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Journal of International Relations and Development
Volume 2, No. 4 (December 1999)
Towards Global Social Theory
By Björn Hettne
*
and Fredrik Söderbaum
**
In Search of New Theories
IT IS DIFFICULT TO DISPUTE THAT THE WORLD IS UNDERGOING A DEEP TRANSFORMATION PROCESS. The fact that reality has changed does not automatically give birth to new theory, since it is through theory of some sort or another that we can understand change in the first place. Our starting point is that we simply feel uneasy with the theories we have, especially given the events that are poorly explained, for instance the end of apartheid, or the fall of the communist system, or the increase in intra-state rather than inter-state conflicts. In addition, the re-emergence of regionalism since the mid-1980s has largely been unexpected. The decline of our development favourites and the rise of the NICs (newly industrialising countries), the subsequent 'Asian Crisis', the crisis of the welfare state, increasing social marginalisation and unemployment despite continued economic growth exemplify this recurring element of unpredictability in the field of development. This is not to say that we have been completely taken by surprise by these events. It is possible to reflect and draw sensible conclusions about ongoing events, but that is not the same thing as already having an established theory that makes immediate sense of events as they happen. To the extent that our theory is incapable of doing that, we are simply stuck with bad theory, and this again influences our way of understanding reality. After all, theory is primarily a practical tool.
What do we do in a situation of uncertainty? We cannot just invent a new theory as soon as it is needed. We live in a period characterised by what is often called globalisation. But that does not give us a theory of globalisation (although many attempts are now being made to build such a theory). Rather than creating theories afresh, we normally return to the drawing table with the theories that we have and look at them critically in the light of new events. We can then, from the point of view of what is not explained, make specifications of what we demand from theory. This is to take one step backwards (in order to later take two steps forwards) and reflect about good theory, in other words to engage in meta-theoretical reflection (see the article in this issue by Mikael Baaz).
Good theory makes sense of ongoing events. It explains where we are, how we got there, and where we are going (without necessarily being able to forecast everything on the way). Good theory makes it possible to act in order to improve our situation, but since we are not all sitting in the same boat, it also differentiates between different interests.
Our purpose in this article is to argue for the transcendence of the development discourse and to move towards a comprehensive social science theory, here called 'global social theory', meaning a social science that is no longer constructed around the nation-state and the obsolete notion of 'national development', but which instead is focused on understanding structural and social change in a turbulent globality. In what follows we will identify and discuss some of the largest challenges to development theory - (i) globalisation and the restructuring of the nation-state; (ii) the new wars and development-related conflicts; (iii) the unbundling of the state, and (iv) the role of culture in the process of development - that must be accommodated when moving towards global social theory.
Globalisation and The Nation-State
THE KEY TO UNDERSTANDING WHAT IS NEW IN THE NEW GLOBAL SITUATION SHOULD BE LOOKED FOR IN WHAT HAPPENS TO THE CONSTITUTIVE INSTITUTIONS OF THE OLD ORDER, ABOVE ALL THE NATION-STATE. The problems facing the nation-state order are many, complex and interrelated. Some are external, coming from the global system or the macro-region, some are internal, coming from various movements that question the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and legitimacy, i.e. the constitutive elements, of the nation-state. In fact, the external and internal processes are intimately linked.
The process of globalisation can be seen to have reached a qualitatively new stage in the post-Second World War era. Economic interdependence was made possible by the political stability of the American world order, which lasted from the end of the Second World War and until the late 1960s or early 1970s. Since then, globalisation has further intensified. Globalism implies as its ideological core the growth of a world market, increasingly penetrating and dominating 'national' economies, which in the process are bound to lose some of their 'nationness'. Globalists consider 'too much government' as a systemic fault. Good governance is thus defined as less government. In accepting this ideology, the state becomes the disciplining spokesman of global economic forces rather than the protector against these forces, which is the traditional task of mercantilist nation-building.
This historical retreat from its Westphalian functions also implies a dramatically changed relationship between the state and civil society and, in particular, a tendency for the state to become increasingly alienated from civil society. In this process of change, legitimacy, loyalty, identity, function and even sovereignty are transferred up or down in the system, to political entities other than the state - i.e. to macro-polities or micro-polities. This makes it necessary to transcend the conventional obsession with the nation-state as the dominant political unit in the global system and to instead think in terms of a more complex, multilevel political structure in which the state assumes different functions. In this context, it should be emphasised that the neo-liberal ideology of globalism lacks ethical content, i.e. a concern for the victims of structural change, which can only be safeguarded by organised political will, a return of 'the political', for instance in the form of new regionalism and new social movements (Cox 1997; Hettne, Inotai and Sunkel 1999). Globalism and tribalism hang together and both signify a need for order.
The fundamental problem with globalisation is selectiveness. Exclusion is inherent in the process, and the benefits somewhere are negatively balanced by misery, conflict and violence elsewhere. The exclusivist implications of globalisation and market dogmatism lead to the politics of identity, as identities and loyalties are being transferred from civil society to various primary groups. Challenges to the nation-state come from several quarters but, as it seems, in interrelated ways: ethno-nationalism is expressed in claims for increased autonomy or even separation, and micro-regionalism in the emerging economic possibilities of sub-national regions to reach macro-regional and global markets and networks in a more direct way. A third type of domestic conflict is associated with anti-state or anti-society sub-group formation, a fourth with alienated groups (old or new) that try to build a separate and parallel society within the existing state in some kind of voluntary internal exile. To this list can even be added a fifth category: what Robert Cox (1999:14) has called "the covert world" of intelligence services, organised crime, terrorist groups, arms traders etc.
All this makes it difficult to see what the state's role in development could be and what type of governance is viable in the current world disorder. At the same time, the security function of the state is equally badly served. As Georg Sørensen shows in his article in this issue, a qualitatively new relationship between sovereignty and development is emerging in some parts of the developed world while, in the post-colonial world, sovereignty in its present form is no longer conducive to a rapid process of development. As Sørensen stresses, this lack of a positive relationship between sovereignty and development may be the greatest current challenge facing both the global society and the emerging global social theory.
New Dimensions of Conflict
LATELY IT HAS BECOME POLITICALLY CORRECT TO STATE THAT DEVELOPMENT AND PEACE ARE TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN. Without peace there can be no development, and without development, peace is not sustainable. This can be considered the 'classical view' of the problem, 'classical' in the sense that the remedy was found in 'peace-intensive' rather than 'conflict-intensive' national patterns of development (Hettne 1984). Simultaneously, the certainties surrounding such statements are breaking up, not because they are untrue, but because they increasingly refer to conditions which are no longer there. The 'development model of conflict', as it has been called, is questioned and the new reality is referred to as 'post-modern conflict', 'post-modern transformation', 'neo-medievalism' or 'durable disorder' (Cerny 1998; Duffield 1998). This multitude of concepts, signalling a new situation, could indicate a paradigm shift. Conflict theory is now busy understanding 'new conflicts' or the 'new wars' (Kaldor 1999). Development theory is still seen to be in an impasse (Booth 1992; Schuurman 1993; Hettne 1995a) or even considered completely irrelevant in a post-development era (Sachs 1992). Its revival is dependent on the possibility of conceiving a new social and political space (beyond the nation-state) for, and the new transnational actors behind, the implementation of development strategies which also have to take the new conflict dimensions into consideration.
The conventional view of the peace and development link has it that disintegration of the state leads to chaos and, consequently, non-development (Kaplan 1994). The reaction among donors is that development aid has to include conflict resolution as well as elimination of those socio-economic imbalances that might have caused the conflict, thus restoring the state's development and improving it by replacing uneven economic growth with sustainable development. But new, non-state-centric anthropological analyses of 'real' substantive economies suggest a more complex picture of emerging 'local' (or rather 'glocalised') economies, delinked from state control, run by a new type of entrepreneur, supported by private military protection, and drawing on international connections (cf. Reno 1995; Chabal and Daloz 1999). All of this is possible since the disintegrating state is unable to legally define and protect various assets situated within the former 'national' territory (Duffield 1998). The new political economy of warlordism can be studied in many parts of Africa, in Pakistan, in Cambodia, in former Yugoslavia, in the post-Soviet area - and elsewhere.
Privatisation is generally supported by International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and most donors as an accepted and the politically correct way out of the dreadful clientist state syndrome and the economic inefficiency associated with it. Even if this theoretical position contains a kernel of truth, the lack of legal enforcement creates a need for private protection for new property owners, since a deficient state has been replaced by an equally deficient market. This paves the way for what is basically a new political economy, the political economy of 'the new medievalism' (Cerny 1998). It grows from below and, in order to survive, certain traditional state functions like enforcing property rights, protecting economic transactions, and settling commercial disputes are reproduced in the form of Mafia-type organisations. These may seem exceptional, but are hard to replace once they have been established. Even NGOs (non-governmental organisations) and some official donors have been forced to rely on such forms of protection and improvised logistics in order to be able to carry out their ordinary work. The phenomenon is obviously increasing and may not be a simple passing crisis for the state. On the contrary, there are also state actors involved in the new business (Chabal and Daloz 1999).
Elsewhere one can discern a distinction between the nation-state strategy of maintaining sovereign rule over the national territory and local strategies of keeping local assets for local entrepreneurs disregarding claims by the official, but no longer existing, nation-state. This implies that the description of such situations as state disintegration, 'black holes', and 'failed states' is simplified. It is not the state that disappears. It is everything else that changes.
The conflict in certain 'countries' can thus be described as a clash between the new business of glocalised exploitation and private protection on the one hand, and the old nation-state project trying to maintain the structures of a nation-state on the other. This strategy would indeed seem to be difficult, since the new strategy of glocalised exploitation and private protection is effective, at least as a business strategy. The new militias can be used wherever they are needed, thus moving from one country to another, and the number of victims are kept confidential. The comparative advantage compared to conventional interventions by the United Nations and regional organisations is obvious. In the future, private protection companies may involve themselves in more conventional development work as well.
The important point for our purposes is that the 'classical view' has little new to offer in this new situation and that this post-modern perspective on the security, development and peace problems is somewhat acquiescent and should, as mentioned above, be complemented by a more constructive and modernist concern for political rationalism, implying the need to think in terms of multilevel political structures, to which we now turn.
The Unbundling of The State
NEO-MEDIEVALISM CAN BE SEEN AS A GENERAL TENDENCY TOWARDS WORLD DISORDER. It may also be seen as part of the creation of a new world order in which the nation-state is losing some of its historical importance while a more diffuse and multilevel system of governance ('the new medievalism' in a more positive meaning) is being formed (Bull 1977). Genuinely new structures both above and below the nation-state level are emerging, i.e. 'multilevel governance', which makes the medieval metaphor of limited value. One helpful way of conceiving this is to understand the Westphalian state as a 'bundle' of functions, loyalties and identities, some of which are now becoming delinked from the state and associated with other political levels, new and old (Ruggie 1993).
The point we want to make is not that the 'social' (and 'political') is derived from fear and individual urge for security, but that its continued institutionalised forms, however originally created, cannot be taken for granted and that the advanced forms that we have become accustomed to might (very well) pave the way for more primitive ones. A new, more or less stable equilibrium will be found in reviving old or constructing new political structures. By 'old' we mean both primitive pre-Westphalian forms such as robber gangs and feudal warlords and various forms of enduring Westphalian states, particularly polities such as North Korea, Israel, Cuba, China and Turkey, and emerging territorial micro-states such as the re-organised Balkan states; by 'new' we mean transnational structures, either macro-regional (the European Union or, for instance, the more informal networks of power in East and Southeast Asia) or micro-regional ('Europe of the regions' and emerging cross-border regions in East and Southeast Asia, Americas and Africa) or global 'regimes', which could provide new models of order for a new time.
In many parts of the world, there is no return to the nation-state as it was once known, while many other people, particularly in Africa, have not yet experienced a functioning nation-state/state that provides security and welfare, peace and development (and it is unlikely that they will ever experience the Westphalian nation-state). In the era of globalisation, new larger structures beyond the state are obviously preferable to political regression into micro-polities. However, an all-encompassing global organisation is simply premature and therefore the region-based territorial order -'regional multilateralism' - seems to possess a stability and equality that a completely globalised order, assuming that this is at all possible, would lack (Hettne, Inotai and Sunkel, 1999; cf. Cox 1997). A regionalised world order would still be hierarchical, and the way to horizontalise this order and create 'regional multilateralism' is for the peripheral regions to increase their level of 'regionness' through security and development regionalism.
The resurrection of regionalism is clearly one of the trends in today's world, being one example of the unbundling of state functions and political identities. The 'new regionalism' began to emerge in the mid-1980s in the context of the comprehensive structural transformation of the global system (Hettne, Inotai and Sunkel 1999). The new regionalism is taking place in more areas of the world than ever before. Today's regionalism is extroverted rather than introverted, reflecting the deeper interdependence of today's global political economy and the intriguing relationship between globalism and regionalism. Apart from the fact that there is a variety of perceptions and opinions on how globalism and regionalism relate, it is equally important to point out that the new regionalism is simultaneously linked with nationalism and domestic factors, sometimes challenging the nation-state while at other times strengthening it - i.e. contributing to a more complex multilevel polity, and once again indicating the need to transcend conventional notions of the states and how the world is organised. Needless to say, states remain important actors, but it is also quite clear that they experience a lack of capacity to handle global challenges to national interests, and increasingly respond by 'pooling sovereignty'. At the same time, they (un)intentionally give up sovereignty, autonomy and decision-making power; and may ultimately end up as semi-independent parts of larger regional political communities.
Furthermore, in this process of shaping a transformed and layered system of governance, actors other than the state are gaining strength. There is a trend whereby local and provincial political actors take over state functions while these actors are simultaneously involved together with a variety of non-state market and society actors in the increasingly complex game of transnational and multilevel politics and identity formation. Thus, the challenge for the emerging global social theory is to ensure that the current process of global transformation simultaneously involves state as well as non-state actors, and is occurring as a result of global, regional, national and local level processes. It is not possible to state which level is dominant, because actors and processes at the various levels interact and their relative importance differs in time and space.
The Cultural Turn In Development
THE MOST RECENT CHALLENGE TO DEVELOPMENT THEORY IS THE INTRODUCTION OF CULTURAL STUDIES TO THE STUDY OF DEVELOPMENT (Nederveen Pieterse 1995; Tucker 1996). Are they compatible? Some post-modern theorists now talk of 'post-development', relativising the whole business of development theorising. Others look for a combination of political economy and cultural studies. The significance of culture and identity in development has to do not so much with the cultural factor in the process of development as in doing away with Eurocentric development thinking, development as catching-up and imitation, but instead conceives and conceptualises development as an inclusive, liberating process in which different worldviews are accommodated and constitute a dialogical process (Munck and O'Hearn 1999). The new emphasis on culture has far-reaching implications, and may constitute the greatest challenge to the rethinking of development theory and the effort to move towards global social theory. It is quite clear that the early development theorists were not self-critical enough on this issue, inter alia neglecting the fact that development is necessarily culture and context specific. Today, however, few reflective social scientists would dispute that social theorising is significantly marked by the particular intellectual and practical context from which it emerges.
We agree with Preston (1999:18):
that a reflexive implication of the reconstruction of development theory is that achieving a process-centred strategy of understanding and engagement will involve a significant element of de-toxification in regard to the sets of assumptions which First World scholars have brought to the analysis of the Third World and familiar ideas about knowledge, expertise and ethics will have to be examined and revised.
However, while Preston sees no real chance of escaping his own Eurocentric perspective, we believe in the possibility of an inter-cultural dialogue which transcends the cultural prisons of theorists without denying that 'intensive reflection' might be a workable alternative liberation strategy. This is not possible without global (regional multilateralism) and local (multiculturalism) structures facilitating such a dialogue. 1
Elements of Global Social Theory
LET US NOW DRAW THE THREADS TOGETHER. Hettne has pointed out elsewhere that there are at least three different interpretations of the career of development studies to date (Hettne 1995a). The first approach is classical development studies, which sees development studies as a new social science discipline, containing a set of theoretical cores: modernisation, structuralism, dependency and 'another development', a discourse which is concerned with the specific problem of development in the so-called 'Third World'. The second is the now fashionable standpoint that development is an 'economistic' and 'narrow' process essentially amounting to the same thing all over the world, if only the 'natural' forces (the market) are allowed to prevail over the 'unnatural' (the state bureaucracy). In this perspective, development studies is a non-starter.
Our own view is that the dominating approach today, the 'economistic' ideological project, implies two relatively questionable retreats: back to the basic mono-disciplines; and back to the conventional development paradigm of economic growth and little else (Hettne 1995a:13). We are sympathetic to the first position, but as elaborated in more detail by Anthony Payne in this issue, we believe that the object for theorising cannot be a particular category of countries, more or less arbitrarily designated as the 'Third World', which now is a more or less historical concept anyhow. Our ambition has, therefore, been to try to contribute to the development of a third approach: development studies as a precursor to a more comprehensive, integrated, and universally valid, critical, historical social science - what we have labelled global social theory. According to this view, to which all the authors in this issue adhere, the research object must be different types of societies in different phases of development, trying to improve their structural position within the constraints of one world economy and one world order - a revival of the general interest in transformation and change which characterised classical social science, for instance political economy, but which is today based on a broader, global, and culturally more complex empirical experience. In this sense, development theory is also relevant in the industrial countries, meaning that it has gradually acquired an increasingly universal quality, i.e. "authentic universalism in contradistinction to the false universalism that characterised the Eurocentric phase of development thinking" (Hettne 1995a:15).
Building on the discussion of the various challenges outlined above, we argue that development theory as a state-centric concern today lacks relevance and, in order to regain its earlier importance, needs to be merged with International Political Economy (IPE) which, on the other hand, in turn would be enriched by the more dynamic and normative concerns central to classical development theory and in particular 'another' or 'critical' development theory (Hettne 1995a; 1997; Payne 1998). It is clear that such a proposed marriage only makes sense if development is interpreted according to the third position outlined above. It also means a return to the political economy tradition in which development studies are in fact rooted.
The basic argument is, thus, that the proposed marriage between certain strands of IPE theory and certain strands of development theory provides a base from which to start rethinking development theory, ultimately contributing to a unified historical and comprehensive social science. Such a merger should on the IPE side build on an emerging 'new' or 'critical' political economy, dealing with historical power structures, emphasising contradictions in them, as well as change and transformation expressed in normative terms (Murphy and Tooze 1991; Hettne 1995b; Cox 1996; 1997; Hooegvelt 1997; Payne 1998). The contribution by Hans Abrahamsson to this issue is an illustration of this perspective. The much needed focus on history in this line of thinking is an escape from unchanging, trans-historical theory, artificially imposed on an ever changing reality and characterising what is still mainstream international theory (i.e. International Relations - IR - and IPE). This would furthermore address the problem of the 'lack of emancipatory content in international theory' (Smith, Booth and Zalewski 1996). The latter dimension is the contribution from development studies, generalising from the 'poor countries' to global poverty and social exclusion.
With regard to the development side of the equation, it should be quite clear from the above that we do not reject all aspects of classical development thinking, although we strongly argue for the need to transcend it. Needless to say, we seek to avoid the pitfalls of Eurocentric modernisation, 'imitation', 'development as catching up', and various stage theories of growth. However, certain elements of the pioneering works of classical development theorists such as Gunnar Myrdal and Dudley Seers still have some relevance. There is, in our view, no need to abandon the 'modernistic' visions of material and basic needs altogether. By the same token, although the policy prescriptions and strategies of structuralism and dependency theories have reached a dead-end, their normative concerns for global disparities in material resources and the political, economic and social consequences thereof are certainly still relevant in today's world. It should not be neglected that this body of thought was the frontrunner to the 'globalisation of development theory', which is also important for global social theory.
Further, the main principles of 'another development' - defined as need-oriented, endogenous, self-reliant, ecologically sound and based on structural transformation (Nerfin 1977; Hettne 1995a:175-206) - are important inputs for a revived development theory as well as global social theory more generally. Particularly important in this regard is its emphasis on the content of development rather than the form, implying a critical questioning of what type of development, for whom and with what consequences. In fact, an unbending concern for the excluded, poor and marginalised people, critically questioning existing structures and in whose interests the prevailing strategies are carried out constitutes perhaps the most important component of a revived and 'critical' development theory. 2
Furthermore, as discussed in detail above, the new concern for the conflict dimension in development has to be integrated into the global social theory. This also has to do with the decline of the state, particularly as far as the monopoly over the legal use of violence is concerned. But in contrast to both the 'classical view' and the post-modern position, we argue that the notions of unbundling state functions, legitimacy, loyalty and identity are constructive for understanding the emergence of multi-layered polities as well as the involvement of non-state actors.
The new way of thinking - the emerging global social theory - also has to accommodate the new emphasis on cultural studies, both in development theory and IR/IPE theory. Global social theory has to avoid the pitfalls of the universalising assumptions and priorities of Western science and the tendency for a convergence around the cognitive model of the West in contradistinction to drawing on the local cultural resources and forms-of-life, the basis on which people read and react to global structural change (Preston 1999:18), thereby giving shape to different patterns of development.
The new emphasis on culture should also lead to a questioning of the uni-polar cultural hegemony of the West towards an authentic civilisational dialogue. Instead of asymmetry and polarisation, the structural gap between regions should be bridged and the global structure horizontalised. This would be an international society of regional communities, i.e. what we previously labelled 'regional multilateralism'.
A more symmetric, or horizontalised, world order would necessarily mean a reduced role for the West. A regionalised world order and a more complex globality, rather than continued uni-linear globalisation, would not only be more efficient in resolving conflicts but would also facilitate a genuine global cultural pluralism. The region-based inter-civilisational dialogue gives a new meaning to history, in contrast to the 'end of history' thesis of ultimate Western dominance or the 'clash of civilisations'; and this kind of dialogue on a global level presupposes that the parties possess a material base, which could only be guaranteed within a regionalist protective framework (new forms of political community and new governance structures). So far, there is little experience of constructive inter-regional relations to draw upon, but there is equally little reason to believe that there necessarily must be a clash between the new regions.
October 1999
Endnotes
Björn Hettne is Professor at the Department of Peace and Development Research, Göteborg University, Sweden.
Fredrik Söderbaum is Doctoral Candidate at the Department of Peace and Development Research, Göteborg University, Sweden.
Note 1: The cultural turn in development thinking is elaborated in more detail in the contribution by Maria Erikssson Baaz in this issue. In her article, she highlights some crucial problems associated with critical and post-development theorists, arguing convincingly that instead of going beyond the Eurocentrism which these critical theorists so deeply oppose, they tend to remain within and support the same essentialist and simplistic logic.Back.
Note 2: See Georgina Waylen's article in this issue for a discussion of gender aspects and Simon Bromley's article for a focus on the environment.Back.
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