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Journal of International Relations and Development
Europeanisation and Its Limits: the Case of Sweden
By Karl Magnus Johansson
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This article analyses the europeanisation of Sweden. The intention is that an analysis of the specific features of this particular member-state of the European Union (EU) should contribute to an understanding of the generality of Europeanisation, its dimensions, impact and limits. The article thus combines theoretical and empirical aims.
The article is organised along the following lines. The next section introduces Sweden and the fundamentals of Swedish EU membership. The following section establishes an analytical framework, with particular reference to Europeanisation and domestic politics. Drawing on the concepts introduced there, the analysis will identify the impact and limits of Europeanisation in Sweden. The concluding section assesses the Swedish EU membership and draws out the implications of this case study for related studies in the field of Europeanisation.
In general terms, the findings should have a wider significance, especially for applicant-states in a similar category to a country like Sweden, that is, a category of comparatively small states joining late and therefore facing strong pressures of adaptation both at the state and societal levels. As the EU has advanced and become an increasingly complex organisation, countries seeking membership or new member-states are faced with a more difficult and steeper learning curve. At the same time, latecomers are in a position to learn from the experiences of others. This article thus raises the question of what kind of institutional learning, or modelling, has taken place in the case of Sweden as a latecomer to the EU.
Introducing Sweden and the Fundamentals of its EU Membership
A background to Sweden will be provided in this section, with a view to an interpretation of the Swedish experiences as an EU member. Sweden is a unitary state and a constitutional monarchy, but the monarch has only ceremonial functions. The system of government is parliamentary. Every fourth year there are general elections for the national parliament, the Riksdag, which has 349 members. The electoral system is proportional, which results in a multiparty system and nowadays always in minority governments. To become represented in the Riksdag, a political party must achieve at least four percent on a national basis or at least twelve percent in the electoral district, of which there are twenty-nine altogether. At the present, seven political parties are represented in parliament (in declining order of size of their party groups following the September 1998 general election): the social democratic party, the moderate party, the left party (former communists), the Christian democrats, the centre party (former agrarians), the liberal party, and the green party. Having done badly in the 1998 election, the social democratic party entered into negotiations and built a kind of informal coalition with the left party and the green party, the two most Eurosceptical parties in parliament.
The matter of membership rose to the top of the political agenda within a very short time. Although strongly associated with West Europe, full membership had been ruled out with reference to the policy of neutrality and non-alignment in particular. However, the ruling social democratic party took a sudden step towards EC membership in October 1990, in the context of management of an acute economic crisis (Gustavsson 1998). On 12 December 1990, the Riksdag voted in favour of applying for European Community (EC) membership, by 289 votes to 28, with the reservation that it must be in a form compatible “with the retention of neutrality” (Miles 1997:184). The application for membership was handed over to the Dutch EC presidency in The Hague on 1 July 1991.
The decision to seek membership can be seen as a logical consequence of the interdependence between the strongly export-reliant Swedish economy and the West European economies. 1 Although officially neutral, Sweden has been western-oriented throughout the post-war years, both economically and politically (af Malmborg 1994).
Whereas the founding members to a large extent were ideologically driven, it is argued that it is beyond any doubt that the primary motivations for latecomers such as Sweden to join the EC/EU have been of an economic nature. Just like in the United Kingdom and Denmark, membership has been justified primarily by the political elites on economic grounds, which provided the rationale for requesting membership in the first place and provoked unrealistic expectations of economic benefits that have thereafter continued to haunt the elites broadly in favour of membership.
At the same time, however, there clearly were political determinants behind the decision to apply for membership. To be sure, the argument of increasing political influence was the one most often employed by political leaders when arguing the case for joining the EU (K. Jacobsson 1997). In other words, those leaders were willing to “trad(e) off some of their de iure sovereignties for a guaranteed say in effective policy-making” (Wessels 1997:289). The referendum on membership was held on 13 November 1994. As expected, the outcome was tight, with a majority of 52.3 percent in favour and 46.8 percent against (Gilljam and Holmberg 1996). Turnout was 83.3 percent. The referendum outcome can be explained with reference to persuasive opinion formers, notably the then social democrat leader Ingvar Carlsson. Nevertheless, the result clearly indicated that European issues would be awkward for Swedish political leaders and parties.
The most salient questions during the referendum campaign concerned, in broad terms, foreign and security policy, democracy, the environment and agriculture. And during the accession negotiations, the ‘devils’ were in the details such as ‘snus’, or wet snuff tobacco, alcohol and regional aid for the scarcely populated northern parts of Sweden. On politically salient issues such as the emerging Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU, Swedish representatives were keen to stress the European dimension, and that Sweden would not hinder the further development of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) towards a single currency (Luif 1995: chapter 13; Miles 1997: chapter 8).
It is important to emphasise that much of the acquis communautaire was integrated into Swedish law through the European Economic Area (EEA). This made the accession negotiations easier and has contributed to the high degree of compliance with EC law and single market directives in the case of Sweden. 2
Although there has been a consensual style in the making of Swedish policies more broadly and towards the EU, especially when supposedly ‘national interests’ are at stake, the political priorities have very much been shaped by the social democratic party. From the outset, a priority of theirs was to turn the debate away from institutional issues in particular. Since Sweden did not join the EU until January 1995, there was formally no possibility to influence the contents of the Maastricht Treaty. Nevertheless, the leading social democratic party was critical of the focus on institutional reform and monetary union. It wanted to put other issues on the EU agenda, notably the environment and employment. At the same time, politicians across the political spectrum welcomed the insertion into the Treaty of the subsidiarity principle, conveniently defining it in terms of ‘nearness’, just as in the United Kingdom and Denmark.
Social democrats have invested enormously in committing the EU to a Swedish-style active labour market policy. Accordingly, employment had top priority in the 1996-1997 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), resulting in a separate title on employment in the Amsterdam Treaty (Johansson 1999a). Predictably, this was considered a victory by the social democratic party.
In the IGC, Sweden reluctantly accepted the flexibility clause, which implies that those member-states that want to go on with co-operation and integration could do so without having all partners on board (Herolf 1998). For Sweden, as one of the smaller EU members, the notion of flexibility was seen as favourable for the larger member-states, eventually forming a hard core, but it was stressed that flexibility would be of limited use given the right of veto and also for reasons of solidarity among member-states. Also, the Swedish government was opposed to changes to the rules for qualified majority voting in the Council and to changes of the composition of the Commission.
One can detect a growing awareness on the part of the Swedish government that supranationalism in the sense of strong EU institutions and decision-making procedures could be advantageous for the relatively smaller member-states, fearing the emergence of directoires among larger states. However, this is difficult to communicate in a country where the influence of Sweden in the EU generally is measured in terms of the number of votes, presently four, in the Council.
Accordingly, the Swedish government has been reluctant to discuss deepening, that is, institutional reforms necessary or desirable in order to extend the number of EU members. Sweden has been an enthusiastic and unequivocal supporter of EU enlargement, performing the role of an advocate for the Baltic states.
For the foreseeable future, the Swedish policy of non-participation in military alliances, with the aim of making it possible for the country to remain neutral in the event of a war in its vicinity, is likely to remain unchanged. However, the social democratic government has adopted a more pragmatic attitude towards existing alliances and joint operations. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that a Swedish social democratic government would accept a common defence within the EU.
As for the delicate question of whether or not to join the single currency, the position of the government is to wait and see. This is despite the fact that Sweden, unlike the United Kingdom and Denmark, has no formal ‘opt-out’ from the third stage of EMU. However, the Prime Minister wants to maintain the freedom of action should a favourable moment arrive. 3 Much depends on the positions of the other member-states that decided not to join in the first wave, notably the decision of the British government.
The cabinet formed in October 1998 embraced a more active approach to EU affairs. In the Statement of Government Policy, presented by the Prime Minister, the role of Sweden in the EU and Europe at large was emphasised. 4 At the same time, this might be interpreted as recognition that Sweden, during the first years of EU membership, was insufficiently active and therefore may have missed opportunities that could have been seized. The new message might also be interpreted as an effort to try to convince the public of some of the advantages of being an EU member.
Like the United Kingdom, at least in the past, Sweden has been a ‘reluctant European’ and has had a defensive attitude to European integration. 5 As will be discussed further in the article, the Swedish government has been largely reactive rather than proactive in its dealings with EU matters. This suggests that there are inherent limits to the impact of Europeanisation of Sweden, limits that primarily are attributable to factors at the domestic level.
Analytical Framework
Reintroducing Europeanisation
Europeanisation has made its way into the jargon of the acquis academiqueof European integration. What, then, is meant by Europeanisation? Reintroducing this term, attention should be drawn to an article by Ladrech (1994). Analysing the Europeanisation of domestic politics and institutions in the case of France, he defines Europeanisation as “an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic of national politics and policy-making” (Ladrech 1994:69). Ladrech (1994:71) points out that Europeanisation is different from terms such as internationalisation and globalisation because of the geographic delimitation and “the distinct nature of the pre-existing national framework which mediates this process of adjustment in both formal and informal ways.” This implies that there are exogenous as well as endogenous factors contributing to the adjustments of institutions within member-states. For further analysis, it should also be mentioned that Ladrech (1994:71) has deliberately proposed a broad enough definition to include both governmental and non-governmental actors, such as political parties, organised interest groups, governmental units and administrative agencies.
The definition offered by Ladrech often serves as a point of departure for other scholars picking up the term Europeanisation. They all tend to stress the distinct characteristics of Europeanisation as a process. Such processes refer to networks of transaction, communication and organisation across state borders. Hanf and Soetendorp (1998:1) point out that Europeanisation should be “understood as a process in which Europe, and especially the EU, become an increasingly more relevant and important point of political reference for the actors at the level of the member-states.” Likewise, Olsen (1996:261) provides a process-based definition of Europeanisation as homogenisation and standardisation, that is, convergence across European boundaries, or processes that “signify reduced variance in patterns of thinking, behaviour and organisation.” Analysing Europeanisation in terms of the multilevel nature of the patterns of administrative and political interaction in the EU, Wessels (1995; 1997), for his part, draws attention to the ‘interwoveness’ and ‘institutional fusion’ between institutions at the European, national and sub-national levels (Rometsch and Wessels 1996).
Clearly, administrative interactions and adjustments provide one of the most important indicators of Europeanisation, as do transnational actions among political parties and interest groups. By participating in multiple arenas also at the European level, such actors redirect their activities to exploit perceived opportunity structures (Marks and McAdam 1996). This situation invites transnational strategies of influence and alliance-building across borders and the more that happens the EU polity evolves and its institutions increase their powers. Such patterns of transnational interaction may cause institutional and political change both within the EU polity and domestic polities.
Whereas non-governmental actors may span territorial boundaries without necessarily sensing an inside-outside divide or an undivided loyalty to the nation-state, the situation is probably different for officials and politicians representing the state government. In the perspective of such representatives, Europeanisation is a matter of internalisation of inputs from the ‘outside’, thereby reinforcing the inside-outside divide. Membership of the EU enforces national policymakers to formulate national positions and interests with a view to negotiations with ‘others’. Thus, Europeanisation and nationalisation can be seen as two sides of the same coin. This double-edged challenge can also be interpreted as a paradox of being a member-state in the EU and is often ignored by scholars in the field of Europeanisation. In short, European integration brings about countervailing forces.
Another weakness in existing definitions and analyses of Europeanisation is the institutional bias. Moreover, it is mainly institutions at the state level that usually are dealt with. This state-centric focus reflects a general orientation of political science. However, to understand the impact and limits of Europeanisation, it is not sufficient to only bridge the sub-disciplines of political science but the divisions of academic disciplines have to be bridged as well. A multidisciplinary approach is needed to tackle the multifaceted nature of the Europeanisation of countries, member-states or non-member-states alike.
The Europeanisation and outlook of a country cannot be fully understood without knowledge of its historical background and the roots and norms embedded in its institutions (Olsen 1996; Sverdrup 1998). However difficult to study, the cultural dimension of Europeanisation and institutional change must be taken into account. Since the territorial delimitations of the EU are not static, the geographic dimension is also important. So are questions of business and finance in an expanding market.
Thus, we must recognise the different dimensions of Europeanisation as well as the different forms of integration. The gaps, or disjunctions, between different dimensions and forms may hinder the Europeanisation of individual countries. There are administrative, cultural, economic, geographic, historic, legal and political dimensions. Political and economic forms of integration do not necessarily go hand in hand. State and society may be at odds over integration.
In sum, it takes a multidisciplinary approach to analyse Europeanisation and how the EU is received in the domestic polity and how deeply such processes penetrate into that polity.
Reintroducing the Domestic Politics Approach
While Europeanisation focuses on institutions and thus on polity, it tends to gloss over politics inside the domestic polity. Europeanisation, as a term and analytical perspective, is thus remarkably apolitical, like much of traditional integration theory. To analyse the conditions for Europeanisation, factors imposing constraints on the freedom of action of policymakers must be taken into account. And as scholars of European integration more broadly we have to lift the lid off the black box of domestic politics if we are to understand the behaviour of member-states in the integration processes.
In the study of European integration, domestic politics offers a useful comparativist alternative, or complement, to international relations. In laying out his domestic politics approach, Bulmer (1983) points out that this approach recognises that the same political institutions are involved at the European and national levels (see also Bulmer and Paterson 1987; George 1992). The methodological implication is that EU policy-making should be examined in a similar way to domestic politics. Theories and analyses of European integration, concerned with deeply political processes, should take domestic structures into account to avoid the danger of superficiality.
The metaphor of the ‘two-level game’ applies in a situation where constraints are imposed on the international negotiator (Putnam 1988; Evans et al. 1993). Thus, the metaphor is useful with regard to participation in the EU in so far as policymakers play two-level or even multi-level games in multiple arenas. Such participation and arena shifts provide another dimension to the tendency for political games to be ‘nested’ one inside the other (Tsebelis 1990).
Membership of a complex organisation such as the EU, with its multilateral membership and permanent search for compromise among its members and institutions, provides not only opportunities but also political constraints and risks. Playing different games in the multiple arenas may give rise to problems of congruence between declared and implemented policies at different levels of decision-making. As an EU member, a state faces a credibility dilemma if the policies in the non-national arenas are not congruent with those propagated in the domestic arenas. This dilemma is likely to be more pertinent in systems of adversarial politics than in systems of coalition, or consensual, politics. In any case, elections impose a time constraint on policymakers.
Whatever the extent of the transnationalisation of politics, elections and political parties are essentially nation-bound institutions. Political leaders are responsible to national electorates, or domestic constituencies. Further constraints are thus imposed by inter-party competition and intra-party factionalism as well as by public opinion. In one way or the other, political parties may slow down, or hinder, Europeanisation. Public opinion may have a similar effect. Even though the public in some countries may be ignorant or indifferent to EU affairs, the balance of support and opposition to European integration, as it advances, must be taken into account. A gap between the elites and the public not only imposes a constraint but is detrimental to the functioning of representative democracy. Public opinion and party politics are factors that will be taken into account in the subsequent analysis, moving inside the Swedish polity by identifying domestic constraints as well as institutional and political change connected to the Europeanisation of this particular EU member-state.
Analysing the Europeanisation of Sweden
This section analyses the Europeanisation of Sweden, thereby focusing on institutional changes following from the Swedish EU membership and the adjustments to the EU policy cycle. The institutions dealing with the EU in one way or another are continuously adjusting to the EU policy-making process. The most important actors will be identified. Formally, the obvious actors are governmental units and the public administration as well as the parliament. In addition, there are the levels of sub-national government and non-governmental actors, such as organised interests, political parties and the media. Last, but not least, there is the public opinion.
Non-governmental actors are involved in patterns of informal European integration. They thus exercise transnational strategies of influence and play an agenda-setting role. Such actors could go through central government and public administration or bypass these by targeting EU institutions and policymakers directly. These strategies could also be combined and their effectiveness varies between the phases of the EU policy-making process.
Central Governmental Units and Administrative Agencies
As noted above, Sweden is a unitary state. Although there is an old tradition of local government, and renewed regionalisation, the Swedish polity must be considered as relatively centralised compared to several other EU member-states, especially the federal or semi-federal states. However, there is a certain fragmentation at the central level in so far as there is an inter-ministerial rivalry and, perhaps inevitable, problems of co-ordination.
At a time of globalisation, few if any issues are completely domestic. And, in the light of Europeanisation, an increasing number of policy areas must similarly be handled by other government sections than foreign ministries which thereby lose some of their control of exchanges across borders. This situation may reflect the general waning of influence and prestige of foreign ministries.
In Sweden, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has traditionally had a somewhat superior position compared to other ministries. The Ministry had the privilege of defining neutrality and non-alignment. However, this privilege has no longer the same meaning and importance that it used to have (Ekengren and Sundelius 1998:132). And the involvement in the EU policy-making process has added to the rivalry in the direction of Sweden’s external relations in general.
The search for a smooth horizontal inter-ministerial co-ordination must be seen in the light of the relationship between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries. Given the rivalry pointed out above, in reality as well as potentially, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was naturally keen on having the co-ordinating function. Accordingly, the main co-ordinative unit, the EU secretariat, was placed there. Officially, however, this was considered a cross-ministerial body, with the staff seconded from other ministries as well. 6
When a new social democratic government was formed in March 1996, the widespread impression was that the new Prime Minister and his office (Statsrådsberedningen) would take a firmer grip on the co-ordination of EU affairs. 7 An indication of this was that the position of Minister of European Affairs, placed within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was abolished. At the same time, however, one of the state secretaries in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was to specialise on the EU, thereby reducing the burdens on the Minister of Foreign Affairs. On balance and in terms of influence, the winner from these changes seems to have been the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
However, one of the reorganisations of the government office in connection to the formation of a new social democratic cabinet after the 1998 election concerned co-ordination of EU affairs. A new EU unit was set up within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and another, with overall co-ordinative responsibilities, in the Prime Minister’s office where a new state secretary for EU matters was appointed. There would also be closer links to the permanent representation in Brussels. These changes, also made in view of the Swedish presidency of the EU during the first half of the year 2001, can be seen as an example of institutional learning, in this case from the British model. In this model, the permanent representative in Brussels regularly takes part in meetings in London where EU affairs are co-ordinated by the Cabinet Office and close to the Prime Minister. The learning from this model must be interpreted as recognition of the organisational deficiencies within Sweden as to the co-ordination of EU affairs so far. It remains to be seen to what extent the new arrangements will run smoothly, ensuring effective co-ordination. There is still a potential for co-ordination problems. 8 The relative influence between different bodies cannot only be explained with reference to structural conditions, however. Another factor is the degree of personal commitment to the EU. That several politicians at the ministerial level are apparently not interested in EU affairs results in a lack of political backing. This could be frustrating for officials speaking on behalf of the Swedish government in various working groups, committees and pre-Council meetings.
The ambiguity that has characterised Swedish position-taking in the EU, notably in the Council, is to the detriment of Sweden’s overall influence and has, therefore, a political cost. Such ambiguity makes a member-state an unpredictable ally. For successful negotiation outcomes, civil servants negotiating on behalf of the Swedish government have called for clarity and political backing.
It may go without saying that the permanent Swedish representation to the EU underwent an expansion of staff due to the membership. 9 Again, there is a divide between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries in that the Brussels-based civil servants either are career diplomats or more or less specialised officials from ministries such as the ministries for finance, agriculture or the environment. Specialised experts, on a temporary basis, are also seconded from central administrative agencies.
In addition to horizontal co-ordination at the ministerial level, there is vertical co-ordination between ministries and central administrative agencies. The linkages between them have generally become denser because of EU membership. Since Swedish ministries are relatively small, as measured by the number of staff, they have to rely on assistance and expertise from the specialised administrative agencies and, generally speaking, increasingly so due to the more technical nature of issues dealt with in the context of the EU. These closer contacts and inter-linkages between Swedish ministries and central administrative agencies have constitutional implications given the formally independent status of the latter vis-à-vis the government (B. Jacobsson 1997). This status has a long tradition in Sweden and is likely to be maintained for the foreseeable future, just like the principle of collegial decision-making in the Swedish cabinet and the system of common deliberations (Gemensam beredning) between two or more ministries in general and in budgetary matters in particular.
Swedish government structures — in regard to communication, steering and co-ordination both horizontally and vertically — have thus been deeply affected by the necessary adjustments to the EU policy cycle. Furthermore, EU membership has given rise to a new kind of relationship between the government and the parliament.
The Parliament
Law-making and scrutiny are two functions of a parliament. These functions are both directed towards the government. EU membership has diminished the overall legislative influence of parliaments, including the Swedish Riksdag. However, an awareness of this diminished role has acted as an incentive for new experiments. Looking at other models, notably the Danish one, of how to scrutinise the governmentÌs handling of EU affairs, the Swedish parliament set up the Advisory Committee on EU Affairs (or the EU Advisory Committee) (Hegeland and Mattson 1996; forthcoming; see also Bergman 1997). In Denmark, the parliament can commit a minister to a certain position, which goes further than in other EU countries.
It follows from its name that the committee is a forum for consultation with the government, which has to inform the Riksdag about all matters which are to be dealt with by the Council and has to confer about Sweden’s positions on important matters more generally. 10 Formally, the powers of the committee are limited since it is only advisory and therefore cannot bind a minister in regard to the Council negotiations. Nor can it submit issues under deliberation to the chamber for plenary debates.
Nevertheless, the Committee does exercise a real influence, which is impossible to measure, in so far as the Committee’s recommendations are taken into consideration. And if a minister does not follow the advice given by the Committee, the matter could actually be scrutinised by the Committee on the Constitution and, theoretically, a vote of no confidence could be taken in the chamber. 11 It is also interesting to note, given that IGCs are formally between governments, that the government regularly consulted with the committee during the 1996/7 IGC. 12
The Committee, which regularly convenes on Fridays behind closed doors, is attended by the relevant minister, and his or her advisers, or exceptionally by state secretaries and under-secretaries of state if ministers are unable to attend. Who the relevant minister is depends, of course, on the nature of the issue to be dealt with in the Council the following week.
That government representatives come before the committee so late in the policy cycle is one of the major deficiencies of the ways in which government-parliament relations over EU matters have been organised so far. A related problem is that the issue-specific information primarily is provided by the government, mainly through the EU secretariat and before then from the representation in Brussels. However, the Committee has direct communication with different units in the entire government office.
That the background information to the Committee is provided by the government implies that it could be filtered when it arrives in parliament. The question arises as to what extent the information is reliable and sufficient. Even though relations are said to be good, the Committee does not completely rely on the government which seems to be healthy scepticism from a body having to scrutinise government. 13 For this reason, the Committee, through its secretariat, has established alternative sources of information.
One source is the cabinet of the Swedish commissioner. Other sources are various data bases and documentation from other parliamentary units dealing with EU affairs, notably those of the other Nordic member-states with which the Swedish Committee exchanges information and occasionally holds joint meetings both among staff and Committee members. Information is also provided by the twenty-two Swedish Members of the European Parliament (MEPs). The fact that the government tends to focus on the Council and to ignore what goes in the European Parliament (EP) implies that the information from the government tends not to include briefs about proceedings in the EP and its agenda. In general, the expansion of the powers of the EP is not reflected in the ways in which this institution is treated in Sweden.
The relationship between Swedish MEPs and the Riksdag, notably the EU Advisory Committee, has been somewhat tense in that some of the MEPs wanted access to the Committee on a more formal basis but were denied it. Also the proposal, serious or not, that Swedish MEPs could be invited to attend debates on EU matters in the chamber was turned down. Instead, the links between the Swedish parliament and the Swedes in the EP are primarily upheld by the political parties and the party groups in the Riksdag.
The direct channels of communication between the party groups in the Riksdag and the Swedish MEPs enable Committee members to get first-hand information from party colleagues at the European level of politics. Thereby, one can identify a strategy seeking to bypass the central government. Such a bypassing strategy is also employed by sub-national governments and by a host of nongovernmental actors.
Sub-National Levels of Government
The sub-national levels of the Swedish polity, mainly the regional level, are undergoing a transformation. Although some changes were initiated before Swedish membership of the EU, some of the most apparent signs of processes of Europeanisation of Sweden are related to regionalisation and the new dynamics of regional self-government.
Maps have been redrawn and there are experiments with new regional authorities in some parts of the country, including Scania, West Sweden, the County of Kalmar and the island of Gotland. It is beyond doubt that these changes have been reinforced by processes of Europeanisation in general and the EU membership in particular. Institutional changes at the EU level have acted as an incentive for decentralisation and regionalisation within member-states, especially with reference to the principle of subsidiarity, the structural funds and the establishment of the Committee of the Regions. To an increasing extent, units at the sub-national levels of government and public administration are becoming transborder, or transnational, actors. Specifically, there are the transregional exchanges across Öresund between Denmark and Sweden. There are also wider exchanges across the Baltic Sea. 14 Another illustration is provided by the regional lobbying vis-à-vis EU institutions (Gidlund and Jerneck 1999). One example of representation centres in Brussels of different Swedish regions and associations of local authorities, or communes, is the South Sweden European Office. Swedish sub-national governments are also represented, with a total of twelve members, in the Committee of the Regions. These members are formally appointed by the Swedish central government, but they are nominated by the Federation of County Councils (Landstingsförbundet) and the Association of Local Authorities (Kommunförbundet).
The outward looking regional and local authorities have brought to life a new kind of relationship between public authorities and societal actors, for example through chambers of commerce. In other words, processes of regionalisation and Europeanisation at large may give rise to strengthened partnerships between the private and the public.
Where the Swedish central government has been reactive in its dealings with the EU, sub-national governments have in many cases appeared to be proactive. They have employed influence strategies, bypassing the central level of government and its hierarchical structures. The same situation applies for the multiplicity of non-governmental actors involved in EU policy-making in one way or another.
Organised Interests
Given the corporatist tradition of Sweden, strong and centralised interest organisations have been part of the policy-making process. The central organisation for blue-collar workers is the Swedish Trade Union Confederation (Landsorganisationen) and for white-collar workers the Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees (Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation) and the Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations (Sveriges Akademikers Centralorganisation). These organisations have a joint office in Brussels. The central organisation for employers is the Swedish Employers’ Confederation (Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen), which has a joint representation centre in Brussels together with the Swedish Trade Council (Industriförbundet). It is important to emphasise that both of these Brussels offices were in place several years before Sweden became an EU member. However, since Sweden joined the EU the organisations mentioned above have been able to become full members of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe (UNICE) respectively. And the Federation of Swedish Farmers (Lantbrukarnas Riksförbund), which also has an office in Brussels, has become a full and active member of the Committee of Professional Agricultural Organisations in the European Community (COPA).
Swedish interest organisations, primarily those mentioned above, are indirectly represented in the EU’s Social Dialogue and directly in the Economic and Social Committee (ESC), with altogether twelve seats. Even though Swedish interest groups were active in the European arena before Sweden became an EU member, their overall lobbying in Brussels and Strasbourg has increased considerably since 1995. The same situation applies for ‘new’ social movements such as environmental groups, some of which have linked-up with umbrella organisations, or Euro-lobbies, notably the European Environmental Bureau (EEB).
Political Parties
Just like interest groups, Swedish political parties have linked-up with Euro-parties and co-operate actively with likeminded parties on a transnational basis (Gidlund 1992; Jerneck 1997; Johansson 1997). By Euro-parties, it is meant the European parties called for in the Maastricht Treaty (Article 138a). At another organisational level, there are the EP party groups. Again, we are dealing with processes, involving Swedish non-governmental actors, that were set in motion before Sweden formally became an EU member. In fact, the Swedish social democratic party became a founding and active member of the Party of European Socialists (PES) in 1992. For their part, the moderate party and the Christian democrats became full members of the European People’s Party (EPP) in 1995, but they had previously been affiliated with this Euro-party. A similar situation applies for the liberal party, which joined the European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party (ELDR). While there is no Euro-party for the left party, they sit in the leftist group in the EP. The green party, however, is a member of both the green group in the EP and the European Federation of Green Parties (EFGP), which like the ELDR was founded in 1993.
For a governing party like the Swedish social democratic party, the involvement in a Euro-party like the PES provides channels for access to other governing PES member-parties. Specifically, there are the PES pre-meetings to European Council summits and the group of ‘Sherpas’, that is, of personal representatives of party leaders sitting in government. These representatives prepare European Council summits and seek to co-ordinate EU policies more broadly. Such concerted efforts have, for example, been made in the issue area of employment (Johansson 1999a). The Swedish deputy Prime Minister, Lena Hjelm-Wallén, is a vice-president of the PES.
The socio-economic, or left-right, dimension has traditionally been the strongest in Sweden, but European integration has become a new kind of cleavage in Swedish politics (Oscarsson 1998). The pattern of party support and opposition to EU membership still reflects the positions in view of the referendum in November 1994. Accordingly, the left party and the green party are against, at least nominally, whereas the social democratic party, the liberal party, the moderate party, the Christian democrats and the centre party remain principally in favour. At the same time, however, there is opposition to supranational integration inside the non-socialist parties as well as the social democratic party.
Party attitudes are also formed in relation to the stance of the interest groups with which the parties are related, such as trade unions in the case of the social democratic party, industry for the moderate party and agriculture for the centre party. Arguably, the vacillating position of the latter party reflects a cost-benefit analysis for the agricultural sector as a whole, with many small-scale farmers suffering from the increased competition. However, the Federation of Swedish Farmers came out in favour of EU membership.
Issues related to the EU have, more or less, disrupted the cohesion within the political parties represented in the Riksdag. Intra-party factionalism and conflicts are sometimes difficult to control for party managers. One strategy, most notably employed by the social democratic party but also by other parties, is to contain intra-party divisions by avoiding clear-cut positions on different issues, such as EMU, and avoiding debate altogether. This strategy of party management, which can be interpreted as a lack of leadership, slows down, if not hinders, Europeanisation (Johansson and Raunio, forthcoming).
The Media
The impact of the media on Swedish policies towards the EU and on the Europeanisation of Sweden is also impossible to measure. In any case, the media shapes public opinion and very much so in a Eurosceptical direction given the focus on detailed EU standardisation and legislation reportedly affecting Sweden negatively. Thereby, the media impacts indirectly on the government’s policies and provides a further domestic constraint. But the agenda-setting role of the Swedish media with regard to different issues should not be overestimated.
The quality of media reporting on EU matters varies enormously. The two leading daily newspapers, Dagens Nyheterand especially Svenska Dagbladet, generally contain highly qualitative reports and commentaries. They are widely read by the political elites. Both of these newspapers are non-socialist, as are most of the Swedish newspapers. Accordingly, the leading articles tend to be critical towards approaches to the EU on the part of the Swedish government. This may have contributed to the government’s more active approach, at least rhetorically, since the formation of a new cabinet in October 1998. Also reports in the foreign media may have had the same effect, especially when they have compared Swedish behaviour in the EU to the allegedly more effective and active Finland. 15 In effect, also the media, through opinion formation across borders, appears as a nongovernmental and transnational actor. Such actors exert informal power.
Public Opinion
As regards basic attitudes to the EU, Eurobarometer data has shown that the Swedes are the most reluctant of all EU citizens (Lindahl 1997). Thus, public opinion provides a fundamental constraint, which results in restricted room for manoeuvre for Swedish decision-makers. At the same time, however, the Eurosceptical public is sometimes more of an asset than a liability for Swedish negotiators and policy-makers, playing two-level or even multi-level games (Miles 1998). That public opinion provides a safety valve has, for example, been shown in connection to the accession negotiations and the social democratic government’s justification for not joining the third stage of EMU, at least not in the first wave.
Public opinion, as well as party politics, reflects a basic anti-federalist and Eurosceptic sentiment. In this regard, there is a deep-rooted ‘nation-state logic’ behind Swedish membership of the EU. There is a broad support for the welfare state and even feelings of uniqueness, some might say ‘welfare chauvinism’. In the light of such attitudes and feelings, and also that Sweden entered the EU at a time of economic recession, the EU has been seen by the public largely as a threat rather than as an opportunity. In the words of Ekengren and Sundelius (1998:146):
To many voters, the immediate and very visible costs associated with the Europeanisation of Sweden far outweigh the potential but diffused benefits of membership, as professed by various establishment figures. The people of Sweden were inspired by their political authorities to turn their backs on the Continent of Europe some fifty years ago. In spite of the best efforts by the new generation of leaders to draw public attention back to this traditional focus of interest, most Swedes (across party lines, but more so the young and women than the middle-aged and men) tend to remain sceptical.
Sweden stayed out of the two world wars and many of the ideas underpinning the EU project, such as subsidiarity and personalism, connected to Catholic social teachings, are unknown to most Swedes, few of whom identify with this project. In short, neither crucial parts of general European history nor basic ideas are shared by Sweden and the continental countries which once launched the project of European integration.
Conclusion
The Swedish case is illustrative both of the impact and limits of Europeanisation. In many ways, Sweden has been affected by the processes of Europeanisation. This is illustrated by the membership of political parties in Euro-parties and of interest groups in Euro-lobbies, as well as by the European activities of regional and local authorities and by the increasing number of personnel dealing with EU affairs at different levels of government.
It is important to differentiate between attitudes of the masses and the elites. The Swedish establishment, so to speak, is overwhelmingly pro-EU. Although the cabinet should not be looked upon as being unitary even in regard to EU affairs, a consensus has emerged in favour of membership. However, the cabinet is not a homogeneous entity when it comes to a grand project such as EMU. In this matter, some infighting can be observed as factionalism in the social democratic party over European integration is reflected in the cabinet. Given the lack of consensus inside the party, the political leaders have to tread cautiously. In addition to the external constraints, a government like the Swedish thus suffers internal, domestic, constraints and these have to be identified if we are to understand the behaviour of Sweden as a member-state of the EU.
The Swedish central government is a victim of conflicting pressures emanating from the supranational and the sub-national levels of government. There are, in fact, parallel processes of Europeanisation and nationalisation, in this case of Sweden, in so far as membership of the EU forces, or at least encourages, policy-makers to formulate national positions and vital interests. This double-edged challenge constitutes a paradox of being a member-state in the EU and is often overlooked.
Administratively and politically, Sweden has been undergoing a transformation because of its EU membership. Although there have been, and still are, apparent problems of adjustments and co-ordination, both administrative and political agencies have proved capable of learning and on the whole fit for the task of representing Sweden in the EU. Swedish compliance with EC legislation is among the highest of all the member-states and Swedish representatives seemingly do their best to behave well in the EU, administratively and politically. As a member-state, Sweden must, however, be considered aloof from the ‘heart of Europe’ not only geographically but also ideologically. It might thus be argued that Sweden is and will remain a ‘reluctant European’.
In many ways, therefore, Sweden remains aloof from the Eurospeak and ideologically inspired thinking on the part of true Europeans from the founding member-states on the continent and from mainstream thinking within the EU institutions. Swedish approaches to the EU are very much in line with the ‘nation-state logic’ that was mentioned above. Sweden is and will remain, regardless of the colour of its government, an obstacle to those forces that want the EU to develop further in a federalist direction. This implies that Sweden’s membership even makes it more likely that the EU will become a ‘multi-speed’ or ‘hard-core’, and more or less fragmented, entity.
Sweden’s approaches to EU affairs during the first years of its membership can be characterised as largely reactive rather than proactive and anticipatory. This situation has had negative effects for co-ordination, both horizontally among ministries and vertically between ministries and central administrative agencies. In addition, and perhaps most importantly, Sweden has been an unpredictable partner in the EU. There have probably been many missed opportunities for effective coalition-building, which is very much the name of the game in the EU. This situation has also diminished Sweden’s overall influence in the EU.
That the intergovernmental rather than the supranational image has prevailed in Swedish thinking towards the EU is indicated by the prominent, however diminishing, role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and traditional diplomacy with regard to EU affairs. Likewise, the Swedish government has tended to focus on the basically intergovernmental Council rather than the supranational institutions of the Commission and the EP. In light of the metaphor of the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’, the EU is primarily seen as something outside, that is, beyond national borders and spatially separated from the national territory. In a deeper sense, therefore, “the Swedish nation has not adapted to the requirements of EU membership or even to the wider movement toward a transnationally defined human existence” (Ekengren and Sundelius 1998:146).
In combination with the cognitive and spatial separation from the EU project as such, the cultural differences are perhaps the most important limits to the Europeanisation of Sweden. To what extent we can generalise from this single case must, however, remain a matter for further, comparative analysis.
May 1999
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Endnotes
*: Dr Karl Magnus Johansson is Research Fellow at the Swedish Institute of International Affairs in Stockholm, and Lecturer at the University College of South Stockholm.
The writing of this chapter coincided with the author’s running of a book project on Sweden in the EU. See Johansson (1999b). In addition to the author, the contributors are the following: Björn Beckman, Jakob Gustavsson, Hans Hegeland, Magnus Jerneck, Jonas Johansson, Michael Karlsson, Annika Kronsell, Ingvar Mattson, Kristian Sjövik, Maria Strömvik, Jonas Tallberg, and Ulrika Wienecke. The author gratefully acknowledges the input of their writings and expertise. Thanks are also due to the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments. Back.
Note 1: For accounts of the factors explaining the decision to seek membership, see Gustavsson (1998), Jerneck (1993), Kite (1996), Luif (1995), Miles (1997), Sundelius (1994). Back.
Note 2: In addition to cultural factors, the relatively centralised Swedish political system is probably the main reason why Sweden has turned out to be one of the most obedient member-states as to compliance with EC law and single market directives. At the same time, preparations had already been made in connection to the EEA Treaty, as was noted above. For empirical data regarding compliance, see Jonas Tallberg’s chapter in Johansson (1999b). Back.
Note 3: In his Statement of Government Policy on 6 October 1998, the Prime Minister gave the following message with regard to EMU: “A decision on Sweden’s participation in EMU Stage III will have to be put to the Swedish people through an election or a referendum. In order to increase awareness and stimulate broad discussion, extensive information and adult education work on EMU is being initiated” (http://www.regeringen.se/info_sosenband...ing/regeringsforklaring/981006eng.html) Back.
Note 4: “Sweden will actively contribute to the shaping of Europe’s future. Membership of the European Union makes it possible for Sweden to work for a continent characterised by democracy, solidarity and openness. The presidency of the EU in 2001 will be a new milestone in our work in the EU” (http://www.regeringen.se/info_rosenbad...ing/regeringsforklaring/981006eng.html) Back.
Note 5: The question if Sweden is a ‘reluctant European’ was posed by Jerneck (1993). See also Miljan (1977). Back.
Note 6: On a cross-ministerial basis, there is also a group for EU affairs among state secretaries, the most high-ranking civil servants in the ministries. Back.
Note 7: It is interesting to note that a working group set up by the non-socialist government of 1991-94 actually suggested, similar to the British example, that the primary co-ordinative function should be placed in the Prime Minister’s office were Sweden to become an EU member (B. Jacobsson 1997). In 1997, the entire government office, consisting of the ministries, the Prime Minister’s office and the office for administrative affairs, became a common authority. Back.
Note 8: Following the October 1998 cabinet formation, there are three ministers in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, all three of whom deal with the EU in one way or the other. The head of the Ministry, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, will represent Sweden in the General Affairs Council. There is still a minister for foreign aid. And the Minister for Trade, previously in a separate ministry, will also co-ordinate Sweden’s Baltic Sea policies, which are of high priority for the present cabinet but through this division of work seemingly, and perhaps unfortunately, separated from EU affairs. Back.
Note 9: According to a report in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, only the Greek representation was larger than the Swedish in June 1998. Then, 91 people worked at the Swedish representation in Brussels. Out of altogether 52 civil servants, 24 were from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 28 from other ministries. Back.
Note 10: As regulated in the Swedish Riksdag Act (Chapter 10, Article 5): “The Government shall keep the EU Advisory Committee informed of matters before the Council of the European Union. The Government shall also confer with the Advisory Committee concerning the conduct of negotiations in the Council prior to decisions which the Government deems significant and on other matters as determined by the Advisory Committee.” Back.
Note 11: In 1998, the Minister for Trade was criticised by the Committee on the Constitution, whose chairman also was a member of the EU Advisory Committee, because an official at the Swedish representation to the EU, voting on an issue dealing with tourism, apparently did not take the advice of the EU Advisory Committee into account. Back.
Note 12: The Committee met several times at the final stage of the concluding IGC negotiations in Amsterdam in June 1997, having telephone conferences with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and negotiators. Back.
Note 13: In 1998, the Committee on the Constitution criticised the government for providing unsatisfactory background information with regard to a specific environmental issue. Back.
Note 14: Both the Öresund Area and the Baltic Sea Area have gained financial assistance from the EU, specifically through the Interreg programmes. A small secretariat of Interreg II C is located in the town of Karlskrona, whereas a larger secretariat of that programme is located in Rostock, Germany. Back.
Note 15: In a strongly critical front-page article in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (von Altenbockum 1998), Sweden was depicted as a “foreign policy dwarf” with a wait-and-see policy towards the EU, notably over EMU, common employment and common defence. Contrasting the Swedish approach to the Finnish, it was stated that in Sweden the EU is still, more than three years into the membership, considered an alien body (Fremdkörper). Back.