

THE SHADOW
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In the 1870s and the 1990s, the area of Yugoslavia became the focal point of many contending interests in the Western and Near Eastern worlds. Although they are removed in time and era, the nature and dynamics of these episodes—the “Eastern Crisis” of 1875-1878 and the Yugoslav Wars of Dissolution between 1991 and 1995—have striking similarities.

Both were lengthy, extending through several years of agonizing war. Both elicited multiple international attempts at intervention. In both external interventions brought foreign agendas, which were imposed on the original problem. Both challenged the unity of the current European system. Both caused major political divisions within intervening states.

Both entailed particular South Slav issues of rights and governance. Both stemmed from economic problems. Both brought up concerns of imperial or national sovereignty. Both entailed a power vacuum which resulted in foreign takeover. Austrians moved into Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1878. NATO and the EU took over in 1996. Both resolutions were thought to be temporary expedients but were prolonged in the absence of solutions to the original underlying problems.

This paper will seek to a) set the international context for the evolution of these crises, b) tell the stories of the first phases of the crises, c) attempt to relate what happened "on the ground" with decisions made in diplomatic circles, and d) draw out the recurring patterns that can be observed.

Several caveats are in order. Only the *first* phases of these crises will be treated in detail because it is believed that at this phase the original problems are in best focus. As the crisis continues, and intervention continues, often the original problem becomes clouded. This is true of the historical treatments of the Eastern Crisis where reference to the Bosnian and Herzegovinian rebels decreases and becomes non-existent as the Serbs and then the Russians declare war on the Ottomans and as diplomacy moves to a higher level. This is true of the Yugoslav Wars of Dissolution where the constitutional questions of the division of power between republics and federal government were lost in the maze of disputes over boundaries, atrocities, and preferable methods of intervention, which claimed attention later.

Also, the overall purpose of this paper is to elucidate what happened to Bosnia and Herzegovina. But as small and weak principalities and republics, Bosnia and Herzegovina often represented "bit parts" on a stage filled with Great Powers. Decisions which crucially affected the principality could and did occur at some distance from its center, made by people not directly concerned with her welfare. Neither Berlin nor Dayton was in close proximity to Sarajevo. So the line of historical causation will be followed, not the line of provincial propinquity.

The Eastern Crisis: Background

From the beginning of the Herzegovinian peasant revolt in July 1875, Austro-Hungarian diplomacy in particular--and European diplomacy in general--was put into high gear to deal with the crisis. Indeed, from some points of view, the crisis was brought on by Austro-Hungarian imperial designs. At the very least Austro-Hungarian behavior and attitudes played leading roles in the evolution and resolution of the crisis. Although three European nations believed their vital interests to be at stake in the situation--Russia, Austria-Hungary and England (although indirectly)--Austro-Hungarian concerns were paramount regarding the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. But as the crisis went on, many Great Powers came to believe their vital interests affected, and the Powers acted out their parts as if on a great, classical stage where the actors

knew their roles but were not always sure of the others' exact next moves. Great issues were perceived at stake and the fates of empires in the balance. The dynamics of the crisis, the attitudes displayed, and the actions decided upon established some precedents for European attitudes toward the Yugoslavia of the future.

Leading the Dual Monarchy's diplomatic corps was Count Julius Andrassy, a fascinating, charming, wily, inimical figure. Andrassy had come to the Foreign Ministry by a circuitous route, which goes far to explain the positions he took during the Eastern Crisis. During the Hungarian revolution of 1848, Andrassy, a Magyar aristocrat, had worked with Louis Kossuth for Hungarian independence. When the Russian Army invaded Hungary to aid the Austrian Empire in putting down the revolt, he and many others fled to Constantinople. For nine years, Andrassy remained abroad, *persona non grata* in his homeland. He spent the time moving among European capitals and increasing his store of political knowledge--"both high and low." In 1858 he was amnestied and returned to Budapest to work with Francis Deak to re-establish the Hungarian Constitution and to create the Great Compromise of 1867. He was then made Prime Minister of the newly elevated Hungarian nation and as such led the Hungarian side of the Dual Monarchy through its first years.¹

When Franz Joseph wished to change policy in 1871, he settled on Andrassy. His choice indicated a departure from the policy of vengeance toward the German Empire, which had driven Andrassy's predecessor, Baron Ferdinand Beust. Andrassy represented the political coalition that cemented the Dual Monarchy: Hungarians and German liberals. Known as a "friend of Bismarck and an admirer of Germany," Andrassy and his appointment signaled the possibility of rapprochement with Germany.²

The appointment played into the hands of Otto von Bismarck, Chancellor of Germany and architect of German unification. Bismarck wished to consolidate the position of the newly unified German Empire by an alliance with both Austria-Hungary and Russia, in order to fortify itself against the possible retaliation of France, after her defeat by Germany in 1871. The humiliation of France by Germany and the subsequent German attempt to isolate France had created a new fulcrum for the balance of power in Europe. It drove Great Power relations after 1871.³ There is no understanding of the Crisis of 1875-8 without establishing the German reorientation of Europe as its background. Bismarck, himself, although he insisted his influence be indirect regarding the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire, exerted his iron will when it came to the balance of power in Europe. As will be seen, his was the voice which clinched the final bargain regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878.

The alignment Bismarck wished to create was realized with the establishment of the *Dreikaisarbund* in 1872. The Three Emperors of Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary--William I, Alexander I, and Franz Joseph--established the alliance by a series of meetings between 1872 and 1874. Bismarck's Germany served as the lynchpin of this alliance, since both Russia and Austria-Hungary were very aware of the issues that drove them apart. Secure that he was flanked by allies, Bismarck could afford to sit back and consolidate the new German Empire--until and unless something changed to threaten this comfortable balance of power.⁴

¹ Arthur J. May, *The Hapsburg Monarchy 1867-1914*, (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1968), pp. 34, 111-113 and George H. Rupp, *A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria 1876-1878* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1941), pp. 65-66.

² May, p. 111; Rupp, p. 65.

³ Mihailo D. Stojanovic, *The Great Powers and the Balkans, 1875-1878* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1939), pp. 9-10.

⁴ William L. Langer, *European Alliances & Alignments 1871-1890*, Second Edition (New York, Vintage Books, 1950), pp. 19-23 or A.J.P. Taylor, *The Struggle for mastery in Europe 1848-1918* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 219-220.

The European Powers' varying attitudes toward the decaying and corrupt Ottoman Empire, centered in Constantinople, motivated their behaviors during the crisis. Prince Clemens von Metternich had established Hapsburg policy regarding Ottoman affairs earlier in the century. He postulated that a weak Ottoman Empire bordering Austrian territory benefited Austrians. It served as a buffer zone between the stronger Russians and Austria, while it also policed the "restless" South Slavs. Therefore it should be shored up if at all possible. With the creation of the Dual Monarchy in 1867, Andrassy reinforced this policy from the Hungarian perspective.

It is necessary to understand the nature of the late days of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Nationalism had depleted the holdings of the Hapsburg monarchs to the South in Italy and to the North in Germany. By the 1870s, in every corner of the empire, ethnic conflict prevailed. In Prague, where Czechs were gaining in population, education, and representation, they challenged the dominant Germans and dueled for political and social rights. When outnumbered, Germans regularly boycotted the Bohemian diet. Czechs, for their part, boycotted the imperial parliament in Vienna when the political tide was against them.⁵ In Galicia, Poles, loyal to the empire and supportive of Vienna policies, since they believed themselves better off under the Hapsburgs than under either Russian or German control, regularly put down the Ruthenian minority, which was aligned with Russia.⁶ In Hungary, Magyarization under Solomon Tisza, was brutal and unrelenting. Croats were disparaged and suppressed in their own search for self-rule. Count Charles Khuen-Hedevary was appointed governor (ban) in Croatia precisely to suppress the Croat craving for independence.⁷ In Transylvania, Hungarians ignored and suppressed Romanian voices.⁸

The game was ethnic one-upsmanship where, in a hierarchical world, the rungs of the vertical social ladder necessitated that one group's victory entail another group's defeat--a constant antagonism in which strivings for national self-identification were squelched in the expression of the stronger group's national self-identification.

One way out was federation, considered by a paternal Franz Joseph and his heir Crown Prince Rudolph. Federalism would have created a loose association of national entities with equal representation in Vienna and greater local control, a horizontal system with greater sharing of power at the central level. But ultimately the static, hierarchical principles--both of the Catholic Church and of the old concept of divine-right monarchy--dominated the empire. Since federalism never was seriously attempted, the policy outcome amounted to a continued social/ethnic juggling act, within the provinces of the empire, at the imperial parliamentary level, and also in foreign affairs. The goal: do not destabilize the status quo; the only way to maintain the precarious existence of the ancient Austrian position is to look backward, retain ancient class privileges, and balance the nationalities against one another. There was little room for innovative modern political ideas, political pluralism, tolerance, or the politics of cooperation.

Foreign Minister Andrassy occupied a unique and precarious position in this balance of ethnic forces. He was vehemently anti-Russian, "liberal" in his association with the German Liberals, but overwhelmingly a Hungarian nationalist.⁹ The Hungarians, having achieved equality with the Germans in a *dual* monarchy, did *not* wish to extend that status to others.

⁵ May, pp. 194-199.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 215-216.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 266.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 264-265.

⁹ Charles Burns, *The Balkan Policy of Count Gyula Andrassy* (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1980), p. 48 quotes Lieutenant General Emil Pott as saying: "Count Andrassy, in spite of his great ability, was basically only an Hungarian, like all his countrymen, and he regarded the common monarchy from the Hungary

Andrassy's appointment as Foreign Minister resulted from the Emperor's short flirtation with federalism. Franz Joseph had envisioned a "harmonious multi-racial Empire." In response to the Franco-Prussian War and new German power in 1871, he chose as Premier Count Charles Hohenwart, Slavophile and Germanophobe, to oversee a government, which would conciliate the Slavs. The Emperor even offered the Czechs full equality with Germans and Hungarians in September of that year. The proposal aroused a frenzy of protest among Germans in Vienna. At the very same time, Illyrianists, in the Hungarian Vojvodina, rebelled, demanding a new "state of Illyria and inclusion in the empire on an equal basis."¹⁰ The multiple crises overwhelmed Franz Joseph. Andrassy intervened, persuaded the emperor to abandon the federalist idea, and became foreign minister as a result.¹¹ This was the only time Franz Joseph ever attempted to establish a regime of equal nationalities. It is significant that the crisis that followed was part of this conservative backlash against federalism. Andrassy's entire history and identity was bound up in exclusive Hungarian nationalism and in the attempt to shore up and extend Hungarian gains made by the *Ausgleich*.

Andrassy prolonged and extended Metternich's policy. He agreed with Metternich that a strong, independent South Slav state would draw to it Slavs from both Hungarian and Austrian lands. It would hinder commercial relations with Constantinople, as well as strengthen Russian pretensions in the Balkans.¹² Austro-Hungarian-Russian tensions would rise. Therefore a strong South Slav state should be avoided at all costs, whether it stemmed from Serbia, or Montenegro or Bulgaria. The opposite approach to the Slavs--including more of them in the Dual Monarchy--would likewise further threaten the status of the Hungarians since more Slavs would only mean a greater likelihood of their equality within the Empire. To avoid either of these possibilities, Andrassy concluded the Balkans should either remain in Ottoman hands or be divided up among many, weak nations, quarreling and bickering with each other rather than threatening the Empire. The issue of Bosnia-Herzegovina represented all of these questions for the Foreign Minister. Andrassy's policy was crystal clear. Plan A was to avoid all change, or return to the status quo--e.g. continued and weak Ottoman control. *If*, however, the Ottoman regime should collapse, Plan B would come into effect: no one but the Austro-Hungarian Empire should possess Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹³

But Andrassy did not run foreign policy alone. The Empire's military leaders had influenced the Emperor since his accession to power. Having endured defeats to the west and the north, military leaders were left with nowhere to look for expansion except the south. And a vibrant, healthy empire would by its very nature grow. To the south lay the northwest outpost of the crumbling, decadent Ottoman Empire--Bosnia and Herzegovina. This province--populated by a Slavic Muslim land-owning class, an Orthodox Serbian peasant (or *rayah*) renter class, and a Catholic Croat peasant class--had been badly governed and overtaxed by Constantinople for centuries. Austrian military planners had eyed the provinces as early as the 1850s, when Russia had invaded Moldavia and Wallachia and Serbia seemed ready to spearhead a Balkan League to

point of view only as a means to raise Hungary to the status of a great power, in spite of the Romanians, South Slavs, and Slovaks."

¹⁰ Edward Crankshaw, *The Fall of the House of Hapsburg* (New York: Viking Press, 1963), p. 256.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 256-257; May, pp. 59-61.

¹² F.R. Bridge, *The Habsburg Monarchy Among the Great Powers, 1815-1918* (New York: Berg Publishers, 1990), p. 113.

¹³ Rupp. pp. 34-35.

¹³ Istvan Deak, *Beyond Nationalism, A Social and Political History of the Habsburg Officer Corps, 1848-1918* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 61; Gunther E. Rothenberg, *The Army of Francis Joseph* (West Lafayette, IN.: Purdue University Press, 1998), p. 86.

throw off the Ottoman yoke.¹⁴ After 1867, with continued revolts in the provinces, the dream was revived. Field Marshal Count Friedrich Beck-Rzikowsky, who saw the Emperor every day, dreamed of expansion to Salonika to fortify Dalmatia and to provide a base for newly developing Adriatic trade. Beck was a Russophile, however, hoping for cooperation with Russia, and so argued for joint partition of the region in a pacific takeover of weak Ottoman lands. Franz Joseph favored the idea, adding his own notions of religious protection for the Catholic population to the stew.¹⁵

Serbia—an autonomous Ottoman province next door--had been planning to lead a Christian uprising against Ottoman officials and liberate its Slav brothers since the 1840s. Montenegro, to the southwest, with a stubborn pride, had never allowed itself even to be called an Ottoman province. Its identity was tied up with raids on Ottoman authorities and continuous warfare from its mountain hideouts against the agents of foreign, tyrannical, Muslim Constantinople. Montenegro played an unexpectedly large role in the crisis to come. Nationalists, whether Serbian or Montenegrin, were no more interested in seeing an Austro-Hungarian takeover than they were in having the Ottomans stay.

An early incident occurred in the fall of 1874. The records illustrate the position and roles of the major figures who made policy regarding the Slavs in the Empire before the later, larger crisis. Their plans prefigure the ultimate outcome of the Eastern Crisis.

In November 1874, twenty Montenegrins, in a border area of Montenegro, close to Podgorica, were massacred by Ottoman officials. The Montenegrin Prince, Nicholas, faced an outraged population and appealed to both Austria-Hungary and Russia for help. Although representatives of the *Dreikaisarbund* requested an investigation and punishment for the perpetrators, Constantinople evaded the question and avoided taking responsibility.¹⁶ Also, as early as December 1874, reports arrived in Vienna about Herzegovinians fleeing to Montenegro and requests for aid from Prince Nicholas for these refugees.¹⁷ As a result of these incidents an extraordinary Crown Council meeting was held on January 29, 1875.

Although it was not the first of its kind, the minutes of this meeting show clearly the intentions of the Austro-Hungarian government. The question for consideration was: if war occurs between Montenegro and the Ottoman Empire, what should we do? Andrassy took the following position: at the current moment, we are perfectly fine. In general, the Ottoman Empire "vegetating" on our border is good.¹⁸ Andrassy is quoted as having said:

Turkey is almost of a providential utility to Austria...her existence is essential to our well-understood interests. She keeps the status quo of the small states and hinders their aspirations to our advantage. Were there no Turkey, then all these heavy duties would fall on us.¹⁹

In other words, Andrassy wished to let Turkey do the dirty work of suppressing nationalist Slav tendencies, rather than transfer that responsibility over to Austria-Hungary--a restatement of Metternich's position.

But, he continued, if the Ottomans were to become so weak they could not control Montenegro or Serbia, and if either of these fledgling states wanted to extend its sovereignty into

¹⁴ Rothenberg, pp. 50-51.

¹⁵ Bridge, p. 112; Rothenberg, p.91.

¹⁶ Burns, pp. 98-99.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 100.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 101.

¹⁹ Stojanovic, pp. 30-31.

Bosnia or Herzegovina, Dalmatia would then be threatened. So, he reasoned, if war occurred between Montenegro and the Ottomans, and if the Ottomans were to win, the status quo would be restored and Austria-Hungary would have nothing to worry about. But if Montenegro were to win, Austria should then take Bosnia and Herzegovina as a part of "border rectification."²⁰

The Empire's military planners described how to implement "border rectification." Two approaches to Bosnia and Herzegovina were possible. The first was from Slavonia through the Bosnia River Valley. If moving from this direction, the army would move through Banja Luka and Travnik to Sarajevo and Mostar. The other approach was from Dalmatia into Herzegovina and, evidently, also to Mostar.²¹

Andrassy wanted to be sure that this move, if it occurred, should be perceived as Austria-Hungary's response to a threat--i.e. as a defensive reaction, not an aggressive action. He also insisted that it should occur only if the Ottomans proved incapable of continuing to rule the provinces and if Serbia and Montenegro were compensated. He wanted to avoid all possibility of problems with the Serb and Montenegrin princes.²²

Archduke Albert brought up the question of Novi Pazar: should it also be occupied? Andrassy immediately rejected the possibility. No, he answered, leave it as a bone of contention between Serbia and Montenegro, so as to keep them divided.²³

At the conclusion of the meeting, the Emperor called for military attaches, to be sent to the consulates in the provinces in order to carry out two mobilization studies: one to strengthen the empire's borders in view of its own security (as a purely defensive strategy) and the other for intervention.²⁴ At least one authority interprets the outcome of this meeting in the following way:

The conference decided to make all necessary preparations for the event of an insurrection, which was to be used as a *pretext* for annexation.²⁵

At the highest levels of the Austro-Hungarian government, then, plans had been carefully laid to take advantage of the next uprising in Bosnia or Herzegovina,²⁶ and lower military officials, sympathetic to the military position and close to the indigenous population could easily have supported further rebellion, even if they did not organize it, per se. As we will see, the military governors of Dalmatia and Croatia were in a position to do just this.

Andrassy faced nearly overwhelming opposition not only from hostile outsiders in Russia but from the highest military authorities--General Beck--and their men in the field in his own government. Andrassy was caught between his own overwhelming *Hungarian* interests and his role as Foreign Minister of Franz Joseph's *Dual* Monarchy. The military men had been advisors to Franz Joseph for many years. Andrassy was a relative newcomer to this "cabinet." As a Hungarian former rebel, he had been an enemy of the empire as well. It is to be assumed that he was not completely trusted in the company of these others, although by this time it must have

²⁰ Burns, pp. 101-102.

²¹ Burns, p. 103.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 104.

²³ *Ibid.*, pp. 102-103.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 104-105.

²⁵ Stojanovic, p. 34. (Italics are the author's.)

²⁶ David MacKenzie, in "Russia's Balkan Policies under Alexander II, 1855-1881," in Hugh Ragsdale, ed., *Imperial Russian Foreign Policy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 229 says: there is "little evidence that the insurrections were organized from outside." He may be referring only to *Russian* outside help. Burns, p. 110 says: [the revolt] appears to have been primarily an indigenous movement which sprang from local causes, the most important of which were a poor harvest couple with an extremely onerous system of taxation."

been absolutely clear that politically they had to work together, if the empire was to survive. The determined position that Andrassy took--and his diligent work to implement it--is all the more remarkable in this context.

In March 1875, General Beck and others convinced Franz Joseph to visit Dalmatia. The Emperor toured the southernmost province of his empire for 33 days in April and May. While there, Bosnian delegations crossed the border, requesting the Emperor's protection. Even Prince Nicholas of Montenegro, met with the Emperor on this visit and appeared ready to support his "aspirations."²⁷ If a "pretext" had been planned, this was clearly an opening for it. According to General Mollinary, Commander in Croatia, the visit was an "open invitation to revolt."²⁸

The Situation on the Ground Prior to July 1875

The outbreak of fighting in 1875 had its own short-term background. As has been seen the oppressive tax situation and resistance to it were not new in Bosnia. There had been revolts in 1868 and 1869.²⁹ Then in both 1872 and 1873 local leaders in Bosnia once again petitioned the Great Powers (first the Emperor and then the Tsar) for support in their rebellions, explaining that misery and injustice forced them into their hostile positions.³⁰ In June 1873 a group of new refugees in Croatia complained of mistreatment by the Ottomans.³¹ The Ottoman Governor of Bosnia, at this time, complained in his turn to Vienna of increased "cultural" activities, presumably in and around the consulate in Sarajevo.³² Later in the year, more refugees arrived, some telling of Christians who had been "condemned to death for fraternizing with the Austrian consul."³³ Andrassy, hearing these stories from Anton Mollinary in Zagreb, was forced to make a formal request to Constantinople for improvement, even though he wished not to disturb the status quo.³⁴ Rebel leaders were playing one power against another in a desperate attempt to get some relief. None was forthcoming.

In 1874 the harvest failed but tax collectors demanded in-kind payments anyway. Local leaders of the Nevesinje district in Herzegovina met and decided to "take up arms" the following spring. They informed both Montenegro and Serbia of their intentions. Ottoman officials heard about the plan. They hunted down and killed as many leaders as they could find.³⁵ When officials attempted to collect new taxes in the summer of 1875, rebellion spread very quickly. By the end of the summer, virtually all peasants in Herzegovina had taken up arms and many were fleeing from Bosnia. The Governor of Bosnia assembled an army and responded with a severe crackdown. Some landlords also assembled their own troops and terrorized the population, causing a mass exodus of Christian peasants to Croatia, Slavonia, and Hungary. By the end of 1876, between 100,000 and 250,000 people had left Bosnia, 5,000 were dead, and many villages burned to the ground.³⁶

The local situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina was desperate. Austrian military intentions were clear and military commanders in the field were fully aware of the situation. The moment for the realization of their plans--even if a "pretext" had not been fomented--was ripe. The

²⁷ Rothenberg, p. 92; Bridge, pp. 111-112. Rothenberg says "staged" demonstrations occurred.

²⁸ Rothenberg, p. 92.

²⁹ Malcolm p. 130.

³⁰ Petrovich, p. 381.

³¹ Rothenberg, p. 92.

³² Bridge, p. 111.

³³ Malcolm, p. 131.

³⁴ Rothenberg, p. 92.

³⁵ Petrovich, p. 381.

³⁶ Malcolm, p. 132.

question is, then, given the established Austrian military plan and preferences, how did this crisis play itself out?

Initial Response to the Insurrection: The Attempt at Neutrality

Andrassy went into an immediate "flurry of activity" in order to control the situation in Herzegovina. He announced that Austria-Hungary would remain completely neutral in the new situation. He insisted this was an internal affair for the Ottomans themselves to handle. Methods for determining the peace should be left entirely to them. The insurrection had *not* been created by Austria-Hungary. No foreign states should become involved. He denied accusations in the press that Austria-Hungary wished to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina.³⁷ He moved to prevent the extension of the conflict and to avoid involvement of Austro-Hungarian Slavs.³⁸

For Andrassy, the generals and even Franz Joseph gave him most worry. He over-rode military instructions to Governor Baron Gabriel Rodic in Dalmatia, insisting that the Dalmatian governor receive his instructions directly from the Foreign Ministry since that ministry "bore the brunt of the responsibility for the empire's conduct in the resolution of the Balkan problems."³⁹ Of course, neither Serbia nor Montenegro should be allowed to move into either Bosnia or Herzegovina, but since that was unlikely, it appeared that the status quo would reassert itself, according to Andrassy's analysis of August 12.⁴⁰

To implement the policy of neutrality, Austria-Hungary ordered in early July that no refugees who had "guns in hand" should be allowed to cross the Dalmatian or Croatian borders. Two companies of infantry were sent to Metkovich, on the south Dalmatian border, to enforce the regulation.⁴¹

In August, evidently hearing of Serbs intending to cross Dalmatia to join the rebels, Vienna ordered that they be forbidden passage through Dalmatia. On August 12, Andrassy urged the Governor Rodic, to insist that this was *not* the moment "ripe for revolt" and they could not expect support from Austria-Hungary. He even stressed that Rodic work to *prevent* a final solution to the Eastern question. A definitive solution to the Christians in Turkey was not in the interests of Austria-Hungary at the moment. He told Rodic: "...Consideration for Russia's reaction forced Austria-Hungary to be circumspect in dealing with the principalities."⁴²

Andrassy was cornered by the requirements of two policies, which he had helped create. The first was unity among members of the Dreikaisarbund. At a meeting between Franz Joseph and Alexander as late as February 1874, the emperors had agreed that: "Expression of desire for the progressive improvement of the lot of Turkey's Christians...would not transgress the bounds of European accord."⁴³ In other words, unity between Austria-Hungary and Russia through the *Dreikaisarbund* would take precedence over concerns for improvement in the lot of Christians in the Ottoman Empire. If these two goals clashed, the former would come first. Thus it was in the name of this unity that Andrassy and Franz Joseph both made public statements in the summer of 1875 that only in the event of complete Ottoman collapse would Austria-Hungary change its

³⁷ The fact that Andrassy would feel the need to deny these accusations indicates they were widely made in the first place and that the military plans were known. Germans and Hungarians in the Empire would have been against those plans. The issue was probably a political football from the very start.

³⁸ David Harris, *A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878: The First Year* (North Haven: Archon Books, 1969), pp. 69-70; Burns, pp. 112-114.

³⁹ Burns, p. 116 n.17.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

⁴¹ Harris, p. 69.

⁴² Burns, p. 117.

⁴³ Harris, p. 57.

policy of neutrality.⁴⁴ This was putting the needs of the alliance and of peace among the Powers ahead of help to the insurgents on the ground. And Andrassy could camouflage his Hungarian purposes behind this unity.

The second policy Andrassy had helped create was Austro-Hungarian patronage and dominance over Slav nationalism. Andrassy would not allow the troubled provinces to be possessed by any power other than Austria-Hungary. In a fierce fight for unofficial patronage he had been following a policy of indirect aid to the Catholics in the principalities. For the change that the military leaders wanted, it would have to be necessary to prepare the inhabitants--which is what he had been doing through aid to Catholic Croat leadership and positive responses to refugees in Zagreb, albeit reluctantly.⁴⁵ The policy was an answer to similar Russian aid to the Orthodox communities. The aid undercut the unity insisted upon at the international level. Andrassy nearly caught himself in his won web. The fragile unity of the *Dreikaisarbund* was negated by the fierce competition on the ground.

The Situation on the Ground: Summer 1875

As Herzegovinians took to the hills with their guns, Governor General Dervish Pasha sent two "local notables" to negotiate with the insurgents. These efforts producing no fruit, he sent Constant Effendi, Ottoman Frontier Commissioner, who spoke with the insurgents twice, but to no avail. Perhaps because of these failures, after July 16, "Promptly several Turkish battalions were dispatched to the scene of the insurrection."⁴⁶ At the same time, like Andrassy, officials in Constantinople refused to attribute significance to the rebellion. Even so, "By the middle of August, 30,300 men were in the field and additional thousands were marching" according to reports to Andrassy from Count Francis Zichy, the Austrian Ambassador at Constantinople.⁴⁷

In Dalmatia and in Croatia, spurred on by the enthusiasm of Governor Rodic and by Mollinary, local populations eagerly supplied the insurgents with arms, ammunition, and supplies. The Croatian diet was very supportive to those in Bosnia. On the Dalmatian coast, Ragusa became a regular center of planning and resupply. Indeed, even though Ottomans regularly used the port of Klek to deliver materials, thousands of Austrian arms were also being delivered directly to the rebels. As early as June, one "astounded officer" watched as "an Austro-Hungarian steamer unload[ed] eight thousand Wanzel rifles and two million rounds of ammunition at Cattaro which were promptly picked up by native bands and carried into the hinterland."⁴⁸ In twentieth century terms, a proxy war was being fought. And Andrassy was indeed swimming upstream!

The Consular Mission

As early as July, the Russians began to communicate their concern over the uprising and to make proposals for joint action. For the most part, Andrassy rejected these, but ultimately the powers joined in a first combined effort.

On July 25, the Russian Ambassador to Vienna, Eugene Novikov, proposed that representatives of the *Dreikaisarbund* make a joint intervention by Andrassy, himself, and the German Ambassador to Vienna, Count Hans Lothar von Schweinitz, to alleviate the situation for

⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 68, 70.

⁴⁵ Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia, A Short History* (New York: New York University Press, 1994), pp. 125-126, 130-131.

⁴⁶ Harris, p. 64.

⁴⁷ Harris, p. 65.

⁴⁸ Rothenberg, p. 93.

the insurgents. Andrassy replied that they could do this only to say the insurgents could expect no help from the Powers, insisting that non-intervention was the best principle. Novikov thought, "such a limited role...would be too cruel."⁴⁹ On the 29 of July Andrassy, realizing that he could not flatly turn down the Russian proposal, made a counter proposal. He suggested "combined" instructions to both countries' representatives in Constantinople and Bosnia. Consuls should try to calm the rebels, urge them to negotiate directly with Turkish authorities, and assure them that the Powers would require the Turks to remove "just grievances." The Ambassadors in Constantinople should warn the Turks of the results of military excesses and request the Ottomans to renew their efforts at pacification. This approach, Andrassy argued, would avoid unrealizable moral obligations for the Powers.⁵⁰

Alexander II and his Foreign Minister, Alexander Gorchakov, holding cooperation with the Dual Monarchy as the predominant goal, accepted this counter proposal. Getting wind of it, however, the French took offense and threatened a separate initiative with Great Britain. Alexander responded to this possibility by immediately inviting the French and English to participate in the consular initiative. Before Andrassy could move to contain it, his initiative, despite his intentions at working entirely within the *Dreikaisarbund*, was thwarted and the initiative was extended to six, rather than three Powers, Italy being the sixth. His response to Alexander's move: "profound silence."⁵¹

By September 7 all six representatives had arrived in Mostar, where their common mandate was to "warn insurgents of their isolation and admonish them to submission."⁵² In the meantime, the former Bosnian Governor General, Dervish Pasha had been removed, and Server Pasha had replaced him. According to the British journalist, W.J. Stillman, when Server Pasha had held a similar position in Crete, it had been a fiasco. Server Pasha was known for his slowness and hesitation. Nonetheless, the consuls had been instructed to support the work of Server Pasha. Server Pasha's own instructions, however, informed him to negotiate himself and not to allow any consul to be directly involved in talks with the insurgents. So he was evasive and elusive.⁵³

The consuls went out to the field in two groups. The English, Russians and French went to Nevisinje, where the uprising had started. The others went to the Dalmatian frontier. All of them witnessed the devastation the fighting had brought, heard the insurgents say they did not trust any Ottoman promise of reforms or the mercy of an Ottoman tribunal, and listened to the insurgents state they would talk with Server Pasha only in the presence of the consuls.⁵⁴

But in the end the mission was brought down by Ottoman treachery. On September 19, a large group of rebels gathered near Nevisinje to meet the consuls. Governor General Server Pasha ordered a surprise attack in the early hours of September 20, just hours after the consuls had left. No further talks could occur on this basis. The consuls returned to Mostar and the insurgents went back to the hills and their guns. It appeared to Consul W.J. Holmes in his report to the British government that Server Pasha had "acted without the slightest regard for the consequences which might result to ourselves and to our mission."⁵⁵ Although the consular committee remained in operation for some time, it lost its momentum at this point. The Grand Vizier rejected further suggestions for a conference in Ragusa, for example, and told the

⁴⁹ Harris, pp. 74-75.

⁵⁰ Ibid. p. 75.

⁵¹ Ibid., pp. 77-80.

⁵² Ibid., p. 90.

⁵³ Ibid., pp. 88-91.

⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 91.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 93, n. 134.

European ambassadors in Constantinople that the consular mission was finished. The main argument: Europeans are meddling in our internal affairs.⁵⁶

Both British and Austro-Hungarian consuls reported independently that in their opinions nothing but European intervention could solve the problems in Herzegovina. Conrad Wassitsch, the Austro-Hungarian Consul in Mostar, reported on the "appalling chaos and anarchy" that he had seen. He told Andrassy that the Porte was "not in a position to subdue the revolt" and, on September 24, that the rebels might not need help. He thought that either Austria-Hungary should occupy Hercegovina or that it should be divided up between Austria-Hungary, Montenegro, and Serbia.⁵⁷ Holmes reported:

A feeble government like Turkey, however sincere, cannot change by decree the nature and traditions of the ignorant, fanatic, corrupt and obstinate agents which it must necessarily employ, nor can it alter the sentiments of whole populations.⁵⁸

And in the late fall, he added that the Turkish troops, "sick, ragged" and out of food, were being beaten. They did not dare go off the roads.⁵⁹ Clearly these were not the reports Andrassy wished to receive. And he began to ignore them. It is quite possible that the demise of the consular mission--the only one which really attempted to gain a clear, first-hand picture of what was happening on the ground--was due primarily to Andrassy's ultimate lack of interest in it.⁶⁰ After this, the gap between the diplomats' negotiations and the insurrection in Bosnia and Herzegovina deepened and widened progressively.

In this early period, Andrassy's neutrality policy reflected Plan A, his first priority: do nothing, return to the status quo, allow the Ottoman Empire to govern its Slav population as it saw fit. This was in spite of military minds in his own government, the Emperor's preference, Russian pan-Slavist agitation, and the situation on the ground, which, contrary to Andrassy's purportedly sincere assessment, *did* indicate the time was ripe for change. He, himself formed an undertow to the forces which might have positively resolved the situation for the insurgents.

The Andrassy Note

At the same time as the consuls were attempting to negotiate in the field, the ambassadors were jockeying for power in Constantinople. Intrigue and power-plays were by no means new in the Ottoman capital. A power vacuum existed and European emissaries had been working to fill it for years. British Ambassador Sir Henry Elliot had the ear of the Sultan and represented the Turks' strongest supporter. The British wished to see the Ottomans remain as a buffer to Russian expansionism. Russian Count Nicholas Ignatiev had been in Constantinople for fourteen years, intriguing for Turkish dependence on Russian guidance or for its fall. As a leading pan-Slavist, his dream was a Balkan Federation under Russian hegemony. Count Francis Zichy, Austrian Ambassador, followed the will of Andrassy. All played on a weak, corrupt government for dependence on their respective wills. Ottomans--those who knew what they were doing--played one Power against the other. It was a hot-bed of intrigue and corruption.

⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 94-96.

⁵⁷ Burns, pp. 124-125.

⁵⁸ Harris, pp. 96-97, n. 148.

⁵⁹ Ibid. At the same time, Holmes continued to report, Server Pasha reported that the insurrection was being put down. He was trying to please his superiors.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 125.

In this context, a reform package for Bosnia and Herzegovina became an international political football. The personal animosity between Andrassy and Ignatiev motivated most of the drama but Elliot also played a major role.

Since Andrassy had initiated the joint consular mission, Ignatiev, jealous of any successful program presented by Andrassy, determined to influence the Porte's official edict of reforms and thus maintain the center of activity in his realm, Constantinople. In response to European pressures for reform, the Porte issued an irade on October 2. It included modest tax reforms such as the remission of a 2% surtax on the peasants and cancellation of unpaid taxes before 1873.⁶¹ It also included a mechanism by which Ottoman subjects could petition the Sultan for treatment of their complaints.⁶² Many of these measures had been proposed by Elliot, with Ignatiev's input.⁶³ Andrassy perceived the imprint of a foreign hand but concluded it to have been Ignatiev's.

Determined not to allow Ignatiev the upper hand, Andrassy rejected the *irade*, criticizing it as limited only to material reforms and omitting vital social and moral changes.⁶⁴ He then sent his own draft proposals to St. Petersburg, calling for 1) no "political rearrangement" at this time, Bosnia and Herzegovina, remaining "under Turkish control" 2) no administration similar to that of Serbia and Montenegro (autonomous principalities under Turkish rule) but: 3) absolute religious equality 4) abolition of the medieval corvee and seigneurial tithes, and 5) elimination of tax-farming. These were the bases of the ultimate Andrassy Note, put forward for acceptance by the Six Great Powers in late December.⁶⁵ It was from the beginning a move motivated by Andrassy's desire to undercut Ignatiev by going over his head and removing the decision-making center from Constantinople to the capitals of the Great Powers.⁶⁶ It aimed, as can be seen, at as little change as possible for the provinces but the certainty of retaining the Austro-Hungarian initiative for whatever reforms should come about--exactly as Andrassy had established in the January 29 Crown Council meeting. Ignatiev, for his part, jubilant after the irade was enraged now.⁶⁷

Andrassy, it should be noted, was smoothly transitioning from one policy to another. He had begun attempting to insist on full neutrality and no international intervention. Pushed from several directions, by the end of the year, he was intent on leading a full 6-Power intervention for a list of limited reforms.

Italy and France accepted the Note almost immediately. Britain--in particular Prime Minister Disraeli--did not like following on the coattails of the others--for the second time--and stalled.⁶⁸ The French had raised a central question, which the Disraeli Cabinet reiterated. Were all taxes, raised in every province to be used only in that province--as the Note now called for--or

⁶¹ Stojanovic, p. 39.

⁶² Burns, p. 132 n.55.

⁶³ Harris, p. 139 indicates there is no evidence of Ignatiev's proposals but they would "of necessity have paralleled closely those of Elliot.

⁶⁴ Burns, p. 134.

⁶⁵ The ultimate Note of December 30, 1875 also stipulated the use of taxes raised in the provinces for the provinces own needs and an implementation committee composed of equal numbers of indigenous Christians and Moslems. Burns, pp. 139-140.

⁶⁶ Harris, p. 141. Andrassy in prior correspondence had been crystal clear about removing the center of power from Constantinople.

⁶⁷ Ibid., pp. 139, 145. Ignatiev is quoted as having told Elliot after the *irade*: "This will take the wind out of Andrassy's sails." But after the October 16 proposal Harris says: "Ignatiev's hostility mounted to the point of frenzy."

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 209.

just in Bosnia and Herzegovina?⁶⁹ It is significant that England was a major financial source for the Porte. In October, the Porte had declared bankruptcy. Disraeli's question then would have meant: where did Ottoman money go--to its creditors in European capitals or to its subjects in the provinces? The Russian Ambassador, Count Peter Shuvalov, reported at this time that England was *not* moved by "ideas of humanity and civilization."⁷⁰ Eventually the Porte *requested* that England also sign the Note and Disraeli, who had been holding out almost single-handedly against the dominant opinion in his own Cabinet, acquiesced.⁷¹

After haggling over timing and method in Constantinople, the Note was delivered in identical form by the six ambassadors on January 31 and February 1, 1876. It was an "intolerable humiliation to imperial sovereignty"--as it was designed to be--according to the Turks' wounded dignity. The Ambassadors called for "immediate execution of the proposed reforms."⁷² It was clearly an ultimatum and was as close as the Powers came to unanimity.

The story of the Note's presentation and acceptance is too colorful and revealing not to repeat. It indicates the extent of the decay in the Ottoman Empire and the central cause of the difficulty. When the Ambassadors did move to present the Note, they presented it to Foreign Minister, Rashid. They were met with one of several absurd and chaotic scenes that stud the crisis. The Sultan, Abdul Aziz, responded first by threatening to let his Foreign Minister go. Next he called for a band of *bashi-bazoukis* to prepare for Bosnia. Then on February 10, having eaten eighteen eggs for breakfast, the Sultan declared himself poisoned and would not leave the harem. The next day he refused to go to the mosque--the first time a Sultan had done this in a century. All the time, Rashid was attempting to contact him and receive a clear reply by letter. Finally Rashid went in person to the palace, conferred through a secretary, and a harem guard, and obtained acceptance of four of the five points of the Andrassy Note. Such was the government, which, throughout the crisis, Andrassy--as well as many in England--insisted was to be propped up and kept alive.⁷³

The Attempt at Implementation: Pacification, Repatriation, and Insurgents Demands

In January 1876 along with his work on the Note, Andrassy had also worked to prepare the Porte for implementation of the reforms and repatriation of refugees who had been living in Dalmatia or Croatia. He outlined for the Ottoman government a repatriation plan with which Austria-Hungary could cooperate. It included amnesty for rebel leaders, safeguards for protection against Moslem vengeance, aid for rebuilding the houses and churches, and seeds for the approaching season. In return Austria-Hungary offered to work to seal the borders and gain Montenegrin neutrality. On January 26 the plan was accepted.⁷⁴ One can perceive Andrassy's first priority--return to the status quo--at work here.

On February 18, Andrassy also proposed that the Ottomans officially summon rebels to stop fighting and return home. Austro-Hungarian border officials would support them. Turkish commissioners should go at once and proclaim publicly amnesty as they had accepted to do. If the rebels refused, then Andrassy suggested the Turks would have the right to force them into Austria-Hungary where they would be disarmed and arrested. The plan included a pacification

⁶⁹ Ibid. pp. 82, 208. Harris was quoting from the British letter of response to the Note written in late December 1876.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 206.

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 209.

⁷² Ibid., p. 223.

⁷³ Ibid., pp. 223-229.

⁷⁴ Burns, pp. 142-144.

commission to be appointed by the Porte.⁷⁵ Now the Ottomans and the Austro-Hungarians were to work together to resolve the rebellion. If the plan was successful, Andrassy would be seen as an effective benefactor of the Christian population in the provinces, without, however, having to take full responsibility for their welfare or incorporate them into the Empire. This was just the restricted solution he had advocated.

As a result of this plan and acceptance of the note, Andrassy called Governor Rodic from Dalmatia to Vienna for extensive new instructions. Rodic, who had the trust of the rebels, should tell them their lot would now be improved. The Powers had achieved more than the rebels ever could have gained alone. Rodic was to say: the Ottoman government has promised reforms not just to you but to the Powers, so they will guarantee the reforms. To continue fighting would mean a "hopeless sacrifice of Christian blood."⁷⁶ Rodic was also told to tighten up border patrols and seize all unauthorized guns and ammunition. Andrassy also instructed Mollinary in Croatia and the consuls in the provinces--especially Consul Wassitsch who was appointed to the Pacification Commission--in the same fashion.⁷⁷

But the situation on the ground defied orderly controls. Nearly daily reports in March described villages burned, people robbed, women raped, impalements, and beheadings. The borders continued to be porous. Arms poured into both provinces from Dalmatia and Croatia as they had in the past.⁷⁸

Rodic, however, attempted to carry out his instructions. He first met with the rebels in early March. Their response was: we cannot return home, everything is destroyed, we have no trust in Turkish authorities, and we want the troops to withdraw first.⁷⁹

As part of these talks in the middle of March, the rebels proposed a 12-day truce. As soon as it was agreed to by the Turkish commander Mukhtar Pasha, he broke it by leading an attempt to reprovision the Turkish garrison at Niksic, which the rebels surrounded.⁸⁰ Rodic kept trying to talk to both sides, cajoling and threatening, to persuade them to come to agreement. In late March another truce was agreed but also broken immediately, this time by a rebel attack on Nevisinje.⁸¹

One of Andrassy's requirements was that the reforms agreed to at Constantinople should be adequately publicized and clarified to the rebels. When finally the Porte published the reform edict in late March the Ottomans used language identical to that used by the Turks for many generations. The edict did not specify the agreed reforms. Nor did it mention amnesty for the rebels. Naturally it did not increase rebels' confidence in a changed Turkish policy. Rodic was incensed and concluded the Turks wanted no part of peace.⁸² Relations between Rodic and Commander Mukhtar went from strained to hostile.

For their part on April 6, the rebels presented Rodic with a written list of conditions for their return and for giving up their weapons. This was the first and only official expression of desires on the part of the insurgents. Thus it is a central document. They demanded that Christians be given one third of the land as their own; all Turkish troops be withdrawn except for six garrisons; and that Turks aid in rebuilding houses and churches and provide tools and seeds for one year and exempt Christians from taxation for three years, Muslims give up their weapons

⁷⁵ Harris, p. 241.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 243.

⁷⁷ Burns, p. 146.

⁷⁸ Harris, pp. 244-245; Burns, pp. 142-147.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 246.

⁸⁰ Burns, p. 149.

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 252.

⁸² Ibid., p. 251.

first, reforms be discussed and written into a constitution by a group of Christians and Muslims and be applicable to everyone in Herzegovina and Bosnia, a European commission oversee the distribution of funds for return, and agents from Russia and Austria-Hungary monitor reform in the six Turkish garrisons.⁸³

This was not an unreasonable list of requests for those who had endured such a heavy dose of taxation, injustice, violence, and arbitrary government. Andrassy's response to it differed dramatically from Russia's. But before either Great Power had a chance to respond, another crisis presented itself.

On April 13, Mukhtar attempted again to reprovision Niksic. He was defeated in this attempt by rebels aided--he claimed--by "7,000 Montenegrin regulars."⁸⁴ In Constantinople, the authorities were divided. As a result of reports about this fiasco, the war party, headed by Dervish Pasha, who had been governor of Bosnia when the rebellion began, voted to declare war on Montenegro.⁸⁵ This was just the issue, it will be recalled, that had evoked a Crown Council meeting and serious planning for occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in January 1875.

A war scare ensued. In Constantinople Ignatiev spearheaded a joint declaration by the Powers that they would not accept any attack on Montenegro. All the Powers agreed. Gorchakov, dressed in full uniform, called all the Ambassadors together in St. Petersburg and urged a common very strong protest.⁸⁶ Nicholas of Montenegro had become the "darling" of all the Powers by this time, so adept was he in his diplomacy.⁸⁷ Andrassy for once could act in complete accord with Saint Petersburg. Ultimately Rashid convinced Abdul Aziz to rescind the war declaration. So the premature threat of war was averted.

On the ground, however, nothing changed. On April 28, Mukhtar successfully reprovisioned Niksic. He fought his way into the city and out again, believing that thousands of Montenegrins fought him in the forests. By doing this, he removed one of the major issues for negotiation between the Pacification Commission and the rebels.⁸⁸ The ground for Andrassy's leading initiative--limited reforms as put forward by himself in the Note and implemented successfully by the Porte under Austro-Hungarian authority and an ultimate return to the status quo--had been undercut by Turkish pride, stubbornness, and duplicity. The situation was becoming so chaotic, that Andrassy would now have to turn to his second policy priority: insistence that no one other than Austria-Hungary should occupy or control Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Berlin Memorandum

As has been mentioned, Andrassy and Gorchakov differed markedly in their responses to the "Conditions" put forward by the insurgents on April 6. Andrassy rejected them outright, saying he would not move a hair's breath beyond the reforms of the Note and adding: "Those conditions of an agrarian character are obviously inimical to the rights of property and therefore unrealizable."⁸⁹ Thus Andrassy, in attempting to keep down Slav nationalism, also used the cohesion of the landed proprietors against the radical proposal that Bosnia and Herzegovinian

⁸³ Ibid., p. 255.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 267.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 268.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 272.

⁸⁷ Ibid., p. 273. Ambassador Langenau reported to Andrassy on April 26: "C'est l'enfant chéri de la Russie, auquel on n'ose pas toucher." It is interesting to consider the difference in the European attitude toward Milan, in Serbia, who was not an attractive personality.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 287.

⁸⁹ Ibid. p. 256.

rebels should own part of the land they tilled. Gorchakov, however, on the other hand, thought the insurgents' proposals "not beyond the pale of discussion" and considered it reasonable to ask for guarantees before returning home. In general, the Russians saw reforms as happening first, while Andrassy was advising the rebels to return first and the Turks to organize the reform commission only after rebels had returned to their homes.⁹⁰

Because of the dangerous and widening gap between the Austrian and Russian positions, Gorchakov called a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the *Dreikaisarbund* for May 11. The upshot of this meeting was an agreement that incorporated many of the insurgents' proposals. The proposal to be presented by all six of the Great Powers--but created by Andrassy and Gorchakov--called for the following. Turks would provide materials for rebuilding homes and churches and subsistence to the next harvest. A mixed commission of indigenous Christians and Muslims would oversee the rebuilding. Turkish troops would concentrate in a limited number of garrisons on a temporary basis. Christians would have the right to bear arms. Foreign consuls would monitor reforms and repatriation. If the armistice to precede these moves was to expire without implementation of the above, the Powers reserved the right to take "effective measures."⁹¹ Thus five of seven rebel conditions were incorporated in the Memo. The Memo itself, it must be reiterated, was initiated in St. Petersburg.

Gorchakov had come to the meeting to demand concessions to the insurgents, autonomy for the provinces, and occupation of the region by a European commission. Andrassy, with his fixation on the threat of a strong South Slav state, would have none of this. Enraged, he fumed to both Bismarck and to Alexander, effectively undercutting Gorchakov. Because of his commitment to the unity of the Powers, Alexander again acquiesced to Andrassy's tantrum. The Berlin Memorandum ended as outlined above, with the very lukewarm threat of European military intervention.⁹²

This, it must be noted, was not the first time a Russian proposal for military intervention had been made. From the beginning, Gorchakov had proposed joint occupation of the provinces by Russia and Austria-Hungary. Andrassy had always rejected such ideas and did so again successfully at this point. Indeed, his success on the diplomatic front was as remarkable as his failure on the ground.

Chaos in Constantinople

The month of May 1876 in the Ottoman world seemed truly to reveal the disintegration of the Empire. First, the revolt was taken up in Bulgaria. But badly organized the Bulgarians were subjected to enormous reprisals and atrocities. Thousands were killed in retaliation for their planned uprising.⁹³ A cry of outrage went up from Liberals in Great Britain.

Second, in Salonika on May 6, the French and German consuls were murdered by a "mob of Turkish citizens."⁹⁴ The western diplomatic community in Constantinople was put on high alert. Four days later, on May 10--just as Andrassy was holding preliminary talks with Bismarck in order to undercut Gorchakov in Berlin--as a result of hysteria in Salonika, riots occurred in

⁹⁰ Ibid., pp. 258-259, 261.

⁹¹ Ibid., 297-298 and in general Chapter VI.

⁹² Rupp, pp. 69-105. Rupp quotes Andrassy as saying at this meeting: "This Gorchakov memorandum is a noose they are pleasantly trying to put round our necks. Austria will never accept...My decision has been carefully considered, and *I succeed in everything on which I am thoroughly determined*. I shall break this noose even if I have to stand alone." (The italics are the author's.)

⁹³ Seton-Watson, Chapter III.

⁹⁴ Burns, p. 166.

Constantinople and the "mad Sultan" Abdul Aziz was overthrown. Murad, the Sultan's nephew, took over. Abdul Aziz was forced out of his bedroom and required to abdicate with 53 boatloads of women! Five days after this, Tscherkess Hassan, a "wild young Circassian officer" broke into a Turkish Council of Ministers' meeting, assassinated seven people, including Rashid--the Western oriented Foreign Minister who had conveyed Andrassy's Note to the sultan in February and appeared to be working for real Ottoman reforms.⁹⁵ Abdul Aziz had been "suffering from mania, with paroxysms of fury" and committed suicide, it is thought, with scissors.⁹⁶ Murad, also ultimately diagnosed with "monomania of the suicidal type" lasted until he too was deposed on August 30.⁹⁷ This instability and disarray in the Ottoman capital deterred the Powers from presenting the Berlin Memorandum, which was unlikely in any case to elicit a serious response.

By the end of May also, it was becoming clear that Serbia, under the voluntary Russian leadership of General Chernyaev, was preparing to declare war on the Ottoman Empire and that Montenegro would follow suit. For Andrassy, then, it must have appeared as if his wildest nightmares were being realized. If he had argued that the Ottomans could be propped up and the status quo revived, even he must have had to admit there was little practical substance to the possibility at this point. In spite of his diplomatic victories over the Russians, his policy needed to shift. From July--after the declaration of war on the Ottomans by the Serbs and Montenegrins--he strove to realize Contingency Plan B--the guarantee of border rectifications along the line envisioned in the January 1875 Crown Council meeting.

The Reichstadt Agreement

When the foreign ministers of Russia and Austria-Hungary met at Reichstadt on July 8, 1876, they set the basis for territory changes that had been pressed by Bismarck since late 1875 and would be legalized at the Berlin Conference in June 1878. The question for consideration was the same as had concerned the Crown Council of January 1875, but now the hypothetical situation had become reality. The allies asked themselves: In the current war, how shall we deport ourselves? The answers were: If the Turks were to win, there would be a return to the status quo. If the Serbs were to win, a strong South Slav state might very well result. To avoid a militarily victorious Serbia from taking Bosnia, Andrassy and Gorchakov secretly agreed that Austria-Hungary would move into "parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina" while Russia would have compensation by re-taking Bessarabia, which she had lost in the Crimean War.

In other words, both powers agreed that Serbia would not be allowed to enjoy the fruits of her victories. It must be noted that this was a reversal for the Russians, who had posed as the supporter of Slavic and Orthodox Christian liberation for years. Now, in a crass land grab, and--it must be said--to maintain the *Dreikaisarbund* unity--they not only betrayed their Serbian Slav brothers--whom they were unofficially helping in the battlefield--but also reneged on their commitment to the rebels in Bosnia and Herzegovina, whom they had championed from the beginning of the crisis.⁹⁸

It must be pointed out that Bismarck had advocated such a territorial division of European Turkey since at least January 1876. He had reiterated the advice several times.⁹⁹ He had also taken the position that, although Germany was not directly interested in the fate of the

⁹⁵ Seton-Watson, p. 36.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 50.

⁹⁸ Burns, pp. 188-192; Harris, Chapter VI.

⁹⁹ Harris, pp. 174-175, 290. He had advised such a move in talks preceding acceptance of the Andrassy Note and in talks preceding the Berlin meeting.

Ottoman Empire, she would adhere to anything that Austria-Hungary and Russia could agree upon. In the shadowy background of official diplomacy regarding the fate of Bosnia and Herzegovina, then, lay the giant figure of Bismarck, Foreign Minister of the third member of the *Dreikaisarbund*--which was desperately attempting to retain its unity. Bismarck necessarily retained his prestige as formulator of foreign policy for Germany and creator of the new, post-1871 European balance of power.

The division of territory--and Austria's insistence on the right to occupy the provinces--was the question that Andrassy again took up in secret talks in December and January with his friend, the Russian Ambassador Eugene Novikov. Russia, now considering outright war with the Porte, needed assurance of Austrian benevolent neutrality. Andrassy used the leverage he had to good effect, again insisting that no large South Slav State be established and that Russia acknowledge Austria-Hungary's right to occupy the provinces at a moment she thought auspicious. These talks culminated in the secret Budapest Convention of January and March 1877, by which Austria-Hungary agreed to remain neutral if and when Russia went to war with the Ottoman Empire in return for the above guarantees. Andrassy was insisting on Plan B, since he had not been able to maintain Plan A. Andrassy had fought the generals in the Crown Council, he had fought the Russians, he had fought Rodic and Mollinary on the ground, and he had fought the insurgents to maintain his position. He would fight to the end to continue to see it through.

Autonomy

Autonomy under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire was a solution for Bosnia and Herzegovina advocated by many of the interested parties at one point or another. Each time it was brought up, the idea was rejected by Andrassy.

As early as August 1875 Gorchakov had proposed autonomy for the provinces.¹⁰⁰ The idea provoked Andrassy to begin a campaign against it in the *Neue Freie Presse*, where he argued that autonomy was impossible for "mixed" populations. They would fall on each other if left to their own devices. Autonomy would also present a bad precedent for other provinces such as Bulgaria and Rumania. (He did not want to see a string of autonomous Slavic provinces, even if left in the Ottoman Empire.) On October 16, he sent a Circular Note to all Austro-Hungarian representatives abroad, explaining his views. Autonomy would "stimulate other revolts and reopen the whole Eastern Question," he argued.¹⁰¹

By March 1876 and the crisis over pacification, the truce, and Niksic, Gorchakov concluded that autonomy for the provinces was the only possible solution. In his prepared proposals for the Berlin Conference of May, in addition to concessions to insurgent demands, he sought to gain agreement for ultimate autonomy for the provinces. As has been seen, Andrassy used every possible device at his disposal to have Gorchakov retract these proposals and once again Andrassy succeeded.¹⁰²

In June Disraeli approached Bismarck, thinking if England and Germany agreed, they could create a settlement that would last a generation. His proposal: autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina but no additional territory to be awarded to any other vassal state, i.e. Serbia.¹⁰³ This would have raised the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina to that of Serbia, allowing some amount of self-government. But Bismarck informed Disraeli that Andrassy had come to Berlin

¹⁰⁰ Bridge, p. 114.

¹⁰¹ Stojanovic, pp. 36-37.

¹⁰² Harris, p. 259.

¹⁰³ Stojanovic, p. 72.

and refused to even consider autonomy and England should support Austria-Hungary because the Empire was essential to peace in Europe.¹⁰⁴

Then Disraeli attempted to gain an understanding with the Russians. In the process autonomy was defined more precisely as similar to the status of Serbia and Rumania. Andrassy, hearing of these talks, again "used all his energy" to prevent any agreement on autonomy between England and Russia. He argued that the rebels would never stop fighting if they thought that the Powers condoned autonomy in the end. By the end of June he had convinced both Derby and Disraeli.¹⁰⁵

The issue continued to be discussed and became a kind of *idée fixe* for the Russians. Ultimately, at the end of the war between Russia and the Ottomans, in January 1877, Ignatiev drew up an armistice plan, which became the basis for the first peace treaty ending the war--the Treaty of San Stefano. Instead of the agreement reached at Reichstadt and Budapest--that Austria-Hungary would be accorded the right to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina at a time of her choosing--San Stefano stipulated autonomy for the provinces. Although much attention has been paid to other facets of the treaty, such as a "Big Bulgaria" which was not palatable either to England or to Austria-Hungary, it was the clause regarding Bosnia which was most galling to Andrassy, which sent him into a lather, and played a major part in his calling of the Berlin Conference to rectify the San Stefano Treaty.

The idea of autonomy, then, which the rebels had insisted upon despite their weakness, played a large role in the thinking of all the active players in the game. There is one final chapter, which sounded the death knell for this solution to the whole problem.

Andrassy wished to have it appear that Austria-Hungary was acting as the agent for European civilization in gaining the right to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina. For personal and political reasons, he perceived that the initiative should come from England. He needed a prior agreement with England. On June 6, 1878 just one week before the Berlin Conference opened on June 13, a secret agreement with new British Foreign Minister Salisbury was signed. In it Austria-Hungary agreed to back the English preference for the Bulgaria border in return for English acquiescence in Austro-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹⁰⁶ Accordingly, in a preplanned, staged enactment Andrassy, at the Berlin Conference of June 1878 effected Plan B of the policy he had outlined in January 1875, three and one half years earlier. A vivid description has been written by R.W. Seton-Watson.

The second main phase opened on 28 June, when Lord Salisbury, in a written speech, proposed that the Powers should entrust Austria-Hungary with a mandate for the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Like a schoolmaster with cane in hand, he assured the Turks that it was greatly to their advantage to surrender territory of no strategic value..., while he dismissed as objectionable the alternative of a chain of Slav states across the Balkan peninsula...

Salisbury's motion was promptly endorsed by Bismarck on behalf of Germany, again in a written speech, which proved to the Turks, if proof were necessary, that the whole matter was prearranged. The French...immediately followed. The Italians were aghast and taken by surprise, but reduced to silence when Andrassy, turning to Corti pointedly, addressed to him the laconic phrase, 'Austria-Hungary, in occupying Bosnia, places herself upon the European standpoint. I have nothing to add.'...The solemn farce was completed by a speech

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., pp. 68-69.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., pp. 72-73.

¹⁰⁶ Rupp, pp. 525-527.

of Lord Beaconsfield, insisting that the motive of this decision was to 'prevent partition'....The unhappy Turks, taken utterly by surprise...begged for adjournment and argued that Turkey was quite able to restore and maintain order in Bosnia....This brought down Bismarck with sledge-hammer force upon them. 'Turkey', he said, 'already had to thank the Congress for the recovery of several lost provinces, and she must now accept the decisions of the Powers as a whole, not pick and choose between them. The agreement of the Powers is irrevocable, and the minutes remain open to receive the adhesion of Turkey.'¹⁰⁷

The high-handed and strong-arm tactics of host Otto von Bismarck thus cemented the agile diplomacy of Count Gulus Andrassy. The question of the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina, raised by the rebellion of those who tilled its soil, was resolved in Berlin by the iron will of Bismarck, stating: "The agreement of the Powers is irrevocable." These Powers had nothing to do with the province, and worse yet some of them xtended to that province--or at least the people in it--actual ill will. Andrassy, having come to power through the German-Hungarian coalition in the new Dual Monarchy, hated the Slavs for their impulse toward strength and unity.

Autonomy with the right to self-government that it represented was widely discussed during the entire crisis. It might easily have come about. Andrassy with Bismarck behind him killed that solution and took for Emperor Franz Joseph and for Hungary the province he had fought not to gain, so that Hungarians could retain their privileged place in the Empire. From the point of view of Austro-Hungarian policy, his policy and tactics had been brilliant. From the point of view of pure Hungarian partisans, seeking to keep additional Slavs out of the Empire, he had failed. From the point of view of the ragged struggle for Slav unity and progress toward self-government, the policy was disastrous. It is significant that, after military entry, Hungarians administered the provinces and that their overriding priority was to stir up Serb against Croat in the continued effort to create small, quarreling units and avoid a large unified South Slav state.

Partial Conclusions

As has been seen, the nature of international intervention in the Eastern Crisis of 1875-1878 tended to be impelled by either Hungarian interests or by the personal animosities of key players, especially the rivalry between Andrassy and Ignatiev. Because of the tenuous unity of the Dreikaisarbund, negotiations among the Powers tended to delay resolution of the actual crisis on the ground, and increasingly to become removed from it because of the national interests of the Great Powers. The Andrassy Note was delivered to the Porte but not implemented. The Berlin memo was not even delivered. Together these two attempts to impose a peace on the Ottomans represented either months of fruitless diplomacy. It may be argued that the original consular mission, attempting to learn about and grapple with the ills of Ottoman government on the ground, came closer to offering viable solutions to the problem than either the Andrassy Note or the Berlin Memo. Consuls called for direct intervention by the Powers to correct a chaotic situation. Because Andrassy did not want such an outcome, those calls went unheeded. Those calls came out of reactions to the inhuman brutality of Ottoman authorities--tactics learned and repeated by insurgents. Diplomats at higher levels tended to speak their own language and indulge in personal politics.

Also, if Vienna had indeed planned in early 1875 to find a pretext for occupying Bosnia Herzegovina, then when that pretext occurred Andrassy's Hungarian policies of neutrality,

¹⁰⁷ Seton-Watson, pp. 451-452.

support to the Ottomans and limited reforms contradicted the Dual Monarchy's original purpose. If they had understood Franz Joseph's spring visit in this light, which is quite likely, insurgents would have been confused and contradicted by Andrassy's later policies, especially as on the ground Rodic and Mollinary were enthusiastically encouraging them. Andrassy's policies and international prevarication probably extended the length of the crisis and caused greater suffering than necessary.

Ultimately German support helped Andrassy achieve his contingency plan. Bismarck had consistently advocated partition of the Balkans between his two allies. Andrassy knew Bismarck and what he stood for. He counted on Bismarck's support. That support came through at the key moment in Berlin. That support meant nothing positive for the South Slavs. The attitudes of Andrassy and Bismarck played a powerful role in the ultimate implementation of Andrassy's Plan B--occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina with an eye to keeping the South Slavs in small states, divided and quarreling among themselves. No thought of justice, self-government, or economic improvement motivated this plan. With these conclusions in mind, we may now turn to an analysis of the situation in Southeastern Europe a century later. Although many years had passed and circumstances had changed, odd similarities in the nature and dynamics of international intervention remained.

The 1990s First and Second Wars of Yugoslav Dissolution.

Deep-set economic and constitutional problems had plagued Yugoslavia after Tito's death in 1980. Slowly, the constitutional structure he had established, which balanced federal power against the powers of the six constituent republics and maintained a quota system among the nationalities in federal places of employment, was falling apart. The country had faced massive inflation and the displacement that many third world nations experienced under the IMF "restructuring" program.

By 1989 the relaxation of Soviet power made it possible for many Eastern European nations to hold their first multi-party elections since the 1940s. Elections in Yugoslavia brought out the tendencies that had been building during the 1980s: devolution of real political--and economic power--to Yugoslavia's constituent republics and a renewed ethnic/national--rather than Yugoslav-identification. Although rabid nationalism threatened to come to the political forefront as multiparty elections were held in other parts of Eastern Europe, nowhere else did the virulent kind of nationalism seen in Yugoslavia have such successes.

In Slovenia, those elections held in 1990 brought economic complaints against the Yugoslav government to the foreground. Generating the highest income and taxed proportionately, Slovenes resented having to support the poorer provinces of Yugoslavia. Talk of secession dominated political discourse. The anti-Communist, pro-independence coalition, headed by Milan Kucan, won the multiparty April elections. In July 1990, the Slovenian Parliament declared the "complete sovereignty" of the republic. On December 6, the Slovenian parliament voted to hold a plebiscite on independence and on December 23, the plebiscite returned a vote of 88.5 % for independence within six months.¹⁰⁸

What happened in Slovenia crucially affected Croatia. It followed suit, holding its first multi-party elections in late April and early May 1990, its referendum on independence in May 1991, and followed Slovenia by one day in its declaration of independence in June 1991. The elections brought the hard-line nationalist Franjo Tudjman to the Croatian presidency--without,

¹⁰⁸ Susan Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1995), p. 119, 132, 138.

however, a majority.¹⁰⁹ Tudjman instituted discriminatory, anti-Serb policies in government employment practices. Serbs in Croatia felt threatened.¹¹⁰

In the meantime, Serbia, too, had held its first multi-party elections. Slobodan Milosevic defeated Vuk Draskovic, by using the Kosovo and Vojvodina autonomy and anti-Muslim issues as lightning rods to voter fears.¹¹¹ Although democratic rhetoric was bandied about, exclusivistic nationalist propaganda produced more colorful and emotionally satisfying results. It also masked the deep-set economic problems that plagued the country.

By the Slovenian and Croatian declarations of independence, then, in the spring of 1991, the cauldron of Yugoslavia was steaming. Slovenian intentions were clear. Serbs had already revoked Kosovan and Vojvodinian autonomy and the self-rule that went with it. As a result Kosovars were agitating for complete independence. Nationalists in Serbia had given a political voice to disgruntlement with Titoist policies. Tito, they implied, had denigrated the Serbs, robbing them of the nationhood they had bequeathed to the first Yugoslavia in 1918 in the name of non-nationalist Communism.¹¹² The old Titoist system--the 1974 constitution--with its rotating presidency, decision by consensus, and quotas in federal positions--was weakened and dying. Republic-based politics and local, nationalistic power were replacing it.

The First Wars of Yugoslav Dissolution--the Slovenian and Croatian wars--mirrored this relocation of power militarily. Between mid-June 1991 and mid-January 1992, the federal government of Yugoslavia lost all semblance of existence and the governments of Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia solidified along exclusively ethnic lines. The Yugoslav multi-ethnic state, which had been a kind of microcosm of the Austro-Hungarian Empire albeit superior in its treatment of ethnic groups was crumbling. Outside intervention played a definitive role in the dissolution.

The Situation on the Ground: Summer and Fall 1991

When Slovenia declared independence on June 25, it moved to take over Yugoslav border posts with Austria, as an independent nation. Doing so elicited a response from the federal government in Belgrade, which sent Yugoslav Army troops to re-take the posts. Slovenes fought with determination for eleven days and, with European intervention, reached a compromise with the Yugoslav government on July 8, agreeing to put off further implementation of independence for three months and to staff the border posts "on behalf of federal authorities."¹¹³

In Croatia, the situation was more involved and complex. Pockets of Serb villages existed inside the Croatian borders. From 1990, Serbs in these areas had been resisting Tudjman's edicts.¹¹⁴ Fighting between Croat police and Serbs forming into militias resulted, especially in the area of Knin. When Croatia declared independence, these Serbs declared their independence from Croatia. During July, after the compromise with Slovenia, the Army--based naturally throughout Yugoslavia--was revamped. Dozens of mid-level officers were reassigned. It is believed at this time the Army, already dominated by ethnic Serbs, became predominantly a tool of ex-Communist Slobodan Milosevic's Serbian government, instead of a Yugoslav

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p.119. Tudjman's party, the Croatian Democratic Union, gained 41.5% of the vote.

¹¹⁰ Ibid. pp. 119, 120.

¹¹¹ Ibid., p. 121.

¹¹² Ibid., p. 71.

¹¹³ *The New York Times*, July 8, 1991, p. A1.

¹¹⁴ Woodward, p. 120; Laura Silber and Allan Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia* (London: Penguin Books, 1995), Chapter 7.

institution, although it was a gradual process and many officers were trapped in barracks guarded by Croatian National Guard as time went along.¹¹⁵

In August fighting heated up. Troop maneuvering in Vojvodina in July preceded troop crossings over the Danube and into eastern Slavonia where fighting became intense in Vukovar and Osijek. By mid-August Yugoslav planes were bombing Croatian strongholds, tanks were crossing the Sava River into Croatia, and troops moved into Okucani.¹¹⁶ Many parties were raising the question of who controlled the Army. The answer seemed to be it gave its own orders.¹¹⁷ Certainly Ante Markovic, Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, desperately attempting to carry through a federal program, possessed decreasing power.

Fighting intensified in September and October. Tudjman had called for general mobilization in late August.¹¹⁸ The Croatians, who were fighting a guerrilla war without real organization, did control supplies and power connected to Serb industry and Yugoslav barracks on Croatian soil, however. They used this to full advantage. On September 11 they shut off a major oil pipeline to Serbia, affecting refineries in Novi Sad and Pancevo.¹¹⁹ On September 14 they cut off water, food, and power to Army barracks under their control.¹²⁰ In retaliation, Army jets attacked the Croatian capital,¹²¹ increased assaults in Slavonia and along the Adriatic, cutting off the city of Split¹²² and beginning to move on Dubrovnik.¹²³

By the middle of October Army shells were hitting Old Dubrovnik and the city's population was cut off and under siege. By mid-November Dubrovnik citizens were in real danger of starvation. Some were rescued by one ferry allowed in to receive the sick and wounded. Supplies were allowed in but shelling was intense. The world was shocked to see the precious medieval city harmed.¹²⁴

On November 17, the city of Vukovar, under siege for weeks, fell to the Army. Those allowed in saw that nothing was left of the city.¹²⁵ Fighting continued around the village of Osijek. By this point, the Serb-controlled Army had taken about one third of Croatia and most of Serb occupied areas.

Intervention Number 1: The "Troika"

Introduced into this extremely complex and fragile situation was the European Community (EC), just in the process of reorganizing to create a unified foreign policy. As soon as independence was actually declared in Slovenia and the Yugoslav Army was sent to put it down, the EC began to respond to its first foreign policy challenge. Hearing of the Yugoslav advance, the ministers moved immediately to intervene. Gianni de Michelis, Foreign Minister of Italy, Jacques Poos, Foreign Minister of Luxemburg, and Hans van den Broek, Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, traveled to Belgrade to meet with Yugoslav authorities. Thinking they had been successful, they returned to Brussels. Two days later, realizing their lack of

¹¹⁵ *The New York Times*, July 16, p. A11.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, August 19, 1991, p. A3;

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, July 3, 1991, p. A1; July 4, 1991, p. A1.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, August 23, 1991, p. A3; August 28, 1991, p. A3.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, September 12, 1991, p. A3.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, September 15, 1991, p. A3.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, September 17, 1991, p. A3; September 18, 1991, p. A1.

¹²² *Ibid.*, September 22, p. A1, 18.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, September 19, p. A3.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, October 24, 1991, p. A7; October 25, 1991, p. A5; November 13, 1991, p. A12; November 14, 1991, p. A8; November 15, 1991, p. A3; November 16, 1991, p. A4.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, November 17, p. A15; November 21, 1991, p. A1, 18.

success, they returned. They insisted on three points: the Croats and Slovenes suspend implementation of independence for three months to allow time to work out the problems involved; the Army return to its barracks; and Stipe Mesic—a Croat who had been scheduled to take over as acting President of the rotating Yugoslav Presidency but blocked by the Serbs--be allowed to take his rightful position.¹²⁶

This Troika, as they were called, achieved what they sought on the island of Brioni when Slovenia and the Army reached a compromise.¹²⁷ Both sides agreed that border posts would be staffed by Slovenes "on behalf of federal authorities." On behalf of the Slovenes, Kucan agreed to a 3-month hiatus on implementation of independence. The Troika called for a team of European monitors to report independently on events in the field. This became the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), highly respected by all parties. A team was assigned to Slovenia as soon as the cease-fire was in place. It appeared that in Slovenia at least EC intervention had been a success.

The initial position taken by the EC--and for the most part followed by the United States--was that unity and territorial integrity should be maintained, that the parties should agree to a cease-fire, and the longer-term, political issues should take place under European oversight.¹²⁸ Slowly there was a shift of tactics as it became clear that the preponderance of aggressive action was being taken by Serbs, who, as the Army was reorganized, increasingly dominated the Yugoslav Presidency and took responsibility for the Army. To try to quell escalation of the conflict in Croatia, the EC, under advisement from the Troika, declared an arms embargo on Yugoslavia on July 5.¹²⁹ The ECMM returned invaluable information from the field beginning in late July.¹³⁰ Troika both hosted meetings for the Yugoslav leaders and visited Yugoslavia over the course of July and August. But their approach in the end was ad hoc and disjointed. The issues demanding long-term attention needed a more permanent and independent mechanism to treat the entangled problems of the now "former" Yugoslavia.¹³¹

Intervention Number 2: The Carrington Mission

The European Community Conference on Yugoslavia convened on September 7 in The Hague. The conference was chaired by the respected Lord Peter Carrington, former British Foreign Secretary responsible for Rwandan independence. Admired as a man of complete integrity, Carrington initially insisted on a Croatian cease-fire as a prelude to on-going discussions. He quickly changed his mind, however, and determined to proceed without a cease-fire, searching for peace on the ground at the same time as maintaining long-term talks on underlying issues. Eventually three working groups were established to treat economic, political, and ethnic/minority rights, respectively.¹³² These underlying deeper political issues were from the beginning masked by the crises brought by the fighting.

Carrington held weekly meetings with the Yugoslav principles through September. All of these meetings were fraught with the mutual recriminations and bickering that the Troika had faced.¹³³ Carrington seemed to be getting nowhere. Diplomats were "gloomy."

¹²⁶ James Gow, *Triumph of the Lack of Will* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 50-52; *The New York Times*, June 24, 1991, p. A4; July 4, 1991, p. A1; July 7, 1991, p. A1; July 8, 1991, p. A1.

¹²⁷ *The New York Times*, July 8, 1991, p. A1.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, June 26, 1991, p. A1; July 1, 1991, p. A6.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, July 6, p. A4.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, July 30, p. A3; August 1, 1991, p. A3; August 9, 1991, p. A5.

¹³¹ Gow, pp. 46-50.

¹³² Gow, p. 53; Woodward., p. 190.

¹³³ *The New York Times*, September 15, 1991, p. A3; September 20, 1991, p. A6.

On October 16, Carrington distributed the framework for a solution, *Arrangements for a General Settlement*, which envisioned for the future of Yugoslavia a free association of republics, with assurance of human rights to all groups and based on the principles of a market economy.¹³⁴ It detailed extensively the rights of Serbs outside of Serbia, but--rightfully--it put these rights in the perspective of minority groups throughout Yugoslavia, including Albanians in Kosovo. Milosevic rejected it--not once but twice.¹³⁵ Two observers have commented: "By extending to the Albanians the same rights that Milosevic was demanding for the Serbs of Croatia, the Carrington Plan struck at the very foundations of Milosevic's power base."¹³⁶ Thus minority rights foundered on Milosevic's tunnel vision and any solid treatment of the question was jettisoned in October 1991 but Carrington's proposals put minority rights solidly at the center of his plan. The General Settlement also stipulated that EC recognition of republics resulting from the breakup of Yugoslavia would be made after and in the context of political agreements resulting from the talks at the conference.

Intervention Number 3: The Vance Mission

Milosevic's rejections and the increased aggression on the ground hardened the international community's attitudes. By October 28, the EC was threatening sanctions on Yugoslavia.¹³⁷ On November 8, at an EC summit in Rome, it followed through.¹³⁸ Although Carrington continued to push the peace conference sessions as the belligerents' "best bet," the sessions were going so badly that European leaders threatened to end them.¹³⁹ At the same time the twelfth cease-fire was announced and broken.¹⁴⁰

As early as September, the EC introduced another approach. Frustrated by the diplomatic stalemate and intensified fighting, the EC, itself, began a discussion about military intervention. The Dutch Foreign Minister, van den Broek, proposed a lightly armed force of West European Union troops--a fledgling European security force more concept than reality--to be deployed to Yugoslavia to separate the warring parties. The idea was rejected by the English Foreign Minister, Douglas Hurd, as too dangerous and risky of endless involvement, and it sputtered out.¹⁴¹ But as an alternative to an exclusively European initiative, French President Francois Mitterand and German President Helmut Kohl, joined to suggest a UN mandate for a Yugoslav peacekeeping force.¹⁴² This was the beginning of UN involvement.

On September 25, the British, French, Belgian and Soviet representatives sponsored a resolution in the Security Council calling for an arms embargo. Two weeks later, outgoing UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar appointed former US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance as his special envoy to Yugoslavia.¹⁴³ Vance made it a point to cooperate and not compete with the Carrington Peace Conference. A division of labor was worked out, such that Vance concentrated on a cease-fire on the ground, while Carrington pursued the longer-term political issues.¹⁴⁴

¹³⁴ Silber and Little, pp. 192-193; *The New York Times*, October 19, 1991, p. A3.

¹³⁵ *The New York Times*, October 19, 1991, p. A3; October 26, 1991, p. A5.

¹³⁶ Silber and Little, p. 194.

¹³⁷ *The New York Times*, October 29, p. A10.

¹³⁸ Ibid., November 9, p. A1.

¹³⁹ Ibid., November 6, 1991, p. A16.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., November 6, 1991, p. A16; November 7, 1991, p. A10.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., September 17, 1991, p. A3; September 18, 1991, p. A7; September 20, 1991, p. A6.

¹⁴² Ibid., September 20, 1991, p. A6.

¹⁴³ Ibid., October 9, 1991, p. A5.

¹⁴⁴ Silber and Little, p. 197.

Vance was able to solve problems that had plagued everyone else. One of the most pressing was the problem of placement of outside troops. Serbs insisted on the front-line at the moment, and Croats on the original borders between the Yugoslav republics of Croatia and Serbia.¹⁴⁵ On November 23, Vance brokered the cease-fire that presaged success. Shuttling between the principles for five days, he could credibly discuss the idea of a UN peacekeeping force to follow a real cease-fire. Furthermore, he acknowledged it would be impossible to cover a 700-mile Croatian border, so he came up with the "inkblot" system. Place the peacekeepers in the tensest spots where they were most needed and ignore the border issue for now, he suggested.¹⁴⁶ This was the creative thinking and breakthrough that the situation needed.

Oddly, by this point, even the Serbs had called for peacekeepers to be assigned to Croatia.¹⁴⁷ Before this point, Serbs had fought such an idea, labeling it a foreign invasion. Milosovic and his allies calculated that they controlled most Serb territories in Croatia now, that peacekeepers would protect those Serbs, and that their presence would be a Serb advantage.¹⁴⁸

As it worked out, Vance was also able to arrange for a mechanism to avoid the return of hostile fire. A UN liaison team linking both sides would be on hand for consultation after enemy fire. Both sides would be obliged to consult with this team before any fire was returned. The peacekeepers also would cooperate completely with EC monitors already at the site of action so as to ensure continuity.¹⁴⁹ Although the November 23 cease-fire did not hold fully, due to other factors, the second one, following on December 31 did hold and the shooting in Croatia largely stopped. By January 5, the first advance group of 20 UN observers had been dispatched to prepare for the larger mission.¹⁵⁰ The momentum for this success had been building from at least November 23 onward.

German Intervention: Recognition

From the very beginning of the crisis, the Austrians, Germans, and Hungarians worked at cross-purposes with the rest of the European Community and the US. Austria had been surreptitiously involved in the sale of weapons to Slovenia and Croatia in 1990. Huge stocks of guns, withdrawn because of conventional force reduction, were sitting in stockpiles in Hungary and Czechoslovakia and subsequently sold through Austrian intermediaries to Slovenes and Croatians.¹⁵¹ In September 1990, the Hungarians had been embarrassed by a public scandal revealing their illegal sale of between 36,000 and 50,000 Kalashnikovs to Croats, while they publicly avowed support for Yugoslav integrity.¹⁵²

As the crisis broke out in late June 1991, the Austrians over-reacted. They called upon the European Conference of Security and Cooperation to activate rules calling for investigation into unusual troop movements.¹⁵³ On June 28, the Austrian defense minister ordered Austrian

¹⁴⁵ *The New York Times*, August 7, 1991, p. A3.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, November 24, 1991, p. A21.

¹⁴⁷ *The New York Times*, November 13, 1991, p. A12; November 14, 1991, p. A8. It was a startling reversal for the Serbs, so startling that newspapers did not catch it at first and it was lost at the end of reports.

¹⁴⁸ Silber and Little, p. 197. The authors quote Boris Jovic as saying at the end of November: "Slobodan and I after many conversations decided now was the time to get the UN troops into Croatia to protect the Serbs there. When Croatia would be recognized...the JNA would be regarded as a foreign army..."

¹⁴⁹ *The New York Times*, January 3, 1992, p. A1.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, January 6, 1992, p. A7.

¹⁵¹ Woodward, p. 137.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 149.

¹⁵³ *The New York Times*, June 28, 1991, p. A10.

jets into the air to show that Austria would defend her borders.¹⁵⁴ Two days later Austria refused to withdraw 5,000 troops from her borders. Troops, jet, and mines had been accumulated at a closed bridge at Gornja Radgona, which was under Yugoslav Army control. It was clear to the reporter observing this scene that "Austria sees any potential danger as coming from the Yugoslav forces, not from the Slovenian militia."¹⁵⁵

Tudjman had conducted "frequent consultations" in Bonn during 1990. The American Ambassador to Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmerman, has said the Germans were in *daily* contact with the Croats.¹⁵⁶ Also during 1990, Jorg Reismuller, publisher of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, had developed a journalistic campaign against the nationalism of Milosevic and for the independence of Croatia, which heavily influenced readers.¹⁵⁷

Within EC discussions, from the very beginning of the crisis, Germans argued for the right to self-determination in stark contrast to the EC initial stance for territorial integrity and continued unity.¹⁵⁸ As early as July 1, German Chancellor Kohl threatened to end German aid to Yugoslavia if troops moved against Slovenia and Croatia. "One does not hold a country together with tanks and violence," he told journalists.¹⁵⁹ On the same day, the chairman of the Christian Democratic Union, Kohl's party, announced in a radio interview: we have "no moral or political credibility" if we do not recognize Slovenia and Croatia.¹⁶⁰ The German Bundestag approved a resolution for recognition in early July.¹⁶¹ Clearly many portions of the population in Germany had already defined the situation in Yugoslavia long before it had actually solidified.

Germany's own situation explains this position. Helmut Kohl, who had campaigned actively in East Germany before unification, reaped the benefits of his work when the two Germanies reunited on October 3, 1990 and when he won 55% of the vote in the first united German elections two months later in December. These successes appear to have arisen from the Right, liberated from 40 years of Russian domination, and from the process of national self-determination. Germans, euphoric about reunion, generalized and projected this concept and applied it indiscriminately to Yugoslavia.¹⁶²

Additionally, the relationship between the Germans and Croatia was a close one economically. Germany was Yugoslavia's main trading partner. Half of all German investments were in Slovenia and Croatia.¹⁶³ Croats formed a large part of the *gastarbeiter* population in Germany; 700,000 lived there and 200,000 voted.¹⁶⁴ For the most part Croats voted in Germany's Liberal Party, part of the coalition formed by Kohl to win the 1990 elections. Many Germans traditionally took their holidays on the Adriatic coast.

Although their position occasionally softened a bit over the summer of 1991, Kohl and Genscher continued to argue to the EC the benefits of recognition. They pushed their arguments hard and continued to back Slovenia and Croatia. That they were having an effect was clear when Slovenia interpreted its compromise at Brioni as its first step toward recognition.¹⁶⁵ And

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., June 29, 1991, p. A4.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., July 1, 1992, p. A6.

¹⁵⁶ Woodward, p. 149 n. 6.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ *The New York Times*, June 29, 1991, p. A4.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., July 2, 1991, p. A8.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Woodward, p. 174.

¹⁶² Gale Stokes, *The Walls Came Tumbling Down* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 181-188. Woodward, p. 183.

¹⁶³ *The New York Times*, June 28, 1991, p. A10.

¹⁶⁴ Ibid., December 24, 1991, p. A3.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., July 9, 1991, p. A8.

confusing EC divisions were apparent when Tudjman said that EC mediators told him after the 3-month cooling off period--requested by the Troika in initial negotiations—that Croatia "would be free...in all respects. No interpretation of that is needed."¹⁶⁶ For their part, Serb fears about German aims, stemming from Hitler's invasion in 1941, rose to the surface and they over reacted. They claimed Germany was attempting to create a "chain of Catholic nations from Baltic to Adriatic."¹⁶⁷ Germans were aware of Serb sensibilities but pushed ahead anyway, oblivious of the impact.

Americans who thought about it might have concluded with Leslie Gelb:

Self-determination has its dark side--virulent, oppressive nationalisms. Stability and order have a positive side--a context for peaceful change...Separated republics could treat their minorities...still more unfairly. Minority rights are every bit as essential to democracy as majority rule.¹⁶⁸

In other words, there was no equation between breakaway republics, democracy, and tolerance of minorities. And there was no gross contrast between a monolithic Communist federal government and a democratic breakaway republic. Gelb cautioned his readers against an easy interpretation:

It is no accident...that every European state except Germany and Denmark opposes uncontained, unilateral self-determination in Yugoslavia. And to them all, stability and order are not abstractions. For them nasty nationalism and dictatorship loom in the shadows of self-determination unchecked by reason and history. Americans ought to hear out these European worries and appreciate our State Department's own agonies before we start leading the self-determination parade.¹⁶⁹

The issue of recognition came to a head in early December, after the EC had begun to take a stronger, more punitive stand toward the now Serbian rump Yugoslavia, after the Carrington Plan had been turned down by Milosevic, and while the first Vance brokered cease-fire was taking effect. On December 7, in contradiction to all German assurances they would adhere to EC unity, Kohl announced Germany would extend diplomatic recognition to Slovenia and Croatia unilaterally before Christmas.¹⁷⁰ The announcement came one day before the opening of the Maastricht conference, the major historical meeting to cement plans for further European unity. Germany had led the campaign to strengthen that unity.¹⁷¹ (It had been decided to leave the issue of recognition *off* the Maastricht agenda for fear that it would bog down the proceedings.) The announcement was also in direct contradiction to Carrington's *Arrangements for a General Settlement*, which stipulated that recognition would be extended to all the republics on the same basis *after* a general settlement for peace and the political relationships between the republics had been worked out.¹⁷²

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., July 2, 1991, p. A8.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid.

¹⁶⁸ Leslie Gelb, "The Dark Side of Disunity," in Ibid, July 10, 1991, p. A19.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid., December 8, 1991, p. A18.

¹⁷¹ Ibid., December 2, 1991, p. A3.

¹⁷² Woodward, p. 183

A fury of diplomatic protest ensued. France, Britain and the US all sent messages to the President of the EC, Hans van den Broek, arguing that recognition would help extreme nationalists like Tudjman and Milosevic and give encouragement to other small, breakaway states. Carrington also protested that the peace process would be torpedoed. He told journalists:

The only incentive we had to get anybody to agree to anything was the ultimate recognition of their independence. Otherwise there was no carrot. You just threw it away, just like that.¹⁷³

UN General Secretary Perez de Cuellar wrote to van den Broek expressing his own deep concern about the other question on everyone's minds:

I am deeply worried that any early, selective recognition would widen the present conflict and fuel an explosive situation especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and also Macedonia, indeed serious consequences could ensue for the entire Balkan region.¹⁷⁴

Carrington wrote likewise:

There is also a real danger, perhaps even a probability that Bosnia-Herzegovina would also ask for independence and recognition, which would be wholly unacceptable to the Serbs in that republic in which there are something like 100,000 JNA troops, some of whom had withdrawn there from Croatia. Milosevic has hinted that military action would take place there if Croatia and Slovenia were recognized. This might well be the spark that sets Bosnia-Herzegovina alight.¹⁷⁵

U.S. Under Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleberger, wrote in the same vein, to no avail.

At the EC Foreign Ministers meeting of December 15 and 16, Genscher and Kohl bulldozed others in a style fully reminiscent of Bismarck, pushing through their demand that not only Germany but also the EC extend recognition, promising unilateral recognition if the others did not comply.¹⁷⁶ Britain and France caved in and made a deal, acquiescing on recognition to retain unity and as a political swap, in return for German cooperation on monetary union, an issue left over from the Maastricht conference. The outcome was that the EC extended a highly accelerated timetable and process for *all* the Yugoslav republics, announcing that any republic which wished to apply for recognition from the EC could do so *within a week*. The applications would then be considered by the Badinter Arbitration Commission, set up as part of the EC Peace Conference to deal with legal matters. Badinter and his colleagues would review the republic's practices on human and minority rights among other things, and make a decision as to whether that republic qualified. The Commission would report by January 15.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷³ Silber and Little, p. 200.

¹⁷⁴ David Owen, *Balkan Odyssey* (London, Indigo Press, 1996) p. 376.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ The incident was alternatively labeled railroading, (Silber and Little, p. 17); cultural arrogance (Woodward, p. 186); a "disastrous political mistake" (Zimmerman, p. 178)

¹⁷⁷ Woodward, p. 184; *The New York Times*, December 17, 1991, p. A3. (Italics are the author's.)

As it turned out, the Commission, when it reported, recommended for recognition only Slovenia and Macedonia. By this time, however, it was far too late. Ignoring its own deadline, Germany announced unilateral recognition of Slovenia and Croatia on December 23. When Kohl announced the decision, he told reporters who asked about the timing that it was a "matter of interpretation."¹⁷⁸

Why did the Germans proceed in this manner? The German newspaper *Süddeutsche Zeitung* described the move as "a foreign policy reaction to domestic political pressure."¹⁷⁹ Susan Woodward has pointed out the political pressure in Germany, arguing that Genscher, in particular, was pressured from within his own Free Democratic party to seize the initiative in foreign policy from Kohl, who had claimed too much credit for the success of German unification. She says Genscher was caught in the middle between the political Right and Left, in a tug of war over Croatia.¹⁸⁰

Genscher has argued in his memoirs--and also did so at the time--that the Carrington negotiations had bogged down and were simply serving as an excuse for procrastination while Serbs gained territory on the battlefield. While this may be partly true--Milosevic certainly had stalled the talks with his early apparent acceptance of Carrington's terms and later rejection--Genscher in his memoirs ignored completely the success that Vance had made.

As has been shown, on November 23 Vance brokered a cease-fire that held for the most part. The ink-blot approach had solved the front-line/boundary problem. He was in the middle of working out the "liaison team" concept to prevent return fire. The Serbs had already joined the call for peacekeepers two weeks earlier--around November 13. The UN Security Council had voted on November 27 to send 10,000 troops when the cease-fire showed to be holding. Vance and Carrington, working together, were making clear progress.

Furthermore, on the ground the one advantage the Croats had possessed, surrounding and blockading the Army garrisons on Croatian territory, was being traded for peace, also by late November.¹⁸¹ And the Army, long criticized for not controlling the Serb paramilitaries, had begun to do so.¹⁸² This progress was occurring *in November*, well before the German announcement about unilateral recognition before Christmas, made on December 7. The timing of the main efforts for peace, then, undercuts Genscher's argument for recognition.

But there are additional relevant internal German issues to consider. Germany was, just in these months--especially October and November--besieged by racism. Skinheads were reacting violently to immigrants. At the end of September a wave of attacks in Hoyerswerda, Herford, and Leipzig by gangs seeking out Africans and Vietnamese had rocked German equilibrium.¹⁸³ In addition, Dennis Mahan, the American KKK leader from Oklahoma, visited Germany in October, held a demonstration and burned a cross outside Berlin. German kids wanted Mahon's advice on how to get rid of foreigners.¹⁸⁴

In mid-November--just as the Dubrovnik crisis provoked an EC-sponsored rescue ferry to carry out 1600 new refugees--a group of refugee Kurds in Germany, who had been living in Norderstadt were assigned to Griefswald, close to Noyerswerda, the center of neo-Nazi activity. After six weeks of desperately protesting their destination, the Kurds finally complied. When they moved into the hostel near Noyerswerda, they were--just as they had feared--attacked by

¹⁷⁸ *The New York Times*, December 24, 1991, p. A3.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁰ Woodward, p. 185.

¹⁸¹ *The New York Times*, November 25, 1991, p. A3.

¹⁸² *Ibid.*, November 29, 1991, p. A21

¹⁸³ *The New York Times*, October 1, 1991, p. A1,8.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, November 3, 1991, p. A16.

"young hooligans" who "tried to storm the building, threw rocks, bottles, and smashed windows and doors with baseball bats and axes." The hooligans turned on the police and injured fifteen when they arrived. The Kurds were moved back to a suburb of Hamburg, but officials later said they would be reassigned to other East German towns.¹⁸⁵

Kohl had brought the issue of immigration to the EC and requested a common policy. The problem was even discussed at the Maastricht meetings, but a decision was put off.¹⁸⁶ Germany was receiving three times the number of immigrants as France and Britain. Of the total in Germany, Yugoslavs made up the biggest single group. They had been invited as guest workers in the 1960s. Now the situation was quite different and Kohl and others were seeking either to change the German constitution or apply to the EC for new guidelines.¹⁸⁷ The refugee issue and racist German responses to it *must have* affected the attitudes of Kohl and Genscher regarding the war in Yugoslavia.

The issue had yet another twist. In mid-December, just as Kohl and Genscher were pushing through recognition, it was reported that several thousand Croats had recently left their homes in Germany to fight in Croatia and "might possibly continue the fighting from Germany with terrorist means if the conflict is not resolved." And:

The German police already have their hands full with Croat extremists. This week, the Bavarian police announced the latest in a series of arms seizures, arresting two Germans, two Croats, and two citizens of Arab states seeking to smuggle ground-to-air missiles, automatic weapons, and several million rounds of ammunition from Germany to Croatia.¹⁸⁸

Here, through Germany, was the evidence for reports that arms were pouring into

Yugoslavia. And the problem was not limited to Croats:

Earlier, the federal police announced...they had information indicating that Serb extremists planned terrorist attacks against German leaders. At the top of the hit list...was Mr. Genscher's name. This new threat recalls the 1970's, when Croat terrorists in Germany skirmished with agents of Tito's Communist Yugoslavia.¹⁸⁹

If one considers the Croat situation alone, it appears that Croat extremists, among the many Croat citizens of Germany, were attempting to intimidate the German government into moving toward a positive, Croatian solution to the Yugoslav problem. If this is true, then Croat extremists, pressuring German political leadership successfully, had also created pressure on the highest circles of EC leadership and won.

It is more difficult to say--other than greater security precautions--what the German government's reactions might have been to Serb terrorism. German authorities might have mitigated their position with regard to Serbia, but they did not. Instead Genscher in a public statement let it be known that personally he *detested* the Serb leadership.¹⁹⁰

¹⁸⁵ Ibid., November 17, 1991, p. A19.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid., November 1, 1991, p. A6.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., December 29, 1991, pp. A1,8.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., December 16, 1991, p. A12.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.,

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., December 4, p. A3. (Italics are the author's.)

With regard to the racists in the North, pressure was put on the German government from the opposite angle. Racist Germans wanted no more of any immigrants, Croats or others. In either case--Croats or German racist hoodlums--the message was: stop the flood of refugees seeking asylum. This seems to have provided the spark for the arbitrary, unilateral announcement in early December to recognize Croatia. Recognition, Genscher and Kohl had argued, would halt Serb aggression because it would obviate further calls for unity and territorial integrity. Months of negotiations had not worked. And recognition would internationalize the war, making it possible to send troops to Croatia without a Serb request.¹⁹¹ If the war threatened to spill over, through the refugee population, to Germany itself, by mid-December--just as the crucial EC meeting was taking place--Kohl and Genscher would have considered themselves doubly justified. They did not have time to wait any longer while Serbs procrastinated and prevaricated. Their own vital national interests were at stake. So they pushed through in Bismarckian fashion a decision that virtually all other involved international leaders had opposed. It was, Genscher announced, a "great victory for German foreign policy."¹⁹²

Both Genscher and Kohl argued that a combination of sanctions against Serbia and recognition of Slovenia and Croatia would work. And commentators in early January, seeing a newly compliant Milosevic and a Yugoslav Army that abided by the cease-fire, wondered if, after all, recognition had worked.¹⁹³

In Bosnia, however thoughts were otherwise. From September, reports had been issued about the Army disarming Muslims and Croats and arming Serbs.¹⁹⁴ Muslims and Serbs traded scathing denunciations of each other in the Bosnian parliament. In middle October, the Serbs walked out.¹⁹⁵ Troops liberated from Yugoslav garrisons in Croatia late in the year went to Bosnia.¹⁹⁶ EC monitors were very concerned. As has been seen, the prediction among those who knew was that recognition of Croatia and Slovenia would leave Bosnia--with a very mixed population--and Macedonia--with no alternative other than also to declare independence, for they believed they could not live in a predominantly Serb Yugoslavia. When and if a vote for independence occurred, the Serbs in Bosnia would behave much as the Serbs in Knin had, rebelling against the rebellion and forming their own statelet. Bosnian fighting would break out in full force. A bloodbath would ensue.

Predictions became reality. On December 20, the BiH presidency decided to apply for EC recognition.¹⁹⁷ A week later President Alija Izebetgovic faxed his government's application to the EC "reluctantly." At the same time, he urgently appealed for peacekeeping troops in the republic, as he had before.¹⁹⁸

Formal EC recognition of Croatia and Slovenia took place on January 15, 1992. On January 9, the Bosnian Serbs declared the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. By March 2, Sarajevo was heavily barricaded.¹⁹⁹ Last minute talks were held in Lisbon between Bosnian leaders and EC mediators. Nothing worked.²⁰⁰

In March the necessary referendum on independence was held. Serbs boycotted. On April 6, the EC recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina. In two days, Bijelina, Zvornik, and Foca along

¹⁹¹ Woodward, p. 183.

¹⁹² Woodward, p. 184.

¹⁹³ *The New York Times*, Editorial, "No War, No Peace, No Yugoslavia," January 4, 1991, p. A18.

¹⁹⁴ *The New York Times*, September 22, 1991, p. A18; December 12, 1991, p. A6.

¹⁹⁵ Silber and Little, p. 215.

¹⁹⁶ *The New York Times*, December 12, 1991, A6.

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, December 21, 1991, p. A3.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, December 28, 1991, p. A6.

¹⁹⁹ Silber and Little, p.205.

²⁰⁰ Gow, pp. 80-83.

the eastern border of Bosnia were being bombarded by Milosevic-backed Serb paramilitaries. In a month not a Muslim remained in these towns and Sarajevo was under siege. Bosnia was to undergo three years of dreadful war before the Holbrooke mission succeeded in establishing peace.

There is a direct line of causation here. Wrong-headed, strong-arm German intervention, interrupting the larger aims of the Carrington-Vance peace processes, brought on the ultimate dissolution of Yugoslavia. Premature recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, outside the parameters of a General Agreement, which was centered on human and minority rights, had forced Bosnia also to apply for recognition. Milosevic and his cronies took the opportunity to make nationalist propaganda of the move and war was on. There had been an alternative. It was shouldered aside by grossly insensitive German tactics, taken not in response to the situation in Yugoslavia but as a reaction to political and social developments within Germany.

Conclusions

A comparison between two episodes separated by 120 years of eventful history might lead to conclusions that are removed from the original contexts or too abstract. But, the above detailed review of events as they unfolded might serve as a counter-weight to those tendencies. In any case, undeniable similarities pop out from the evidence.

First, the situation on the ground in both cases invited intervention. In the late nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was falling apart and unable to manage its affairs. Whether or not Franz Joseph, Friedrich Beck and the military planners instigated the rebellion in 1875--and there is much evidence to indicate they did--a power vacuum existed on the other side of the Sava River and the temptation for power to move in and fill it was great, as has been seen. Yugoslavia, likewise, was not managing its affairs well by the end of the 1980s. It was not Russian control which caused Yugoslav problems, as it had been with other East European countries, but the dissolution of federal power, the lack of robust federal institutions, the lack of a method of transition to Tito's successors that made Yugoslavia weak at the center and allowed nationalist party bosses to try to assume control. Weakness caused intervention in both cases.

Second, both situations entailed external debt. The Ottomans owed many Western governments, as Yugoslavia did through the IMF and World Bank restructuring program. Debt elicited questions from England and France when tax revision was presented in the Andrassy Note, as well as in various Ottoman attempts at reform. Debt certainly played its part in the German reaction to war in Yugoslavia, which entailed a reduction in trade and economic intercourse with Slovenia and Croatia, two of Germany's main trading partners.

Third, the unity of the existing European system was severely threatened by both crises. The *Dreikaisarbund* fell apart as a result of the San Stefano Treaty and the Berlin Congress. Russians were humiliated and any semblance of trust was destroyed. EC unity, if not destroyed, was severely strained and trust was damaged by Germany's tactics in December 1991.

Fourth, in both cases, the very real underlying issue of minority rights was ignored in the overlay of secondary issues. Rebellion or war became the issue, to gain a cease-fire the primary goal of diplomats. The attempt to pacify insurgents with temporary expedients--admittedly better than their prior situation, if achievable--took the place of efforts to resolve the complex underlying questions. Governance issues, such as the federalism, which had concerned Franz Joseph just before Andrassy's appointment, receded in importance, as fighting grew intense, and as Great Power interests became at stake. In 1991, the constitutional reform issues which had been considered in the 1980s were pushed into the background as war and then atrocities gained the public's attention.

Fifth, the similarity in intent between the multi-national empire of Franz Joseph and the multi-ethnic state of Yugoslavia cannot be overlooked. Governance--political thinking about how best to structure social life among different peoples or thinking about human and minority rights--the kind of thinking that took place during and after the American Revolution--was lacking. Power politics, a juggling for first place, replaced it.

Sixth, the comparison that pops out most strikingly from evidence is the remarkable will of the Hungarian and German personalities in both crises and their effects on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Hungarian partisan Andrassy used all his energies throughout his tenure of office--1875 to 1878 was only the high point--to see that his negative intentions regarding the South Slavs were realized. In the process, he gained for the Dual Monarchy the province it had been coveting for twenty years--without, by the way, so much as a military maneuver. Andrassy's major opponent--the Russians--fought the war the Austrians did not want to fight. They won the war, but were denied all the fruits of victory they had claimed. The Austrians gained the fruit without fighting the war. This was a brilliant, dazzling success for the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Genscher and Kohl gave lip-service to EC unity but stiffened their spines in early December 1991. What moved them to announce unilateral recognition is still not completely clear, but from then on they were unbending in their insistence on recognition. The German will prevailed not only over the Serbs but also over Carrington, Vance, Perez de Cuellar, and leaders in the US, France and England as well. Kohl announced this as a major victory for German foreign policy.

In neither case were the above policy decisions reasonable, just, or benign for the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The natural impulse toward national unification which existed in central Europe in the mid-nineteenth century--and which was successfully concluded in Italy and Germany--was denied to the South Slavs ultimately by the very person responsible for German unification. In 1991 the constitutional issues of republican-federal authority had not been resolved. One of the central problems in those issues was minority rights. Carrington had attempted to deal with the issue. Significantly, the Badinter Committee, assigned to assess the applications of republics seeking recognition, failed to certify Croatia when it reported in January 1992. Genscher's response to this was a direct negation of the Committee's finding: "Croatia has achieved the highest imaginable standard of respect for minority rights."²⁰¹ The Germans, for internal reasons of their own, had created policy that broke up Yugoslavia and led inexorably to three years of war for Bosnia-Herzegovina, just as Andrassy with Bismarck behind him, for *his* own Hungarian reasons, created policy that kept the South Slavs apart, haggling and bickering among themselves until 1918. Whether saying makes it so or "saying" reflects reality is a matter of some conjecture for historians.

The German shadow hangs long over the province of Bosnia. In the 1870s, German strong arm tactics and Hungarian ill will elongated a war and obviated the possibility of autonomy or self-rule for the provinces. In the 1990s, German strong-arm tactics forced a European imprimatur on the dissolution of Yugoslavia, which despite its problems had brought the region's peoples together with an indigenous self-government that had elicited respect and recognition from the rest of the world. Now, as the international community faces the task of nation-building in the former republics of Yugoslavia, it is not inappropriate to point out the negative influence of these earlier interventions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and attempt to correct them.

²⁰¹ *The New York Times*, January 16, 1992, p. A10.

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