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Volume 19, Number 4, Fall 2005
The Vulcanization of the Human Brain: A Neural Perspective on Interactions Between Cognition and Emotion Jonathan D. Cohen
Emotions may explain inconsistencies in human behavior and forms of behavior that some have deemed irrational, though such behavior may seem more sensible after a discussion of the functions that emotions serve—or may have once served in our evolutionary past. People do have the capacity to override emotional responses. This capacity relies in large measure on the most recently evolved parts of our brains that support forms of behavior that are more recognizably rational. Neuroscientists are beginning to make headway in identifying the neural mechanisms involved in both emotional responses and higher cognitive processes. Among the most recent and exciting developments in neuroscience has been the introduction of methods for imaging the function of the intact human brain. This effort offers the promise of a deeper understanding of how and why emotions impact decision making, how this may contribute to behavior that appears to deviate from optimality, and how and when we are able to overcome such emotional responses.
Cognitive Reflection and Decision Making Shane Frederick
This paper introduces a three-item "Cognitive Reflection Test" (CRT) as a simple measure of one type of cognitive ability—the ability or disposition to reflect on a question and resist reporting the first response that comes to mind. The author will show that CRT scores are predictive of the types of choices that feature prominently in tests of decision-making theories, like expected utility theory and prospect theory. Indeed, the relation is sometimes so strong that the preferences themselves effectively function as expressions of cognitive ability—an empirical fact begging for a theoretical explanation. The author examines the relation between CRT scores and two important decision-making characteristics: time preference and risk preference. The CRT scores are then compared with other measures of cognitive ability or cognitive "style." The CRT scores exhibit considerable difference between men and women and the article explores how this relates to sex differences in time and risk preferences. The final section addresses the interpretation of correlations between cognitive abilities and decision-making characteristics.
Individual Irrationality and Aggregate Outcomes Ernst Fehr and Jean-Robert Tyran
In their personal lives, many economists recognize that they are surrounded by individuals who are less than fully rational. In their professional lives, however, economists often use models that examine the interactions of fully rational agents. To reduce the cognitive dissonance of this situation, many economists believe that interactions in markets will correct or offset individually anomalous behaviors—although the reasons for this belief are often not clearly spelled out. This paper presents evidence indicating that "strategic complementarity" and "strategic substitutability" are important determinants of aggregate outcomes. Under strategic complementarity, a small amount of individual irrationality may lead to large deviations from the aggregate predictions of rational models; under strategic substitutability, a minority of rational agents may suffice to generate aggregate outcomes consistent with the predictions of rational models. Thus, the presence of strategic substitutability or complementarity seems to be a key condition in determining when a population that is heterogeneous with regard to rationality reaches either a "rational" or an "irrational" outcome.
Assessing High House Prices: Bubbles, Fundamentals and Misperceptions Charles Himmelberg , Christopher Mayer and Todd Sinai
How does one tell when rapid growth in house prices is caused by fundamental factors of supply and demand and when it is an unsustainable bubble? In this paper, we explain how to assess the state of house prices—both whether there is a bubble and what underlying factors support housing demand—in a way that is grounded in economic theory. In doing so, we correct four common fallacies about the costliness of the housing market. For a number of reasons, conventional metrics for assessing pricing in the housing market such as price-to-rent ratios or price-to-income ratios generally fail to reflect accurately the state of housing costs. To the eyes of analysts employing such measures, housing markets can appear "exuberant" even when houses are in fact reasonably priced. We construct a measure for evaluating the cost of home owning that is standard for economists—the imputed annual rental cost of owning a home, a variant of the user cost of housing—and apply it to 25 years of history across a wide variety of housing markets. This calculation enables us to estimate the time pattern of housing costs within a market. As of the end of 2004, our analysis reveals little evidence of a housing bubble.
The American Mortgage in Historical and International Context Richard K. Green and Susan M. Wachter
The U.S. mortgage before the 1930s would be nearly unrecognizable today: it featured variable interest rates, high down payments and short maturities. The authors compare the form of U.S. home mortgages today with those in other countries. The U.S. mortgage provides many more options to borrowers than are commonly provided elsewhere: American homebuyers can choose whether to pay a fixed or floating rate of interest; they can lock in their interest rate in between the time they apply for the mortgage and the time they purchase their house; they can choose the time at which the mortgage rate resets; they can choose the term and the amortization period; they can prepay freely; and they can generally borrow against home equity freely. They can also obtain home mortgages at attractive terms with very low down payments. The authors discuss the nature of the U.S. government intervention in home mortgage markets that has led to the specific choices available to American homebuyers. They believe that the unique characteristics of the U.S. mortgage provide substantial benefits for American homeowners and the overall stability of the economy.
Accounting for Stock Options Jeremy Bulow and John B. Shoven
As public companies begin their new fiscal years, they are implementing a new and controversial Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB, 2004) proposal for expensing stock options. Applied to 2003 and 2004, this rule would have slashed reported earnings of the Standard & Poor's 500 by 8.6 and 7.4 percent; the effect in the bubble years would have been more than twice as large. We describe the history of how these options have been expensed for financial statement purposes. We assess the new FASB approach and find that it is deeply flawed. The main purpose of the paper is to describe an alternative options expense valuation method, the Bulow-Shoven approach, that addresses these problems. Our approach is simpler than the new FASB methodology, less prone to earnings manipulation and more consistent with the way the rest of compensation is treated in financial statements.
The Original Management Incentive Schemes Richard T. Holden
During the 1990s, the structure of pay for top corporate executives shifted markedly as the use of stock options greatly expanded. By the early 2000s, as the dot-com boom ended and the Nasdaq stock index melted down, these modern executive incentive schemes were being sharply questioned on many grounds—for encouraging excessive risk-taking and a short-run orientation, for being an overly costly and inefficient method of providing incentives, and even for tempting managers of firms like Enron, WorldCom and Tyco to commit fraud in order to ensure a high stock price at the time of exercise. This article examines executive incentive schemes developed by Du Pont and General Motors in the 1920s—the original incentive schemes linking executive compensation to stock prices. The author argues that these plans were well-designed to pre-empt and address many of the criticisms of modern-day executive stock option plans.
A Natural Experiment in Monetary Policy Covering Three Episodes of Growth and Decline in the Economy and the Stock Market Milton Friedman
The third of three episodes in a major natural experiment in monetary policy that started more than 80 years ago is just now coming to an end. The experiment consists in observing the effect on the economy and the stock market of the monetary policies followed during and after three very similar periods of rapid economic growth in response to rapid technological change: the booms of the 1920s in the United States, the 1980s in Japan and the 1990s in the United States. In this experiment, the quantity of money is the counterpart of the experimenter's input. The performance of the economy and the level of the stock market are the counterpart of the experimenter's output. The results of this natural experiment are clear, at least for major ups and downs: what happens to the quantity of money has a determinative effect on what happens to national income and to stock prices. The results strongly support Anna Schwartz's and my 1963 conjecture about the role of monetary policy in the Great Contraction. They also support the view that monetary policy deserves much credit for the mildness of the recession that followed the collapse of the U.S. boom in late 2000.
Intelligence Failures: An Organizational Economics Perspective Luis Garicano and Richard A. Posner
Two recent failures of the U.S. intelligence system have led to the creation of high-level investigative commissions. The failure to prevent the terrorist attacks of 9/11 prompted the creation of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004), or 9/11 Commission.The mistaken belief that Saddam Hussein had retained weapons of mass destruction prompted the creation of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (2005), or the WMD Commission. In this paper, we use insights from organizational economics to analyze the principal organizational issues these commissions have raised in the ongoing discussion about how to prevent intelligence failures.
The Degradation of Reported Corporate Profits Mihir A. Desai
Recent corporate scandals have highlighted abuses by firms overstating profits to capital markets. In a related but less noticed vein, the reporting of profits to tax authorities has come under increased scrutiny with heightened concerns over the spread of tax avoidance activities. How could firms simultaneously be inflating profits reported to the capital markets and understating profits reported to tax authorities? The practical answer is that American firms keep two sets of financial statements: a financial statement that reports "book profits" to the capital markets and a separate financial statement that reports "tax profits" to the government. These two profit reports can bear little resemblance to each other and follow distinct rules. This paper argues that the latitude afforded managers by the dual nature of corporate profit reporting has contributed to the simultaneous degradation of profit reporting to capital markets and tax authorities. The distinction between book and tax profits allows managers the ability to mischaracterize tax savings to capital markets and to mischaracterize profits to tax authorities. Examination of three high-profile cases of managerial misreporting of profits and tax avoidance—at Enron, Tyco and Xerox—reveals how the drive to improve reported book profits fosters tax avoidance and how the drive to limit taxes gives rise to the manipulation of accounting profits and managerial malfeasance.
Oil for What?—Illicit Iraqi Oil Contracts and the U.N. Security Council Paul Heaton
The Oil-For-Food program was established by United Nations Security Council Resolution 986 in 1995 as a means of providing humanitarian relief to Iraq, which had been under U.N. economic sanctions since the Persian Gulf War in 1991. After the invasion of Iraq, considerable evidence emerged suggesting that Saddam Hussein was able to subvert the Oil-For-Food program to obtain hard currency as well as items on the United Nation's prohibited transfer list. In this paper, I use recently available data to examine how the Iraqi government used illicit contracts for underpriced oil to reward supporters. Although it may never be possible to prove conclusively that the Iraqi government used oil contracts as a mechanism to trade bribes for votes in the U.N. Security Council, I demonstrate that nations with seats on the Security Council received a greater number and a greater value of these contracts and that receipt of the contracts was positively associated with pro-Iraqi votes. I also find that Iraq was more likely to give contracts to countries on the Council that had exhibited prior support for the Iraqi regime.
Retrospectives: Eugenics and Economics in the Progressive Era Thomas C. Leonard
During the Progressive Era, eugenic approaches to social and economic reform were popular, respectable and widespread. This essay documents the influence of eugenic ideas upon American economic reform, especially in the areas of immigration and labor reform, and tries to illuminate something of its causes and consequences.
Recommendations for Further Reading Timothy Taylor
Comments Lawrence H. Goulder , Ian W.H. Parry and Roberton C. Williams III
Notes