CIAO DATE: 2/08
In this lecture I review some of the issues that meta-theorizing was supposed to address in international relations and show how this project of securing knowledge through hierarchization and finding absolute foundations failed. Basically I argue that since neither the 'order of being' nor the categories of the mind provide an unproblematic and trans-historically valid Archimedean point that allows for an incontestable 'view from nowhere', the traditional epistemological project cannot make good on its promise. I'm trying to refute the twin fallacies that seem to fuel much of the hypertrophic concern with epistemology: First, that in the absence of secure universally valid and trans-historically established criteria everything becomes 'relative' and that, therefore, the adherents of a more critical or pragmatic orientation towards knowledge have to be either nihilists or charlatans since they deny 'truth'. Second, since the foundationalist claims of traditional epistemology can be shown to be faulty, indeed 'anything goes' and we need not worry about criteria that warrant our knowledge claims. Here relatively mindless research activism or some form of pragmatism at basement prices is supposed to take care of the problems. I argue for a pragmatic turn in theorizing not in the hope of having now found a new foundation after the failure of the epistemological project, but with the understanding that such a turn represents a good bet in pursuing our research while remaining attentive to the importance of meta-theoretical issues that arise in its course.
The factvalue distinction and the conception of science as a practice put a premium on the ethics of the scholarly community. The principles of ethics, not those of logic, govern this process of knowledge production. Values not only enable facts, but sustain our identities as scholars and enable the practice of science. In the absence of ethical commitments, we would become indistinct from polemicists and spin doctors. Ethics are instantiated and sustained through practices. As graduate students, we learn professional ethics the same way we learn other values and habits: by emulating those we respect. It is imperative that we practice and communicate tolerance and pluralism to our graduate students and younger colleagues, not merely the professional skills we associate with the production and evaluation of research.
In response to Kratochwil's focus on the problem of theory-building in international relations (IR), I argue, first, that history (or historical ways of asking/answering questions) is essential to IR, but that, once this is accepted, a host of questions regarding the nature and function of historical knowledge-claims must be incorporated into meta-IR investigations of the kind Kratochwil and others have engaged in predominantly from the perspective of the philosophy of science. Second, I accept Kratochwil's main thesis that the failure of foundationalism does not lead us to nihilism or relativism but point out that there is an easier way to express this thesis via Kuhn's later treatment of theory choice in science. Third, I briefly point to a number of uncertainties regarding Kratochwil's plea for pragmatism in IR theory-building.
In this short rejoinder to Friedrich Kratochwil's plea for a 'pragmatic approach to theory building', I argue that, despite his claims to the contrary, his position essentially rests on a curious form of foundationalism and relativism. The problem, as I identify it, is that Kratochwil's attempt to move contemporary debate forward fails because he treats the issue only in epistemological terms. Kratochwil is deeply suspicious of the very idea of the 'real world' and reduces it to an infinitely malleable construct of our ways of thinking and talking about it. This means that he remains trapped in the epistemological cave and is condemned to an endless quest to solve problems that have no solution. But the real world is not simply something that we think and talk about but, rather, we engage with it in practice and as such it offers resistance to our attempts to grasp it. Hence, it is not a subject without a voice in the global conversation. This is an important theoretical limit, particularly in relation to contemporary issues surrounding global environmental problems.
In responding to the critics of my Tartu lecture, I firstly examine a little further the 'community' aspect of science as a practice, because I do not quite share Lebows's optimism that 'ethics' applied to the scientific enterprise are powerful enough to prevent its derailments. Secondly, I admit that a lack of an explicit historical dimension in my lectures noticed by Suganami was dictated more by circumstances than by an oversight or a denial of its importance. While Suganami believes that a sense of history, as well as some criticism of both international relations (IR) and history on the meta level, are sufficient for a new and fruitful beginning of IR analysis, I'm emphasizing the contribution which ordinary language philosophy could make to a new type of social analysis and, in particular, the theory of speech acts and of 'institutions' la Searle. Thirdly, instead of putting up a straw man and knocking him down, as Wight has done in his misunderstanding of my position, I'm addressing the issue of 'scientific realism' and its alleged predominance in the philosophy of science, the question of ontology and epistemology and, finally, the issue of whether the claims that 'nature' directly speaks to us is of any help in explaining actions rather than events.
Pearson Prentice-Hall,Harlow, England, New York, 2005, 254pp.
ISBN: 0-273-68609-7
Klaus Dodds
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Lanham, 2004, 123pp.
ISBN: 0-7425-1779-9
Aleš Debeljak
Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2005, 376pp.
ISBN: 0-7619-3328-X
Britha Mikkelsen
Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2005, 312pp.
ISBN: 0-691-12340-3
David A. Welch
Blackwell Publishing, Malden, Oxford, and Carlton, 2004, 384pp.
ISBN: 1-4051-1575-0
Stephen Graham (ed.)