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CIAO DATE: 04/07
International Security, Winter 2005/2006 (Volume 30, Issue 3)
Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq by Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, Jason Reifler
Since the Vietnam War, U.S. policymakers have worried that the American public will support military operations only if the human costs of the war, as measured in combat casualties, are minimal. Although the public is rightly averse to suffering casualties, the level of popular sensitivity to U.S. military casualties depends critically on the context in which those losses occur. The public's tolerance for the human costs of war is primarily shaped by the intersection of two crucial factors: beliefs about the rightness or wrongness of the war, and beliefs about the war's likely success. The impact of each belief depends upon the other. Ultimately, however, beliefs about the likelihood of success matter most in determining the public's willingness to tolerate U.S. military deaths in combat. A reanalysis of publicly available polls and a detailed analysis of a series of polls designed by the authors to tap into public attitudes on casualties support this conclusion.
Who "Won" Libya? The Force-Diplomacy Debate and Its Implications for Theory and Policy by Bruce W. Jentleson, Christopher A. Whytock
The debate over credit for Libya's shift away from "rogue state" policies, most especially by settling the Pan Am 103 Lockerbie terrorism case and abandoning its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, is lively politically and challenging analytically. It has important implications for theories of force and diplomacy, particularly coercive diplomacy, and policy debates including such cases as Iran and North Korea. U.S. coercive diplomacy against Libya can be divided into three phases: the Reagan strategy of unilateral sanctions and military force, which largely failed; the mixed results from the more multilateral strategy of the George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton administrations; and the substantial success achieved through the secret direct negotiations initiated along with Britain in the latter Clinton years and furthered under George W. Bush, which culminated in Libya closing down its WMD programs. These differences in success and failure are principally explained by (1) the extent of "balance" in the coercer state's strategy combining credible force and deft diplomacy consistent with three criteriaproportionality, reciprocity, and coercive credibilitytaking into account international and domestic constraints; and (2) target state vulnerability as shaped by its domestic politics and economy, particularly whether domestic elites play a "circuit breaker" or "transmission belt" role in blocking or carrying forward external coercive pressure.
Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done by Robert F. Trager, Dessislava P. Zagorcheva
Many scholars and policymakers argue that deterrence strategies have no significant role to play in counterterrorism. The case against deterrence rests on three pillars: terrorists are irrational; they value their political ends far above anything deterring states could hold at risk; and they are impossible tofind. Each pillar is either incorrect or its implications for deterrence have been misunderstood. Under certain conditions, deterrence is preferable to the use of force. Analysis of the structure of terrorist networks and the processes that produce attacks, as well as the multiple objectives of terrorist organizations, suggests that some deterrence strategies are more effective than those of the past. In particular, many terrorist groups and elements of terrorist support networks can likely be deterred from cooperating with the most threatening terrorist groups, such as al-Qaida. Although the use of force against multiple groups creates common interests among them, an appropriate deterrence strategy could fracture global terrorist networks. The current policy of the U.S. and Philippine governments toward the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group illustrates the potential of this approach and the risks of using force. Not only can groups such as the MILF be deterred from cooperating with al-Qaida, they may even be coerced into providing local intelligence on operatives linked to it.
The Afghan Model and Its Limits
Winning with Allies: The Strategic Value of the Afghan Model by Richard B. Andres, Craig Wills, Thomas E. Griffith Jr.
When the war in Afghanistan ended in 2002, the country was largely governed by Afghans. This result came about because, rather than inserting thousands of troops into the country, the United States fought the war using a new type of military operation that relied on special forces, airpower, and Afghan allies. In the operation, approximately fifty U.S. special forces personnel accomplished what planners had believed would require 50,000 U.S. ground troops. In the wake of the war, military planners largely dismissed the Afghan model as unworkable elsewhere. The performance of the model in Afghanistan and later in Iraq, however, illustrates that the traditional military's pessimism toward this method is unwarranted. The Afghan model vastly improves U.S. leverage in coercive diplomacy and war because it requires few U.S. ground troops and facilitates the transition to stability and democracy by empowering indigenous allies.
Allies, Airpower, and Modern Warfare: The Afghan Model in Afghanistan and Iraq by Stephen D. Biddle
The Afghan model of warfare uses indigenous allies to replace American conventional ground troops by exploiting U.S. airpower and small numbers of American special operations forces. Some argue that this model is widely applicable, enabling a major restructuring of the U.S. military and considerable freedom for American military intervention. An assessment of such claims in light of recent combat experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, however, finds the model's applicability to be more limited. Where U.S. allies have had skills and motivation comparable to their enemies', the Afghan model has proven extremely lethal even without U.S. conventional ground forces. But where U.S. allies have lacked these skills, they have proven unable to exploit the potential of American airpower. The model can thus be a powerful tool, but one with important preconditions for its useand these preconditions limit its potential to transform U.S. force structure or defense policy.
Correspondence
Striking the Balance by Robert J. Art
Brooks and Wohlforth Reply by Stephen G. Brooks, William C. Wohlforth
Lieber and Alexander Reply by Keir A. Lieber, Gerard Alexander