have an inadequate basis for comparison, we are tempted to exaggerate either continuity with a past we know badly, or the radical originality of the present, depending on whether we are more struck by the features we deem permanent, or with those we do not believe existed before' (Hoffmann 1977:57). Comparative studies of IR communities will potentially lead to a richer conceptual tool-box and therefore allow us to understand global politics in a more nuanced fashion.

The fourth cure addresses the relationship between IR theory and civil society's political practice and reflection on

international affairs. Thompson's question, PEACE STUDIES: SOCIAL MOVEMENT OR INTELLECTUAL DISCIPLINE? (1992:52), can serve as a point of departure for the point I am trying to make. I think that asking the question suggests there is a fuzzy border between academic reflection and reflection by social movements. Indeed, it was liberal reflections which contributed to the creation of an academic discipline. Are NGO (non-governmental organisation) reflections on world politics just ideology not worthy of the attention of serious scholars? Which kind of social actors and analysts do we tend to exclude from further attention (*cf.* Puchala 1997)? In this way, the relationship between academic theory and social reflection seems to be an obvious issue for further attention. Take the attention currently given to research on terrorism as an example. Given the potential and manifest threats to security, there is a practical need for knowledge on terrorism, its different forms, historical dimensions and ideological sources. Further, the problem of terrorism constitutes a challenge to most theoretical orientations, particularly because of the asymmetrical relationship between state and NGO political action. Finally, research on terrorism implies deep analytical challenges as well, *e.g.* cultural encounters of separate scholarly communities such as security analysts, area studies specialists, history of ideas and business administration. To the degree there is a downside to research on contemporary terrorism, it is that analysts are too willing to uncritically buy the state political agendas and then go for a research agenda which is instrumental towards political goals (the embedded academic, so to speak). In short, research on terrorism and research on the theory-society practice linkage involves all three kinds of practice.

The fifth cure is acknowledging disciplinary diversity as a potential asset rather

than a manifest liability. The cure requires mutual recognition, a notoriously difficult process because it involves foundational myths, disciplinary identity issues, strong path-dependencies, professional power relations and tenure-track career paths. It will be immensely difficult to convince the average American IR scholar, trained to do the kind of research published in *International Studies Quarterly*, that there is any value added in going beyond the social science canon or the political science/IR package. Similarly, it will be an almost impossible mission to convince the sovereigns of European IR-principalities that they (we) can do much better and that part of it, *muß auf Amerikanish sein* (to refer back to Michael Zürn's question posed in 1996). After all, the BISA (British International Studies Association) was to some degree modelled on the ISA because a majority of its founders concluded that traditionalism had had its time. In Germany, the *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* was launched in order to counter the power of the traditional system. Acknowledging diversity should not equal uncritical embracement. In other words, Latin American *dependencia* theorists, European Luhmanians, Japanese historicists and Canadian admirers of Critical Theory — in principle all theoretical orientations — should be both object and subject of criticism. One task ahead could include the difficult exercise of co-operation under anarchy, *i.e.* first the requirement of a massive effort to understand very different scholarly horizons and then, secondly, the possible creation of truly international norms for "best practice" and global standards. Perhaps the notion of minilateralism is relevant, that is, the existence of a key group of players who, within a multilateral setting, reach an agreement and subsequently have their agreement legitimised by the multilateral

group (Kahler 1993). One minilateral configuration would be similar to negotiations within the WTO, *i.e.* the US, the EU and a coalition of various countries (G21). Within the world of IR scholars, a similar configuration would also include three groupings: the ISA, the SGIR/BISA[5] and a loose coalition (Japan, Australia, China, Canada, Nigeria), the 'true periphery' as it is called by Aydinli and Mathews (2000:291).

The sixth cure requires us to reconsider traditions. Two examples illustrate my point. The first example concerns the American theoretical tradition, embodying several contradictory interpretations. It is common to encounter the following description:

— "Once upon a time, IR carried the birth mark of liberal internationalism. Then realism arrived and, thank God, described reality just as it is. Therefore realism won the first great debate and demonstrated that, within IR, there is progress."

— But there are contending interpretations of this development. According to Brown (2001), realism retained key elements of liberalism, most importantly the view of the state. Essentially, European realism went through a metamorphosis so that it could make sense in an American context, a context which has been built on a liberal edifice (Shimko 1992).

— "Nonetheless, realism was succeeded by the behavioural revolution, cleansing US departments for remnants of traditionalism."

— But behavioralism was just the extension of realism with other methodological means. All realist key assumptions were kept in place (Vasquez 1983) — and remember, these key assumptions are in part liberal.

— "Then came the post-behavioural era, during which the worst excesses of the behavioural revolution were modified."

— Though what really happened was that explicit references to the principles of the behavioural manifesto were changed into implicit principles and therefore no longer open for discussion (except for those contending the principles).

— "Eventually, rational choice arrived, only to continue the behavioural revolution in a new key."

In other words, we are still with realism, that is, a realism which is partly liberal. Constructivism, though agnostic concerning the liberalism-realism debate, has in the US primarily been promoted by liberals (but see Nau 2002). When presented in this fashion we have got rid of the great debates and have instead arrived at a variation on a common theme.

The second example is European, where in research on foreign policy national boundaries continue to define key parameters of the research agenda. Hence, studies of the foreign policy of country "x" are legion and, yes, there are some comparative studies as well. Underlying issues such as European foreign policy traditions have hardly been analysed. Concerning American foreign policy, it is common to make distinctions between foreign policy traditions. Though categorisations differ, labels like "isolationists", "internationalists" and "unilateralists" illustrate my point. For decades, there has been a lively debate among representatives of these traditions. In Europe, there is no such debate. We even lack a language for describing cross-boundary foreign policy traditions (distinctions between "Atlanticists" *vs.* "Europeanists" are often as far as we get). Therefore, studies on European foreign policy traditions across national boundaries are almost completely lacking which, in turn, explains our failure to fully understand underlying issues in debates on the development of the EU's foreign policy. This cure addresses the theory/state practice relationship head-on, suggesting by means of constitutive theory to explore uncharted territory.

Conclusion

It would be difficult to dispute the fact that the League of Nations committee functioned during a very difficult time in world politics. It began its work shortly after the global economic collapse; it convened in Madrid only a few months before the Spanish civil war started; and months after the meeting in Prague, Germany invaded Czechoslovakia. Nonetheless, the committee devoted an entire session to the issue of defining the discipline and considering how IR should be taught. Given this, I have no problem in focusing on the seemingly naval-gazing issues I have addressed above. On the contrary, both the seven problems diagnosed and the six cures serve, one way or another, as the point of departure for most research on global issues; linkages between disciplinary historiography and research on substantive issues are much closer than most are ready to acknowledge. The exploration of relations between problems, diagnoses and action programmes constitutes an invitation to further improve the discipline. Part of the WISC Istanbul conference could be reserved for such an enterprise, in fact to embody a global meeting of numerous intellectual traditions. Even if Hoffmann is not right in saying that the discipline was born and raised in the US, there is still a chance it may grow up in the world.

Notes:

Knud Erik Jørgensen is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, the University of Aarhus.

Address: Knud Erik Jørgensen, Department of Political Science, Universitetsparken, DK-8000 Aarhus C, Denmark [E-mail: kej@ps.au.dk].

1 Indirectly, this assessment is supported by C. K. Webster who in 1923 stated that 'though in other countries there are professors whose duties are akin to mine, there is no general acceptance of the principles of the study' (quoted from Brown 2001:205). Between 1929 and 1939, the committee held eleven meetings on international affairs.

2 The meeting took place at a time when flows of influence were very different from contemporary power grids. Thus, the League of Nations was situated in Geneva; Paris hosted the League-sponsored *L'Institut international de cooperation intellectuelle; Sciences Po* functioned as a model for the creation of the London School of Economics — and Zimmern's report on the Prague meeting was written in French.

3 WISC stands for the World International Studies Committee and is a joint body of ISAs. The idea of organising a global conference arose during the joint CEEISA-NISA-RISA conference in Moscow in June 2002. CEEISA stands for the Central and East European International Studies Association; NISA is the Nordic International Studies Association; and RISA is the Russian International Studies Association.

4 In this respect, Japanese features are strikingly similar to continental Europe (Jørgensen 2000; Giesen 2004).

5 SGIR stands for the Standing Group on International Relations of the ECPR (European Consortium for Political Research).

References

ALEXANDER, Jeffrey C. (1997) *Fin de Siécle Social Theory: Relativism, Reduction and the Problem of Reason*. London: Verso.

AMSTRUP, Niels (1989) 'The Study of International Relations: Old or New? A Historical Outline (1500 to 1939)'. Aarhus: Department of Political Science, Working Paper.

AYDINLI, Ersel and Julie MATHEIWS (2000) Are the Core and Periphery Irreconcilable? The Curious World of Publishing in Contemporary International Relations. *International Studies Perspectives* **1**(3), 289-303.

BLEEK, Wilhelm (2001) *Geschichte der Politikwissenschaft in Deutschland*. München: Verlag C.H.Beck.

BROWN, Chris (2001) Fog in the Channel: Continental Relations Theory Isolated (Or an Essay on the Paradoxes of Diversity and Parochialism in IR Theory). In Robert M.A. CRAWFORD and Darryl S.L. JARVIS (eds) *International Relations — Still an American Science: Towards Diversity in International Thought?*, 203-19. New York: State University of New York Press.

BUZAN, Barry (2001) The English School: An Underexploited Resource in IR. *Review of International Studies* **27**(3), 471-88.

CRAWFORD, Robert M.A. and Darryl S.L. JARVIS, eds (2001) *International Relations — Still an American Science: Towards Diversity in International Thought?* New York: State University of New York Press.

DREYER, Hugh C. and Leon MARGASARIAN, eds (1989) *The Study of International Relations: The State of the Art*. London: Macmillan.

DUNNE, Tim (1998) *Inventing International Society: A History of the English School*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

FORD FOUNDATION (1976) *International Studies in Six European Countries: The United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Italy: Reports to the Ford Foundation.* New York: The Ford Foundation.

FRIEDRICHS, Jörg (2002) *A House With Many Mansions: European Approaches to International Relations Theory*. Ph.D. thesis. München: Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität.

Giesen, Klaus-Gerd (2004) France. In Knud Erik Jørgensen and Tonny Brems Knudsen (eds) *International Relations in Europe: Traditions, Perspectives and Destinations*, forthcoming.

Griffiths, Martin and Terry O'Callaghan (2001) The End of International Relations. In Robert M.A. Crawford and Darryl S.L. Jarvis (eds) *International Relations — Still an American Science: Towards Diversity in International Thought?*, 187-201. New York: State University of New York Press.

Groom, A. John R. and Peter Mandaville (2001) Hegemony and Autonomy in International Relations: The Continental Experience. In Robert M.A Crawford and Darryl S.L. Jarvis (eds) *International Relations — Still an American Science: Towards Diversity in International Thought?*, 151-65. New York: State University of New York Press.

Hassner, Pierre (2002) 'The United States: The Empire of Force or the Force of Empire'. Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, Chaillot Papers No. 54.

Hayward, Jack, Brian Barry and Archie Brown (1999) *The British Study of Politics in the Twentieth Century*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hellmann Gunther, Klaus Dieter Wolf and Michael Zürn (2003) *Die neuen Internationalen Beziehungen: Forschungsstand und Perspektiven in Deutschland*. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.

Hoffmann, Stanley (1977) An American Social Science: International Relations. *Daedalus* (106), 41-60.

Holden, Gerard (2004) The Relationship between Anglo-Saxon Historiography and Cross-Community Comparisons. In Knud Erik Jørgensen and Tonny Brems Knudsen (eds) *International Relations in Europe: Traditions, Perspectives and Destinations*, forthcoming.

Holsti, Kalevi J. (1987) *The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory*. Boston, MA: Allan and Unwin.

Inoguchi, Takashi and Paul Bacon (2001) The Study of International Relations in Japan: Towards a more International Discipline. *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* **1**(1), 1-20.

Jepperson, Ronald L., Alexander Wendt and Peter Katzenstein (1996) Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security. In Peter Katzenstein (ed.) *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, 33-75. New York: Columbia University Press.

Jørgensen, Knud Erik (2000) Continental IR Theory: The Best Kept Secret. *European Journal of International Relations* **6**(1), 9-42.

Kahler, Miles (1993) Multilateralism with Small and Large Numbers. In John G. Ruggie (ed.) *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form*, 295-326. New York: Columbia University Press.

Katzenstein, Peter J., Robert O. Keohane and Stephen D. Krasner (1998) *International Organization* and the Study of World Politics. *International Organization* **52**(4), 645-85.

Khalidi, Rashid I. (2000) Edward W. Said and the American Public Sphere: Speaking Truth to Power. In Paul A Bové (ed.) *Edward Said and the Work of the Critic: Speaking Truth to Power*, 152-86. Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press.

Moravcsik, Andrew (2001) Constructivism and European Integration: A Critique. In Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jørgensen and Antje Wiener (eds) *The Social Construction of Europe*, 176-88. London: Sage.

Nau, Henry R. (2002) *At Home Abroad: Identity and Power in American Foreign Policy*. Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press.

Puchala, Donald (1997) Some Non-Western Perspectives on International Relations. *Journal of Peace Research* **34**(2), 129-34.

Schmidt, Brian C. (1998) *The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations*. New York: State University of New York Press.

Schmidt, Brian C. (2002) On the History and Historiography of International Relations. In Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds) *Handbook of International Relations*, 3-22. London: Sage.

Shimko, Keith (1992) Realism, Neorealism and American Liberalism. *Review of Politics* **54**, 281-301.

SMITH, Steve (1985) *International Relations: British and American Perspectives*. Oxford: Blackwell.

SMITH, Steve (1995) The Self-Images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations Theory. In Ken BOOTH and Steve SMITH (eds) *International Relations Theory Today*, 1-37. Cambridge: Polity Press.

SMITH, Steve (2000) The Discipline of International Relations: Still an American Social Science? *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* **2**(3), 374-402.

SMITH, Steve (2002) The United States and the Discipline of International Relations: Hegemonic Country, Hegemonic Discipline. *International Studies Review* **4**(2), 67-85.

SMITH, Steve (2003) International Relations and international relations: The Links Between Theory and Practice in World Politics. *Journal of International Relations and Development* **6**(3), 233-39.

TICKNER, Arlene B. (2003) Hearing Latin American Voices in International Relations Studies. *International Studies Perspectives* **4**(4), 325-50.

THOMPSON, Kenneth W. (1992) *Traditions and Values in Politics and Diplomacy*. Baton Rouge, LA and London: Louisiana State University Press.

VALBJØRN, Morten (2004) IR: Culture Blind or Culture Blinded? In Knud Erik JØRGENSEN and Tonny Brems KNUDSEN (eds) *International Relations in Europe: Traditions, Perspectives and Destinations*, forthcoming.

VASQUEZ, John (1983) *The Power of Power Politics: A Critique*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

WALLACE, William (1996) Truth and Power, Monks and Technocrats: Theory and Practice in International Relations. *Review of International Studies* **22**(3), 301-21.

WÆVER, Ole (1998) The Sociology of a Not So International Discipline: American and European Developments in International Relations. *International Organization* **52**(4), 687-727.

ZIMMERN, Alfred (1939) *L'Ensignement Universitaire des Relations Internationales*. Paris: Institut international de cooperation intellectuelle.

ZÜRN, Michael (1996) We Can Do Much Better! Aber muß es gleich auf amerikanish sein? Zum Vergleich der Disziplin 'Internationale Beziehungen' in den USA und in Deutschland. *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen* **1**(1), 91-114.

TOWARDS
A SIX-
CONTINENTS
SOCIAL
SCIENCE:
INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS