|
|
|
|
Journal of International Relations and Development
Austria and the European Union: From nation-state to member-state
By Johannes Pollak and Sonja Puntscher-Riekmann
*
Austria’s accession to the European Union (EU) on 1 January 1995 marks a decisive break in the country’s post-war european policy. Although the political elite stressed a degree of continuity to shore up domestic support for European integration, the extent of change is quite considerable. Launching the formal application in 1989 not only required the main actors to clarify or even change their positions but also to open up the cosy world of Austria’s corporatist system. The article aims to give an overview of the Austrian application process, its preconditions and results. Further, since Austria has now been a member for nearly four years it may be allowed to attempt an assessment of these years which include the country’s first presidency of the Council of the EU.
Background
Austria’s attitude towards the European integration process since 1945 has been ambivalent at best (Schneider 1990; Gehler and Steininger 1993; Gehler and Kaiser 1997). The first steps towards post-war recovery and re-integration of the country into the international community were largely shaped by its participation in the Marshall Plan and the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC). The amazing economic success of the first decades helped to build a stable socio-political environment although this process seems to have been delayed compared to other countries in the 1950s. In memory of the conflicts of the inter-war period, the emergence of a consensus-oriented society was a major task resulting in a pact between parties, employers and trade unions called the social partnership (Gerlich 1992; Bischof and Pelinka 1996; Tálos 1996; Tálos and Kittel 1999). Participation in the then ongoing constitution of a new world order was limited to the economic area. Austria became a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) in 1948, whereas in 1951 it joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
At the same time, the Austrian government was particularly careful to avoid any association with Western defence organisations such as the Brussels pact of 1948 or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (established in 1949) thus mirroring the status of a country still occupied by the Allies. 1 Membership of the United Nations (1955) and the Council of Europe (1956) was achieved shortly after the signing of the State Treaty on 15 May 1955.
In the summer of 1959, Austria decided to participate in setting up the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) of the so-called outer Seven, that is—apart from Austria—Britain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Switzerland and Portugal. It was hoped that the creation of EFTA would put some pressure on the previously founded European Economic Community (EEC) to induce their member-states to renew negotiations about a multilateral association within a wider free-trade area. The main objective of the Austrian contemporary government 2 was to continue to enjoy the advantages of economic interdependence without participating in the political integration planned by the six founding members of the EEC. 3 However, it took some years until the bilateral free-trade agreements with the EEC came into force, as only the retirement of Charles de Gaulle from French politics in April 1969 paved the way for the free-trade agreement with the EEC which was signed in 1972. Consequently, the EEC was joined by Britain, Denmark and Ireland in 1973. According to Austrian free-trade agreement with the EEC, 4 all tariffs on industrial goods between Austria and the EEC were to be abolished by 1977 (Article 3).
After the so-called Euro-sclerosis which marked the 1970s in particular, 5 the Commission under the presidency of Jacques Delors undertook a great leap forward suggesting the creation of an internal single market in goods, capitals, services and people abolishing all non-tariff barriers by 1992. This initiative, built on previous and reiterated though never fulfilled commitments, 6 started a dynamic phase in European integration that lasted until the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Thus, the external economic context for Austrian European policy changed completely. Austria could not enjoy the economic advantages of the envisaged single market project (seductively described in the Cecchini report (European Commission 1988)) without becoming a full member of the European Communities (EC), which seemed ever more necessary since by the mid-1980s the corporatist economic system was seen to be in urgent need of structural reform and modernisation of the still highly regulated service sector. Furthermore, with the demise of the Soviet Empire on the one hand, and with the intensifying debate in the EU about the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) on the other, the political eroticism of neutrality got its first scratches. EC membership was regarded as providing the necessary external pressure for deregulation and, at the same time, helping to cushion the political and economic effects resulting thereof (Wieser and Kitzmantel 1990:436).
Against this changing economic background, EC membership was first demanded by the Federation of Austrian Industrialists in May 1987. In January 1988, the Austrian ÖVP, the smaller of the two coalition parties followed suit always keen to keep up its image as the ‘true’ European party. After all Ländeshauptleute (state governors) and the four institutions of the so-called system of social partnership (the Federal Chamber of Labour, the Austrian Federation of Trade Unions, the Presidential Conference of Chambers of Agriculture, the Austrian Chamber of Business) had come out in favour of EC membership in March 1989, the SPÖ finally made up its mind to vote for the application which was subsequently lodged in July 1989 (Kaiser 1995b). Six months before, the Commission President Jacques Delors had proposed the participation of EFTA countries in the internal market programme without actual EC membership; the initiative, the European Economic Area (EEA), which was designed to delay enlargement of the Communities until after its institutional deepening in the Maastricht process. However, the Austrian government did not regard the EEA as a suitable substitute for full membership of the EC. Membership in the EEA was only taken as a tiresome but necessary preliminary stage. The Austrian government’s reorientation was motivated primarily by economic considerations (Schneider 1990:106). With nationalised industry in a state of deep crisis and rising unemployment, the highly corporatist economic system was increasingly perceived as a millstone around the Austrian neck. The privatisation of the state industries which began in the 1980s was to be fostered by EC membership. In addition, with roughly two-thirds of Austrian exports going to the EC, participation in the internal market programme was expected to prevent a competitive disadvantage for Austrian exports. Security arguments, by comparison, only began to feature more prominently with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the war in former Yugoslavia.
The so-called Letter to Brussels—the formal membership application 7 —stressed Austria’s role as a neutral country and stated several provisions for membership: upkeep of neutrality; upholding of the principles of federalism; internal market competition must not affect Austria’s social system; maintenance of high environmental standards; financial support for Austrian agriculture; and regulation of transit traffic (Schneider 1990:91). In other words, the government emphasised that accession at any price was not on the agenda.
Austria’s entry negotiations began on 1 February 1993 and were concluded on 1 March 1994. Areas of greatest domestic political concern for the government were agriculture, transit traffic and regulations restricting the sale of property in Alpine regions. 8 Reflecting the internal politics of the grand coalition, the Austrian negotiating team was officially led by the former Foreign Minister Alois Mock (ÖVP), an early and enthusiastic advocate of membership, and the State Secretary in the Chancellor’s Office, Brigitte Ederer (SPÖ). The Austrian negotiating positions had mainly been a matter of co-ordination between the government, the social partners, and the Länder, while the Austrian parliament (hereafter referred to as the Parliament), despite its participation and information rights, by and large remained outside that circle.
As for the negotiations themselves, two fields deserve particular mention: agriculture and the transit of heavy trucks. On agriculture, the Austrian government had to agree to the immediate opening up of the domestic market to agricultural products which led to a significant price fall in certain commodities such as butter and flour. However, for a transitional period of four years, the Austrian government got the right to make compensatory payments to farmers, receiving EU contributions for these purposes. While the farming community was disappointed with certain results of the negotiations, such as the sugar quota (390,410 tonnes), in other respects the outcome satisfied initial Austrian expectations, as for example the milk quota (2.752 million tonnes) (Stadler 1995:43). 9
The transit of heavy trucks had become a politically sensitive issue during the 1980s, particularly in the provinces of Tyrol and Salzburg. More and more grass root organisations took up the unbearable situation in Austria’s West. How explosive it really was became clear in 1989 when the ÖVP suffered heavy losses in elections in both of these Länder, losses at least partly attributed to their almost unqualified support for EC membership at that time (Lairaiter et al. 1994) then suspected of aggravating the problem. During the entry negotiations, it was eventually decided that the terms of the Transit Agreement 10 originally agreed as part of the EEA package would be shortened by one year to 1 January 2004. Furthermore, from 2001 onwards a different regime from the current ecological points system may be applied, if by then the legally binding aim of a 60 percent reduction of exhaust fumes has been reached. And finally, Tyrol and Salzburg were allowed to continue their discriminatory regulations, which allow only those persons who have had permanent residence in Austria for at least five years to purchase property up until the year 2000.
In Austria a referendum on membership was obligatory under the constitution 11 and was called by the government for 12 June 1994, well in advance of the Scandinavian countries. The referendum debate was characterised by a marked and stable elite consensus on the desirability of EU membership (Kaiser 1995a). Main opponents were the right wing populist FPÖ, 12 the Green Party as well as the insignificant Austrian Communist party. The FPÖ under Jörg Haider tried to stir up and exploit popular sentiments as well as parts of the Trade Unions and farmers, extra parliamentary initiatives such as the Anti-transit Movement (Schaller 1994), and some other grass roots organisations formed by more or less prominent individuals opposing EU membership. The large heterogeneity of interests prevented any common position amongst these groups.
Opinion polls in Austria since the application had indicated a relatively clear, if volatile, majority in favour of membership that dwindled temporarily during the critical phase of the entry negotiations in the winter of 1994. Indeed, the extent of the domestic adjustments that Austria was to carry out before and when becoming a member of the EU was deliberately played down by the elites so as not to put at risk the majority in the referendum. But this was true only in so far as the EU application was an attempt to adapt Austrian European policy to the fast changing external economic and political circumstances at the end of the Cold War era. The Austrian major objectives remained the same: guaranteeing sustainable economic growth and securing political manoeuvrability and influence when the neutrality-EFTA strategy no longer appeared to provide sufficient benefits. Moreover, economic interests in membership were enhanced by the subterraneous desires of a large majority for irreversible integration into the newly emerging polity and would-be superpower called the EU. Eventually, on the voting day the turnout was 82.4 percent, with 66.6 percent voting in favour of EU membership and only 33.4 percent against. After the parliamentary ratification process had been concluded, Austria joined the EU on 1 January 1995 (Schaller 1994:74).
Analysis of the voting pattern shows that the pro-EU parties managed more successfully than the anti-EU parties to unite supporters behind the official party line (Plasser and Ulram 1994:97). In terms of the Länder, support for membership varied from 77.7 percent in the Burgenland in the East, which in the negotiations had been awarded Objective 1 status 13 in the Structural Funds, to 56.7 percent in Tyrol in the West, where the referendum debate was dominated by the controversial transit and property issues. The ‘yes’ vote was significantly lower among women and younger age groups. This has been attributed to a more pronounced fear of job losses among low-skilled, low-paid female blue-collar workers (Birk et al. 1994:2), a general scepticism towards a ‘fortress Europe’ wrapped in red tape, and especially to the fear about an additional layer of faceless and technocratic bureaucracy which could be neither understood nor influenced.
The reason for the overwhelming ‘yes’ vote can be found in the expectation of a general economic advantage for Austria in the EU. During the discussion in the wake of the referendum, the political elites constantly stressed the danger of becoming economically isolated if Austria remained outside the EU. The reduced EFTA—so it was argued - could not provide a suitable alternative, in particular with Iceland and Switzerland being countries with a different economic structure. One report expected EU membership to result in accumulated extra growth of about 3.4 percent by the year 2000. Unemployment was predicted to be 1.4 percent lower than if Austria remained outside the EU (Felderer et al. 1994:45). According to exit polls, voters also mentioned a positive personal attitude towards integration and hopes for higher external security. Among those who voted against membership, agriculture and environmental concerns featured prominently. Significantly, only 15 percent mentioned neutrality, an argument frequently raised in the period up until the referendum by opponents on the political left, primarily by the Greens (Plasser and Ulram 1994:87). However, in the subsequent federal elections in October 1994 the two government parties combined lost more than 12 percent and, consequently, their previous two-thirds majority in Parliament. 14 Among the reasons for this loss were the relatively low mobilisation of the voters, the first electoral participation of the Liberal Forum Party, the lack of differentiation between the SPÖ and ÖVP which, according to a general European trend, are moving towards the middle of the political spectrum thus losing on the margins, and their early announcement of their intention to build a grand coalition once again. Further, the FPÖ managed to attract 22.5 percent of the votes due to their rigid anti-establishment course, speaking out against privileges, bureaucracy and EU membership (Müller et al. 1995).
Concerning the political effects of membership, Gerlich (1994:71) forecast a gain in manoeuvrability for the government and a change of traditional Austrian policy from reactive to anticipatory, from consensual to conflictive. What was clear from the beginning was that the balance between government, Parliament and the social partners would shift in the direction of the former. The Parliament was expected to lose its legislative monopoly (Neisser 1994:44), the public service would come under mounting pressure and the social partnership, the system which served Austria so well in the sixties and seventies but which had become a slight burden on modernisation, would change substantially too (Tálos 1994:179). What has become of these expectations?
Expectations and Results
Soon after the accession it became clear that all that glitters is not gold. Consequently, the first year was marked by a debate about the non-realised promises: a clear drop in consumer prices, safeguard of employment, the abolition of border controls, and the renouncement of a tax increase (Biffl 1996). The catchy press announcement of the then State Secretary Brigitte Ederer that membership in the EU would bring in about one thousand Austrian Shillings per month more for every household had to be corrected slightly. 15 The introduction of the convergence criteria for reaching a sound basis for the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and Austria’s decision to join EMU as early as possible put the reform of the Austrian budget on top of the government’s agenda. EU membership put an additional burden on the Austrian budget of about 0.7 percent of GDP for 1995, this figure rising in later years (Kaiser 1995b:416). 16 As a result, the structural budgetary problem, arising partly from generous welfare spending decisions before 1994 has been severely aggravated. An austerity budget was introduced which easily swallowed the day-to-day perceptible positive financial aspects of accession. The main target of the government’s concern was the restriction of all public bodies’ deficits to a 3 percent net deficit, respectively a total debt of 60 percent of GDP (Schaller 1996:27).
At the same time, around the beginning of 1995, the government loosened its (sometimes very colourful) efforts to convince the citizens of the gains of membership. 17 The heavy critique by the opposition parties which accused the government of wasting public money for biased information led to a resumption of the ‘information campaign’. The rising scepticism against membership is partly due to disappointments as to the promises given by the political elites, but also disillusionment as to the structural and institutional changes provoked by EU membership.
First and foremost, the perception of Austrian society as being composed of quite stable relationships of relatively equal interest groups suddenly was superimposed by the reality of antagonisms between winners and losers in the integration process. Against all predictions, unemployment has risen from 6.5 (1994) percent to 7.2 percent (1998) and the number of precarious jobs has also increased. 18
Second, Austria had been a latecomer in the European nation-building process. The idea of an Austrian nation was all but accepted after the demise of the Habsburg Empire, yet it became firmly established after the catastrophe of the Anschluss to Nazi Germany and the Second World War. Neutrality whose economic success led to a stable Austrian Schilling was a symbol that helped in shaping the self-assertiveness of Austria as a nation. Thus, Austrians were hardly aware of the fact that these assets are again being questioned by European integration.
Third, before 1989 Austrian neutrality had initially been reinterpreted to conform with the aim of EU membership, that is, as being restricted to the prohibition on membership in any military alliance. It was still referred to in the application text, but subsequently never mentioned in the entry negotiations. Instead, in June 1992 the Austrian government declared its “preparedness to participate in the CFSP and in its dynamic development actively and in a spirit of solidarity” (Jankowitsch 1994:57). Observer status in the Western European Union was taken up in 1995. Although the former geo-strategic function of neutrality may have been lost, a majority of Austrians still regard it as a valuable feature of their identity. The incumbent parties are themselves split on this issue. While the conservative Austrian minister of defence organised the first meeting of European defence ministers in 1998 during the EU presidency, prominent actors of the Social Democratic Party continue to reiterate that giving up neutrality is no option for the foreseeable future. 19
Institutional Changes
Besides the severe economic and financial adaptation problems, the institutional balance within the Austrian system was affected. Post-war consociational patterns of governance came under strain driving the system towards greater competition and confrontation.
As pointed out before, the Austrian political elite expected EU membership to be a catalyst for structural reform. In order to optimise its influence within the complex EU system, a more anticipatory policy-making style and swifter decision-making procedures had to be developed. The traditional, sometimes sluggish consultations with the social partnership institutions and with interest groups were not seen as enabling the Austrian political system to deal effectively with the complex multi-level system of the Union. From the aspect of the Länder, structural reform of the federal system was on top of the agenda for some years. The Landeshauptleute made their approval of accession dependant on successful reform of the federal system. 20 On 8 October 1992, a “Political Agreement on the Reform of the Federal State” was signed between the Länder and the federal government (Luther 1997) which included a general commitment to a redistribution of competencies in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, reform of the financial transfer system and the establishment of the Bundesrat as the representative of the Länder similar to the German model. A joint commission was to develop concrete proposals but no agreement has yet been reached. The Landeshauptleute removed the linkage after the overwhelming result of the referendum so as not to be seen as being responsible for the failure of EU entry.
In order to adapt the domestic decision-making structures to EU membership, three major problems had to be tackled: how to co-ordinate the governmental policy-making process, how to involve the Länder in it, and how to secure parliamentary scrutiny of government policy within the EU. The results have to be interpreted as a typical product of the Austrian corporatist system. The two coalition parties (SPÖ and ÖVP) decided on a system of formal equality. Today, EU policy is co-ordinated by the Federal Chancellory and the Foreign Ministry, the former being dominated by the SPÖ, the latter by the ÖVP. From a legal point of view, co-ordination within the Austrian government is only necessary in so far as a European topic enforces several ministries to act. This is mainly the result of a different distribution of competencies at the European level and within the Austrian bureaucracy. The political agreement to share the responsibilities and merits to a far greater extent goes back to the coalition agreement of 1994 (and a separate statute from 1996). 21
Once a week the government discusses the Austrian position for the next meetings of the Council of the EU. Under a special item on the agenda, the respective member of the government reports “about the subjects which for implementation need a governmental decision by law in the form of an oral or written cabinet address before the meeting of the Council of the EU where the decision is taken at the latest.” 22 The purpose of the cabinet address is to describe the subject and to justify the Austrian position. Furthermore, the coalition agreement demands a permanent information exchange between the ministries. Due to the potential role of the so-called Hauptausschuss (the Main Committee) of the Parliament granted by constitutional law, the heads and directors of the parliamentary groups of the government parties were granted the right of participation and speech in Austrian cabinet meetings.
The position of the permanent representative in COREPER 23 I and II is co-ordinated in a weekly jour fixe where all ministries, the Austrian National Bank, the Austrian Statistical Office, the League of cities and municipalities, the Standing Committee of the Austrian Länder and the social partners take part. As a general rule for common working groups, a system of periodic change in chairmanship was fixed between the parties.
Concerning the Länder, the federal government has been constitutionally bound to inform the Länder about all EU questions which affect their independent sphere of action or may otherwise be of interest to them (Article 23d of the B-VG 24 ). The Länder can issue a simple or qualified opinion from which the government can still deviate for important integration reasons, but it has to justify its decision within eight weeks. In addition, the federal government can transfer its participation in the Council of the EU to a representative nominated by the Länder (Article 23d paragraph 3 of the B-VG; Schäffer 1996; Rudolf 1997; Schambeck 1997). Foreseeing their shrinking influence without close co-operation, the Länder founded the so-called Integration Conference of the Länder, comprising the Landeshauptleute and the Standing Committee of the Länder. In practice, the Standing Committee plays only a marginal role since it is not provided with sufficient resources to cope with the enormous information overflow. Reflecting the EU Commission strategy of bypassing the federal governments, some of the Austrian Länder have opened representations in Brussels to improve their chances in lobbying.
In comparison to other national parliaments, the Austrian Parliament is provided with strong constitutionally embodied participation rights in the field of EU policy. 25 Articles 23e and 23f of the B-VG were introduced in a constitutional amendment in December 1994 regulating the rights of information and opinion. Thus, Morass (1996:39) speaks about the “special constitutional democratic legitimation” by the Parliament. Today, this assessment seems to be in need of a certain revamping. The government is obliged to inform the Parliament, i.e. its Hauptausschuss about any initiatives within the EU. Parliamentary scrutiny not only includes legislative initiatives but also political ones. Positions of the Hauptausschuss bind the government. An escape clause can be invoked by the government if there are “compelling reasons of integration policy” (Article 23e paragraph 2 of the B-VG). EU decisions which require constitutional changes in Austria necessarily demand the advance agreement of its Parliament. What in theory looks like a remedy for the lamented democratic deficit in domestic EU-related policy-making turns out to be of limited use in practice. Setting a tight scope for negotiations would impede the manoeuvrability of the acting minister and contradict the widespread practice of package deals in the EU (Österreichische Juristenkommission 1996:218). On the other hand, the Parliament simply cannot cope with the enormous amount of information—which may be a strategy of the bureaucracy (Falkner and Müller 1998) to neutralise the Parliament. In addition, the Parliament depends on the reports of the participating agents and has no possibility to get first-hand information due to the complex and non-transparent multi-level system of the EU. In 1995, the Parliament was informed of 17,317 European projects. 26 Around 100 of these projects became the subject of deliberation in the Hauptausschuss which finally issued 18 opinions. Between 1996 and 1997, 37,624 projects were conveyed to the Hauptausschuss, 106 have been dealt with, 11 statements were made at last. Considering that the Hauptausschuss comprises only 29 members, even a very selective approach can handle a fraction of the important issues. 27
To compensate the social partners for their loss of influence on Austrian European policy-making, the government parties in 1994 agreed on the so-called Europaabkommen (Agreement on Europe) which guaranteed them participation in important, for them relevant technical questions. At first, the federal government tried to secure their official involvement in the various working groups of the Council of the EU. However, equal participation in these groups failed because it would have been an infringement of EC law (Article 203 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community) which states that only representatives of the government have the right of vote and speech (Karlhofer and Tálos 1996:141).
The presidential element of the Austrian constitution has—contrary to some expectations before accession—not been strengthened. After a short disagreement between the Austrian Chancellor F. Vranitzky and the Austrian President T. Klestil on the occasion of the Corfu summit in June 1994 about who was going to be the main representative, the latter was limited to his constitutional role, i.e. he had no specific competence in European politics.
In the 1980s, Siedentopf and Ziller (1988) pointed to the importance of early preparation for successful implementation of EC law in the national legal systems. Since 1987, the Austrian federal government has taken care to have a domestic legal status conforming with the EC law. For this purpose, a guideline was issued which demands a check of all government bills regarding this conformity (Potacs and Pollak 1996:733; Potacs 1998). With Austrian accession to the EEA, around 1,600 EU regulations have been taken over. However, the 1996 report of the Commission on implementation of EC law shows a total of 819 complaints about Austria which is an improvement of some 14 percent compared with 1995 (1,145 cases). 28 Unfortunately, in the same period the Austrian share of non-implemented or poorly implemented directives rose by 15 percent. Concerning the implementation of inner-market directives, Austria occupied the last position in 1996 and 1997. The reasons for this delay are manifold: the federal distribution of competencies, the rigid constitutional principle of legality which demands a legal determination for state actions, and the still strong tradition of social partnership. Furthermore, implementation of the acquis demanded far reaching changes in the Austrian economic administrative law. At the same time, a staff reduction in public administration was under way due to budgetary reasons (Holzinger 1997; Potacs 1998). In November 1997, 10 percent of the directives have been notified as not having been implemented. However, in May 1998 a big leap took Austria to seventh position, with only 5 percent of directives then remaining unsettled. 29
Concerning Austria’s applications for preliminary rulings of the European Court of Justice, significant growth can be witnessed. In the first year of membership, Austria asked for 2, and in 1996 for 6 preliminary rulings. In comparison to Sweden and Finland, this is quite a standard development (Sweden 1995—6, 1996—4; Finland 1995—0, 1996—3). 30 But in 1997, the Austrian cases multiplied to 35 whereas Sweden asked for 4 and Finland for 6 preliminary rulings (European Commission 1996:513; 1997:481; 1998a:431). One possible explanation for this development might be that the awareness of Austrian judges concerning EC law is to a certain degree higher than among the judges in other new member-states.
Austria’s Position Within the EU and Financial Aspects
Compared to its population size, Austria occupies a strong position within European institutions. In the Council of the EU, Austria is provided with 4 votes out of the 87 necessary for qualified majority voting. The country has 21 parliamentarians in the European Parliament and 12 representatives both in the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. This is due to the special institutional structure of the European institutions which generally favours small member-states. Concerning the imminent decisions on reform of this structure before the next enlargement, Austria’s position is still fickle. Besides the usual calls for democratisation, transparency and grass-roots politics a clear concept is missing.
For the period from 1995 to 1999, Austria has received EUR 1,623 million (ATS 22 billion) from the structural funds of the EU. 31 Of this amount, 90 percent goes to programmes dealing with Objective 1 to 5 areas. 32 Until August 1998, around 57 percent of the ascribed amount from the structural funds had been consumed which means that Austria occupies a position in the top bracket in this regard. Considering that Austria had to invent the necessary administrative structure on communal, Länder and federal levels from scratch this is quite a considerable performance.
Because Austria had to agree to the immediate opening up of its market for agricultural products, compensatory payments were agreed upon. Since the conservative ÖVP has strong political roots in the farming community, these payments attract additional relevance. The total agricultural subsidies in 1997 amounted to EUR 2,107.5 million, of which the largest share was paid by the EU. Since accession, the expenditures for agriculture and forestry have increased significantly due to the fact that the fixed producer prices were adjusted to the EU level. What followed was an average lowering of the prices of agricultural products in the first year of membership which resulted in severe income losses for farmers. For securing these incomes, digressive compensation payments for 1995 until 1999 were agreed upon. In 1995, they amounted to EUR 523.2 million, in 1996 to EUR 312.5 million, and in 1997 to EUR 218 million.
With the accession to the EU, Austria also participated in the Fourth Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development which comprehended EUR 13.2 billion for the years 1995 to 1998. Until October 1998, a total of 63,000 project proposals had been handed in to Brussels of which 5,200 had Austrian co-operation partners. Thus, 1,306 projects with more than 1,670 Austrian partners have been approved. The Commission granted EUR 179.1 million for Austrian projects which were carried out by industry (which got 43 percent of the grant), universities (35 percent) and independent research institutions (14 percent). Concerning EU grants for education (SOKRATES and LEONARDO), around EUR 22.9 million was spent for Austria in the 1998-1999 study year.
Recently, the discussion about a new distribution of the financial sharing within the EU came to the fore again. Although the calculation of contributions and return flows is problematic, the following Table 1 can serve as a guide.
Table 1: Austrian Contributions and Return Flows
| 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| in EUR million | |||
| Austrian contributions | 1,762.90 | 1,874.00 | 2,110.40 |
| Return Flows | 902.30 | 1,660.50 | 1,386.80 |
| Balance | -860.50 | -213.50 | -723.60 |
Source: European Commission (1998B:27)
In 1998, Austria had a share of 2.6 percent of the total EU budget, and thus held the ninth position among the member-states of the EU. Due to difficulties in calculating the financial contributions and membership gains, the EU-Commission proposed a per capita scale. This means a per capita contribution of EUR 261 in 1997 (EUR 268.1 in 1998) which puts Austria in fifth position behind Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Belgium. In the recent discussion triggered by Germany’s Chancellor Schröder during the German presidency of Council of the EU in the first half of 1999, Austria joined the club of the dissatisfied together with Germany and Sweden lamenting about unjust burden-sharing in the EU. Being in favour of the EU’s eastern enlargement, Austria has not clarified its position on how this is to be financed. Nevertheless, the outcomes of the Berlin summit (24 and 25 March 1999) were hailed as a success by the Austrian government parties SPÖ and ÖVP. The Austrian net contribution was reduced to EUR 742 million (0.31 percent of the Austrian Gross National Product—GNP) until 2006 from previously EUR 851 million (0.43 percent of the Austrian GNP). A precondition for this reduction was the agreement for stabilisation of EU spending to 1.27 percent of the EU’s GNP 33 which amounts to a financial framework of EUR 686 billion until the year 2006. 34 From the Austrian point of view, the Agenda 2000 agreement sends a positive signal to the accession countries (Hungary, Poland, Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovenia) and guarantees the rapid enlargement of the EU to the East. 35
As a final point, we want to mention direct foreign investments in Austria. 1997 foreign investments amounted to EUR 1,534 billion, 76.6 percent coming from EU member-states (mainly Germany, Italy and Great Britain) thus fulfilling Austrian expectations about its international competitiveness.
Austrian Presidency of the European Council
In the second half of 1998, Austria fulfilled its first EU presidency, following the United Kingdom and preceding Germany. Since presidencies have significantly grown in importance over the last few decades in terms of co-ordinating European politics as well as in terms of enhancing the visibility of the Union, the Austrian presidency was relatively well prepared by the government administration. The management of the presidency was successful. The same could be said for the public spectacle during the various formal and informal summits. However, as to the political achievements of this presidency, a more sceptical judgement is in place. The two main goals of the Austrian presidency can be summarised by the slogans proposed by the government: Austria aims at to play the role of ‘honest broker’ in the policy process and wants to achieve greater ‘fitness’ of the EU particularly in view of the next enlargement. The government’s Programme of the Austrian EU-presidency 1998 (1998:1) lists the following points as “Goals and Priorities”:
The list contains such a variety of important themes that one can hardly qualify them all as priorities for a six-month presidency. Furthermore, these topics represent quite an unequal choice, the introduction of Euro being at that stage largely a technical issue, while the negotiations on Agenda 2000 and enlargement were subjects of political controversy. During the opening ceremony though, the Austrian Chancellor V. Klima and the Vice-chancellor W. Schüssel put the accent mainly on enlargement, while the Minister of Finance R. Edlinger pointed to tax harmonisation as his priority. 36
In terms of a first assessment of the Austrian EU Presidency, the following judgement could be proffered: many of the points listed above in the programme have not resulted either in concrete policies or pioneer steps which perhaps could not be expected given the size of the problems underlying them. Furthermore, Austrian initiatives in the process of EU enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe as well to Cyprus have not led to agreements about concrete time schedules. Beyond the Commission’s screening of applicants’ strategies for implementing the acquis communautaire and the achievements thereof, enlargement policy appears to lack strong political will by the key players from the member-states. This is partly due to the self-imposed budgetary constraints as a result of the Treaty of Maastricht as well as the stability pact and, partly, to the urgent, yet unanswered need for institutional reforms. At the same time, postponement of negotiations on Agenda 2000 until the German presidency was intimately linked to the question of enlargement. Interestingly, the Austrian Programme of the EU Presidency touched upon this highly delicate issue only very vaguely in that it referred to the Conclusions of the Summit in Cardiff in June 1998 where a more equal distribution of financial contributions by member-states is mentioned as being a matter of conflict. However, the Austrian Programme does not show any way out of the problem. Although expectations of finding such indications in an official paper might be too high, one could speculate about the links between this omission and the lack of results at the Vienna summit in December 1998.
Similarly, although listed among the priorities the issue of democracy and legitimacy is not tackled any further in the text of the Programme. Only the conclusions drawn at the Summit of Cardiff are mentioned which state that as a first step the President of the European Council will call for an informal summit in order to deepen discussions about the future of Europe. To this the Austrian Programme adds that the Presidency will take care to improve co-operation with the European Parliament and to respect the regional dimension of the integration process, whereby it remains unclear whether this formula simply translates the principle of subsidiarity or something else. The informal summit took place in Pörtschach in October 1998. The agenda of this summit, however, did not focus on democracy nor the institutional reform but on unemployment and CFSP.
Conclusion
Although not all of the promises did prove true, the first years of Austrian membership in the EU have been quite successful. External pressure led to faster modernisation of the economy 37 and the administration. In particular, the ‘Europeanisation’ of the public administration during the Austrian presidency of the Council of the EU is an invaluable asset. 38 Still, the process of domestic economic and political adjustment to the conditions of membership is far from concluded. Since European integration must itself be regarded as an ongoing process with its own specific problems and deficiencies rather than a finalised idea which only needs to be put into practice, a constant, flexible approach is required.
Compared to the traditional way of policy-making in Austria, EU membership has required a more intensive and informal co-ordination procedure between the participating agents due to the constant time pressure. Because there is no clear and stable distribution of competencies at the EU level, a more creative modus operandi is needed. The explosive growth of the information that has to be dealt with leads to quite selective attention as the only way to keep track with the most important issues. As Falkner and Müller (1998) conclude from their study, conflicts between Austrian agents about goals within the EU’s policy-making become relative, whereas struggles for competencies come to the fore. Inner Austrian conflicts take a back seat; only when implementation of EU directives is on the agenda (the process which leaves certain room for manoeuvrability) do the old corporatist patterns reappear.
May 1999
References
Ambrosius, G. (1996) Wirtschaftsraum Europa. Vom Ende der Nationalökonomien. Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer.
Austrian Parliament (1999) Information. Vienna, 18 February.
Bergmann, T. (1997) National Parliaments and EU Affairs Committees: Notes on Empirical Variation and Competing Explanations. Journal of European Public Policy 4, 373-87.
Biffl, G. (1996) Makroökonomische Entwicklung: Wachstumseinbrüche und Beschäftigungs-rückgang. In E. Talós and G. Falkner (eds ) EU-Mitglied Österreich. Gegenwart und Perspektiven: Eine Zwischenbilanz, 99-115. Vienna: Mantz.
Birk, F., G. Feistritzer, E. Gehmacher, C. Hofinger and G. Ogris (1994) Die Abstimmung. Die Märchen über die Volksabstimmung. Zukunft—Zeitschrift für Politik, Wirtschaft und Kultur (7), 5-8.
Bischof, G. and A. Pelinka (1996) Austro-Corporatism: Past—Present—Future. In G. Bischof and A. Pelinka (eds) Contemporary Austrian Studies, Vol. 4, 21-52. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publ.
European Commission (1988) Research on the Cost of Non-Europe. Luxembourg: Office of Official Publications.
European Commission (1996) General Report on the Activities of the European Union. Luxembourg: Office of Official Publications.
European Commission (1997) General Report on the Activities of the European Union. Luxembourg: Office of Official Publications.
European Commission (1998a) General Report on the Activities of the European Union. Luxembourg: Office of Official Publications.
European Commission (1998b) Austria in the European Union. Luxembourg: Office of Official Publications.
Falkner, G. and W. C. Müller, eds (1998) Österreich im europäischen Mehrebenensystem. Konsequenzen der EU-Mitgliedschaft für Politiknetzwerke und Entscheidungsprozesse. Vienna: Signum.
Federal Chamber of Labour (1994) EU-Konsequenz, Nr. 1011. Vienna: Federal Chamber of Labour.
Felderer, B., R. Koman, K. Pichelmann and A. Wörgötter (1994) “Wirtschaftliche Folgen der Ausgrenzung Österreichs von der EU”. Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies Research Report.
Gehler, M. and R. Steininger, eds (1993) Österreich und die europäische Integration 1945-1993. Aspekte einer wechselvollen Entwicklung. Vienna/Cologne/Weimar: Böhlau.
Gehler, M. and W. Kaiser (1997) A Study in Ambivalence: Austria and European Integration 1945-95. Contemporary European History 6(1), 75-99.
Gerlich, P. (1992) Farewell to Corporatism. In K. Luther K. and W. C. Müller (eds) Politics in Austria, 132-46. London: Cass.
Gerlich, P. (1994) Regierungspolitik und Europäische Union. In P. Gerlich and H. Neisser (eds) Europa als Herausforderung. Wandlungsimpulse für das politische System Österreichs, 71-111. Vienna: Signum.
Granell, F. (1995) The European Union’s Enlargement Negotiations with Austria, Finland, Norway and Sweden. Journal of Common Market Studies 33(1), 117-41.
Griller, S. (1995) Zur demokratischen Legitimation der Rechtsetzung in der EU. Journal für Rechtspolitik 3, 164-79.
Holzinger, G. (1997) Umsetzung und Anwendung des Gemeinschaftsrechts in Österreich. In S. Magiera and H. Siedentopf (eds) Die Zukunft der Europäischen Union, 87-104. Berlin: Duncker & Humbolt.
Jankowitsch, P. (1994) The Process of European integration and Neutral Austria. In S. Harden (ed.) Neutral States and the European Community, 35-62. London: Brassey’s.
Kaiser, W. (1995a) Die EU-Volksabstimmungen in Österreich, Finland, Schweden und Norwegen: Folgen für die Europäische Union. Integration 18(2), 76-87.
Kaiser, W. (1995b) Austria in the European Union. Journal of Common Market Studies 33(3), 411-25.
Karlhofer, F. and E. Tálos (1996) Sozialpartnerschaft und EU. Integrationsdynamik und Handlungsrahmen der österreichischen Sozialpartnerschaft. Vienna: Signum.
Khol, A. (1995) Demokratieabbau durch EU-Regierungsgesetzgebung? In: Österreichische Parlamentarische Gesellschaft (ed.) Festschrift 75 Jahre Bundesverfassung, 273-88. Vienna: Verlag Österreich.
Lairaiter, C., C. Schaller, H. Sickinger, A. Vretscha and T. Weniger (1994), Die österr. EG Diskussion in den Ländern: Vergleichende Analyse von regionalen Konfliktpotentialen in sechs Bundesländern. Österreichische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 23(1), 67-88.
Luther, K. R. (1997) Bund-Länder Beziehungen: Formal- und Realverfassung. In Herbert Dachs et al. (eds) Handbuch des Politischen Systems Österreichs. Die Zweite Republik, 907-19. Vienna: Manz.
Morass, M. (1996) Österreich im Entscheidungsprozess der Europäischen Union. In E. Tálos and G. Falkner (eds) EU-Mitglied Österreich. Gegenwart und Perspektiven: Eine Zwischenbilanz, 32-49. Vienna: Manz.
Müller, W. C., F. Plasser and P. Ulram, eds (1995 ) Wählerverhalten und Parteienwettbewerb. Analysen der Nationalratswahl 1994. Vienna: Signum.
Neisser, H. (1994) Parlamentsreform und Europäische Union. In P. Gerlich and H. Neisser (eds) Europa als Herausforderung. Wandlungsimpulse für das politische System Österreichs, 43-69. Vienna: Signum.
Neisser, H. (1998) Die Mitwirkungsbefugnisse des Nationalrates im Entscheidungsprozeß der Europäischen Union. In H. Schäffer et al. (eds) Staat—Verfassung—Verwaltung. Festschrift für Friedrich Koja, 335-55. Vienna and New York: Springer.
Österreichische Juristenkommission, ed. (1996) Kritik und Fortschritt im Rechtsstaat. Österreich in der EU. Vienna: Verlag Österreich.
Pelinka, A., ed. (1994) EU-Referendum. Zur Praxis direkter Demokratie in Österreich. Vienna: Signum.
Plasser, F. and P. Ulram (1994) Meinungstrends, Mobilisierung und Motivlagen bei der Volksabstimmung über den EU-Beitritt. In A. Pelinka (ed.) EU-Referendum. Zur Praxis direkter Demokratie in Österreich, 87-119. Vienna: Signum.
Potacs, M. (1998) Erfahrungen eines neuen Mitgliedstaates im Hinblick auf die europäische Rechtseinheit—das Beispiel Österreichs. Europarecht (suppl.1), 59-71.
Potacs, M. and C. Pollak (1996) Österreichischer Landesbericht. In J. Schwarze (ed.) Das Verwaltungsrecht unter europäischem Einfluss, 733-85. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
Programme of the Austrian EU-Presidency 1998 (1998). Available at: http://www.austria.gv.at/.
Representation of the European Commission in Austria (1998) Österreich in der Europäischen Union. Vienna: Representation of the European Commission in Austria.
Rudolf, W. (1997) Die Mitwirkung der Länder bei der Willensbildung in Europa. In D. Dörr and M. Dreher (eds) Europa als Rechtsgemeinschaft, 33-52. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
Schäffer, H. (1996) Österreichs Beteiligung an der Willensbildung der Europäischen Union, insbesondere an der europäischen Rechtssetzung. Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht 50, 3-73.
Schaller, C. (1994) ‘Ja’ oder ‘Nein’ zu ‘Europa’. Die österreichische EU-Debatte im Vorfeld der Volksabstimmung unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Konfliktlinien im Parteiensystem—ein Rekonstruktionsversuch. In A. Pelinka (ed.) EU-Referendum. Zur Praxis direkter Demokratie in Österreich, 49-86. Vienna: Signum.
Schaller, C. (1996) Zur Diskussion umd den österreichischen EU-Beitritt. In E. Tálos and G. Falkner (eds) EU-Mitglied Österreich. Gegenwart und Perspektiven: Eine Zwischenbilanz, 17-31. Vienna: Manz.
Schambeck, H. (1997) Regierung und Kontrolle in Österreich. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
Schneider, H. (1990) Alleingang nach Brüssel. Österreichs EG-Politik. Bonn: Europa Union.
Siedentopf, H. and J. Ziller (1988) L´Europe des Administrations? La mise en oeuvre de la législation communautaire dan les Etats Membres. Brussels: Bruylant.
Stadler, G. (1995) Europarecht. Verträge—Gesetze—Dokumente. Vienna: Mantz.
Tálos, E. (1994) Interessenvermittlung und Interessenkonzertierung. In P. Gerlich and H. Neisser (eds) Europa als Herausforderung. Wandlungsimpulse für das politische System Österreichs, 159-184. Vienna: Signum.
Tálos, E. (1996) Corporatism—The Austrian Model. In V. Lauber (ed.) Contemporary Austrian Politics, 103-23. Boulder, CO: Westview.
Tálos, E. and B. Kittel (1999) Interessenvermittlung und politischer Entscheidungsprozess: Sozialpartnerschaft in den 1990er Jahren. In F. Karlhofer and E. Tálos (eds) Sozialpartnerschaft. Wandel und Reformfähigkeit. Vienna, forthcoming.
Wieser, T. and E. Kitzmantel (1990) Austria and the European Community. Journal of Common Market Studies 28(4), 431-49.
Endnotes
*: Univ. Doz. Dr. Sonja Puntscher-Riekmann is director of the Research Unit for Institutional Change and European Integration of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, lecturer at the Universities of Vienna and Innsbruck, and chairwoman of the Austrian Political Science Association.
Dr. Johannes Pollak is Research Fellow at the Research Unit for Institutional Change and European Integration of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, and lecturer at the Universities of Vienna and Salzburg. Back.
Note 1: Of course, permanent neutrality was the condition upon which Austria gained new independence. Back.
Note 2: From 1947 to 1966, Austria was governed by a grand coalition between the ÖVP (Österreichische Volkspartei— the Austrian People’s Party) and the SPÖ (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs— the Social Democratic Party of Austria); in 1966 the ÖVP gained an overall majority which lasted until 1970, followed by a minority government under Bruno Kreisky from the SPÖ. In 1975 the SPÖ gained an overall majority. From 1983 to 1986, Austria was governed by a small coalition between the SPÖ and the FPÖ (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs— the Freedom Party of Austria). Since 1987, Austria has been ruled by a grand coalition between SPÖ and ÖVP again, the ÖVP being the junior partner. Back.
Note 3: France, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Federal Republic of Germany. Back.
Note 4: Federal Law Gazette , Nos 466 and 467/1972. Back.
Note 5: After the failing of the ‘Werner-Plan’ which meant to introduce an economic and monetary union, the fading away of the idea of a social union and external crisis factors the integration seemed to be somewhat stalled. The free exchange of goods was still hampered by countless regulations, non-competitive industries were subsidised and the common agricultural market was thwarted by compensation payments. A situation for which the term Euro-sclerosis to mark the standstill was coined (Ambrosius 1996:145). Back.
Note 6: The four freedoms were already laid down in the Treaty of Rome (1957)—their political implementation took a long time. The same holds true for the monetary union, being on the agenda from the Werner Plan (1970) till Maastricht (1992). Back.
Note 7: The Austrian parliament approved of this membership application with a large majority in June 1989 (Resolution E125 from 29 June 1989). For the full text of the application, see Stadler (1995: Chapter 39). Back.
Note 8: On the negotiations, see Granell (1995). Back.
Note 9: Austria had requested a sugar quota of 400,000 tonnes and a milk quota of 2.9 million tonnes. Back.
Note 10: The Transit Agreement (Federal Law Gazette , No. 823/1992) was confirmed in Protocol No. 9 to the Accession Treaty (Stadler 1995:47). Back.
Note 11: EU membership was generally considered to fundamentally affect various central constitutional principles, such as the democratic and federal principles, amounting to a so-called Gesamtänderung (total revision) of the constitution that, according to Article 44, requires a referendum in addition to a two-thirds majority in the Parliament. Back.
Note 12: The FPÖ only changed its position towards the European integration of 1991/92. It had previously been an ardent supporter of the integration process. The sudden change of Jörg Haider led to the formation of the splinter group called the Liberal Forum Party in February 1993. Back.
Note 13: A region is eligible for Objective 1 status if per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in such a region is below 75 percent of the EC average. Back.
Note 14: This enabled the opposition to press for strong controlling rights for the Parliament in EU-issues (Khol 1995; Neisser 1998). Back.
Note 15: Joint press conference of Brigitte Ederer and Johann Ettl (Vienna, Federal Chamber of Labour, 28 December 1994). The statements were based on the study of the Federal Chamber of Labour (1994). Back.
Note 16: A valuable source for studying the development of the Austrian budget is the monthly reports of the Austrian Institute for Economic Research, also published online and available at http://www.wifo.ac.at/. Back.
Note 17: For a discussion of the Austrian government’s advertising efforts, see Schaller (1994). Back.
Note 18: Employment figures based on statistics from the Federal Ministry of Work, Health and Social Affairs, January 1999. Data also available from the Austrian Employment Service on the Internet: http://www.ams.or.at/amsallg/index.htm Back.
Note 19: In the wake of NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo, Austria was asked to permit fly-over rights for NATO aircraft. This was refused with reference to the Austrian status of neutrality and it stirred up a new debate between the two coalition partners, the ÖVP speaking in favour of NATO accession, the SPÖ being defiantly against it. Back.
Note 20: , the strengthening of the regional parliaments (Landtage ), and even the set-up of Constitutional Courts in the Länder all of which was refused by the Länder Back.
Note 21: Circular of the Federal Chancellory and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 19 January 1996, part I. Back.
Note 23: Comité des Représentant Permanents —Committee of Permanent Representatives. Back.
Note 24: The acronym B-VG stands for Bundesverfassungsgesetz (Austrian Constitutional Law). Back.
Note 25: The Austrian model to involve the Parliament in EU-politics is discussed in Griller (1995) and Bergmann (1997). Back.
Note 26: One must not forget that this huge number comprises proposals of legislative acts, reports, opinions, invitations to meetings, agendas, requests for preliminary rulings, etc. Around 70 percent of the documents came from the Council of the EU, 20 percent from the European Commission, 7 percent from the Permanent Representation of Austria in Brussels, 1 percent from the European Court of Justice, 1 percent from the European Parliament and 1 percent from the European Court of Auditors (Austrian Parliament 1999). Back.
Note 27: Further investigations into the reality of this practice are needed, in particular to the real weight of parliamentary opinions in the negotiations of the respective minister at the EU-level and are currently done by the Research Unit for Institutional Change and European Integration of the Austrian Academy of Sciences. Back.
Note 28: KOM [97] 299 final, II.A. Back.
Note 29: Press communiqué of the European Commission from 18 May 1998. Back.
Note 30: European Commission (1996; 1997; 1998a). Back.
Note 31: The numbers and data in this paragraph are taken from Representation of the European Commission in Austria (1998). Back.
Note 32: Objective 1: development and structural adjustment for regions lagging behind—compare note 13; Objective 2: Conversion of regions, border regions and smaller areas badly hit by industrial decline; Objective 3: Combating long-term unemployment and easing the entry into the labour market of young people and those at risk of exclusion; Objective 4: Facilitating workers’ adaptation to industrial change and changes in the production systems; Objective 5: Stimulating the development of rural areas by accelerating the adjustment of agricultural structures. The preconditions for granting aid are that the area should be characterised by a low population density, a high proportion of the labour force employed in agriculture, low level of agricultural earnings and a below-average overall regional economy. Initiatives: Instruments for solving specific problems, e.g. INTERREG (cross-border co-operation between regions), URBAN (development of urban areas). Back.
Note 33: In the year 2006, EU spending will correspond to 1.13 percent of the EU’s GNP. Back.
Note 34: For the detailed results in the respective policy areas, see: http://www.austria.gv.at/. Back.
Note 35: See: http://europa.eu.int/comm/. Back.
Note 36: “Austria plans push for tax harmonisation” (Financial Times , 2 July 1998, p.1). Back.
Note 37: Data on this process can be found on the web site of the Austrian Federal Chancellory: http://www.austria.gv.at/e/. Back.
Note 38: This fact was constantly stressed by senior officials of the Austrian administration during a conference hosted by the Research Unit for Institutional Change and European Integration of the Austrian Academy of Sciences on “The Austrian Presidency of the European Union: Assessment and Perspectives”, Vienna 19-20 March 1999. Conference report forthcoming, available via: http://www.iwe.oeaw.ac.at. Back.