# The Geographical and Systemic Influences on Greek Foreign Policy in the Balkans in the 1990s

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**Abstract:** The aim of this article is to structurally and operationally link geography to foreign policy. Greek foreign policy will be used as a case study in order to define reasons for policy differentiation between Greece and its EC/EU partners. The analysis builds upon a state-centric assumption of state behaviour according to which a state's foreign policy is determined by geography, culture, threat [mis]perceptions, domestic politics as well as its systemic features such as structure, interactions amongst players, the input and output ratio of the local subordinate system as well as its self-stabilizing potential. The analysis is formulated on the assumption that foreign policy choices are dependent on cultural elements, and that foreign policy cannot be formulated in a vacuum of domestic interests. To support the view that geography and system structure define state behaviour and affect international outcomes, the paper uses the two-security zone typology of M. Singer and A. Wildavsky that operationally and structurally differentiates Greece's environment from that of its EC/EU partners. The emergence of the post-Cold War Balkan subordinate system and its characteristics will provide a causational approach to the adoption of self-help policies that may distance the country from its European partners. To look into the causes of this trend in Greek foreign policy in the 1990s, its policy adjustment margins in a zone of turmoil will be compared to the Western European zone of peace and within Greece's systemic operational framework (Balkan subordinate system).

**Key words:** Greek foreign policy, Balkan security, European security zones, Balkan subordinate system, geography and security, threat [mis]perceptions

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## GREEK FOREIGN POLICY AND DOMESTIC POLITICS: AN OVERVIEW

State international behaviour is influenced by a number of parameters not commonly acknowledged by international relations paradigms. This analysis suggests that domestic politics play an important role in the formulation of foreign policy. The Greek case foreign policy choices in the 1990s have been substantially affected by domestic politics parameters and inter-party rivalry.

More particularly, a covert or overt maximalism as far as goals is concerned, along with political instability and consecutive elections in the years 1989–1993 affected dramatically the conceptual model through which the Greek political elite looked at the regional challenges that emerged after the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Outside mediation or military involvement (i.e. Richard Holbrooke's mediation in the "Macedonian dispute", the U.S. bomb-

ing of Serbia) were viewed under the catalytic impact of anti-Americanism and the role of the superpower in Greek politics during the 1950s and 1960s.

On the systemic level, the suggested structural hindrances for the expression of a compliant Greek policy may be epitomized as follows:

A. Balkan endemic insecurity resulting from the security paradigm adopted by Balkan states, namely "security competition".[1] The term describes a conflictual inter-state relationship, which "commences when state actors come to view their security as highly competitive and divisible, not quasi-harmonious and semi-indivisible".[2]

B. Domestic Politics: Domestic politics in Greece played a catalytic role in the formulation of foreign policy, a fact that did not allow for much flexibility and policy adjustment. Non-cooperative behaviour on the part of the Greek political elite is thus partly due to the restraints imposed by the domestic environment.

C. The "Great Idea" of the Balkan States that constitutes a constant, overt or covert, challenge to the territorial status ever since the end of the 1912–1913 Balkan wars.

D. Long standing territorial disputes not accommodated by the intrusive policies of powerful out of system players.

E. Historical and national stereotypes and the long-standing enmity on the part of the Balkan peoples, along with the catalytic role of self-identity[3] and historical continuity.

## THE TWO-SECURITY ZONE MODEL

In their security typology M. Singer and A. Wildavsky divide the early post-Cold War world into two contrasting security zones, two "fundamentally different worlds"[4] with incompatible characteristics and orientation. The suggested division into "zones of peace" and "zones of turmoil" refers directly or indirectly to a geographically-defined and structurally-affected framework of foreign policy formulation. This stems from a system's structure and sets the problem of the lack of operational security unity[5] within the EC/EU, which, in the early post-Cold War era, set systemic limitations to Greece's international behaviour.

Zones of peace were identified with those zones controlled by NATO, while zones of turmoil were almost identical with ex-communist zones.[6] The ad hoc early post-Cold War division of Europe into two security zones set the incompatible operating and structural settings from which states in the zones of turmoil and those in the zones of peace operated.[7]

The inherent destabilising characteristics of the Balkan zone of turmoil may be categorised as those related to economic factors and those connected with politico-historical variables.

Economic related characteristics centre around economic backwardness, resulting in underdevelopment and are enhanced by transitional issues. Politico-historical variables include anarchical structure, lack of a local security regime, catalytic and at times distorting historical and national stereotypes,[8] use or threat of use of military force, as well as long-lasting boundary disputes, that have long challenged the territorial status.

Southeast Europe has been haunted by diachronic instability and political fragmentation (Balkanisation), due to inherent and endemic systemic deficiencies as well as antagonistic relations of powerful intrusive actors which then became reflected in intra-Balkan relations. On the contrary, zones of peace or the "no-war parts of the world"[9] are characterised not only by a no-war culture, but also by economic advancement and complex interdependence enhanced by collective security mechanisms.

The two-security-zone model attempts to scrutinise international, interstate relations through two different lenses, since, in the authors' opinion "if you try to talk about the world as a whole all you can get is falsehoods or platitudes".[10] Under this spectrum, generalisations do not help to understand the essence of the problems entities face in zones of turmoil, the geographical context of their security considerations, as well as the dictates of their domestic political arena.

As suggested, "the domestic politics of a state cannot be fully understood without reference to the neighbouring environment in which that nation has developed".[11] This statement suggests that a national policy, whether it is constructive or not, ought to be seen under the geographical and structural settings within which it is formulated. These two fundamental parameters define [mis]perceptions domestically and lead to varied reactions to either input to the system or actions, stemming from actors within the system.

In essence the two-security zone model refers to dissimilar regional settings with distinctive features. In both zones there are forces of integration[12] and forces of fragmentation[13] that compete with one another with different outcomes in each security zone. Fragmentation is the key word describing the political, operational and strategic setting of a zone of turmoil, while integration[14] is the key determinant of co-operative interstate relations in zones of peace.[15]

This suggestion pinpoints the incompatible orbits of the Western European zone of peace and that of the South-eastern European zone of turmoil. Western Europe's post-Second World War course to economic and political integration, accelerated during the early 1990s with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, was heavily contrasted by South-eastern Europe's contrasting transition course, its political parcelisation and disintegration, triggered by emerging nationalistic trends, that had long been contained under the ideological polarization of the Cold War.

Entities in zones of peace build their security policies, inter allia, on military power, although their primary aim is not territorial expansion, but protection of the economic advantages of their developed economies, since a failure on the military security level could void economic achievements. However, as noted, "the political relations among countries in the zones of peace and democracy will not be influenced by relative military power".[16] There is no harmony of interests amongst entities in zones of peace, yet, this does not lead to war, as there is "internal peace" within the stability zone and this eliminates war as a cost-effective means of resolving disputes.

As a result, concern about direct military threats in the Western European zone of peace has lost part of its importance, since industrially, socially and above all politically developed nations refrain from going to war with one

another, despite their ability to project military power. Max Singer & Aaron Wildavsky make the suggestion that wealth, democracy and peace are interconnected characteristics and thus cannot be separated.[17] This reflects the opposite portrayal of the Balkan subordinate system, where economic backwardness, poverty and lack of long lasting democratic institutions have given birth to zero-sum policies and conflictual approaches to interstate disputes.

States in the zones of peace and democracy "have most of the power in the world (economic and military), so they will not face a serious threat to their national survival or freedom, regardless of the outcome of conflicts in other zones".[18] The suggestion sets the operational and structural ground for differentiated international behaviour on the part of Greece and defines reactions to security considerations and threat perceptions to a substantial degree. It also sets the strategic setting of a security environment dominated by the non-cooperative security paradigm of interstate relations. As a result, military force has become the key determinant of power in zones of turmoil, since the use, or threat of use, of military force is the basis of exercising foreign policy, in a way that infers to the Clausewitzian concept of conducting politics (war), resulting in the use of force and marginalisation of international law.

## THE SIDE-EFFECTS OF THE END OF BIPOLARITY ON GREECE'S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

To look into the impact of geography and thus the structure of the Balkan subordinate system on Greece's international behaviour this paper will analyse the geopolitical effects of the end of the Cold War on security in the region.

According to L. Cantori and A. Spiegel a subordinate system is defined as a state system that "consists of one state, or of two or more proximate and interacting states which have some common ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social, and historical bonds, and whose sense of identity is sometimes increased by the actions and attitudes of states external to the system".[19] A system is also defined as "the totality of relations which exist between the autonomous units in a particular arena".[20]

It is these state interactions that define qualitatively the parameters of a particular security environment (i.e. zone of peace or a zone of turmoil) and provide the operational milieu for exercising foreign policy. The Balkans became entangled in intense ethnic politics that affected the internal balance of the Balkan subordinate system by setting a conflictual transformation norm. In its turn, Greek foreign policy was formulated to a substantial degree by the challenges of the re-structuring process of the Balkan security environment, consisting of neophyte actors that longed for independence and yearned to express their politico-cultural otherness.

A thorough evaluation of Greek foreign policy ought to be based on Greece's geographical and structural setting.[21] Greece's geographical proximity to Balkan flashpoints makes it, to this day, part of an insecure state subsystem. Not being instability-proof from endemic Balkan fluidity, Greece does not share the same perceptions of threat with its Western European partners, a fact that differentiates it in a number of ways, as far as security priorities are concerned.

The Balkan aspect of Greece's foreign policy, influenced by inherent systemic instability, has often contradicted its European course and orientation, making it painful and politically costly for the Greek political elite to find common ground with its EU partners. The early post-Cold War geopolitical arrangements perplexed Greece's systemic milieu and its internal balance and gave its policy a Janus-like character, which, at times, became the target of intense criticism.

The catalytic geopolitical consequences of the end of bipolar era and the subsequent dissolution of Yugoslavia altered qualitatively and quantitatively the structural features of the Balkan subordinate system and turned geography into a catalyst in foreign policy making. The post-Cold War security vacuum in southeast Europe resulted in the dominance of certain non-constructive aspects of Greek policy over its overall foreign policy choices.

### *Figure 1. Greek Foreign Policy Trends*[22]



| European Agenda | Balkan Agenda |
| --- | --- |
| Western European Policy | Western European Policy |
| Greek policy | Greek Policy in the Balkans |
| Result: Compatibility on a satisfactory level | Result: Incompatibility and adoption of self-help policies |

Greek and the other EC/EU state policies in the Balkans in the 1990s were formulated on a divergence axis (the Yugoslav break-up, the Macedonian Issue, Kosovo, Serbia) while Greece's policies on what constituted the EC/EU agenda (institutional issues, European constitution, consensus) were formulated within a convergence ratio (see Figure 1). The two trends illustrate that the two agendas resulted in incompatible behaviour as there was limited consensus on regional issues

## POST COLD-WAR TRANSFORMATION
## OF THE BALKAN SUBORDINATE SYSTEM

A depiction of the Cold War Balkan subordinate system according to the Cantori and Spiegel model would divide it into three axes (see Figure 2). First, the core actors, the states that are the local, internal elements of the system, second, the peripheral actors, states that neighbour the system states and which have immediate interests in the region and third, the non-system actors (the intrusive system), consisting of states external to the system, these are powerful actors with their own geopolitical weight and local interests, who are able to interfere in the region and dominate the interests of local actors.

The [de]stabilising potential of the intrusive actors is of tantamount importance, but it does not always apply, since state interests do not remain the same and vary according to the given in the international political arena, as well as its structure.

*Figure 2. The Cold War Balkan Sub-System*

| *Core Actors* | *Peripheral Actors* | *Non-System Actors (Intrusive system)* |
|---|---|---|
| Albania | Turkey | USA |
| Yugoslavia | Italy | Soviet Union |
| Greece | Hungary | EC actors |
| Bulgaria | Austria | |
| Romania | | |

The onset of the de-communisation process in the late 1980s coincided with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, which led to the structural collapse of the bipolar Balkan subordinate system and triggered in-system centrifugal forces. Ethnic groups complicated the picture as they engaged in intense rivalries after decades of social and political isolation.[23] The new state system that came into existence included neophyte actors that changed the security arrangements and strategic balance of the Cold War era.

According to the L. Spiegel / S. Cantori's subordinate system model, the post-Cold War Balkan subordinate system may be described as follows (see Figure 3).

*Figure 3. The Post-Cold War Balkan Subordinate System*

| *Core Actors* | *Peripheral Actors* | *Intrusive System* |
|---|---|---|
| Albania | Turkey | USA |
| Slovenia (until 1992) | Italy | Russia |
| FYROM | Slovenia (since 1992) | EC/EU actors |
| Croatia | | Iran |
| Bosnia-Herzegovina | | |
| Serbia-Montenegro | | |
| Greece | | |
| Romania | | |
| Bulgaria | | |

The early post-Cold War system re-arrangement in the Balkans altered its internal politico-military balance, which, during the Cold War, under the ideological communist / non-communist divide and the overall cleavage and polarity of the two blocks, managed to sustain its internal cohesion.

However, the end of block confrontation resulted in the emergence of two negative structural elements in the region, namely the non-creation of a local security community and second, the formulation of a competitive security complex.[24]

In the first case border changes did not facilitate the creation of a local security community defined as "a group of states which neither fear, nor prepare for the use of force among themselves".[25] As a consequence, territorialized ethnic politics dominated the agenda of interstate relations and allowed nationalism to defuse the Balkan rationale that brought the local system into the state of Realist anarchy.

In the second case, conflict over control of territories and the fate of ethnic groups prevented the establishment of a security complex defined as "a group of states whose primary security concerns overlap sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot be realistically considered separate from one another".[26] Under this spectrum, Greek foreign policy choices were formulated under the impact of geography, the system's inherent instability and its immediate security environment in a regional rather than a pan-European level.

Regional, geographically-related threats dominated the Greek security agenda and became the qualitative determinants of the course of action taken, while the rest-EC/EU focused on a generalised approach to European security, without the necessity to engage in foreign policy activity, based on the "need to protect and defend the common interests of the governments".[27]

The post-Cold War emergence of a new subordinate system in the Balkans did not threaten the national survival of Western European states, a fact that refers to the suggestion that in the zones of peace the survival of the states is not in question.[28] This set the geographical and structural framework of Greece's differentiated regional policy, dictated by threat perceptions and their intensity, whether they were accurate or distorted misperceptions.[29] Kegley and Wittkopf suggest that, "the way we act is shaped by what we perceive, we must continually question the validity of our images of world politics and ask if they are accurate views of reality or misperceptions". Greek officials, like many of their European and American counterparts, have viewed intra-regional politics under the mental model of Balkan instability. Such mental models may distort real images either by "exaggerating some features of the real world... or... ignoring others".[30]

By contrast, Greece's European partners looked into the region through their intrusive role deprived of the proximity factors that affect foreign policy choices. The aforementioned contending perception framework set the operational basis for Greece's self-help policy.

## THE EMERGENCE OF NEOPHYTE ACTORS AND ITS CONSEQUENCE ON THE BALKAN SUBORDINATE SYSTEM

The dissolution of Yugoslavia with its tectonic geopolitical consequences and side-effects substantially altered the political map, the structure, and the balance of power of the Balkan subordinate system. The neophyte states did add to the political pluralism of the Balkan subordinate system, but they also perplexed its endemic systemic inefficiencies, as their emergence brought to the surface the traumatic intra-Balkan history, namely the Serbian-Croatian

historic incompatibilities and the long-standing struggle for control of geographical Macedonia, which has been the apple of discord for over a century. As noted, "the newness of these states, their turbulent history of internecine wars with neighbours, and the expansion and contraction of their borders, contribute to enduring feelings of insecurity. This is most evident in Greece's reaction to the emergence to the Macedonian issue".[31]

For Greek policy-makers the emergence of a new security system, related to Balkan politics, constituted an unprecedented challenge, since the post--Cold War territorial changes allowed for the re-emergence of the Macedonian Issue that always dominated Greek foreign policy in the Balkans. History seemed to have played its catalytic role and become the qualitative axis of Greek policy, affected heavily by the long-lasting but temporarily dormant boundary disputes that have haunted the Balkans ever since the dissolution of the Ottoman and Austrian Empires. Although, "freedom, flexibility and interaction" were the benefits of the post-Cold War security arrangement, these new situation caused Balkan instability, which resulted from the revival of historical grievances.

## THE BALKAN SUBORDINATE SYSTEM AS A SOURCE OF INSTABILITY

In the early post-Cold War Balkan subordinate system Greece operated from a zone of turmoil, an immature system of anarchic structure in which "each state recognises no other legitimate sovereign unit except itself".[32] In such systems, the systems themselves "not only generate many of the threats which define the national security problem, but also constitute a major target of national security".[33] Under this spectrum, Greek insecurity is a non-desired side-effect of the country's security environment and not a matter of choice. In essence it was a problem stemming from its geography.

Despite certain aspects of cooperative behaviour, the Balkans, as a state system, appeared to have an anarchic structure and thus constituted a source of insecurity per se for Greece, which adopted a self-help international behaviour, due to:

a) Systemic inefficiencies created by its members' conflicting goals (status quo versus non-status quo powers) and exacerbated by national stereotypes and history.

b) Domestic inefficiencies of the Greek political arena, rooted in inter-party rivalry.

c) Long-lasting destabilising interference of non-system actors (the intrusive system).[34]

d) Political instability, economic backwardness and lack of a win-win political culture on the part of local actors.

Conflicts in the region could not be peacefully accommodated in a compromising way since for local policy-makers the "irreducible core of national interests"[35] could not be bargained for. This may attributed to the fact that "a certain minimum of interests belong to all the members of the community, which must at all costs be safeguarded and which are so important and so well grounded that they turn into principles and gain unquestionable and unreasoned acceptance".[36]

To a substantial degree, the Balkans represented a microcosm of the structural condition described by the Realist term anarchy, or the Hobbesian world of "all against all" or "the state of nature". Anarchy may have the form of "mature anarchy" (utopian anarchy), in which, with the application of certain criteria a state "could recognise and accept each other's legitimacy and at the same time increase their own".[37] However, this was not the case with the Balkans, particularly in the 1990s, when disputes were territorialized and seen through a zero-sum prism. Actually this differentiated South-eastern Europe from central Europe, where the creation of an advanced political culture and a win-win approach to conflict resolution allowed for peaceful transformation.[38]

The difficulty in maintaining the security balance of the Balkan sub-system lies in the conflict of interests and goal divergence, since "a system is maintained when certain functions are performed. If a system is to be maintained, interests must be coherent and deprived of their divisive potential".[39] Any interference, either from within or outside the system must have the form of a system maintaining activity, otherwise, local actors, even if they have stabilising intentions, may act in an un-cooperative manner. If the mediating potential of local actors is not encouraged, the system is at stake, as it tends to be prone to destabilising changes, uncooperative behaviour and be vulnerable to instability, since it is "at the centre of a flow".[40] The suggestion underpins the significance of self-stabilising mechanisms and the [de]stabilizing potential of powerful intrusive actors.

Local and non-system stabilisers were expected to enhance equilibrium, meaning "mechanisms that try to absorb the consequences of anomalies, irregularities that upset the system... positive functions are eufunctional, while destabilizing policies dysfunctional".[41] The above will assist the states to formulate the operational framework of the needed regulatory mechanisms to keep the system together and enhance its cohesion. As noted, "a system must maintain its fabric in existence... To maintain a system, its members must be socialised, meaning must accept the system's way of operating".[42]

The early post-Cold War Balkan state-system did not form a eufunctional operational mode and stabilising mechanisms that could provide the common ground for inter-Balkan co-operation. Nationalism, revisionism, violation of human and civil rights, strategic minority expansionism, ethnic politics and poverty, along with the institutional problems of the de-communisation process originally marginalized the prospects of co-operation and the establishment of a community of states. It appears that there was not a strong sense of common fate amongst local actors, resulting in the adoption of self-help security policies at the expense of a local security regime. This provided a complex structural setting which affected the local players' international behaviour.

At this point the application of a system functioning model and its comparison with the Balkan subordinate system's structural and operational characteristics may illustrate the degree of the system's dysfunctionality. According to Roy Jones' functioning model (see Figure 4), systems operate at three levels:[43]

*Figure 4. System Levels of Operation*

1. System's capabilities, as reflected from its relations with the external environment

2. System's way of responding to inputs coming into it, which are converted into outputs.

3. System's maintenance / self-stabilising mechanisms

In the early 1990s particularly the Balkan subordinate system seemed to be economically and politically cut off from its external environment and constituted a nucleus of instability within post-Cold War Europe. This affected heavily its capability to absorb the shock caused by the massive politico-economic changes. To make things worse, the input coming into such a state-system could not assist its stabilisation. EC/EU actors, including Greece, championed their national preferences and supported local actors on a selective basis, acting at times as a negative input provider. Under the then circumstances, the catastrophic outcome was unavoidable, as the system lacked self-stabilising mechanisms that could prevent or at least contain conflicts to a no--war framework.

The Yugoslav break-up illustrated the system's operational dysfunctionalities and its inherent systemic anomalies, which dramatically affected Greek policy. Furthermore, domestic inter-party rivalry made Greek inefficiencies apparent, despite the application of groupthink practices that meant to overlay Greek security worries. In the Greek case, although groupthink[44] did not prevent Athens from adopting self-help policies, it mentally and operationally "imposed" security norms that functioned on generalisations that exaggerated or downgraded actual or potential threats. In part, this may also be attributed to the non-application on the part of the EU of a single, common operational norm on both the western European zone of peace and the Balkan zone of turmoil. It appears that there were two contending trends adopted by Greece and its European partners. While Greece tended at times to magnify actual or potential threat perceptions, EC/EU states tended to undermine the geographical limitations imposed on Greek foreign policy and its security implications.

A causal explanation of the two incompatible tendencies is that the Balkans did not pose a direct threat to Western Europe, to the same degree they did to Greece. The restructuring of the Balkan subordinate system affected Greece's international behaviour, since it was considered to be a direct threat to its physical base defined by its populations and territory.

It is argued that, "insecurity, after all, is a condition rather than an end. It is a product of the structure of the international system, a reflection as much as a cause of tension".[45] Seen through this prism, Greek insecurity was not a self-imposed choice, but rather an unfavourable situation stemming, inter allia, from systemic deficiencies since "for ordinary states security is an exercise in execution; for the strong it is a matter of definition".[46] In the same

way insecurity perceptions were imposed on Greek officials and people by the structural elements of the security environment. Furthermore, inter-Balkan politics could not be disconnected from Balkan history and its catalytic impact on Balkan peoples' national psychology that distorted perceptions of the other side (mirror images). This sense of otherness, these distorting images have long divided Balkan peoples, and along with the ever-changing nature of the Balkan subordinate-system turned the peninsula into a zone of instability.

## GEOGRAPHY AND SYSTEM ORIENTED SECURITY PERCEPTIONS AS A POLICY DIVERGENCE POINT

The non-existence of a common strategic approach among EC/EU states in the 1990s, along with their unwillingness or inability to express a compact Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) on issues affecting the European periphery, marginalised the stabilising and mediating role of the EC/EU in the Balkans, enhanced the role of the US in European security and externalized Greek security [mis]perceptions.

The lack of security unity in the absence of a pan-European security regime was also hindered by the lack of an institutional framework that would promote convergent trends within the EC/EU and deal with European security under a compact, holistic spectrum. This was of tantamount importance to Greece's security, as Greek officials considered that the country was threatened by conflicts, which did not affect the national security systems of its European partners. The above suggests that Greece appeared to be facing security problems stemming from its geographical positioning in the Balkan sub-system. By contrast, similar issues had long been peacefully resolved in the western European zone of peace, where territorial disputes or the threat of war as a foreign policy instrument were eliminated.

Geography and the local security environment set the operational axis for Greece's differentiated policy. The precondition for the application of a common approach to security issues demanded, inter allia, convergence of national interests, setting common goals and above all a common perception of threat(s). However, as security threats are often subjective, idiosyncratically-defined and geographically-rooted, they may be interpreted in several ways, as well as applied on many levels. Under this perceptual spectrum formulated within a geographical divide, it is difficult to find wide consensus of what an actual or potential threat consists of, since security is, inter allia, a state of mind, affecting judgment and evaluating procedures.

The meaning of security is vague and takes a form according to how it is defined and conceived by policy makers and defence analysts. After all, "security is a relative concept... and...it is easier to apply to things than people",[47] a suggestion aiming at pinpointing the catalytic role of psychological aspects in the formulation of threat perceptions. To the same direction points the suggestion that "the ambiguity of the word security is due both to its deliberate misuse in international diplomacy and to the inherently subjective nature of the concept. Thus, the phrase pursuit of security concerns has often been used as a euphemism for aggressive action or in a broad context which goes beyond defensive needs".[48]

It may be assumed that, by definition, it is a highly contested issue to pinpoint what a security threat is, particularly when looking into matters from different angles, without the pressure of geographical proximity to flashpoints. These constitute the structural elements of Greece's foreign policy system and qualitatively defined threats and their intensity as well as perceptions. The importance of security perceptions for the formation of foreign policy choices should not be underestimated and ought to be linked with the conditions of being safe. It is suggested that *"a nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war"*.[49] Besides, as *"the search for security is perennial... all foreign policies of all states are basically influenced by it"*.[50] The two suggestions may explain the fact that although Greek policy in the Balkans was aimed at stability and did not express territorial claims, certain policies adopted were non-constructive. Greek foreign policy choices have been determined to a substantial degree by the qualitative determinants of foreign policy, dictated by "the activities of other members of the region"[51] which, in a security zone of anarchical structure, enhances the perpetuating security dilemma.

The above depict the geographical element of the country's security environment, a main element defining foreign policy choices. The second defining element is the lack, in the Balkans, of an advanced political culture that would accommodate disputes within a win-win framework as was the case with Central European states. Balkan states adopted a competitive model of security in inter-Balkan relations, under the weight of historical suspicion and antagonism for the scarce resources of the peninsula,[52] a fact that caused their alternative policy choices to be trapped in zero-sum policy norms.

The geographical setting, the system's structure, and the adopted policies revealed the link between [mis]perception, intensity of threats and geography. In its turn, the systemic and operational link between geography and security[53] depicted and defined the structurally oriented security problem of Greece in the Balkans.

Greek policies and [mis]perceptions were also influenced by proximity and territoriality factors. Proximity theory uses statistical tools to suggest that armed conflicts break out among neighbouring states. Although proximity may not be the primary cause of a war, it provides the opportunity for states sharing borders to become involved in a war.[54] In this way, proximity among long-term rivals and territorial disputes that constitute fundamental conflicts of interest appear to be prerequisites for conflictual approaches, a fact supportive of the suggestion that armed conflicts occur among neighbouring states. Thus, the probability of war and the territorial issues Greece faced in the Balkans provided motives for foreign policy differentiation and at times led to aggressive policies (i.e. the Greek embargo against the Republic of Macedonia[55] in 1994) not appreciated by its European partners.

## DISUNITY IN THE EUROPEAN ZONE OF SECURITY AND ITS SOURCES

By definition the term "disunity" refers to a parcelised, dissimilar security setting and implies the existence of different security structures or differentiated geographical settings. As already suggested, the lack of common ap-

proaches to security issues resulted from the different structural settings from which Greece and its European partners operated. The convergence / divergence policy ratio was magnified by the lack of security unity in Europe, while the security disunity pattern was deteriorated by the two major contending and self-paralyzing trends[56] within the EU namely intergovernmentalism and supranationalism. The two approaches support integration at two different qualitative levels, a vertical (deepening-supranationalism) and a horizontal (widening-intergovernmentalism) with the final result being a compromise between the two trends.

The lack of security unity, inaugurated de facto with the early 1990s division of Europe into zones of peace and zones of turmoil, found Greece geographically isolated in a zone of instability, seemingly dominated by territorial expansionism, lack of democratic background, economic backwardness, lack of social cohesion, clashing nationalisms and explicit or implicit irredentist claims. The aforementioned qualitative and quantitative deficiencies of the Balkan subordinate system did not characterise the western European zone of peace, which was not affected to the same degree and with the same intensity the Balkans were by the post-Cold War geopolitical changes. As a result, the institutional framework of the EU's CFSP was satisfactory for western European member-states but inadequate to accommodate Greek security worries.

The uncontrolled changes in the Balkan subordinate system illustrated the EC/EU's lack of adaptation to the rapidly changing geopolitical conditions in South-eastern Europe. European security unity became a heavily contested issue since EC/EU partners had long faced a teleological problem as far as European integration and its finite goal were concerned.

The institutional perplexity of the EC/EU nationalised its members' foreign policies, resulting in the expression of divergent views. As the process of de-nationalisation of EU members' foreign policies had been highly imperfect, Greece found itself institutionally deprived of EC/EU mechanisms that would accommodate its systemic-rooted and geographically defined security worries, while the eventual adoption of maximalistic policies allowed little space for compromise and flexibility. However, the need to construct new institutional and analytic approaches to security issues was not of the same intensity for Greece and its European partners, nor was it within the ability of the Greek administrations to influence policy choices and outcomes. The Greek side felt that the EC/EU was unable to express a casus foederis towards it and thus operate as a strategic guarantor of the territorial status quo in the Balkans.

## GREECE IN A ZONE OF TURMOIL

The unstable character of the Balkan subordinate system was de jure acknowledged with the 14 May 1997 resolution adopted by the European Parliament, where the Balkans was referred to as the principal zone of instability in Europe.[57] The statement acknowledged the structural, political and economic diversification of the region and provided the ground for causational explanation of the geographical limitations imposed on Greek policy-makers' policy adjustment capability.

In the Greek case and in accordance with the publicly stated political goals of the Greek political elite, security, reflecting the general Realist definition, referred to the preservation of territorial status and thus acquired a defensive meaning, orientating towards containment of specific multi-level historical threats the country has faced in a fragile security environment. The feeling of insecurity was heavily reflected on excessive defence expenditure, which acquired more than a semiotic significance or a vague sense of being threatened.

Although Greece is a defence-oriented country, meaning a stern supporter of territorial status quo, it has been forced to spend more than its European partners on defence since *"defence-minded states are much more liable to indulge in military and technological overinsurance"*[58] a fact that has long affected the country's economy.[59] Defence spending in Greece has been well above the NATO norms, a fact indicative of the particular security considerations of Greek policy-makers.

Policy divergence and non-compliance, stemming from incompatible perceptions of threats or non-involvement in the process of evaluating the intensity of a threat or misperception of a threat, may give vent to disagreement on the nature of threat, since in zones characterized by perennial territorial fluidity states may differentiate their policies when threats or perceived threats are justifiably/or not linked to survival.

The fundamental operating elements in zones of peace are peace and the lack of fear of war, while the development of democracy fortifies the security regime. By contrast, "zones of turmoil are regions where war at all levels, from organized urban violence to international conflict, is not only plausible but endemic. And from the prevalence of armed conflict, or the constant threat of violence, flow the instability, insecurity, and absence of a reliable institutional order..."[60]

It is within this security environment and geographical setting that Greece was expected to apply a coherent, stable and non-reactionary Balkan policy. In a way, acting as a stabilizer would mean adopting a neutral stance in regional crises taking place at Greece's immediate security environment. However, neutrality in a zone of turmoil was an extremely demanding task, particularly when [in]direct threats, concerning territorial status, are expressed on a long-terms basis. As underlined, "the absence of territorial claims and the ensuing stability of frontiers are a contributing factor securing a policy of permanent neutrality".[61] This seems not to have been the case in the post--Cold War Balkan subordinate system where threats to territorial status were overtly or covertly expressed by multiple actors.

Under a neo-realist perspective the environment (systemic milieu) defines reactions and perceptions particularly in the case of small states since "it is a much more important variable than for a great power, and hence any reasoning about its role should probably start by an identification of the type of international system in which it has to operate".[62] For Greece, the territorialised perceptions of threats had a catalytic impact on the state's security agenda and foreign policy formulation. To make things worse, war in the Balkans had been an endemic feature, as "the platitude that military force does not solve anything has been invalidated daily in the Balkans".[63] The 1990s Balkan crises illustrated that military aggressiveness and the use of military force has

been used in its Clausewitzian notion, as a means of advancing political aims, thus, fortifying M. Singer and A. Wildavsky's structural depiction of a zone of turmoil.

On their part, Western European states assumed that local actors disposed of the required political will to resolve disputes within a mutual compromise framework. This evaluation was formulated outside Greece's systemic environment and its priorities agenda. However, "world-order policies such as the one exemplified by the League of Nations after World War I and the UN after WW II, failed because their authors assumed that peace could be created by political will and that all sovereign governments shared the same basic goals of international peace and domestic prosperity. But the world is not the same everywhere. Governments in the zones of turmoil tend, for many reasons, to have different purposes and priorities than do governments in the zones of peace... Promoting peace in the zones of turmoil is a matter for generations not for a single administration."[64]

The above suggestion portrays the priority and urgency divergence between Greece and its partners and the particular security setting within which Greek officials operated, as well as the security dilemmas they faced. An alternative policy for Greece would be to adopt the "pilot-fish behaviour", meaning a policy fully compatible with that of the most powerful EC/EU states, or the "anti-balance of power behaviour".[65] In such a case systemic peculiarities would have to be ignored while the domestic factor of exercising foreign policy would have to be affected in order to allow changes in policy orientation.

## GEOGRAPHY AND [MIS]PERCEPTION OF THREATS

To provide an explanation for self-help prone Greek foreign policy in the Balkans and the country's inability to agree with its European partners' policies one should scrutinize the concept of insecurity or perception of threat and take into account the psychological effects of this perception (an operational prerequisite). Similar psychological parameters are of paramount importance since "in international society it is beliefs about that situation (and the attitude of the actors), rather than the reality, which will determine the course of action"[66] to be adopted.

The beliefs and [mis]perceptions of Greek policy-makers, concerning evaluation of threats and their intensity, along with the search for security, were the qualitative determinants of the adopted policy. However, as "the inaccuracy of perception in international society affects the effectiveness of the action taken",[67] it should be pointed out that Greek policy reflected the degree of accuracy of threat perception of Greek policy-makers within a particular structural setting.

Thomas Schelling claims that, "the extent of knowledge we have of other actors may determine how far the action we take is rational and how far, in the long term, maximizes our interests".[68] The aforementioned suggestion may imply that either Greek policy was formulated within a limited knowledge framework or an irrational axis or that its European partners ignored perceived threats due to limited understanding of the limitations geography imposes on foreign policy drawing.

A perceptual model for scrutinising Greek-other EC/EU states incompatibilities in the Balkans should first look at the target of the perceived threats. Seen under this spectrum, divergence in goal setting and foreign policy norms may be exacerbated by the fact that certain threats or perceptions of threats are (in)directly related to parts of national territory with an enhanced emotional and historical value, since, "although as a rule states will contest all challenges to their territorial integrity, some pieces of territory are clearly more valuable than others".[69] This suggestion underpins the contending, and at times conflicting, angles of approaching security issues, the ambiguity of naming threats, as well as their sentimental and historical value for local communities. This very fact, at least in part, provides explanation for Greece's motives in adopting uncooperative policies in the Balkans, although the current analysis does not aim at rationalising or purging non-constructive policies.

To most Western European policy-makers, the Greek policy, particularly in the Yugoslav crisis and the "Macedonian Issue", was irrational and uncooperative, though the very concept of irrationality was not common between Greece and the rest of the EC/EU states. Eventually, "irrationality can imply a disorderly and inconsistent value system, faulty calculation, an inability to receive messages or to communicate efficiently".[70] Divergence, stemming from the existence of opposed value systems, may lead to misunderstandings, concerning the motives of the states. Furthermore, Greek-other EC/EU states often incompatible strategies were exacerbated by both sides' inability to receive and send messages in a communicative way, due to different motives, priorities and perceptions.

## CONCLUSION: DEFINING ELEMENTS OF GREEK FOREIGN POLICY INCOMPATIBILITY AND ITS SIDE-EFFECTS

This analysis has focused on a number of factors that define state international behaviour and the adoption of self-help policies such as geography, threat [mis]perception, proximity to flashpoints, history as a qualitative determinant of national attitudes as well as the lack of an advanced political culture with enhanced conflict resolution and accommodating capacity. Among these, the geographical element of foreign policy drawing constitutes a defining factor for the adoption or elimination of alternative choices.

In the case of Greek policy in the Balkans during the 1990s geography operated as the qualitative element for defining threats, their perceptions and intensity. Eventually it structurally imposed a mental model of looking into regional issues and resulted in Greece adopting a policy incompatible with the policy of its European partners. It prevented the adoption of a concrete, compliant with the rest EC/EU, cooperative, and eufunctional policy for a number of reasons related to structure, the policies of intrusive actors, domestic politics variables, and cultural elements.

First, the post-Cold War emergence of a new subordinate system in the Balkans constituted by its operating mode an unstable geographical and operational milieu leading Greece to formulate a nationalised foreign policy under the impact of the structural elements of its near abroad. This is reflected by the different agendas and priorities set by EC/EU members and may explain, to a certain degree, why threat perceptions between Greece and the other

EC/EU states often did not coincide, leading the Greek administrations to adopt incompatible policies, magnified by contending strategic perceptions and influenced by geographical variables.

Geography defines security to a considerable degree, as "it conditions, shapes, and influences the course of a polity's historical choices",[71] particularly in those regions or sub-systems which are politically and culturally divided and eventually Balkanised. Under a statist prism, Greek interests in the Balkans were perceived as related to the survival of the country, a fact that, at times of crises, drove the Greek political elite to adopt non-co-operative approaches to regional issues or to even become part of the destabilising processes.

Second, the Balkan subordinate system did not operate in a eufunctional way due to the interference of intrusive actors and particularly the antagonism[72] between European actors and the U.S. The intrusive system and out-of-system interference played a catalytic role in the internal balance of the Balkan subordinate system and its operating mode as well as the capacity of Greece's European partners to accommodate Greek security worries. This did not assist Greece to become a stability chain in the power and security vacuum in the 1990s Balkans, since, in the Greek view, stabilising-oriented input marginalised Greek interests and downgraded actual, potential or perceived threats. Although Greek intransigence cannot be underestimated, powerful intrusive actors may also be held co-responsible for Balkan instability and the magnification of Greek insecurities, as "the West has always found it difficult to devise adequate geopolitical concepts for Eastern Europe".[73]

Third, Greek policy did not adapt to the new period of the transitional phase of international and above all regional politics. The lack of stabilising mechanisms that would absorb insecurity side-effects during the early transitional phase in Balkan politics affected Greece's international behaviour heavily. Greek policy became at times uncooperative in its quest for security, which is "a perennial goal... [as] all foreign policies of all states are basically influenced by it [security]".[74] Security policy is driven by threat perceptions and the notion of national interest, which is catalytic when it affects actual or assumed irreducible national interests related to the survival of the state. Greece adopted non-constructive policies, since perceived non-negotiable interests were formulated within a zone of turmoil, a systemic setting that became a major hindrance to adopting non-zero sum policies.

Fourth, Greek policy-makers assumed that they could not expect a priori their European partners to fully acknowledge Greek security worries, an anticipation that could not be materialised, since it did not take into considerations the particular and at times conflicting national interests of the other EC/EU states in the Balkans. This implies that Greek foreign policy did not function in a national priorities vacuum and failed to converge with the interests of the other European actors due to zone dissimilarities and urgency. Divergence in the perception of threat between Greece and the other EU states in the 1990s was at times schismatic, while the contrasting operating frameworks within which the contending parties (Greece-other EC/EU) functioned set a de facto conflictual operational setting. At this point geography defined policies, attitudes, perceptions, misperceptions, and eventual alterna-

tive policies. Even if the perception of threat was the same, its intensity was different, which was a qualitative structure-stemming characteristic of paramount importance. This set an incompatible zone-related framework for approaching regional issues and led to conflicting policies. Eventually proximity or non-proximity to the Balkan subordinate system defined courses of action and reaction to particular policies.

Finally, besides the geography and structure-oriented elements that critically defined Greek foreign policy choices one should take into consideration the peculiarities of domestic politics, the effects of domestic public opinion and their catalytic impact on foreign policy issues. Public opinion imposed operational limits on diplomatic efforts to resolve bilateral issues. The above parameters constitute useful evaluation criteria in the process of analysing the foreign policy process and the alternatives at hand.

Conventionally it is suggested that, "while diplomacy may help to contain or temporarily diffuse disputes, this can usually only be done at a politically prohibitive price".[75] The inflexibility of the Greek political elite, functioning under the catalytic pressure of domestic politics, brought Greek policy-makers to a dead end. This appears to comply with the suggestion that, within the foreign policy domain, "the choices will also be affected by the procedures and processes through which selections are made".[76]

Under the impact of a geographically-defined operational setting, the realities of the domestic environment, and the maximalistic tendencies of the actors involved in regional disputes, the adopted policies eliminated alternative foreign policy choices and the prospects of compromise. As a result, the Greek political elite constructed an agenda of perceived or assumed national interests, which brought it on a collision course with its partners.

The division into two security zones makes a critical qualitative distinction between security issues in the two zones: distinction between non-military threats and actual, potential or [mis]perceived threats to the survival of a country.[77] This distinction differentiates Greece in a zone "agitated by powerful [centrifugal] forces that are difficult to recognise and essentially impossible to control".[78]

## ENDNOTES

[1] The term was first used by Stephen Van Evera (1990), "Why Europe Matters, Why the Third World Doesn't: American Grand Strategy After the Cold War". *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, No. 13 and widely used by Robert J. Art (1996), "Why Western Europe Needs the US and NATO". *Political Science Quarterly*.

[2] See Robert J. Art (1996), ibid., p. 6.

[3] See Todorova Maria (1997), *Imagining the Balkans*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 13.

[4] See Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky (1993), *The Real World Order, Zones of Peace & Zones of Turmoil*. New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, p. 4.

[5] The problem of security disunity in the European security environment after the end of the Cold War was pointed out by the wish of Central and South east European states to join NATO and the WEU. See Dienstbier Jiří (1991), "The Future of European Security. Prague Conference Confirms Agreement on Basic Ideas". *NATO Review*, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 22–27.

[6] Central European states escaped this arrangement and adapted to the new politico-economic given, transforming their politico-economic systems in an orderly way, without the catastrophic and destabilizing processes adopted by the Balkan states.

[7] See M. Singer & A. Wildavsky (1993), p. 3.

[8] As suggested, "history plays a catalytic role in zones of turmoil, as it is the case of the Balkans". Ibid., p. 6.

[9] Ibid., p. 23.

[10] Ibid.

[11] See Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel (1972), *International Politics of Regions, a Comparative Approach*. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, p. ix.

[12] In the study of comparative national policies integration is defined, inter allia, as "creating a sense of territorial nationality which overshadows-or eliminates-subordinate parochial loyalties". See Weiner Myron (1967), "Political Integration and Political Development". In: Welch C. (ed.), *Political Modernization*. Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Co., p. 150.

[13] See Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel, op. cit., p. 12.

[14] In the case of the EU, political integration may be broadly defined as *"the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states"* and is seen either as a process or a means. See Haas Ernst (1958), *The Uniting of Europe*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. 16.

[15] As noted, "the rich and peaceful countries are all democracies", a suggestion that depicts the socio--political and economic situation in zones of peace. See Singer Max & Wildavsky Aaron, op. cit., p. 37.

[16] Ibid., p. 3.

[17] Ibid., p. 22.

[18] Ibid., p. 3.

[19] See Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel, op. cit., p. 6.

[20] Ibid., p. 3.

[21] For an in-depth analysis see James Pettifer (1996), "Greek Political Culture and Foreign Policy". In: Featherstone K. and Ifantis K (eds.), *Europe in Change*, *Greece in a Changing Europe*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

[22] See George Voskopoulos (2001), "Greece, Common Foreign and Security Policy and the European Union, Interaction Within and Between a Zone of Peace and a Zone of Turmoil as an Explanatory Factor". PhD Thesis. Exeter University, Centre for European Studies, p. 29.

[23] For a short analysis see Stephen Bowers (1991), "Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe". *Conflict Studies*, No. 248, p. 21.

[24] The concept aimed at facilitating regional security analysis and pinpointing the variables affecting inter-state relations, namely geography, history and proximity that play a decisive role in the formulation of foreign policy choices within a particular security environment.

[25] See Barry Buzan and Morten Kelstrup (1991), *The European Security Order Recast, Scenarios for the Post-Cold War Era*. London: Pinter, p. 28.

[26] See Barry Buzan (1990), *People, States and Fear, The National Security Problem in International Relations*. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, p. 190.

[27] See Roy Ginsberg (1989), *Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community, The Politics of Scale*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, p. 1.

[28] See M. Singer and A. Wildavsky, op. cit., p. 23.

[29] See Charles Kegley and Eugene R. Wittkopf (1995), *World Politics, Trend and Transformation*. New York: St Martin's Press, p. 11.

[30] Ibid.

[31] See Hugh Poulton (1994), "The Rest of the Balkans". In: Hugh Miall, *Minority Rights in Europe*. London: Pinter, p. 76.

[32] See Barry Buzan and Morten Kelstrup, op. cit., p. 96.

[33] Ibid., p. 93.

[34] Indicative as well as revealing is the estimation made by the CIA, the Intelligence Organisations of the Department of State and the Joint Staff in mid-1950s, according to which "foreign influences play an important role in the Greek political system'. See Foreign Relations of the United States 1955–1957, Vol. XXIV, No. 276, National Intelligence Estimate, 18-1-1955, p. 528.

[35] Under a Realist perspective, "irreducible national interests" are those related to an entity's survival, liberty and economic subsistence. See Plischke Elmer (1988), *Foreign Relations, An Analysis of its Anatomy*. London: Greenwood Press, p. 54.

[36] See Modelski George (1962), *A Theory of Foreign Policy*. New York: Praeger, pp. 86–87.

[37] See Barry Buzan and Morten Kelstrup, op. cit., p. 96.

[38] For an in-depth analysis see George Voskopoulos (2001), "The West and the Balkans: A Geo-cultural Approach of International Relations". *Perspectives*, No. 17, pp. 30–42.

[39] See Roy Jones (1967), *The Functional Analysis of Politics*. New York: Routledge and Kegan, p. 3.

[40] Ibid., p. 22.

[41] Ibid., p. 23.

[42] Ibid., p. 24.

[43] Ibid., pp. 23–24.

[44] See I. Janis (1972), *Victims of Groupthink*. Boston: Houghton Milfflin.

[45] See Peter Mangold (1990), *National Security and International Relations*. London: Routledge, p. 3.

[46] See Michael Mandelbaum (1982), *The Fate of Nations*. New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 142.

[47] See Barry Buzan and Morten Kelstrup, op. cit., p. 88.

[48] See Thanos Veremis (1982), *Greek Security Considerations, A Historical Perspective*. Athens: Papazisis, p. 13.

[49] See H. Lippman (1943), *US Foreign Policy*. London: Hamish Hamilton, p. 32.

[50] See P. Reynolds (1980), *An Introduction to International Relations*. London: Longman, p. 51.

[51] See Louis Cantori and Steven Spiegel, op. cit., p. 1.

[52] The economic backwardness of the Balkans turned the port of Thessaloniki into the apple of discord for local peoples. See Arnold J. Toynbee (1928), *Survey of International Affairs 1926*. London: Oxford University Press and Royal Institute of International Affairs, pp. 165–177.

[53] See Collin Gray (1996), "How Geography still Shapes Security". *Orbis*, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 247–259.

[54] See J. Vasquez (1995), "Why do Neighbours Fight? Proximity, Interaction or Territoriality". *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 277–293.

[55] The name FYROM will be used in events described after the 1995 Interim Agreement between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia.

[56] The suggested categorization, based on a more generalized synthesis of the four classical political science perspectives, namely national interests, the elite actor, domestic politics and bureaucratic politics. See Roy Ginsberg (1989), *Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community, The Politics of Scale*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, pp. 9–40.

[57] See Parliament Resolution OJC 167, 02-06-1997, Bulletin of the EU, 5-1997, p. 59.

[58] See Peter Mangold, op. cit., p. 12.

[59] This has been a diachronic hindrance to development in the post-Second World War era. As noted as early as the mid-1950s, "...it is improbable that a politically acceptable standard of living can be maintained without some form of economic assistance unless there is reduction in Greece's contribution to its defence budget". See Foreign Relations of the United States 1955–1957, Vol. XXIV, Washington: US Government Printing Office, No. 276, 1989, National Intelligence Estimate. *The Outlook for Greece,* 18 January 1955, pp. 527–528.

[60] See David Gress (1997), "Agenda 2000, The Weak Heart of Post-modern Europe". *Orbis*, p. 60.

[61] See Ronald Burston (1971), "The External Relations of Small States". In: A. Schon and Arne Olav Brundtland (eds.), *Small States in International Relations*. Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, p. 95.

[62] Ibid., p. 34.

[63] See Lawrence Freedman (1993), "Recasting European Security". *Brassey's Defence Yearbook*, p. 13.

[64] See Jacques Freymond (1971), "How Small States Can Contribute to Peace". In: A. Schon and Arne Olav Brundtland (eds.), op. cit., p. 61.

[65] See Annette Fox (1959), *The Power of Small States*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, p. 187.

[66] See Evan Luard (1990), *International Society*. London: Macmillan, p. 44.

67 Ibid., p. 45.

[68] See Thomas Schelling (1995), *The Strategy of Conflict*. London: Harvard University Press, p. 48.

[69] See Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear, The National Security Problem in International Relations,* op. cit., p. 63.

[70] See Thomas Schelling, op. cit., p. 16.

[71] See Collin Gray, op. cit., p. 248.

[72] David Owen explicitly claimed that US officials did not assist his mediating initiative. See David Owen (1996), *The Balkan Odyssey*. London: Indigo.

[73] See Lawrence Freedman, op. cit., p. 12.

[74] See P. Reynolds, op. cit., p. 51.

[75] See Peter Mangold, op. cit., p. 57.
[76] See P. Reynolds, op. cit., p. 51.
[77] See Max Singer & Aaron Wildavsky, op. cit., p. 23.
[78] Ibid, p. 37.

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