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Intermarium
State and Media in Belarus
by Marek Karp
Foreword
A restrictive policy towards mass media in Belarus' is usually linked by observers to the arrival in power of Alaksandar Lukashenka. In reality, however, it should be stressed that the ideas of freedom of the press and expression were foreign to the Belarusian government from the very moment political independence was achieved in December 1991. The state-controlled media adhered to the official line of the governing elite and the first independent publications and radio stations which began to appear in Belarus' at the beginning of the 1990s met with repressive measures on the part of the government of Prime Minister Vyacheslau Kebich.
An entirely different assessment of the situation in the country as presented in the pages both of the independent and official press became evident during the presidential campaign in 1994. The independent media shattered the positive image of the government of the day so scrupulously created by official sources which actively supported Kebich and went to great lengths to discredit the other candidates - in particular, the Prime Minister's most dangerous rival Alaksandar Lukashenka.
In a formal sense, existing Belarusian legislation accords with generally-accepted norms. Both the constitution approved in March 1994 - that is, before Lukashenka became president - and a law on mass media approved in January 1995 forbade censorship as well as the monopolization of the media by the state.
Lukashenka's Policy Towards the Media
Despite his promises, Lukashenka has clearly been guided practically from the beginning of his presidency by the principle - 'if the 'fourth estate' can control the 'first,' why can't the first do the same to the 'fourth'?' With even greater determination than the former Prime Minister, he opposes every manifestation of independent thought appearing in the pages of the opposition media - now critical of him to no lesser an extent than once was the case with Kebich. Although, in the final analysis, Lukashenka has not been able to completely neutralize the oppositional character of the independent media, he has, however, succeeded in subordinating the official media previously beholden to Kebich.
Official Media
He was able to do so without great difficulty because with respect to fundamental questions such as integration with Russia or assessing the communist past, Lukashenka's electoral program differed little from that of Kebich. Undoubtedly, for many publicists in the official media, Lukashenka's plans for Belarusian-Russian integration coincided with their own beliefs much more than the 'national idea' actively propagated by other candidates vying for the presidency such as former Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Stanislau Shushkevich (together with Boris Yeltsin and Leonid Kravchuk one of the signatories of the 'Belovezhskaya accords' in December 1991 which codified the dissolution of the USSR) or Zyanon Pazhnyak (leader of the nationalist Belarusian National Front). It would thus be mistaken to conclude that journalists working for the official media are driven only by conformism or fear of losing their jobs.
Lukashenka's relatively quick success in gaining the support of the official media results also arises from the fact that these institutions are owned by the state. This situation can be contrasted, for example, to the Baltic states where government newspapers were privatized, or Russia and Ukraine where they have become the voices of particular lobbies. In Belarus', on the other hand, such well-defined interest groups have simply not developed.
Today, criticism of the president in official media is impermissible. Furthermore, the opposition has lost even what limited influence it had with state newspapers during the Kebich's tenure. At the beginning of the 1990s, the small but comparatively strong parliamentary opposition led by the BNF managed to gain access to the official organ of the then Supreme Soviet (parliament), the daily Narodnaya hazeta. Among state-controlled media, this newspaper was thus an exception - commentary often sharply critical of the government appeared regularly in its pages.
It should be noted, however, that during the first years of Lukashenka's presidency, the official press also felt the effects of his restrictive policy. Although the subordination of the official press did not demand a great deal of effort on Lukashenka's part. Lukashenka's first obvious attempt to bring state-controlled media under his supervision was a ban by his administration on publication of allegations of corruption within the president's inner circle made in a speech before parliament in December 1994 by opposition deputy Siarhiej Antonchyk. As a result of the fact that the decision on a ban came down virtually at the last minute, several newspapers appeared with 'blank spots' where Antonchyk's remarks would have otherwise been printed and others failed to publish altogether. At the beginning of 1995, having evidently fallen into his disfavor, the editors-in-chief of the most influential official newspapers were removed on the force of several Lukashenka decrees.
Citing alleged 'gross financial improprieties' brought to light not coincidently in the course of an investigation conducted by the presidential control commission, Lukashenka dismissed the editor of Sovetskaja Belorussija - one of the leading Belarusian dailies which today is among those newspapers supporting the president's policies. The editor of the daily Znamya Junosti, which is currently the official organ of the pro-presidential youth organization the Belarusian Patriotic Youth Union, met a similar fate. Despite the protests of opposition deputies, in March 1995 the editor of the official parliamentary organ Narodnaya hazeta, Josef Siaredzich was also dismissed (it should be added that Siaredzich subsequently established one of most important oppositional newspapers - the daily Narodnaya Volya). This action clearly violated the law according to which parliament alone possessed the right to appoint or dismiss the editor of its own newspaper. The absurdity of the reasons given for the dismissal of the editors should also be emphasized. In the case of Siaredzich, for example, it was the appearance in the paper of a publication from an anonymous reader supposedly calling for the use of 'unconstitutional means' ('force') in order to overthrow the government. It should be added furthermore that this was not the only attempt by the president at interfering in the structure of the newspapers editorial staff. In March 1996, once again on the force of decree (as had by now become his traditional style of governing) Lukashenka named the successor editor-in-chief of Narodnaya hazeta, Mikhail Shymanski, who fulfills this function to this day. Parliament's preferred candidate was prevented from assuming the position through the intervention of the Belarusian militia.
The steps taken by Lukashenka in the first years of his presidency made further restrictive actions unnecessary. The complete subordination of the official press to the president is attested to by the fact that none of these newspapers published amendments adopted by the Supreme Soviet prior to new parliamentary elections in 1995 reducing the percentage of voter turnout necessary to have the elections declared valid (the so-called 'legitimacy threshold'). According to Belarusian law, the publication of such legal acts in the press is a necessary condition of their becoming binding. By way of further explanation, it should be noted that Lukashenka did not conceal his hostility towards parliament at this time which he considered redundant.
The Independent Press
Whereas the president has succeeded in subordinating completely the official media, the independent press is today one of the most important oppositional forces in Belarus'. Owing to the fact that the executive branch has no influence on personnel decisions within the editorial staffs of independent newspapers, the methods employed against them have had to be more sophisticated. The authorities have progressed to blackmailing and intimidating journalists, confiscating their work, evicting editorial staffs from their office space, as well as denying publishers licences for their activities.
During the summer of 1996, the authorities withdrew their consent for the appearance of Belorusskaya delovaya gazeta, accusing it of having violated state secrecy laws by publishing material on the subject of the Belarusian special services. At the same time, the independent Pahonya (published in Grodno) received a notice of eviction from its current premises. Many journalists have been threatened with legal action for failure to honor the dignity of the highest state officials. The clearest example of this was the trial of the poet Slavomir Adamovich called to account for the appearance in the independent Vybar (published in Vitebsk) of a poem bearing the controversial title "Kill the President!." Although his verse did not refer to any concrete situation or personality, Adamovich was detained for almost a year. These specific examples of repressive methods against the independent press characterize the general policy of the Belarusian state.
The circulation of the oppositional press is not large is basically confined to the capital Minsk. On the other hand, for these publications, the provinces are virtually inaccessible. Bearing in mind that about 20 per cent of the entire Belarusian population lives in Minsk and its environs, the limited potential readership of the independent press becomes obvious. This means, moreover, that the combined circulation of all independent Belarusian newspapers does not exceed the circulation of even one of the large state-controlled dailies.
The small circulation of the independent press is also a result of the fact that the Belarusian state monopolizes the entire system of printing and distributing publications. This has become defacto a weapon in the struggle against freedom of expression. Although - most likely for the purpose of keeping up appearances of impartiality - significant official restrictions in the sphere of printing and distribution obviously affect official media, they are above all directed at minimizing the influence of oppositional publications. Undoubtedly under official pressure, the Dom Prasy publishing house, which has a monopoly on printing, refused repeatedly, under the pretext of inadequate production facilities to print a number of titles (apart from independent newspapers, several official publications found themselves in this position). On the other hand, the firm Sajuzdruk, which exercises the state monopoly on the distribution of printed matter and is also the sole owner of the national network of newspaper kiosks, has frequently violated contracts with a number of opposition newspapers, and the post office in Minsk has refused to send material to subscribers. Lukashenka has brought under his supervision not only the central system of printing and distribution but publishing houses outside of the capital have also felt the effects of the president's policy.
In the fall of 1995, the president's administration issued an order compelling local printing firms to submit all contracts with publishers for approval to the Main Administration of the Office of Socio-Political Information (employees of this bureau are credited with authoring the fundamental principles of the government's policy towards the media.) As a consequence of the breaking of contracts by Belarusian printing houses with the editors of many independent newspapers, these media have been forced since 1995 to seek foreign assistance. The majority of them, including the most important opposition newspapers - Belarusskaya delovaya gazeta, Belarusskaya gazeta, Narodnaya volya and Svaboda, are now printed in Vilnius, Lithuania. This makes Belarus's disturbing and perhaps unique example among states.
Without question, an important problem facing opposition publications is an acute lack of financial resources. While these newspapers can count on a certain amount of support from private sponsors, their income deriving from contracts with advertisers is minimal. Concern on the part of private Belarusian firms for inspection of their finances by the president's administration is so great that few of them are inclined to advertise in the oppositional press. It goes without saying that inspections occur in these firms much more frequently than in other enterprises.
Television
Given its mass audience, the most effective means at the president's disposal for manipulating public opinion is without doubt Belarusian television. Indeed, the State Radio and Television Committee was subordinated directly to the president in 1994. The fact that the head of this committee, Ryhor Kiesiel continues to serve in this position, attests to his unqualified personal loyalty to Lukashenka. All the more, that almost from the moment of his appointment Kiesiel has evoked sharp criticism from within many circles demanding his resignation.
The opposition complained of a lack of access to television. Deputies accused state television of biased reporting of parliamentary proceedings and in September of this year - when the conflict between parliament and the president came to a head finally denied accreditation to correspondents covering parliament. Bearing in mind that the, including the leaders of parliament, were denied completely access to television, these accusations were undoubtedly justified. In these conditions, assertions by Lukashenka about democracy and pluralism in Belarus' ring rather hollow.
State television creates an image of the Belarusian leader as a good father deeply concerned about his children. Lukashenka's speeches, meetings and trips are given broad coverage. It is in large thanks to television that Lukashenka enjoys such popularity in the countryside which, as noted previously, is entirely cut off from the independent press.
By contrast, the president's setbacks, for example the final declaration of the Lisbon summit of the OSCE in December 1996 which sharply criticized Lukashenka's policies, are passed over in total silence by the official media including television.
However, television doesn't limit itself to creating a positive image of Lukashenka; it is also a means for discrediting the opposition as a hostile 'anti-Russian' force acting under the influence of the West. A striking example of this was the broadcast during the 1995 parliamentary elections of a film in which the opposition Belarusian National Front was depicted as being a Fascist organization. Currently, there are essentially no independent radio or television stations functioning in Belarus'. It should be added, moreover, that even when a small number of independent stations existed, it is hard to say that they were really independent. A condition of their being granted a licence for operation was agreeing not to broadcast any kind of informational service; hence, their programming contained very little political content.
Nonetheless, the independent television station Channel Eight - its broadcasts having been systematically blocked under the pretext of 'technical difficulties' - was finally forced to cease operations. The same thing happened in the case of an independent FM radio station in Minsk - Radio 101.2 - whose programming, in contrast to the propagandistic material heard on official radio, enjoyed broad popularity especially among young people. It is safe to assume that precisely the popularity of independent stations among younger generation Belarussians who, in the majority, are negatively disposed towards Lukashenka and on whose support Lukashenka so greatly depends, is one of the principal reasons behind their closing.
Russian Media
A role similar in a certain sense to that of the Belarusian oppositional media is often fulfilled by Russian media, first and foremost television which reaches all parts of the country and, if for no other reason than it is of superior professional quality, is watched by far more people than the single Belarusian channel. For many Belarussians, Russian television is their window on the world as well as, most importantly, the source of more objective reporting about what is going on in their own country although, obviously, this information reflects Moscow's perspective and interests.
In contrast to official Belarusian television., Russian television, typically emphasizing Lukashenka's resort to non-democratic methods in his political struggle with the opposition, tends to present the president in a highly unfavorable light. Russian television has also been skeptical of the motives behind Lukashenka's vigorous pursuit of integration with Russia presenting it as part of a broader strategy aimed at gaining him a foothold in Russian politics and perhaps even the presidency of any new Belarusian-Russian 'confederation.' The paradoxical fact that in spite of the criticisms of Russian television he continues to enjoy widespread popularity in Belarus' suggests that Lukashenka's fear that the broadcasts of ORT, NTV and other Russian networks might create for him new opponents in his own country are not always justified. Nevertheless, this fear has led Lukashenka to undertake a struggle against Russian television no less resolute than with the Belarusian oppositional press.
The Belarusian authorities have several times attempted to influence the content of Russian media. For example, during the summer of 1995, following the publication in a Russian newspaper of a controversial article entitled Alaksandar Lukashenka wants to be President of Russia, the president's administration dispatched a letter to the leadership of the Russian State Duma (parliament) informing of the intention to limit henceforth the availability of Russian media on the Belarusian market. Furthermore, following the signing in April 1996 of an accord establishing a new Belarusian- Russian commonwealth, Lukashenka threatened the expulsion of foreign journalists who continued to inform the world about anti-integration demonstrations taking place at that time in Belarus'. Following last years constitutional referendum, the press service of the Belarusian Security Council accused Russian media in particular of dishonest reporting about the situation in Belarus' (specifically, inflating the number of participants in protest actions and generally overdramatizing the course of events) and divulged plans to establish new principles for accrediting foreign journalists.
The methods employed by Belarusian authorities against Russian media differ little from those used against the domestic media. On numerous occasions, they have made it difficult for Russian journalists to dispatch material to Moscow.
A number of repressive actions have been taken against individual correspondents of Russian television working in Minsk. In March of this year, the correspondent for NTV, Alaksander Stupnikov was expelled from the country, officially accused of reporting on events in a way tendentious and damaging to the reputation of Belarus'. At the same time, the Belarusian Foreign Minister, Ivan Antonovich, warned that journalists who were not 'objective' in their reporting on the situation in Belarus' would share Stupnikov's fate. The best example to date of this sort of reprisal against correspondents of Russian television is that of Pavel Sheremet who works for the network ORT.
Near the end of July, Sheremet was arrested by Belarusian authorities who accused him of unauthorized presence in a restricted zone along the border with Lithuania and held him in custody for more than two months. The 'Sheremet affair' resonated loudly around the world and had a profound negative impact on bilateral relations between Minsk and Moscow. Indeed, Boris Yeltsin went so far as to threaten the cancellation of an accord signed in April this year creating a new Belarusian-Russian 'union'. Although in the end he relented and released Sheremet, Lukashenka, well-known for his anti-Western rhetoric, stated that not even the Western press was conducting the sort of informational war against Belarus being waged by Russian mass media.
Conclusion
From the foregoing it can be concluded that a moderation of Belarusian state policy towards the media should not be anticipated in the near future. On the contrary, taking into account amendments to the law on the press and other media passed in October this year by the lower house of the Belarusian parliament (which is completely subordinate to Lukashenka) it should be expected that this policy will become even more restrictive. Although the upper house rejected these amendments, they are indicative nonetheless of a clear tendency in the policy of the Belarusian authorities. For example, they include a provision forbidding the distribution of materials slandering the honor and dignity of the president as well as other high state officials. The imprecise character of this provision will without doubt favor the discretional interpretation of the law for which the Belarusian president is well known. A provision according to which state officials would have the right to temporarily suspend the activities of publications in the event of their violating the principles of the proposed law is further cause for concern (until this fine, this right was held by the owners or founders of publications alone). The most serious blow which the authorities intend to deal the media is an amendment forbidding the import onto and export from Belarusian territory of all materials prejudicial to the political and economic interests of the republic. In view of the fact that the majority of opposition publications are printed abroad, this provision could seal the fate of these papers.
In my view, these amendments are above all an attempt to legitimize the actions of the Belarusian state against the mass media. Up to now, these measures were legitimated only on the basis of presidential decrees which often contravened both the Belarusian constitution and a law on the media adopted in 1995. While it is difficult to say what form the amended statute will finally take, it is certain that henceforth it will be difficult to accuse the authorities of acting in a way contradictory to the law.