



Blair, Neo-Conservatism and The War on Territorial Integrity

Stuart Elden

Geography Department, Durham University, Durham DH1 3LE, UK.
E-mail: stuart.elden@durham.ac.uk

This essay uses the war on Iraq and in particular the legal advice of the British Attorney General to explore two tensions.¹ The first is between Blair's foreign policy with its 'ethical dimension' and call for humanitarian intervention by the international community and the project of the neo-conservatives in the US. The second is in the notion of territorial integrity, which means both the idea of territorial preservation and that within this territory a state is sovereign. The war on Iraq, which violated territorial sovereignty, was fought against a backdrop of preserving the existing territorial settlement, especially regarding the Kurds. While Blair and the neo-conservatives share an argument against territorial sovereignty as an unconditioned absolute, and hold a belief in the need for territorial stability, their positions differ on the mechanisms needed. Blair strove for an internationalist position; the neo-conservatives argue for US exceptionalism. Ultimately though, faced with a decision, Blair joined the US in violating a sovereign state's territorial integrity without international support.

International Politics (2007) 44, 37–57. doi:10.1057/palgrave.ip.8800157

Keywords: Iraq; Blair; neo-conservatives; territory; sovereignty; humanitarian intervention; US exceptionalism

Introduction

In a series of speeches Tony Blair has called for a greater role for the 'international community' in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. These calls were first made around the time of the Kosovo conflict, and were later used to justify actions taken in East Timor and Sierra Leone. Blair stated in 2001 that 'if Rwanda happened again today... we would have a moral duty to act there also' (<http://politics.guardian.co.uk/labour2001/story/0,1414,562006,00.html>). There is an explicit relation to the positions earlier advocated by Robin Cook as British Foreign Secretary calling for an 'ethical dimension' to foreign policy (1997, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/ethical/0,2759,181072,00.html>). At the same time, strands of opinion in the US were making not dissimilar claims about 'contingent' sovereignty, particularly in the Project for the New American Century's report *Rebuilding America's Defenses* (2000,



<http://www.newamericancentury.org/RebuildingAmericasDefenses.pdf>). Since the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, these two strands of opinion have come together in an alliance that has made an explicit challenge to long-standing norms of international law and international politics. These are the notion of equal sovereignty of states and the principle of non-intervention in domestic affairs. Both of these norms relate to the legal concept of territorial integrity, both in practice, and particularly in the UN Charter, which rests on three mutually enforcing ideals — the sovereign equality of all states, internal competence, and preservation of existing boundaries.

Although these ideals are regularly violated, the semblance of order in the international system requires them to operate as founding principles, or as necessary myths. That they have been challenged since September 11th, 2001 is not especially remarkable, but what should give us cause to pause is the way in which they have been explicitly argued against. The question of ethics is rarely far away, both as a cause and in opposition. This paper contends that these arguments can be profitably analysed through the lens of the issue of territorial integrity, and illustrated through a reading of the advice over the legality of the war on Iraq. In doing so, this paper seeks to analyse the convergence between the ethical aspects of foreign policy and the call for a notion of ‘international community’ by Blair, and the project of the neo-conservatives in the US. In so doing it both illustrates the convergence and divergence between two dominant strands of thinking of world politics, and the ethics of intervention.

Territorial Integrity and Humanitarian Intervention

Territorial integrity is a complicated notion in international law, as it has two distinct yet usually compatible meanings. One is that states should not promote secessionist movements in other states, nor try to seize land from them. This is the idea of territorial preservation, the continuation of existing boundaries and the cementing of the territorial status quo. On decolonization in South America or Africa, for example, states inherited the boundaries of colonial divisions, a notion legally known as *uti possidetis* (see Lalonde, 2002). The International Court of Justice has claimed that this is not a particularity of those cases, but a ‘principle of general scope, logically connected with the phenomenon of the obtaining of independence, wherever it occurs’ (1986, http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icasess/iHVM/ihvm_isummaries/ihvm_isummary_19861222.htm). The second meaning is that within this territory, within its boundaries, the state is sovereign. This trades on the idea of equal sovereignty and accepts what the EU calls internal competence. Of course, no state is absolutely sovereign, both in terms of the powers held by other power groupings within its boundaries, and whole rafts of international law limit a



state's competence in myriad ways. Yet for actions which do not have an effect beyond its borders, a state has been held to be sovereign, the notion of territorial sovereignty (for fuller analyses see Akweenda, 1989; Zacher, 2001; Elden, 2006a).

The UN is, as is commonly remarked, a misnomer, since it is not really a congress of *nations*, but of states. As Mann notes, 'there are now 190 self-styled nation states, that is states claiming sovereignty over their territories in the name of the nation or people'. While there are states that not 'effective sovereigns... no one else can legally wield sovereignty in their territories', a position that is enshrined in the UN Charter (Mann, 2003, 80). In Walzer's work on just war theory, the support for 'the rights of political communities... territorial integrity and political sovereignty' is important. But for Walzer, while these 'belong to states... they derive ultimately from the rights of individuals' (1992, 53; see 61), namely life and liberty, and they can therefore be defended on the same basis (1992, 54). It is on this basis that 'every violation of the territorial integrity or political sovereignty of an independent state is called aggression' (Walzer, 1992, 52; see 62).

What this means — and this is important for some of the justifications used for the violation of territorial integrity — is that if the state fails in its contract with the people, interventions can sometimes be ethically justified, even though 'the practice of intervening often threatens the territorial integrity and political independence of invaded states' (Walzer, 1992, 86). The grounds for this are threefold: where the issue is secession or 'national liberation' for a particular community within a set of boundaries; counter-intervention to protect boundaries that have already been crossed; and where there is terrible 'violation of human rights', such as 'cases of enslavement or massacre' (Walzer, 1992, 90). These would be just wars 'that are not fought in self-defence or against aggression in the strict sense' (1992, 90).

Secession is necessarily a challenge to territorial integrity, and as Buchanan notes, for a state to function it requires effective enforcement of its rule, which 'requires effective *jurisdiction*, and this in turn requires a clearly bounded territory that is recognized to be the domain of an identified political authority... territorial integrity facilitates the functioning of a legal order' (1997, 47). Without territorial integrity, he claims, states are not only not able to survive, but they are also not able to discharge their responsibilities to the 'most basic morally legitimate interests of the individuals and groups that states are empowered to serve, their interest in the preservation of their rights, the security of their persons, and the stability of their expectations'. States therefore do not merely have a 'morally legitimate interest in maintaining the principle of territorial integrity', but an '*obligatory* interest' (Buchanan, 1997, 47).

However, Buchanan similarly wants to challenge the absolutist interpretation of territorial integrity, where it applied to all states, and proposes a more



circumscribed version which applied to legitimate states only. This is what he calls 'the morally progressive interpretation of the principle of territorial integrity' (1997, 50). States are not legitimate if they 'threaten the lives of significant portions of their populations by a policy of ethnic or religious persecution' or if they deprive 'a substantial proportion of the population of basic economic and political rights' (1997, 50). The second case is exemplified by South Africa; the first by the infringement of 'Iraq's territorial integrity in order to establish a 'safe zone' in the North for Kurds' (1997, 50). What we have here is the basis for the argument for humanitarian intervention, where a state that does not discharge its responsibilities to its populations can legitimate international intervention. Indeed, Walzer goes further, suggesting that wars can be just if they are to support representative secessionist movements, to balance out another state's intervention, or for humanitarian reasons. For Walzer, 'we permit or, after the fact, we praise or do not condemn these violations of the formal rules of sovereignty, because they uphold the values of individual life and communal liberty of which sovereignty itself is merely an expression' (1992, 108).

There is, of course, an unexamined 'we' here that calls for, legitimates and undertakes international intervention. In some of the recent calls for the 'responsibility to protect' only partly adopted at the UN World Summit the answer is a reformed UN Security Council (see Elden, 2006b). For Blair the solution is the 'international community', which may or may not coincide with the will of the Security Council. In the latter case, the charge is obviously that states are acting in their own interests, but for Walzer this is not necessarily a problem. In fact, he declares that 'mixed motives are a practical advantage', because a combination of acting 'in their own interests as well as in the interests of humanity' means action is taken (2002). This parallels Blair's assertion of a notion of 'enlightened self-interest', where he claims that 'self-interest and our mutual interests are today inextricably woven together' (2002b, 120). Indeed, Blair has even claimed that such rhetorical tropes can explain more than this: 'politics is different in America. This is a Republican administration with a certain view, so they will couch what they do in terms of US national interest, not international community. But the doctrine of international community is just enlightened national self-interest, so whatever the different rhetorical perspectives you come to the same point' (in Goodhart, 2002, <http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/printarticle.php?id=5347&category=151&issue=484&author=&AuthKey=6a507cc8bf8575be654eac84c8d7b79d>).

It is worth a little more examination of the background. In its 1997 election manifesto, under the heading 'Human rights', Labour declared that it wanted 'Britain to be respected in the world for the integrity with which it conducts its foreign relations', with the 'promotion of human rights' and the 'creation of a permanent international criminal court' to be priorities (Labour Party, 1997).



Rather than the later media shorthand of ‘ethical foreign policy’, Cook’s early speeches noted an ‘ethical content’ suggesting that foreign policy should have ‘an ethical dimension and must support the demands of other people for the democratic rights on which we insist for ourselves’ (1997). The statement, as Kampfner shows, ‘appears to bear out the theory that ethics and human rights were intended only as a cog, and not a particularly prominent one, in the wheel’ (Kampfner, 1999, 134, see 216). Although Number 10 initially showed some caution, Blair later did not want the ethical dimension to be confined to the arms trade, but to include environmental issues, crime and — tellingly — ‘the right to secure frontiers’ (see Kampfner, 1999, 216). One of the first tests of this came in the Balkans, in Kosovo, with the former Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Wesley Clark, noting the importance of Blair’s election in changing strategic priorities (2002, 73–74, 79–80), with the pressure for ground troops particularly coming from Blair (2002, 264–265, 330–331, 412, 414–415, 461).

For Stevens, this marked a profound shift, in that it was NATO’s first war, and ‘unlike any other conflict in Europe’s bloodiest century’, because ‘the battle was not being fought over territory but to uphold a set of values’. It therefore challenged the ‘international system that had prevailed since the founding of the United Nations’, namely the idea of non-interference in the actions of states that took place within their own territory (Stevens, 2004, 162, see 170). Although Stevens is clearly correct in that the war was not fought to gain territory — at least, not for the NATO powers, and leaving aside debates about the Trans-Balkan pipeline from the Caspian basin — and his formulation parallels Blair’s own claim that this was ‘a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on values’ (1999, <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1297.asp>), I want to suggest that the relation is more complicated than this. Blair’s reference to frontiers is essential: this war was inherently about territorial integrity. On the one hand Blair sought to challenge the notion of internal competence, but at the same time insisted on the territorial integrity (i.e. preservation, of ‘secure frontiers’) of Yugoslavia in several international forums, including the G8, at Rambouillet and in the UN Security Council. But the challenge to territorial sovereignty was clear, and indeed, the Yugoslavian government protested to the UN that its territorial integrity was being violated. Blair stated the inherent tension, and the territorial aspect, of non-intervention in a famous speech in Chicago. Here, he suggested that we should not ‘jettison too readily’ this principle, as ‘one state should not feel it has the right to change the political system of another or foment subversion or seize pieces of territory to which it feels it should have some claim’. But this did not mean that it should not be ‘qualified in important respects’ (1999). These qualifications were genocide; oppression leading to refugees; and minority rule. Despite these, the broad scope was clear. For Lord



Robertson, formerly Secretary of State for Defence under Blair and then NATO Secretary-General, the Chicago speech did for foreign politics what reform of Clause IV did domestically: 'it was one of those occasions where Tony Blair set out a bold line that changed the whole geography' (cited in Seldon, 2005, 407).

For Blair, the 'doctrine of international community' concerned 'a community based on the equal worth of all, on the foundation of mutual rights and mutual responsibilities' (2000, <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page1529.asp>). Post September 11th, 2001, Blair (2004a, <http://politics.guardian.co.uk/iraq/story/0,12956,1162991,00.html>) would claim that even before he was 'already reaching for a different philosophy in international relations from a traditional one that has held sway since the treaty of Westphalia in 1648; namely that a country's internal affairs are for it and you don't interfere unless it threatens you, or breaches a treaty, or triggers an obligation of alliance' (2004a). This needed to be done by Europe and America, who should jointly push for 'a greater role of leadership for the UN on the responsibility of states to protect not injure their own citizens' (2004c).

Despite continuity, it is important to note a crucial difference. In 2004 Blair followed his call for UN reform by suggesting that 'none of this will work, however, unless America too reaches out. Multilateralism that works should be its aim. I have no sympathy for unilateralism for its own sake' (Blair, 2004c, <http://politics.guardian.co.uk/foreignaffairs/story/0,11538,1352442,00.html>). But in 1999 he had noted something rather different. Instead of the US reaching out to the world, the world needed the US, as 'those nations which have the power, have the responsibility. We need you engaged. We need the dialogue with you'. This was followed by a plea for avoiding 'the doctrine of isolationism' as the world could not afford it.

The Neo-Conservative Challenge

Changing administrations in the US have shown both parallels and significant tensions. As Clinton declared in his first inaugural address, 'when our vital interests are challenged, or the will and conscience of the international community is defied, we will act; with peaceful diplomacy whenever possible, with force when necessary (Clinton, 1993, <http://www.unclefed.com/EduStuff/HistDocs/clinton1.html>). The significance of the phrase 'vital interests' is important, as is the reference to the notion of 'international community'. Tellingly, Clinton suggested to the UN that the US would act 'multilaterally when possible, but unilaterally when necessary'. As Derrida notes, it is significant that this claim was in relation to article 51 of the UN founding Charter, that is 'the article of exception' (Derrida, 2004, 103).



This article makes clear that nothing in the Charter limits the right of 'individual or collective self-defence' (the exception), but this itself is limited to it being in response to 'an armed attack', and until the Security Council 'has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security'. But even under the Clinton administration, this willingness to act was not confined to armed attack but was understood more generally. As Derrida recounts, Secretary of Defence William S. Cohen was willing to 'intervene militarily in a unilateral way (and thus without the prior accord of the United Nations or the Security Council) each time its vital interests were at stake; and by vital interests he meant 'ensuring uninhibited access to key markets, energy supplies, and strategic resources', along with anything that might be considered a vital interest by a 'domestic jurisdiction' (Derrida, 2004, 103–104; citing Chomsky, 2000, 4).

What we find is thus not a dramatic change in the transition from Clinton to Bush, but at most a shift of emphasis. Cohen was a Republican member of Senate before his appointment for the second Clinton term, and had made clear his support for a bipartisan national security policy.² The Clinton *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, for example shows evidence of much of what followed (The White House, 1995, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/research_pubs/nss.pdf; see Der Derian, 2003). But if in this earlier period the emphasis had been on unilateralism as a last resort, with a multilateral strategy preferred (see Riddell, 2003, 59), the shift was to one where multilateral strategies were pursued only if felt necessary. Clinton's 'new internationalist foreign policy' was designed to make the US 'the 'indispensable nation'' in such issues as peace in Europe, Northern Ireland, and the Middle East and to 'reestablish collective security for a new age of globalization and interdependence' (Blumenthal, 2003, 789).

The reaction to this internationalism within neo-conservatism thinking was pronounced. One of the issues was the supposed surrender of US interests to the UN, along with the critique of Madeleine Albright's notion of 'assertive multilateralism', by which is usually meant a majority in the Security Council, minus any 'great'-power veto. In distinction, as Mann puts it, the new Bush regime has 'a unilateralist and militarist vision of how to overcome world disorder' (2003, 2, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030226-11.html>; see Derrida, 2004, 95–96, 98). Charles Krauthammer calls this a form of realism, a 'new unilateralism', a recognition of unipolarity. But he cautions this is not isolationism, because 'the new unilateralism defines American interests far beyond narrow self-defense. In particular, it identifies two other major interests, both global: extending the peace by advancing democracy and preserving the peace by acting as balancer of last resort' (Krauthammer, 2003, 60).³



Alongside this willingness to go against the UN or indeed world opinion more generally was a swift reaction against multilateral treaties (see Krauthammer, 2004, 5–6). As Lind notes, ‘in his first year, Bush cancelled more international treaties than any president in American history’ (2004, 134). The ground for this had been prepared beforehand. For example Dick Cheney sent a letter to Clinton in 1997 in the wake of the Kyoto protocol, suggesting that it would ‘hamstring’ American military operations... and undermine American sovereignty’ (cited in Sands, 2005, 89). Not only did Bush refuse to ratify Kyoto, but the US walked out of the Durban conference against racism for criticisms of Israel, and refused to be a party to the International Criminal Court (ICC), or to conventions, protocols and treaties on the rights of the child, landmines, and biological weapons, and unilaterally withdrew from the anti-ballistic missile treaty (see Brzezinski, 2004, 230 n. 6; Halper and Clarke, 2004, 122–129; Smith, 2005, 193). John Bolton’s appointment as ambassador to the UN, and the 750 changes he proposed to the recent World Summit outcome document are further indications of this resistance to multilateralism (see Elden, 2006b).

This was largely the basis on which Bush had run for president, with an intention to take a ‘a narrow view of America’s national interest’. Bush and Condoleezza Rice had indicated that they were ‘not interested in do-gooding in far-flung lands’, and were therefore ‘scornful of the multilateralism at the heart of Blair’s outlook’ (Stevens, 2004, 188; see Rice, 2000, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20000101faessay5/condoleezza-rice/campaign-2000-promoting-the-national-interest.html>; Halper and Clarke, 2004, 134–135; Naughtie, 2004, 73). September 11th, 2001 was the catalyst for a rethinking. For Blair, the opportunity of these events was that his earlier themes of ‘international community’ could be seen in sharper focus (Stevens, 2004, 201). And indeed in the immediate aftermath around the issue of Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, there would be indeed by international support. ‘Nous sommes tous américains’ as *Le Monde* famously declared, and NATO invoked Article 5, declaring these were attacks on all members. Indeed, superficially there was a shift in the Bush rhetoric.

Our nation’s cause has always been larger than our nation’s defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace — a peace that favors human liberty. We will defend the peace against threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent.

Building this just peace is America’s opportunity, and America’s duty (Bush, 2002, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020601-3.html>).



Indeed this and the mobilization of the figures of ‘good’ and ‘evil’ show how the religious aspects of Bush’s conservatism, which in the 2000 election had largely been confined to domestic issues, now took on a much wider international ‘moral’ agenda (see Lind, 2004; Frank, 2004). While this seems to mirror Blair’s intentions, it masks a much harder line of the unipolar moment in US foreign policy, which refused to be bound by the collective constraints of NATO (see Clark, 2003, 126–128) or the UN. Elements within the Bush administration used September 11th, 2001 as an opportunity for implementing ideas dating back to Cheney and Wolfowitz’s ‘Defence Planning Guidance’ of 1992,⁴ to PNAC’s *Rebuilding America’s Defenses* (2000), and a report written for the Harvard Visions of Governance for the Twenty-First Century project by Ashton B. Carter, John M. Deutch and Philip D. Zelikow. The latter report declared that

International norms should adapt so that such states are obliged to reassure those who are worried and to take reasonable measures to prove they are not secretly developing weapons of mass destruction. Failure to supply such proof, or prosecute the criminals living in their borders, should entitle worried nations to take all necessary actions for their self-defense (Carter *et al.*, 1998, <http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/visions/publication/terrorism.htm>).

The policies enshrined in the National Security Strategy of 2002 (rewritten by Zelikow from an earlier draft by Richard N. Haass) and the subsequent strategies on homeland security, military, counter-intelligence, and defence, all outline ways in which territorial sovereignty is open to challenge. But at the same time they continually reinforce the importance of states being fully in control of their territory, the importance of territorial stability and the dangers of failed states. As Bush declared in the preface to the National Security Strategy, ‘America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones’ (The White House, 2002, 1, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html>).

As Stewart Patrick of the US State Department has noted, since the end of the Cold War there ‘has been an erosion of this non-intervention norm and the rise of a nascent doctrine of ‘contingent sovereignty’ [which] holds that sovereign rights and immunities are not absolute’. Sovereignty depends on ‘the observance of fundamental state obligations’, and when these are not followed the state ‘risks forfeiting its claim to non-intervention’, and ‘the responsibility to protect may devolve to the international community’ (2004). Both the project of US foreign policy and Blair’s foreign policy aims are thus explicitly challenges to the notion of territorial integrity, in the second sense of territorial sovereignty, while reinforcing the first sense of territorial integrity as preservation of existing boundaries. The projects are not entirely compatible,



however, for there is one key distinction, which can only be simply rendered as multilateralism *versus* unilateralism, and might better be understood as the question of internationalism for Blair, *versus* the uniqueness, or exceptionalism, of the US.

This distinction is a tension that has come to a head with Sudan, where Blair argued for the referring of the crimes in Darfur to the ICC, supporting a French resolution in the Security Council in opposition to the US, which eventually abstained rather than vetoed the proposal. What is notable again here is that while Blair advocates internal intervention on a multilateral basis — thus violating territorial sovereignty — he has again stressed the importance of the preservation of the existing territorial boundaries of Sudan, rather than any other settlement (see Blair, 2004b, <http://www.britishembassy.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1097073763187>). Both tensions — between Blair and the US, and between territorial sovereignty and territorial preservation — were also at the heart of the debate over Iraq.

Sovereignty, Territory and the Challenge to the UN

The justification for an attack on Iraq took many forms, and although the question of weapons of mass destruction took the headlines, other reasons, including Saddam's threat to his neighbours and putative links to terrorism, and his undeniable human rights abuses were also part of a confused — and intentionally confusing — rationale. These reasons were, according to Paul Wolfowitz, all at stake, even though the weapons issue was privileged 'for reasons that have a lot to do with the US government bureaucracy' (2003, <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030509-depsecdef0223.html>).⁵ There is not the space here for a full discussion of the reasons given, but a few points are worth making.

Just in Afghanistan, there was an attempt to tie the global security issues to the basis of the internal actions of the regimes they aimed to depose — counter-terrorism as humanitarian intervention. In addition, by the beginning of a war, Saddam was clearly not in control of all of Iraq's territory, nor could he guarantee the needs of its population. Iraq was a failed state (see Anderson and Stansfield, 2004, 83–84). What these necessarily conflate is an external threat and internal actions. While a right to self-preservation in the face of a forthcoming attack is legitimated under international law, and can — in tightly circumscribed ways — allow the violation of another state's territorial integrity, this is not the case for internal actions. What we find is an attempt to use the internal actions of the regime as a part justification for intervention, while at the same time denying this is the case (for a discussion see Greenwood, 2002a; Maogoto, 2004).



The claims of the US go further than this. In fact, they claim a right to pre-empt danger, that is to take action before threats materialize. Legal advice to the US Congress laid this out, suggesting that Iraq could not be presented as an 'imminent threat' that would justify pre-emption, *except* on two bases: possession of WMD and links to terrorist groups that might use them against the US. It suggested that this necessarily related to the National Security Strategy question of whether pre-emption 'ought to be recast in light of the realities of WMD, rogue states and terrorism' (Ackerman, 2003, 6, <http://www.usembassy.it/pdf/other/RS21314.pdf>; see The White House, 2002, 15). British Attorney General Lord Goldsmith noted that 'this is not a doctrine which, in my opinion, exists or is recognized in international law (Goldsmith, 2003a, Section 3, <http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Guardian/documents/2005/04/28/legal.pdf>; see Greenwood, 2002b, Section 24, <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/196/2102406.htm>). But as well as being illegal, it is also potentially counter-productive, in that states that may find themselves potential US targets are likely to want the same capacity to retaliate in advance as the US currently has. It is notable that Bolton removed a UN call for 'nuclear weapons States to reaffirm their commitment to Negative Security Assurances' from the World Summit outcome document. This means that the US reserves the right to first-strike a non-nuclear power, outside even of the initial restrictions to this policy. For Bolton the document was flawed as it 'emphasizes disarmament, when the true threat to international security stems from proliferation' (2005, 2). As Maogoto phrases it, 'what Bush fails to realize is that his actions will encourage other states to acquire the very weapons that he purports to abhor' (2004, 39). But it is clear from the security strategies put forward by the US administration that they have anticipated this, and that one of their aims is to prevent other states gaining that capacity to defend themselves from a US pre-emptive attack, lest the US lose its power of deterrence.

On the July 23rd, 2002, Blair met with the Defence Secretary, the Foreign Secretary, the Attorney-General, military and intelligence officials and advisors to discuss the situation in Iraq. The minute of that meeting (Rycroft, 2002, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1593607,00.html>), recently leaked, is revealing. It reports on the intelligence advice, which notes that Washington now saw military action as 'inevitable', with no patience for the UN route, and that the justification would be on the basis of 'the conjunction of terrorism and WMD'. It was reported that 'the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy'. There had been 'little discussion... of the aftermath after military action'. The opinion of Jack Straw, Foreign Secretary, who was shortly to discuss this with Colin Powell is that 'the case was thin', as he was not 'threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran'. Straw urged planning for 'an ultimatum



to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors', that 'would also help with the legal justification for the use of force'. In 2002 then a case is not felt to exist, which takes away the continuation or revival argument later used. Indeed, the opinion of the Attorney-General shows the legal situation was already being worked out, and that 'regime change was not a legal base for military action'. He reported that

There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change (Rycroft, 2002; see Goldsmith, 2003a, Section 2).

The meeting closed with the clear direction that 'we should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action', but that they 'must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers' (Rycroft, 2002).

Blair had met Bush at his Crawford Ranch in April 2002, and had 'said that the UK would support military action to bring about regime change' (memo of July 19th, 2002, reported in Norton-Taylor and Wintour, 2005, <http://politics.guardian.co.uk/election/story/0,15803,1474755,00.html>), despite the fact that as the Attorney General unequivocally states later, this is not permissible.⁶ What is telling about this part of his legal advice is that it lays out the limits of actions in war: not merely legal, but ethical in the way it relates to criteria for just war. The objective must be enforcing the ceasefire of resolution 687 (1990); the scope must be limited to that; and the means used must be proportionate. This leaves open the possibility of removing 'Saddam Hussein from power if it can be demonstrated that such action is a necessary and proportionate measure to secure the disarmament of Iraq' (Goldsmith, 2003a, Section 36). This is why regime change in itself 'cannot be the objective of military action', and why 'this should be borne in mind in considering the list of military targets and in making public statements about any campaign' (Goldsmith, 2003a, Section 36).

Stevens notes that one Downing Street aide described Bush in Afghanistan as 'unilateralist in principle but multilateralist in practice' (2004, 204). Tellingly, for Iraq the reverse was true, not for Bush — who abandoned the principle for US self-interest pure and simple — but for *Blair*. As Stevens suggests, 'Blair was by instinct a multilateralist, but his commitment to international institutions was conditional — the United Nations, he would often say, could not be an excuse for inaction' (2004, 208). Blair was instrumental, along with Powell, in suggesting the UN route be followed at all, with Cheney a key advocate of the exceptionalist route (see Stevens, 2004, 218). In fact this mirrored a larger debate within the US administration on policy,



with the signatories of the PNAC statement of principles (1997, <http://www.state.gov/s/p/rem/31299.htm>) advocating a exceptionalist position against the more cautious multilateral approach. In 1999 Wolfowitz and Stephen J. Solarz had called on the US government ‘to commit ground forces to protect a sanctuary in southern Iraq where the opposition could safely mobilize’ (160; cited in Lind, 2004, 132; see Mann, 2004, 333). As Neil Smith notes, ‘from the beginning of the Bush administration this group [including Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Perle] had pressed for all-out war against Iraq but the President was unsure. September 11th was a gift to their cause and Bush raised the banner’ (2005, 153). The balance undoubtedly shifted after the ‘new Pearl Harbor’ that PNAC had anticipated (2000, 51),⁷ in favour of a more clearly orientated unipolar approach.

While Riddell is correct that Blair’s moral attitude does not make him a neo-conservative because ‘his doctrine of humanitarian intervention is rooted in liberal values, international treaties and institutions, not American hegemony’ (2003, 289, <http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page3294.asp>), there is a similar logic at play. This distinction is the unresolved tension at the heart of Blair’s foreign policy (see Kampfner, 2004, 216–217). In Stothard’s account of the days around the start of the war, he claims that on March 25th, 2003 ‘the Prime Minister now admits what has been clear for many days, that he has been ‘uncomfortable, frankly’ with the context and confines of international law and United Nations resolutions’ (2003, 141). While he attempted to provide international support for the US’s unilateralism by tying it to the UN route, he ultimately failed to deliver the second Security Council resolution on Iraq which would have provided unambiguous international support. Faced with an impasse, he still went along with the US in invading and therefore violating a sovereign state’s territorial integrity. For Blair, as he stressed many times, a decision *had to be made*. Tracing how that decision was made, working through the tangled arguments used to justify the reconciliation of these positions is revealing both in terms of the tensions between Blair and the neo-conservatives and between territorial sovereignty and preservation.

In order to investigate these two tensions further, the rest of this paper concentrates on the two legal statements given by the British Attorney General. The first was a 36 paragraph ‘Secret’ briefing on March 7th, 2003 (Goldsmith, 2003a), the second the much shorter nine points given to Parliament on March 17th, 2003 (Goldsmith, 2003b, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,2763,1471659,00.html>). Although it has been claimed that the new advice was written by Christopher Greenwood (Cook, 2004, 344), it must be noted that Greenwood’s evidence to the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs (2002b) is considerably more careful an argument in terms of the revival case than that eventually presented by the British government.



The key issue at stake is precisely a decision of sovereignty: who decides? Who decides if Saddam is in material breach of resolution 1441? The British opinion was originally that it was the UN's job to decide if Saddam was in material breach; the US position was that individual states (i.e. the US) could make that decision, as it was a 'matter of objective fact', but Goldsmith notes that he is 'not aware of any other state which supports this view' (2003a, 9, see 1; Blix, 2004, 274). The Attorney General is therefore equivocal in his advice of March 7th, 2003. Although he notes that 'I disagree, therefore, with those commentators and lawyers, who assert that nothing less than an *explicit* authorization to use force in a Security Council resolution will be sufficient' (2003a, 11), he concludes that 'if an assessment is needed of that situation, it would be for the Council to make it. A narrow textual reading of the resolution suggests that sort of assessment is not needed, because the Council has predetermined the issue. Public statements, on the other hand, say otherwise' (2003a, 26).

It is for this reason that he suggested that 'the safest legal course would be to secure the adoption of a further resolution to authorize the use of force' (2003a, 27). In other words, the decision is one that it is best to bind to the international process. He notes, however, that the 'arguments of the US Administration which I heard in Washington' lead him to 'accept that a reasonable case can be made that resolution 1441 is capable in principle of reviving the authorization in 678 without a further resolution' (2003a, 28). But, this is only 'sustainable if there are strong factual grounds for concluding that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity... we would need to be able to demonstrate hard evidence of non-compliance and non-cooperation'. This 'matter of objective fact' (in the US sense) would be dependent on the views of UNMOVIC (the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission) and the IAEA (the International Atomic Energy Agency), which are both UN bodies. As Goldsmith notes, at least in the first case, headed by Hans Blix, this is insufficient (2003a, 29; see Blix, 2004, especially 172). The question here is whether the US is bound to return to the UN Security Council, or if the decision can be made on the basis of 'strong factual grounds' alone. In the latter case, the issue is who is responsible for providing those grounds.

The point here is not just that the case was insufficient. On March 7th he notes the clear distinction between the US and British positions. 'The question is who makes the assessment of what constitutes a sufficiently serious breach. On the UK view of the revival argument (though not the US view) that can only be the Council, because only the Council can decide if a violation is sufficiently serious to revive the authorization to use force' (2003a, 17). In the March 17th, advice to Parliament, Goldsmith declared that 'it is plain that Iraq has failed so to comply and therefore Iraq was at the time of Resolution 1441 and continues to be in material breach' (2003b, point 7), thus taking the British



government as arbitrator of this. In the House of Commons the next day Blair notes that Iraq's '8 December declaration is false. That in itself is a material breach'. And yet shortly later he notes that 'had we meant what we said in Resolution 1441, the Security Council should have convened and condemned Iraq as in material breach' (2003). This is indicated as a statement of fact that the UN should have merely endorsed, not decided. Indeed, Goldsmith claims explicitly that 'Resolution 1441 would in terms have provided that a further decision of the Security Council to sanction force was required if that had been intended. Thus, all that Resolution 1441 requires is reporting to and discussion by the Security Council of Iraq's failures, but not an express further decision to authorize force' (2003b, point 9), which sidesteps the issue by pretending it does not exist (see Goldsmith, 2003a, Section 18).

This hints at the fudge of 1441, where the agreement was reached through precisely *not* having an automatic trigger, yet not explicitly stating that a further resolution was needed. There were several examples of this, perhaps most evident in the substitution of 'serious consequences' for Saddam rather than empowering the UN to take 'all necessary means' to enforce the resolution (see, among others, Kendall, 2003; Blix, 2004, 89; Naughtie, 2004, 145–146). Indeed, this is a good example of a favoured Blair negotiation strategy: that of constructive ambiguity. Blair had used this effectively in Northern Ireland and he and Clinton had also used this to find a diplomatic way through a complicated situation in Kosovo (see Albright, 2003, 415–416; Blumenthal, 2003, 643). What this allows is for an intentionally vague or non-specific resolution of a problem that both or all sides can agree on — or even leaving it out entirely — while leaving the actual solution to a later date.

Goldsmith considers the various arguments quite carefully — noting that Foreign Secretary Jack Straw and UN Ambassador Jeremy Greenstock had informed him of the background of these negotiations (2003a, 1)⁸ — and actually notes that not only did the French and Russians feel that Resolution 1441 was not an automatic trigger, but that while 'the US objective was to ensure that the resolution did not constrain the right of action which they believed they already had, our objective [i.e. the UK's] was to secure a sufficient authorization from the Council in the absence of which we would have had no right to act'. The strongest argument he has is that that the word 'consider' was introduced into Resolution 1441 'deliberately to indicate the need for a further discussion, but not a decision', at least partly because the US felt that a 'material breach' was a 'matter of objective fact and does not require a Security Council determination'. Tellingly, Goldsmith notes that 'by contrast, the UK position taken on the advice of successive Law Officers, has been that it is for the Security Council to determine the existence of a material breach of the ceasefire'. However, the US were determined that 'the



resolution should not concede the need for a second resolution. They are convinced that they succeeded' (2003a, Section 22).

Essentially the Goldsmith of the March 7th says that the UK position is that only the Security Council can authorize force (international), and that this has been the 'advice of successive Law Officers' but by the 17th he claims that this is either a decision that can be made without the Security Council (unilateral) or does not need to be made by them as they merely need to 'consider'. As he notes, he was in discussion with the US before the March 7th (2003a, 1) and apparently again before March 17th. As *The Observer* discovered, which has now been confirmed by the government, Goldsmith met with five of the Bush Administration's lawyers — Alberto Gonzales, William Taft IV, Jim Haynes, John Bellinger and John Ashcroft — on February 11th, 2003 (Barnett and Bright, 2005, <http://observer.guardian.co.uk/politics/story/0,6903,1474276,00.html>). As Goldsmith says in the March 7th advice, he was 'impressed by the strength and sincerity of the views of the US Administration which I heard in Washington on this point', but that he is necessarily 'reliant on their assertions for the view that the French (and others) knew and accepted that they were voting for a further discussion and no more', rather than hard evidence. He suggests the legal status of the negotiations as evidence is 'very uncertain' (2003a, 23). But on the March 17th, Goldsmith puts this in a rather different way. Either Saddam was in breach as a matter of fact, and thereby force was justified under 1441; or the SC did not need to discuss this anyway. This effectively gave Bush, with or without Blair, the final decision.

Conclusion

The March 17th advice served a number of purposes. It was the document seen by cabinet, given to Parliament, and also to the armed forces. As Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, then Chief of the Defence Staff argued, the need for a clear legal opinion began from when the British were starting to get troops in the area (Boyce, 2005, <http://observer.guardian.co.uk/politics/story/0,6903,1474607,00.html>). Boyce noted that his 'concern was always that the troops should feel absolutely confident that what they were doing was absolutely black-and-white legal... I just wanted to make sure that if my soldiers went to jail and I did some other people go as well with me... I had a perfectly unambiguous black-and-white statement saying it would be legal for to operate if we had to' (2005). In providing that advice, Blair's government may have allowed the war to go ahead, but it exposes the tensions he had sought to cover and minimize between the path he was trying to tread and the US project.

It also exposes the other tension explored in this paper: that within the notion of territorial integrity, between territorial preservation and territorial



sovereignty. Just as Iraq's territorial sovereignty was being violated, the preservation of its existing territorial settlement was a priority. It was underlined in the Azores Summit statement (Bush *et al.*, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2855567.stm); Blair noted it as a priority in his speech to the House of Commons in advance of war (2003) and it appeared as an explicit war aim in briefing papers (see, e.g. Simpson (ed.) 2005, 12, 44); and Bush promised that 'we will provide security against those who try to spread chaos, or settle scores, or threaten the territorial integrity of Iraq' (2003). Blair similarly gained an assurance from Ala Talabani of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan that 'they will not try to form an independent state' (Stothard, 2003, 76–77). The question of the territorial settlement in Iraq is obviously too large to consider here (see Anderson and Stansfield, 2004; O'Leary *et al.*, 2005; Elden, 2006a, 2007), but it is worth noting that while humanitarian reasons have been advocated for the violation of one pillar of territorial integrity (sovereignty) there seems little support outside of the theorists for the questioning of the other pillar, that of territorial preservation. Indeed, for Blair this is not on the table: 'Today boundaries are virtually fixed. Governments and people know that any territorial ambition threatens stability, and instability threatens prosperity' (Blair, 2002a, <http://politics.guardian.co.uk/speeches/story/0,11126,680866,00.html>).

The relation of territorial preservation to stability and then to prosperity is revealing. James Naughtie recounts a conversation with Blair where he was asked for the relation between his thought and that of neo-conservatism's advocacy of 'the primacy of American values', the right to pre-emptive action and a dislike of internationalism (Naughtie, 2004, 72). Blair suggested that 'I come at this from a completely different perspective — a progressive perspective that says there should not be a doctrine of non-intervention in every set of circumstances. Why should the Left never support that?' (reported in Naughtie, 2004, 72). Between the double negative and the question lies Blair's dilemma. Why do some interventions gain legitimacy and others not?

In Halper and Clarke's phrasing, 'neo-conservatism is not updated Reaganism. It is a new political animal born of an unlikely mating of humanitarian liberalism and brute force' (2004, 181). Blair sacrificed the former to join the latter, but his relative strength compared to Bush does not make this bipolar or bilateralism, far less international, but merely a very junior partner to exceptionalism. Blair was too far in to turn back, and became merely an ally to 'dress' the US when the UN failed to 'bless' them. On the one hand territorial integrity is sacrosanct, on the other entirely conditional. What is crucial is that the nation–state linkage is immutable precisely in order that the sovereignty can be questioned, but without an investigation of the ethical status of territorial settlements in themselves.



Notes

- 1 I am grateful to participants in the Ethics in World Politics workshop at the University of Warwick, especially Daniel Bulley and James Brassett for organising the workshop and this special issue. I am also indebted to two anonymous referees for International Politics for their insightful and supportive comments.
- 2 http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/secdef_histories/bios/cohen.htm
- 3 For readings of the neo-conservatives, see Halper and Clarke (2004), Mann (2004), Williams (2005) and George (2005).
- 4 For sections of the original draft, see <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/wolf.html>; and <http://america.scientium.com/bush2004/commentary/bowden/washpost1992.htm>. The final report is available as Cheney (1993, http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/pdf/naarpr_Defense.pdf).
- 5 For a discussion of the misquotation of these words in the *Vanity Fair* article, and the media debate, see George (2005, 195–196).
- 6 At the end of the visit, Blair gave a speech at the George H.W. Bush presidential library (2002), which — albeit in a more cautious way — left little doubt for what his decision would be. For an analysis see Naughtie, 2004, 85–86. The briefing papers Blair received in advance make things clear. See Simpson (ed.) 2005. Note that in the speech to the House of Commons on 18th March, 2003 Blair is explicit: ‘I have never put our justification for action as regime change. We have to act within the terms set out in Resolution 1441. That is our legal base. But it is the reason, I say frankly, why if we do act we should do so with a clear conscience and strong heart’.
- 7 On a new Pearl Harbor, see also Carter *et al.* (1998), which talks of ‘an act of catastrophic terrorism’ that, ‘like Pearl Harbor... would divide our past and future into a ‘before’ and ‘after’; and more tendentiously (Brzezinski, 1997, 212). This phrase has led to several theories about the Bush administration’s possible complicity in September 11th, 2001. For a relatively sober set of questions, see Griffin (2004).
- 8 In his censored and therefore unpublished book *The Costs of War* Greenstock has described the decision as ‘politically illegitimate’ (see Bright and Beaumont, 2005, <http://observer.guardian.co.uk/politics/story/0,6903,1530311,00.html>).

References

- Ackerman, D.M. (2003) ‘International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force Against Iraq’, CRS Report for Congress, Washington, DC, Available online..
- Akweenda, S. (1989) ‘Territorial integrity: a brief analysis of a complex concept’, *Revue Africaine de droit International et Comparé* 1: 500–506.
- Albright, M. (2003) *Madam Secretary: A Memoir*, London: Pan.
- Anderson, L. and Stansfield, G. (2004) *The Future of Iraq: Dictatorship, Democracy or Division?*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Barnett, A. and Bright, M. (2005) ‘British Military Chief Reveals New Legal Fears over Iraq War’, *The Observer* May 1, Available online.
- Blair, T. (1999) ‘Speech to the Chicago Economic Club’, April 22, Available online.
- Blair, T. (2000) ‘Speech to the Global Ethics Foundation, Tübingen University, Germany’, June 30, Available online.
- Blair, T. (2001) ‘Speech to the Labour Party Conference’, October 2, Available online.
- Blair, T. (2002a) ‘Speech at George Bush Senior Presidential Library, Texas’, April 8, Available online.



- Blair, T. (2002b) 'The Power of World Community', in M. Leonard (ed.) *Re-ordering the World: The Long-Term Implications of September 11th*, London: The Foreign Policy Centre, pp. 119–124.
- Blair, T. (2003) 'Prime Minister's Statement Opening Iraq Debate, House of Commons', March 18, Available online.
- Blair, T. (2004a) 'Speech in Sedgefield', March 5, Available online.
- Blair, T. (2004b) 'Press Conference in Khartoum', October 6, Available online.
- Blair, T. (2004c) 'Mansion House Speech on Foreign Policy', November 16, Available online.
- Blix, H. (2004) *Disarming Iraq: The Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction*, London: Bloomsbury.
- Blumenthal, S. (2003) *The Clinton Wars*, New York: Plume Books.
- Bolton, J. (2005) 'Letter to the United Nations and Enclosure on United States Amendments', September 1.
- Boyce, M. (2005) 'Interview: Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, conducted by Antony Barnett, April 29 2005', *The Observer*, May 1, Available online.
- Bright, M. and Beaumont, P. (2005) 'No 10 Blocks Envoy's Book on Iraq', *The Observer*, July 17, Available online.
- Brzezinski, Z. (1997) *The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives*, New York: Basic Books.
- Brzezinski, Z. (2004) *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership*, New York: Basic Books.
- Buchanan, A. (1997) 'Theories of Secession', *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 26(1): 31–61.
- Bush, G.W. (2002) 'Remarks by the President at 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy', June 1, Available online.
- Bush, G.W. (2003) 'President Discusses the Future of Iraq, American Enterprise Institute, Washington Hilton Hotel', February 26, Available online.
- Bush, G.W., Blair, T. and Aznar, J.M. (2003) 'Azores Summit Statement', March 18, Available online.
- Carter, A.B., Deutch, J.M. and Zelikow, P.D. (1998) 'Catastrophic Terrorism: Elements of a National Policy', *Visions of Governance for the Twenty-First Century*, Cambridge, MA, Available online.
- Cheney, D. (1993) 'Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy, Available online.
- Chomsky, N. (2000) *Rogue States: The Rule of Force in World Affairs*, Cambridge MA: South End Press.
- Clark, W.K. (2002) *Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future of Combat*, New York: Public Affairs Press.
- Clark, W.K. (2003) *Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism and the American Empire*, New York: Public Affairs Press.
- Clinton, W.J. (1993) 'First Inaugural Address', January 20, Available online.
- Cook, R. (1997) 'Speech on the Government's Ethical Foreign Policy', May 12, Available online.
- Cook, R. (2004) *The Point of Departure: Diaries from the Front Bench*, London: Pocket Books.
- Der Derian, J. (2003) 'Decoding The National Security Strategy of the United States of America', *boundary 2* 30(3): 19–27.
- Derrida, J. (2004) *Rogues: Two Essays on Reason*, (translated by Pascale-Anne Brault and Michael Naas), Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Elden, S. (2006a) 'Territorial Integrity and the War on Terror', *Environment and Planning A*, 37(12): 2083–2104.
- Elden, S. (2006b) 'Contingent sovereignty, territorial integrity and the sanctity of borders', *SAIS Review of International Affairs* 26(1): 11–24.
- Elden, S. (2007) 'Reconstituting Iraq', in D. Cowan and E. Gilbert (eds.) *War, Citizenship, Territory*, New York: Routledge, 2007.



- Frank, T. (2004) *What's the Matter with Kansas? How Conservatives Won the Heart of America*, New York: Owl Books.
- George, J. (2005) 'Leo Strauss, Neoconservatism and US foreign policy: Esoteric Nihilism and the Bush doctrine', *International Politics* 42(2): 174–202.
- Goldsmith, P. (2003a) 'Memo to Prime Minister on Iraq: Resolution 1441', March 7, Available online.
- Goldsmith, P. (2003b) 'The Legal Basis for the Use of Force against Iraq', March 17, Available online.
- Goodhart, D. (2002) 'Tony's world', *Prospect* 77, Available online.
- Greenwood, C. (2002a) 'International law and the "war on terrorism"', *International Affairs* 78(2): 301–317.
- Greenwood, C. (2002b) 'Memorandum: The Legality of Using Force Against Iraq', Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Minutes of Evidence, Available online.
- Griffin, D.R. (2004) *The New Pearl Harbor: Disturbing Questions about the Bush Administration and 9/11*, Gloucestershire: Arris Books.
- Halper, S. and Clarke, J. (2004) *America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- International Court of Justice (1986) 'Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute Burkina Faso/ Republic of Mali', December 22, Available online.
- Kampfner, J. (1999) *Robin Cook*, London: Phoenix.
- Kampfner, J. (2004) *Blair's Wars*, London: Free Press.
- Kendall, B. (2003) 'Showdown at the UN', in S. Beck and M. Downing (eds.) *The Battle for Iraq: BBC News Correspondents on the War against Saddam and a New World Agenda*, London: BBC, pp. 52–65.
- Krauthammer, C. (2003) 'The Unipolar Era', in A.J. Bacevich (ed.) *The Imperial Tense: Prospects and Problems of American Empire*, Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, pp. 47–65.
- Krauthammer, C. (2004) *Democratic Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World*, Washington, DC: The AEI Press.
- Labour, P. (1997) *Labour Party Manifesto*, London: Labour Party.
- Lalonde, S. (2002) *Determining Boundaries in a Conflicted World: The Role of Uti Possidetis*, Montreal and Kingston: McGill's-Queen's University Press.
- Lind, M. (2004) *Made in Texas: George W. Bush and the Southern Takeover of American Politics*, New York: Basic Books.
- Mann, M. (2003) *Incoherent Empire*, London: Verso.
- Mann, J. (2004) *Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush's War Cabinet*, New York: Penguin.
- Maogoto, J.N. (2004) 'New frontiers, old problems: the war on terror and the notion of anticipating the enemy', *Netherlands International Law Review* LI(1): 1–39.
- Naughtie, J. (2004) *The Accidental American: Tony Blair and the Presidency*, London: Macmillan.
- Norton-Taylor, R. and Wintour, P. (2005) 'Papers reveal commitment to war', *The Guardian*, May 2, Available online.
- O'Leary, B., McGarry, J. and Salih, K. (eds.) (2005) *The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Patrick, S. (2004) 'The Role of the US Government in Humanitarian Intervention'. Available online.
- Project for the New American Century (1997) 'Statement of Principles'. Available online.
- Project for the New American Century (2000) *Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century*. Available online.
- Rice, C. (2000) 'Campaign 2000: promoting the national interest', *Foreign Affairs* 79(1), Available online.



- Riddell, P. (2003) *Hug Them Close: Blair, Clinton, Bush and the 'Special Relationship'*, London: Politico's.
- Rycroft, M. (2002) 'Iraq: Prime Minister's Meeting, 23 July 2002, Memo to David Manning, S 195/02', *The Sunday Times*, May 1, 2005, Available online.
- Sands, P. (2005) *Lawless World: America and the Making and Breaking of Global Rules*, London: Allen Lane.
- Seldon, A. (2005) *Blair*, London: Free Press.
- Simpson, T. (ed.) (2005) *The Dodgiest Dossier*, Nottingham: Spokesman.
- Smith, N. (2005) *The Endgame of Globalization*, London: Routledge.
- Solarz, S.J. and Wolfowitz, P. (1999) 'How to overthrow Saddam', *Foreign Affairs*, March/April, 160, Available online.
- Stevens, P. (2004) *Tony Blair: The Making of a World Leader*, New York: Viking.
- Stothard, P. (2003) *Thirty Days: Tony Blair and the Test of History*, New York: Harper Collins.
- The White House (1995) *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, Washington DC: The White House, Available online.
- The White House (2002) *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington DC: The White House, Available online.
- Walzer, M. (1992) *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations*, 2nd edn, New York: Basic Books.
- Walzer, M. (2002) 'The argument about humanitarian intervention', *Dissent* 49(1): 29–37.
- Williams, M.C. (2005) 'What is the National Interest? The Neoconservative Challenge in IR Theory', *European Journal of International Relations* 11(3): 307–337.
- Wolfowitz, P. (2003) 'Interview with Sam Tannenhaus', *Vanity Fair*, May 9, Available online.
- Zacher, M.W. (2001) 'The territorial integrity norm: international boundaries and the use of force', *International Organization* 55(2): 215–230.