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CIAO DATE: 03/02
Intermarium
The "Great Historical Experiment" or the Demise of Real Socialism in Poland
Andrzej Paczkowski
The recounting and analysis of the series of events taking place in Poland in 1988 and 1989 is no longer, or so it seems, a task for sociologists and political scientists as much as for historians. This is due to the detachment now possible and the ever better access to archive materials, the natural target of quest by those involved with times past. Obviously, there is no need to fall over to extremes: any series of events will have its own, "present" dynamics, and its "genetic predispositions" will form frames within which the dynamics unfold and provide the tool kit used by actors on the political stage. This series may be approached as entry into a new constitutive formation (the period of transformation). This is the subject for political scientists, who are less interested in determining "how did all this come about . . . ?", but focus more on how "the old" reflects (today) on "the new. One could approach these events as the end (the fall) of the earlier formation. This is a field for historians, who limit their query to trying to find answers to the first of these questions.
A note should be made of this difference in horizons of study, since intend to "avert my eyes" from anything that happened after crossing the point at which the fall changed into the beginning. 1 A historian will certainly be granted the liberty of stopping the clock and attempting to describe events from the vantage point, from which they were perceived (and planned) by their participants. This should be even more so, as the main protagonist of this essay is the team of General Wojciech Jaruzelski, or the team which had the task of "closing that chapter," rather than the people grouped around Lech Walesa, who shaped the start-up team.
Due to space limitations there will be no discussion or critical assessment of the very ample literature of the subject, some of which have dutifully relied on. Nonetheless, a mention of the reference base would be in order. This is made up primarily of the already public documents of top authorities from the hegemonistic ruling Party (Ostatni . . . , 1994), information gathered in the course of a query into documents pertaining to the years 1980-89, carried out in the archives of the PZPR (Polish United Workers' Party) Central Committee, 2 minutes of confidential talks between representatives of authority and opposition forces (Dubinski, 1990), and minutes from meetings of the Joint Commission of the Government and the Episcopate (Panstwo . . . , 1993). I have also analyzed in depth the reminiscences and memoirs (some in the form of book-length interviews) of several top personages involved in these events. 3 It did not prove possible, however, to examine Kremlin documents, a fact which made it substantially difficult to form a view on Moscow's attitude to developments in Poland.
There are several widely subscribed hypotheses as to the main causative factor which triggered the whole series of events Leaving aside, due to space limitations, the question of their origins, and with the reservation that the presentation here will be in a grossly simplified and extreme form, these hypotheses were:
The subject of analysis, as one could easily guess, will be the second hypothesis, the fallacy of which should become evident to the reader.
One will note that all three hypotheses are rooted in an unspoken assumption, namely that the imperial Center would not or could not — which is more or less (but rather less than more) the same — resort to force and take up effective intervention to defend the status quo. One may accept without much risk of exaggeration that the neutrality (or rather: the benign neutrality) of the Kremlin leaders was a sine qua non condition. Yet it was not a sufficient — or decisive condition, something that may be inferred when comparing the situation in Poland (and Hungary at that) with the situation in the remaining countries of the Socialist bloc. It is difficult to judge when this "sine qua non condition" started to become reality and even, though here the difficulties are somewhat lesser, when did the Jaruzelski team come to realize this fact. One should probably not infer Moscow's abdication from Mikhail Gorbachev's address to the Tenth Congress of PZPR (June 26-July 3, 1986), in which he stressed that "socialist Poland withstood" and "defended the revolutionary gains." Still, by the middle of the following year, questioning attitudes were already in evidence among the people from Jaruzelski's inner circle, 5 and even fears that the Party leaders will be overtaken not only by a stormy rise of social unrest, but even by the pace of reforms in the Soviet Union itself. 6 This reflected the accelerated pace of perestroika which was moving through successive "higher" phases in 1987. Even though one could nurture doubts as to sustainability of the "new line" promulgated by the Soviet leaders, the will to carry through reforms was unmistakable, personified most clearly by none other than the General Secretary, vesting the whole thing with credibility.
The first signals from "Warsaw's White House" (i.e. PZPR Central Committee building) came on the closing days of summer 1986, when a general amnesty was proclaimed for political prisoners. This gesture was an element of the new "salami policy" pursued unsuccessfully in relations with the opposition, which would not be put down without reversion to all-out Stalinist-style terror. Combined with the next, it yielded meagre results. Several people linked to the opposition agreed to join the Consultative Council appointed in December, 1986; in June 1987, following a lengthy period of parlaying, the Res Publica journal, earlier published in the underground, was allowed to come out in the open. This may be seen as the beginning of the "constructive opposition" approach. The earlier cited memoirs suggested other steps in the same direction, and their authors all agreed, in no uncertain terms, that "earlier methods of coming to grips with arising situations have outlived themselves" (Nastroje . . . , 1992, p. 70) and even that the "earlier model of socialism is outdated" (Rakowski, 1991, p. 101).
The "conservative-bureaucratic" reform, actually its "second phase" proclaimed by the Zbigniew Messner government installed in office still in the fall of 1985 was yielding no effects. Time was running out, yet the Jaruzelski team could still not take the leap to parallel introduction of political and economic reforms, even though it was becoming ever more apparent to one and all that the two-prong approach is indivisible. Economic reforms, on a scale major enough to yield effects, could not be undertaken without a political shield. A military shield has already proved itself unproductive, and in reality counterproductive in that it brought all earlier attempts to a grinding halt, The society's patience was running short, the threshold of fear has all but whittled away, and Lech Walesa with his closest associates, as the mainstay of the opposition, were giving rather clear signals that they were ready to negotiate. The offer on their part took the form of the "Anti-Crisis Pact," proposed in the final weeks of 1987.
Following the spring wave of strikes (March-May, 1988) defused with moderate use of force, but without any of the fury of December, 1981, thoughts reverted once more to "carving up" the opposition, which meant sticking to a long-tested approach. During the July talks with Gorbachev, who accepted the approach used so far, General Jaruzelski promised that "We will go farther" (Ostatni rok . . . , 1994, p. 8). Yet, the next sentences proved that this "farther" meant very near indeed; "there are two frontiers which we will not cross," said the General "we will not reconcile to trade union pluralism [ . . . ] and we will not allow for establishment of opposition parties." He only condescended to "participation in representative and civic bodies of [individual] people."
In face of the next wave of strikes, which started in August, the PZPR found a spectacular and effective solution. The Central Committee at its plenary meeting on August 26 endorsed the Politbureau decision to offer talks, formation of the Council of National Reconciliation and to discuss institutional changes (revised electoral law, second house in Parliament, Office of the President). General Czeslaw Kiszczak, Jaruzelski's closest subordinate and Minister of the Interior, in a dynamic TV appearance proposed to hold a "round table" meeting. The term since then has become part of the national political vocabulary for the coming era.
This was a skillful maneuvre; it captured the fancy of public opinion, already tired of the protracted economic crisis, by then in its tenth year, and the endless series of political tensions But the "meat" shrouded by the shiny wrapping of the package was a bit stale — "there is no place for Solidarity" — said Jaruzelski — "but there is a place for people from the former Solidarity, who are willing to cooperate constructively" (38). For several weeks a propaganda campaign ruled the day; i.e. Trybuna Ludu, the main PZPR mouthpiece, started a new regular column on the front page under the ominous title Leading Up to the Round Table, and television kept showing cabinet makers busy on assembling this round piece of furniture. The analytical sections of PZPR Central Committee kept churning out documents, practically all built around the idea of incorporating the opposition within the system and turning this into a permanent fixture of the system. Still, the practitioners at the very top focused more on techniques of social manipulation, more intent on finding an effective way to "speed up the processes of internal differentiation of the opposition" (47).
The opposition was indeed made up of diverse fractions, and this was nothing new, but perhaps more important was the fact that there divisive forces also within the Communist Party. Next to the almost classic division into "liberals" "the center" and "hard-headeds," a new group surfaced, centered around Alfred Miodowicz, member of the Politbureau and chairman of the OPZZ (All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions). While one could hardly describe OPZZ as being sovereign, yet it was clearly becoming an autonomous force, to some extent dysfunctional in the face of inevitable economic reforms. Competing with the outlawed Solidarity, it was shifting increasingly in the direction of claims for restitution, but above all vociferously protesting even the slightest hint of possible necessity of re-legalizing Lech Walesa's Union. Any talk of such an eventuality would be rare among the PZPR top anyway. Fears of consequences which legalizing Solidarity could bring were the dominant theme. As General Kiszczak predicted at the Secretariat meeting on October 4, "this would become the first, relatively mild stage of the oppositions's struggle for power. The next stages (which he failed to define) will be much more difficult for us" (63).
General Jaruzelski disagreed with the arguments of those suggesting that meeting Western demands concerning Solidarity would contribute to acceptance of Polish financial requests: "All the democracy which we are promising them" said Jaruzelski on October 10 — "second houses and the like, they know that it would be theirs for the asking, once Solidarity would be there. Because Solidarity will take care of everything, commune (sic!) and socialism included" (155). Even though the final decision to postpone the Round Table was not taken, the PZPR top gun almost openly sounded the bugle of withdrawal. I did not manage to find any materials which could unequivocally shed some light on the motives behind this about-face. Perhaps this was part-and-parcel of the very concept of an "opening" which was to be, above all, a propaganda gambit. Most likely, the opinion prevailed in the Jaruzelski camp to once more try for reforms without involving the opposition, and win public favor by some personal reshuffles. On September 19 the Messner government submitted its resignation (in part due to a barrage of union fire from the OPZZ side), and on September 27 the post of Prime Minister was entrusted to Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski, perceived as champion of reforms.
The Prime Minister's declaration that Poles preferred a "fully laid" to a "round" table could be read as a signal that economic reforms would be carried out without major political reforms. But the drive for economic change was unmistakable. Its direction: to introduce a degree of market rule, and particularly pave the way to economic initiative, was affirmed by entrusting the post of Minister of Industry to Mieczyslaw Wilczek. He was a "rank-and-file" Party member and one of the richest private entrepreneurs, skillfully exploiting (like thousands of others) the line of contact between private manufacturing and the state sector in which a pivotal role was plaid by the — as a rule local — group of nomenklatura Party nominees.
One could note that the "Rakowski maneuvre" corresponded strategically with the logic of the well-tested model of "perfecting socialism"; economic reforms without political reform. These were to be instituted not only without the opposition, but even going against it. One should, of course, avoid drawing too far-reaching conclusions, and the following comparison is to be treated as drastic in the extreme and actually failing outside the area substantiated by documentary evidence. It is possible to risk a hypothesis that the situation came close to one where "the way to reform through Ten An Men Square" would be called "the way through the Shipyard." When the government made the decision to institute liquidation proceedings of the Gdansk Shipyard (the cradle of Solidarity) on November 1, it had to take into consideration the possibility of stormy reactions, including taking to the streets, which would have to be put down by force.
Party analysts and experts, clearly dominated by reform-minded individuals, had many formulas on hand to mask the disinclination to try reforms which would go too far. Such terms as "socialist pluralism" or "Marxist personalism" in reality reflected the conviction that "socialist reforms [ . . . ] cannot imply abandoning the principle of guiding and leading role of the Marxist-Leninist Party in the society" (173) "Pluralism, but under leadership (sic!) of the Party" (174) was the credo of the reformists. It seems that General Jaruzelski identified himself fully with this line of thinking During discussions on a draft paper which he was to deliver at an upcoming plenary meeting of the Central Committee, he vehemently disavowed any ideas of change in state institutions Office of the President? "Let the guys from the Democratic Party play with that" (185) The future coalition was perceived by him as a structure made up of three Circles the basic coalition (Polish United Workers' Party, United Peasants' Party, Democratic Party), broad coalition (the PRON; Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth), and the "broadest" with participation of "constructive opposition" (187). The willingness to consider inclusion of "constructive opposition" was the maximum of what could be termed a new quality in the traditional concept of the hegemonistic role to be played by the Communist Party.
The fact that any thought was given to one sort or another of practical socialism was already In contrast to opinions of the career Party bureaucrats. A poll taken among "Voivodship-rank Party leaders" in November indicated that 85% spoke out in favor of "acceptance and refusal to cross the frontiers of fundamental system features [ . . . ] at its root from 1948 until the present" (AAN, ref. 451, vol. 41, p. 175). Organizers of the poll described close to 60% of those polled as "advocates of totalitarian methods of wielding power" (AAN, ref. 451, vol. 41, p. 214). This, beyond doubt, could not but serve as a restraint on the champions of change, even those in the forefront.
Situations can develop, or perhaps are even the rule, when a turn (or acceleration) of events comes about in result of a singular development, at first sight even of secondary importance. It would appear that this is precisely what happened in the late fall of 1988, when the Round Table idea was for several weeks in limbo. On November 30, during the top viewing hours, the TV carried a live debate between A. Miodowicz and L. Walesa, The original idea came from Miodowicz, but had the imprimatur of the Politbureau. A survey taken the next day on a representative sample of the adult Warsaw population indicated that a clear, "qualified" majority judged that the contest was won by the Chairman of outlawed Solidarity (Spoleczenstwo . . . , 1994, pp. 383-385). The same survey indicated that, compared with August 1988, there was a marked shift (from 42% to 62%) in favor of legalizing the union.
Admittedly, General Jaruzelski was quick to draw conclusions from this. By December 5, at a Secretariat meeting, he observed that "a change took place in the perception of Walesa and there is a new approach to Solidarity" (196). As he bluntly put it, there was a need "to escape forward" (197). Realizing that "for some of our comrades this will mean a disintegrative step for the party," he consoled himself that "for other comrades this offers the only chance for the party to retain its role, exercised in another manner" (198). He obviously fell in the latter group. He was confirmed in his assessment of the situation by an expert analysis drawn up in mid-December by the Central Committee Interdepartmental Projections Unit (Miedzywydzialowy Zespol Prognoz KC). The anonymous authors stated therein that the way in which the Miodowicz-Walesa debate developed, it "ruined the fine, so labouriously woven texture" of defusing the expectations and hopes pinned on the Round Table (216). More important here was the recognition that "we see no possibility of avoiding the legalizing of Solidarity. Either we harness Solidarity within the frames of legal norms, or we allow it to continue as an extra-legal, but real presence, yet hence unbridled by the constraints of law" (220). It was also noted that "resort to Stalinist methods — as an alternative would be a tragedy" (221).
In such a scenario, the ruling team took the final plunge and decided to follow the path of negotiations. Yet, the first battle was to be waged not with the opposition, but with the Party appratus people. The key phase of that skirmish lasted abut one month and started on December 20, at the tenth plenary meeting of the Central Committee. The main bone of contention was the attitude to legalization of Solidarity. But first Jaruzelski made sweeping changes in the top Party bodies, replacing 8 out of 15 Politbureau members and 4 out of 1 1 Central Commiftee Secretaries. Then a propaganda barrage was launched, addressed to all Party activists, who, in any case, were already shifting their opinion in the direction desired by the "reformist center." 7 The finale came during the second installment of the plenary meeting (January 16-18, 1989), when in a dramatic blackmail maneuvre centered on the crisis at the Party top (motion for a vote of confidence in the Politbureau), Central Committee members were given no choice but to endorse a resolution on political and union pluralism. One of the sources of Jaruzelski's success was seemingly the fact that those opposed to changes (meaning advocates of totalitarian methods) lacked a leader with sufficient standing and charisma, The purge carried out in 1985, when the most vociferous "hard-heads" were relegated to the sidelines (including Stanislaw Kociolek, Mirostaw Milewski and — the most effective of them all — Stefan Olszowski, who decided to emigrate from the country altogether), yielded its fruit. Credit should also be given to party discipline and, above all, the conviction that possible departure by Jaruzelski, who enjoyed the clear support of Gorbachev, could plunge the Party in chaos, and that in the face of a foe ever more sure of himself.
At his press conference following this "war against the apparatus," Jaruzelski tried to please one and all: at first making a reservation that "we have not taken [ . . . ] break-neck turns," only to add that "we have made a sort of revolution" and, to clarify that "this means a very important, mile-leap forward" (Majer, 1993, p. 12). In reality, the interpretation of what has come to pass was neither easy in the language of public declarations nor in the internal parlays in the "inner sanctum" of power wielders.
In a talk with Milan Jakes, head of the Czechoslovak Communists, Jaruzelski was forthright in noting that the "stakes in the game are to assimilate it [the opposition] by our system" (262). This was certainly not question of "muddling the eyes" of someone viewed as one of the staunchest Communist stalwarts in politics. He also reminded his comrades from the Politbureau that "we have our backs aginst the wall" (235). The most straightforward substantiation of the adopted position was given by the author of martial law during the very tense debate with OPZZ representatives on February 9, when the Round Table meetings were alredy underway: "we have taken this decision in the face of a growing threat of strikes, of the chance that Walesa might get ahead of us, of the need to capitalize on the time element" (275). Elsewhere he added that "we are aware that without altering our domestic policies we stand no chance of the West changing its attitude to our country" (261). The thesis concerning the "rescue operation" nature of this really courageous decision was confirmed by Wladyslaw Baka, the team member responsible for economic affairs, on February 16, when it was becoming clear to everyone that the initiative at the Round Table debates was failing into the hands of the opposition. He said then: "I have the impression that we are beginning to question our wisdom in launching the Round Table initiative. We were forced to this by the projections of economic developments, which were coming true in their blackest scenario" (282).
For in-house use there was talk of the forced hand behind the decision to legalize Solidarity and start formal negotiations with the opposition. To the outside world, the accent was on the good will and an approach allegedly derrived from own traditions as declared by the Politbureau, "The present agreements go back in their underlying philosophy to the very beginnings of People's Poland, the Polish road to socialism, and also the re-evaluations of October 1956" (320). And so an imperative was turned into virtue
The first words of warning could be heard immediately after the first debates at the tenth plenary meeting. General Kiszczak, who took the most pessimistic view of the whole situation, noted i.a. that "the situation among our allies (meaning the satellite United Peasants' and Democratic parties) leads to the conclusion that in the Parliament we may face a situation going against us" (234). By mid-February Kazimierz Cytryniak was enlightning his comrades that the Round Table "set in motion processes, which we will no longer be able to halt. What is left to us is to control and guide them" (283). Yet there were no really good ideas on how to go about it. The opposition obtained practically everything with which it came to the negotiating table, and it looked that not only guiding, but even controlling would prove difficult, if not impossible. Already by mid-February General Kiszczak proposed adding a strong safeguard to any agreement: "the President should be elected by the present Parliament for a seven year term of office" (283). He continued "For us, the important thing is to win the elections, and not the style in which we will win them" (284). And he summed it up; "We should not resign power through the ballot" (284). The very same thing was repeatedly said by Gomulka in the years 1945-47, and again in 1956.
Yet, even though the idea of a joint list of candidates and a joint declaration was completely rejected by the opposition, and even though it was realized that "the situation is not developing in a direction favorable to us" (348), could find no trace in the documents of any thought of solving the problems by resort to force, General Jaruzelski counted on the possibility of winning over "the immense center of the society which has not made up its mind" (349) and directly before the elections believed that anything less than 40% of the seats in the Senate for the government side — in elections in which there was no pre-apportionment of seats — would be a "disastrous" result (371). The June 4 elections dispelled any such illusions: the opposition scored a crushing victory and in the Senate captured 99% of the seats. That was the style of electoral "victories" in the system of practical socialism. Qualms were voiced, perhaps for the last time, before the second round of elections. On June 16, at a meeting of the Secretariat, General Jaruzelski unexpectedly noted: "We face a dilemma — whether to live with this or to decide on a drastic course of action which could yield grave repercussions" (409). Such decisions were never taken. The top rulers from PZPR reconciled with the situation.
On the basis of documents and statements to which I had access, and on which this article is based, one may draw the following conclusions:
General Jaruzelski's team lost control over a maneuvre designed to defuse social tensions and to spread responsibility for the then experienced, but above all for the still expected, economic difficulties. It realized that, as Jaruzelski put it to Jakes, it was embarking on a "great historical experiment." Yet there is nothing to indicate that this experiment was meant to go beyond modification, and only such modification, of the structures of practical socialism which would allow for absorbing the opposition within them. The fact that it proved impossible to atomize the opposition dictated the eventual scope of modifications, going beyond anything tried earlier. Return to the logic of martial law could imply the takeover of power by another team, especially as this time around a military operation to reinstate order would probably not prove sufficient in itself. It would have to be accompanied by reimposition of Stalinist mechanisms of both terror and "cultural revolution".
After passing the point of "critical mass" buildup, "All the General's People" and Jaruzelski himself have condemned themselves to trying to outrun — not just Walesa, but even their own comrades. Despite warning signals, they did not falter in their pace; "we ourselves are tightening the noose on ourselves, we are going as sheep for slaughter" said General Kiszczak in February (284). Yet there is no evidence that such determination had any underpinning in ideological roots, so eagerly claimed post factum. Something which started as a political game, to which the Party sat down with a stronger hand, ended as an all-out battle, the fates of which were sealed by the electorate.
This article originally appeared in Polish in Edmund Wnuk-Lipinski, ed., After Communism — A Multidisciplinary Approach to Radical Social Change (Warsaw: Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, 1995). Translated from Polish by Witold Kmiecik.
References
AAN; Archiwum Akt Nowych, zespol "KC PZPR" [Archives of New Documents, section "KC PZPR"]
Dubinski, K., 1990
Magdalenka. Transakcja epoki [Magdalenka. Deal of the Era]. Warszawa.
General Kiszczak..., 1991
General Kiszczak m6wi ... prawie wszystko (General Kiszczak Says It ... Almost All]. Warszawa.
G6rnicki, W., 1994
Teraz juz mozna [Now One Is Already Allowed]. Wroclaw 1994.
Majer, P., 1993
Polska i Swiat 1989 - 1992 [Poland and the World, 1989 - 1992). Warszawa.
Messner, Z., 1993
Kuglarze i ksiegowi [Conjures and Bookkeepers] Warszawa.
Nastroje..., 1992
"Nastroje przed bitwa". Zeszyty Historyczne (Paryz). vol. 100.
Ostatni rok..., 1994
Ostatni rok wladzy 1988 - 1989. Tajne dokumenty Biura Politycznego i Sekretariatu KC [Last Year in Power, 1988 - 1989. Secret Documents of Politbureau and Central Commitee Secretariat]. Londyn.
Panstwo..., 1993
Panstwo - Kosciol 1980 - 1989. Tajne dokumenty. [State - Church 1980 - 1989. Secret Documents. Londyn 1993.
Rakowski, M.F., 1991
Jak to sie stalo [How This Came About]. Warszawa.
Spoleczenstwo..., 1994
Spoleczenstwo i wladza w badaniach CBOS [The Public and Authorities in Surveys of the CBOS Polling Organization]. Warszawa.
Urban, J. (undated)
Jajakobyly.Spowiedz zycia Jerzego Urbana [Mare's Bollocks (or, read separately, "I as the Former") Life Confession of Jerzy Urban]
Endnotes
Note 1: Somewhat arbitrarily, but following the practice of most authors, the parliamentary elections of June 4 (and 18), 1989 were accepted as this historical juncture. Back.
Note 2: These documents are held in a huge section designated as "KC PZPR" in the State Archives of New Documents in Warsaw (Archiwum Akt Nowych — AAN); I had covered the query about 100 volumes of documents. Back.
Note 3: Among these particularly notable are: Rakowski, 1991; Kiszczak 1991; Messner, 1993; Urban, undated; Gornicki, 1994. Back.
Note 4: A sub- (or super-) version of this hypothesis is the opinion that the same maneuvre was carried out in the entire Soviet bloc and was masterminded from the very center. Back.
Note 5: What will happen, "if one day there is an explosion [...] and we point out that, after all, someone could interfere in our domestic affairs, and yet if that someone, considering his own interests, will refuse to interfere?" wrote Mieczyslaw F. Rakowski in a memorandum presented to the General Rakowski, 1991, p. 101). Back.
Note 6: Gorbachev's policy I...] places the Polish leaders in a difficult position. It is increasing the demands on authorities [...] with gradually eroding effectiveness of the threat of 'Soviet bogey' which in Poland serves as the real safety valve" wrote Stanislaw Ciosek, Wladyslaw Pozoga and Jerzy Urban in their report for General Jaruzelski (Nastroje.... 1992, p. 67). Back.
Note 7: This stems from the Analizy wewnatrzpartyjnej konsultacji tez Biura Politycznego [Analysis of Inter-Party Consultation of the Theses of Politbureau], carried out in 47 voivodships [administrative provinces] (out of 49). See: AAN, ref. 452, vol. 2, pp. 142-148. Back.