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Journal of International Relations and Development
Volume 2, No. 3 (September 1999)
Where is the New World Order?
Hegemony, State Strength, and Architectural Construction in International Politics
By Thomas J. Volgy, Lawrence E. Imwalle and John E. Schwarz
*
Introduction
It has been a decade since the Cold War architecture of international politics began to crumble. The bipolar divisions, dominant for approximately half a century of international politics, rapidly came to an end without resort to the type of major war that has historically accompanied structural change of this magnitude. While there has been much rhetoric and scholarly speculation devoted to the ‘new world order’ (for summaries of the speculative literature, see Kegley and Raymond 1994; Mastanduno 1997), the newly emerging architecture of the international system remains murky and clouded in speculation.
There are some who believe that a ‘new world’ order has already developed out of the ashes of the Cold War (Friedman 1999; Gray 1999). They argue for an emerging new, market-based international system involving a unique form of globalisation, new actors and new rules for the governance of the global order. Policy makers, however, in those countries most likely to try to form new global architectural arrangements have been neither shy nor quiet in expressing their preferences for creating a new world order in distinctly traditional terms, and they disagree sharply over the form that the new world order should take. Particular emphasis has been placed on the possibility of an emerging hegemonic structure in the new world order. United States (US) policy makers, for example, have articulated their perceptions of dominant American military 1 and economic 2 capabilities consistent with hegemonic intentions, and speak of a new “global system we are structuring” (Erlanger 1997a:A1).
Nor are US declarations being ignored. Prior to the Kosovo conflict, a joint Russian/Chinese statement on their willingness to pursue a “multipolar world” also stressed that “no country should seek hegemony … or monopolize international affairs” (Gordon,1997:A3). Soon after the Kosovo conflict began, Chinese official organs publicly denounced America’s “global strategy for world hegemony” (Eckholm 1999). French policy makers have “expressed alarm at American domination in what [they call] a ‘unilateral world’ and ha[ve] expressed a determination to stand for a different economic model and a more multilateral global order” (Cohen 1997:A1). At the G7 summit of 1997, a French official described the US stance on North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) as “fundamentally imperial,” while another pointedly asked “When exactly did the Americans go from leadership to hegemony?” (Erlanger 1997b:A6).
As these statements indicate, major global actors in international politics are focusing on (and trying to do something about) the possible contours of the ‘new world order’. While there are many possibilities as to why the new world order has not yet evolved, we suggest that one key to the puzzle may revolve around an argument between comparative politics scholars and students of international relations. The first group has argued that the modern state is stronger today than at any time in recent history. International relations scholars, however, have argued that the state — the basic unit of the international system — is eroding substantially. If the second group is accurate in claiming that the state is under significant transformation and weakening, then the development of any new global architecture may be much more problematic than perceived by either scholars or policy makers.
This effort is part of a larger research project focusing on the issue of whether or not state strength is in decline. Here, we explore the relationship between state strength and one possible structural outcome. Specifically, we probe the extent to which the US has the capabilities to act as a hegemon for shaping the architecture of the post-Cold War international system in a manner consistent with the stated beliefs of its policy makers to do so, and consistent with the fears of policy makers from other countries that it will do so.
Salient Architectural Arrangements
Both realists (Schweller and Priess 1997) and neorealists believe that structural arrangements exist and matter in international politics. The manner in which system-wide capabilities are organised (polarities), and rules and norms (or regimes) are created and sustained, have important implications for interstate and intrastate behaviour, and as well for patterns of systemic conflict, co-operation, stability and change. As long as the primary principle of international political relations is anarchy (e.g., Herz 1950; Waltz 1979), these structural arrangements provide sufficient predictability for actors to act as if there is a minimum amount of order and certainty in the system.
Structural arrangements in international politics do not provide a comprehensive explanation for all forms of international phenomena. We agree that the importance of anarchy and the resulting security dilemma (Herz 1950) for states “may vary all the way from being a central preoccupation of policy makers to a residual background condition” (Lamborn 1997:207). Yet we believe as well that while structural considerations may not account directly for the behaviour of international actors, those actors and actions are “strongly affected by the constraints and incentives provided by the international environment” (Keohane 1984:26). The statements of foreign policy makers attest to similar evaluations and concerns regarding the importance of replacing old architecture with new ones (e.g., Bush 1992; Lake 1993).
If the structure of the system matters, what types of structural considerations should we worry about? History is replete with various structural options for the international system, including overlapping vertical and horizontal structural dimensions (e.g., Thompson 1986; Volgy and Imwalle 1995). Our focus here is on only one type: a hegemonic global structure. 3
Approaches to international politics based on hegemony or global leadership (e.g., Gilpin 1987; Modelski 1987; Levy 1991) see the development of world order from potential anarchy as a function of strong leadership exercised by a single, extremely powerful and wealthy state. During periods of hegemony one actor emerges with sufficient capabilities (both economic and military) and the desire to fashion some amount of global order by establishing essential systemic rules, and through its power compels others to accept its leadership. Typically the hegemon’s share of global economic and military capabilities is so extensive that it creates a deterrent effect among many of those who are dissatisfied with either hegemonic leadership or the rules being proposed for the system. Eventually challengers arise and hegemonic power declines (Kennedy 1987; Modelski 1987), and the international system often — but not always (Modelski 1990) — will experience major global war as new leadership comes to the fore. 4
Approaches to State Strength
The analytical approaches of neorealists have been far more successful in explaining the dynamics involved with various structural arrangements than with explaining the actual creation or transformation of structural arrangements. Scholars have identified a number of critical preconditions for the rise of hegemony (e.g., Gilpin 1987; Modelski 1987) and conditions for hegemonic decline (e.g., Modelski and Thompson 1988; Rupert 1995). We do not know, however, if critical actors in possession of such capabilities will actually begin to pursue strategic interactions consistent with their capability concentrations. There is certainly no automatic threshold of power concentration after which actors begin to construct systemic architecture. 5
More importantly, neorealists assume that the state remains as the basic, fundamental unit in the international system. While they recognise that other actors are becoming increasingly salient, they nevertheless continue to assume that the major powers remain sufficiently strong to continue to set systemic rules, create architectural arrangements, and to compel a relatively homogeneous set of perceptions about the nature of emerging structural arrangements. Neorealists recognise that some key states will get weaker, but they do not expect that, as the basic units of the system, states may be uniformly weakening. They would not likely expect all great powers to weaken, nor that such weakening would make global architectural construction increasingly problematic.
We assume that a number of conditions would need to exist in order for a specific state to successfully engage in global architectural creation. These would include (at a minimum) the strength to engage in such an enterprise, along with the desire, commitment and the competence to do so. We see state strength as a necessary condition, without which architectural construction is not possible. Desire, commitment, and competence are sufficient conditions, but they cannot create a new world order in the absence of sufficient state strength. Thus, the debate over the declining strength of states becomes singularly important in assessing the viability of global architectural construction.
Forecasting the systematic weakening of state capabilities (and being wrong) is nothing new (e.g., Herz 1942). What does seem to be new is the number of international relations scholars who describe the state as growing increasingly impotent. Susan Strange, for example, virtually dismisses the strength of states in economic policy, arguing that markets “are [now] the masters over the governments of states” (1996:1-2). The judgements of others may be less harsh, but few see the state as maintaining its traditional strength, as it withers between the scissors of endogenous and exogenous forces: domestic constituencies (Hudson and Skidmore 1993; Rosenau 1995; Lamborn 1997); multilateral mechanisms (Keohane 1995; Caporaso 1997); and globalisation process creating transformations so radical that states are actually bargaining away their own sovereignty (Holm and Sorensen 1995b). 6
Students of comparative politics offer a very different assessment of state strength: systematic historical comparisons of the capabilities of states show that state strength has accelerated greatly over the last two centuries. Gurr notes, for example, that in “four West European countries for which time-series data are available, the budgeted expenditures of the central government increased from an average of 6.4 percent of GNP in 1875 to 11.2 percent in 1925 and 44.1 percent in 1982” (Gurr 1990:74). Gurr finds as well that the ‘directiveness’ and political continuity of states have increased considerably, a finding consistent with recent literature on “putting the state back in” (Evans et al. 1986; Chodak 1989; Weiss 1998) analyses of political processes.
Which of these perspectives is a more accurate portrayal of state strength and particularly the type of state strength that is needed to be an active participant in the creation of new global architectural arrangements? It is possible that the ‘state is weakening’ school has failed to take into account the efforts taken by states to respond to the variety of new demands and pressures facing them. It is equally plausible that the ‘state is stronger’ school has failed to take into account the extent to which increases in state capabilities have failed to match increased domestic and international pressures and constraints upon states. It is also possible that both approaches are partially correct. This would be the case if states had become stronger, but had failed to transfer increased strength for external interests and pursuits, or if they are stronger domestically, but not quite strong enough to address the growing complexities in the external environment.
Conceptualising and Measuring State Strength
What do we mean by state strength, and especially as it applies to hegemonic capabilities? We start with the notion that hegemonic strength can be viewed from two different perspectives (Strange 1989). One is through the concept of structural power: the capability and willingness of the hegemon to create essential rules, norms, and modes of operation for various dimensions of the international system. The hegemon enjoys “structural power through the capacity to determine the terms on which those needs are satisfied and to whom they are made available” (Strange 1989:165-6). Hegemony then creates and/or sustains critical regimes to further patterns of co-operation and to reduce uncertainty as states pursue their objectives (Keohane 1984; Hasenclever et al. 1996).
The hegemon also possesses another type of strength that is more routinely utilised in studies of international politics. Strange labels it relational power: the capabilities of the hegemon vis-à-vis other actors in the system, and its ability to get some groupings of others, by persuasion or coercion, to do what they would not otherwise do (Strange 1989:165). It is quite possible for the hegemon to maintain its relational strength while its structural strength diminishes. When it comes to establishing a new set of global rules and norms, however, both structural and relational powers are likely to be needed.
Of the two, conceptualising and measuring relational strength is the far easier task. Such strength refers to dominant economic and military capabilities, readily available for external use on the part of the state. In this context, strength is relative to those of other great powers that may seek to challenge systemic norms or hegemonic leadership. Relative hegemonic capabilities have been successfully measured previously (e.g., Spiezio 1990; Volgy and Imwalle 1995) as the hegemon’s aggregate share of economic and military capabilities of all ‘great powers’ in the system.
It is far more difficult to conceptualise the strength needed for Strange’s structural power. We assume that for the purposes of architectural construction, a potential hegemon requires, at the minimum: a) extensive economic, political, and military capabilities; b) capabilities relative to and reflective of the complexities and growth of the international environment; and c) demonstrable effort to develop such capabilities.
We assume as well that for purposes of global architectural construction, external resources are immediately more important than domestic resources. External resources, however, cannot be utilised extensively for architectural creation, unless they are buttressed by sufficient domestic capabilities. While domestic resources may be predictive of external capabilities (and are a necessary condition for developing extensive external capabilities), the two dimensions do not necessarily move in tandem. In fact, the relationship between the two should give us important clues about the overall strength of major states in the international system.
Given these assumptions, we propose to measure structural strength using the following steps: 1) we measure external capabilities in the context of changing constraints imposed by the global environment; 2) unlike relational strength — which is measured compared to the strength of other great powers — we measure structural strength in external capabilities relative to the entire system; 3) we incorporate into our measure of strength an indicator of ‘effort’ to maintain and increase capabilities consistent with changes in the environment; and 4) we measure domestic strength in order to assess whether or not the internal capability of the state can sustain its external capabilities.
We start by measuring annually external capabilities (EC) as a function of all monetary resources committed to foreign activities. Then, we modify resource commitments by a constraint measure that taps the relative international autonomy (RIA) of the state. We concur with others (e.g., Rupert and Rapkin 1985; Holm and Sorensen 1995) that interdependencies in the global economy reduce national autonomy and weaken states. Growing reliance on international trade may mean that trading states are affected greatly by the domestic economic health of their trading partners. Trade dependencies also make it increasingly difficult for countries to pursue objectives in other areas of foreign policy. 7 We measure RIA as a state’s total trade divided by a country’s gross domestic product (GDP).
We integrate as well into our index the concept of external effort (EE): the extent to which states are utilising their share of domestic resources for external capabilities. We measure this concept as the amount of spending for external activity, divided by a state’s GDP. Finally, we take account of the growing complexity of international politics by controlling for system size (SS): the number of states in the international system. While the size of the system may not be very consequential for regional actors, growing system size may tax significantly the strength of global aspirants. 8
Since we are searching for some symmetry between external strength and domestic strength, we develop as well a separate set of measures related to the domestic strength of states. In doing so, we identify a pattern similar to external strength: basic resources modified/constrained by forces endogenous to the political system. 9 These constraints include: limits placed on the fiscal resources of government; limits placed on the use of extracted capabilities by political capabilities and demands; and limits placed on national resources by demands emanating from societal/state relations.
Domestic resources (DR) represents the annual resources that the central government extracts from society and uses to pursue its policy objectives. We measure it in terms of central government revenues. We identify three types of constraints on the resources available by government. The first is the extent to which the government’s revenue base is constrained by its overreach (OR) in spending: overreach occurs when states identify problems and seek to address them without having the resources at hand to do so. The concept of overreach should be important in assessing state strength in two ways. First it shows indirectly the extent to which state capacity may not meet perceived needs; second it has an indirect effect, through indebtedness, on future state capabilities. We measure overreach annually as the amount the government spends in excess of revenues and the amount it spends on debt service as a result of previous overspending. 10
In addition to constraints on spending, we identify a political constraint dimension as well, consistent with the literature noting the constraining salience of domestic political conflicts and their management (e.g., Hagan 1998; Evangelista 1997). Here we are particularly concerned with the political strength (PS) of the primary decision maker responsible for the policies of the government. We presume that leaders in democratic polities will be constrained in their activities when they lack broad political support from the public. 11 Lower levels of public support may also force presidents to expend more resources on those domestic policies that are likely to increase satisfaction with presidential performance. 12 We measure political strength by focusing on annual presidential approval ratings.
Our third dimension of constraint is in response to the persistent suggestion in the literature (e.g., Risse-Kappen 1991; Evangelista 1997) that societal demands may constitute vigorous constraints on the state (depending upon the centralisation of state power). Three societal pressures we view as particularly important are patterns of inflation (IN), unemployment (UN), and crime (CR). Although democratic polities will vary in their responses to such societal pressures, unlike non-democratic polities, they are likely to be constrained by the need to commit significant resources to address these issues.
Finally, we wish to control for the growth of a country’s population base. Therefore, we divide our domestic measure by the size of the US population (for a full description of all measures and sources, see Appendix).
Findings
Hegemonic Strength
Does the US have the strength needed for hegemonic architectural creation? For the US to qualify as having sufficient hegemonic capabilities, we require that it meet three criteria of strength: 1) evidence of hegemonic structural power capabilities; 2) evidence of hegemonic relational power capabilities; and 3) evidence of some symmetry between external strength and domestic strength. We find that although substantial relational power capabilities are demonstrated for the US, and it holds domestic strength that is substantial and perhaps adequate for hegemonic aspirations, clearly the first condition is not realised.
Figure 1 demonstrates the ebbs and flows of US relational capabilities over the half century. In this dimension, and compared to other major powers, the US looks hegemonic and not only militarily. In economic terms, it has the world’s largest and most productive economy, its GDP growth is the highest of any of the G7 countries, and compared to the other six, virtually unencumbered by unemployment or a budget deficit. 13 US relational strength in the mid-1990s approximates its strength in the mid-1960s, a point in time that predates any serious discussion of US decline. In relative terms, the US seems to have the strength (along with verbal pronouncements of interest) to create a hegemonic architecture for the ‘new world order’. Perhaps it is in this relational context that policy makers in other countries fear US hegemony.
Our measure of external structural strength, however, portrays a different picture. Figure 2 demonstrates changes in US external resources, constrained by relative autonomy, effort, and growth in the international system, through the Cold War and its aftermath. Unlike relational power capabilities, the data demonstrate a dramatic pattern of persistent decline in the face of reduced effort, decreasing autonomy, and larger numbers of states in the international system.
The pattern also shows two major attempts to readjust dwindling external capabilities. The first occurs when the US was challenged and sought to respond in Vietnam; the second — and the only peacetime growth in external strength — occurs during the first Reagan Presidency, and that pattern is reversed by the end of Reagan’s second term. Overall, in the post Cold War environment, US external strength looks to be substantially weaker in facing global systemic forces than in the early 1950s or the 1960s, and the pattern is relatively consistent over time (regressing the variable against time yields an R2 of .55, significant at .001).
Table 1: Bivariate Regression Results of Domestic Resources, External Resources, and Time, 1950-1994.
** indicates significance at prob. < .01
See Appendix for sources and operationalisation of measures.
Yet, such decline in external strength cannot be attributed to a parallel decline in domestic strength. Figure 3 demonstrates that even with controls for population growth, overreach in US spending, and political and societal pressures, US domestic strength has not diminished and has actually increased over time. Although there has been substantial overreach in budgetary spending, the measure exhibits a pattern in the last decade that is stronger than during the strong period of US hegemony in the 1950s. While there is substantial fluctuation throughout the period, when we regress the relationship with time, the R2 is .69 (see Table 1), indicating that domestic strength has grown over the period in question. At least when observing the US, comparative scholars seem to be correct when they argue that, from a domestic perspective, state strength is not in decline.
While domestic resources and external capabilities are marching in the opposite direction for the US, it would not be accurate to portray domestic dynamics as not affecting external capabilities. When we disaggregate the domestic strength measure into its constituent parts, and then regress the external measure on these variables, we can demonstrate how some domestic constraints influence external capabilities (see Table 2). The results show that while domestic resources do have an independent and positive effect on external strength, societal constraints and pressures (the misery index and size of population) also demonstrate substantial negative effects on the external strength index.
These results seem to suggest the possibility that domestic dynamics and domestic capabilities are not unimportant for external strength. A booming economy (present today), coupled with decreasing inflation, unemployment and crime (also present today), may allow the transfer of increased resources for external purposes. The renewed interest in funding the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and for greater increases for military capabilities in the Congress (above and beyond those requested by the President for Kosovo) are occurring precisely under these domestic circumstances.
The evidence from Figures 2, 3, and Table 2 suggest as well that while the decline in US external strength is quite dramatic over the last three decades, there is nothing automatic in such decreases, nor are such decreases an artefact of the strength index. Figure two illustrates reversals to the trend line on no fewer than three occasions, with the latest upswing coming during the Reagan administration. As Figure 3 demonstrates, there are ample domestic capabilities to be applied to external capabilities as well, and Table 2 leads us to conclude that the conditions most likely to allow for such transfer of capabilities (increased domestic revenues, along with substantial decreases in the misery index) from the domestic to the international realm presently exist for the US. In fact, Table 2 implies that the domestic conditions for transferring resources for external pursuits in the US today are significantly more favourable than they were during the last such transference in the 1980s. Clearly, however, what is missing this time is an unambiguous external threat such as President Reagan’s ‘evil empire’.
Table 2: Regressions of External Resources on Individual Components of the Domestic Resources Measure.
Note: Entries are parameter estimates, standard errors are in parentheses
** probability < .01, * probability < .05
See Appendix for sources and operationalisation of measures.
Addressing the Validity Issue
Is our measure of structural strength an artefact of our data procedures? Apart from arguing the logic of the measure, we suggest an additional test of validity: if the measure is valid, then it should be able to show consistency with the extent to which members in the international system are accepting of US global leadership. Architectural creation means, among other things, identifying and securing broad agreement in the system to the norms and rules espoused by the hegemon. As the structural strength of the hegemon declines, so should concurrence with its leadership and direction.
We offer a measure of concurrence with US leadership in the international system: aggregate voting concurrence with US positions taken in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. This measure is by no means an ideal one, but it is the only one consistently available across the time frame of the study. Furthermore, voting in the UN General Assembly does provide one way in which we can assess the extent to which states concur — for whatever reasons — with the positions of the US. We construct a measure by assessing the average annual agreement scores with the US on the part of all nations in the General Assembly on issues that are non-unanimous, and on which the US took an affirmative or negative position. We then compare the annual concurrence scores with the external strength measure. Table 3 shows the comparisons across decades. Note that the average UN General Assembly concurrence score with US policy positions during the 1950s — the period of the strongest structural power capabilities for the US — is also the highest for the period at .593. During the period of greatest hegemonic strength, nearly sixty percent of UN voting members register concurrence with US leadership.
Table 3: United Nations Voting Agreement with the United States and United States External Political Capabilities, 1950-1989.
Note: Entries reflect the average annual value for each decade. The correlation between UN voting agreement with US positions and our measure of external political capabilities, using annual data (1951-89) are as follows: Lag(0) r=.508, Lag(1) r=.550, Lag(2) r=.637.
If our measure of structural power capability is valid, then we would expect that as US external resources decline substantially, so would concurrence scores in the UN General Assembly. This appears to be the case, and relatively consistently so across the decades. As American external strength scores dip to their lowest average across the 1980s, so does the global concurrence score with US positions on international issues. Even the magnitude of the two changes is remarkably similar. US external strength in the last decade is roughly one-third the strength exhibited in the 1950s. The respective ratios for external strength and UN concurrence are 3.35 and 3.45; these changes reflect nearly identical magnitudes of decreases in both concurrence and strength between the 1950s and the 1980s.
Another way of looking at the two relationships is by correlating the measures across time. We would not expect a perfect relationship annually, since we are not arguing that nations carefully (and annually) assess changes in strength on the part of the hegemon, and then vote accordingly. We would, however expect a rough correspondence, and the evidence is in that direction. A Pearson’s r between the two variables yields a correlation of .512 (p. < .01). When we lag UN agreement for one and two years behind external strength, the r values increase to .550 and .639. The comparison between UN concurrence scores and the external strength measure gives us some confidence in the validity of our structural power capability measure.
Conclusions
Despite a major decline in structural power capabilities, American policy makers continue to speak in hegemonic terms and are creating wary responses from other system members. In the absence of declining external US strength, what consequences can we draw for the new world order from these contradictions? We suggest three possibilities.
The first is that US efforts to create a new global order, both in political and economic spheres, are likely to continue to be half-hearted and minimally effective, unless US decision makers are willing (and able) to expend substantially greater domestic resources to reverse declining external capabilities. To date, American leadership has been exhibited, albeit in a halting way in both economic and political spheres. The US has been successful in structuring the terms for expansion of the NATO, and for maintaining its leadership in the alliance. Likewise, in the economic realm, the last round of G7 meetings witnessed a strong push on the part of the US to seek emulation of its approach to economic growth and international trading strategies.
At the same time, such efforts at leadership have begun to encounter substantial resistance. NATO allies are chaffing against US terms for NATO expansion and the US has been unable to stop the thawing of Russian/Chinese relations to combat US ‘hegemony’. In the economic realm, the 1997 parliamentary elections in France may have provided a first indicator of growing resistance to the American model of economic growth, with its attendant social welfare costs for wealthy democracies. Recently, French, Russian and Third World policy makers have challenged as well the right of the US to set rules for their multinationals to operate in regions identified by the US as friendly to global terrorist activities (Cohen 1997).
Even US leadership in NATO actions vis-à-vis Kosovo has proven to be of mixed success. The US has demonstrated an amazing amount of leadership in solidifying and maintaining the coalition of German, French, and British allies in the effort. At the same time, relations have substantially worsened with the Russians and the Chinese, and in the aftermath Europeans are publicly debating their need to develop military capabilities independent of US leadership (Cohen 1999).
Without a much stronger commitment of resources to develop a new, global architecture, American interest in developing new global architecture may be insufficient to create new forms of global order. American ‘hegemony’ without additional capabilities will probably dissipate under the onslaught of greater interdependencies, domestic constraints, increasing systemic complexities, and the numerous states chaffing against US leadership.
The alternative scenario comes from the lessons of previous systemic challenges. At the start of the Cold War, the US transferred to external capabilities significant amounts of domestic resources in response to a widespread perception of a threat from the Soviet Union. Clearly today, it has again the capability to make a similar transfer (and the Congress is showing some preliminary signs of doing so), and to use those capabilities to structure systemic rules. Yet, the old threat is gone, and unless similar threats arise, domestic pressures are unlikely to permit interested policy makers to increase US external capabilities to hegemonic proportions.
Of course, the Congress has not been reticent in replenishing the military hardware used in Kosovo, and has been especially sensitive to increased Russian and Chinese rhetoric resisting NATO’s actions. Whether it is willing to go beyond such measures to a much broader expansion of external capabilities seems highly unlikely unless Chinese and Russian resistance to American direction goes beyond verbal confrontation.
Finally, we do not mean to imply that the ability of US foreign policy makers to influence the ebb and flow of systemic dynamics is non-existent or trivial. In fact, US relational strength has been quite impressive in the 1990s. American influence in economic policy and security issues in the post-Cold War environment has been extensive and we expect that it will continue for quite some time given its relative strength vis-à-vis other major powers in the system. Ultimately, US policy makers succeeded in Bosnia (and less clearly in Kosovo), prevailed in NATO restructuring, forced settlements on Iraq, and have been generally successful in regional and global trade negotiations. US influence, based on relational power, remains extensive. The danger lies in confusing relational power with structural power, and in the evident belief both inside and outside the US that the hegemon possesses enough of the latter to shape the structure of the new world order.
June 1999
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Appendix: Measures, Operationalisation, and Data Sources
Domestic Resources
Government Revenue
Source: International Financial Statistics Yearbook (1979-1996). Washington, DC: IMF.
Measure: total central government revenues in constant dollars.
Overreach
Sources: International Financial Statistics Yearbook (1979-1996). Washington, DC: IMF.
Measure: 1 - (Gov’t Expend + Repayment / Gov’t Rev.) / Gov’t Rev.
Unemployment
Source: Survey of Current Business. Washington, DC: US Department of Commerce.
Inflation
Source: Survey of Current Business. Washington, DC: US Department of Commerce.
Crime
Source: Uniform Crime Reports. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics.
Public Support
Source: Gallup Polls (1950-1994). Princeton, NJ: The Gallup Organization.
Measure: Presidential Approval Ratings as reported by Gallup Poll.
Population
Sources: Correlates of War Project (1992). Ann Arbor, MI: National Capabilities Dataset; and Penn World Tables, Mark 5.6. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Gross Domestic Product
Sources: Penn World Tables, Mark 5.6. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research; and International Financial Statistics Yearbook (1996). Washington, DC: IMF.
Measure: GDP in constant 1985 International Prices
External Capabilities
Military Expenditures
Sources: Correlates of War Project (1992) Ann Arbor, MI: National Capabilities Dataset, and SIPRI Yearbook of World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (1995-1997). Stockholm: SIPRI.
Relative International Autonomy
Sources: Penn World Tables, Mark 5.6. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research; and International Financial Statistics Yearbook (1979-1996). Washington, DC: IMF.
Measure: (1-openess) where: openness = (exports + imports)/ Gross Domestic Product
External Effort
Sources: Military expenditure data (1992). In Correlates of War Project. Ann Arbor, MI: National Capabilities Dataset; GDP data from Penn World Tables, Mark 5.6. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research; augmented with SIPRI military data and IMF economic data post 1992.
Measure: Military expenditures divided by Gross Domestic Product.
System Size
Source: International System Membership 1816-1994. In Correlates of War Project. Ann Arbor, MI: National Capabilities Dataset. Gross Domestic Product Sources: Penn World Tables, Mark 5.6., Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research and International Financial Statistics Yearbook 1996. Washington, D.C: IMF.
External Strength Index
is calculated as external spending — relative autonomy reduced external effort, and deflated by system size.
Notes:
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the first annual CEEISA conference. The authors would like to thank both the anonymous reviewers at JIRD and the discussants at CEEISA for their helpful comments.
*: Thomas J. Volgy is a professor of political science at the University of Arizona. He is also the executive director of the International Studies Association, and is the co-author of over 30 articles and books including co-authorship of The Forgotten Americans: Working Hard and Living Poor in the Land of Opportunity (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992). Back.
**: Lawrence E. Imwalle is a doctoral candidate in Political Science at the University of Arizona. His publications include work on international conflict, terrorism, and structural change. Back.
***: John E. Schwarz is a professor of political science at the University of Arizona. His numerous publications include America's Hidden Success (New York: W.W. Norton, 1988), and The Forgotten Americans: Working Hard and Living Poor in the Land of Opportunity (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992). Back.
Note 1: “We want to dominate across the full spectrum of conflict, so that if we ever do have to fight, we will win on our terms” (Cohen 1997:A1,11). Back.
Note 2: “[The US is] the world’s only economic superpower..[and has] the world’s most flexible and dynamic economy” (Sanger 1997). Back.
Note 3: There are numerous alternative structural arrangements possible in the ‘new world order’. Regional and global collective security arrangements are one possibility and the expansion of the NATO could signal that such prospects are not impossible. The potential evolution of the G7 to include Russia and China could signal as well the emergence of structural great-power co-operation in a variety of policy areas. In the economic realm, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) suggest the possibility of evolving substantial global norms for systematic co-operation between most states, expanding on earlier trends toward economic regimes that may survive changes in other global structures. Yet the statements of policy makers are clearly reflective of traditional historical structures akin to hegemony and multipolarity in the new world order. The last Soviet leader, Mihael Gorbachev, even warned the world that a “US desire for global hegemony risked creating another Cold War and even, perhaps, a hot war” (Reuters 1999). Back.
Note 4: The last half century of international politics is instructive in demonstrating some of the salient environmental effects of hegemonic structural arrangements. Recent research has demonstrated the salience of fluctuations in hegemonic dynamics in accounting for the ebb and flow of both systemic interactions and conflicts. Changes in hegemonic capabilities, for example, were most strongly associated with variation in systemic norms, fluctuations in crises, wars, and acts of terrorism both during and after the Cold War (Volgy and Imwalle 1995; Volgy et al. 1997). Back.
Note 5: Data, for example on capability concentrations (Kugler and Arbetman 1989), shows that the US was a formidable great power between World Wars I and II. Yet its actual role never came close to matching its near-hegemonic capabilities. Back.
Note 6: Not all international relations scholars, however, see uniformly declining state strength (e.g., Nau 1990; Nye 1990). In fact, traditional ways of measuring state power by comparing the relative capabilities of great powers in the system, demonstrates that the US has the capability to behave as a hegemon in the post Cold War world (Volgy and Imwalle 1995). Back.
Note 7: A recent example is offered by the problems of the Clinton administration in effectuating a human rights policy with China when the risks of deteriorating relations involve billions of dollars for US industries. In the Congressional battle over China’s trading status, American business interests seemed to have played an embarrassingly decisive role, prompting the following news story: “One retailer warned (members of Congress) that Tickle Me Elmo dolls would soar in price if higher tariffs were imposed in Chinese goods. But one presidential adviser cringed, saying at last weekend’s economic summit in Denver, ‘It made it sound like we should decide China policy at Toys ‘R Us’” (Clymer 1997). Back.
Note 8: Note for example the difficulties the US has in securing budgetary resources for developing adequate protection against terrorism for its broad range of embassies. Back.
Note 9: For a similar assessment, see Organski and Kugler (1980); Kugler and Domke (1986); Kugler and Arbetman (1989). We diverge here from the Kugler et al. measures since we are assuming that issues involving freedom and will to use resources cannot be captured by a ratio based primarily on predicted tax extraction from some socio-economic factors versus actual tax extraction. Back.
Note 10: The formulas used are (expenditures-revenues)/revenues and debt service/expenditures, for annual central government budgets. Back.
Note 11: We do not mean to suggest that democracies are precluded from playing an active role in world politics; we are only contending that such a role is likely only when political strength is high. Back.
Note 12: Presidents may likely respond in a number of ways toward declining support. One would be to seek to increase domestic programmes, thus reducing resources available for external policies; another would be to reduce taxes, with similar effects. Back.
Note 13: In 1997, for example, compared to others in the G7, US GDP growth was 4.1% versus 2.03%; its unemployment rate hovered at 4.8%, versus 9.2%; its budget deficit as a percentage of GDP at 1.5% versus 2.87% (official government statistics reported in Montague 1997). Back.