

# The transformationalist perspective and the rise of a global standard of civilization

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## Abstract

The ongoing process of globalization is transforming the world. States, the principal actors in international systems, are the privileged subjects of this transformation. State identities are changing and state sovereignties are challenged. Some scholars refer to this as a 'Grotian moment'. I argue that a meaningful analysis of contemporary international politics needs to consider seriously questions related to the identities of actors and the quality of anarchy. Furthermore, I argue that the rise of a 'global standard of civilization' reflects the transformation of the world and is affecting state sovereignty. Finally, I argue that only a truly democratic culture is able to construct durable, peaceful and generative co-operation.

## 1 Introduction and assumptions

Current transformations are more substantial than ever before in history. The identities of states such as the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, the Baltic republics, etc., are quite different in kind than they were before the end of the Cold War. The most important identity transformation is unquestionably the change which has occurred in the identity of the Russian state. This change has had significant consequences for peace and stability in the world. Hence, we may say that Russian missiles today are *culturally* different from the earlier Soviet missiles. However, there is some resistance to this general pattern of transformation. China, North Korea, Iran, Iraq and some other states are to different degrees resisting the transformation of the identity of their respective states. However, the change in state identities has not

affected the structure of the international system. A *system* changes only if its ordering principle changes. The *ordering principle* of the system is still anarchy, and the system therefore remains the same. Has *bipolarity* changed? Not in military terms; more than ten years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, we still have a nuclear balance of power between the United States and Russia, as the successor to the Soviet Union.

If the ordering principle of the system has not changed, and if the nuclear balance of power remains unchanged as well, then what is it that has actually changed? The change lies in the transformed identities of many states. Consequently the identity of the system has changed. I am suggesting that the *identity* of the system can be subjected to change while the *structure* remains unchanged. So we still have anarchy, although qualitatively different; a balance of power, which has changed; and we have states, but they no longer have the same authority and sovereignty. At the same time it is obvious that the world before and after the fall of the Berlin Wall is quite a different place. The balance of power between a democratic bloc on the one side and a non-democratic bloc on the other differs from a balance of power between two democratic blocs. More specifically, the US–Russia balance of power is completely different from a potential US–EU balance of power. It is equally true that a democratic anarchy is quite different in terms of functioning, communications and consequences to a mixed anarchy, which is constituted by democratic *and* non-democratic states. In an anarchical system there are two ways of categorizing states. One is *power*-based and the other is *quality*-based. Most theories, realism (old and new) in particular, classify states according to their respective material (power) capabilities: superpower, great power, medium power and small power. Conceived in this way, atomic weapons are atomic weapons independently of the qualitative attributes of their possessor. But some atomic weapons are friendlier than others. There is neither ‘good’ nor ‘bad’ in a Machiavellian universe, only *amity* and *enmity*. The *quality*-based approach distinguishes ‘civilized’ and ‘uncivilized’ atomic weapons, just as there are ‘democratic’ and non-democratic missiles. While all civilized and democratic missiles are allied because they share the same democratic values, the uncivilized and undemocratic missiles are hostile not only to each other, but certainly also to civilized and democratic missiles. One could argue that barbarians share the same value – *barbarian* – which will restrain them from going to war against other barbarians. Against this argument we may say that barbarian ‘values’ do not create durable ‘common interests’ and lack a co-operative culture. For decades, the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China shared the same ideology (Marxism-Leninism) and pursued the same objective: the realization of Communism. This was obviously not sufficient to establish durable common

interests between them. Moreover, a schism actually produced ‘fratricide’, antagonism and hostility between Beijing and Moscow. Since they were non-democratic, their ‘common cultures’ were negative. And *negative* common cultures are insufficient for establishing ‘barbarian peace’.

The main reason for the lack of long-term common interests and co-operation between the non-democratic states is that their ‘culture’ is alien to the concept of voluntarily entering into contracts. While the entire underpinning of democracy is based on the contract system, the non-democratic states are arbitrary products of force, and they are therefore incapable of generating common interests. One could also argue that the Warsaw Pact and Comecon, created in 1955 and 1949 respectively, provide evidence that counters the argument presented here. In response to this argument, I emphasize the substantial difference between a military alliance on the one hand, and collective security or the existence of a security community on the other. In Alexander Wendt’s words, ‘alliances are temporary coalitions of self-interested states who come together for instrumental reasons in response to specific threats. Once the threat is gone, the coalition loses its rationale and should disband’ (Wendt, 1994, p. 386). It is true that both the Warsaw Pact and NATO initially had the same character. A significant difference is that while the former became extinct before the end of the ‘threat’, the latter transformed itself from an alliance to a community – changing its *raison d’être* from working against a specific threat to working against non-specific threats. If we compare Comecon with the EU, we arrive at the same conclusion, that the auto-dissolution of Comecon was a result of its mechanical and abortive character, while the progress of the EU is due to its integrative and cumulative character.

Drawing on just such a quality criterion, John Rawls divides states (peoples in his terminology) according to the degree to which they have internalized ‘liberal culture’. He divides states into: (1) reasonably liberal peoples; (2) decent (non-liberal) peoples; (3) outlaw states; and (4) societies burdened by unfavourable conditions (Rawls, 1999, p. 4). He believes that peace should be possible between the first and the second categories of state, and obviously not between these states and states in the third category. Rawls does not assign much importance to atomic weapons, but what in his model (or imagination) makes peace possible between 1 and 2 are again the ‘basic cultural affinities’ between them (respect for basic human rights, moral duties, obeying the law, etc.). The most important requirement for being classified as a decent state is to be non-aggressive (Rawls, 1999, pp. 64–70). In civilizational terms, Rawls’s classification of states is based on ‘cultural identity’ rather than material power. From this point of view the world consists of the ‘civilized’ or ‘semi-civilized’ and the ‘barbarians’

or 'savages' (Rougier, 1910; Oppenheim, 1912; Gong, 1984). In both approaches actor identity determines the quality of anarchy, and not the reverse.

My argument is that the change we are witnessing in the post-Cold War period is due primarily to the transformation of Russian identity, not the disintegration of Soviet Union. The former gave rise to the latter and not vice versa. The Soviet Union may disintegrate and yet remain the same (with a Marxist-Leninist identity). On this hypothesis, the Soviet Union would surely have been a weaker challenger without this tangible effect on the identity of the system. NATO could hardly have intervened in Yugoslavia and Poland, and the Czech Republic and Hungary could not as easily have become full members of NATO. The reason is that the Soviet Union challenged not only the military power of the United States (and the West as a whole), but also and especially the very identity of the West. It was only when the Soviet Union changed its identity, giving up its adversarial position towards Western identity, slowly moving in the direction of Western 'civilization' and sharing the same intersubjectivity, that the sense and meaning of Russia's military challenge changed in consequence. That is, 'Russian missiles' are culturally different from the earlier 'Soviet missiles' independently of their technical performance.

At the present time there are no tangible signs indicating China's possible return to Maoism, Vietnam's to the Ho Chi Minh era, or Iran to Khomeini's. On the contrary, there are numerous indicators that these countries intend to pursue policies of reform. We are experiencing an ongoing process of global convergence that also affects inter-state relations. This convergence is not tactical, nor is it a contextual convergence of merely materialist interests between states. Convergence is too broad a concept and cannot be reduced to temporary 'alliances' (i.e. the alliance between Nazi Germany and the Stalinist Soviet Union in 1939). Convergence is a product of changes in the orientation of states. I am not saying that it is complete, or that it is perfect, but the trend towards convergence is unprecedentedly great. Contemporary state orientation moves roughly in the direction of capitalism and liberalism. This tendency is more immediately noticeable in the 'centre' of the world system (the West) as well as in countries such as Russia, China, Vietnam and Iran. These countries have yet to 'internalize' the norms associated with what I call the 'global standard of civilization' (GSC), but they are at the stage of preinternalizing or 'norm cascade' (Finnemore *et al.*, 1998, pp. 887–911).

This factual observation does not necessarily mean that all these countries share the same ideas and values and have similar approaches to human rights, democracy and liberalism. On the other hand, it is undeniable that

the gap between different world visions is now as narrow as it has ever been historically. Two pillars of our current mega-civilization remain unchallenged, and adherence to liberalism and capitalism (in all their variety and nuance) is also on the increase. In other words, globalization has considerably reduced the differences between various world visions. Not yet complete convergence, or complete divergence. If we accept globalization as a fact and an inescapable reality, and if we accept that in a single global world, multiple, concurrent and contradictory civilizations cannot coexist, then we have to acknowledge the existence, or at least the emergence, of a global civilization. The shift from a world with multiple civilizations to a single global civilization has inspired some scholars to conceptualize the present transitory phase as a 'Grotian moment'. In Richard Falk's view, Grotian moments indicate 'decisive historical moments of the location of a boundary between one epoch and another that obscure the slow, gradual tectonic shifts in values, beliefs, ideas, and behavior that are hidden from general view' (Falk, 1998, p. 3). The study of the GSC is the subject of enquiry in this study.

## 2 Concepts and characteristics of the GSC

The GSC refers to a set of laws, norms, values and customs that provides opportunities and constraints for international actors. States remain the primary actors, both in the shaping and implementation of the GSC. Non-state actors such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and individual citizens are also subject to the GSC. The GSC covers not only inter-state relations; it also covers states' behavior *vis-à-vis* their respective citizens, and minorities in particular. Furthermore, the GSC defines appropriate human conduct *vis-à-vis* animals and the environment. In this sense, the GSC goes beyond conventional global human rights norms.

The GSC is a product of the European standard of civilization that has been formulated through the centuries in a cumulative fashion. The European code of conduct has been analysed by Gong in his well-known book, *The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society* (1984). The standard of civilization described by Gong is what may be referred to as *classical*, a standard that was deeply Christian, colonialist and Eurocentric. These elements have not yet disappeared completely. Europe (the West at large) is still Christian and dominates political, economic, technological and cultural spheres. Nevertheless, there has been substantial change. Let us here note just two major changes. First, there has been a change in Western attitudes. Without the prospect of having to face a potent and dangerous opponent in the foreseeable future, the West has found a new self-confidence and a precious tranquility. Having acquired self-confidence, the West has seized the opportunity to return to its original intellectual, normative and ethical roots.

This ‘Second Enlightenment’ has enabled the West to focus more on *values* by incorporating a revived set of norms into its *realpolitik*. The second major change is embodied in the *universalization* of the most relevant ingredients of the First Enlightenment (freedom, tolerance, human rights etc.), emphasized by world-wide democratization. The emerging GSC in contemporary international society has two dimensions: a GSC applicable in inter-state relations, and a standard of civilization aimed at states’ treatment of their own citizens. What is new is the second dimension. In the current era it is not enough that a state behaves in a ‘civilized’ fashion *vis-à-vis* other states; states are now also required to adopt civilized behavior towards their own citizens (minorities of all kinds: religious, ethnic, secular, etc.). Therefore, the addition of a second dimension to the classic standard of civilization constitutes the novelty that differentiates our epoch from the previous one.

### 3 Constitutive elements of the GSC

The argument here is that the GSC is the outcome of *interaction* between international ethics, law and politics. In the terminology of social constructivism this interaction is called *process*. The process possesses two main and interrelated characteristics: it is *dynamic* and it is *reciprocal*. The dynamic aspect indicates that the process is never ending; it is an eternal movement, and the standard of civilization is permanently being reconstructed. We have seen different standards of civilization in Europe. The nineteenth-century standard is obviously quite different from the European standards of pre- and post-World War One, post-World War Two and the post-Cold War period. It is convincing proof that the same civilization can create different standards of civilization, depending upon the international environment. The process is also reciprocal, in the sense that the three components of the GSC influence each other continuously.

International politics (IP) is both *structural* and *relational* in character. Anarchy is one form of structuration; conflict and co-operation are relational and not necessarily consequences of anarchy. International ethics has only an implicit and indirect impact on structural aspects of IP. But actors, especially the most powerful ones, are under certain circumstances able to keep their relations ‘civilized’ instead of ‘militarizing’ them. Anarchy is, after all, what states make of it. If they feel that their ‘physical’ or ‘ontological’ security is assured, they generally tend to be less conflict prone and more co-operative (Wendt, 1994, p. 385). In such cases international ethics becomes more relevant.

## 4 International ethics and GCS

I have argued that globalization causes a change in the quality of anarchy and the identity of the units in the international system. A globalizing world requires global ethics. The function and regulation of a global world (environment, economy, finance, intervention, information, etc.) can hardly take place without a global vision and, in some respects, global decisions. How to control capital flows, and how to combat pollution and AIDS? Who owns the map of the human genome? Is genetic manipulation of vegetables, animals and human beings to be unrestricted? Who is to restrict such activities? What makes a military intervention morally legitimate? What should the advanced countries do to help the underdeveloped countries? Are human rights universal? These and many other important questions need ethical answers. There are two aspects to the above complex of problems. First, *is a global ethics possible?* And second, *who is in charge?*

The first question is of a philosophical nature. A *global* set of ethics must necessarily be rationally valid for everybody. The best way to reach this objective is to decide, *à la* Rawls, behind a veil of ignorance. Rawls applied his model to relations between peoples (states). One can extend this model to humankind at large. If we put the question to each individual/citizen in the world we can arrive at the conclusion that in our time everybody is for values such as freedom, justice, peace and prosperity. But these values are rather abstract, and their contents could be subject to differences of interpretation and conflict. One person's understanding of justice could be different from another person's. The same is valid for other fundamental concepts such as freedom, peace and prosperity. The question is, which interpretation prevails? As individuals, everybody is entitled to their own interpretation. As *societies* and as *states*, however, the situation is different. Societies and states are constructed and organized on the basis of human communication. The quality of communication (co-operative or conflictual) is not the issue here. The issue is that any lasting communication requires a minimum standard of common rules. Ethical questions are purposive. Therefore, the contents of ethical principles must be sufficiently explicit, in a manner that can be sustained by the communication system. The role of formulating and making such principles explicit is incumbent upon the predominant civilization. When Roman civilization was dominant, ethical principles were Roman; when the Islamic empire was at its zenith, the dominant ethical principles were Islamic; and when Christianity was predominant, the dominant values were Christian.

This brings us to the second question: who is in charge of formulating global ethics? In a global world, ethical issues are determined by *globality*. Scholars in the realist tradition have tended to argue that shared ideas can

only be created by a centralized authority (Wendt, 1999/2000, p. 252). Under anarchy no such authority exists, and we therefore will not find ‘consensus’. But this realist assumption is not true. Buddhists and Muslims have, each on their own terms, shared ideas and values, without having had to resort to centralized institutions. Europeans have – through the centuries – elaborated a set of shared ideas and values within a decentralized and anarchical system. The difference between traditional and global anarchy resides in the fact that ‘identity formation’ in the former was restricted to the state level and was limited to Europe (and subsequently to the West), while the latter is increasingly extensive and inclusive. It has been extended to *citizens*, incorporating humankind. In a *global* anarchical system ethics is elaborated in a *process*. The process is extended to a multitude of issues of different natures: from genetic manipulation to pollution, from gender equality to finance and communications.

How do we decide what is globally good and what is globally bad? There is no institution charged with delivering an authoritative directive on each issue. A number of institutions and organizations such as the UN do, of course, attempt to define appropriate conduct. For instance, war is considered legitimate only if two conditions are fulfilled: (i) legitimate defense, and (ii) in case of a threat against peace and security. On the use of force in circumstances other than these two explicit cases, the Secretary General of the UN continues to search for an authoritative principle. As Kofi Annan observes, ‘Under our [United Nations] charter, we are allowed to use force in the common interest. But there are questions that we will have to answer. What is the common interest? Who defines it?’ (*New York Times*, 8 March 2000). ‘Common interest’ is an abstract notion. In order to define it, actors must agree on minimal shared values and priorities. Is ‘order’ more important than ‘justice’; or is their importance equivalent? Who defines common interest, and will he do it according not only to his material interests, but also his understanding of common interests? The definition and formulation of such ethical questions must ultimately reside with *public opinion*, by which I mean the opinions of experts, journalists, civil societies, NGOs, philosophers, writers, theologians, politicians, and so on and so forth. Public opinion is obviously more powerful in the democratic world than in the non-democratic world. And this does matter, as the standard of civilization is primarily defined by the dominant civilization. The global standard of civilization is therefore defined – primarily – by the dominant Western civilization, which happens to be democratic.

Now, let us take a concrete political example: the case of Austria. What motivated the fourteen EU countries to begin a diplomatic ‘boycott’ of the Austrian government, the fifteenth member of the EU? The reason cited was



the participation of an extreme right-wing party in the Austrian government coalition (Conservative and FPÖ). This decision was not motivated on legal grounds. It was a political decision based on *ethical* considerations. The Austrian government did not commit an illegal act, nor were they in violation of any EU or international agreement. Fourteen other members of the EU nevertheless equated the participation of a ‘racist and xenophobic’ party in the government as contradicting what we can refer to as an ‘EU standard of civilization’. By their political decision the European leaders affirmed the existence of an ethical code of conduct, insisted that it be respected and punished the member which moved in a direction considered to be in violation of this code of conduct. As President Jaques Chirac put it, ‘the European Union is based on common values . . . and Austria did commit a “rupture du contrat”’ (*Elysée*, 9 February 2000). The Austrian case illustrated two important things. Firstly, there exists a set of ethical values which are regarded as being above political consideration. Secondly, the sanctions initiated against the Austrian government demonstrated that a decentralized authority is able to ‘administer’ what have been proclaimed as common values. More specifically, a group of states tried to ‘force’ a particular member of their group to become socialized via *emulation* for the purpose of preserving what sociologists and anthropologists call *groupness*, or *asabiyya* in Khaldunian terminology.

In short, we must acknowledge that international and global ethics remain elusive and without recognized authority. Other than the UN agencies there exist, of course, numerous non-governmental organizations and institutions such as the Vatican that try to create new norms or/and improve existing ones. Further, and probably most important, there exist a number of ‘global moral entrepreneurs’, charismatic and credible personalities such as the Dalai Lama, Nelson Mandela, or the late Lady Diana and Mahatma Gandhi, who contributed to the elaboration and diffusion of global ethics: a culture of tolerance and compassion, of non-violence and non-discrimination. Nevertheless, despite a number of encouraging factors, it seems appropriate to note that humanity still has a long way to go to articulate and abide by a comprehensive set of global ethics. On the other hand, what is expected and what is already observable is a *convergent* trend towards the sharing of certain fundamental values on human rights, democratic culture and fairness.

## 5 International law and the GSC

While the contribution of ethics to shaping the GSC appears to be elusive, the role played by international law is more tangible and visible. International law is nourished from two different sources. The first source is *ethics* and the

second is *needs*. Some norms are created because of the appearance of a completely new situation. With the discovery of the New World, the European powers were suddenly faced with new problems and new questions. Is it legal to wage war against American indigenous peoples? How can the appropriation of indigenous lands be justified? Such questions could not be answered without referring to the very basic ethical foundation of Europe at that time. Christianity as both the ethical and legal foundation of Europe was called upon to provide answers to the new questions. In a sense, the existing standard of civilization was challenged by the discovery of America. The Thomist theory of natural law had to be ‘modernized’ to better fit the beginning of the era of colonialization.

Some norms are epoch builders. The introduction and establishment of such norms often heralds the inauguration of a new era. This particular category of norms is generally most crucial and tends to emerge after great wars. Let us mention some of these events: the Thirty Years (religious) War ended with the Peace of Westphalia (1648, perhaps the first step towards multilateralism) and the beginning of a new international system based on the nation-state. In this system, sovereignty became the dominant principle. Multiple, different sovereign states made anarchy inevitable. Consequently, international law had to be formulated in such a way that the sovereignty of states (territorial integrity, non-intervention in states’ internal affairs, extra-territoriality of diplomatic representations etc.) be respected. In reality, the Westphalian era set its own standard of civilization, according to which any violation of principles related to sovereignty is judged as ‘uncivilized’ and therefore liable to punishment.

The Napoleonic wars (1803–1815) provided the occasion for the rise of the Congress System and the formulation of new fundamental norms in international relations. The Congress of Vienna (1815) was charged with establishing a new order. The new order required new and supplementary norms. Principles such as free navigation on international rivers and regulations concerning the rank of diplomatic agents were adopted. Furthermore, the most notable decision of the Vienna Congress was its condemnation of slavery. Even if this condemnation was formulated in very general terms, it was nevertheless the announcement of the end of slavery. It is noteworthy that the demand for this condemnation came from England due to pressure from English public opinion (Nussbaum, 1947, p. 180). The process of globalizing European international law continued and was reinforced by the establishment of the Permanent Court of Arbitration by the Hague Conference in 1899, amended in 1909. The same process led to the extension of the European standard of civilization to non-Europeans and non-Christians. World Wars I and II also generated considerable qualitative changes in the

domain of international law, accelerated written law and expanded multilateralism, the creation of international organizations of a universal nature (League of Nations, UN), and the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

After the Cold War, the globalizing trajectory of international law together with humanitarian interventions has considerably accelerated. Two *ad hoc* international tribunals – one for ex-Yugoslavia and one for Rwanda – have been established and are functioning. In this particular chain of events, the most important step was taken at the UN Conference in Rome (15–17 July 1998). At the end of the conference, the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was adopted, with 120 voting in favor, seven against and twenty-one abstentions. As of January 2001, 139 countries (including the United States, Iran and Israel) have signed the Statute, and twenty-seven countries have ratified it (the statute requires sixty ratifications to enter into force). The jurisdiction of the court encompasses genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. An investigation can be initiated if a state, a group of states or the UN Security Council refers a case to the prosecutor of the ICC, or at the initiative of the prosecutor him/herself. Without going into the details governing this emerging institution, it seems obvious that the creation of the ICC constitutes a crucial step towards what the UN Secretary General called ‘*universal justice*’ (Alton, 1999).

This brief review of the globalizing process in international law suggests three observations: first, since the beginning of the *Renaissance*, and particularly after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, only European civilization has succeeded in producing a set of norms and creating various institutions and organizations with a global/universal scope and dimension. None of the old civilizations, be they Chinese, Islamic, Indian and so on, made any successful attempts at elaborating an alternative ‘international law’. The last Islamic treaty of international law was written in the eighth century by Shaybani (750–804) (Khadduri, 1966; Hashmi, 1996, pp. 128–166). It is interesting to note that in the nineteenth century, Henry Wheaton’s *The Elements of International Law* was translated into Chinese (in 1864) and was used by the Chinese government to inveigh against Western extraterritorial privileges. Wheaton’s *Elements* became the bible on the subject of international law in China, and later in Japan (Gong, 1984; pp. 26, 126–154).

This is to say that a long time ago, these civilizations ceased to produce specific norms even for the purpose of their own inter-state relations. Take for example the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), which includes forty-six Muslim countries. It is a fact that despite great rhetorical discourses about ‘Islamic values’, Muslim countries nevertheless fail to fol-

low an 'Islamic normative standard'. This does not exist; Muslim inter-state relations are regulated according to an international law that is universal and Western in origin. This factual observation does not necessarily exclude contradictions among dominant cultural norms; it is, however, revealing that the democratic West continues to be the dynamic source for the transformation, progress and reformulation of norms. Non-Western contributions to this dynamism remain weak. Look at the movements that challenge the abuse of human rights, the uneven process of economic globalization, or environmentalist movements such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Greenpeace or Attac. All these movements also originate in the West. The lack of democracy and the weakness of civil society in non-Western societies is certainly among the causes of their weak contribution to the improvement and correction of dominant norms.

Secondly, as a consequence of the development of international law, the standard of civilization is becoming increasingly global. The creation of new universal institutions (e.g. the ICC) and the rise of a human rights culture are among the facts that demonstrate a change of emphasis away from the Westphalian concept of the absolute and perpetual sovereignty of state, towards the rights of citizens.

Finally, while significant qualitative change in international law has occurred as a result of violent wars (the *Cold War* included), it seems that in the future this progress will continue almost peacefully. The new *quality* of anarchy has already considerably reduced the risk of another world war. And even in the field of war, and despite the cruelties (Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo), much effort has been expended towards humanizing humanitarian law (Meron, 2000, pp. 239–278).

## 6 International politics and the GSC

International politics covers a vast and complex area. The aim here is not to describe the ontology or epistemology of this discipline. The aim is to identify relations between IP and the GSC. In this respect, IP has played a crucial and multidimensional role. The argument is that the rise of a global civilization does not necessarily require a central authority; and an anarchical system is not incompatible with a global civilization. The *quality* of anarchy is the determinant in this connection. Alexander Wendt identifies three cultures of anarchy: the *Hobbesian*, the *Lockean* and the *Kantian*. While it is impossible for a Hobbesian anarchy based on enmity to possess any kind of shared culture, the Lockean culture is different because it is based on a different role structure, on rivalry rather than enmity. The Kantian culture is based on a role structure of friendship (Wendt, 1999/2000, pp. 246–312). So, theoretically, a global civilization based upon respect for human rights and individual

freedom is more likely to arise in a Kantian culture than a Lockean culture. Hence, the Hobbesian culture is private and not shared, and as a culture is unqualified to produce or generate a global civilization.

Here we face a crucial question. How does the culture of the international system change from one epoch to another? Do Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian cultures represent different phases of cultural progress? Is this progress irreversible? There are no easy answers to these central questions. What we do have is a variety of *approaches* to these questions. Realists reject the idea of progress. From their point of view, the contemporary international system is fundamentally similar to the world of Thucydides. Opposing this approach, Kantians argue for a progress that carries implicit suggestions of irreversibility. Social constructivists situate themselves between the first and the second approaches. They recognize that the contemporary international system represents considerable progress over that of AD 500 or even AD 1500. But 'there is no historical necessity, no guarantee, that the incentives for progressive change will overcome human weakness and the countervailing incentives to maintain the status quo' (Wendt, 1999/2000, pp. 310–311).

None of these approaches sees globalization as a new and determining factor. Studying the international system without considering globalization amounts to a misrepresentation of reality, because things are completely different in a non-global and a global world. The international system is a dependent construction and necessarily subject to the impacts of infrastructure on the world system. The international system thus reflects the world system, and not vice versa. Today's world system is capitalist and liberal. Globalization is the conceptual denomination of the current world system. Consequently, the international system must become global. Having achieved this, it will follow globality's trends and imperatives. It is possible to focus on the international system as an independent entity, and either to reject or anticipate the possibility of change. But such a focus would have as its object only what has been caused; it would not be a study of *the cause itself*. If the identity of the world and the quality of anarchy are changed, this transformation is due to globalization. So, we must look to the evolution of globalization if we are to understand the evolution of the international system and its possible progress. From this perspective, progress amounts to satisfying the needs of globalization and correcting its course. If the conjunction of the two pillars of globalization (capitalism and liberalism = global civilization) requires changes *in* or *of* the international system, these will be produced accordingly.

What we are observing at the edge of the twenty-first century is that globalization is continuing its momentum towards broader and deeper inter-

national communications and integration. International politics – and likewise international ethics and law – are simply following this path. Since a global world operates at high speed, the dynamism of interaction between politics, ethics and law occurs in an almost febrile atmosphere. The decoding of the human genome calls for immediate ethical, normative and political answers. Alterations in the ozone layer and (sharp) fluctuations in the international financial market also require prompt reactions. Responding positively to these challenges calls for an international system which is more dynamic and flexible than what can be provided by the Westphalian system. Let us look at two fundamental issues, both of which are coming under scrutiny and which have already gained more flexibility. One is the problematic of *power* and the other is *sovereignty*.

In contemporary international politics '*soft power*' is gaining increasing importance. This is not to imply that hard power has become completely obsolete. Hard power is still exercised through economic sanctions or military force, but mostly against states like Iraq, Iran, Libya and Serbia. And to a still smaller degree in normal relations between normal states. Soft power is – as Joseph S. Nye puts it – an ability to get what one wants through attraction rather than coercion. Discussing the position of the United States, he states that 'one source of soft power is our values. To the extent that we are seen as a beacon of liberty, human rights and democracy, others are attracted to follow our lead' (*New York Times*, 3 January 2000). Another source of soft power is culture; '. . . when others see our [American] power as morally based, it is more effective'. But even more important is the impact on the balance of power. Nye – referring to a German observer – points out that historically, when one country is preponderant, the desire of others to balance its power leads them to team up against it. Why has this yet to happen to the United States? One reason is American soft power. 'Others do not see us as a threat, but rather as an attraction.' If soft power is becoming important to the United States (as the most powerful country, also in terms of hard power), it is clear that soft power is – at least – equally important to less powerful states. In relation to power, the dichotomy power/norm is also becoming an obsolete assumption. In our time, 'the legal rules and norms operate by changing interests and thus reshaping the purposes for which power is exercised' (Slaughter *et al.*, 1998, pp. 367–413).

The contemporary discussion of the priority of 'interests' or 'norms' seems equivalent to the question of the chicken and the egg. 'Interest' is necessarily defined within a context; a cognitive map determines the context in itself. The identity of a fully democratic state is different from that of a non-democratic state. And its interests are likewise different. The 'self-help' principle depends on how the state defines 'self' in relation to 'other', and

this is a function of social identity (Wendt, 1994, p. 385). My argument is that when a GSC is shaped, it contributes to a convergence of (state) identities. Convergence of identities enables convergence of interests. This is a logical argument. Empirical evidence must prove or disprove it. If we consider the huge cumulative progress in international law, in conjunction with the increase of the relevance of international ethics, we have to admit that the world today has become – also in normative terms – a global world. One implication is that international co-operation and conflict resolution are more likely to take place *within* a global normative set.

*Sovereignty* is another fundamental Westphalian element. Since the Peace of Westphalia, state sovereignty has been accorded almost sacrosanct status – or at least been perceived thus. Krasner, challenging the importance of the Peace of Westphalia, states that ‘in the international system norms, including those associated with Westphalian sovereignty and international legal sovereignty, have always been characterized by organized hypocrisy. Norms and actions have been decoupled. Logics of consequences have trumped logics of appropriateness’ (Krasner, 1999, p. 220).

What is new is that it is precisely this aspect of sovereignty that has come under double pressure. One aspect of this pressure is concretized by the increasing adherence of states to multilateral treaties as they allocate more and more of their respective sovereignty to international institutions (as of 15 May 2000, 514 multilateral treaties had been deposited with the UN). Today, ‘sharing sovereignty’ is an almost daily routine in the EU. The same evolution is observed to a lesser degree in the international arena (i.e. WTO and IMF). Why do states voluntarily delegate an increasing share of their sovereignty? This question is explained by the fact that multilateralism will facilitate Pareto-optimal outcomes and help states get what they want in cost-effective ways. Further, states do it for cultural reasons.

Participation in the growing network of international organizations is culturally necessary and ‘appropriate’. . . . Participation in international organizations constructs or constitutes what states want or, in the case of European Union participation, what they are. (Finnemore, 1996, p. 338)

The other source of pressure on state sovereignty is independent of state decisions, and is therefore incomparably more important than the first aspect. This pressure comes from inside states and is an expression of ‘citizen power’. Actually, the adherence of states to multilateralism is partially due to pressure from citizens, especially in matters related to subjects such as human rights, the struggle against discrimination and environmental preservation. The real domestic pressure, however, is meant to challenge the ‘absolute and perpetual’ sovereignty of the state in favor of real recognition

of human and citizens' rights. It is evident that this trend is wider and deeper in advanced democratic countries than in semi-mature or non-democratic societies. In this conjunction, what really counts is the values that are held at the center of the world.

The center of the world in our time is democratic. This is where essential decisions with world-wide consequences are taken. This is also where the patterns of the future of the world are drawn. Consequently, when citizens in democratic countries obtain more rights, this leads to a general formulation of new norms. In this respect, one of the best examples is gender equality. Inequality between man and woman was a dominant norm until quite recently, even in democratic societies. Today, gender equality is considered a universal principle by 'civilized' nations. Once this principle arose in the West, it became an issue in other parts of the world. Not only Iranian, but also Kuwaiti women are now demanding rights similar to those that women in democratic countries have already obtained. Consequently, the pressure from citizens in the democratic countries on their respective states will generate a further pressure on non-democratic states. It is no longer tolerable that a state hides behind the principle of sovereignty when repressing its own citizens. Gender equality represents, after all, a 'soft' case as compared with the massacres of Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo.

In such cases the new standard of civilization does not recognize state sovereignty as an inviolable principle. The Kosovo crisis showed – once again – the flexibility and fragility of Westphalian sovereignty. Krasner is right to say that the so-called rule of non-intervention has constantly been violated, either by intervention or by invitation (Krasner, 1999, pp. 20–22). From this perspective, then, the NATO/UN intervention in Kosovo is not a new case heralding the emergence of a new era. It represents merely the most recent and most important intervention, an intervention as usual. Opposed to this line of argument, one could argue that Kosovo is not really a 'usual' intervention. The difference lies in the intentions, motivations and the final target of intervention. It is true that expansionism, colonialism and imperialism have motivated most interventions in history. In the case of Kosovo, however, motives were different. NATO and the UN obviously had neither territorial nor colonial intentions. The real motives were (i) the preservation of peace and stability in Europe, and (ii) the prevention of ethnic cleansing. Both are legitimate, and while the former can be described as a traditional Westphalian rule, the latter as *humanitarian* belongs to the new standard of civilization.

## 7 Conclusion

This study suggests that globalization has arrived at a stage where the



international normative set is on the way to becoming global. As a result of this emergence of a new GSC, world *identity* as well as the *culture* of anarchy are accordingly transformed. These changes, however, leave the ordering principles of the international system unchanged. It has also been argued that the international system constitutes a construction that is the product of a causal chain: the rise of capitalism and liberalism caused globalization, which in turn shaped the new standard of civilization. This causal relationship has not been fully demonstrated in this study. I have argued only that a democratic culture is able to create a global civilization. The study also focused on the *interaction* between international ethics, law and politics. This interaction is not itself new. What is new is the increasing importance of ethics as well as new rules and norms. The role played by new technologies and faster communications considerably enhances the dynamics of this interaction. Globalization together with the change in Russian identity has pushed the world into a transitory phase that is best described as a Grotian moment. What will emerge from this Grotian moment is of course unknowable at this stage. But, based on the knowledge that we possess today, the reversal of globalization seems highly improbable. Globalization can be adjusted and corrected; its unfortunate consequences can also be contained and remedied. Nevertheless, it can hardly be halted. The logical deduction of this assumption indicates a progressive replacement of *coercion* by *attraction*, and gradual reformulation of interests in terms of value rather than physical force. This is not to pretend that every problem will be solved and that a peaceful world will suddenly emerge. It is only to suggest that the elements of *convergence* are becoming stronger than the elements of *divergence*.

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