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Journal of International Relations and Development
Democratic Politics and Russian Foreign Policy: Russia's Domestic Debate and the Conflict in Kosovo
by Michael E. Aleprete Jr.
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Introduction
In their 1995 article, Democratisation and the Danger of War, Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder argued that the introduction of new and often less than fully developed democratic political systems increases the risk of a state becoming engaged in international conflict. They estimated that in the first decade after a democratic transition occurs, states are about twice as likely to become involved in an international war than either older democracies or autocratic regimes (Mansfield and Snyder 1995:5). This finding runs counter to the popular claim that democratic politics generally inhibit conflict. However, attempts to test this version of "democratic peace", as opposed to the well-supported claim that democracies do not fight each other, have produced inconclusive empirical results. 1
Proponents of democratic peace have criticised Mansfield and Snyder’s thesis. The debate between Mansfield and Snyder on one hand and the proponents of democratic peace on the other is over the impact the spread of democracy will have on the likelihood of international violence. Mansfield and Synder argue that, whatever the benefits democracy may have on dampening down conflict, they will not emerge for some time, and that meanwhile the dynamics produced by democratising polities will actually lead to more conflict. Their critics reject the notion that there is anything uniquely dangerous about democratisation itself, and that all Mansfield and Snyder are observing are the general dangers associated with the political instability inherent in any sort of political transition. 2
This article examines the domestic debate and development of the Russian foreign policy response to the 1999 conflict between the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, looking for evidence that policy-making within Russia conformed either to the expectations of Mansfield and Snyders’ provocative "danger of democratisation" thesis or to the "democratic peace" literature. Mansfield and Snyder expect the processes that dominate policy-making in democratising states to look very different to those in established democracies, therefore examining these processes is a fruitful avenue for evaluating their thesis. Three comparisons are drawn between the predominate forms of behaviour each thesis expects during an international crisis: elite logrolling versus appeals to the median voter, prestige strategies versus transparency-inspired caution, and appeals to nationalism versus appeal to democratic norms. The domestic political debate that occurred within the Russian Federation during the first weeks of the conflict is then reviewed, where it is evaluated how close the nature of this debate and the behaviour of the specific actors actually conformed to these expectations.
One way democratic political systems are commonly thought to prevent war is by creating incentives for policy-makers to adopt positions during an international crisis that minimise the chances of any escalation. Among the features of democratic systems cited by scholars as producing these effects are the accountability of leaders (Doyle 1986), the transparency of information (Schultz 1999) and adherence to common democratic norms (Risse-Kappen 1995). Different scholars may stress different factors, alone or in combination, but they arrive at similar conclusions. The operation of democratic politics reduces the probability of violent conflict. This constellation of factors produces what is commonly called "democratic peace". 3
Most "democratic peace" theories have been developed by observing the behaviour of a relatively small set of states clustered in Western Europe and North America, states with long traditions of popular rule. The applicability of these findings to the new democracies of Eastern Europe, Asia and Latin America has been a source of contention. The incentives produced by the operation of new, and often seriously flawed, democratic institutions may influence the behaviour of policy-makers in ways that differ significantly from the incentives produced by older, more established, democratic systems.
Mansfield and Snyder seize on this limitation, arguing that the political dynamics found in these new democracies fundamentally differ from the dynamics found in their older, more established cousins. When the leaders in newer, partially democratic states are confronted by an international crisis, a volatile combination of mass politics and elite bargaining creates incentives for them to adopt strategies likely to escalate, rather than diffuse, a crisis. 4 In their article, Mansfield and Snyder specifically identified Russia as a prototypical ‘poorly institutionalised, partial democracy’ likely to encourage the adoption of aggressive policies that increase the chances of escalation during an international crisis (Mansfield and Snyder 1995:6).
While Russian political institutions do meet minimum criteria for a functioning democratic system, the Russian Federation is not usually classified as a fully developed democracy. 5 For example, the Polity IV data, one of the most widely cited and used data sets on political regimes, rates Russia with a ‘5’, right in the middle of their 10 point democracy scale, largely because of the lack of constraint on executive power (Gurr and Jaggers 1998). Likewise, Freedom House classifies the Russian Federation as only ‘partially free’. 6
The "danger of democratisation" argument assumes that establishing stable democratic institutions takes a relatively long time. In the initial post-transition years, non-democratic elements compete with rising democratic forces for control of the state. Both groups mobilise mass (popular) allies in their political struggles. However, the institutions that integrate public interests into the political process remain underdeveloped. What emerges is a dangerous combination of high levels of political participation in a system with weak integrative institutions (Mansfield and Snyder 1995: 2, 22; Huntington 1968). This allows belligerent factions to mobilise mass sentiment without having to account for the interests of the publics being mobilised.
In the spring of 1999, the Russian Federation’s imperfect democratic institutions were put to the test. Russian policy-makers were confronted by a serious international crisis, as NATO sought to impose a settlement of the conflict between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Albanian separatists in the Serb province of Kosovo. Russian negotiators had been involved in the talks that proceeded the NATO air campaign, but adamantly opposed military action against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The conflict threatened to create a serious and lasting breach in the relationship between Russia and the West. With powerful domestic factions favouring a policy whereby Russia would actively support the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the potential existed for any escalation to ultimately lead to a direct Russia-NATO military confrontation.
The domestic political situation in Russia during the spring of 1999 was particularly unfavourable for the Russian President, Boris Yeltsin. Simultaneous to the bombing, the State Duma was considering a variety of impeachment charges against him. Yeltsin’s position was also weakened by illnesses that kept him from the day-to-day management of national affairs, and by the fact that he had been forced to accept a compromise choice for Prime Minister, Yevgennii Primakov, following the August 1998 collapse of the rouble. At the beginning of the crisis, the President’s administration operating under a cloud of scandal and with an ill chief executive was clearly on the defensive.
These are exactly the conditions Mansfield and Snyder would expect when the dangers associated with democratisation are the most acute. Weakness at the centre creates more opportunities for dangerous inter-elite bargaining and mass mobilisation.
Today, the return to imperial thinking in Moscow is the result of Yeltsin’s weakness, not his strength …. Weak central political leadership resorts to the same strategies as do the more parochial elite interests, using nationalist ideological appeals and special-interest payoffs to maintain their short-run viability, despite the potential long-run risks associated with these strategies (Mansfield and Snyder 1995:31).
Yet, one can argue that most Russian policy-makers responded to the Kosovo crisis in ways that do not conform to Mansfield and Snyder’s expectations. The failure of Russian policy-makers to behave according to these expectations raises serious questions about the strength of the "danger of democratisation" argument. With a democratic system as flawed as that of the Russian Federation, we should expect the "danger of democratisation" thesis to explain Russian behaviour during the Kosovo crisis quite well, especially given the political conditions found there in the spring of 1999. It will be argued, however, that upon close examination the behaviour of Russian policy-makers and the outcomes which resulted from their interactions seem to conform more to the expectations of standard "democratic peace" arguments than those of the "dangers of democratisation" thesis. This is especially true of their behaviour during the first weeks of the crisis, when the danger of Russia becoming drawn into a military confrontation with the West was at its highest.
Insights From the "Democratic Peace" and "Danger of Democratisation" Theories
Mansfield and Snyder’s "danger of democratisation" thesis points to three types of behaviour that should characterise policy-making in post-transition democracies: elite logrolling, the adoption of prestige strategies and appeals to nationalism. Unlike the "danger of democratisation" thesis which presents a coherent model about the behaviour of policy-makers, the "democratic peace" literature is comprised of a variety of propositions. 7 Still much of this literature describes the policy-making process as being dominated by appeals to the median voter, transparency, and appeals to democratic norms and international institutions. These features are thought to help pacify the behaviour of democracies during an international crisis, and each differs fundamentally from the processes described by Mansfield and Snyder.
The Median Voter versus Elite Logrolling
Liberal thinkers have long pointed to the pacifying effects that democratic institutions have on foreign policy. Both Immanuel Kant and Thomas Paine observed that states in which leaders are held accountable to the public, who pay the costs associated with war, should be less inclined to engage in international conflicts (Kant 1798/1991:100; Paine 1791/1995:538-539). Democratic institutions are thought to moderate policy by holding political leaders accountable to a broad spectrum of domestic interests. Formal institutional arrangements tend to divide decision-making authority, forcing policy-makers to obtain the support of a wider set of interests than leaders in non-democratic states. Policy-makers are also held accountable through elections. The costs associated with the use of military force, in blood and taxes, are thought to be more widely distributed than the benefits and policy outputs in democratic systems tend to reflect the interests of the "median voter" rather than the political extremes. It should follow then that domestic interests more often than not act as a restraining influence on foreign policy.
Proponents of "democratic peace" expect this tendency to be reinforced by the nature of the bargaining among policy-makers operating in this environment. Since the costs associated with aggressive foreign policies are assumed to be more widely distributed than the benefits, the process of coalition building acts as a moderating influence. Large coalitions will be more likely to include groups who would have to pay the costs associated with aggressive policy options. Such coalitions are less likely to agree to aggressive policies or to policies that run high risks of escalation. Thus, the domestic bargaining that occurs in democratic systems tends to produce foreign policies that are more cautious and peaceful (Siverson 1995).
Leaders in democratic states are only likely to escalate crises when the costs to the public are very low. Democratic politics make the state more of a rational actor than in a non-democracy, since the accountability of their leaders makes them more sensitive to the costs their policy choices impose on the wider society (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999). Some circumstantial evidence supports this view of the behaviour of democratic states. For example, democratic states tend to be involved in shorter wars and they almost always win the wars that they do fight (Bennett and Stam 1996). This indicates a greater sensitivity among policy-makers to the costs imposed on their societies. Overall, this makes democratic leaders more risk-averse than their non-democratic counterparts.
The "democratic peace" perspective presents us with a relatively reassuring picture of the effect of domestic politics during a crisis. From this perspective, we could expect to see the statements of policy-makers reflecting a strong concern with the costs associated with particular courses of action. We should also predict that policy moderates, as various political factions interact and bargain with each other, with the resulting foreign policy stance approaching the preferences of the median voter.
The "danger of democratisation" thesis presents a very different picture of the effects of domestic bargaining, one described better by the concept of "logrolling" than the "median voter". From this perspective, relevant policy-makers represent much narrower constituencies. Some of these will have strong incentives to adopt aggressive foreign policies. Mansfield and Snyder point to military interest groups and military-industrial groups as the likely groups to press for aggressive policies within elite coalitions. This does not mean these groups advocate war, but they are more likely to advocate offensive-minded strategies that increase the chances of escalation (Mansfield and Snyder 1995:31, 33). In these conditions, we are more likely to find decision-makers engaging in risky behaviour since a good portion of the costs associated with policy failures will be paid by poorly represented groups.
Instead of moderating policy, coalition building in this political environment has the opposite effect. The key assumption underlying this proposition is that political institutions are thought to have little capacity to integrate the interests of the general public into the political bargaining process. Policy emerges instead through a process of "logrolling" among elite groups that have very weak links to the broad constituencies likely to pay the costs of aggressive policies. Logrolling gives each elite group what it desires the most. Since the elite groups in this model represent much narrower interests, it is likely that larger coalitions built on this basis will include groups with a strong interest in aggressive policies. Meanwhile, the broader public which would shoulder a disproportionate share of the costs associated with these policies remains poorly represented. Consequently, coalition building in this environment increases the chances that aggressive policies will be adopted as more sets of narrow interests are brought into the policy-making coalition (Snyder 1991). Under these conditions, we would expect policy to become more aggressive as narrow constituencies with strong interests in a confrontational foreign policy attempt to exert their influence.
Transparency Inspired Caution versus Prestige Strategies
According to "democratic peace", transparency also contributes to the ability of policy-makers to avoid the escalation of crises. Transparency refers to the access the public has about information on the policy-makers’ position on a foreign policy issue. It is the ‘mechanisms that facilitate the release of information about politics, capabilities and preferences to outside parties’ (Finel and Lord 1999:315). When political oppositions, foreign leaders and the public have access to high quality information about policy choices, it becomes more difficult for leaders to misrepresent their interests to domestic constituents or foreign actors (Schultz 1999:238). Transparency is highly correlated with democracy, since it protects elements of civil society like the media and opposition parties, capable of obtaining and disseminating information about policy decisions (Schultz 1999). While not all democracies are equally transparent, almost all meet some minimum level allowing electorates, media and political oppositions access to information about their government’s policy choices. 8 Since information about the government policies and intentions are available to the public, decision-makers are less able to misrepresent their policy preferences for the purposes of gaining bargaining leverage. Leaders are less able to present one policy for domestic consumption and another for international consumption.
Transparency also makes it easier for other international actors to see what is going on "inside" the domestic arena. They are therefore less likely to be surprised by the actions of a transparent state. They will have more opportunity to avoid confrontations by developing their own policies with their adversary’s domestic political constraints in mind (Starr 1997). While transparent environments could present a danger that policy-makers would become trapped into an overly aggressive policy, it is generally thought that decision-makers, aware of this danger, avoid it by not making threats they are not willing to carry out (Fearon 1994; Schultz 1999). Instead, they are more likely to simply not make any strong commitments for as long as they can in order to maintain their freedom of action. Transparent political systems therefore tend to prevent policy-makers from committing to a course of action early on, when uncertainty is highest and the danger of escalation is greatest.
Again, the "danger of democratisation" asserts that policy-makers in less fully developed democratic systems are likely to behave quite differently. Early commitment to dramatic and often aggressive policies will have greater appeal to policy-makers operating in these systems. When democratic institutions have little capacity to integrate the interests of the public into the policy-making process, mass participation is thought to be sporadic and more easily manipulated by political elites. Political elites are also thought to retain greater control over media outlets and information than might be expected in more mature democratic systems (Mansfield and Snyder 1995:7).
In these conditions elite groups engage in competitive mass mobilisation, exercising control over the terms of that mobilisation by deploying their still substantial ability to frame issues and control the flow of information (Mansfield and Snyder 1995:28). Most often, this mobilisation is likely to draw upon well-recognised cultural or national symbols. Individuals or factions whose domestic political position is weakening are thought to find this course of action especially appealing. An international crisis provides an opportunity to gain public support by mobilising publics around an aggressive foreign policy stance. Thus, there is a strong domestic interest in adopting risky foreign policies. Confrontation abroad serves as means of rallying a policy-maker’s faltering domestic position (Mansfield and Snyder 1995:33). Policy-makers become hypersensitive to issues of national prestige, because it is a useful tool to manipulate public opinion. The institutional weaknesses in post-transition democracies are thought to be permissive environments for this sort of behaviour.
Democratic Norms versus Nationalism
Finally, the two perspectives make very different assumptions about the kinds of ideological and normative appeals that policy-makers will deploy during a crisis. The "danger of democratisation" argument assumes nationalism has a stronger ideological appeal in post-transition democracies than nascent democratic norms. Nationalism conveys a message of cultural distinctiveness that can serve as ideological glue holding together diverse political coalitions in societies wracked by deep divisions. It may also help political elites justify retarding the further development of democracy within the society (Mansfield and Snyder 1995:33).
For major powers like Russia, nationalism at home is likely to require the adoption of more confrontational policies abroad. Additionally, for many Russians communism is interwoven into the national identity to such an extent that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between communist and nationalist symbols. This is especially true of issues involving Russia’s international prestige, since the Russian Federation has assumed many of the Soviet Union’s international obligations. Many Russians still identify with the Soviet Union as a powerful symbol of their former international importance. This is evidenced by the "red-brown" coalition on several foreign policy issues during the last years of Yeltsin’s administration. We could expect Russian nationalism to be dangerous given the inconsistency between the role it envisions for the nation, and the declining capacities available to the Russian state (Garnett 1999:329).
Mansfield and Snyder emphasise that the introduction of democratic politics is especially dangerous when its introduction coincides with a declining international position. 9 For policy-makers in declining powers, employing nationalism will likely lead to a more confrontational foreign policy. Other states are likely to ignore the declining power, or treat it in a manner reflecting its limited capacities. Mansfield and Snyder explain that, as a consequence, ‘democratising states often become over committed, provoking too many enemies at the same time, while claiming that the resulting conflicts are due to the others’ inherent hostility’ (Mansfield and Snyder 1995:32).
Proponents of "democratic peace" argue that policy-makers will likely articulate a very different set of values. They see democracy more as a normative commitment than simply a set of political institutions. These norms become embodied both within political establishments of the democracies themselves and within the current set of international institutions, since most international institutions have been created in large part by democratic states. 10 These normative linkages create channels that enable policy-makers to adopt conciliatory foreign policies and help them to avoid escalation in international crises.
Democratic systems are also thought to inculcate a certain set of values regarding conflict resolution and interest formation. According to this argument, broad segments of the political elite share a set of norms concerning the use of force in international relations (Russett 1993). From this perspective, shared democratic values promote a collective identity among democratic states. It reduces the importance of two major obstacles to international co-operation: fear of cheating and the relative gains problem (Risse-Kappen 1995:5). This makes it much easier for democracies to co-operate with each other. Co-operation initiates a virtuous circle increasing trust and helping democracies develop a collective identity which leads them to frame crises in a similar fashion.
Many of these values are reflected in international institutions. In addition, politicians in new democracies may attempt to protect these values domestically, by linking their countries to these institutions. There is some evidence to suggest that newer democracies are even more likely than established democracies to support granting international institutions powers that impinge on state sovereignty. These institutions provide domestic legitimacy to pro-democratic factions struggling to maintain the threatened democratic order (Moravcsik 2000:244). In a similar example, Linden (2000) found that, despite the operation of strong nationalist groups and the importance of long-standing disputes over Transylvania, decision-makers in the relationship between post-communist Romania and Hungary were able to insulate themselves from nationalist pressure to adopt conflictual policies towards each other. Linden attributed this peacefulness in large part to the effects of a common desire to join NATO. Opportunities to strengthen international institutions promoting democratic values can serve as an alternative to nationalism. Policy-makers in democratic states are more likely to try and act through international institutions that legitimise democratic principles, especially when the legitimacy of the democratic order itself seems threatened.
Table 1: Summary of Expectations
"Democratic Peace"
"Danger of Democratisation Thesis"
Policy-makers make appeals based on ethnic or cultural nationalism, promoting policies that ignore or minimise the role of international organisations.
A First Cut: Russian Domestic Politics and the Kosovo Conflict
This section focuses on the statements and actions of the leading politicians and political factions within the Russian Federation made during the first weeks of the conflict in Kosovo. 11 All of the source material for this article is publicly available. Three main sources have been used, Russian newspapers, official statements and press releases, and the record of the State Duma sessions. The State Duma became an important platform for Russian political parties to express and mobilise opposition to President Yeltsin’s policies. 12 While not having access to private information is certainly a limitation of the present study, the expectations outlined above concern public actions and debate. Evaluating the public aspects of Russian politics may reveal a great deal about the political dynamics that operate in the Russian Federation. The following analysis compares the behaviour of Russia’s leading political actors during the first weeks of the conflict in Kosovo to the expectations drawn from the "democratic peace" and "danger of democratisation" theories outlined in the preceding section.
It should be kept in mind that the conflict in Kosovo coincided with several other important issues, including the negotiation of International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans and impeachment hearings against President Yeltsin. The Duma’s impeachment proceedings were not resolved in the President’s favour until the middle of May. The President’s impeachment victory was indicative of what appeared to be a strengthening of Yeltsin’s domestic political position over the course of the crisis. This may have undermined his sensitivity to domestic pressure, as the crisis dragged into the summer months. It seems clear that Yeltsin’s position improved over the course of the crisis. Not only did Yeltsin stave off impeachment, but he also managed to replace his somewhat independent-minded Prime Minister, Yevgennii Primakov. By the end of May it was the President’s supporters who were on the offensive, suggesting that the President dissolve the Duma and call for new elections. 13 Thus, the President was at his weakest during the first weeks of the crisis. Given Mansfield and Snyder’s emphasis on the dangers of executive weakness and the high degree of uncertainty that accompanied the outbreak of hostilities, this initial phase of the conflict has been focused on in this article as the most likely period to find the pathologies associated with the "danger of democratisation" thesis.
The decade-long disintegration of Yugoslavia has come to define the European security landscape in the post-Cold War era in much the same way as the division of Germany once defined the preceding era. The ongoing peacekeeping operations there are one of the most visible forms of co-operation between Russia and its old NATO adversaries. Throughout much of the 1990s, Russia had been moving towards greater co-operation with the West on a variety of issues. The drastic reduction of East-West tensions is often associated with the spread of democracy eastward, contributing to the notion that democracy at home leads to co-operation and peace abroad.
However, the last bout of violence in Yugoslavia’s painful disintegration threatened to radically alter Russia’s policy towards the West, NATO and the United States.
The conflict in Kosovo had two dimensions. There was a civil conflict in the province between the Serb-dominated government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and ethnic Albanian separatists. The second dimension of the conflict, however, was international. This dimension pitted the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia against the NATO alliance, which was seeking to impose an international settlement on the civil conflict. The dispute between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was important to the Russian Federation for several reasons. First, Russia had a close relationship with both parties to the dispute. Second, the outcome of the dispute had serious implications for defining the role NATO would play in future European "peacekeeping". Finally, any serious rupture between Russia and NATO over the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia could affect both the future of arms control and of Western economic assistance to Russia.
NATO’s attack on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia represented a major foreign policy set-back for the Yeltsin government. Russian diplomacy over the preceding year and a half had been aimed at keeping the two sides at the negotiating table, where Russian negotiators could exercise leverage as the only actor on relatively friendly terms with all the parties. The collapse of the negotiations in Paris on 19 March 1999 with the hardening of both the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia’s and NATO’s bargaining positions made it impossible for Russia to continue to play this role. 14 Russian negotiators were exasperated by this turn of events and, as part of the Contact Group in France, they complained of being ignored by both the Yugoslavs and the Western powers.
At first, Yugoslav President Slobodan Milo_ević did show some willingness to sign an agreement in France, but the Albanian negotiators had without the guarantee of an international peacekeeping force refused to enforce the terms of settlement. 15 Confronted by this impasse, the Western members of the Contact Group drew up a second protocol. This second document called for the replacement of Yugoslav forces with an international peacekeeping force. The introduction of this second protocol, supported by the Western powers, led to the breakdown of negotiations between them and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
The Russian negotiators also responded negatively to this protocol. They disavowed all knowledge of the "implementation" accord and refused to support it, claiming that the Western powers drew up this document without their participation. 16 The Russian negotiators continued however to urge the Yugoslav government to accept the political accord, the first document granting Kosovo autonomy, hoping to use partial Yugoslav acceptance as a means of keeping negotiations open over the rest. 17 But, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, whose leaders refused to sign anything, ignored the requests of the Russian negotiators. The categorical refusal of the Yugoslav government coupled with a fresh round of operations carried out by Yugoslav paramilitary and police against the Albanian population in Kosovo led NATO to begin its air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on 26 March 1999.
The outbreak of hostilities created a window of opportunity for domestic actors to help redefine Russian policy. What occurred in the immediate wake of the commencement of hostilities was a relatively freewheeling debate over the nature of Russia’s response to the crisis. This window of opportunity combined with the anger and resentment felt by many Russians towards the West made a potentially volatile mixture. 18 Various political factions sought to influence the government’s response to the outbreak of hostilities.
Members of the largest Duma factions, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation along with the ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Power to the People faction advocated the most aggressive policies, placed all of the blame on NATO and expressed solidarity with the Serb people. 19 These groups were the first to articulate a clear set of policy prescriptions so it might be of some value to outline the salient features of their proposals.
The day after the NATO strikes began Communist leader Gennady Zyuganov, speaking on behalf of the Popular-Patriotic Union, outlined what he believed Russia’s response should be. His proposals included sending military assistance to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the form of air-defence systems, and the formation of volunteer units to help defend this country. In addition, Zyuganov called for the end of Russian-Western co-operation on a whole series of security issues, including ending Russian participation in the Bosnian peacekeeping operation, the end of sanctions against Iraq, re-deployment of missiles in Belarus, and rejection of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) II agreements. 20 The head of the Duma's Security Committee, Viktor Ilyhkin, echoed Zyuganov’s call for extending military assistance to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and rejecting START II. 21
The position of the communists and nationalists had three features. Advocates of this position called for direct Russian intervention on behalf of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The exact nature of this intervention varied from sending military assistance, to volunteers, through to direct intervention by Russian armed forces. Further, they linked NATO’s actions in Kosovo to Russian co-operation with the West on other issues, especially in the areas of arms control. Finally, their statements tended to focus on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as being the "victim". Explicit references were made to the Serb people, portrayed as Slavic or orthodox brethren. Further, they were almost alone in making positive references to the former President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milo_ević. 22 No significant disagreement between the communist and nationalist groups are found on either policy recommendations or even on the images and arguments used to justify their positions. 23 Both groups pressured the government exactly in the way we would expect according to Mansfield and Synder’s thesis. Together, the nationalists and the communists controlled around half the seats in the Duma, and constituted a formidable political bloc. 24
At the other end of the Russian political spectrum, Russian liberals were left scrambling to formulate an alternative to the hawkish policies advocated by the communists and nationalists. Few liberals openly expressed support for NATO’s actions. Almost alone among Russian politicians, the former Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, publicly argued that Russian policy was out of touch with European opinion. In his remarks, Kozyrev described Milo_ević as a dictator who only understood force. Kozyrev ultimately viewed the conflict in terms very similar to Western leaders and drew similar policy conclusions from this analysis: Russia should support the West which, acting through NATO, was opposing a nationalist dictator and his oppression of ethnic minorities. 25
Kozyrev’s position is interesting for two reasons. First, his position conforms almost exactly to the expectations about the effects of shared democratic norms and values. Kozyrev, a paragon of liberalism in Russia, shared a similar conception of democracy and human rights, which helped him define the crisis in ways similar to decision-makers in Western capitals. His comments did not reflect any indication of him being concerned that NATO’s actions posed any sort of threat to Russia. It was the Yugoslav actions that posed the threat. By framing the crisis in these terms, Kozyrev advocated support for NATO.
The second interesting thing about Kozyrev’s position is how far removed it was from public opinion, even among Russian liberals. Kozyrev served as Foreign Minister until 1996 and his foreign policy outlook has always been regarded as very pro-Western (McFaul 1999:398). No other major political figure in Russia advocated such a staunchly pro-NATO position. More typical among Russian liberals were the statements of Grigory Yavlinsky, leader of the Yabloko faction in the Duma. In Yavlinsky’s analysis, NATO’s use of force was ill advised. 26 The liberals joined in describing NATO’s actions as "aggression" and condemning the attacks. The fundamental problem facing the liberals: how to articulate a critical stance towards NATO’s action that could offset the appeal of the nationalists and communists. 27
Russian liberals met this challenge by constructing a position that articulated opposition to NATO’s action not as an outgrowth of fraternal love for the Serbs, but as a violation of international norms. In doing so, they tapped into a large base of popular support. Polls taken during the crisis indicated that, while angry, most Russians were not particularly enthusiastic about becoming involved in the Balkans conflict. While 74 percent wanted to aid the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in some way, less than half blamed the United States (43.3 percent) for the war and less than 3 percent favoured Russia’s entry into the war. What resonated most with Russians was the United States’ disregard of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, condemned by 88.8 percent of respondents (Kommersant, 31 March 1999).
Liberals tended to play up the fact that NATOŐs actions were in violation of the UN Charter and argued that NATO contributed to the violence in the Balkans by providing cover for Milo_evićŐs ethnic cleansing. Initially, the liberals avoided references to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as much as possible, and its culpability in the crisis was muted in their comments. But as the size of the humanitarian disaster became apparent and Yugoslav leaders publicly chastised Russian liberals and their attempts at mediation, criticism of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia became expressed more openly, much of it directed at Milo_ević himself. 28
The President and the Foreign Ministry remained extremely critical of NATO’s actions throughout the crisis, consistently describing them as "aggression" and firmly blaming the alliance for the human rights disaster. 29 In the wake of NATO’s first attacks, President Yeltsin made it clear that military action by Russia was possible saying on March 24, ‘Russia reserves the right to take appropriate measures, including measures of a military nature to safeguard its own security and the security of Europe as a whole’. He went on to state that American actions ‘could mean war in Europe and even more than that’. 30 Unlike past saber rattling by Yeltsin, who from time to time had engaged in some rather bellicose statements, these remarks were made during a major national address and were not immediately explained away or contradicted by other representatives of his government. It was only a week later, on 30 March, that Yeltsin himself when speaking to the Federal Assembly indicated that Russian would not intervene. 31 Yeltsin repeated his decision not to allow Russia to intervene on 6 April. However, there were also instances after this that military intervention was again mentioned as a possibility by the President. 32
While it is difficult to imagine that Yeltsin would actually have sought a confrontation with the West given the state of Russia’s armed forces and the fact Russia was in the midst of negotiating loans from the IMF, he was clearly experiencing pressure in that direction. 33 He publicly admitted that certain Duma deputies had tried to use the threat of his upcoming impeachment hearings to push Russia into a military confrontation (Novia Izvestia, 10 April 1999) While aiming harsh words at NATO, and even threatening the possibility of military intervention, the President and other executive officials were careful not commit themselves to any particular course of action, except to offer humanitarian assistance to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 34 The President did suspend co-operation with the alliance the day the air campaign began, closing its mission in Moscow and recalling its representatives from Brussels. But, significantly, the Russians did not withdraw their participation in the Bosnian peacekeeping operation. Overall, Yeltsin refrained from taking any but symbolic actions that could easily be reversed. 35
Beyond offering humanitarian assistance to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and suspending some, mostly symbolic, co-operation with NATO, the main thrust of the official Russian policy was an attempt to have international institutions place pressure on Western governments. This is consistent with the expectation that leaders in democratic states look to international institutions as a means of insulating themselves from domestic pressure to adopt aggressive polices during an international crisis.
Yeltsin immediately demanded a meeting of the UN Security Council to discuss a resolution designed to halt NATO’s attack. Two days after the bombings began, the Security Council rejected Russia’s resolution proposed to that effect by a vote of 12-3. It was always clearly difficult for the Russian government to obtain a favourable outcome of such a vote anyway, given that three NATO members are also permanent members of the Security Council. Still the lack of support for the Russian move in the Security Council was disappointing. Only China and Namibia voted with Russia to halt the bombings. 36
Why did the Russian government opt for a vote in the Security Council on this issue at all? One reason was to try and demonstrate that NATO did not have the support of a substantial portion of world opinion. Interestingly enough, despite the poor showing in the Security Council this was indeed the argument adopted by Russia’s Permanent Representative to the UN. To this end, the Russian delegation mitigated the impact of this setback by convincing India, which was not on the Security Council, to oppose the bombing. With Indian and Chinese support, the Russian officials could make the semi-plausible claim to be ‘in the majority’ (on the basis of population). 37 But a second reason, and perhaps more important one, may have been to constrain Russian policy, and insulate it from domestic pressure.
Yeltsin and the Russian Foreign Ministry adopted a much stricter interpretation of the UN Charter than the NATO officials did. NATO was acting on the notion that, while the UN could be a partner, it was not the sole mechanism for collective security in Europe. NATO claimed for itself an independent role in providing regional stability, by defining instability anywhere in the Euro-Atlantic areas as a potential threat to its members’ security. This was a position that would be articulated in the new ‘Strategic Concept’ adopted at NATO’s April 1999 Washington summit. 38 The Russian President and Foreign Minister however argued that under the UN Charter no military action could occur without prior Security Council approval. 39 As part of their strategy of using international institutions, the Russian government also requested towards the end of April that the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) begin an investigation into human rights violations resulting from NATO’s air attacks. 40
This stance gave Russian officials a means of criticising NATO, without running a very high risk of becoming involved unilaterally. Adopting this position, they committed themselves to a policy that actually precluded almost all forms of unilateral involvement. At this time, Alexander Lebed, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) deputies and others, including the Yugoslav government, were pressuring Yeltsin to break the arms embargo. 41 This course of action would have violated existing Security Council resolutions, a point made repeatedly by the Foreign Minister, Ivan Ivanov, and his deputies. 42 The Administration’s stance allowed them to simultaneously criticise NATO and insulate themselves from pressure to act unilaterally. This is very close to the "democratic peace" expectations about how leaders make use of international institutions to insulate themselves from domestic pressure in favour of escalation.
One of the features of Russian politics has been the existence of relatively non-ideological politicians whose support the government can court through pragmatic concessions on issues directly relevant to their constituencies. The economic hardships of the past decade have been profound. The 1990s have been marked by consistent economic decline (White et al. 1997:60). The economic decline has also increased the traditional disparity of wealth between the centre, Moscow and the regions (Stavrakis 1996:18). 43 In this environment, deputies from regions can garner a good deal of political support by demonstrating the capacity for extracting resources from the centre for their locality.
This large pool of deputies, which seemed willing to support the President on foreign policy issues not directly related to their regions’ economic interests, helped undermine the need for the President to rely on more ideologically committed factions for support. Such quid pro quo supporters of the President were to be found among independent deputies and deputies from the small parties that comprised about 30 percent of the Duma representatives. Many of these politicians were in the parliamentary group Russian Regions (White et al. 1997:236-38). This group became an important swinging vote during the Kosovo conflict, between the government and the communist/nationalist blocs pushing for a more aggressive stance against NATO. These parliamentarians tended to support the government during the initial weeks of the crisis. At the special Duma meeting on 27 March 1999, they supported Prime Minister Primakov’s efforts to tone down the anti-NATO language in the resolutions on Kosovo. 44 While their rhetoric was critical of NATO, they demonstrated a lack of support for the more aggressive communist and nationalist proposals outlined above. Essentially they deferred to the President and the Foreign Ministry, undercutting the CPRF and LDP 45 deputies’ ability to use the Duma as a platform to press for an aggressive response to the crisis.
However, on the issue of arms control and the proposed inclusion of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into the Russian-Belarus Union the independents joined the CPRF and nationalists to oppose the government. Nevertheless, these issues were raised in the middle of April after Yeltsin had already made it clear that Russia would not be intervening unilaterally. The START II treaty had been languishing in the Duma for years, precisely because parts of the treaty imposed costs on the districts of some of those regional politicians (Lepingwell 1995:86, 89). As for the proposed union, this attempt by the communists and nationalists to secure Russian military aid for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia also failed. What could be loosely referred to as the moderate "centre" approved the acceptance of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into the Russian-Belarus union, notwithstanding Yeltsin’s objections. 46 However, the Duma resolution that was passed merely urged the President to take steps to make the union feasible. 47 Yeltsin simply ignored the request, and only the communist deputies pressed the point. The centre groups simply allowed the issue to drop off the political agenda after the resolution was passed.
Yeltsin gradually positioned himself to take an even a more conciliatory position towards the West. In his Presidential address on 30 March, where he denied the possibility of any direct Russian military intervention, Yeltsin made his first reference to ethnic cleansing being committed by Yugoslav forces. Subsequently, the theme of "mutual blame" was picked up by more liberal elements in the press and government. Major publications such as Isvestia ran articles and editorials portraying the NATO campaign as being in the personal political interests of the Yugoslav President, who was using the crisis to strengthen his domestic support. 48
The nationalists and communists, who subsequently demanded government censorship to stop criticism of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, viewed these articles as a serious threat. The Communists introduced a resolution, ‘On the Impermissability of Using the Russian Media in NATO’s Psychological Operations’, designed to limit publications and broadcasts describing Serb actions as "ethnic cleansing". 49 But no action was ever taken against the press, and the vote on the proposed union became overshadowed by events on the diplomatic front.
On 13 April, three days before the vote on the Yugoslav-Belarus-Russian union, the Secretary of State of the United States Madeline Albright met with Russian Foreign Minister Ivanov for the first time since the crisis began. This meeting led to a public agreement on the principles that were to guide a final settlement. Most significantly, the Russians agreed that Yugoslav police and military should be withdrawn in favour of an international peacekeeping force, though Ivanov and Albright continued to disagree about its composition. 50 The Ivanov-Albright agreement represented an important change in Russian policy. The Russian government had refused to support essentially the same proposal in the form of the Contact Group’s implementation accord. This meeting was followed the next day with Chernomyrdin’s appointment as Russia’s Special Representative for the crisis in Yugoslavia. 51 The Yeltsin Administration seized on the Ivanov-Albright meeting as an opportunity to return to its role as mediator between the parties.
After this point, Russia’s policy was consumed with mediating a settlement. There was correspondingly less talk among domestic actors about Russian intervention except among the most extreme nationalist groups. Most of the debate at home shifted to a debate on how well Chernomyrdin was defending Russian national interests.
There are two points in time after this when abandoning the mediator role was discussed in Russia, both occurring as a result of NATO’s actions and blunders. One took place in the wake of the United States’ bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Serbia. This set off some discussion of a Russian-Chinese alliance to force NATO to abandon its campaign. The second occurred when NATO leaders began discussing imposing a naval blockade of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which increased the possibility that Russian ships would be boarded by NATO forces. Most of this criticism occurred within the communist and nationalist press, and was largely ignored by the President and Foreign Minister.
After Milo_evićŐs capitulation, the President and his Special Envoy came under heavy criticism for Ňselling outÓ to NATOŐs demands. 52 Towards the end of the crisis there seemed to be increasing stress between the Foreign Ministry, Defence Ministry and the Presidential administration. Defence officials including the Minster and Russian Chief of Staff made statements opposing the final settlement that Chernomyrdin had agreed to on behalf of Russia. 53 The most dramatic move during this phase was the deployment of Russian paratroopers who were part of the Bosnian peacekeeping force to the airport in Pri_tina. However, Russia ultimately participated in the peacekeeping operation and did not act to seriously disrupt NATO’s plans. 54
Conclusions
In the first three weeks of NATO’s air campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia intense pressure was placed on the Yeltsin government by Russian nationalists and the Communist Party. Yet we see little evidence of the pathologies that supposedly afflict a post-transition democracy with weak central leadership. Instead of becoming more bellicose, Russian policy over this period actually became more conciliatory.
The Yeltsin government behaved much as the "democratic peace" theory would predict. The administration constructed a policy that was both consistent with public opinion and precluded unilateral Russian action. The President and his top officials avoided making statements early in the crisis that would commit themselves to confrontational polices. This is just what we would expect from policymakers operating in a relatively transparent domestic environment.
Nor did elite logrolling have the disastrous consequences described by Mansfield and Snyder. It seems in fact that the existence of a large group of "centre" politicians muted the most dangerous effects of "logrolling". What logrolling did occur seems limited to symbolic issues. The independents gave the communists and nationalists victories on the union issue and arms control, but resisted their attempts to achieve what they wanted most. Consequently, the CPRF and LDP leaders were unable to drag Russia into overt support for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that could have led to a military confrontation with the West.
One of the most interesting aspects of Russia’s domestic debate was the role that appeals to international law played, and their apparent acceptance by both the Russian public and large segments of Russia’s political elite. When we separate the notion that "democratic values" must mean support for the policies of Western states, a relatively optimistic appraisal of Russian political culture is possible. While nationalism undeniably has strong appeal in the Russian political context, few politicians seemed to be trapped by those appeals in the way Mansfield and Snyder describe. Instead, the alternative, liberal vision, seems to have had as much resonance as nationalism. The rationale for Russian opposition to NATO’s action was as likely to be cast in the context of international liberal norms rather than as an extension of ethnic solidarity with the Serbs. Furthermore, it was this rationale that was adopted by the Yeltsin government and seemed to shape Russian policy during the crisis. By framing Russian policy around the principles of liberal internationalism, the Yeltsin administration and its supporters were able to simultaneously criticise NATO and insulate themselves from pressures to give overt military support for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia despite the ardent appeals of the nationalists and communists.
By the second week of the bombing campaign, Russian liberals began to attack Milo_ević in the press, helping to create a moral ambiguity between NATO and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Yeltsin ultimately agreed to accept an international peacekeeping force as part of the final agreement, and moved to act as a neutral mediator through his Special Envoy. In summary, despite their limitations Russia’s democratic institutions did not produce any of the dangerous forms of behaviour hypothesised by Mansfield and Snyder.
Overall, examining Russia’s domestic political debate during the Kosovo conflict provides very little support for the "danger of democratisation" thesis, despite seeming to be at first glance an easy case to demonstrate its effects. In fact, much of the behaviour of Russia’s politicians seems to conform more to standard "democratic peace" accounts than to the "danger of democratisation" thesis. Yeltsin, despite his weakness, was not forced into adopting the high-risk prestige strategies suggested by Mansfield and Snyder. Nor was the political leadership of the Russian Federation helplessly trapped by appeals to nationalism. In fact, appeals to liberal values, once distinguished from support for NATO, seem to have had as much resonance as nationalism. Nor did elite logrolling produce policies likely to escalate the confrontation. In fact, the Duma only seemed to oppose the President’s wishes on symbolic issues, and always allowed the President sufficient latitude to mitigate the effect of these inter-elite bargains.
No single case can prove or disprove the validity of a theory. A close examination of other cases might reveal some of the pathologies Mansfield and Snyder that claim plague democratising states like Russia. 55 But this case provides us with little reason to support treating post-transition democracies as being a completely distinct type of international actor. It is important to remember that foreign policy-making is usually a highly centralised affair, even in established democratic systems. The issue is not whether partial democracy is "good enough", only whether such a system radically increases the danger of war. This article has not addressed the former, and has found little evidence to support the latter.
November 2000
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Endnotes:
Note *: Michael E. Aleprete Jr. is Ph.D. Candidate at the Department of Political Science, University of Pittsburgh.Back.
Note 1: Scholars disagree as to whether the pacifying effect of democracy is a general phenomenon or extends only to relations among democratic states. The earliest studies hypothesised a general effect (Rummel 1983). But most empirical work since has concluded that democracies were only more peaceful towards other democracies (Chan 1984; Russett 1993; Maoz and Russett 1993; Dixon 1994; Henderson 1998). The studies concluding that democracy has no general effect measured only the rate at which democracies become involved in wars or disputes. For a long time this was the conventional wisdom, but recent research has resurrected the notion that democracies might be, in general, more peaceful (Morgan and Cambell 1991; Ray 1995; Oneal et al. 1996). In their recent review of the literature, Geller and Singer (1998:55-6) conclude that there still remains insufficient evidence to establish that democracy inhibits conflict. A similar conclusion was made by Gleditsch and Hegre (1997:307), though they also noted that their empirical analysis produced mixed results and that they could also not reject the possibility that democracy had a pacifying effect on state behaviour. Back.
Note 2: In a re-examination of Mansfield and Snyder’s empirical findings, Ward and Gleditsch (1998:60) concluded that reversals in the process of democratisation rather than the process of democratisation itself were responsible for making states more bellicose. Critics of Mansfield and Snyder have also questioned the aggregation of the data they used, and their failure to account for differences between transitions from different types of authoritarian governments. For a review of these criticisms and Mansfield and Snyder’s response, see Wolf et al. (1995). Back.
Note 3: Not all "democratic peace" arguments focus on the process of escalation. Some scholars simply point to factors that prevent the "last step", i.e. actually going to war. In this article, only those democratic peace arguments will be concerned with that point to factors that interfere with the process of escalation. In one of the most comprehensive reviews of the "democratic peace" literature, Ray (1995:18-21) points to a variety of studies that have found evidence that democratic institutions inhibit escalation or the initiation of violence on the part of the democratic state. Back.
Note 4: There is a bit of confusion here between "newness" and "partialness". Their theoretical argument points to institutional deficiencies as the source of the danger. However, in their analysis Mansfield and Snyder equate the newness of a democratic institution with weakness. Their quantitative analysis is based on the length of time since the transition from autocracy to democracy, rather than any direct measure of institutional strength. Back.
Note 5: For an overview of the state of Russia’s democratisation efforts, see Brown (1999). Back.
Note 6: See www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/. Since 1992, the Russian Federation has been rated in the middle of their indexes on both civil and political freedoms. Back.
Note 7: For reviews of the democratic peace debates, see Maoz and Russett (1993), Risse-Kappen (1995), Reiter and Stam (1998). Back.
Note 8: The Russian Federation would be considered transparent according to the index developed by Finel and Lord (1999). Back.
Note 9: This is another point where Mansfield and Snyder’s theoretical argument becomes confusing. It is not clear how much of the danger results from the fact that a state is partially democratised, and how much results from the state’s declining capacity. It is unclear, for example, what their predictions would be for a democratising state that is not declining, or for a declining state that did not democratise. However, for our purposes Russia is clearly both declining and democratising and we can apply their argument despite its conceptual confusion for our case. Back.
Note 10: Both liberal and realist scholars share the view that international regimes are likely to reflect the values of the hegemonic or leading states. The post-World War II era institutions were shaped largely by the United States and its allies. See Keohane (1984). Back.
Note 11: The NATO air campaign began on 24 March 1999 and formally ended on 21 June 1999, though the fighting ended prior to that date, with the international peacekeeping force entering the province on 12 June 1999. This article focuses on the events between the beginning of the air campaign on 24 March 1999 and the first meeting between the Russian Foreign Minister and the American Secretary of State on 13 April 1999. At this meeting, the Russians first agreed that an international peacekeeping force should enter Kosovo at the conclusion of the conflict. Back.
Note 12: It is a common view among scholars that the Duma is largely ineffective (Kubicek 1994; Easter 1997), and that the President can govern almost entirely without the legislature. For a good review of the limitations of Presidential power in Russia, including his use of the decree power, see Remmington (2000). Remington suggests that a wide range of policy conflicts between the branches has been resolved through negotiated agreements rather than executive fiat. Back.
Note 13: Statement by Victor Chernomyrdin reported in Sevodnya, 14 May 1999 (Current Digest of the Post Soviet Press 51(19):16). Back.
Note 14: There were two rounds of negotiations in France between the Yugoslav government, representatives of the Albanian population in Kosovo, and Contact Group Members. The first round opened at Rambouillet, France, on 7 February 1999, which is where the unsigned agreements took their name. The second round of negotiations took place in Paris and ended on 19 March 2000. Back.
Note 15: Washington Post electronic Timeline at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/balkans/timekosovo2.htmBack.
Note 16: Sevodnya, 17 March 1999: 3 (Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 51(11):20). Back.
Note 17: Boris Maiorsky’s comments reported in Noviye Izvestia, 20 March 1999: 3 (Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 51(11):7). Back.
Note 18: LDP faction leader Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s comments reported in Izvestia (Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 51(11):6). Back.
Note 19: See statements made by Vladimir Zhirinovsky. Transcripts of the State Duma, 27 March 1999:3 and 3 April 1999:8. Zyuganov’s statement in State Duma Transcripts, 27 March 1999:15. Back.
Note 20: Sovietskaya Rossia, 27 March 1999:1 (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press 51(12):5). Back.
Note 21: Comments of Viktor Ilyukhin reported in Sevodnya, 25 March 1999:1-2 (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press 51(12):12). Back.
Note 22: See Editorial in Sovietskaya Rossia, 6 April 1999:3. Back.
Note 23: The communists and nationalists share similar foreign policy objectives dedicated to restoring Russia to an international position similar to that of the old Soviet Union. See Brokin’s (1996:27-8) article for an outline of the similarities and differences in their foreign policy outlook. Back.
Note 24: Estimating the number of deputies is difficult since the bloc membership changes and not all groups are equally coherent. The CPRF had 147 seats, and the LDP 51. If one counts the Power to the People Bloc, whose members were primarily elected as independents but whose leadership adopted similar rhetoric, one could estimate another 38 seats. For numbers, see White et al. (1997:238). For examples of statements by Power to the People deputies, see their statements in the Transcripts of State Duma, 27 March 1999. Back.
Note 25: Sevodnya, 25 March 1999 (Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 51(12):4). Back.
Note 26: Sevodnya, 25 March 1999 (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press 51(12):4). Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 25 March 1999:1 (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press 51(12):10). Back.
Note 27: Otta Latsis editorial in Noviye Izvestia, 26 March 1999 (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press 51(12):12). Back.
Note 28: For example, see Maxim Yusin’s editorial in Izvestia, 1 April 1999: 1 (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press 51(13):4). Also see stories in Izvestia and Moskovskie Novosti reprinted in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 51(14):6-7, and Yulia Berezovskaya’s article in Izvestia, 16 April 1999:4 (Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 51(17):10). Back.
Note 29: Examples include Yeltsin’s televised address, 24 March 1999; Foreign Ministry Press Release on 31 March 1999; Interview with Foreign Minister Ivanov appearing in Kommersant, 28 March 1999. Back.
Note 30: President’s address printed in Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 26 March 1999:2 (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press 51(12):2). Back.
Note 31: President’s speech to Federal Assembly printed in Kommersant, 31 March 1999 (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, 51(13):14). Back.
Note 32: Yeltsin repeatedly said he would consider military intervention as a response to the commencement of NATO’s ground operations. Back.
Note 33: One of my reviewers astutely pointed out that the Yeltsin government’s interest in securing loans from the IMF may have created a strong incentive to avoid confrontation with the West. In addition, the Yeltsin government had been more assertive during the Bosnian Civil War, when the Russian economy was stronger. However, Mansfield and Snyder argue that a worsening economic situation should intensify the pressure on leaders to be aggressive. Hence, evidence that the Yeltsin government was more aggressive when Russia’s economy was strong would not salvage their thesis. To assess the extent which Russia’s foreign policy was affected by its economic instability would require a comparative study of Russian diplomacy during Kosovo and the Bosnian Civil War. This is not needed for the more limited purpose of testing Mansfield and Snyder’s thesis, which does not view aggression from a position of strength as much as the danger brought about by democratisation. Back.
Note 34: Foreign Minister Ivanov’s Press Release, 31 March 1999, similar to his testimony given to State Duma concerning the government’s position on 27 March 1999. Back.
Note 35: Formal NATO-Russian co-operation has essentially been restored to its pre-Kosovo status. See Russia and NATO, Split over Kosovo, Agree to Renew Relations, New York Times, 17 February 2000:A11. Back.
Note 36: Kommersant, 27 March 1999:1 (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press 51(13):12). Back.
Note 37: This was the position of the Russian Permanent Representative to the UN in an interview given to Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 30 March 1999:1. Back.
Note 38: The Alliance’s Strategic Concept adopted on 24 April 1999 defines providing ‘peace and security’ to the Euro-Atlantic area, not simply limited to direct threats to member-states. This includes what it describes as crisis management and conflict prevention. While several articles in the ‘Strategic Concept’ call for co-operation with other organisations including the UN, nowhere does the document require NATO to seek permission from these organisations to conduct operations necessary to provide this sort of security in the Euro-Atlantic area (see the Alliance’s Strategic Concept at www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm). This was a source of concern in many member-states, and the outcome of NATO’s action in Kosovo was thought to have important implications for whether or not NATO would be able or willing to play this sort of role in the future. For a good discussion on the implications of Kosovo, see Rodman (1999). Back.
Note 39: Foreign Ministry Public Statement, 4 April 1999. Back.
Note 40: Foreign Ministry Press Release, 23 April 1999. The request included demands that NATO releases its list of targets to the OSCE. Back.
Note 41: Izvestia, 1 April 1999:2 (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press 51(13):8). Back.
Note 42: Ivanov and Boluyevsky’s statements in Foreign Ministry Press Releases on 4 April 1999 and 7 April 1999. Back.
Note 43: Stavrakis (1996) argued that the richest provinces are more than five times as wealthy as the poorest, and that more than 75 percent of all financial transaction occur within Moscow. Back.
Note 44: Transcripts of the State Duma meeting on 27 March 1999. Also for the report of this meeting, see Kommersant, 30 March 1999 (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press 51(13):8). Back.
Note 45: Vladimir Zhrinovskii’s ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was the largest nationalist party in the Duma. Back.
Note 46: Transcripts of the State Duma meeting on 16 April 1999. Back.
Note 47: The vote was 293 yes, 54 against, and was taken on 16 April 1999 in the State Duma. Most of the No votes were from the Yabloko faction. Back.
Note 48: For example, see the editorial in Izvestia, 1 April 1999:4-5 (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press 51(13):4). Back.
Note 49: Sevodnya, 9 April 1999:2 (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press 51(14):13). Back.
Note 50: Novie Izvestia, 14 April 1999:2 (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press 51(15):10-1). Back.
Note 51: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 15 April 1999:1 (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press 51(15):12). Back.
Note 52: Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 8 June 1999:1, 6 (Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press 51(23):2). Back.
Note 53: General Ivashov, Director of the Defence Ministry’s Chief Administration of International Military Co-operation, publicly expressed his opposition to the final settlement, reported in Kommersant, 5 June 1999. Defence Minister Sergeyev also stated that he took a ‘different approach’ than Chernomyrdin during the negotiations (Sevodnya, 5 June 1999 reprinted in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 51(22):10). Three days later, Defence Minister Sergeyev essentially recanted his statement that there was any disagreement within the Russian delegation (Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press 51(23):4) Back.
Note 54: These troops were apparently meant to be the advance units for a much larger deployment of Russian troops that were to establish a separate zone of control independent of NATO command. For a discussion of their mission goals and the subsequent decision to abort the mission, see Brokin (1999). Back.
Note 55: There has been a good deal of speculation that the second war in Chechnya was escalated intentionally by President Putin and the military leadership for domestic political gain. For example, see Busza (1999). Still, from the Russian perspective this is a domestic political issue which makes it difficult to draw inferences about Russia’s foreign policy behaviour from its behaviour in Chechnya. Back.