Intermarium

Volume 1, Number 2

 

Elite Fragmentation, Industry and the Prospects for Democracy in Slovakia: Insights from New Elite Theory ₁
by John Gould, Phd Candidate, Columbia University
Sona Szomolanyi, Chair, Department of Politics, Comenius University

Introduction

One of the most notable recent developments on the Slovak political scene is the consolidation of the five Slovak opposition parties into a single movement, the Slovak Democratic Coalition (SDC). A mechanical addition of the 1994 vote gives SDC parties a narrow plurality ahead of Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar's ruling coalition. ₂ Recent polling data is even more encouraging for SDC politicians. ₃ Despite such promising prospects for the next general election in 1998, SDC appears to be on the verge of squandering an wider opportunity: the chance to win a the battle for a more stable Slovak democracy. This is because SDC attitudes and electoral politics fail to address Slovakia's fundamental political problem—the political polarization of Slovak society and the disunity of its national elites.

According to new elite theory, a prerequisite of stable democracy is that elites agree on the parameters of a democratic political system. Where elites fail to unify behind the concept of democratic norms and procedures as "the only game in town," the viability of democratic institutions is endangered. As elite rifts widen, the trade off between stability and democratic rule increases. Some elites may prefer to attempt to rule by non-democratic means rather than forego their claims to power.

This, in a nutshell, may explain the ongoing fragility of Slovak democracy. Elites are broadly polarized into opposing polar constellations of diverse interests in which the fear of what will happen if the opposing pole captures or retains power in the next elections is the primary motive for political cooperation. Such conflict is more reminiscent of elite conflict in 17th century Britain or 19th century Netherlands, than today's Western democracies.

Were two monolithically unified polarized elite groups to form, one of the groups might prefer to rule or be ruled by force rather than willingly submit to the political control of the opposing camp. Many speculate that this is becoming an increasing likelihood especially as the SDC threatens victory in 1998.

Indeed, Slovakia's elites are separated by a fundamental gulf in values, beliefs and basic world view. Elite consensus might only be possible as painful experience makes if clear that the burden of continuing conflict eventually harms elites core values this realization would create space for historic elite compromise. This could be a long process. In Slovakia, for example, even the failure to enter into the first wave of negotiations to integration for Euro-Atlantic structures remains unlamented by most governing coalition elites.

But, this "common fear" is an unjust generalization. There are vested interests of the members of the ruling elite. The fear of the members of the ruling coalition who violated the rules of the game is different from the concern of the democratic politicians about the international isolation of the country. hile Slovakia's overall political structure is dominated by two nearly irreconcilable political camps, each camp has significant fissures and divisions. New elite theory, suggests that the fragmented organization of each of the two Slovak camps into cross-cutting interests offers some hope for Slovak democracy. SDC politicians may have to reconcile themselves to a long hard cultural battle in Slovakia. Yet, in the shorter term they can take steps to first, isolate extremists within the governing coalition camp, and second, achieve an understanding a tactical pact based on recognition of mutual interest with groups of opposing camp pragmatists. Hence, while a historic elite compromise may be impossible except with the benefit of enduring conflict—SDK can take steps to encourage an elite revolt within the ranks of the ruling coalition.

An elite revolt strategy would require a significant departure in Slovak electoral politics. Most importantly, opposition elites have an opportunity to compromise with a key pillar of the current ruling coalition—its industrial elite supporters. To take advantage of this, the SDC should reverse its current populist platform threatening a significant number of Slovak industrial elites with re-nationalization of their property and criminal charges following their victory. In exchange, opposition elites should gain industry's cooperation in establishing competitive conditions and the rule of law in Slovakia. If possible, such a tactical arrangement would go far towards creating space in which industrial elites could reconcile their material interests with the unencumbered practice of democratic rules and norms in Slovakia.

I. New Elite Theory:

New elite theory attempts to predict when new democracies will not endure. It argues that the cohesion of a state's elites helps determine the state's democratic prospects. New elite theorists focus on two variables, elite consensus and elite differentiation. Elites are defined as "people who are able, by virtue of their authoritative positions in powerful organizations and movements of whatever kind, to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially." ₄

Elite Consensus: Elite consensus measures elites by whether they share similar values and belief systems and their degree of access to crucial decision making. There are a number of potential cohesion patterns ranged between two oppositional ideal types: strongly unified elites and divided, or disunified elites. Strongly unified elite consensus has two identifying characteristics: First, strongly unified elites "share a largely tacit consensus about rules and codes of political conduct amounting to a restrained partisanship." ₅ Second, consensual elites retain, "relatively reliable and effective access to each other and the most central decision-makers." They understand that in the long run they will retain or achieve their core values. Politics is hence viewed as a positive-sum game which, if played by the rules, will lead to benefits in the long run—even in the face of set-backs at the polls. ₆

Weakly unified or disunified elites, by contrast, retain neither shared understandings on the rules of the game, nor consistent and reliable access to key decision makers. They are either "in" or "out" and their position determines whether their core values can be retained or achieved. For divided elites, politics is thus a zero-sum game—one that may often be waged as vigorously and brutally as a fire fight on a battlefield. Divided elites provide us with a stark reminder that democracy only works where the outcome doesn't matter enough to induce groups to use other means to attain their ends.

Between strong elite consensus and a high degree of elite division, we might add that there are a lot of mixed elite interest configurations possible. In this realm, we expect to see the range of outcomes typical of mixed motive games and oligopolistic behavior, including temporary alliances, balances of power and logrolling of interests at the expense of the rest of society. ₇

Elite Differentiation: John Higley and Jan Pakulski argue that in addition to looking at the degree of consensual unity among elites, it is also useful to examine how elites are differentiated. A "widely differentiated" elite is "less anchored in classes, more numerous, more socially heterogeneous and functionally specialized, and more autonomous from each other." Wide elite differentiation can be loosely conceptualized as an elite counterpart to societal pluralism; "it prevents the domination of any one group and ensures a democratic competition for mass support." Wide elite differentiation develops over time through industrialization and political modernization.

"Narrow elite differentiation," by contrast, is more typical of a pre-industrial society. Narrowly differentiated elites are typified by an arrangement of elites in several homogeneous groupings on the basis of narrow class or state-bureaucratic interests. Due to the limited and potentially zero-sum conflict of interests between narrow elite groupings, narrow elite configurations are characterized by high conflict in which warring groups tend "to defend or challenge the status quo." ₈

Put together, elite consensus and elite differentiation provide us with a convenient constellation of regime predictions provided in the chart below. Strong elite unity and wide elite differentiation are the ideal conditions for stable democracies. As elite consensus deteriorates towards disunity, the prospects for democracy decline. A wide elite configuration can sustain a democratic regime—even when elite beliefs in the democratic rules of the game are not shared and some elites do not have access to decision making. But because some elite are both excluded and possess values that remain irreconcilable with other elite values, the legitimacy of the democratic process is consistently called into question as the core values of certain elite groups are challenged by losing elections. Under these conditions, democracy may only persist due to some balance of power or log rolling of interests among competing elite groupings.

As elite differentiation narrows, the opportunities for cross-cutting cleavages, log-rolling and balances of power declines. The elite configuration becomes characterized by two mutually antagonistic forces—either of which can only rule or be ruled by force. The result, potentially, is an authoritarian regime. Finally, should narrow differentiation correspond with elite unity—we would expect an ideologically or theologically motivated partocratic regime. In this configuration, power holding elite's are unified into one hegemonic faction or political party while all other factions conform to the single, explicit ideology of that dominant party or are suppressed or eliminated through extreme use of force.

Elite Configurations and Associated Regime Types ₉

		Elite Unity
		Stronger	Weaker
Elite Differentiation	Narrower	Consensual Elite (stable democracy)	Fragmented Elite (unstable democracy)
	Narrower	Ideological elite (partocratic regime)	Divided Elite (authoritarian regime)

Democratic Consolidation: The use of elite configuration to explain democratic outcomes is not without its problems. Perhaps most troublesome is that a definition of consensually unified elites is very close to a definition of the broader conception of democratic consolidation. According to Przeworski, consolidation occurs "when [democracy] becomes self-enforcing, that is, when all the relevant political forces find it best to continue to submit their interests and values to the uncertain interplay of the institutions." ₁₀ This is virtually indistinguishable from Burton and Higley's definition of strong elite unity, given above, as, "...a largely tacit consensus about the rules and codes of political conduct." Thus, while the concepts of elite consensus and democratic consolidation are ultimately different concepts, democratic consolidation presupposes some degree of elite consensus. Using elite configuration to explain democratic consolidation courts tautology.

A focus on elite configuration, however, remains useful in helping us to explain where democratic institutions will develop or will not develop and where they endure or deteriorate. It thus provides us with an improved understanding of why democratic consolidation remains an open ended and complicated process. The concept can be seen as an important elaboration of the democratic consolidation literature—one that will even help us to better operationalize an elusive concept.

Elite Pacts: According to scholars of the new elite framework, until a settlement between elites is achieved either by a one-time historic compromise or through gradual transformation, a stable democracy is unlikely. In other words, divided or fragmented elites must struggle over and settle on procedural consensus before prospects for a sustainable democracy can improve.

The study of transitions from totalitarian regimes towards democratic consolidated regimes again, often presuppose some progress towards stronger unified elite consensus—generally in the form of an elite pact. O'Donnell and Schmitter define a pact as "an explicit, but not always publicly explicated or justified, agreement among a select set of actors which seeks to define (or better, to redefine) rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the vital interests' of those entering into it." ₁₁ Whether it is due to a decline in the regime's ability to control society by force, or a broader inter-elite realization that continued violence serves nobody's core interests, the elite pact is one of the crucial stages of many successful democratization events. An elite pact seeks to reconcile the core values of society's contending factions with changed political institutions.

These pacts frequently have some undemocratic elements: an amnesty for members of the old regime and its security forces, for example, or a twist in the rules of the game that guarantees one elite group's core values. But undemocratic compromises will rest side by side with elite agreement by key parties to abide by the outcomes of the political framework that is set up. Most importantly, "At the core of the pact, lies a negotiated compromise under which actors agree to forgo or under-utilize their capacity to harm each other by extending guarantees not to threaten each others' corporate autonomies or vital interests." ₁₂ In short, an elite pact is a significant step towards unified elite consensus. It does not necessarily mean that actual elite consensus has been achieved, however. Elites can come to a tactical compromise out of mutual self interest without reconciling their fundamental values and beliefs. Pacts might also deprive former ruling elites of access to decision making while guaranteeing—-at least for the time being the sanctity of their core values. Pacts should thus be seen as short term tactical agreements among elites that the emerging rules of the game will not endanger the core values of the declining regime's elites.

Indeed, in contrast to elite consensus, which can take decades of conflict to develop, elite pacts can frequently and quickly become irrelevant. Conditions following the transition can change the balance of power between elite groups. In Europe's former communist states, liberalization of freedoms of speech and the press often allowed national elites to rise to prominence by using the new freedoms to pursue nationalist and populist mobilization strategies. ₁₃ The introduction of privatization and private property also creates room for entrepreneurs and industrialists to amass wealth and influence. These groups might soon find that the democratic institutions established in the transition no longer serve their immediate purposes—creating tensions with civic-oriented elites and former nomenclature who have established a stake in the new political context. In addition, much of the theoretical literature and experience in transitions from centrally planned or mixed-market economies towards markets expects elite consensus to deteriorate as the pain of transition reforms endures and deepens. ₁₄

Nor are elite pacts necessarily crucial factors in the democratic development of a country in transition. First, it is possible that a transformation towards democracy will be so swift that the old regime is dispensed with without any need for a pact. Or, the pact may soon become irrelevant as democratic institutions and the elite groups that support them become stronger. These groups can then quickly brush aside the guarantees won by the dominant elites of the previous regime: holding members of the old regime responsible for atrocities, for example; or eliminating a parliamentary stipulation that a certain number of seats will go to the ruling party of the old regime. ₁₅ It is entirely possible therefore, that a democratic transition can occur without an elite pact, or, as an the transition wears on, an initial elite pact may deteriorate as new elites emerge that challenge the immediate post-revolution consensus on procedures. Elite pacts, therefore, might be helpful in building elite unity, but they are unlikely to be a sufficient condition for reaching value consensus.

Our Argument: This essay argues that weakening elite consensus in Slovakia is undermining the viability of its nascent democratic institutions. Current coalition elites possess basic values that are frequently not served by the unfettered operation of democratic institutions. They thus frequently redefine or simply ignore the rules of the game as they were institutionalized following the revolution and have systematically sought to deny opposition elites access to decision making. At the same time, Slovakia retains wide elite differentiation. Elite theory thus suggests several strategies that democratically oriented elites in Slovakia could take right now to ensure the stability and endurance of the democratic regime.

Part II explores the historical origins of elite disunity in Slovakia. It argues that abrupt rapid Soviet-style industrialization under socialism created an electorate sympathetic to paternal approaches to the economy and failed to eliminate pre-modern behavior and attitudinal patterns traditionalism as a powerful force in Slovak political culture. It also resulted in a poorly rooted civic political culture in the post-1989 period and weak support for anti-communism. Against this background, contemporary elite disunity in Slovakia reflects almost 80 years of bitterness and disagreement over the issue of Slovakia statehood and national identity and the divisive, exclusionary, mobilization strategies of national-populists, who attempt to separate and isolate "Czechoslovak" and "Hungarian" citizens from "Slovak" political life.

Part III locates Slovakia's elites according to two variables, elite differentiation and elite unity, that will allow us to assess Slovakia's democratic prospects. We find that the bitter divide over appropriate forms of Slovak independence as well as Meciar's populism are reflected in a high degree of disunity among Slovak elites. This is demonstrated by two starkly different world views and interpretations about what ails Slovakia today. Indeed, elite disunity leads to speculation that Slovak ruling coalition elites may be willing to weaken or subvert democracy rather than submit to rule by opposition elites should they appear likely to lose the upcoming general election.

Yet Slovak elites are not divided into two monolithic blocs—one of which will only submit to being ruled by force. Rather, Slovak elites are widely differentiated. The situation is perhaps best described as "fragmented polarization." Hence while there are roughly two polarized camps, each camp retains numerous cross-cutting interests providing an opportunity for pacts between segments of either side to create a new common ground based on short term material interests.

Part IV explores healing strategies for the Slovak elite divide. It looks at the material interests of Slovak industry—heretofore primarily supporters of the Meciar camp—and finds that there are strong self-interested reasons for industry to cast its lot in with the current opposition.

Part V suggests a short term, tactical elite pact between opposition groups and Slovak industrialists; one in which the current democratic opposition promises Meciar's industrial elites amnesty for past privatization wrongs in exchange for political support in the 1998 election and an agreement to submit to a competitive economic environment free of party-state-industry clientalism.

II. The Origins of Societal Polarization and Elite Fragmentation in Slovakia:

One of the ironies of democratic transitions is that under the wrong conditions, democratic institutions enable anti-democratic forces to rise to power through legitimate electoral means. Since 1991, Slovak society has twice returned Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar to power. Many independent observers claim that Meciar frequently subordinates democratic norms and procedures in order to maintain his political position while his consistent waging of power politics expands the elite disunity. Yet his support in society has remained significant. This section examines the origins of this "Meciar Phenomenon." It first looks at the Soviet-Czechoslovak, centrally planned transformation of Slovak society and assesses its effects on the Slovak electorate. The socialist-era transformation of Slovakia was externally imposed and done in a way that reinforced traditional behavioral attitudes rather than modernity. This, we add, has produced a society with large segments that are prone to populism and paternalism providing fertile soil for the mobilization strategies of national-populist politicians, like Meciar, to take root.

Second, this section looks at the formative experiences of contemporary Slovak elites. We find that Slovak success in achieving some national goals during Prague Spring led to less eltie alienation in the period after. Purges following the Prague Spring were neither as extensive nor punitive as in the Czech Lands. At the same time, Slovak elites retained a more positive attitude towards the constructive possibilities of political life to fulfill national and personal professional goals. The result was greater popular acceptance of the post 1968 regime, a weaker civic dissident movement, greater tolerance of the participation of former communists in the post November 1989 regime, and a muted anticommunist drive. This, in turn allowed Meciar to draw much of his support base from former communist elites.

Finally, this section looks at the immediate causes of contemporary elite disunity in the problem of Slovak statehood. It reviews acrimonious debate on the issue between "autonomists" and "Czechoslovaks" since the First Czechoslovak Republic (1918-1938), and demonstrates how the final victory of autonomists in 1992 is used as a political weapon to informally attempt exclude Czechoslovaks and ethnic Hungarians from having an impact in the future direction of the state.

The Origins of Contemporary Slovak Society: Slovak development over the past century has been shaped by its location at the periphery of Central Europe: first within the framework of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire (prior to 1918), then within the First Czechoslovak Republic and finally within the Soviet Bloc (1948-1989) closely connected to the timing and pace of industrialization. Hence the modernization of Slovakia has been shaped by external economic and political actors. Liberal civic principles, for example, were first imposed on Slovakia at the behest of reform elements in Budapest. Czech reformers later attempted something similar. In both cases, Slovaks largely refused liberal principles on the ground of the nationality of their advocates who were perceived as "alien" or foreign. Indeed, Hungarian revolutionary liberals lacked any understanding of the national and cultural emancipation demands of the Slovaks and, at times, later Czech administrators were perhaps equally insensitive. While the Soviets obviously dispensed with liberalism, they brought "socialist industrialization" to Slovakia, imposing it, in the early-mid 1950s, over the literally dead or imprisoned bodies of much of Slovakia's national-communist elite.

In addition to being alien in origin, Slovakia's transformation has been rapid. While the Czech lands of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia were ranked among the world's 15 richest regions globally in GNP per capita, ₁₆ Slovakia remained, in 1938, "little more than an agrarian appendage of the Czech lands, supplying it with raw materials." In 1930, for example, 59.8 percent of Slovaks, compared to 26.9 percent of Czechs made their living in agrarian pursuits. Worse, Slovak peasants remained less productive: On average, a four-hectare farm in the Czech lands out-produced a Slovak farm of over ten hectares. ₁₇

Socialist policies of equalization preferentially developed the Slovak economy after 1948. ₁₈ By 1990, standards of living as indicated by a number of objective indicators—from numbers of televisions per household to numbers of graduates with higher levels of education—reflected growing economic equality between the two regions. In 1985, industrial production as a share of total economic activity was approaching the proportionate levels of the Czech Lands, leading the federal government to proclaim that equalization had been reached in most areas. Industrial workers had comprised 43.8 percent of the work force in Slovakia compared to the Czech lands' 47.2 percent. Agricultural laborers made up a mere 12.2 percent of the work force—down from the 1948 figure of 60.6 percent. By contrast, the drop in the Czech lands was from 33.1 percent to 9.4 percent. ₁₉

The speed and abruptness of industrialization has rendered Slovak society highly prone to paternalism and populism:

Populism: Socialist industrialization was the process of modernization in technological terms only. Unlike in the Czech lands where traditional society was gradually transformed in conjunction with gradual capital accumulation, the Soviet type of modernization was imposed on society. ₂₀ Rapid, externally imposed technological modernization left society reeling in response. The effect of imposed industrialization and partial urbanization was not the breakdown of traditional elements of society but the reinforcement of them. As a result, despite rapid industrialization and modernization under socialism, Slovakia remains heavily influenced by the countryside, its traditions, and its mentality. Thus, although Slovakia is now industrialized, a corresponding shift in behavioral patterns towards "modernity" has occurred less rapidly. ₂₁ The Slovak electorate retains a significant component of "traditionalism" that is mostly concentrated in the elderly, rural dwellers and the less educated. ₂₂

The uneven development of a relatively industrialized and urbanized country on the one hand, and reinforced pre-modern political culture on the other, provides a favorable environment for charismatic and populist politicians. This partly explains why the ruling elite of the independent Slovak Republic was composed of the nationalist-populist politicians. Nor is it surprising that the current ruling coalition focused around Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar finds its greatest and most steadfast support in Slovakia's "socially conservative rural setting," while support for opposition parties comes more frequently from metropolitan areas. ₂₃

Paternalism: Despite the many bottlenecks and inefficiencies of Czechoslovak central planning, for the majority of Slovaks, communist policies of equalization produced a generation whose only economic experience was of broad, if restrained, upward mobility. The 1970s brought the peak of efforts to equalize levels of development across the two republics. For Slovak managers and bureaucrats, this meant unprecedented growth and opportunities. Many of today's industrial leaders in Slovakia got their first jobs and promotions during this period. ₂₄ For older Slovaks as well, most of whom had grown up on poor, under-productive farms under comparatively primitive conditions, as well as for recent graduates, this was also period of unparalleled upward mobility. Not surprisingly perhaps, the period of "normalization" from 1968 to 1989, was perceived by a majority of Slovaks interviewed in at least one 1990 poll as "the most successful and happiest periods in their nation's history." ₂₅

Slovakia's intensive period of industrialization and urbanization familiarized Slovaks with a strong state role in the economy. This may be reflected in the present day in the form of greater levels of support for state intervention in the administration of the economy than is found in the Czech Lands. ₂₆ According to polls taken in 1990—before the pain of transition took the form of unprecedented unemployment—state paternalism remained an important concept in Slovak attitudes: a much greater proportion of Slovaks (47 percent) preferred continued state employment guarantees (compared to 32 percent in the Czech lands). 34 percent of Slovaks (vs nine percent of Czechs) agreed that unemployment should be avoided even if it would hinder or require the suspension of economic reform. Radical steps towards reform were similarly somewhat less popular in Slovakia that in the Czech lands (51 vs. 60 percent approval). Ironically, these views were held in spite of the broad rejection of the old regime demonstrated by popular Slovak support for the Velvet Revolution. ₂₇ They also implied that Slovaks would be more reluctant to undergo the costs of economic transformation based on the principle of "de-etatization" than the Czechs.

Slovak Elite Character: Differences between Czech and Slovak elite character are often striking. The divergence dates back to the First Republic (1918-1938) and even before, but emerges in the current generation of leadership in their reaction to the 1968 Prague Spring movement. Czech Prague Spring reformers sought primarily to gain greater political and economic liberties within a socialist or western-style social democratic framework. The goals of Slovak reformers were not as clear cut.

Given the rapid development of the Slovak economy under policies of equalization, the need for economic revitalization in Slovakia was not as pressing. Slovak communist reformers saw themselves first and foremost as Slovak "patriots." Their primary aim was "national self-assertion" rather than economic reform and democratization. ₂₈ While some Slovaks shared the aims of Czech reformers, a significant portion of Slovak Prague Spring participants fell into the Czech hard liner (limited or anti-reform) camp on economic issues. One apparent fear of Slovaks was that "Czech-led" economic reforms would restore priority to Czech industry in planning and investment and thus set back nascent Slovak industrialization. On economic issues, therefore, many Slovak reformers were decidedly reactionary and status quo. ₂₉

This cleared the way for a unique Slovak drive to establish autonomy within a federative Czech and Slovak republic. Czech reformers challenged the monopoly of the Communist Party on political life. They sought democratic reforms above all else—trusting that additional reforms would come soon thereafter. Slovak reformers, by contrast, rejected the formula of "democracy first" and focused their challenge more on the location of party power and the demand for "symmetry" in representation in Czechoslovak governing bodies. ₃₀

By its very demands, the Slovak reform movement was less threatening to the communist regime. Given the example of the Soviet Union, there was certainly nothing contradictory between federal forms of government and Leninist principles. ₃₁ Unlike in the early 1950s, hard line Soviet and Czechoslovak Communists were willing to accept that one could be both a good communist and a Slovak nationalist simultaneously—particularly if granting Slovaks some concessions would undermine their support of the fundamental challenges to one-party rule made by their Czech brethren. As one analyst has noted, their "need to consolidate Slovak commitment in crisis was paramount." ₃₂

With Soviet approval, hard liners thus granted Slovaks their demand for a federation. They had outgoing General Secretary of the Communist Party Alexander Dubcek sign the Agreement on Federation in Bratislava in October 1968. On paper, at least, the agreement went far towards granting many of the Slovak reformers' demands.

When Dubcek was finally ousted in April 1969 ₃₃ , pro-Soviet hard liners replaced him with Gustav Husak, whose Slovak credentials had been well established by a lengthy prison sentence in the 1950's for "nationalist deviation." During the Prague Spring, Husak had been a leading Slovak advocate of federalization and was, ironically, counted amongst the ranks of Prague Spring reformers. After the invasion, Husak's regime limited the extent and harshness of the post-invasion purge in Slovakia. Many Slovaks who had participated in the reform movement were allowed back into party ranks provided they signed a document approving the Warsaw Pact's "international assistance." Moreover, the apparent gains for the Slovak nation made signing such a humiliating document all the more easy: Slovaks benefited from the Husak regime's decision to pursue and even intensify policies of "equalization"—in effect continuing the redistribution of dwindling Czech prosperity to Slovakia. ₃₄

While the KSC Party bodies and ministries continued to be governed on the principles of democratic centralism and national asymmetry, Husak pursued an aggressive Slovak affirmative action program at top party levels. Henceforth, Slovaks would hold between 30 and 40 percent of all cabinet posts. ₃₅

Czech '68 reformers, by contrast, were thoroughly purged—forced into exile, or allowed only to work as menial laborers. Moreover, while many could have and did sign documents "approving" of the Soviet invasion, they would for the most part, not be readmitted into political life or even the ranks of the Communist Party.

Thus, the line for naked, opportunistic collaboration with a patently disliked regime was clearly drawn in the Czech lands. In Slovakia, it was blurred. It was therefore more easily crossed. This was by no means insignificant. Dissidents in Slovakia thereafter never had the clear, unchallenged moral authority of Czech dissidents. Indeed, Husak and other Slovak communists rationalized collaboration with the Soviet invaders as an "act of patriotism" that served the interests of the Slovak nation. ₃₆ Husak took this tact in his persecution of Czech Prague Spring reformers—many of whom were charged with not being sufficiently attentive to Slovak concerns or including Slovaks in reform planning. ₃₇

In Slovakia, secular-civic activism against the regime was muted after 1970. Concessions on federalism; greater top-level representation; moderated purges; and a continuation of the upward mobility and improved standards of living that accompanied ongoing policies of equalization, combined to produce a greater tolerance of the status quo in Slovakia. After 1989, it also meant that those with a communist nomenclatura background retained some status.

In marked contrast to the Czech lands, most dissident activity in Slovakia centered around freedom of religious expression rather than a fight for civic and political rights. Of only seven Slovak trials involving secular dissidence during normalization, only two involved ethnic Slovaks. This "Slovak phenomenon" reached far into Slovakia's intellectual elite where even "dissident" writers and artists could find accommodation with the post-68 regime if they focused their attentions on achieving national expression and goals rather than democracy. Some Slovak's even apparently joined the Communist Party in the 1970's, in an explicit effort to, "keep the spirit of reform alive." ₃₈ Moreover, as young Slovak intellectuals grew into political life in the 1970s, they too, found conditions more accommodating that in the Czech lands, where intellectual life continued to be shaped by the exile or repression of leading thinkers. ₃₉ By and large, the democratic agenda pursued by Prague Spring reformers and revitalized by the Charter 77 affirmation of the principles of Helsinki, had a smaller impact on political and intellectual life in Slovakia than it did in the Czech Lands. ₄₀

In sum, Slovakia's contemporary ruling elite were socialized as willing participants in the middle and lower levels of the communist system, not dissenters. While this is also true of a majority of contemporary Czech ruling elite, Slovakia's communist era produced only a weak, and largely marginalized, civic dissident movement that by 1989 lacked the ability to provide the strong national leadership of its Czech counterparts. Civic-dissident leadership in Public Against Violence, the Slovak counterpart to Civic Forum was limited to Miroslav Kusy and less than a handful of others. Not only did these individuals have no desire to retain political office, they found they needed to cooperate closely with moderate, reformist elements of the former communist Slovak nomenclatura to run the country. Fomer Communist Marian Calfa became Federal Prime Minister, for example. Meciar was not nomenclatura, but neither had he emerged from the civic dissident background of the VPN leadership. Indeed, his background until 1990 was notable for its complete lack of political activism.

Elites and the Problem of Slovak Statehood: Populism and paternalism, and the lack of an elite civic dissident movement character enabled but do not determine Slovakia's contemporary elite configuration. While Slovakia possesses strong elements of traditionalism and paternalism. The same can be said of Poland or Hungary. ₄₁ And while civic political culture has never taken deep roots in Slovakia, this is again not distinctly different from Slovakia's neighbors. The prevalence of populist beliefs and attitudes in those countries is about the same. ₄₂ The exception is the Czechs who arguably developed perhaps the most robust civil society in the region prior to World War II. This was undermined by socialism, yet even following the Velvet Revolution, Czechs remained less traditionalist and paternalist than their Slovak neighbors, although there remained significant elements of each in Czech society. ₄₃

A comparison of Slovakia with its Central European neighbors indicates that the country possesses the least robust accumulation of favorable conditions for democratic consolidation. ₄₄ Slovakia has a higher degree of ethnic heterogeneity and an absence of a sustained, historical experience with statehood. ₄₅ Historically there has never been elite unity in Slovakia. For Slovak elites the debate on the national issue has been a fundamental divide since the first Czechoslovak Republic (1918-1938), beginning with debates between two Slovak elite groupings, the autonomists' on the one hand and Czechoslovaks' on the other. Under the early First Republic, Slovak autonomists were politically represented by Andrej Hlinka and the People's Party. They fought against Czech-centrism and Prague's drive to create a "Czechoslovak" nation. Czechoslovaks, many of whom were Slovak, argued against Slovak autonomy on political and cultural grounds. They emphasized the kinship and unity of Czech and Slovak cultures as a means of unifying the Slavic peoples in the face of threat of irredentist Hungarian and later Germanic claims. Czechoslovaks feared that greater Slovak autonomy would also mean greater Hungarian and Germanic autonomy and eventual dissolution of the state. ₄₆

There was also a significant paternalistic cultural component to the Czechoslovak argument. Czechoslovaks associated coexistence with the Czechs with more rapid "progress" that would make up for centuries of neglect under Hungarian rule. Advocates of Slovak autonomy emphasized the need for cultural isolation of the Catholic, traditional, and anti-liberal Slovak culture from the "Western-liberal, anti-religious" oriented Czechs. ₄₇

Following World War II, autonomist strains in the Slovak Communist Party were harshly repressed under Klement Gottwald in the early-mid 1950s, but as we have seen, they reemerged in the form of a Slovak demand for federalization (rather than democratization) in the time of the Prague Spring. Autonomy again became the most crucial issue following the Velvet Revolution particularly after Czechoslovak Federal Minister of Finance, Vaclav Klaus introduced an inflexible program of radical shock therapy that generated national-populist complaints about "alien" solutions to Slovakia's problems once again being imposed from without.

In 1991, Meciar began to form a splinter political movement within VPN around old Slovak resentments against "prago-centrism" (the administration of Slovakia from Prague). Meciar was particularly good at creating and playing on fears and resentments that resonated with the semi-modernized segments of the Slovak electorate. He was aided by continuing insensitivity of Czech leadership to Slovak perceptions and the lack of a relatively sophisticated Slovak civil society. The radical economic reforms of Klaus and the moral guidence of President Vaclav Havel came under particular attack. Klaus's reforms, Slovak leaders stated or implied, were "a Czech invention, created in the Czech environment for Czech conditions, and most importantly, inappropriate for Slovakia." ₄₈ Havel was reviled for, among other things, taking a moral stand against the export of weaponry (as much as 65 percent of Czechoslovak industrial defense production was in Slovakia). ₄₉ Following and then surpassing the lead of former religious dissident and Christian Democratic Movement leader Jan Carnogursky, Meciar implied that given local control over the organs of government, the transition would go smoother in Slovakia.

Anti-communism, which played an important role in placing former communist nomenclatura in the Czech Lands on the defensive, had a less important role in Slovakia. ₅₀ Meciar took a public stand against lustration (meaning, literally "purification") of Slovak officials with communist-era secret service ties and was supported in that stand by most Slovak elites. This weak anticommunist stand allowed industrial nomenclatura to begin to lobby aggressively for an active sectoral industrial policy and insider preference in privatization without the fear of a strong anti-communist backlash that faced their counterparts in the Czech Lands.. ₅₁

At first, the civic wing of VPN was almost entirely isolated on the political scene. ₅₂ Indeed, in the 1992 general election, VPN did not even poll the necessary votes to clear the five percent threshold. Yet the bitter fight over issues surrounding secession from the Czech Republic and Prime Minister Meciar's intolerant and somewhat undemocratic leadership style created a new civic opposition comprised increasingly of alienated Czechosolvaks but then eventually extending to autonomists of a more civic democratic orientation as well as a sprinkling opportunists who lost in their own personal power struggles with the Prime Minister.

Meciar and his supporters "established" an independent Slovak Republic on January 1, 1993 following a pact between himself Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus the winners of the June 1992 elections.. ₅₃ The pact was reached and implemented without a referendum and against the will of the majority of the Czech and Slovak citizens.. ₅₄

Meciar and his group of "founders," never specifically elaborated a concept for building the new state. This might be because, prior to his meeting with Klaus, Meciar truly did not expect the dissolution of the Czechoslovak state except as a final resort. The concept of an "ethnic Slovak nation-state," however, was strongly present in the new government's policy. The preamble of the Slovak Constitution, for example, begins with a phrase, "We, the Slovak nation." Only later are ethnic minorities mentioned as "other citizens," but not as a part of the "Slovak nation." This implies the exclusion of national minorities from participating in state-formation and had a profoundly alienating effect on Slovakia's ethnic Hungarian minority.. ₅₅

Formally, the principle of inclusive citizenship exists, but the founders of the new Slovak state have applied a principle of exclusion to maintain their bases of political support. This is not the formal, transparent exclusion that has afflicted ethnic Russians in the Baltics. Rather, in their rhetoric, Meciar and his supporting elites frequently divide citizens into informal categories of "good Slovaks," and Slovaks who were against the division of the former Czechoslovakia and independent statehood of the Slovak Republic. They also exclude ethnic Hungarians.

Hence, the leaders of the ruling coalition attempt to derive at least some of their legitimacy from their status as "founders" of the independent Slovak state. On this ground, they claim the right to prevent all who were against the separation of the Czech and Slovak Republic from participating in building the new Slovak state. They often tell both opposition leaders and representatives of the cultural elite, "You were against it—you have no right to talk.". ₅₆

Inter-elite antagonism has been further exacerbated since Meciar was restored to power by the general election of fall 1994. Meciar's party, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, and its two coalition partners, have cobbled together a ramshackle social alliance founded on the financial support of the old industrial nomenclatura and the voting strength of the rural, elderly and less educated. Educated, urban voters as well as new entrepreneurs in the finance and service sectors have tended to reject Meciar's populism as has Slovakia's ethnic Hungarian minority. But there has been no clear focus for these interests and their votes have been spread out across a wide range of programmatic and association-based parties.

III. New Elite Theory: Elite Consensus and Differentiation

Elite Consensus: New Elite theory makes predictions about regime types that are likely to endure or emerge on the basis of two variables, elite consensus and elite differentiation. The higher the elite consensus and the greater the elite differentiation, the more likely a state will be able to maintain a stable democracy. Slovakia's elite procedural consensus, established during the Velvet Revolution, had already begun to weaken by the first dismissal of Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar in March 1991, It has weakened even further since Slovak independence on January 1, 1993. Slovak elites, however, remain highly differentiated—increasing the chances that pacts and balances of power can be achieved that will maintain democratic practice in the face of fundamentally competing world views.

Disunified Elites: New Elite theory contends that there are two components to elite consensus, elite unity and elite access to decision makers. One of the most important ramifications of the issue of Slovak statehood has been the divisive effect it has had on Slovak elites since at least the First Republic. This is exacerbated by the uniquely Slovak world vision of many of Meciar's national-populist supporters, a vision that simultaneously generates, reflects and reinforces the belief systems of Slovakia's less educated, rural and traditional cultural elements and is sharply opposed by the opposition's more civic-democratic world view.

Opposition elites would assert that the issue at the core of Slovakia's inter-elite conflict is the current ruling coalition's fundamentally undemocratic approach to the conduct of democracy. Ruling elites, the opposition argues, fail to understand or respect democratic rules and norms. Instead, they conceive of politics as warfare in which the ruling coalition alters the rules of the democratic game in their favor. They play a winner-take-all strategy in which they subordinate the standard rules and norms of democratic competition to retaining political power. ₅₇

Opposition perceptions are fiercely opposed by the unique world view of the ruling coalition elite. Their world view retains with a strong, but by no means dominant, measure of popular assent. ₅₈ . The least cynical and most credulous of ruling coalition elites picture themselves as the founders and the protectors of the independent democratic Slovak state. They argue that most of the current opposition elites were against independence and thus have no right to specify what is right for Slovakia—even if opposition elites do it through the democratic process. Worse, they suspect opposition Slovak and ethnic Hungarian elites of being either naive or actively complicit in a conspiracy to grant Slovakia's ethnic Hungarian minority collective rights in preparation for the eventual annexation of Southern Slovakia into the Hungarian Republic. They are loathe to forget that Hungary did just that after Munich in 1938. Nor do they omit to stress more than "1000 years of suffering" under Hungarian rule. They also warn that ethnic Slovaks have fared poorly in post-war Hungary and claim that as many as 25,000 ethnic Slovaks have been actively assimilated into the ethnic Hungarian population since the 1960's. Finally, they believe a wide range of international interests are conspiring against Slovakia. They fear that many neighbors, such as the Hungarians, and possibly even the Czechs and Austrians, seem intent on compromising the territorial integrity of the Slovakia. They argue that other interests—including international Jewish and financial conspiracies—are also complicit in the plot and, in addition, are intent punishing Slovakia for its refusal to allow foreign capital into the privatization process. ₅₉

However misguided, many ruling coalition elites thus see themselves as national patriots who possess the vision to see the "real" threats to Slovak sovereignty. These sentiments, however, overlap and intermingle with a wide range of actors with more opportunistic motives. Of particular importance is Slovakia's new industrial class which includes a number of "privatization groups"—loosely organized networks of Slovak entrepreneurs and ex-communist nomenclatura with political connections and/or positions who have done extraordinarily well in the privatization process. By linking themselves to Meciar's ruling coalition they have gained insider access to power and wealth distributed through the privatization process. At industrial elite urging the government scuttled mass privatization in 1995 and provided industrialists with significant influence in subsequent privatization decisions. ₆₀ Slovak industrialists now justly fear that opposition groups want to re-nationalize some key properties in preparation for distributing it to other actors.

Despite the opportunism of some industrialists and the clear willingness of ruling coalition elites to deliberately construct threats as a means of mobilizing frustrated and frightened voters, some exceptional ruling coalition elites might indeed be entirely honest when they claim they believe in democratic rule. But given their perception of the dire threats surrounding them, they also believe that some compromise, or at least convenient redefinition of democratic principle is entirely justified to retain their political and material position and counter threats to Slovak sovereignty. Industrialists and other opportunist elites, meanwhile, have gone along out of self-interest.

The ruling elite's highly xenophobic world view and their willingness to compromise democratic rules of the game, vastly constrains their ability to make domestic alliances. As a result, extreme elements of Slovak society have been mobilized and pushed into the center of political system. Since 1994, Meciar's HZDS has had to rule in cooperation with parties that have nothing in common but a common populist approach, shared values and considerable opportunism. Hence the country is currently ruled by a combination of HZDS with both the nationalist-right Slovak National Party (SNS) and the far-left Association of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS). In a country with a stronger elite consensus, this combination would appear absurd. Moreover, HZDS's extremist coalition partners would have been marginalized. In Slovakia, however, they take advantage of HZDS' inability to create a centrist coalition. Indeed, they are almost Meciar's only feasible coalition partners. ₆₁

Unequal access to Decision Making: Slovakia's lack of elite consensus in fundamental political values and outlook have endangered Slovak democracy. Given the ruling coalition's conspiratorial and fearful world view, many industrial and coalition elites continue to feel that draconian measures remain necessary to fulfill their objectives. Behind such rationale, the administration of Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar and his ruling Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) have systematically sought to limit the access of opposition elites to decision making power. Indeed, they have taken a degree of control of Slovak political decision making procedures that is inconsistent with parliamentary practice in Western democracies. This was best illustrated in a night session of the Slovak Parliament of November 3-4, 1994.

The night session violated standard Western rules and norms as well as established democratic practice in Slovakia. In a single sitting of Parliament, Meciar's parliamentary majority denied its minority opposition meaningful participation in institutions vital to democracy. Specifically, the ruling coalition excluded opposition members from meaningful participation on bodies monitoring and supervising important state functions, including: the Supreme Control Office, Special Control Body (OKO), the General Prosecutor's Office, and the National Property Fund (NPF). ₆₂ Opposition exclusion from OKO was particularly critical as that body monitors the security service. Meciar's ruling coalition also selected top executives for Slovak Radio and the Board of TV and Radio Broadcasting from its ranks—effectively turning the public mass media into a partisan political servant.

The exclusion of the opposition extended to parliamentary bodies. The ruling coalition reduced the representation of opposition MP's on important parliamentary committees to levels far below their representation in Parliament. Nor did the ruling coalition allow opposition parties to choose specific MP's for those committee positions allotted to them. As of this writing, (November 1997), the ruling coalition has agreed to increase opposition representation on these committees and bodies. EU co-chair of the Joint EU-Slovakia Parliamentary Committee praises these moves, but adds that they have not gone far enough to allay EU concerns. ₆₃

Perhaps most importantly, by denying opposition elites regular access to decision making procedures, these exclusions undermined consensual unity of Slovak elites and have made it more likely that Slovak political competition will be seen by elites as a zero-sum game. This has done enormous damage to Slovakia's democratic prospects.

Since late 1994, however, a number of additional steps have further weakened democratic institutions in Slovakia. HZDS has built a party-state apparatus that makes political orientation—or, rumor has it, a well placed bribe—prerequisite to favorable government treatment. This includes decisions as diverse as central state budget allocations to a village or a municipality, the award of government purchasing contracts, or a favorable privatization ruling by the Fund for National Property. ₆₄

More recently, in apparent violation of a constitutional provision, the ruling coalition expelled Member of Parliament Frantisek Gaulieder from Parliament after he resigned from HZDS. It has since refused to heed Slovak Constitutional Court and European Parliament recommendations that he be reinstated. Finally, in May 1997, the government unilaterally canceled a referendum despite a Constitutional Court ruling that the decision on whether to hold the referendum rested with an independent referendum commission and not with the government. ₆₅

An additional challenge to opposition elite access to decision making has been HZDS steps to monopolize channels for societal interest group representation. Darina Malova HZDS calls this mode of interest group representation "party-state corporatism." It typically consists of an effort by the dominant ruling party or parties to either establish party-affiliated or party-controlled interest group monopolies in a certain field, take control ("colonize") of existing societal interest groups, or establish and support parallel interest groups that compete with independent societal interest groups in their particular field. Malova demonstrates how this form of societal interest group representation has become a standard control mechanism of the current coalition over the past two years. Party-state corporatism is actually a more sophisticated way of establishing the hegemony of the ruling party under the conditions of formal democracy. ₆₆

Again, new elite theory would point out that the result of HZDS actions to deny equal access to decision-making for all elites is the likelihood that politics in Slovakia will come to be perceived as a winner-take-all form of political warfare. The fundamental challenge to democratic rules of the game has led Western diplomats to repeatedly voice their displeasure and issue numerous informal complaints and formal diplomatic demarches to the Slovak government. The Slovak government's apparently inadequate response to Western complaints and concerns, moreover have led the governing bodies of the European Union and NATO to exclude Slovakia from the first wave of accession talks to both institutions. ₆₇ The failure has had little impact on ruling coalition policies. Opposition Slovak elites speculate that these actions prove that the ruling coalition would rather subvert the 1998 election rather than risk losing it in a free and fair vote.

Elite Differentiation: While Slovak elites are polarized into divided elite camps, they are also highly differentiated as is characteristic of an industrialized society. ₆₈ This is perhaps best demonstrated by the political groupings that have formed since 1989. According to Lukas and Szomolanyi, the Slovak political party system is characterized by "fragmented polarization." ₆₉ In addition, to the seemingly untenable red-brown alliance combining extreme right (SNS) and extreme left (ZRS) into a single coalition with HZDS, the opposition Slovak Democratic Coalition similarly contains strange bedfellows—ranging from the conservative Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), Democratic Party (DS) and Democratic Union (DU) on the right, to the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia (SDSS) and Greens (SZS) on the left. Unallied to the Slovak Democratic Coalition—but still in the opposition—is Slovakia's successor party to the Communists, the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL). The SDL has successfully shed its communist past and now functions well as a mainstream European social democratic party. Finally, the left-right spectrum is repeated across Slovakia's spectrum of smaller, loosely-aligned Hungarian parties. ₇₀

The wide differentiation of Slovak parties demonstrates that the polarization of its elites is not socio-economically based. Left and right are incorporated into all three of Slovakia's coalition groupings—Meciar's ruling coalition, the Slovak Democratic Coalition, and the smaller ethnic Hungarian coalition. Perhaps as importantly, a major potential coalition partner for both SDC and the Meciar's HZDS could be the Party of the Democratic Left. Indeed, it is hard to use class terms to explain how a communist-turned-social democratic movement could become a central coalition broker after the next election.

In short, Slovakia's political elite have not polarized over traditional "programmatic" issues that can be ranged on a typical left-right spectrum. ₇₁ Rather, polarization reflects each side's base in the wider continuum along axes of ethnicity, tradition and modernity, rural and urban behavioral tendencies, and past and present position on issues of Slovak independence and identity. The implication is that there is little programmatically to bind the ruling or opposition elite poles. These political poles are entirely creations of identity and perception and a common fear of what would happen if power shifted, or does not shift, to the other pole. ₇₂

IV. Creating Common Ground: A Political Program for the Opposition

Elite theory tells us that Slovakia will have to generate greater elite consensus or risk ongoing democratic instability or even the eventual reintroduction of an authoritarian state. However, despite the consolidation of two political poles in Slovakia, each side remains a fragile coalition of diverse and potentially conflicting material interests. Were these blocks monolithic, as we would be more likely to find with class-based or a military-bureaucratic social polarization, the likelihood that the ruling coalition would rather rule by authoritarian means than give up its claim to power would be greater. Yet the fragmentation of material interests within each block holds out the potential that elite subgroups could defect—either to the other side or to some new center ground that has yet to be created. The implication for Slovakia's democratic future is that its elite configuration neither predisposes it to consolidated democracy nor to authoritarianism. Rather, the polarized fragmentation of the elite allows some room for maneuver and pact building and the potential to swing in either direction.

The SDC's challenge in 1998, therefore, is to come up with a positive national program that can solidify and unify its past constituent base and win over a fair portion of support from the current supporters of the ruling coalition. This can be done either by reorienting Slovak perceptions of identity or by creating strong focal points for a meeting of material interests across the elite polar divide. ₇₃

The group most vulnerable to this latter strategy is Slovakia's new industrialist class. Unlike the national-populist "patriots" in the ruling coalition, industrialists support for the current coalition has its roots in self-interested material opportunism. Meciar gained industrial support early on by granting sectoral industrial policy and insider privatization to industrial managers and political cronies. Some analysts believe that Meciar realized early this close alliance would repay itself in the form of industry side payments to HZDS. ₇₄

Meciar's coalition has since cemented industry's cooperation by creating an unholy-party-state-industry triangle of clientalism in which occasional cooperation with the ruling coalition on marginally legal or illegal terms remains the only feasible business plan. ₇₅

Yet, the HZDS-industry alliance is not a match made in heaven. Strains are starting to develop. Perhaps the most important fissure is the latent strain between Slovakia's heavy and medium industrial producers and the Prime Minister himself. The problems of Slovak politics have always been intimately tied to the problems of its industry. Meciar's policies are beginning to complicate these problems. Slovakia has a small, very open economy. In 1995, exports made up 49 percent of Slovak GDP. Thirty-seven percent of these went to the EU. ₇₆ The lion's share of exports are produced by several large manufacturers of low value added products—industries inherited from socialism. These industries import large quantities of raw or semi-processed materials. They "tweak" them through the next stage of the production cycle and export them to manufacturers abroad for high value added finalization. Under communism, the Slovak economy was industrialized with just this purpose in mind: low-value added production for Czech and COMECON inclusion into a final product. ₇₇

The Slovaks remain very good at this task. With relatively modern capital equipment and production processes, relatively inexpensive energy imports, and a talented, low-cost labor pool, Slovakia's intermediate products are competitive in Western markets. The only problem is that Slovakia's major exporters are very low value added. The competitiveness of these markets over the long term keep international prices quite low. Meanwhile, creeping wages eat into profit margins and raise the import bill as workers and managers alike spend a portion of their earnings on foreign goods. ₇₈

Hence, despite its strong macroeconomic performance, Slovakia is beginning to live beyond its means. There are two solutions to this: earn more, or spend less. The government is perhaps correct to implement temporary barriers to import spending—as long as it can do so without harming producers, creating inflation or risking international retaliation against its exports. It may also make sense to keep out portfolio capital — or "hot money" — which leaves the economy open to the whims of international market forces. ₇₉

The best solution, however, is to sell more abroad. Theoretically it can do this in two ways. First it could expand sales of its current product lines abroad. But Slovakia's eastern neighbors inherited similar heavy industrial portfolio's from socialism, and while these industries are in measurably poorer shape than Slovakia's, determined leadership and western capital should turn at least a few of them around within the next five to ten years—and when this happens, Slovakia's heavy industrial profit margins will come tumbling down. ₈₀

A strong additional option is to move as rapidly as possible up the production process towards end-products with higher value added production and into international markets with oligopoly structures and higher profit margins. ₈₁ In some industries, this will require foreign partners whose capital, technology, marketing and managerial assets are a helpful boost overcoming the high barriers to entry that characterize oligopolistic markets. But Slovakia's political and economic climate appears dangerously under-suited to the task. ₈₂ Slovakia's leading steel producer, VSZ serves as the best illustration. Recently Toyota courted VSZ to build its first major Central European assembly plant near Kosice. It would have been exactly the type of deal Slovak industry needs if Slovakia is to escape its current trade woes. VSZ steel and other intermediate products from Slovakia's substantial engineering sector would have joined Toyota technology, global sourcing and marketing to produce a regional car manufacturer that could rival existing Polish, Czech and Hungarian joint ventures with major Japanese, European and American car manufacturers.

Despite intense interest by Toyota, the deal finally did not go through. At least part of the problem was political. In the opinion of Central European Automotive Report, the region's leading automotive trade journal, political uncertainty in Slovakia was a major factor in Toyota's decision not to invest. ₈₃

While VSZ and other Slovak manufacturers have succeeded in achieving a number of high value added joint ventures, overall, foreign interest in Slovakia remains low. ₈₄ As of mid-1996, Slovakia had a mere $152 foreign direct investment per capita. This compared to over $ 1,200 for Hungary, over $ 500 for the Czech Republic and $ 265 for Poland. ₈₅ At least part of Slovakia's dismal showing reflects foreign concerns about Slovakia's internal stability.

Indeed to the foreign investor, the Gaulieder affair, the aborted referendum on direct presidential elections, as well as European concerns over the rule of law and constitutional democracy in Slovakia—indeed the very symptoms of inter-elite conflict in Slovakia—endanger not only the internal political stability of the country, but also its external relations. Of crucial importance to a large investment designed as a platform for exports is the European Union Association Agreement, that provides member countries with preferential trade access to European markets. Even the slightest threat to this agreement could send large investors looking elsewhere. As of this writing, the Slovak government's on-going refusal to return Gaulieder to his parliamentary seat—despite recommendations by both the European Parliament and the Slovak Constitutional court—has led at least one EU diplomat to confide off the record that should democratic violations continue, the EU's Association Agreement could be reexamined. ₈₆ Not surprisingly, as the ruling coalition's relations with the West continue to deteriorate, the watch word among foreign direct investors is extreme caution.

Slovakia's investment climate is further complicated by a ruling elite that places low priority on attracting foreign direct investment. Despite legal regulations and government statements that play lip service to welcoming foreign investment, ruling elites are largely ambivalent—and at times outright hostile—towards foreign direct investment. In addition, the unique world view of Meciar's national-populist supporters retains deep suspicions of foreign investor's intentions. Meanwhile, many industrial insiders largely saw foreign companies as competitors—rather than potential partners—in the privatization process. The Meciar cabinet responded to this fear by making a specific point of privatizing only to "domestic business subjects." The official desire was to create a "class of national entrepreneurs." National entrepreneurs would then deal with their assets as they saw fit in what Meciar predicted would be a "third wave" of privatization. Foreigners, it was hoped, would come in at this stage as strategic investors.

But foreigners have not come in. The FNM press office boasts of having failed to approve a number of predatory buy outs by foreign companies. ₈₇ But under current Slovak conditions, few foreign investors are willing to come in with anything less than majority control. The damage of this lost opportunity to the Slovak economy is substantial. In 1996, Czech companies with foreign participation significantly outperformed wholly-owned Czech companies. Production increased by 30 percent versus three percent for wholly indigenous firms while productivity increases were 20 percent and seven percent respectively. ₈₈ Indeed, the dynamism of the Czech's foreign sector may yet provide the economy with an acceptable cushion as it finally begins to grapple with the problem of restructuring the lion's share of its industries. In Hungary, Peter Balas, deputy state secretary at the Industry, Trade and Tourism Ministry, credits the dynamism of the economy's substantial foreign economic sector in giving the nation its first trade balance with the EU over the first 10 months of 1997. ₈₉ Meanwhile, the National Bank of Slovakia laud's the beneficial effects of Slovakia's few existing foreign direct investments in raising enterprise efficiency, expanding exports and foreign markets, and generating vertical links and incentives to efficiency among Slovak supplier firms. ₉₀

The slow start of the "third wave" of privatization highlights the growing contradiction between the political techniques of the Meciar regime and the fundamental economic requirements of the industrial elite. Undaunted, the government is trying to go it alone with a sectoral industrial policy that seems designed to provide politically connected owners with debt relief and cushy state purchasing contracts. ₉₁ Meanwhile, Slovak industry is losing time. With a poorly functioning and debtor-based bankruptcy framework and a disastrous, politically manipulable debt forgiveness program in the offing, firms with decent management that are performing well are losing the ability to collect debts from deadbeat suppliers, gain easier credits on loan markets, raise capital through IPO's, or find foreign buyers who won't seek an extra risk premium in any joint venture. ₉₂ Nor are firms with poor management able to find foreign buyers to pull them out of the economic morass. ₉₃

V. Towards an Historic, Inter-Elite Pact:

Slovakia's economic future faces fundamental problems and the opposition needs to think big to solve them. There are solutions, but first, the opposition needs to stop making the problem worse. The illegitimacy of the privatization process provides a tempting opportunity for the opposition to make a short term political gain—one they have already shortsightedly seized.

By promising to reopen the books on privatization, they offer the satisfying and populist craving for vengeance. They should resist this temptation. First, it may be on weak moral grounds. Under a state guided by strict adherence to the rule of law, such a promise would be entirely legitimate. But under current conditions, the policy is perhaps misled. This pertains particularly for industrial elites for whom cooperation with the ruling coalition on marginally legal or illegal terms remains the only feasible business plan. And while many industrialists are all-too willing accomplices, the blame ultimately resides with the ruling coalition.

Second, opposition threats of vengeance encourage managers to strip their companies of their assets and ship those assets to safe bank accounts abroad rather than taking steps to make their companies perform. Third, threats of vengeance will gain them few new votes, if any at all few new votes. Coalition supporters know the privatization process was rife with cronyism and corruption, but years of ruling coalition rhetoric and some scandalous behavior on the part of opposition elites ₉₄ has convinced supporters that all Slovak elites are corrupt. It is a popular, if potentially mistaken Slovak belief that the opposition would have done the same thing had they won the 1994 election.

Finally, vowing vengeance against politically connected privatizers and Slovakia's new economic elite only strengthens these elites' conviction that they still need Meciar to survive. It drives them towards the point where industrial elites must choose between subverting democracy or losing their property and perhaps even going to jail. Even given the threat that an undemocratic 1998 election could virtually end Slovak access to Western markets, industrial elites' past record of support for flagrant violations of the rule of law and their unapologetic lobbying for indirect government handouts in the form of insider privatization and debt rescheduling or cancellation provides a strong indicator of which choice many would make.

New elite theory would additionally point out that by threatening the core values of its opponents, vengeful opposition policies reinforce the polarization of Slovakia's fragmented elite groupings. Even if they win the 1998 election, greater polarization will result in difficulties retaining political control over the country. As the opposition implements vengeful policies, it is likely to meet organized resistance. Elite theory predicts that this resistance will not respect democratic procedure or norms.

The SDC's challenge in 1998, therefore, is to come up with a positive national program that splits rather than unifies current ruling coalition elites. We suggest that one possible way of accomplishing this goal is to strike a tactical political pact with industrialists. The goal of the pact would be to reconcile the material interests of Slovakia's new industrial elites with democratic norms and a rule of law-based, competitive market economy. ₉₅ In its most ideal form, it would legitimize the property relations established by the Meciar regime through privatization. By making this major concession, Slovak opposition elites can provide industrial elites with the space to rid themselves of Slovak industry's biggest liability—its Prime Minister—and at the same time, establish a centrist elite consensus around basic democratic and market principles, including respect for the rule of law, constitutionality, transparency, and non-partisan governance of the economy.

Such a pact would have to take the form of a pre-election bargain, implicit or explicit. Opposition leaders would promise that their government would exchange a post-election amnesty for illegal and dubious practices during privatization for an agreement on the industrial elites' part to dismantle the cozy party-state-industry triangle that makes close government ties such a competitive advantage. This would include reintroducing the use of transparent, arms-length public tenders in government purchases, as well as public privatization auctions and direct sales of FNM property. The ruling coalition's politically suspect project to select specific firms for revitalization and debt relief might be converted to some form of a politically neutral, one-time cancellation. ₉₆ Introduction of bankruptcy with full creditor rights and short, administrative procedures (rather than long, legal proceedings) as well as a forced divestiture of cross ownership between government, banks and industry—should be able to put the economy on a footing where owners will have an incentive to make their assets perform.

At a minimum, amnesty should also be contingent upon cooperation with a multi-partisan or independent, South African-style truth commission, with a mandate to investigate and document past privatization abuses. At a maximum, punishments should be meted out to government figures who have used their position to enrich themselves or those connected to them. Many will have used the privatization process to become industrialists in their own right. They should be punished as politicians, not as industrialists. Overall, demands for justice should be met, but not in a way that will cripple or prolong the agony of recently privatized firms.

Conclusion:

New elite theory predicts that elite unity and differentiation are strong indicators of regime type and regime endurance. Applying this theory to Slovakia reveals a country at a crossroads. Abrupt socialist-era modernization of the Soviet type has produced an industrialized country that retains a strong remnant of traditionalism based on the elderly, the less educated and the countryside. These groups are mobilized and represented by a group of elites that are unlikely to embrace western conceptions of modernity in the near future. Instead, national-populist elites have fueled an ongoing debate over Slovakia's sovereign status and Slovak national identity and used populist mobilization strategies that build on and reinforce the pre-modern elements of Slovakia's political culture. The result is a bitter elite divide along lines of traditionalism/modernity and national/ethnic identity.

In addition to this, Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar has cemented his political position by using privatization and state governance of the economy to reward political allies and cronies and punish enemies. In their effort to retain power in this conflict-ridden atmosphere, we have seen that Meciar's current ruling coalition, with the support of industrialists, has exhausted democratic and even resorted to undemocratic means to reduce the opposition's access to formal and informal decision making channels. Some analysts even speculate that Meciar and his allies might prefer to subvert the 1998 election rather than lose it in a free and fair contest.

Weak elite unity, however, is complimented by a rich differentiation among elites in Slovakia. While elites are grouped into the opposing poles described above, within each pole they maintain a diverse left-right spectrum of political parties. This holds true for all three major groupings comprising, respectively, the ruling coalition, the mainstream democratic opposition, and minority Hungarian parties. Such diversity holds promise that elite polarization will not necessarily lead to an authoritarian solution in which one elite group would prefer to rule or be ruled by force rather than submit to a government of its opponents. Rather, a number of loose cross-cutting elite configurations are possible that might prevent Slovakia's disunified elites from developing two monolithic and divided elite coalitions with irreconcilable interests and views of how Slovakia should be run.

One possible solution is for Slovak opposition parties to attempt to reach an historic agreement with the ruling coalition's industrialist allies. In this scenario, opposition elites would agree to recognize and guarantee the Meciar government's privatization decisions since 1994 in exchange for industrialists' agreement to submit to democratic rules and norms and competitive market behavior. Such a pact would be a significant step towards the gradual transformation of Slovakia from a disunifed to a consensually united elite configuration. It would thus promote more favorable conditions for the stability of Slovakia's fragile democratic regime.

The choice to accommodate the immediate interests of Slovakia's new entrepreneurs would be painful and difficult. Many of Slovakia's elite industrialists have gained their current status and wealth through inegalitarian and marginally legal or patently illegal procedures. But the growing polarization of Slovak elites threatens the very existence of democracy in Slovakia. As it stands, the free and fair practice of democratic procedures could threaten too many ruling coalition elite interests. To secure victory and democracy in the 1998 elections, opposition elites need to act now to begin to create and capture the middle ground-a space where democracy is reconciled with the wealth and power of its new industrial elite.

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Endnotes

Note 1 Parts of this essay are drawn from John Gould, "Seeding Slovakia for Secession: The Sociological and Economic Effects of Socialist Industrialization," paper presented to the North Eastern Political Science Association Annual Conference, Philadelphia, PA, November 15, 1997; Sona Szomolanyi, "Identifying Slovakia's Emerging Regime," in Sona Szomolanyi & John Gould, eds. Slovakia: Problems of Democratic Consolidation and the Struggle for the Rules of the Game, (Bratislava: Friederich Ebert , 1997), pp. 9-34; JohnGould & Sona Szomolanyi, "Bridging the Chasm in Slovakia," Transitions, 4:6 (November 1997), pp. 70-76; and Sona Szomolanyi & John Gould, " Elity Vitaz Neberie Vsetko," Domino Forum, (November 7-14, 1997), pp. 7-9. The authors would like to thank the Friederich Ebert Stiftung, Bratislava, Slovakia; The Institute of International Education, New York, and the Imstitut fur die Wissenschaften vom Menschen, Vienna for support at various stages of this project.Back

Note 2 See data in Grigorij Meseznikov," The Open Ended Formation of Slovakia's Political Party System," in Szomolanyi & Gould, eds. Slovakia, pp. 50-51. Back

Note 3 Recent polls give the SDC the highest voting preference at 31.1 percent. HZDS, by contrast received 25.7 percent. See data from Institute of Public Affairs, Bratislava, Slovakia, October 1997. Back

Note 4 Michael G. Burton & John Higley, "Invitation to Elite Theory," in G. William Domhoff and Thomas R. Dye, eds., Power Elites and Organizations (Newbury Park, CA: Sage, 1987), pp. 133-143; Michael G. Burton & John Higley, "Elite Settlements," American Sociological Review (June 1987), pp. 295-307. Back

Note 5 Burton & Higley, "The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns," American Sociological Review, (February 1989), p. 9. Back

Note 6 Giovanni Sartori, The Theory of Democracy Revisited, Part One: The Contemporary Debate, (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House Publishers, 1987), p. 224 as cited in, Burton & Higley, "The Elite Variable," p. 9. Back

Note 7 For more on mixed interest games, see Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation, (New York: Basic Books, 1984). For more on elite logrolling, see especially, Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire, (Ithaca: Cornell, 1991), pp. 31-55. Back

Note 8 G. Lowell Field et al, "A New Elite Framework for Political Sociology," Revue Europeenne des Sciences Sociales, Vol. 28: 88, (1990), p. 154.Back

Note 9 Adopted from John Higley & Jan Pakulski, "Elite Transformation in Central and Eastern Europe," Australian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 30, p. 418.Back

Note 10 Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Easter Europe and Latin America (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 26.Back

Note 11 Guillermo O'Donnell & Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions From Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University, 1986), p. 37; For an argument that international constraints—particularly economic globalization—influence transition outcomes more than elite competition and leadership strategies, see, Paul G. Lewis, "Theories of Democratization and Patterns of Regime Change in Eastern Europe, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, Vol. 13:1 (March 1997), pp. 4-26.Back

Note 12 Ibid.Back

Note 13 Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine, "Nationalism and the Marketplace of Ideas," International Security, (Fall 1996), pp. 1-35.Back

Note 14 Przeworski, Democracy and the Market, pp. 136-187.Back

Note 15 The deterioration of an initial pact will have the most significant adverse effect and is probably least likely where the old regime elites retain control over military or police assets. This has not been the case in Central Europe and particularly not in Slovakia where the armed forces and police have been returned in relatively short order to apolitical professional structures. Gould's correspondence with Major Patrick Antoinelli, United States Army, December 7, 1997. Back

Note 16 See Valter Komarek, "Czech and Slovak Federal Republic: A New Approach," p. 66, and Jan Svejnar, "Czech and Slovak Federal Republics: A Solid Foundation," p. 22, in Richard Portes, ed., Economic Transformation in Central Europe: A Progress Report, (London: Center for Economic Policy Research and Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1993). Back

Note 17 Vaclav Prucha, "Economic Development and Relations, 1918-1989" in Jiri Musil, ed. The End of Czechoslovakia, (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1995), pp. 42-44. Back

Note 18 Actually the communist commitment to equalize Czech and Slovak levels of development was made during a Czech and Slovak conference in Kosice in the waning days of World War Two. See especially, Alice Teichova, The Czechoslovak Economy, 1918-1980, (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 91, 116. Back

Note 19 Ibid.," pp. 40-76; Jiri Musil, "Ceska a Slovenska Spolecnost: Skica Sronavaci Studie," Sociologicky Casopis, Vol. 29:1, (1993), pp. 9-24. Back

Note 20 As one analysts commented: "soviet modernization is perverted modernization: it ostensibly builds up the body of modernity, but kills its soul. The communist laid down the roads, erected hydroelectric plants, and the like, but they killed (or tried their best to kill) the human capacity for autonomous action." G. Nodia , "How Different are Postcommunist Transitions?" Journal of Democracy , Vol. 7:4 (October 1996), p. 24. Back

Note 21 Sona Szomolanyi, "Identifying Slovakia's Emerging Regime," in Szomolanyi and Gould, eds., Slovakia, p. 23. Back

Note 22 Vladimir Krivy, "Slovakia's Regions and the Struggle for Power," in Szomolanyi and Gould, eds., Slovakia, pp. 124-125. Back

Note 23 Ibid. For a sociological explanation of the Meciar phenomenon, as well as polling data, see Sona Szomolanyi," Preco je Tak Tazko? Y.Prebieha Konsolidacia Demockracie na Slovansku" in Pritomnost Minuilosti, Minulosti Pritomnosti, (Bratislava: Nadacia Milana Simecku, 1996), pp. 169-176. Back

Note 24 Notes from Gould's interview with Jan Buncak, Slovak Academy of Sciences, Sociological Institute, November 11, 1996. Buncak is currently compiling a sociological survey of 1000 Slovak elites; Focusing particularly on Poland, Thomas A. Baylis argues that current elites in power in Central Europe were what one dissident has labeled the "lower nobility" of the communist era. Thomas A. Baylis, "Plus Ca Change? Transformation and Continuity Among East European Elites," Communist and Post-Communist Societies, Vol. 27:3, (1994), pp. 315-328.Back

Note 25 Poll cited by Pithart, "Towards a Shared Freedom," in Musil, ed., The End of Czechoslovakia , p. 201; See also, Sona Szomolanyi, "Old Elites in the New Slovak State and their Current Transformations," in Sona Szomolanyi and Grigorij Meseznikov, eds., The Slovak Path of Transition—To Democracy" (Bratislava: Slovak Political Science Association, 1994) p. 67. Carole Skalnik Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia: The Making and Remaking of a State, 1918-1987, (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1988), Conclusion. Back

Note 26 Miroslav Kusy "Slovak Exceptionalism," in Musil, ed. End of Czechoslovakia, pp. 139-157.Back

Note 27 See, in particular, marked divergence Czech and Slovak attitudes in Richard Rose, Czechs and Slovaks Compared: A Survey of Economic and Political Behaviour, Studies in Public Policy Number 198, Center for the Study of Public Policy, Glasgow, 1992. Back

Note 28 Jaroslav Krejci and Pavel Machonin, Czechoslovakia, 1918-92: A Laboratory for Social Change, (Oxford: MacMillan, 1996), pp. 30, 45-46; Slovensky Fenomenon," Listy, Vol. 15:5 (1985), pp. 29-36.; Samuel Abraham, "Early Elections in Slovakia: A State of Deadlock," Government and Opposition (Winter 1995), pp. 86-100; Samuel Abraham, "The Break-up of Czechoslovakia: A Threat to Democratization in Slovakia," in Szomolanyi and Meseznikov, Slovak Path of Transition, pp. 13-40; see also Abraham's revised manuscript of this article. Back

Note 29 On the eve of his replacement by Dubcek, Communist Party General Secretary Antonin Novotny even felt compelled to reassure Slovaks that "the overall economic development of the republic must not overshadow the important task of the precedence of the development of Slovakia which does not yet equal the level of the Czech lands." Gould's interview with Miroslav Kusy, Department of Politics, Comenius University, Bratislava, Slovakia, December 18, 1996.; The New York Times (January 2, 1968), as cited in Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia, fn pp. 120-1. Back

Note 30 Gould's Interview with Kusy, December 18, 1996; While Slovak insistence on federalization was consistent in principle with Czech demands for democratization, the establishment of an equal Slovak voice in governing on the principle of "one nation one vote" would mean that the numerically inferior Slovaks would be over-represented at the federal level. Many Czechs thus felt Slovak demands were un-democratic. The final compromise was a bicameral legislature in which Representatives to the one house were apportioned equally between the Czech Lands and Slovakia with the other house proportionally representative. Real decision-making power remained in the hands of the KSC which continued to be organized along asymmetric lines. The majority principle also dominated the ministries—again a locus a real power in Communist systems and one where Slovaks remained in the minority. Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia, pp. 120, 127, 244-246. Back

Note 31 Gould's Interview with Kusy, December 18, 1996; Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia, p. 124. Back

Note 32 Ibid.Back

Note 33 For a good, although Czecho-centric, account of politics during Prague Spring and its aftermath, H. Renner, A History of Czechoslovakia Since 1945, (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 49-89. Back

Note 34 Krejci and Machonin, Czechoslovakia, 1918-92, p. 196. Back

Note 35 According to Carol Skalnik Leff, the enhanced presence of Slovaks at top levels of leadership may have had something to do with the moderated purge in Slovakia. The new cadres may have been able to protect proteges from persecution. In sum, only 17 percent of cadres lost their positions compared to 42 percent in the Czech lands. Punitive measures likewise were often less harsh in Slovakia. Slovaks compromised by Prague Spring activities were generally only demoted. Czechs, by contrast, generally lost their jobs and were forced into menial positions or exile. Leff speculates that the fact that Slovak reformers could keep their jobs later contributed to the muted dissident movement in Slovakia. Slovaks retained a stake in the system. By contrast, Czech's had little left to lose. For anecdotal evidence of this, see testimony of Czech dissident, Jan Urban in Tim D. Whipple, ed., After the velvet revolution : Vaclav Havel and the New Leaders of Czechoslovakia Speak Out, (New York: Freedom House, 1991). Reform cadres in both regions however were subjected to similar interrogations, surveillance and the lose of higher education abilities for their children, Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia, pp. 252-3, 261. Back

Note 36 Krejci and Machonin, Czechoslovakia, 1918-92, p. 193. Back

Note 37 Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia, p. 243-4.Back

Note 38 Abraham, "Early Elections in Slovakia"; Krejci and Machonin, Czechoslovakia, 1918-92, p. 193. Back

Note 39 Peter Petro, "Slovak Literature: Loyal, Dissident and Emigre," In Gordon Skilling, ed., Czechoslovakia: 1918-88: Seventy Years From Independence (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991), pp. 196-209; Miroslav Kusy, "Slovensky Fenomenon." Back

Note 40 H. G. Skilling, Charter 77 and Human Rights in Czechoslovakia, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981), as cited in Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia, p. 264. Back

Note 41 For example, an empirical analysis of popular beliefs and attitudes indicates that Slovakia's capacity for EU integration is no worse than that of Poland or Hungary. See Zdenek Lukas & Sona Szomolanyi, "Slovakia," in W. Weidenfeld, ed., Central and Eastern Europe on the Way into the European Union: Problems and Prospects of Integration in 1996. Strategies for Europe, (Gutersloch: Bertelsman Foundation Publishers, 1996), pp. 201-224. Back

Note 42 Silvia Mihalikova, "Socio-political, Economic, and Axiological Orientation and Changes in Central European Societies," in Z. Strimska, ed., Report on the International Sociological Research, (Paris: C.N.R.S., 1995-1997). Back

Note 43 20 percent of respondents in Slovakia, 22 percent% in Hungary and 23 percent% in Poland prefer a single party system over one of competing parties. In CR - 6 percent%. * The number of respondents agreeing to the statement, "Dictatorshoip can be better under certain circumstancies,." was highest in Poland, at 17 percent%, while in the CR and SR support was about 11 percent, and only eight percent in Hungary. ( F. Plasser and P. Uram, "Measuring Political Culture in East Central Europe," in Fritz Plasser and Andreas Pribersky, eds., Political Culture in East Central Europe (Avebury, 1996), p.22; Also, see polling data from 1992 in Rose, Czechs and Slovaks. Back

Note 44 For an eleaboration of this argument, see Szomolanyi, "Identifying Slovakia's Emerging Regime," pp. 19-30. Back

Note 45 As elite theorists assert, "nation-state formation has so frequently left a legacy of elite disunity and resulting regime instability as to constitute the modal pattern of politics in the modern world" Field et al., "A New Elite Framework," p. 159. Back

Note 46 It is only slightly ironic that today's national-populists play on a similar fear. Back

Note 47 For a good, even-handed review of these issues, see Leff, National Conflict in Czechoslovakia, pp. 133-140; For a largely "autonomist's" view, see Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, A History of Slovakia: the Struggle for Survival, (London: MacMillan, 1995), pp. 169-179. Back

Note 48 Ivan Miklos, "Economic Transition and the Emergence of Clientalist Structures in Slovakia," in Szomolanyi and Gould, eds., Slovakia, p. 60. Back

Note 49 For a more complete summary of these elements, see Gould, "Seeding Slovak Secession"; For more on Slovakia's heavy reliance on defense production, see, Zora Kominkova and Brigita Schmognerova, eds. Conversion of the Military Production: Comparative Approach (Bratislava: Institute of Economics, Slovak Academy of Sciences, 1992) and Danes Brzica, "Arms Industry Conversion: A Critical Part of Reform Strategy," Working Papers on Transitions From State Socialism, Cornell University, January 1996.Back

Note 50 Hilary Appel, "Politico-Ideological Determinants of Liberal Economic Reform: The Case of Privatization." Paper presented to the Annual Conference of the North Eastern Political Science Association, November 15, 1997. Back

Note 51 Ibid. Back

Note 52 After the split VPN transformed into the Civic Democratic Union. Back

Note 53 This was not modern Slovakia's first experience with statehood. In March 1939, a Slovak state was established in response to Hitler's threat to divide the country and annex its former parts to the neighboring states unless its leadership acted quickly to create an allied, quasi-independent state. Back

Note 54 Zora Butorova, "Public Opinion in Slovakia: Continuity and Change," in Szomolanyi and Gould, eds., Slovakia, pp. 129-130. Back

Note 55 Miroslav Kusy, "The State of Human and Minority Rights in Slovakia," in Szomolanyi and Gould, eds., Slovakia, pp. 169-186. Back

Note 562 As recently as December 1997, HZDS were repeating this old refrain, asserting that opposition parties, especially the Christian Democrats (KDH) and the Democratic Party (DS), as well as Hungarian minority parties, do not have the right to "tell people that they will build this state if they have declared openly that they disagreed with the establishment of the Slovak Republic." CTK News, December 3, 1997. Back

Note 57 For more, see Szomolanyi, "Identifying Slovakia's Emerging Regime," and Meseznikov, "Slovakia' Political Party System." Back

Note 58 According to an October 1997 opinion poll, 55 percent blame the governing coalition's unwillingness to observe democratic rules of the game for the EU's negative evaluation of Slovakia. 48 percent think that Slovakia has not met the EU's political criteria. By contrast, only 30 percent blame the president and the current opposition for Slovakia's failure to integrate. IVO poll, Bratislava, October 1997. Back

Note 59 The best indicator of the ruling coalition's world view remains the HZDS party daily newspaper, Slovenska Republica. Within that, the most strident views are consistently put forward by HZDS commentator and parliamentarian Roman Hoffbauer.Back

Note 60 Miklos, "Emergence of Clientalist Structures."Back

Note 61 Sona Szomolanyi, "Does Slovakia Deviate from the Central European Transition Path"" in Sona Szomolanyi and Grigorij Meseznikov, eds., Slovakia: Parliamentary Elections, 1994, (Bratislava: Slovak Political Science Association, 1995). HZDS pragmatists and SDL "soft liners" have maintained a flirtatious relationship over the years. Many speculate that a future coalition could be formed from a reformed SDL , shorn of its hard line opponents to cooperation with Meciar, and a faction of HZDS that excludes its more extremist national-populist elements. See, Vladimir Jancura, "The Courting of Pragmatists," Pravda, (September 23, 1997), p. 4; While such an alliance would be more centrist that the current coalition government, this alliance might still leave HZDS officials with a fundamentally undemocratic world view in charge and thus would not go as far as the elite pact advocated that we advocate below in building Slovak democracy. Back

Note 62 Despite its majority, the ruling coalition did not actually form a cabinet until a month later. Until then, the cabinet was actually in the minority opposition. Back

Note 63 Of vital concern to the EU is Slovak language legislation. For more, see Kusy, "The State of Human and Minority Rights," p. 176.; M.E.S.A 10, Slovak Monthly Report, (November 1997): p. 1. Back

Note 64 For more on state-party-society clientalism, see Miklos, "Emergence of Clientalist Structures," and Krivy, "Slovakia's Regions and the Struggle for Power," in in Szomolanyi and Gould, eds., Slovakia. Back

Note 65 For more on these events, see Szomolanyi, "Identifying Slovakia's Emerging Regime;" pp. 9-34. For a developed discussion of constitutionalism in Slovakia, see, Katarina Zavacka, "The Development of Constitutionalism in Slovakia," in Szomolanyi and Gould, eds., Slovakia, pp 157-168. Back

Note 66 Darina Malova, "The Development of Interest Group representation in Slovakia after 1989: From Transmission Belts' to Party-State Corporatism'? " in Szomolanyi and Gould, eds., Slovakia, pp. 93-113. Back

Note 67 Duleba, "Democratic Consolidation." Back

Note 68 Higley & Pakulski,"Elite Transformation," p. 117. Back

Note 69 Lukas & Szomolanyi, "Slovakia," pp. 201-224. Back

Note 70 Meseznikov, "Slovakia's Political Party System," insert. Back

Note 71 Ibid. This not unique to Slovakia. As one analyst states, "Left, right, center: all these notions have a strange, and elusive meanings under postcommunism. Using interpretive Western paradigms would simply create false analogies and would explain little if anything." The author stresses that populism in particular cannot fit into a left-right spectrum. Hence post-communist conditions require new conceptual framework, one that can accommodate the "new version of radicalism in East Europe [that] combines themes of the left and right in a baroque, often unpredictable alchemy." See, Vladimir Tismaneanu, "The Leninist Debris, or Waiting for Per¢n," East European Politics and Societies. Vol 10:3 (Fall 1996), p. 504. Back

Note 72 The most consistent and innovative thought on creating common ground on the basis of perception and identity has been Samual Abraham. See especially, "Tamarkin's Question: Where is our Positive National Program?" Sme, June 5, 1997, p. 2. Back

Note 73 Miklos, "Emergence of Clientalist Structures."; It is hard to determine whether Meciar really believes any or all of his rhetoric. Many analysts are convinced that his conception of "patriotism" is solely an instrument used to flog his internal enemies. Again this fits into a regional trend: "Zhan Videnov in Bulgaria, Ion Iliescu in Romania, Kiro Gligorov in Macedonia, Vladimir Meciar in Slovakia, Milan Kucan in Slovenia, and Slobodan Milosevic are all former Communists, but they are not neocommunists . They are rather cynical pragmatists, chameleonlike survivors, ready to espouse any creed with lightning speed, if it upholds their stay in power." Tismaneanu, "Waiting for Per¢n," p. 504. Back

Note 74 Miklos, "Emergence of Clientalist Structures." Back

Note 75 Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, Statistical Yearbook of the Slovak Republic, (Bratislava: Slovak Academy of Sciences, 1995). Back

Note 76 This is not meant to imply that Slovakia's levels of finalization are lower than in the Czech Republic, indeed, 1987 data indicates that finalization levels were approximately the same in the Czech Lands and Slovak with the very important exception of the machine building industry, in which the Czechs tended to produce more final goods. See, Ales Capek, "the Split of Czechoslovakia and the Specific Features of the Slovak Economy," in J. Krovak, ed., Current Economics and the Politics of (ex)-Czechoslovakia, (New Science Publishers: Jericho, NY, 1991), p. 54 as cited in Gould, "Seeding Slovakia for Secession." Levels of Czech finalization have most likely risen relative to Slovakia in recent years due to relatively greater Czech openness to foreign direct investment. Back

Note 77 According to a recent wage survey by Coopers & Lybrand and Kno Slovensko, average industrial wages have increased by approximately 30 percent since 1995, with an almost 12 percent increase expected for 1997. Lynn Ciadella, "Wage Increases for all Industries," The Slovak Spectator, (December 4-17, 1997), p. 4. Back

Note 78 Low foreign ownership of short term Slovak assets combined with a tight monetary policy—has rendered the Slovak crown reasonably more secure than the Czech market against capital flight. As a result, the Slovak crown has escaped two stampedes out of short term assets in emerging markets in 1997 with only slight exchange rate adjustments. Whether intended or not, this is a potentially beneficial side effect of governmental distrust of foreign capital. Of course, one of the reasons currency stability is desirable is to attract foreign capital when needed. Deputy Finance Minister, Peter Stanek, however, claims that such benefits are intentional. Gould's interview with Peter Stanek, Vice Chairman for Economic Transition, Slovak Republic, January 16, 1997. Back

Note 79 As the OECD points out, "export performance based on heavy industries, cheap labour and reliance on energy imports may not last in the face of a down-turn in European export markets and likely increased competition by neighboring countries." OECD Economic Surveys: The Slovak Republic, 1996, (Paris: OECD, 1996), p.120. For good regional surveys of various industries in Central Europe, see latest regional surveys by ING Bank and Wood & Company, Prague, Czech Republic. Back

Note 80 In its 1996 Economic Survey, the OECD ranked the price sensitivity of Slovak exports as an indicator of the competitiveness of Slovak markets. Slovakia's most competitive market flat-rolled iron and steel was also its largest export. Highly competitive markets comprised over 50 percent of Slovak export items and a much greater share of total export share, indicating relatively unsophisticated production and low margins. Despite this, Slovakia has begun to develop several areas of expertise in more profitable, lower price sensitive foreign markets. OECD Economic Survey: The Slovak Republic, 1996, pp. 86-7. Back

Note 81 For a discussion of economic disincentives to foreign direct investment, see, Adela Hoskova, "Foreign Capital in the Economy of Slovakia," Institute of Monetary and Financial Studies, National Bank of Slovakia, Bratislava, 1996, pp. 29-31. Back

Note 82 Jeff Jones, Central European Automotive Report (June 1997); This opinion was supported in, Dean Calbreath, "VSZ's expansion Plans have Nerves of Steel: Ties to Slovakia's Prime Minister May Prove Troublesome," Wall Street Journal, (June 18, 1997). Another part of the problem may have been timing. Toyota is entering on the tail end of a major wave of investment in the Central European Automobile market that is rapidly closing in on saturation. As of this writing, Toyota has still not announced a major alternative project in the region. Back

Note 83 While it failed in attracting Toyota, VSZ recently entered into a joint venture with US Steel Group in a project to increase annual output of zinc-coated sheets, mostly for export. The project will rely on US Steel's state of the art technology in the application of zinc coats to steels sheets. M.E.S.A. 10, Slovak Monthly Report, (November 1997), p. 4 Back

Note 84 As cited in Michael Wyzan, "Is Slovakia's Economic Reputation About to Tarnish," RFI/RL Daily Report, November 3, 1997. According to the National Bank of Slovakia, "The present foreign investment situation in Slovakia is unsatisfactory." Hoskova, "Foreign Capital," p. 29. Back

Note 85 Confidential interview, New York, September 10th, 1997; See also Alexander Duleba, "Democratic Consolidation and the Conflict over Slovak International Alignment," in Szomolanyi and Gould, eds, Slovakia, p. 220. Back

Note 86 Gould's interview with Oto Balogh, Press Secretary, Fund for National Property, Slovak Republic, Bratislava, April 22, 1997. Back

Note 87 Mlada Fronta Dnes, April 5, 1997, p. 1 Back

Note 88 RFE/RL Daily Report, (December 11, 1997), Part II.Back

Note 89 Hoskova, "Foreign Capital," pp. 21-25. Back

Note 90 See Miklos, "Emergence of Clientalist Structures."; The OECD repeatedly warns against a Slovakia's tendencies towards sectoral industrial policies in OECD Economic Survey: The Slovak Republic, 1996, passim. Back

Note 91 For details on bankruptcy procedures in Slovakia, see Ibid., pp. 56-57. Back

Note 92 In the opinion of at least one analyst, "Many Slovak companies do not always have a sufficiently wide choice [or foreign partners] and they are forced to accept unfavorable demands from foreign company. [sic]" Hoskova, " Foreign Capital," p. 31. Back

Note 93 For an example of the later, see the scathing attack on KDH in the normally pro-opposition Domino Forum, November 7-14, 1997. Back

Note 94 There are perhaps a number of significant objections to this strategy. In public statements and private correspondence, significant opposition-oriented figures most notably Ivan Miklos and Eduard Zitnansky have constructively pointed out to us that the willingness to compromise among Slovak industrialists is very weak. They are perhaps right. Experience with the South-African truth commission show that compromises only come when the alternative is much worse. For leading Slovak industrialists, this point has not yet been reached, and given the potential that Meciar has detailed knowledge any illegal dealings that top industrialists might have committed, they may now have no choice but to see their position as inextricably linked to Meciar's political future. Hence, while HZDS Deputy Chairman, Arpad Matejka (also a leading industrialist) has called for an rapprochement with the SDL—to the great irritation of HZDS popular nationalists—he has asserted elsewhere that the primary obstacle for social reconciliation in Slovakia remains opposition attacks on the Prime Minister. Meanwhile, VSZ Chairman is taking responsibility for managing the HZDS reelection campaign. See Ivan Miklos, "Nerovnu Boj" Domino Forum, (November 7-14, 1997), p. 9; Eduard Zitnansky, Domino Forum, (November 15-21, 1997); Jancura, "The Courting of Pragmatists." Back

Note 95 One possible solution might be to provide debtors with a one-time right to cancel their debts to state agencies and state-owned banks up to the amount of accounts receivable they are willing to forgive their own debtors.Back

Note 96 One possible solution might be to provide debtors with a one-time right to cancel their debts to state agencies and state-owned banks up to the amount of accounts receivable they are willing to forgive their own debtors.Back