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Journal of International Relations and Development
Modern European Diplomacy: A Research Agenda
By Knud Erik Jørgensen
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Introduction
Combinations of the terms ‘modern’, ‘European diplomacy’, and ‘theory’ remain somewhat rare birds in studies of European diplomacy. I believe this is an unfortunate state of affairs. Hence, my aim in the present article is to make clear why connections should be made and to suggest how they can be made.
When European politicians and diplomats characterise their own activities, they sometimes call contemporary European diplomacy ‘modern’. However, most often the designation happens en passant, without any more profound reflections about how contemporary diplomacy is ‘modern’ and hence how it is different from previous forms of diplomacy. I think, however, that this remains an interesting idea which deserves more attention than it has attracted so far.
By ‘modern European diplomacy’, I understand the subtle interplays between national and European levels of policymaking which have evolved over the last thirty years, i.e. a period characterised by greater or lesser degrees of cooperation within the field of foreign policy in the European Community’s European Political Cooperation (EPC), as well as the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and concerning defence matters including those dealt with by the Western European Union (WEU). It should be emphasised, however, that by focusing on multilateral diplomacy I am not implying that other, traditional forms of European diplomacy have substantially disappeared. Thus, it would be incorrect to argue that the demise of ‘the bilateral embassy’ in Western Europe demonstrates the withering away of bilateral diplomacy. We are witnessing changes in the forms and functions, not disappearance of well-established patterns.
The tradition of diplomatic studies has been slow to incorporate European diplomacy’s multilateral forms. Articles on the CFSP in journals like Diplomatic History and Diplomacy and Statecraft are rare — not least because the EPC/CFSP/WEU experience, developed over the past thirty years or so, is short in historical terms. The truth is that studies focusing on multilateral forms of diplomacy have been conducted mainly within the pragmatic traditions of foreign policy analysis and non-theoretical policy studies. As for theory, my point of departure is that we Europeans have not been particularly good at developing international relations theory. Since International Relations (IR) was established as an independent discipline, theorising has mainly been an American enterprise. Hoffmann reminded his European readers of this fact in the mid-1970s when he wrote an article with the provocative title, An American Social Science: International Relations (Hoffmann 1977). 1 In case we had forgotten this article, Hoffmann and Keohane were kind enough to remind us in 1990 that European studies of the dynamics of integration tend to be "longer on detailed description than analysis" (Keohane and Hoffmann 1990:276). To a considerable degree, Kahler (1993) shares Hoffmann and Keohane’s critique. Yet Kahler acknowledges that the transatlantic balance in this issue has changed slightly, and it would be appropriate to add that British scholars, primarily, have contributed to this slightly changed transatlantic balance of IR scholarship, while the continent’s European scholars still lag far behind. Indeed, sometimes it seems as if we are not in the same race, and it is precisely because of this European theory handicap that I have written this article. It is basically a plea for more theoretically informed, empirical analysis of modern European diplomacy.
It’s a Jungle Out There!
How can we approach modern European diplomacy theoretically? I acknowledge it is risky to make pleas for a theoretically informed, empirical analysis. Yet, what is even more risky is to engage in such endeavour. First, because it easily results in both theoretically minded and empirically minded scholars being left equally dissatisfied with the results. It is widely accepted that the two scholarly communities often have different objectives for their research, and a pronounced mutual scepticism is discernible. Second, because the supply of potentially useful theories is very impressive. We have a veritable jungle out there, and it is inhabited by intellectual ‘species’ with fashionable names such as ‘schools’, ‘paradigms’, ‘theories’, and ‘traditions’. It takes time to become familiar with all these perspectives and, therefore, to engage in theoretical consideration of diplomacy can become an obstacle, rather than a helpful endeavour. You can get lost — and when you realise that you have lost your way and ask for advice — you may get the same answer as the man in Hedsomewhere in Scotland. The man asked a farmer if he could tell him which was the way to Edinburgh: "‘Oh Sir’, the farmer replied, ‘if I were you, I shouldn’t start from here’" (Bull 1977:295).
If you decide to engage, not only in theoretical but also in metatheoretical issues, your steps can become even more fatal, which is probably the reason you can see many warning signs around. Some consider metatheory to be simply "dead ends [because] they fail to enhance the understanding of our subject matter" (Holsti 1989:260-1). 2 Others claim that travelling the path of ‘higher methodology’ may result in the traveller not returning from the journey (Barry 1970). Still others regard metatheory as an example of travelling becoming the purpose of the journey (Jørgensen 1993). Despite all these more or less friendly warnings, I stick to my plea for theoretically informed, empirical analysis (Jørgensen 1997b). It should be noted that being ‘theoretically informed’ includes different exercises, ranging from conceptual analysis to theoretical-deductive ‘testing’ of a given theory against data, and on to exploratory studies leading eventually to theory construction. In short, a structured examination of a research agenda for developing studies of modern European diplomacy.
In the following sections I will focus on three basic critiques of the current state of affairs in research on common European foreign policy:
Subsequently, I will respond to each type of criticism in as constructive a fashion as I can. The obvious and logical response to the critique of unconnectedness is, first, to introduce some sort of connection and, second, to explore options of synthesis and coordination. To overcome the problem of timelessness and formalism, we can introduce change and transformation. A solution to tackle the lack of context requires the introduction of context — in one appropriate form or another — as each case requires.
Connecting Floating Islands of Research
The problem of disconnectedness exists in different versions. You meet one version when consulting your library where you will probably find that literature on modern European diplomacy is located in different sections: here, books on national foreign policy; there, books on EPC/CFSP; over there, books on diplomacy; and around the corner, we will find books on theory. This physical separation is, of course, not a real problem. It is just a convenient way for library staff to organise books. Nor is it a real problem when some analysts choose to make an analytical distinction between national and European levels of decision-making. In other words, analytical distinctions can be excused, indeed useful, if the analyst has convincing arguments for such distinctions. It is simply an inevitable fact that European diplomacy is very complex, and we have to simplify, concentrate and be selective in order to analyse it.
However, there are, in my opinion, two real problems. The first is that different fields of research remain separated, or the degree of disconnection remains too high. The research community has not organised its own ‘intergovernmental conferences’ where the need for adjustments and reforms can be discussed. One example of ‘real-life’ change is the gradual rapprochement between economic and political dimensions of the external relations of the European Union (EU). Has it prompted a major shift in analytical approach? Not really. Another example is the EU’s involvement in crisis management. Has it prompted increasing cooperation between those scholars who focus on defence topics and those who focus on economic and political topics? In other words, has the scholarly community been more successful in merging different research agendas than, say, policy-makers have been in merging the Council Secretariat and the CFSP Secretariat?
The second real problem is that distinctions are often made implicitly and without arguments. When the analyst reproduces the separation in the library uncritically and sometimes even without knowing it — as if the different fields of study exist in worlds apart — the pre-programmed result is that dialectics between national, European and international layers of policy-making are obscured, and that interplays between layers of policy-making therefore remain unexamined. I would claim that most published books and articles on the foreign policy of EU Member States neglect the European dimension (CFSP, European Community, WEU). In research of common European foreign policies, it is more difficult to neglect the national foreign policy dimension. Yet, when Hill published his first book (1983) on national foreign policies and the EPC, he did introduce a novel approach. Until the publication of his book, it had been common to focus almost exclusively on institutional arrangements or on the output of these arrangements. Hill simply brought state actors back in and thereby contributed to changing the focus of studies on the EPC.
In the following sections my aim is to bridge some of the hitherto largely unconnected positions. I begin with the assumption that there is a two-way flow of influence between national and European levels of foreign policy-making. Indeed, some of the existing theories are precisely about such flows of influence.
Figure 1 appears to be a very simple model showing two interrelated layers of policy-making. As is often the case, ‘the devil is in the detail’ which in this figure are the arrows. Relevant questions include:
| Figure 1: Interplay between National Foreign Policy and EPC/CFSP/WEU |
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The answer to the first question can be established by the help of both deductive and inductive methods. The deductive method implies that we, as part of an existing theory, assume that the relationship is thus and so. Then we construct an adequate number of hypotheses tested against empirical evidence to reach a conclusion. The inductive method implies that we, on the basis of a certain number of case studies, construct a theoretical claim about the character of the relationship. It would be misleading to claim that one method is better than the other. Each has its strengths and limitations. Orthodoxy is to be avoided, and the best means to do so is to regard the issue as essentially empirical. The second question is more difficult, and the answer depends a great deal on the research design chosen. As a minimum, the scholar should make clear which type of impact (s)he is looking for, and consider the consequences of this choice.
In more concrete terms, does the CFSP cause national foreign policy-making to move in a specific direction? Many scholars with a behavioural mindset cannot imagine anything else but causal relations. In the European universities of today, we have quite a few of the Professor Pangloss type known from Voltaire’s Candide, i.e. characters preoccupied with the study of cause and effect. According to Smith (1995:15-16), “much of the literature of international relations since the 1950s” is based on causal explanation. However, instead of continuing to discuss these questions abstractly, I will use some examples to illustrate my major points. I will begin with the more straight-forward impact: How do EU member-states influence the CFSP?
CFSP: the Instrumental View
The impact of national governments on the CFSP is part of modern European diplomacy’s rationale — in other words, what it was established for: a tool for national foreign policy to be used when convenient — and not used if deemed inconvenient. Hence, in some cases the CFSP merely functions as a cover for national foreign policy: a national initiative is presented within the framework of CFSP and supported by other member-states and then presented as a European diplomatic initiative. Examples of such multilateralisation are legion, ranging from German Ostpolitik, the Italian security guarantee to Malta, joint Anglo-French policy towards ex-Yugoslavia, Danish policy towards the Baltic States’ independence. Moreover, how did the EU get a policy towards Latin America if not for the sponsorship of Spain and Portugal? Reasons for EU member-states to Europeanise certain initiatives include increased credibility and legitimacy as well as a substantial reduction of risk. Thus, it is clear that the CFSP sometimes functions merely as a multiplier. There is a certain ‘politics of scale’ involved in these processes (Ginsberg 1989). This ‘politics of scale’ can hardly be surprising because coalitions and alliances are created with this purpose in mind, so why not expect the same to occur in the CFSP?
Soetendorp (1994), among others, suggests that the CFSP can be analysed as a European regime. This would be consistent with the version of regime theory which is based on or oriented by a ‘contractarian’ view of international politics (Wendt and Duvall 1989:52-8). The approach appears attractive because it bridges research on the CFSP with the vast literature on regimes that has emerged over the last twenty years or so. Yet, this seems to be an inconsistent solution. The main reason is that regimes are issue specific and the CFSP is not an issue area but rather a quite impressive cluster of issues. A cluster which has recently assumed an almost tous azimut character.
CFSP: Influencing National Policy-making
After the examples of national influence on the CFSP, I will take a closer look at the reverse flow of influence. In other words, I will turn to the CFSP’s impact on national foreign policy-making. This impact is even more controversial, as the CFSP is probably not supposed to have too much of it. I also acknowledge that the examples I can provide are, to some degree, unintended consequences of intergovernmental cooperation. Yet, the impact’s origin should not lead to underestimation of its influence on national foreign policy making.
I will look for impacts on four dimensions: organisation, identity, the so-called acquis politique, and the time dimension. First, the organisation dimension deals with the organisation of foreign ministries in member-states. According to a Dutch senior official, the CFSP has a significant impact: “you gain something, not sovereignty but some influence, participation, contacts, relationships — it is even reflected in the structure of the Foreign ministry. I mean, this ministry is not disappearing — look at it, even the building is growing — because we now have even greater responsibilities” (Tonra 1997:197). Is the foreign ministry in the Hague unique in this respect? I do not think so. It is not the only ministry which has been reorganised and upscaled due to EU membership. I do not have data to generalise these findings but I would expect the conclusion of a systematic comprehensive analysis to be that the CFSP has had a significant impact on the manner in which member-state’s foreign ministries are organised (Barbé 1995; Ortega 1995; Hocking and Spence 1999).
The second dimension, identity, is both crucial and difficult to measure. The term ‘identity’ has a very well developed immune system to satisfactory definition. Indeed, all definitions tend in a certain sense to be flawed. Interesting work on ‘identity’ has nevertheless emerged (Cohen 1998; Neumann 1996; Wendt 1992; Lapid and Kratochwil 1997). What is Germany’s identity after the end of the Cold War? Hellmann (1996; Kratochwil 1982) reports about six different answers among German scholars and demonstrates, thereby, that German identity is contested and changeable. When identity, conceived of in this way, is subsequently translated into national interests, the resulting identity-interest nexus has serious ramifications for a conception of national interest which is fixated or relegated into the sphere of assumptions. A former Danish Minister of Defence once remarked about diplomats from the three new members of the EU (Sweden, Finland, and Austria) that, “[I]t’s remarkable how different they are in their outlook. And it’s remarkable how much we have changed during the period we have been members of the EU.” 3 Politicians, diplomats and scholars are currently reconsidering the Netherlands’ international status and contemplate whether ‘middle power’ is an appropriate term to use. The three new members of the EU, Austria, Sweden and Finland, are in the process of reconsidering their neutral past — but also ‘where to next’?
The third dimension is the so-called acquis politique. The term describes the obligations EU member-states have in the field of foreign policy. Some scholars think the term is empty (realists constitute an obvious example). Their typical argument is that European states, whether EU members or not, exist in an anarchic international system. Seen from this perspective, it is bordering on nonsense to speak about ‘binding rules’ (Lipson 1991:502-8). Others are also critical of the term but focus on the distinction between politically and legally binding rules (Curti Gialdino 1995; Wessel 1997). Still others argue that diplomats, in modern European diplomacy, have to follow certain rules of the game, some of which are explicit and some not (Jørgensen 1997a). Explicit rules are codified in treaties and political agreements. While these rules are based on the unwritten social norms for appropriate behaviour in European diplomacy they are usually complied with — even in the absence of an authority to enforce the rules. Obviously, it would be foolish to argue that member-states never behave in ways which harm the CFSP. Yet, it is also possible to point out numerous examples in which member-states would have acted differently, had they not been members. Thus, Germany would have adopted a different policy on recognition of Slovenia and Croatia (Jakobsen 1995; Lucarelli 1998); Brückner (1990:179) points out that European permanent members of the United Nations Security Council feel bound by common European policies; it is well-known that France during the first years under President Mitterrand had problems with the common European policy on the Middle East — but then adapted; finally, the first Italian government under Silvio Berlusconi found they had problems with borders around Trieste, yet then adapted to a European stance, i.e. realising that the issue was a non-issue. In my view, analysing the balance between the two types of behaviour is an analytical task, not something which should remain hidden in various theoretical assumptions.
The impact of the fourth dimension, time, has, unfortunately, only rarely been reflected upon. Ekengren (1997, 1998) is among the few who has engaged in such research. He argues that European governance has a significant impact on the national level of decision-making (Figure 2). Ekengren’s argument concerns the EU as such, but it applies equally well to the CFSP. The ‘Yard Stick’ model might at first glance seem complex but it actually describes a single, simple and important factor, namely the idea that modern European diplomacy has changed the way diplomats use their time. This change in diplomacy’s time-structuring is probably most felt by the new members of the EU, who have not been through a long adaptation and socialisation period. The EU calendar constitutes the European time frame from which national and domestic calendars, so to speak, are derived. The dotted line in figure 1 indicates a system with such dense interplays between national and European levels of policy-making, that we are close to having a system of decision-making, i.e. the Europolity’s branch in the field of foreign policy. This modern European polity is very decentralised, multi-layered and has policy outputs at different levels. The actors involved are gradually socialised in the sense of behaving social rather than like egoists. The polity can be seen as resembling closely Allison’s (1971) bureaucratic politics model with its competition between subentities and suboptimal outputs.
Timelessness, Modern European Diplomacy and Change
The problem of timelessness is more difficult, and has numerous consequences for research design. Timelessness is sometimes explicit in theories, and sometimes it is implicit in reflections on diplomacy.
Stephen Jay Gould makes a useful distinction between two images of historical development: ‘time’s circle’ and ‘time’s arrow’ (Jervis 1991:44-6). The image of the ‘time’s circle’ implies that no promise of progress can be given, no development and change expected. History repeats itself in circles. The time dimension disappears and we find ourselves in a state of timelessness where Thycudides and Machiavelli’s insights are as relevant as ever. One of the discrete charms of timelessness is, of course, that complex phenomena can be transformed into relatively simple phenomena:
Timelessness makes it possible to construct theories which are similar to those known from economics, or rather, it becomes possible to apply economics methodology in studies of international politics (Schneider and Seybold 1995). 4 Arguments are made by analogy: states are like firms, and the international system is like a market. Consequently, Waltz (1990) does not refrain from comparing himself with the Physiocrats because, in his view, he has been able to accomplish what the classical realists could not, namely, provide a real theory of international politics. 5 In my view, however, the costs of constructing theories based on an old Sciences ideal are far bigger than the benefits. For instance, if you apply theoretical neorealism, most questions about modern European diplomacy remain unanswered, or, everything has to be explained in terms of balance of power.
More often than not, timelessness plays an implicit role in studies of diplomacy. Many analysts are looking for evidence which suggests that modern European diplomacy is not so modern, after all. Thus, the establishment of the EPC in 1970 made Berger wonder whether we were witnessing the renaissance of the Vienna Congress system: “Vor der Wiedergeburt Europas à la Wiener Kongress?” (Berger 1971; Bull 1982). Clark (1989) depicts the European state system as a pendulum which swings between, on the one hand, order, stability and European Concert; and on the other hand, disorder, instability and disharmony. Mearsheimer (1990:52-6) cannot imagine anything else in post-cold War Europe than the reestablishment of the 19th century’s, unstable, multipolar European order, with the United Kingdom back in the role of ‘balancer’. With his classic, realist framework of analysis, Pijpers (1990:241-2) is led to criticising ideas of progress in international relations. Similarly, Hamilton and Langhorne (1995) contend that the EPC constitutes nothing that is really novel to diplomatic practice. In much the same vein, Jackson (1981) claims that British diplomacy on Europe will remain focused on relations between Britain and France, no matter how multilateral the EPC evolves to be.
According to Wallace (1973), a similar view can be found on the other side of the Channel, where France conducts its diplomacy with the Community as if it remains classic diplomacy. In 1996, European Commission officials warned IGC 6 decision-makers that the construction of Europe was in danger of degenerating into a ‘League of Nations system’. Thus, Europeans have temporal ‘others’ ready at hand, whether these pasts are seen as threats, as unavoidable conditions, or as past worlds welcomed back to the present and the future (Jørgensen 1998).
Stephen Jay Gould’s second option, ‘time’s arrow’, presents a completely different perspective. Progressive views on international relations are well known in IR. To talk about modern European diplomacy logically implies that we have left previous forms of diplomacy behind. Thus, by using the term ‘modern’, I inevitably presume the potential for change and transformation in my representation of European diplomatic practice. After all, we are not dealing with renaissance diplomacy (Mattingly 1955). More than two decades ago, the former Canadian Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau, expressed an extreme perception of this change: “I think the whole concept of diplomacy today ... is a little outmoded” (Clark 1973). 7 Similarly, Allott (1990:2493) has predicted the end of traditional European diplomacy, arguing that intra-European diplomacy has been replaced by democracy. 8
If we stick to the idea that European diplomacy has not disappeared but merely changed its modus operandi, it becomes important to note that different scholars use different reasons for characterising contemporary diplomacy as ‘modern’. Plischke (1979) points out such factors as enlargement of the society of states; a more democratic perception of diplomacy; and the ‘qualitative’ proliferation of functional international interests. What Barston (1988) finds important is that the agenda of diplomacy has become broader; the numbers of persons involved in diplomacy have increased significantly; content and methods of diplomacy have changed. Harmon (1971) claims that it is primarily the revolution in communication and transportation which justifies the use of the term ‘modern’. 9 It should be added that none of the three authors refer specifically to contemporary European multilateral diplomacy — they are US-centric or global in their approach.
Yet, in my view, the idea concerning communication and transportation is fruitful in the analysis of modern European diplomacy, with the COREU acting as a well-known, but hardly analysed feature. 10 First and foremost because it is widely agreed that communication is an important aspect of interstate relations. In the European context, the idea is interesting because a web of foreign ministries in which each is linked by means of a telex network is unprecedented in the history of diplomatic relations. Personal communication is another well-known, and presumably not less important, feature. As for transportation, readers of David Owen’s book, Balkan Odyssey (1996), will know that he and Cyrus Vance more than once flew ‘by Concorde’ to and from New York, just like they ‘shuttled’ between various capitals in Europe to conduct mediatory diplomacy. The other features of modern diplomacy are also relevant. Indeed, they can be found among the core characteristics of what Jackson (1981) calls ‘Eurodiplomacy’. 11
The WEU Secretary-General, José Cutileiro, for his part, connects the past, the present and the future in an interesting fashion. He emphasises that one of the functions of European cooperation in the field of security:
[...] is to consign to the past, in a definitive way, the risk of armed conflict among ourselves. The upsurge of nationalism that followed the end of the Cold War and the signature of the Maastricht Treaty reminds us that this endeavour is never finished and must be constantly renewed. Institution building has had and keeps having an important role. 12
Perhaps, however, not only diplomacy but also the unit of analysis has changed; maybe even the state, itself, has changed. Above, I have touched upon this already so I will limit myself to present only one theoretical model in which change plays a significant role. The model is strikingly similar to the processes through which the construction of Europe has impacts upon the member-states (see Figure 3).
| Figure 3: The Interplay in a Dynamic Perspective |
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If the CFSP has an impact of the type I have described, it follows logically that the states themselves are changed through dialectical interaction. Wendt summarises this view in the following fashion: “Through participation in new forms of social knowledge ... the European states of 1990 might no longer be the states of 1950” (Wendt 1992:418).
I presume that Wendt’s hypothesis does not provoke any reaction on the part of a significant number of scholars who have been engaged in so-called ‘thick description’, nor, for that matter, for many of those whose own lifelong experience has resulted in a solid knowledge about the processes involved in modern European diplomacy. They will probably just say: ‘And so what - where’s the ‘beef’?’ The ‘beef’, I believe, is nothing other than the connection thus established between description and theory. Wendt’s idea is a well-known observation concerning European states during times they are engaged in integration. Yet, the observation has not ‘made it’ into the theoretical literature about European integration. One reason, among others, could be that European scholars have not been inclined to “thinking theory thoroughly” — to borrow the title of Rosenau and Durfee’s book (1995). The general attitude towards theory remains negative, and when theory is considered, it remains largely a matter of duty: ‘And so much for theory, now let’s get down to practice!’. However, such an attitude is, as Keohane and Hoffmann pointed out, rather unfortunate: “Attempts to avoid theory not only miss interesting questions, but rely implicitly on a framework for analysis that remains unexamined, precisely because it is implicit” (Keohane and Hoffmann 1990:284). And thus, we have returned to one of the critiques I mentioned in the beginning of the article, namely the plea for theoretically informed analysis.
To summarise then: if organisation, ideas and worldviews change; and if there is a coordination reflex; and moreover if the acquis politique works as described — why then talk about the state as if it were a timeless unit of analysis? Furthermore, why assume that no change has occurred? I am aware that other disciplines share the problem of timelessness, political theory and philosophy, for instance. Yet, this fact just makes it more interesting to think about the problem of timelessness.
Context: International Impact on Europe
The third critique I will examine is the lack of context in much of existing research on modern European diplomacy. Modern European diplomacy has emerged in, and is often conducted in an international context. What we miss is, in short, reflections about relations between Europe and the wider world. This plea to contextualise European diplomacy may seem trivial to some, and I too think it is. My point is that the implications and ramifications of the trivial are often too neglected in literature on European diplomacy. If we, in our analysis of modern European diplomacy, embrace and celebrate an essentially introvert approach, then our conclusions will, as a result, be characterised by serious shortcomings.
To clarify my view: we lack theoretically informed reflections on the impact upon modern European diplomacy stemming from:
In short, we do not have a systematically formulated acquis academique of Europe’s contemporary role in world politics. I am aware of exceptions to this expressionistically painted ‘picture’ (Hill 1993; Regelsberger et al. 1997; Whitman 1999) but I do not think the exceptions are able to invalidate the tendencies described.
Hoffmann’s (1966) classic critique of neo-functionalism was that it did not include the impact of external factors on European integration. Hoffmann’s critique was, eventually, deemed valid by self-critical neo-functionalists (Haas 1975). Although the end of the Cold War has obviously changed something in the composition of external factors, it would be foolish to think that external factors have disappeared altogether. And if external factors do continue to play a role, the logical conclusion then is that we should think about how we can analyse the impact of such external factors. Yet, it would be most unfortunate if we just continue to debate whether external factors function as integrating or disintegrating forces. The idea of the external Federator is probably one of the most persistent and widespread ad hoc hypotheses. The idea has been around since Gamal Abdel Nasser was claimed to be among the Founding Fathers of the European Community (EC), i.e. to be Europe’s external Federator. Later on, the Soviet Union took over Nasser’s role, and when the Soviet threat disappeared, then media commentators began to argue that the CFSP was ‘born’ in Kuwait in 1990-1. The problem with this external Federator hypothesis is that it is just as easy to point at external challenges that did not produce a ‘federating’ but rather a disintegrating effect. The oil crisis in the 1970s is a good example of this, as is the currency crisis in 1992. As the British ex-Prime Minister, John Major, said to the Italian Prime Minister the night before the crisis: “Good luck, Giuliano!”. 14
My contention is that if the debate about external factors’ impact is conducted at a general level, it cannot but remain unsatisfactory and unfruitful. The arguments may be useful for political purposes, but for scientific inquiry they can only serve as starting points. We have to be more specific when we ask questions, and we should aim at identifying conditions likely to produce one or another outcome. For a start, we need to provide answers to fundamental questions such as:
The answer to my first question will have a strong impact on our research design. Some scholars do not include ‘structures’ in their toolkit of explanatory variables. They prefer to focus on external actors’ impact on the development of the CFSP’s machinery: does the US, for instance, genuinely support European unity in the field of foreign policy or does the US merely support European support for its own international policies? The same sort of questions are relevant for specific policy outcomes: What was America’s impact on the fate of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan? What is China’s impact on Europe’s policy towards the Far East? What have been the US and Arab countries’ impact on Europe’s Middle East policy? Such questions are perfectly legitimate and worth systematic examination. Yet, and for good reasons, structural explanations have been part of IR scholarship for a long time, and I find it equally worthwhile to conduct research on European diplomacy based on such structural approaches. However, we should explicitly specify which agencies and structures/institutions we deem important to examine. Furthermore, neither agency nor structure should be a priori considered the more important; and some sort of interplay between agency-oriented analysis and structural analysis should be attempted. And whether examining the interplay between agency and structure is termed a structurationist approach or not is of less importance. In other words, while ‘structuration’ may be a newly coined term, the idea is rather classic and is present in original Marxism as the dialectics between action of agents and societal structures.
| Figure 4: The Euro-Polity (Foreign Policy) in International Context |
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The answer to my second question also serves to determine the general research design for our inquiries into modern European diplomacy. The international system tradition is primarily, but not entirely, a fruit of the American political behaviouralist’s tradition (Kaplan 1957; Waltz 1979; Keohane 1989). If, on the other hand, the international context is regarded to be the international society, we are in the so-called English School tradition, and thereby, ‘worlds apart’. 15 Whichever tradition scholars may choose, they will soon realise that both traditions, by and large, have neglected modern European diplomacy. In other words, we have some scholarly traditions to rely on but, essentially, we have to do the job by ourselves.
The answer to my third question is by no means the least important researchwise. The impact on our research design is crucial if we assume that either only material or only social structures exist and deserve consideration. To the extent that scholars consider the issue in explicit terms, many tend to regard it as a clearcut either/or issue. Mearsheimer (1995), with his pronounced materialist view of world politics, has much difficulty in recognising the existence of social structures (Wendt 1994; 1995). 16 Quite a few postmodern constructivists, on the other hand, completely deny the existence of material structures (Campbell 1992), or else view them as disguised social structures. My preference is for a both/and approach which allows for the inclusion of both social and material structures and, thereby, for a more rich and multifaceted research agenda than an either/or approach would allow.
Obviously, there are more fundamental questions than the three mentioned above. I have merely tried to illustrate my general argument about two methodological needs: the need to contextualise our inquiry into modern European diplomacy and the need to ask certain specific (and so far rather neglected) questions. Indeed, when the questions above have been answered, they should be further articulated into even more specific terms.
As the importance of European diplomacy in world politics increases, international impact on it is, maybe somewhat paradoxically, also likely to gain importance. The reason being that the more impact European diplomacy has on the extra-European world, the more the latter’s actors are likely to bother about and try to influence European diplomacy. In other words, we have seen the emergence of a sphere where significant and interesting interplays take place. Given this fairly novel feature in world politics, we need to be sufficiently equipped with analytical tools to examine such interplays.
The international impact on Europe’s foreign policy actors can take two paths. The first path will have impacts on the Euro-polity, while the second will have an impact on individual states; and furthermore, it will often end up being difficult to make a sharp distinction between the two paths of influence. Impact on the Euro-polity is the least described, in part because its existence is disputed among scholars. Impact is also caused by international expectations that ‘Europe’ exists and can do something in the sphere of world politics. Such expectations manifest themselves in the presence of more than hundred diplomatic missions to the EU in Brussels. There must be concrete motives for so many states having established diplomatic relations with the EU. Yet, we do not need a comprehensive survey questionnaire to conclude that the missions are there primarily because of the EU’s role in world economics, i.e., not in traditional diplomacy or world politics. Not without reason did the US propose to let the European Commission coordinate G24 aid to Eastern Europe. Besides, there are good reasons why the EU has an increasing ‘presence’ in international organisations, whether they be the United Nations, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, or the World Trade Organisation.
During the Cold War, we could quite clearly identify certain patterns of international impact on Europe. Shifts between tension and deténte prompted the EC member-states to behave in almost programmed ways (Drain 1989). Conditions in post-Cold War Europe made France’s re-entry into NATO’s integrated structure possible. New guiding concepts for foreign policy-making, such as ‘humanitarian intervention’, ‘conditionality’ and ‘good governance’ could be introduced. We could also postulate a third option where European states react to international challenges in various Europeanised ways but then we would be back to the impact on the Euro-polity.
I have not discussed the impact of modern European diplomacy on international society — a huge topic which deserves an article of its own. The issue is highly contested. However, three lines of reasoning seem to dominate the debate. First, as mentioned above several analysts of diplomacy believe that there has been no impact. They argue that diplomacy largely is what diplomacy always has been. Second, others (Hill 1993; Whitman 1999) argue that pooling of sovereignty in the field of foreign policy has put Europe back on the map as an increasingly global player. Finally, I would like to point out that modern European diplomacy is interesting in the sense that the original European international society seems to have vanished, i.e. European inter-state relations have been transformed by means of intergovernmental integration.
Conclusion
In this article, I have attempted, in many ways, to play the role Great Britain played in the 19th Century European diplomacy: the role of the ‘balancer’; my aim being to define an appropriate balance between the first two columns in Figure 5.
| Figure 5: Balance of Power Between Analytical Elements and Perspectives |
|
However, I have also had a hidden, parallel agenda in this article, namely to bridge research on modern European diplomacy with classical debates and controversies in the social sciences. Thus, there is a logical and inherent tension between approaches emphasising timelessness and other approaches emphasising change and transformation. The issue of what national, European and global dimensions are able to explain can be translated into the levels-of-analysis issue. The issue of theorising vs. empirical analysis concerns both application of theory, theory construction, and presentation of new information. The controversy about material and social structures is a classic metatheoretical problem, just as the relationship between purposeful action and unintended consequences is a classic one. Debates about the appropriate mix of national and European levels of decision-making, besides being highly politico-ideological, are also problems of individual and collective action, i.e. of agency and structure. To engage in such debates and questions is, in my view, an essential part of what scholarly practice is all about.
January 1999
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Endnotes
*: Knud Erik Jørgensen is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Aarhus, Denmark. Back.
Note 1: See also Smith (1987), Krippendorf (1987), and Wallace (1997) — who has more confidence than Smith and Krippendorf in IR ‘Made in Europe’. Back.
Note 2: Theda Skocpol’s opinion, yet quoted with much sympathy by K.J. Holsti Back.
Note 3: Personal communication. Back.
Note 4: Related approaches are rational choice and formal modelling. They have rarely been applied in research on modern European diplomacy. One example is Schneider and Seybold (1995). Back.
Note 5: 5 Obviously you do not have serious problems with timelessness if you share Waltz’ science ideal. You will celebrate it! Back.
Note 6: Intergovernmental Conference. Back.
Note 7: The citation is used as an epitaph in Clark (1973). Back.
Note 8: Allott’s argument may look quite odd to the many students of diplomacy who regard negotiation as the essence of diplomacy. Back.
Note 9: Yet it is worth noticing that Hamilton and Langhorne (1995:137) point out that the ‘communication and transportation’ argument was used as far back as 1905. Back.
Note 10: Ambassador Philippe de Schoutheete has called the EPC meetings programme and the exchange of telegrams (COREU - Correspondance Européenne) “without doubt the most comprehensive and systematic effort ever made by sovereign states in this field”. Europe Documents, No 1061 (Agence Europe), 3 July. Back.
Note 11: A somewhat similar interpretation is offered by Watson (1982:147). Thus, Watson operates with a scenario in which “[a]mbassadors within the European Community could become like the envoys of German princes to each other after 1871: symbols of sovereignty and part of the ceremonial rather than the administrative side of ‘international’ life.” Back.
Note 12: Speech transcript (Cutileiro 1995). Back.
Note 13: For an attempt, see Jørgensen (1997). Back.
Note 14: The most comprehensive discussion of external factors’ influence on European integration remains Zimmerling (1989). Back.
Note 15: I call it the ‘so-called’ English School because many of its ‘members’ were not English, but came from the British Empire, and later, the Commonwealth. But there are more reasons. It seems to me that there are strong affinities between the so-called English School, a French scholar like Aron (1966), and other so-called traditional scholars. A better term than ‘the English School’ would be ‘the international society tradition’. Back.
Note 16: Cf. the very illuminating exchange between Mearsheimer (1995) and Wendt (1995) in the journal International Security. Back.