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How Progressive is the U.S. Federal Tax System? A Historical and International Perspective
Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez
This paper provides estimates of federal tax rates by income groups in the United States since 1960, with special emphasis on very top income groups. We include individual and corporate income taxes, payroll taxes, and estate and gift taxes. The progressivity of the U.S. federal tax system at the top of the income distribution has declined dramatically since the 1960s. This dramatic drop in progressivity is due primarily to a drop in corporate taxes and in estate and gift taxes combined with a sharp change in the composition of top incomes away from capital income and toward labor income. The sharp drop in statutory top marginal individual income tax rates has contributed only moderately to the decline in tax progressivity. International comparisons confirm that is it critical to take into account other taxes than the individual income tax to properly assess the extent of overall tax progressivity, both for time trends and for cross-country comparisons. The pattern for the United Kingdom is similar to the U.S. pattern. France had less progressive taxes than the United States or the United Kingdom in 1970 but has experienced an increase in tax progressivity and has now a more progressive tax system than the United States or the United Kingdom.
Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion
Joel Slemrod
No government can announce a tax system and then rely on taxpayers’ sense of duty to remit what is owed. Some dutiful people will undoubtedly pay what they owe, but many others will not. Over time the ranks of the dutiful will shrink, as they see how they are being taken advantage of by the others. Thus, paying taxes must be made a legal responsibility of citizens, with penalties attendant on noncompliance. But even in the face of those penalties, substantial tax evasion exists. Tax evasion is widespread, always has been, and probably always will be. This essay reviews what is known about the magnitude, nature, and determinants of tax evasion, with an emphasis on the U.S. income tax. It then places this information into a conceptual context, examining various models and theories, and considers policy implications.
Taxing Consumption and Other Sins
James R. Hines Jr.
Federal and state governments in the United States use income and payroll taxes as their primary tools to collect revenue. Relative to the United States, governments in the rest of the world rely much more heavily on taxing consumption. Heavy American reliance on income rather than consumption taxation has not served the U.S. economy well. The inefficiency associated with taxing the return to capital means that the tax system reduces investment in the United States and distorts intertemporal consumption by Americans. While the economic logic of consumption taxation is compelling even for a closed economy, it is even more powerful for an open economy exposed to the world capital market. Consumption taxes in the form of excises can be designed to help protect the environment and control other externalities. Excise taxes can also serve the function of more closely aligning tax burdens with the benefits that taxpayers receive from certain government services. Understandable concerns arise about the distributional consequences of consumption taxation, but a system that relies heavily on consumption taxes, particularly if accompanied by an income tax, can be as progressive as any income tax the United States would realistically want to adopt.
Tax Reform Unraveling
Michael J. Graetz
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 was widely heralded as the most significant change in our nation’s tax law since the income tax was extended to the masses during World War II. It was the crowning domestic policy achievement of President Ronald Reagan, who proclaimed it “the best antipoverty measure, the best pro-family measure, and the best job-creation measure ever to come out of the Congress of the United States.” The law’s rate reductions and base broadening reforms were mimicked throughout the countries belonging to the OECD. Even at the time, however, reading the paeans to this legislation was like watching a Tennessee Williams play: something was terribly wrong, but nobody was talking about it. Two decades later, the changes wrought by the 1986 act have proven neither revolutionary nor stable. Tax experts now regard the 1986 act as a promise failed. The public seems to agree, and considerable public support exists for a “flat tax” or a national sales tax to replace the income tax. I shall examine the most important individual and corporate income tax changes since 1986, before turning to proposals for restructuring the nation’s tax system.
The Goals and Promise of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act
John C. Coates IV
The primary goal of the SarbanesOxley Act was to fix auditing of U.S. public companies, consistent with its full, official name: the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002. By consensus, auditing had been working poorly, and increasingly so. The most important, and most promising, part of SarbanesOxley was the creation of a unique, quasi-public institution to oversee and regulate auditing, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB). In controversial section 404, the law also created new disclosure-based incentives for firms to spend money on internal controls, above increases that would have occurred after the corporate scandals of the early 2000s. In exchange for these higher costs, which have already fallen substantially, SarbanesOxley promises a variety of long-term benefits. Investors will face a lower risk of losses from fraud and theft, and benefit from more reliable financial reporting, greater transparency, and accountability. Public companies will pay a lower cost of capital, and the economy will benefit because of a better allocation of resources and faster growth. SarbanesOxley remains a work in progress -- section 404 in particular was implemented too aggressively - but reformers should push for continued improvements in its implementation, by PCAOB, rather than for repeal of the legislation itself.
Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental Europe
Luca Enriques and Paolo Volpin
The fundamental problem of corporate governance in the United States is to alleviate the conflict of interest between dispersed small shareowners and powerful controlling managers. The fundamental corporate governance in continental Europe and in most of the rest of the world is different. There, few listed companies are widely held. Instead, the typical firm in stock exchanges around the world has a dominant shareholder, usually an individual or a family, who controls the majority of the votes. In this essay, we begin by describing the differences in the ownership structure of companies in the three main economies of continental Europe—Germany, France, and Italy—with comparisons to the United States and the United Kingdom. We next summarize the corporate governance issues that arise in firms with a dominant shareholder. We take a look at a major European corporate scandal, Parmalat, as an extreme example of investor expropriation in a family-controlled corporation. We outline the legal tools that can be used to tackle abuses by controlling shareholders. Finally, we describe the corporate governance reforms enacted by France, Germany, and Italy between 1991 and 2005 and assess the way in which investor protection in the three countries has changed.
The Economic Lives of the Poor
Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo
The 1990 World Development Report from the World Bank defined the “extremely poor” people of the world as those who are currently living on no more than $1 per day per person. But how actually does one live on less than $1 per day? This essay is about the economic lives of the extremely poor: the choices they face, the constraints they grapple with, and the challenges they meet. A number of recent data sets and a body of new research allow us to start building an image of the way the extremely poor live their lives. Our discussion builds on household surveys conducted in 13 countries: Cote d’Ivoire, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, South Africa, Tanzania, and Timor Leste (East Timor). These surveys provide detailed information on extremely poor households around the world, from Asia to Africa to Latin America, including information on what they consume, where they work, and how they save and borrow. We consider the extremely poor—those living in households where the consumption per capita is less than $1.08 per person per day—as well as the merely “poor”—defined as those who live under $2.16 a day—using 1993 purchasing power parity as benchmark. In keeping with convention, we call these the $1 and $2 dollar poverty lines, respectively.
Payday Lending
Michael A. Stegman
A "payday loan" is a short-term loan made for seven to 30 days for a small amount. Fees charged on payday loans generally range from $15 to $30 on each $100 advanced. A typical example would be that in exchange for a $300 advance until the next payday, the borrower writes a post-dated check for $300 and receives $255 in cash—the lender taking a $45 fee off the top. The lender then holds on to the check until the following payday, before depositing it in its own account. When the fee for a short-term payday loan is translated into an annual percentage rate, the implied annual interest rate ranges between 400 and 1000 percent. Virtually no payday loan outlets existed 15 years ago; today, there are more payday loan and check cashing stores nationwide than there are McDonald’s, Burger King, Sears, J.C. Penney, and Target stores combined. For economists, several interesting issues arise in the study of payday loans: Is this just a situation in which willing customers and firms interact in the market for ready access to high-cost, short-term credit? Or does the payday loan industry encourage habitual borrowing and the snowballing of unaffordable debt in such a way that the state has a role to play in limiting consumers from their own excesses? Would a ban or overly restrictive regulations on payday lending just revive the market for loan-sharking? And what of a similar practice by mainstream banks, who regularly allow their customers to overdraw their checking accounts if they pay a fee comparable in size to a payday loan charge?
Daron Acemoglu: 2005 John Bates Clark Medalist
Robert Shimer
Daron Acemoglu, winner of the 2005 John Bates Clark Medal, uses theoretical and empirical analysis to tackle critical issues in a variety of fields in economics, including labor economics, macroeconomics, and political economy. His unparalleled combination of originality, thoroughness, and prolificacy has propelled him to the frontier of each field that he has explored. The Clark medal committee notes that “his work is always motivated by real-world questions that arise when facts are difficult to reconcile with existing theory.” Daron focuses on a core set of questions and uses the best tools available to answer them. What determines the accumulation of human capital both during formal schooling and on the job? How do the implications of labor market frictions depend on the information available to job searchers? How do economic incentives affect the type of technological change that we observe? Why are there such enormous differences in output per worker and total factor productivity across countries?
Markets: Cartel Behavior and Amateurism in College Sports
Lawrence M. Kahn
This paper studies intercollegiate athletics in the context of the theory of cartels. Some point to the explicit attempts by the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) to restrict output and payments for factors of production as evidence of cartel behavior. Others argue that such limits enhance product quality by preserving amateurism. I find that the NCAA’s compensation limits on athletes lead to high levels of rents from the entertainment revenues produced by the athletes, a finding consistent with the cartel interpretation. The athletes producing these rents are disproportionately African-American, while the beneficiaries are primarily white. The rents are typically spent on facilities, nonrevenue sports, and, possibly, head coaches’ salaries. Big-time football and men’s basketball programs earn accounting profits, although the athletic departments in which they reside make accounting losses on average. However, there is some evidence, albeit not unanimous, that sports generate alumni contributions, state appropriations, and additional student applications. But, arms race considerations suggest that there may be some societal gains to the aggregate limitation of spending on college athletics.
Retrospectives: From Usury to Interest
Joseph Persky
Since the Middle Ages, each epoch has participated in the debate over the conditions in which lending should be prohibited as usury. While disagreements over the definition of usury remain, the debate came to its modern climax on the eve of the industrial revolution, in a well-known interchange between Jeremy Bentham and Adam Smith in the late 1780s. Smith, for all his faith in a system of natural liberty, proved unwilling to let the interest rate float. Bentham argued anything else must reduce total welfare. From a superficial perspective, the entire affair amounts to nothing more than a modest dispute between a failing master (Smith died in 1790) and an over-eager disciple. (Bentham acknowledged in the Defence that all he knew of political economy originated in Smith’s works.) Yet the argument struck a fundamental chord. Gilbert K. Chesterton identified Bentham’s essay on usury as the very beginning of the “modern world.” I tend to agree.
Recommendations for Further Reading
Timothy Taylor
Notes