The Perils of Performance: EU Foreign Policy and the Problem of Legitimization

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Abstract: This article argues that an important feature of contemporary EU foreign policy is the problem of legitimization. The article develops an account of EU foreign policy, from EPC in the 1970s to CFSP and the ESDP today, focusing on its function as a source of "damage limitation". The article then goes on to look at the emergence of pan-European legitimizing strategies for EU foreign policy, concentrating on the EU's "performance legitimacy". The article identifies a disjuncture between the emphasis on the *external effectiveness* of EU foreign policy found in this legitimizing strategy and the *internal functionality* of EU foreign policy encapsulated in "damage limitation". The article finds that relations between EU member states continue to trump their collective endeavour to act in the world. The article concludes that the limit of what the EU is able to achieve in international affairs should be located in the political sociology of the EU itself. Legitimacy provides a useful conceptual prism through which these internal limits and external actions can be connected.

Key words: EU foreign policy, European Political Cooperation (EPC), Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), legitimacy, identity, integration

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INTRODUCTION

This article explores the evolution of the European Union's (EU) foreign policy, from its origins in European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the 1970s to its expansion in the 1990s into the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The article analyses the changing role of legitimacy in the development of EU foreign policy. It is not seeking to provide an account of *how* and *why* EU foreign policy evolved from its origins in EPC to the wider role provided by CFSP and ESDP. This would require a sustained engagement with both geopolitical and institutional dynamics of Europe, and such "theories" of EU foreign policy have been debated at some length by others.[1] Instead, this article aims to uncover, at least in part, the evolving and as yet rather embryonic role that legitimacy plays in EU foreign policy. This role refers to the manner in which EU foreign policy is justified to its own architects in Brussels and in national capitals, to the domestic populations and to the wider world. It refers also to the *content* of these justifications.[2] The article aims to build upon existing work on the normative foundations of European integration. It draws in particular on work that has uncovered the assumptions about democracy and legitimacy that theories of European

integration have been based on.[3] The article pursues this same path, but focuses on EU foreign policy specifically. The article draws attention above all to what it identifies as a major disjuncture in the evolution of EU foreign policy. We see on the one hand an expanding *pan-European* set of legitimizing claims: from the superior *performance* of the EU to its distinctively *ethical* approach to international affairs. On the other hand, we observe in the political sociology of EU foreign policy a set of predominantly *national* dynamics and concerns, formulated in this article as the enduring "damage limitation" function of foreign policy cooperation. This disjuncture between the scope of the legitimizing claims and the degree of integration undertaken in foreign policy is becoming increasingly evident as attention is turned to the EU's international role and its legitimizing claims are being tested in the crucible of international affairs.

Conjoining the term legitimacy with both the EU and foreign policy may appear quixotic: the EU is beset with a series of legitimacy problems that go under the title "democratic deficit", and foreign policy is traditionally a prerogative power of the executive, thus limiting its need for legitimacy.[4] In fact, there are at least two good reasons why the concept of legitimacy is a useful prism through which we can analyse EU foreign policy. Firstly, this article follows David Beetham and others in supposing that legitimacy is not merely the "icing on the cake of power". Rather, it is the yeast, which is a core ingredient that enables the cake to rise in the first place.[5] It follows that legitimacy is not just an afterthought, i.e. what is used in order to mask the naked exercise of power. Instead, what an actor is able *to do* in the world depends in part upon its ability to legitimize its actions. Any expansion in the foreign policy of the EU thus poses the question of its legitimacy. This connection between agency and legitimate political power points to another valuable contribution of the concept of legitimacy: it draws together the study of EU foreign policy with that of European integration.[6] It is in the nature of legitimizing practices that they depend upon the political sociology of the actor in question: democratic states legitimize their actions in different ways from autocratic states, and international institutions draw upon sources of legitimacy distinct from those of nation-states.[7] An underlying assumption of this article is that the development and scope of the EU's foreign policy is connected to the social and political foundations of the EU. More specifically, we can understand the contemporary evolution of pan-European legitimizing narratives of EU foreign policy through an analysis of the changing dynamics of national foreign policy strategies in Europe. The concept of legitimacy connects EU integration and foreign policy and provides an opportunity to explore how the internal dynamics of EU integration might serve as a constraint upon what the EU can achieve as an actor in international politics.

The article begins by analysing the EPC and its function of "damage limitation". This function is explained with reference to the international and intra-European tensions of the 1970s. The article goes on to demonstrate the continued relevance of "damage limitation". It is a key function of CFSP, ESDP and of flagship EU strategic documents such as the European Security Strategy (ESS) of 2003. The article then turns to the growing role played by

legitimacy in the development of CFSP and ESDP. It focuses in particular on the notion of performance legitimacy, or what Javier Solana dubbed "legitimacy through action". The article identifies a tension between the internal functionality of EU foreign policy (damage limitation) and its legitimizing strategy of performance, which emphasizes above all the EU's external effectiveness in foreign policy. This tension is evident particularly in ESDP, and the article dwells upon the problems the EU has experienced in its ESDP missions. The article concludes with a return to the concept of legitimacy and asks what performance as a legitimizing strategy can reveal about the political sociology of the EU and of foreign policy cooperation in particular.

1. EU FOREIGN POLICY AS "DAMAGE LIMITATION"

The goal of EPC was cooperation between EC member states, not the realization of common goals at the international level. As set out in the 1970 Luxembourg Report and the 1973 Copenhagen Report, the goals of EPC were to ensure a *better mutual understanding* of the major problem of international politics through regular information and consultation, to promote a *harmonization of views* and the *coordination of positions* and to achieve a *common approach* to specific cases.[8] At issue was coordination rather than unity. Allen and Wallace observed of EPC that in its early stages of development, there was no mention of "common policy" at all. They pointed out that "there was no plan at all" and "only the flimsiest of guidelines for activity" existed.[9] The role of EPC as a response to the challenges the international situation posed for European unity was also clear, given the absence of intra-European consensus on what direction the development of EPC should take. Allen and Wallace concluded that "the fortunes of EPC still seem … to be more related to the nature of specific external stimuli than to any general integrative mood in Europe".[10] French President George Pompidou, in an interview in 1970 with Lucian Hubert-Rodier, made clear that EPC was intended to accommodate, and not transcend, national divergences,

> Wanting to say that from one day to the next there will be a political union is pure illusion. There is no chance whatsoever at the current time that we will have the same political position. The problems of cooperation are precisely about meeting, discussing, informing each other, and *rapprochement*, to one day have that common policy.[11]

EPC was thus born out of a rather defensive phase in European integration: states were concerned less with moving forward towards "ever closer union" than with holding the Community itself together. Wessels used the phrase of damage limitation in his observation of the purely *reactive* nature of EPC. It was not designed to project power abroad so much as to defend the EC against outside threats and challenges. In his words, "diplomacy can, as a rule, only consist of reactions to developments in outside states which cannot themselves be predetermined". As a result, "EPC can primarily be directed only towards damage limitation and the

neutralization of conflict".[12] For this reason, it would be misconceived to judge the EPC on the grounds of its effectiveness in contributing to world peace. Instead, we should consider "whether foreign policy cooperation benefits those for whom it was originally intended: the member states of the EU".[13] We can therefore think of the *function* of EPC in terms of an inwardly-directed form of "damage limitation". What mattered was not what EPC could achieve vis-à-vis the wider world nor in terms of its incarnation of anything quintessentially European. Rather, its usefulness was in diffusing tensions between EC member states. This is what is referred to throughout this article as the *internal functionality* of EU foreign policy.[14]

Evidence of such relatively modest goals can be found in the institutional make-up of the EPC. Its structure was firmly inter-governmental, a far cry from the supranational aspirations of the 1950s. The Luxembourg Report of 1970 clearly differentiated between the business of the EC and the political issues pertaining to EPC. The role of the European Commission was limited to making its views known only when the EPC work of foreign ministries directly affected the Commission's own business in some way. EPC enshrined this separation via some extreme procedural formalities: in 1973, foreign ministers were made to fly – on the same day – from Copenhagen to Brussels, so that EPC and Community matters would not be discussed in the same European capital.[15] Another sign was the extent to which EPC worked through the existing foreign ministries of EEC member states. The more discerning of such ministries saw EPC as a chance to regain the prestige that European integration had stolen from national diplomacy. Allen and Wallace note that "the readiness, even enthusiasm, with which officials in foreign ministries and embassies abroad took to the development of political cooperation" suggested "a bureaucratic instinct to expand their functions".[16] The Italian foreign ministry "almost immediately grasped the importance of exploiting the potential offered by EPC", whereas the political class "awoke to it only gradually".[17] Hill explained that "the process of coordination [of EPC] calls for a good deal of traditional diplomatic skill and creates a new level of high policy for [foreign] ministers whose monopoly over external relations had increasingly been challenged over recent decades".[18] This accounted for the enthusiasm of diplomats who had, in Simon Nuttall's words, been given "a European shop of their own to run".[19]

The historical context for EPC

Damage limitation was the function served by EPC because of the tensions and pressures that the EC was subjected to at the time. These tensions had their origins in the economic, social and political conflict that returned to Europe as the decades of postwar growth were coming to an end.[20] One problem was the re-nationalization of foreign economic policy, itself a response to the economic turbulence of the decade and to the return of class conflict in some European states.[21] Another was the shifting tides of the Cold War. The 1970s were marked by a period of détente between the two superpowers. This caused some concern in Europe, where it was felt that the United States might scale down its commitment to European defence, leaving Western Europe vulnerable to Soviet attack.[22] The different responses of

European powers to these shifting Cold War dynamics imported considerable tension into the Community, which it was hoped EPC might manage.

The general tenor of the period, particularly the concerns of European elites about the erosion of a common European economic and political interest, is well-expressed in the report produced for the EC member states by the Belgian prime minister, Leo Tindemans, in 1976. Tindemans had been given the task of defining "European Union" at a meeting of heads of state in Paris in December 1974. Significantly, he placed foreign policy cooperation and the EC's role in the world more generally at the forefront of his report. He argued that

> Our people expect the European Union to be, where and when appropriate, the voice of Europe. Our joint action must be the means of effectively defending our legitimate interests, it must provide the basis for real security in a fairer world, and enable us to take part in this dialogue between groups which clearly characterizes international life.[23]

This assertion of the need for European unity was made on the back of a series of concerns and warnings Tindemans gave throughout his report. Tindemans noted that in multilateral negotiations, the Nine needed to ensure that they could negotiate as a single entity. He recognized the difficulties of forging common positions given the trade tensions and heightened international competition, and yet he insisted that "the divergences of opinions and interests among the Nine, which are unavoidable when dealing with so vast a subject [i.e. the formation of a new world economic order], are not insuperable".[24] On another goal, that of ensuring close relations with the United States, Tindemans recognized that disagreements over *détente* and policy with Eastern European states and the USSR had made it difficult for European states to act in concert.[25] This was also the problem with respect to regional crises and to security questions, the two other goals of a common foreign policy. In a phrase that sums up the climate of the 1970s, Tindemans warned darkly that "the Community is crumbling beneath the resurgence, which is felt everywhere, of purely national preoccupations".[26] He went on to note that Europe must "guard against isolation, against Europe turning inwards upon itself, which would reduce it to a footnote in history".[27] The cost of failing to embrace European Union would be high: it would lead to "the crumbling away of the Community, voices isolated and often unheard on the world stage, less and less control over our destiny, an unconvincing Europe without a future".[28]

EPC was an attempt to answer many of these concerns at the diplomatic level. One intra-European dynamic that was particularly important for the launching of EPC was the Franco-German relationship. West Germany's economic renaissance had by the 1970s seen the Federal Republic (FRG) return as the continent's economic powerhouse. The most evident sign of the country's growing confidence was *Ostpolitik*, the new foreign policy direction taken by Willy Brandt, the Social Democratic Party (SPD) chancellor elected in 1966. Brandt's election had been at the cost of abandoning "the aging formulas of Socialist maximalism" and his

accommodation of the SPD to the reality of the Bonn Republic after years of CDU/CSU rule.[29] However, his decision to build closer ties between the FRG and Eastern Europe, the GDR in particular, provoked concern both in France and across the Atlantic. In the early postwar period, the SPD had isolated itself from power because of the hard-line position taken by its leader, Kurt Schumacher. Schumacher and the SPD promoted the "restoration of a sovereign, unified and politically neutral Germany" over any international entanglements with either pan-European or Euro-Atlantic structures.[30] This did not chime with the plans of any of the Allies for Germany's future, and Adenauer's Atlanticism was preferred to the SPD's neutralist alternative. *Ostpolitik* was thus seen by French elites as a possible return to earlier SPD ideas of a neutral Germany cut loose from Western structures. France was also afraid that weakening tensions between the superpowers might undermine its self-declared role as an alternative to bloc diplomacy. France's fear of a more assertive and less integrated Germany, combined with its desire to reassert France's distinctive international identity through its European leadership, came together in Pompidou's triple objective of "finality, enlargement and deepening", the latter goal referring to EPC.[31] Under the difficult conditions of the 1970s, dubbed by Pompidou the "age of uncertainties",[32] EPC was intended to guard against the re-nationalization of the foreign policies of EC member states by providing these states with an avenue for discussion, negotiation and compromise.

The continuing relevance of "damage limitation" in CFSP and ESDP

Neither the CFSP nor ESDP have developed under circumstances similar to the EPC in the 1970s. The "age of uncertainties" identified by Pompidou was not reproduced in the 1990s. Nevertheless, "damage limitation" of a sort continued to shape EU foreign policy. Whilst foreign policy cooperation was less frequently used as a means of diffusing intra-European tensions, it nevertheless remained an end in itself. It continued to be the case that for EU member states, relations with each other mattered more than the relations of the EU with the rest of the world.

CFSP was in its origins obviously an instance of "old-style" damage limitation. French concern over German reunification was its raison d'être. As Françoise de la Serre has argued, "the process which led to the introduction of a CFSP in the Treaty on European Union can largely be explained by the French desire to reinforce European integration in order to bind a reunified Germany to it".[33] French President François Mitterand did not immediately embrace this policy. He held out initially in the forlorn hope that West Germany and the GDR might co-exist as independent states. This prompted him to make a number of seeming blunders: his much criticized visit to East Germany after the fall of the Berlin Wall, his visit to Kiev in late 1989, and the apparent blessing of the Moscow coup in the summer of 1991.[34] Eventually though, Mitterand accepted the inevitability of German reunification and sought to make the best of it by securing German agreement on a common foreign and security policy. He also pushed a quid pro quo with Kohl: France would accept unification if Kohl accepted that a unified Germany would give up the Deutschmark and embrace European

monetary union. CFSP was born in the remnants of intra-European Cold War acrimony as one of the last examples of EPC-style damage limitation.[35]

Subsequently, foreign policy cooperation has continued to function in a way that elevates the process itself over final outcomes. Instead of expressing the desire to move towards a definite pan-European final outcome in foreign and security matters, CFSP and ESDP have proceeded in an ad hoc manner, expressing temporary and shifting arrangements between the major EU states. This reproduces the inward-looking quality of foreign policy cooperation of the EPC. The decision to finally move forward on security and defence cooperation, usually heralded as a great step forward in European integration, is one example of this. In the 1998 decision at St Malo by the UK and France to launch ESDP, there was no final vision of a common "European Army". This was also absent in Germany's key role in promoting the ESDP agenda throughout 1999 and particularly during its European Presidency from January to June of that year.[36] Writing in 2000, François Heisbourg noted that "a certain studied imprecision about the eventual destination has… been essential to the process of ESDP".[37] Echoing Heisbourg's original argument, William Wallace claimed in 2005 that ambiguity was inscribed into the very heart of ESDP at St Malo in 1999: "the St Malo initiative was accepted by other governments in its initial stages on condition that its proposers [sic] did not spell out specifically where beyond Europe's immediate borders common forces might be deployed; leaving discussion to focus on the force structures and institutions, without scenarios for deployment".[38] On ESDP in general, Wallace wrote that "without open debate about strategic priorities and geopolitical interests, the restructuring of European armed forces was a *procedural exercise*, driven by formal commitments rather than recognition of need".[39] Most strikingly, Heisbourg argued that what was significant about ESDP negotiations was not that final goals were left off the agenda because of disagreements between individual member states (which is the classic intergovernmentalist view of the EU's "sedimentary" foreign policy[40]). Rather, Heisbourg notes that these goals were simply not what the agreement was intended to address. In his words,

> It is in the interpretation and the implementation of the Petersberg Tasks that the absence of a common European strategic vision becomes all too apparent. Nor is this absence due to open differences between the most "extravert" and "introvert" states. Indeed, *what is most striking is not the scope of explicit disagreement but, rather, the lack of open consideration of the extent of European interests and ambitions*.[41]

The suggestion here is not that ESDP was an example of "lowest-denominator" type foreign policy.[42] Rather, the essence of ESDP was procedural. As with EPC, EU foreign policy cooperation is characterized by an internal, "navel-gazing" quality that elevates the relations between states over what they want to achieve in common.[43]

A final recent example of "damage limitation" is the European Security Strategy (ESS). Whilst it was often cited as an example of the EU's maturity as an international actor, it was also criticized for being rather vague. It was

"all things to all men": it could satisfy both Atlanticists and those wishing for greater European autonomy in European security; it reconciled the EU with the US whilst also distancing itself from the hawkish unilateralism of the Bush administration.[44] A key function of the ESS was therefore to serve as an exercise in internal damage limitation for the EU. In her "evolutionary history" of the ESS, Bailes grasps this function quite well. She argues that

> As a non-negotiated document produced within a highly legalistic institution, the ESS would have been a quite inappropriate vehicle for laying down binding decisions on the EU… In political terms, it could only achieve its *unity-building aim* by staying broad-brush enough for all the EU members to read their favourite agendas into it, leaving them room to assert their special interests during the follow-up… [The ESS] had a *confidence-building function* and also in some sense an inspirational one designed not so much to embody good policy decisions as to create the environment and mood for taking them.[45]

In her conclusion, Bailes points to the "essentially instrumental role of the ESS" – it was "made to serve, not to direct and not even fully to reflect, the dynamics of 'real politics' in Europe". Thus, "the ESS exists to proclaim and promote greater unity in facing still-emerging challenges, rather than directly to close the gaps or to heal the wounds of past disunity".[46] The audience for the ESS was therefore primarily made up of EU states and, to a lesser extent, the United States. Various other analysts have presented similar accounts of the ESS. Grevi notes a propos that "as was the case in the aftermath of previous setbacks, European leaders rushed to reassert their commitment to the CFSP following the disarray over Iraq".[47] Anne Deighton writes that

> The December 2003 ESS was… not so much a formal strategy as the term is conventionally understood, but rather a form of sticking plaster for the EU member states to help cover their own differences, to find common ground, and to draw up a joint credo with which it could respond collectively to the Bush administration's policies, and build upon the developments of the previous four years in the foreign policy, and specifically CFSP/ESDP sphere.[48]

The ESS thus illustrates the continued importance of internal damage limitation as a function of EU foreign and security policy cooperation.

That EU foreign policy remains so internally oriented was recently demonstrated in a discussion amongst EU experts on the topic of the EU's "grand strategy". Tellingly, this discussion very quickly became a discussion about the meaning and direction of the European project itself.[49] The implications of this internal functionality in EU foreign policy will be explored in a later section of the article. The next section will consider a parallel development, namely the emergence of pan-European legitimizing discourses for EU foreign policy and the specific content of these discourses.

2. THE RISE OF EU FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LEGITIMACY OF PERFORMANCE

Throughout the history of EPC, foreign policy cooperation was considered a peripheral dimension in the wider scheme of European integration. Its function was one of damage limitation, and it was of interest only to those elites who were directly concerned by it. Since EPC originated in an attempt at diffusing intra-European tensions that were considered potential sources of a nationalist anti-EC backlash, its decision-making procedures were far removed from any public scrutiny or popular involvement. Pompidou for one had experienced at his own political cost the lack of popular resonance European integration had with domestic audiences. His referendum of 1972 on British entry into the EC failed to secure the endorsement he expected: 68% voted in favour, but with a 40% abstention rate, only a third of the electorate had supported Pompidou's strategy.[50]

It follows that EPC developed in the absence of any public justifications or strategies of legitimization. Simon Nuttall writes of the "charmed circle" of EPC, and notes about EPC personnel that "their views were inevitably conditioned by the contacts they had with their European colleagues, *sometimes closer than with colleagues from other ministries at home*".[51] Smith writes of the *esprit de corps* that came to animate the European Correspondents – officials given the task of liaising between EPC and national foreign ministries. In his words, "cohesion in the group of European Correspondents became especially close over the years, and many personal friendships were forged within it".[52] Smith also notes that the dynamic for EPC's evolution over the years did not come from outside, but rather from "within the system itself", a sign of EPC's limited connection with the outside world.[53] Hill and Wallace characterize EPC as a policy of "don't tell the children", and note that the evolution of EPC "went largely unnoticed and unreported in national parliaments, hence also in national media".[54] Such secrecy was encapsulated in an EPC innovation, the "Gymnich meetings": private affairs held in country retreats, where ministers could interact with each other free from the prying eyes of the national media and obliged only to give at the end of it a "valedictory briefing". Hill and Wallace note that in the 1970s and 1980s, there developed "a chasm between the practice of foreign policy cooperation and popular perceptions of continuing national autonomy in foreign policy, parallel to the general chasm between technocratic and popular Europe".[55]

This contrasts with the 1990s and the advent of CFSP, which was then followed by ESDP. This period is marked by the growing prominence of foreign policy to the wider process of European integration. In the early 1990s, expectations were raised about the prospects of a common European foreign policy emerging in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Cold War system, particularly as American interest in European affairs waned. These expectations were left unfulfilled, but it was significant that they had been directed to the EU and its assumed role in foreign policy rather than to individual national capitals. Christopher Hill wrote in 1993 that in the early 1990s, the EU had been tasked with a number of functions – from "global intervener" to "regional pacifier" and "bridge between rich and poor" – all of

which were proving to be beyond the EU's limited resources and instruments.[56] Many of these inflated expectations came from European politicians who saw in the early 1990s a chance to raise the EU to the level of a major player in international affairs. The most famous mistake involving these expectations is Jacques Poos' unfortunately timed statement regarding the breaking out of civil war in Yugoslavia. For Poos, this was "Europe's hour", although the EU was only able to fan the flames of war in Yugoslavia rather than to provide any solution.[57] However, it wasn't only Luxembourg that has played up the EU's role. French President Mitterand moved towards a new connection between European integration and the demands of post-Cold War European security. His surprise visit to Sarajevo on the 28th of June, 1992, was intended to "remind world opinion of the seriousness of the Bosnian crisis". It was also to send a dramatic message to French voters, to whom he had only a few weeks earlier declared that France would be holding a national referendum on the Maastricht Treaty. The message was that only a strong commitment to further integration would ensure that the EC would remain a zone of peace.[58] Foreign policy, to paraphrase the American historian of the national interest Charles Beard, had become an inescapable phase of European integration.[59]

European inaction in relation to Bosnia exposed the CFSP as a triumph of rhetoric over substance and created much disillusion with the EU. However, foreign policy continued to rise up the European agenda. Simon Hix has noted that since the Amsterdam Treaty came into force in 1999, "the General Affairs Council has become so dominated by foreign policy that it rarely has time to resolve disputes in other policy areas, which was its original purpose at the pinnacle of the Council hierarchy".[60] More recently, Roy Ginsberg declared that that if the first fifty years of European integration were marked by internal developments, the next fifty years will be about the EU's role in the world.[61] And Geoffrey Edwards remarked in early 2007 that there are signs of the growing authority of the EU's High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana: in 1999, it was the High Representative who was conducting visits around the world while today, visitors come to Solana.[62]

"Legitimacy through action"

Accompanying this greater attention to the EU's foreign policy role have been various attempts to publicly justify a more internationally active EU. Great attention has been paid, at least in academic circles, to the idea of the EU as a "normative power".[63] Another powerful legitimizing discourse has been built up around the notion of "performance". Performance refers to the outputs of foreign policy actions, and it becomes a source of legitimacy when these outputs are shown to be attainable not by any state or actor, but only by the EU. [64] The EU's claim to performance in foreign and security policy is thus a claim to expertise, a claim to providing some "value-added" in its foreign policy.

Two key components to the EU's value-added in international affairs are regularly invoked by scholars and practitioners. The first is the EU's suitability for conflict management tasks. Grandiloquently, Martti Ahtisaari has claimed that "the European Union was born as an initiative for conflict

prevention and crisis management"[65], and he argues that Nordic nations have "brought to the forefront the civilian aspects of crisis management as an integral and inseparable part of successful crisis management", which in his view is "the *niche capability* that operational ESDP must exploit".[66] In a 2001 article, Christopher Hill noted the centrality played by conflict prevention in accounts of ESDP. In his words,

> [Conflict prevention] is seen by many as providing the common thread, in terms of values, objectives and instruments, which holds the system together and gives it purpose… it seems to have the quality essential in any successful political concept of showing how interest and ideals can be yoked to each other: no one could contest that we should both serve a great deal of resources and reduce the sum of human misery were we able to prevent conflicts such as those in Somalia or Bosnia from breaking out – or just manage to contain them.[67]

In Hill's view, conflict prevention has become the "new operational code" and "new orthodoxy" of European policy.[68]

Beyond conflict prevention and crisis management, the EU specifically points to its ability to *combine military and civilian tools.* This is the EU's distinctive contribution to conflict prevention and crisis management. In 2005, the European Parliament emphasized that "the defining characteristic and the additional value of the ESDP lie in the combination of civilian and military components", and it noted that "the EU will in future be increasingly faced with the challenge of striking a good and proper balance between military and civilian components in order to fulfil the objectives and spirit of the European Security Strategy".[69]

Highlighting the EU's ability to combine civil and military tools and tasks has been the leitmotif of many of its operations since 2003. After the completion of the election monitoring mission in Aceh, Indonesia, Peter Feith, the head of mission and former NATO special representative in Macedonia, argued that "this mission and the way the EU has dealt with the crisis, after the tsunami, shows that we have indisputable comparative advantage; we have a broad range of instruments, and all of these have been deployed and used over the past two years".[70] Antonio Missiroli concurs: the EU's added value lies in the EU's "capacity to mobilize a wide array of policy tools well beyond the military".[71] In Solana's words, the EU "has a unique crisis management capacity. Neither wholly civilian, nor wholly military, but simply global."[72] Alistair Shepherd noted, in relation to the suggestion of the European Convention Working Group on Defence that the EU should develop a pool of civilian and military civil protection capabilities: "it is particularly this type of civilian-military synergy where the EU could develop its unique approach to the current security environment".[73] Giovanna Bono observes that "for many EU officials, the key distinguishing feature of the evolving EU military doctrine lies in its integration of civilian and military tools in external crisis management and its officially stated adherence to the principles of international law as defined by the UN charter".[74] Writing about

Operation Concordia in Macedonia, Catriona Mace claims that "the 'added value' of EU crisis management is the Union's ability to deploy a range of instruments, financial, civilian and military, in a coordinated manner".[75]

External effectiveness versus internal functionality

This legitimizing discourse of performance jars with the internal functionality of EU foreign policy. Looking at EU foreign policy in more detail, we find that a gap exists between the emphasis on the EU's foreign policy outputs, and the national preoccupation with foreign policy cooperation as an end in itself. As noted above, the EU's 2003 European Security Strategy is best understood as a product of damage limitation: a clear demonstration of European unity on global security issues was needed in the aftermath of the disastrous intra-European divisions over the US-led invasion of Iraq. This internal function has been identified as a reason why much of the ESS lacked the precision one might expect from a real security strategy. An area more damaging for the EU's "legitimacy through action" discourse and where internal functionality once more trumps external effectiveness is the EU's military missions. These have widely been fêted as a sign of EU foreign policy finally coming of age. It does not quite approximate a European army defending Europe's borders, but in some respects, it brings ESDP up to the level of what some consider to be "modernist" foreign policy.[76]

In fact, a closer analysis reveals a quite different picture. Anne Deighton writes of the "double agenda of Union foreign policy", by which she means the EU's need "both to sustain and reinforce solidarity within the Union itself while acting in the outside world". This agenda is, in her words, analytically significant: it "necessarily underlies any discussion of decision-making, effectiveness and the division of labour".[77] Damien Helly has remarked that the EU's impact as an international actor is better thought of as a secondary consideration for the EU, in comparison to the primacy of foreign policy as a component of the internal integration project. He also notes that the symbolism of ESDP missions is particularly important for some states rather than others. In his view,

> One has to bear these fundamental and structural challenges [e.g. the clash between the Commission and Council in crisis management and conflict prevention] in mind in order to avoid complacent comments and analyses about the Union's successes and failures simply on the basis of several tiny ESDP missions that have been undertaken thus far. These missions may be highly symbolic *especially for certain member states*, [and] also for the development of ESDP structures, but there is little evidence that they are intimately connected to, and reflective of the stated needs of local populations and beneficiaries.[78]

Considering the judgements and assessments made of the EU's ESDP operations since 2003, there is a definite tendency to consider their merits in terms of their relationship to the EU and the ESDP rather than in terms of

their actual impact on the ground. Writing on the EUJUST *Themis* mission in Georgia, Helly recounts its operational failures. In April 2005, "the mission entered into an internal crisis because of a lack of progress", and "the implementation phase [of *Themis*] has never really taken off the ground and Georgian leadership failed to demonstrate interest in the process".[79] Operationally weak, *Themis* was nonetheless of significance for the EU. Helly concludes that "EUJUST *Themis* represented both the prolongation of a long-lasting European commitment to Georgia's stability as well as *a historical, institutional and diplomatic innovation and challenge for the enlarged EU*". He adds: "it was one of the numerous EU/EC instruments used in Georgia and at the same time *a test-case for future ESDP civilian operations*".[80] This notion of ESDP operations serving as test cases for European diplomacy is a constant theme in the accounts of operations provided by both observers and practitioners. The message here seems to be that such operations are stages upon which the EU can rehearse its lines as an embryonic international actor and serve to promote *individual* member states, albeit in a pan-European garb.

The EU's *Proxima* operation in Macedonia was also operationally unremarkable. Ioannides notes that "the [Macedonian] public's lack of understanding of the mission's objectives is due to the fact that *Proxima* did *not produce tangible results* and therefore did not attract the attention of the media".[81] Nevertheless, *Proxima*'s Head of Mission, Jurgen Schultz, claimed that the operation "will set the standards for future EU missions". The lessons learned from *Proxima* were also internally oriented: how to hand over missions competently, the need for carrying out joint Commission-Council fact-finding missions, the use of benchmarking for evaluating performance and progress.[82] Another example is EUJUST LEX in Iraq. Catriona Gourlay observes that "whilst the EUJUST LEX mission is undoubtedly *a constructive internal political project in the light of the rifts that exist within the EU over Iraq*, it is questionable whether it provides value for money".[83] Other missions have similarly been driven by internal political considerations. Howorth notes that the British eventually supported the Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) because "they were looking, as holders of the six-month EU Presidency in late 2005, for a practical way of demonstrating that the French and Dutch vetoes of the Constitutional Treaty did not spell the end of ESDP".[84] Similar inward-looking assessments are made of other EU operations. On Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ulriksen et al. note that "France, backed by the UK, proposed an EU force, partly propelled by the dynamism of Franco-British cooperation in Africa since the mid 1990s, and partly as a way of helping heal the wounds of European disagreements over Iraq earlier in the year".[85] If the DRC was the terrain upon which the renewed Franco-British *entente* of the St-Malo accords of 1998 was tested, then Macedonia was the terrain upon which Atlanticist and "autonomist" EU member states were reconciled.[86] The significance of Operation *Concordia* – in spite of its operational failure[87] – was that it was the first time the Berlin Plus arrangements were used. Significantly, there was no pressing operational need to use Berlin Plus in this case. Howorth writes that "from an

operational standpoint, ESDP's Concordia could have deployed without the back-up of Berlin Plus". However, "from a political perspective, the main EU Atlanticist nations instituted that the resolution of the Berlin Plus procedures should precede the mission".[88]

All in all, it is difficult not to conclude that the EU's ESDP operations have by in large been external projections intended to satisfy or assuage internal considerations and conflicts. It is also striking to note the dominant role played by individual member states in pursuing certain missions. It would seem that the real "value-added" of ESDP lies at the national level, as it allows individual states to pursue their own objectives whilst overcoming the problem of weakened national foreign policy strategies.[89]

CONCLUSION: WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM THE PROBLEM OF LEGITIMIZATION?

This article has identified a disjuncture in EU foreign policy between its internal functionality and its pretension to external effectiveness. The internal importance of "damage limitation" as a function of foreign policy cooperation mines the EU's ability to perform as an international actor and in particular to pursue the "niche" role of crisis management. What this disjuncture points to is the connection between the political sociology of EU foreign policy and its capacity for action in the world. The political sociology refers to the integrative dynamics of EU foreign policy and the role of domestic populations, national governments and pan-European institutions.[90] This article has argued that there is no unified foreign policy that pursues a pan-European interest and that draws its forward momentum from a direct connection with a European "people". Instead, EU foreign policy is dominated by its inward gaze: it serves the function of diffusing tensions between EU member states, and it also serves as a source of legitimacy for individual member states. The real "value-added" of EU foreign policy remains at the national level.

Emphasizing this internal function, the article has considered in detail the legitimizing discourse of "performance" which has justified, alongside other discourses, both CFSP and, to a greater degree, ESDP. The article has shown how performance legitimacy, when examined up close, is in fact regularly undermined by the damage limitation function of EU foreign policy. It is also a product of national strategies that have turned towards the EU in response to problems that they face in maintaining the vitality of their own national foreign policy strategies. "Performance" is therefore pursued as an ostensibly pan-European source of legitimacy, a quality of the *sui generis* features of the EU. Its origins, however, are resolutely national. The value of the concept of legitimacy is that it connects the internal dynamics of EU foreign policy to its external actions. "Performance legitimacy" is a product of these internal dynamics, and a close examination of this legitimizing strategy has highlighted the tensions contained within a foreign policy that is nominally about the EU's role in the world but is in reality a means by which European states overcome their differences and compensate for their limited national roles. Focusing on the problem of legitimization the EU faces in its

foreign policy is thus a good way of grasping what that foreign policy really is and what function it serves.

ENDNOTES

[1] See for example Smith, M. (2003), "The framing of European foreign and security policy: towards a post-modern policy framework". *Journal of European Public Policy,* 10 (4), pp. 556–575; Smith, M. (2006), "Comment: Crossroads or cul-de-sac? Reassessing European Foreign Policy". *Journal of European Public Policy,* 13 (2), pp. 322–327; see the various contributions in Carlsnaes, W., Sjursen, H., and White, B. (eds.) (2004), *Contemporary European Foreign Policy.* London: Sage; see also Smith, M.E. (2004), *Europe's Foreign and Security Policy: The Institutionalization of Cooperation.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and the contributions to Hill, C. (ed.) (1983), *National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation.* London: George Allen and Unwin, and Hill, C. (ed.) (1996). *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy.* London: Routledge.

[2] The connection between legitimacy and justification is explored by Coicaud, J.-M. (2002), *Legitimacy and Politics: A Contribution to the Study of Political Right and Responsibility.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[3] This article has been particularly inspired by Paul Craig's attempt to trace the normative structure of the European Union's institutions and the dominant discourses that explain their origins and functioning. Craig, P. (1999), "The Nature of the Community: Integration, Democracy, and Legitimacy". In: P. Craig, and G.D. Burca (eds.), *The Evolution of EU Law.* Oxford: Oxford University Press. Other illuminating accounts of the EU's sources of legitimacy include Jachtenfuchs, M., Diez, T., and Jung, S. (1998), "Which Europe? Conflicting Models of a Legitimate European Political Order". *European Journal of International Relations,* 4 (4), pp. 249–268, Beetham, D. and Lord, C. (1998), *Legitimacy and the EU.* London: Longmann; Scharpf, FF. (1999), *Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?* Oxford: Oxford University Press, Lord, C. and Beetham, D. (2001), "Legitimizing the EU: Is there a 'Post-parliamentary basis' for its legitimation?" J*ournal of Common Market Studies,* 39 (3), pp. 443–462, and Lord, C. and Magnette, P. (2004), "E Pluribus Unum? Creative Disagreement about Legitimacy in the EU". *Journal of Common Market Studies,* 42 (1), pp. 183–202.

[4] For a useful introduction to the EU's "democratic deficit", see Kohler-Koch, B., and Rittberger, B. (2007), "Charting Crowded Territory: Debating the Democratic Legitimacy of the European Union". In: B. Kohler-Koch, and B. Rittberger (eds.), *Debating the Democratic Legitimacy of the European Union.* Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield. On foreign policy and legitimacy, see Hill, C. (2003), *The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy.* Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan. Specifically on the EU's "legitimacy deficit", see Laffan, B. (1996), "The Politics of Identity and Political Order in Europe". *Journal of Common Market Studies,* 34 (1), pp. 81–102; Obradovic, D. (1996), "Political Legitimacy and the European Union". *Journal of Common Market Studies,* 34 (2), pp. 191–221; and Hansen, L. and Williams, M.C. (1999), "The Myths of Europe: Legitimacy, Community and the 'Crisis' of the EU". *Journal of Common Market Studies,* 37 (2), pp. 233–249.

[5] This is a paraphrasing of David Beetham's point. See Beetham, D. (1991), *The Legitimation of Power.* Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, p. 39. For similar accounts of legitimacy, see Claude, I. L. (1966), "Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations". *International Organization,* 20, pp. 367–379, and Rothschild, J. (1977), "Observations on Political Legitimacy in Contemporary Europe". *Political Science Quarterly,* 92 (3), pp. 487–501.

[6] For a useful account of how and why these two subfields have traditionally been kept apart, see Ohrgaard, J. C. (1997), "Less than Supranational, More than Intergovernmental: European Political Cooperation and the Dynamics of Intergovernmental Integration". *Millenium: Journal of International Studies,* 26 (1), pp. 1–29.

[7] On this point, see for instance Alagappa, M. (ed.) (1995), *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: the Quest for Moral Legitimacy.* Stanford: Stanford University Press. On the legitimacy of the United Nations, see Claude, op. cit.

[8] Cited in Wolfgang Wessels (1982), "European Political Cooperation: a new approach to foreign policy". In: Allen, D., Rummel, R., and Wessels, W. (eds.) (1982), *European Political Cooperation: Towards a Foreign Policy for Western Europe.* London: Butterworth Scientific, p. 2 (my italics).

[9] Allen David and Wallace William, "European Political Cooperation: the historical and contemporary background". In: Allen et al, ibid., p. 21.

[10] Allen and Wallace. In: Allen et al., op. cit., p. 31.

[11] Pompidou, G. (1975), *Entretiens et Discours.* Paris: Plon. Interview with Lucien Hubert-Rodier, July 1970, pp. 79–80.

[12] Wessels. In: Allen et al, op. cit., p. 11.

[13] Wessels, op. cit., p. 5.

[14] My thanks to Michael Smith for suggesting the phrase "internal functionality".

[15] See Hill, C. (ed.) (1983), *National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation.* London: George Allen and Unwin, p. 57.

[16] Allen and Wallace. In: Allen et al, op. cit., p. 29.

[17] G. Bonvicini, "Italy: an integrationist perspective". In: Hill, op. cit., p. 75.

[18] Hill, op. cit., p. 191.

[19] Nuttall, S. (2000), *European Foreign Policy.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 16.

[20] For a useful account of some of the social and political problems, see Bracher, K. (1972), "Democracy". In: R. Mayne (ed.), *Europe Tomorrow: 16 Europeans look ahead.* London: Fontana.

[21] For an account of how these growing tensions impacted upon Franco-German relations, see Simonian, H. (1985), *The Privileged Partnership: Franco-German Relations in the European Community 1969–1984.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[22] The growing cost of the US's war in Vietnam was another reason for European concern, since it meant the Americans hoped Western European states would take up more responsibility for their own security. Nixon looked to French President George Pompidou for instance, to take up some of the slack in Europe. See Bozo, F. (1997). *La Politique Etrangere de la France depuis 1945.* Paris: La Decouverte, p. 60.

[23] Tindemans, L. (1976), "European Union". *Bulletin of the European Communities Supplement 1/76.* Brussels, p. 12.

[24] Tindemans, ibid., p. 16.

[25] On the difficult relations between Europe and the US in this period, see Lundestad, G. (1998), *"Empire" by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945–1997.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[26] Tindemans, op. cit., p. 11.

[27] Tindemans, op. cit., p. 12.

[28] Tindemans, op. cit., p. 14.

[29] For more details, see Judt, T. (2005), *Postwar.* London: Heinemann, p. 269.

[30] Judt, op. cit., p. 268.

[31] Finality referred to completing negotiations over EC agricultural subsidies, and enlargement referred to British entry into the EC.

[32] Bozo, op. cit., p. 63.

[33] Serre, F.d.l. (1996), "France: the impact of Francois Mitterand". In: C. Hill (ed.), *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy.* London: Routledge, p. 32.

[34] Bozo, F. (1995), "France and Security in the New Europe: Between the Gaullist Legacy and the Search for a New Model". In: G. Flynn (ed.), *Remaking the Hexagon: The New France in the New Europe.* Oxford: Westview, p. 215. On his visit to Kiev, where Mitterand met Gorbachev, he urged caution over West Germany's plans for unification.

[35] For details of the quid pro quo, see Ash, T. G. (1999), *History of the Present.* London: Allen Lane/Penguin.

[36] On the details of the St Malo agreement and its follow-up, see Howorth, J. (2000), "Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative". *Survival,* 42 (2), pp. 33–55; Howorth, J. (2004), "Discourse, Ideas, and Epistemic Communities in European Security and Defence Policy". *West European Politics,* 27 (2), pp. 211–234, and Howorth, J. (2007), *Security and Defence Policy in the European Union.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

[37] Heisbourg, F. (2000), "Europe's Strategic Ambitions: The Limits of Ambiguity". *Survival,* 42 (2): pp. 5–15, p. 5.

[38] Wallace, W. (2005), "Is there a European Approach to War?" *European Foreign Policy Unit Working Papers,* (2), pp. 1–19, p. 10.

[39] Wallace, ibid., p. 11 (italics added).

[40] On "sedimentary" foreign policy, see Nuttall, op. cit.

[41] Heisbourg, op. cit., p. 7 (italics added).

[42] For an account of this problem, see Nuttall, op. cit.

[43] The phrase "naval gazing" is from Smith, "Crossroads or cul-de-sac?", op. cit.

[44] Becher highlights the problems that result in this. He argues that the ESS is problematically both pro- and anti- American at the same time. In his words, "Herein lies the greatest political weakness of the European Security Strategy, however, given the political mood of distancing Europe from US policies in European publics, to some degree combined with wider anti-Western cultural and economic emotions. Instead of making an effort to grasp US motivations and intellectual debates and influence them from within in support of desired good policies, many in Europe seem content with depicting the US as a convenient negative role model in an effort to build Europe's separate identity. This approach is utterly incompatible with the strategic analysis of the international system, the challenges and threats, Europe's interests, and the required responses on which the European Security Strategy rests." Becher, K. (2004), "Has-Been, Wannabe, or Leader: Europe's Role in the World After the 2003 European Security Strategy". *European Security,* 13 (4), pp. 345–359, p. 356.

[45] Bailes, A. J. K. (2005), "The European Security Strategy: An Evolutionary History". *SIPRI Policy Papers.* Stockholm: SIPRI, p. 14 (italics added).

[46] Bailes, ibid., p. 23.

[47] Grevi, G. (2004), "European Security: No Strategy without Politics." *Ideas Factory Europe.* Brussels: European Policy Centre, p. 3.

[48] Deighton, A. and Mauer, V. (eds.) (2006), *Securing Europe? Implementing the European Security Strategy.* Zürich: Centre for Security Studies, p. 28.

[49] Roundtable convened by Michael E. Smith at EUSA, Montreal, 2007. Participants in the roundtable: Michael Smith, Richard Whitman and Ulrich Sedelmier. Comments from the floor in line with this argument: Antje Weiner and Wolfgang Wessels.

[50] Bozo notes that the referendum result marked the end of a period in French foreign policy, that had been overwhelmingly oriented towards Europe. Bozo, "Politique Etrangère de la France", p. 64.

[51] Nuttall, op. cit., p. 15 (italics added).

[52] Smith, op. cit., p. 101.

[53] Smith, "Europe's Foreign and Security Policy", op. cit., p. 100.

[54] Hill, C. and Wallace, W. (1996), "Introduction: Actors and actions". In: C. Hill (ed.), *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy.* London: Routledge, p. 6.

[55] Hill and Wallace. In: Hill (ed.), op. cit., p. 7.

[56] Hill, C. (1993), "The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role". *Journal of Common Market Studies,* 31 (3), pp. 305–328, pp. 310–315.

[57] On the role played by Western intervention in the war in Yugoslavia, see Woodward, S. L. (1995), *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War.* Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution.

[58] Hobsbawm, E. (1994), *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914–1991.* London: Abacus, p. 2–3.

[59] Charles Beard, cited in Waltz, K. (2001), *Man, the State, and War: a Theoretical Analysis.* New York: Columbia University Press, p. 80. Beard's phrase was "However conceived in an image of the world, foreign policy is a phase of domestic policy, an inescapable phase".

[60] Hix, S. (2005), *The Political System of the European Union.* Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, p. 391. Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace note that the General Affairs Council was replaced in 2002 by the General Affairs and External Relations Council, as "a response to repeated criticism of the rather natural tendency of the foreign ministers to concentrate on the increasingly numerous foreign policy aspects of their remit, to the detriment of their role as Council coordinator". Though the GAERC has retained its coordination role, the extent of foreign policy business has meant that separate meetings are held, on two consecutive days or on a single day with separate sessions. General affairs are generally dealt with first and then foreign policy issues. Hayes-Renshaw, F. and Wallace, H. (2006), *The Council of Ministers.* Basingstoke: Palgrave, p. 36–37.

[61] Remarks made at the European Union Studies Association conference in Montreal, May 2007.

[62] Remarks made at the International Studies Association conference in Chicago, March 2007.

[63] For the seminal writings on this issue, see Duchene, F. (1972), "Europe's Role in World Peace". In: R. Mayne (ed.), *Europe Tomorrow: 16 Europeans Look Ahead.* London: Fontana Bull, H. (1982), "Civilian Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" *Journal of Common Market Studies,* 21 (2), pp. 149–164; Manners, I. (2002), "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" *Journal of Common Market Studies,* 40 (2), pp. 235–258, and for a review of the debate, see Sjursen, H. (2006), "What kind of power?" *Journal of European Public Policy,* 13 (2), pp. 169–181.

[64] Beetham, D. and Lord, C. (1998), *Legitimacy and the EU.* London: Longman, p. 94. On performance legitimacy, see also Fritz Scharpf. According to Scharpf, output legitimacy arguments "presuppose a need for effective government with a capacity for achieving common purposes that are beyond the reach of individuals and families acting on their own, through market exchanges or through un-coerced cooperation in civil society". Scharpf, F. (2003), "Problem-Solving Effectiveness and Democratic Accountability in the EU". *MPIfG Working Papers.* No page number – an electronic source. Performance legitimacy is also a concern of Majone in his work on the regulatory state. See for instance, Majone, G. (1998), "Europe's 'Democratic Deficit': The Question of Standards". *European Law Journal,* 4 (1), pp. 5–28.

[65] Ahtisaari, M. (2004). In: N. Gnesotto (ed.), *EU Security and Defence Policy: The First Five Years (1999–2004).* Paris: EU-ISS. See also Hill: "it can be argued that [the EU's] very historical identity is fundamentally that of a conflict prevention system". Hill, C. (2001), "The EU's Capacity for Conflict Prevention". *European Foreign Affairs Review,* 6, pp. 315–333, p. 323.

[66] Ahtisaari, op. cit., p. 159.

[67] Hill, "The EU's Capacity for Conflict Prevention", op. cit., p. 315.

[68] Hill, ibid., "The EU's Capacity for Conflict Prevention", op. cit., pp. 315–316.

[69] Parliament, E. (2006), "Resolution on the European Security Strategy". In: EU-ISS (ed.), *EU security and defence: Core documents 2005.* Vol. 6. Paris: EU-ISS, pp. 69–70. Similar claims to expertise exist outside of the ESDP framework. At the time of the 2004 EU enlargement, which brought in eight post-Stalinist states (along with Cyprus and Malta), various EU luminaries – such as Robert Cooper – claimed that what the EU was doing in Eastern Europe was its own, peaceful and highly successful version of "regime change", a sign that the EU was better equipped for such tasks than the US, which had been unsuccessful in its own intervention in Iraq.

[70] Feith, P. (2006), Press conference on the occasion of the end of the EU-led Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM). Brussels: Council Secretariat.

[71] Missiroli, A. (2003), "The European Union: Just a Regional Peacekeeper?" *European Foreign Affairs Review,* 8, pp. 493–503, p. 496.

[72] Solana, J. (2006), Annual Conference of the European Union Institute for Security Studies – speech by Javier Solana. In: EU-ISS (ed.), *EU security and defence: Core documents 2005.* Paris: EU-ISS, p. 267.

[73] Shepherd, A. J. K. (2006), "Irrelevant or Indispensable? ESDP, the 'War on Terror' and the fall-out from Iraq". *International Politics,* 43 (1), pp. 71–92, p. 85.

[74] Bono, G. (2004), "The EU's Military Doctrine: An Assessment". *International Peacekeeping,* 11 (3), pp. 439–456, p. 441.

[75] Mace, C. Ibid., "Operation *Concordia:* Developing a 'European' Approach to Crisis Management", pp. 474–490, p. 474.

[76] Smith, "The Framing of European Foreign and Security Policy", op. cit., p. 558.

[77] Deighton, op. cit., p. 12.

[78] Helly, D. (2006), "Assessing the Impact of the European Union as an International Actor". In: A. Deighton and V. Mauer (eds.), *Securing Europe? Implementing the European Security Strategy.* Zürich: ETH Zürich, p. 84 (italics added).

[79] Helly, D. (2006), "EUJUST *Themis* in Georgia: an ambitious bet on rule of law". In: A. Nowak (ed.), *Civilian Crisis Management: the EU Way.* Paris: EU-ISS, p. 100.

[80] Helly, ibid., p. 101 (italics added).

[81] Ioannides, I. (2006), "EU Police Mission Proxima: testing the 'European' approach to building peace". In: A. Nowak (ed.), *Civilian Crisis Management: the EU Way.* Paris: EU-ISS, p. 82.

[82] Ioannides, ibid., p. 82.

[83] Gourlay, C. (2006), "Community instruments for civilian crisis management". In: A. Nowak (ed.), *Civilian Crisis Management: the EU Way.* Paris: EU-ISS, p. 64 (my italics).

[84] Howorth, "Security and Defence Policy in the European Union", op. cit., p. 213.

[85] Ulriksen, S., Gourlay, C., and Mace, C. (2004), "Operation *Artemis:* The Shape of Things to Come?" *International Peacekeeping,* 11 (3), pp. 508–525, p. 511.

[86] "Autonomist" refers to those EU member states in favour of a European security and defence policy autonomous from NATO. Atlanticist refers to those member states who would prefer security and defence integration to take place within a NATO framework.

[87] The Macedonian government asked for the operation to be wrapped up, in order to help Macedonia in its attempt to gain formal candidate status for EU membership.

[88] Howorth, "Security and Defence Policy in the European Union", op. cit., p. 232.

[89] My thanks to Giovanna Bono for emphasizing this point to me in a commentary on an earlier version of this article.

[90] For a detailed analysis of the EU focusing on the political sociology of Europe, see Bartolini, S. (2005), *Restructuring Europe: Centre Formation, System Building, and Political Structuring between Nation State and the European Union.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.