CIAO DATE: 01/08
In Section 1, we outline the conceptual framework, rationale, and objectives of the Special Issue. Next, we clarify what we mean by ‘international relation theory (IRT)’, which would serve as the basis for organizing the case studies. We then examine several possible explanations of the absence of non-Western IRT, such as the belief that Western IRT has discovered the right path to understanding international relations so as to preclude the need for other voices, the hegemonic status of Western IRT that discourages theoretical formulations by others, the ‘hidden’ nature of IRT in Asia, lack of resources and local conditions that discriminate against the production of IR theory, and the time lag between the West and Asia in developing theoretical writings. This is followed by our suggestions about the possible Asian Sources for IRT, including the writings of classical political, military, and religious figures, thinking, and foreign policy approach of leaders, the work of Asian scholars who have applied Western IRT to local contexts, and finally, generalizations of Asian experiences to develop concepts which can be used more widely.
There is not yet a Chinese international relations theory (IRT) mainly due to three factors: the unconsciousness of ‘international-ness’ in the traditional Chinese worldview, the dominance of the Western IR discourse in the Chinese academic community, and the absence of a consistent theoretical core in the Chinese IR research. A Chinese IRT is likely and even inevitable to emerge along with the great economic and social transformation that China has been experiencing and by exploring the essence of the Chinese intellectual tradition. The Tianxia worldview and the Tributary System in the two millennia of China's history, the radical thinking and revolutions in the nineteenth and twentieth century, and reform and opening-up since 1978 are the three milestones of China's ideational and practical development and therefore could provide rich nutrition for a Chinese IRT. In addition, a Chinese IRT is likely to develop around the core problematic of China's identity vis-à-vis international society, a century-long puzzle for the Chinese and the world alike.
The poor conceptualization of Indian IR can be explained bylocal factors such as its disciplinary location and pedagogicalissues but its mainly because Western IRT has acquired a Gramscianhegemony over the epistemological foundations of the disciplinarycore of Indian IRT – termed as ‘traditional IR’in this article. It discusses the ‘disciplinary gate-keepingpractices’ of Western IRT and the intellectual dependencyof Indian IRT, which does not acknowledge India's own historyand philosophical traditions (e.g. Kautilya) as a source ofIRT. Scholarly endeavors inspired by feminism, critical theory,development studies, and postcolonialism – termed as ‘newIR’ – are yet to be owned by Indian IR. This articleargues for creating alternative sites of knowledge constructionand explains how Indian ‘ways of knowing’, for example,a ‘non-dualistic mode of thinking’ in contrast tothe modern ‘self-other binary mode’ of understandingrealities can address the problematiques of contemporary IR.
There is no Indian school of IR and any assessment of Indianscholars' contribution to IR theory depends upon what countsas ‘IR theory’. The article starts with a criticaloverview of the state of the art of the IR discipline in Indiaby analyzing disciplinary, pedagogical and discursive reasonsto explain its poor conceptualization. This assessment is, however,predicated upon a very narrow disciplinary vision of IR, whichfor analytical purposes, is termed as traditional IR. The nextsection analyzes scholarly endeavors emanating from developmentstudies, postcolonialism and feminism that lie outside the disciplinarycore of (Indian) IR to reflect on issues being debated withinthe postpositivist domain of the ‘mainstream’ IR.To the extent these debates are yet to be owned by Indian IRand these intellectuals acknowledged as part of its scholarlycommunity, it might be termed as new IR. Finally, the articleargues for creating alternative sites of knowledge creationin IR by devising different set of tools and exploring a newrepertoire of resources that have, thus far, been de-legitimizedor rendered irrelevant for knowledge production in IR.
Re-imagining IR in India is not about creating an Indian schoolof IR but redefining IR itself. This problematizes the basicformulation and idiom of our query: why there is no non-westernIR theory in India by highlighting its implicit binary character,which is not merely descriptive but hierarchical: the ‘dominant’west and the ‘dominated’ non-west. From this standpoint,even if scholars were to succeed in creating an Indian schoolof IR, it would at best, earn a small, compartmentalized spacewithin the master narrative of IR (read the western IR1). Thechallenge, therefore, is not to discover or produce non-westernIR theory in India but for the Indian IR community to work towardsfashioning a post-western IR.
This article argues that there are theories of international relations (IR) in Japan and that these theories are mostly of middle range type. I first give a brief survey of IR studies in Japan and its disciplinary backgrounds. On that basis, then I focus on the three outstanding cases of fledgling theories of IR as developed in the 1920s and 1930s, namely Nishida as an innate constructivist, Tabata as an international law theorist presupposing the natural freedom of individuals, and Hirano as an economist placing regional integration higher than state sovereignty, to develop the argument that there are indeed theories of IR in a fledgling form already before World War II.
This article inquires into the absence of non-western theorizing upon Southeast Asian international relations by positing that modernization and its conceptual kin ‘realism’ have proclaimed themselves as the mainstream in both theoretical and empirical research. This is as much a product of postcolonial western scholarship as it is of indigenous scholarship in reproducing the former's frameworks. The effect of this Gramscian hegemony is to marginalize possibilities for non-western international theory. There are nonetheless flickers of hope for a generic ‘Southeast Asian contribution’ to theorizing International Relations, inclusive of non-mainstream western scholarship, if one considers the categories of transitional and hybrid scholarship, in addition to historically informed possibilities of a traditional Southeast Asian statehood.
In the conclusion, we seek to ascertain the possibility of anon-Western International Relations theory (IRT) in Asia. Wefind while there is a good deal of writing that can be regardedas ‘pre-theoretical’, these have not been fullyexploited or exported to other parts of Asia and beyond. Thereis certainly little that can be called an Asian IRT. This isnot because scholars in the region accept that Western IRT isunchallengeable nor that it has found all the answers to themajor problems of international relations. Nor is it becausenon-Western theories are ‘hidden from the public eye’.It is rather due to a lack of institutional resources, the head-startof Western IRT, and especially the hegemonic standing of WesternIRT. At the same time, the case studies point to the existenceof abundant intellectual and historical resources that couldserve as the basis of developing a non-Western IRT that takesinto account the positions, needs and cultures of countriesin the region. There is room in Asia for the development ofnon-Western IRT, but not an ‘Asian School of internationalrelations’ (although national perspectives such as a ‘ChineseSchool’ are possible) which would assume a degree of convergenceof perspectives and interactions among Asian scholars, whichclearly does not exist. This development should and could gobeyond simply ‘joining in to the existing game seekingto add local colour and cases to existing theory’, ordeveloping a localist exceptionalism (‘Asian values’)or organizing local thinking into rebellions against prevailingorthodoxies (especially realism and liberalism) in the mannerof the dependencia theory. Western IRT does not need to be replaced,but can and should be enriched with the addition of more voicesand a wider rooting not just in world history but also in informedrepresentations of both core and periphery perspectives withinthe ever-evolving global political, economic and social order.
In the conclusion, we first offer some generalizations fromthe four case studies with a view to addressing the main questionposed in the introduction: the apparent absence of IRT in Asiaand possible explanations behind it. We then reflect on whetherthe question of a non-Western IRT in Asia is a meaningful one,and whether the way it is approached in this special issue couldresult in a productive debate that would advance the disciplineof IR. Although our empirical focus is on Asia, we suggest someinsights that have more general relevance for non-Western IRT.
The puzzle of why Northeast Asian countries do not have any environmental cooperation comparable to Europe's successful regulatory regime even though both regions have borne similar conditions of the atmospheric problem has been explored. In order to answer this question, the author shed light on some of the conditions in Northeast Asia that would be necessary for regional cooperation to take place, by examining the factors that shape the environmental foreign policy of sovereign states. The success of Europe's regional cooperation in dealing with acid rain has been investigated, through the lens of interest-based and epistemic community approaches. The interest-based approach provides two factors – ecological vulnerability and economic cost – to show why some countries have taken more active positions than others. In addition, the author argues that one more factor is necessary, the existence of an epistemic community, out of the knowledge-based community perspective, because even self-interested states have difficulties in defining their interests due to high uncertainty and complexity about developing goals and preferences. After applying the two perspectives to the cooperation of Northeast Asian countries, it is found that lack of domestic and regional consensus on ecological vulnerability to transboundary acid deposition and the high economic costs of reducing emission have contributed to slow development of the cooperation of Northeast Asia. In addition, the lack of solid expert communities in Japan, as a leading country, could hinder Northeast Asian countries from speeding up the transition toward regulatory regime formation from the current information sharing cooperation.