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CIAO DATE: 03/02
Intermarium
Poles' Responses to the Realities of 1944-1947: Questions for Consideration
Krystyna Kersten
The question that I would like to pose here is the following: what was the reaction of the Polish people to the situation that Poland found itself in as the war was ending and peace beginning? But the question in this form is too imprecise and requires a few clarifications. First of all, the chronological boundaries of this reflection are delimited by the dynamics of the threat to Polish sovereignty emerging from the power relationships prevailing within the Allied camp in the final phase of the war. The starting point is January 4, 1944, when the Red Army crossed the border established by the Treaty of Riga — the only border authorized by international agreements. The threat to Polish sovereignty, the possibility of which had been lurking since 1943, took form as half of Poland's pre-war territory came under occupation for a second time. The closing point is the ultimate liquidation of a truly independent, or real (as opposed to symbolic), Polish political actor, in the final phase represented by Mikolajczyk and his PSL. In this time frame, between January 1944 and January 1947, the old Polish question "What next? How to act?" became dramatically contemporary. A struggle was being waged for Polish sovereignty — its existence and its extent. It was fought on two levels: the geopolitics of Great Powers, and Polish politics, in Poland and abroad.
A second issue: in my title I use the word "Poles" — not "the society," not "the nation," but "Poles." I do not make this distinction out of a conviction that the actions of Poles should be set apart from those of Jews, Ukrainians, or Byelorussians. The attitude of ethnic minorities to communist rule is a different topic, and this is not the place to discuss it. I write "Poles" in order to encompass both society and authorities — both those in exile and in Poland, the constitutional successors of the chief statesmen of the Republic and those who were illegitimate, not only in a legal sense — the group surrounding the Krajowa Rada Narodowa and the Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia Narodowego. I accept that, both as a result of unfolding events and because such was the intention of practically all political camps, including the communists, Poland was becoming and would become a one-nation state, the national state of the Polish nation. National, but not necessarily nationalistic.
When considering the reactions of Poles to the situation facing them, I include the following political actors in my reflections:
The term "situation," and especially the enigmatic concept of rzeczywistosc ("circumstances"), both also require development and clarification. The latter term was a favorite of politicians and editorialists of the day; they spoke and wrote of "the new rzeczywistosc," of approaches to "the new rzeczywistosc." This was true of "Glos Ludu" ("The People's Voice") but the concept often appeared on the pages of underground bulletins as well. On the part of the communists this reflected a tendency to obscure the existing situation, which varied from known and established formulas. It was not freedom, but neither was it enslavement. At first, especially in underground circles, terms such as "occupation," "new occupation," and "Soviet occupation" were used, but these were inconsistent both with fact and with public opinion; let us remember that the point of reference was the German occupation.
The Polish situation after World War II was shaped by factors such as the following: the imposition of changes to the territory of the state; a new regime put in power by the use of force, dependent on outside forces, lacking wide public support, regarded as alien by a large part of the society; direct intervention by the USSR into internal affairs and a complete lack of sovereignty in foreign policy; mass repressions, in some periods reaching the scale of massive terror (spring 1945, early 1946, autumn 1946); the destruction of the country, dispersion of Poles outside of the country's borders, the resulting need to eliminate the lingering effects of the war and to reconstruct all aspects of life at the level of the individual, the society, and the state; finally, the physical and mental exhaustion of the society, the destruction of many old structures and social groups, the drastic erosion of elites, which were the particular target of the occupiers, and the decimation of the most dynamic individuals who had been involved in the armed underground. The destruction of the society did not cease with the German occupation but continued in the post-war period. It began with the internment and subsequent deportation to the USSR of thousands of Home Army soldiers. Up to mid-1945, at least a dozen camps holding Home Army veterans were in operation within Poland's new borders. The prisoners' fates varied — some died without trial, some were deported into remote parts of the USSR, others were recruited into the Polish Army. The repressions began an escalating spiral of resistance and terror whose victims numbered in the tens of thousands. The wave of arrests and deportations executed directly by the NKVD also encompassed thousands of people not belonging to the Home Army. If one were to count short detentions and interrogations, it would not be an exaggeration to say that the repressions affected a significant portion of the society's elites, in the broad sense of the word "elites," i.e. persons active in their fields, from rural local government officials to university professors.
1
Polish reactions to the situation — formed under increasing Soviet pressure as the Red Army gained ground — though extremely varied, do form a pattern when taken in the aggregate. The pattern is one of interaction between two forces: the force of accommodation vs. the force of resistance, i.e., the force that rejected everything that threatened the community and its culture. The interplay of the two forces can be identified in the decisions of politicians and military leaders — in Poland and in London, in the choices made by intellectuals, and in the natural, unrationalized actions of millions of people. The relationship between and proportions of the two forces in the actions of specific individuals and groups in Poland and abroad depended on conditions imposed from without and on evaluations and predictions of how events would develop in Poland and on a global scale. Social, ideological, and political affiliations also played a role, either facilitating accommodation or discouraging it. Accommodation and resistance grew from a single root — the imperative to survive. The biological and cultural survival of the nation and the survival of the Polish state as a protector of the material and cultural life of Poles. A consequence of the yoking of adaptive processes with resistance, be it passive or active, conscious or instinctive, was the appearance of a gap between ideology, the sphere of symbols and values, and everyday actions made necessary by the basic necessities of life. The coexistence and osmosis between the two spheres, which influenced one another, characterized the attitudes and behavior of Polish society from the moment that the communists began to set up their rule. The relationship between the spheres was dynamic, it changed along with developments in Poland and the evolution of the international situation from the "Grand Alliance" to the Cold War. On the domestic scene, the events that had the most influence on the attitudes and behavior of the society, including its elites, were without a doubt the following: the Warsaw Uprising, the Yalta conference, the creation — after months of negotiations - of the Provisional Government of National Unity and Mikolajczyk's return to Poland, the annexation of the western lands and the great migrations that accompanied it, the June 1946 referendum and January 1947 elections, which definitively confirmed the communists' monopoly on power, with all of its implications.
The interaction of accommodation and resistance on different levels (politics, culture, the workplace and everyday life) and on different levels (intellectual, emotional, moral) had unusually important consequences. It meant survival, but for many members of the generation faced with choices large and small, it was to be ruinous, the source of spiritual destruction stemming from the depraving concessions and compromises that were demanded. Annuals of Nowa Kultura from 1951-1954 make for the saddest reading in Polish literature, not so much because of the unambiguously engagé writings of Woroszylski or Kazimierz Brandys. More depressing are the articles by Dabrowska, Slonimski, Nalkowska, not to mention Iwaszkiewicz's "Letter to the President." In his book Wracam z Polski published by Kultura in 1948, which stirred considerable controversy in the émigré community at the time, Aleksander Janta Polczynski quoted remarks made to him by a friend living in Poland: "Every day it's another thread, you don't even feel it as it wraps around you. You don't think about it — it's so thin, so light, so insignificant. You even get used to it, but every day there is a new thread. One day you wake up and find yourself tied up. But the threads are invisible. You don't feel them, at best you just feel anxious, or you feel something tightening. And that's the sign that they're at work. They bite their way in deep, to the soul. They wind around your conscience and only when they have it wrapped up and entangled in their coils of pressure and influence do you jerk. And by then it may be too late." 1 Hanna Malewska wrote at that time: "If one does not live as one thinks, one begins to think as one lives." 2 But a significant part of the society, not excluding the left, could not live according to the values that they believed in.
The difficult harnessing of resistance and accommodation that was — more or less consciously — the life of all Poles in the spring of 1947 was elevated to the rank of a program by a Warsaw group of WiN veterans that had survived the repressions. The main idea of the "Open letter to Polish Socialists" was that the status quo would last, and that "we are the only ones who can and will do something good for Poland now." It thus appealed as follows: "We must not take up arms. We must not express our views openly, because that plays into the hands of the communists, identifies oppositionists, and enables them to liquidate the best Poles. Instead our highest ideal in domestic politics should be to save the largest possible number of Poles from death and destruction, to preserve them until true independence comes. We cannot openly oppose current developments because if we do they will take place without our participation, with no benefit for us, and this will only serve the communists." Positing that the communists worked in a camouflaged fashion, it continued: "Neither can we fight openly or play Don Quixotes. There will be no big operations or events, no Tobruks or Monte Cassinos, but mundane, ant-like, very small-scale work. Today's battle is not one of arms but of ideas, a battle for the nation's soul, for the support of the masses. Only the nation whose members win this battle will survive. Finally it was once again emphasized: "Let us not take up arms. We participate actively in all forms of political, social, and economic life. We sabotage the occupier's efforts to destroy Polishness. We help each other, we warn each other, we seek the cooperation of all Poles, regardless of political views or class, on an equal basis." 3
This program is one of a number of efforts to create a model of resistance designed to suit both conditions and to widely-held social feelings — a model of resistance that did not exclude the possibility of adaptation to the circumstances. If in the autumn of 1945 WiN's creators wished to channel the Armia Krajowa movement into political struggle (of necessity, given the lack of civil rights, to be waged underground), then two years later, in the underground's last days, the idea of camouflage was coming to the fore. This could take many forms: the active "Wallenrodism" postulated in the quoted document, or a feigned passivity, acceptance of the yoke, in order to preserve an internal, tightly concealed independent identity. It seems that the latter describes the path chosen by a large part of the society. It is true that Polish society wanted peace, stability, and normality above all; it is true that its energies were directed toward the work of reconstruction rather than struggle, even political struggle. In any case, there was no longer any place for struggle. This was not, however, equivalent to surrender, capitulation, passivity, and acceptance of the imposed order. There continued an unorganized, uncoordinated, spontaneous — one is tempted to say "natural" — resistance to everything perceived as alien. This was resistance on a fundamental level, in the name of values such as land, family, creed, tradition, Western civilization, freedom. It was put up even by those who considered the communist takeover to be inevitable. Dominik Horodynski wrote in Dzis i Jutro of the unbreakable bond between Polish culture and Western culture and Catholicism. "Catholicism has determined both our cultural production and our political tendencies," he wrote. "One can consider this fact either as a positive or as a negative.... In any case it is a historical fact that we must always bear in mind when we speak of our future and the future of Europe." 4 Poland's cultural tissue produced antibodies that either eliminated foreign elements — including positive ones — or transformed them. The concept of resistance articulated in the "Open Letter to Polish Socialists" was an effort to reconcile the two forces of accommodation and resistance — though seemingly conflicting, they in fact complemented one another, setting out the terms of survival. Survival not merely in a biological sense, in the form of an atomized, enslaved, and re-collectivized mass, but survival of a common culture, retention of an identity shaped by history.
Protest, resistance, opposition to the emerging totalitarian regime, which sought to subordinate all aspects of private and public life to the ideological and organizational control of the state, took many forms: legal and clandestine, organized and spontaneous. Examples were the struggle of the PSL for free elections and true political pluralism, the efforts of the Church to combat the "offensive of godlessness," voting "no" in the referendum, singing "Lord, return freedom to our Fatherland" in churches, crowds cheering Mikolajczyk and participating in the ceremonies of the consecration of Poland to the protection of the Virgin Mary, first at the diocesan level and finally in a national ceremony on 8 September 1946 at Jasna Gora. One can name the resistance of scouts, of the Polish Teachers' Union, and, most of all, the resistant behavior, often requiring great determination, of hundred of thousands of people. Tradition dating back to the partitions aided the development of a resistant sclerotium that would be the source of open opposition activity in the future.
Stanislaw Kasperlik — a veteran of the BCh and PSL activist — made a speech in January 1947 at a belated holiday oplatek gathering after the elections that neatly expressed the idea of accommodation and resistance as two intertwined faces of survival. He said: "Blow after blow comes down on us and repressive policies are becoming increasingly acute. For that reason I think that it is time to consider and to decide what needs to be done in the near future so that none of us will be exposed to the generally known persecutions and chicaneries. I believe that the organization should soon fall asleep, fall into a sort of hibernation. It is difficult to say how long the period of hibernation will last. I do know that after sleep the body is always rested, healthy, and strong." 5
2
The complementary relationship between accommodation and resistance in the behavior of Poles expressed itself in the realm of politics in the form of interacting, and often violently conflicting, concepts and actions. Then, as now, different political groups were seen in terms of paradigms and dichotomies deeply rooted in our thinking: realists vs. romantics, insurrection vs. organic work, compromise vs. struggle, as well as left vs. right. This was a sign of the tendency of Polish thinking to run along traditional lines, to order the world according to old patterns, but to a large extent these intellectual efforts were also the product of a widespread ideological and political crisis that had been brewing at least since the middle of 1943. The crisis was strengthened and exacerbated by actions taken by the communist camp. The intersection of these three factors: traditional thinking, disenchantment with the government of the Republic and its policies, together with disillusionment regarding the Western allies, and the conscious efforts of police, politicians, and ideologues representing the communist order, served to create and prolong a distorted picture of the general situation and of the Polish political scene. Myth-making was all the easier since the documents that would allow one to realistically evaluate the different Polish policy options, especially Soviet documents, are still not available to this day. Debates on the most important decisions, remain complete speculation — sometimes intelligent and competent speculation, sometimes less so. I have in mind decisions such as the Sikorski government's appeal to the International Red Cross for an investigation into the graves of Polish officers discovered by the Germans at Katyn, the Republic's failure to accept the Curzon line, the Warsaw Uprising, the dismissal of Mikolajczyk in November 1944, the rejection by the government (but acceptance by the authorities of the Underground State) of the Yalta agreements, the dissolution of the Council of National Unity and the Armed Forces Delegacy, the continuation of underground activity in various forms, and the rejection by Mikolajczyk of the proposed electoral coalition. In each case, the authors of these decisions are accused of being unrealistic, not taking circumstances into account, and operating on the basis of imponderabilia or resentments.
Looking back from today's perspective and state of knowledge, limited as it is, it seems that no Polish policy, no matter how wise and realistic, could have prevented the incorporation of Poland into the sphere of Soviet domination, i.e., the setting up of communist power. The most that Poles could achieve by their behavior was to increase or decrease the costs and benefits associated with the process to which they were subjected, both in the short-term and in terms of long-term survival. This is not trivial. There is another, more important aspect, however. We often forget that in the period under discussion, especially in the first two years beginning in mid-1946, the international situation was still not stable. The struggle to shape the post-war world was still being waged and its outcome remained unclear. Proving this assertion would take too long, but it is enough to say that events could take one of two paths: either the continuation of the wartime Great Power alliance in the United Nations Organization dreamed up by Roosevelt, or a conflict between the wartime Allies leading to the defeat of one side or the other. Each of these paths would have different implications for Poland. So the starting points for the thinking and behavior of all Polish political actors, with the exception of the communists, who identified with the USSR for ideological reasons, were evaluations of the international situation and its likely future development. These evaluations were the foundations of three basic orientations, representing three different approaches to the dilemmas that faced Poland in 1945. The new orientations to a large extent disrupted the old ideological divisions dating from the interwar period. Rightist, leftist, and centrist groups — nationalists, socialists, peasant activists, Christian democrats, left-wing democrats — could be found in each of the three camps, though not in equal proportions.
What were the three orientations?
3
Orientation I — let us call it the "hawks," although the term sounds ironic and its members do not deserve irony but rather in-depth analysis — worked on two basic assumptions. The first was the inevitability of armed conflict between the USSR and the West. The second was the impossibility of equal partnership with the communists, that political pluralism, coalition rule, and free elections could not be genuine in the presence of the Red Army. The consistent anti-communism of the spokesmen of this group allowed them to see that the concept of a truly independent Poland acceptable to the USSR was an example of wishful thinking. One could go on for pages citing documents, statements by politicians, and press articles published in Poland and abroad affirming the "hawkish" orientation and showing its rationales. The chief advocates of not making compromises and waiting for the international situation to change were: President Raczkiewicz and the London government after Mikolakczyk's dismissal, Generals Anders and Sosnkowski, the majority of the intellectual elite abroad and a minority of it in Poland. Among the emigres, this line was supported by nationalist parties — including the Stronnictwo Narodowe — but it also had support among socialists like Tomasz Arciszewski, Adam Pragier, and Adam Ciolkosz. It was less popular among peasant leaders and Christian democrats, which is apparent from the choices made by the leaders of these two groupings: Stanislaw Mikolajczyk and Karol Popiel. In Poland the "no compromise" line was adopted by many politicians from the nationalist camp. It was these groups that in 1945 sharply criticized the Moscow agreement and Mikolajczyk's decision to enter the Provisional Government of National Unity, and also decried the self-dissolution of the Council of National Unity and the liquidation by Colonel Rzepecki of the Armed Forces Delegacy in Poland. The underground newspaper "Zew Narodu" wrote in July 1945: "We do not recognize any governments like the present one, we do not recognize such elections. We will fight for the Nation's right to a voice, to freedom and greatness.... We have pity and disgust for those who did not persist, who broke down and have gone astray."
The underground press of the time, not only the nationalist press, often voiced such opinions. It bemoaned that "several leading figures are breaking down." It is impossible to say how widespread this attitude was in the society, or how widely and in what social groups was held the idea that a compromise with the communists is tantamount to collaboration and inconsistent with the duties of a Pole. But it was certainly not limited to the "Bec-Walskis" ridiculed in the satirical magazine Przekroj.
The position taken by spokesmen for the "hawks" did not, as one might think, preclude cooperation of any kind with the communists on the principle that "the worse things get, the better." Such a position was taken by some, especially among those who had chosen or had been forced to remain outside the mainstream seeking peace, normalization, and reconstruction. But the underground's leadership circles realized that cooperation was a condition of existence, a condition of preserving the "biological substance" and "cultural substance" that the communists were said to threaten.
If the situation at the time was "an intermission between wars," as "Polska Niezawisla," an organ of the Polish Democratic Party, had it, then it was necessary to ensure that Poland made it through the intermission intact as far as possible. 6 Thus although the underground papers argued that Poland was still an occupied country, that "an honest Pole sees no difference between German and Russian collaborators," that "the only difference is in the direction of betrayal — East or West," at the same time they appealed to the society as follows: "The regime is temporary and so are our problems, but our approach to the most important questions facing the state cannot be temporary, and certainly our generation's responsibility for the future of the recovered western territories cannot be temporary." The quote is from an article bearing the telling title "The Fatalism of Temporariness and Passive Resistance," which appeared in the third issue of the newspaper "Wolnosc" ("Freedom") dated November 3, 1945. The article described the bleak economic situation in the country and criticized the authorities' actions, and went on to say: "... this state of affairs will not be changed by passively waiting for the normalization of Polish affairs... Though the existing state of economic anarchy was in large measure caused by the absurd policies of the Provisional Government, it is to some extent the responsibility of the society to overcome the state of anarchy and maneuver the economy onto a path of reconstruction so as to ensure a living for the populace.... We repeat: people who are directly or indirectly responsible for the fate of the Polish economy must be conscious of the difference between state and nation — immutable factors in our history — on the one hand and the policies of the government, a passing destructive influence, on the other."
This reasoning was even more clearly expressed in the article "Voice of the Polish Underground," which emphasized: "First of all and above all we declare our active cooperation in the reconstruction of the state. We will try to exert a decisive influence on the Polish people's reaction to the call to work, and to convince the people that, regardless of the political situation in the state, the necessity to work effectively is a basic element of the struggle for the country's political rights that we are currently waging." 7
Of course this is only a single voice of the Polish underground, a significant one in the sense that it belies the stereotypical image of the post-war resistance. The quoted passages — examples of many that expressed similar ideas — strikingly show a deep feeling of responsibility for the country and a consciousness of being able to play an active role in relation to the authorities. They reveal a concern that the society, once deprived of its influence, will fall into a malaise, indifference, and passivity — the first step to being enslaved.
From today's perspective there can be no doubt that this model of struggle and resistance was far more dangerous to the system, which was based on atomizing the society and objectifying it, than armed resistance. The latter could even be used to justify mass repressions and as a tool in political skirmishing. This was understood by underground leaders and others in Poland, as well as by emigre politicians. On November 28, 1946, Tomasz Arciszewski's government, under the (false) impression that the mood in Poland threatened to lead to the use of force, published the following appeal: "The Government of the Republic has several times pointed out the pointlessness and harmfulness of armed resistance to the current regime in Poland. The Government of the Republic feels that a reminder of its position is necessary today, as intensification of terror and new provocations threaten to push many Poles onto the path of armed struggle. It is of the highest importance to remind all people of good will in Poland that armed struggle in Poland will not recover independence, but it will serve as a pretext for extermination policies designed to destroy completely the element of the society that is most willing to sacrifice. The Government of the Republic appeals to all citizens not to create any new armed organizations, and to immediately leave any existing ones. Commanders of such organizations should disband them. Anyone who does not obey the Government but continues the armed struggle, taking advantage of the patriotism of Polish youth, will be putting valuable lives in unnecessary danger, and will be guilty of a deplorable act." 8
Arciszewski's successor, General Bor-Komorowski, will write some time later that underground resistance movements under the communists are unsustainable in the long run, and even harmful, since they give the authorities a pretext for pacifications and lead to the breaking of the most patriotic and dedicated element of the society. 9
In terms of domestic politics, by the autumn of 1945 there was not much room to maneuver in a way that was consistently uncompromising. Effective repressions had put an end to the illusions of nationalist politicians who had hoped to take the helm of the underground state, whose government remained in exile. The government persisted and maintained its claim to constitutional legality. In a declaration made after the January 1947 elections, the position of the President's address of June 29, 1945, was reiterated, reaffirming that the elections "had in no way met universally accepted norms for free elections," and therefore: "Given the situation the President and the Government appointed by him will continue to perform their duties until the Polish Nation on free soil expresses its will in free, democratic elections untainted by any compulsion or threats." 10
As the international situation grew increasingly tense, hopes rose that this would take place, if not in the near, then in the foreseeable future. A government policy statement on July 20, 1947, wrote that "in the face of the escalating conflict between the Great Powers, the Government proclaims that the Polish Nation, exhausted by the last war, should conserve its strength. Nevertheless, in the conflict between the communist world and the world of Christian civilization, freedom of nations, and human dignity, Poland's place is in the Western camp, and Poles in exile should play the leading role in this regard." 11 At Cabinet meetings it was often claimed that "Russia will be forced into open conflict," and that "the main principle of Polish policy should be avoiding insurrectionist policies of the past." 12
By bringing in statements made by the Polish government in exile, I have entered the sphere of behavior and actions that were for the most part symbolic and had limited influence on shaping the situation in Poland. I include that part of the situation that is created by people's attitudes. There is much evidence — direct and indirect — that the authority of the Tomasz Arciszewski government and the confidence placed in it diminished rapidly, beginning almost with the moment of its creation. They diminished even in the circles that, until June 1945, were the representatives of the government's authority in Poland. One can even speak of a second phase of the discrediting of pre-war political elites in the eyes of a large part of the society, the first phase being the defeat suffered in September 1939. The situation was similar, just as in 1939 the Republic's leaders were unable to protect the state and society, so after victory over the Germans they were unable to prevent territorial losses and the erection of a regime usually regarded as alien. The government was blamed for the fact that, for Poles, victory brought a new defeat — that the end of the war did not end the struggle begun on September 1, 1939.
The psychological reflex to point out those responsible for disappointments and losses, as well as the need to rationalize and justify compromise, or even conformism and opportunism, immeasurably encouraged the spread in Polish society of an orientation that might be called opposition within the Yalta framework. This orientation, which combined compromise on the one hand and struggle for (broadly speaking) internal autonomy and the preservation of pluralism on the other, took many forms. Their shape depended on the proportion between compromise and opposition to the communists' efforts to build a monopoly on power, as well as on differences in the perception of acceptable limits of compromise and the character and extent of resistance. Besides this it had various dimensions: political, professional, social, quotidian. At its foundation were the rejection of the communist-imposed order as contrary to national and social aspirations, and the conviction that Poland's external situation would not change in the foreseeable future. What is more, for many such a change would not be a positive development from the Polish point of view given the German threat, intensified by the shifting of the Polish state to the Oder and Neisse Rivers. That forced a battle for values within the boundaries determined by international agreements and geopolitics.
The symbol of this opposition orientation is without a doubt Stanislaw Mikolajczyk. It was also chosen by the Church, led by Primate Hlond and Krakow Archbishop Adam Sapieha, and enjoyed considerable popularity in intellectual circles, or, more broadly, among the intelligentsia. This orientation was the basis for the political activity of the PSL and Karol Popiel's Labor Party. But neither was it foreign to many people still operating in the underground, especially in 1945, such as the founders of WiN, exemplified by Colonel Jan Rzepecki, head of the Information and Propaganda Office of the Chief Command of the Home Army, later the last Delegate of the Armed Forces in Poland. Both the PSL and WiN — in its early phase before the dispersion of its leaders by a wave of arrests in November 1945 — considered that the key question in that phase was that of free and unfettered elections. To put it another way, the effort to hold elections seemed the only even slightly realistic chance to shape the Polish situation, given international agreements. The only other options were to uncompromisingly wait for a conflict to break out between the Allies that would change Poland's situation, or capitulation, defined as passivity, apathy, or political cooperation with the communists. On the other hand, despite views popularly held today, the option of waiting with no compromise would probably have been just as debilitating for the society's moral condition, not to mention its material and cultural condition. I have in mind, among other things, positions and behavior adopted by intellectuals, who recently have so readily been pilloried for the choices they made at the time.
As I said before, the differences within the opposition orientation, which included the legal PSL, Church, social associations and organizations, the underground, and millions of people not engaged in activity that was political per se, but who manifested their opposition to the new regime in various ways, were a matter of the forms of resistance and acceptable limits of compromise. There is no question that the popular support and influence of groups remaining underground were gradually decreasing. The underground press, which had played such an important role in maintaining public morale under the German occupation, was losing its significance, though in 1946 there were still a few dozen papers appearing, some more regularly than others. Fear rooted itself increasingly widely and deeply, skillfully spread by perfidious repressions, which were diametrically different from the primitive and brutal terror applied by the Germans.
But it was not only fear that prevented people from reading underground papers. The language and tone of the underground press was out of step with attitudes determined by everyday life. Words like "occupation" and "collaboration" could not strike a chord with readers engaged in positive efforts, if only professionally, who were forced, willingly or not, to work together with the "traitors" and "foreign agents" who were often described in the underground press in more or less primitive, even vulgar, terms. There existed a widening common ground between "true Poles" — a term often used by the underground papers — and the communists condemned by that press. This common ground did not extinguish the fundamental conflicts seen by both sides, but took them to a different level.
The model that most closely fit the views of the majority of the society was that represented by the PSL, and most of all by Mikolajczyk himself. If not the obstacles imposed by the authorities, the PSL would have attracted more numerous and far-reaching support than any previously known ideological or political movement. It achieved this in conditions that were increasingly repressive.
Mikolajczyk personified hope, especially at first. He was a politician of compromise, but not capitulation. Hence his decision to reject the proposition of a common electoral bloc put forward by the PPR and PPS. To agree to the bloc would have been to forego genuine elections and thus to betray all of the expectations that the society placed in Mikolajczyk. Had they taken this step, Mikolajczyk and the PSL would have entered the ranks of the third orientation — capitulation.
On the continuum of Polish political concepts and activity, as well as other behavior, in reaction to the events of the end of the war, the capitulation option is at the opposite pole from the "hawks." One could say that the maximalism of the uncompromising "hawks" and the minimalism of the capitulants formed the outer boundaries of the views of the vast majority of the Polish people.
Who should be counted among the capitulators? First and foremost those groups that, though hostile to the communists and distrustful of the USSR, decided in 1944-1946 that Poland's loss of independence was a fait accompli, and that therefore the boundary of the freedom and sovereignty that could be achieved for Poland was delineated by Stalin's will. They also considered that any effort to take power away from the communists, as would surely have happened in the event of free and unfettered elections, could result in the dismantling of the Polish state. This view was shared by many socialists and intellectuals, and some Catholic activists. People belonging to this orientation also wished to preserve what they considered to be higher values, but their resistance was very slight. They accepted the role given them by the communists. Those of them who came from left-wing backgrounds, such as the socialists, deluded themselves into thinking that at the end of the process lay the socialist Poland of their dreams.
Common to the three orientations described here was a belief that Poland had found itself in a bad situation in 1944-1945; some rejected this situation completely, others tried to modify or placate it. Some wanted to fight, others to give in to the fatalism of geopolitics and history, to conclude that right is on the side of the victors, to discard their "archaic wisdom." Jaroslaw Iwaszkiewicz would later write in his "Letter to the President":
I know, I understand a great deal now.
And I am trying to forget that which has passed,
I do not even look back, though I miss it a little...
...
And I know that You are right...
This bring us to those who "were right" — the communists.
4
There is no doubt in my mind that Polish communists, who were set apart from other formations in that the new order was — both ideologically and politically — their own, did belong to the group described in this article as "Poles." In fact, it was not only communists that identified with the new order — the post-war PPR from the very beginning was a party that was very ideologically heterogenous. Deciphering the real views, concepts, and movements within the PPR is very difficult, and certainly lies outside the scope of this short essay. The communists' approach to the situation — in their case not one imposed by force, but created by them — was one of a difficult balancing of identification with the USSR and Stalin's hegemony, and Polish patriotism and Polish interests, variously understood. This approach is different from that taken by the majority of the society.
The development of the international situation in the direction of cold war, and the shift in United States policy from Great Power cooperation to containment (which consisted of blocking further progress of communism while de facto recognizing its existing boundaries), made the defeat of the "hawkish," opposition, and capitulant orientations a certainty. The politicians and intellectuals representing these orientations either left the country (usually illegally), went to prison, or made a declaration of loyalty, after which they either left political life or continued to be active, accepting the growing domination of the communists. Some were internally broken, others preserved their intellectual and moral strength.
What about the masses of people who were expressing their aspirations and hope in whatever way they could? They protested using the referendum ballot and strikes, demanding genuine recognition of their role, not propaganda slogans. Feelings of civic and national consciousness had been strengthened a great deal by the war. Zygmunt Zaremba wrote at the time in Trzecia Rzeczpospolita that the Polish nation demanded a Republic "based on a powerful internal strength, a union between state and nation, a union that can only be achieved by realizing the principles of social justice and civil liberties."
Polish society, whose national consciousness had been greatly intensified by the wartime period, found itself in a position that was the result of a tangle of contradictions. Differences in attitudes reflected different approaches to resolving the tangle. It was not just a question of national sovereignty and the need to adapt to a situation characterized by, speaking very generally, dependence on the USSR. The national dimension, important as it was, was not the only dimension. Tadeusz Lepkowski keenly observed that there was interaction between, on one hand, the genuine "shifting of world views to the left" and genuine hopes to build a Third Republic different from the inter-war state, and, on the other hand, the actions of the communists who, in the transitional phase of "national roads to socialism," pretended to realize the same values, but in fact were working toward a totalitarian order that, step by step, would extend its control over every aspect of life, one by one: the state, the society, and the individual. The "hawks" saw that this was happening from the beginning, the advocates of compromise without capitulations saw also but hoped to fight for a last chance, while the capitulants — convinced that Poland's future was tied to the victory of communism — believed in the "Polish road to socialism."
Forty years of history, with its sharp turns, have put the orientations of that time to the test. Their creators and spokesmen, and even common people focused on their own everyday concerns, several times changed their attitudes and positions in the Polish political spectrum, which stretched from complete identification with the ruling authorities to absolute negation of the system erected in 1944-1945, calling itself in turn "people's democracy," "dictatorship of the proletariat," and "real socialism." Changes of position took place within the authorities and within the opposition — moreover, great migrations took place between these two spheres, advocates and opponents traded places and roles. A spectacular expression of this process are the biographies that begin in the post-war underground, continue through prison, and end with a cabinet seat. And vice versa — the roads leading from the peaks of the communist hierarchy to the underground of the martial law period. More than one of those who wrote the word "no" on walls in 1946 is today a party member, while more than one of those who chased them away at that time is now a member of the opposition. The young prætorians of the Stalinist period, so aggressively and confidently attacking "ideological enemies" and demasking "the reaction" at the time, sometimes later recovered the ability to see the real world behind the false facade and stood up for humanist values. While their contemporaries who in the most difficult years, marked by the destruction of the cultural tissue, the all-encompassing enslavement of the society, and fear, were opposed to the regime, sometimes allowed themselves to go along with the appeals of the regime when the latter became less coercive and life became easier.
People changed their attitudes toward the regime, but the division into orientations outlined above remained, I think, in place. The system implanted as a result of the war went through various phases. There seems to be a chasm between the realities of 1988 and the realities of 1952. It is difficult not to notice the changes, but at the same time it is impossible to deny that fundamentally the system has not changed. The communists see this — they express it by appealing to the myth of a return to the beginnings of Polish socialism without the deformations blamed on Stalinism. The opponents of the regime also see the situation in this light. So after forty odd years, with surprisingly small differences, we again see the friction between those who reject the possibility of partnership with the communists, those who advocate compromises stretching the sphere of independence and freedom, and — most importantly — compromises that are the only chance for dragging Poland out of the pit in which it is buried. The ruling camp opposes both of the orientations, as it did years ago. It is also heterogenous, but united by the belief that change must come only within the system of power, in the form of modifications that do not threaten the foundations of the arrangement.
Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose. The historian often has the impression that he is watching the same play for a second time, with slightly different scenery and costumes, with new actors in the leading roles. The analogies between that time and the present are sometimes frightening, while the differences allow us to have hope.
This article originally appeared in Polish in Res Publica (February 1990). Translated from Polish by Dawid Walendowski.
Endnotes
Note 1: A. Janta, Wracam z Polski (Paris: 1948), p. 70. Back.
Note 2: H. Malewska, "Uwagi o wolnosci mysli," Dzis i jutro, no. 21 (130), 23 May 1984, pp. 54-58, mimeographed. Back.
Note 3: Centralne Archiwum KC PZPR 295-VII-189, "List otwarty do Polskich Socjalistów," signed by Prezydium Ruchu Niepodleglosciowego WiN, June 1947. Back.
Note 4: D. Horodynski, "Nalezymy do Europy. P. Zygmuntowi Nowakowskiemu z Londynu i p. Janowi Kottowi z Lodzi," Dzis i Jutro, no. 12/69, 23 March 1947. Back.
Note 5: Letter from Stanislaw Kasperlik to peasant activists and veterans of the Bataliony Chlopskie of Warsaw province, November 7, 1956 (in possession of the author's family). Back.
Note 6: Centralne Archiwum KC PZPR 295-II-204, k. 37. "Polska Niezawisla" no. 15 (27), 29 October 1946, printed, original. Back.
Note 7: Ibid., k. 154-155, "Wolnosc" no. 3, 1 November 1945, original, mimeographed. Back.
Note 8: W. Sikorski Institute, London. Protocols of Cabinet meetings, 28 November 1946. Back.
Note 9: Studium Polski Podziemnej, London. General Bor-Komorowski Collection, file 1. Back.
Note 10: Protocol of the Cabinet meeting of 13 February 1947. Back.
Note 11: Studium Polski Podziemnej, London. Collections 5/42, appendix to the protocol of the Cabinet meeting of 20 August 1947. Back.
Note 12: Cf. discussion at the Cabinet meeting of 21 May 1947. Back.