

Neoconservatives Among Us? A Study of Former Dissidents' Discourse*

JENI SCHALLER

Abstract: Neoconservative political thought has been characterized as “distinctly American”, but could there be fertile ground for its basic tenets in post-communist Europe? This paper takes an initial look at the acceptance of the ideas of American neo-conservative foreign policy among Czech elites who were dissidents under the communist regime. Open-ended, semi-structured interviews with eight former dissidents were conducted and then analyzed against a background of some fundamental features of neoconservative foreign policy. Discourse analysis is the primary method of examination of the texts. Although a coherent discourse among Czech former dissidents cannot be said to exist, certain aspects reminiscent of American neoconservative thought were found.

Key words: neoconservatism, Czech dissidents, foreign policy, discourse analysis

I. INTRODUCTION

Neoconservatism, as a strain of political thought in the United States, has been represented as “distinctly American” and Irving Kristol, often considered the “godfather” of neoconservatism, emphatically states “[t]here is nothing like neoconservatism in Europe” (Kristol 2003: 33). Analyst Jeffrey Gedmin writes that the “environment for neoconservatism as such is an inhospitable one” in Europe, especially Germany (Gedmin 2004: 291). The states of Central Europe, in contrast to many of the established continental EU members, represent a rather more pro-American stance. With groups of former dissidents whose political leanings are in part informed by the American anti-communist, pro-democracy policies of the 1970s and 1980s, could there be a more hospitable environment for neoconservative ideas in a Central European state such as the Czech Republic?

The Czech dissident community was not as extensive or well-organised as that in Poland or even Hungary, largely due to the post-1968 “normalisation” in Czechoslovakia. While their counterparts in Poland and Hungary enjoyed some limited bargaining power vis-à-vis the regime throughout the 1980s, Czech dissidents remained a very loose group of individuals with various ideological viewpoints, brought together by their opposition to communist totalitarian rule. Despite their difficult conditions, “a small but forceful opposition

* This paper was written during a research internship at the Institute of International Relations, Prague. I would like to thank all those interviewed in the course of the project, as well as Petr Kratochvíl, Vladimír Handl, and Vít Vaníček for their support, and two anonymous reviewers for their insights and helpful comments.

with echoes of support in society and abroad" was maintained and finally gained widespread public support in autumn 1989 (Vachudova 2005: 28). After the collapse of the communist regime in late 1989, the new government consisted mainly of former dissidents and some who had not been active dissenters, but had not been active party members either. In comparison with Slovakia, many more Czech dissidents with no previous political or even professional experience were willing to assume not only legislative, but also executive posts (Učeň 1999: 85). Václav Havel provides the most striking example, but quite a few other politically inexperienced former dissidents took important positions, especially within the first few post-1989 governments. Without exaggerating the influence of former dissidents in the post-communist era, I assume that their presence in the government, cabinet, and extra-governmental research does have an (at least limited) impact on policies, as well as public opinion. The goal of this paper is not, however, to measure or attempt to characterise the influence of former dissidents on Czech politics, but rather to examine and describe a narrow slice of the ideological spectrum.

My objective is to analyse the discourse of Czech former dissidents on US foreign policy to determine whether there is a pattern of political thought among the Czech political and intellectual elite sympathetic to or supportive of American neoconservatism.¹ The analysis looks specifically at the texts of interviews with former dissidents – who partially comprise the foreign policy elite – to determine whether these texts comprise a discourse supportive of American neoconservatism. Discourse analysis can help to identify the sources, key concepts, and relations between the concepts used by the Czech elite to describe and explain American foreign policy.

Several important works have been published that generally discuss the dissident movements in Central and Eastern Europe, including Czechoslovakia (Falk 2003; Holý 1996; Rupnik 1998), but none directly address the views of the Czech dissident movement on foreign policy, perhaps because the democratic opposition in Central Europe was primarily concerned with the transformation of their domestic systems to embrace democracy. Falk warns against trying to outline the specific views of Charter 77: "Beyond human rights, it is difficult to pin down a definitive 'charter position' on anything, and to do so misses the point entirely" (Falk 2003: 253). However, once the democratic transformation was realised, and the former democratic opposition assumed the leadership role, specific policies had to be formed. In the literature dealing with the transformation from democratic opposition to the new rulers, no study has examined the role of American neoconservatism on Czech foreign policy. This project, therefore, aims to be a first step in exploring the possible implications of neoconservatism for the Czech Republic, and hopes to spark a debate about the resonance of this "distinctly American" mode of thought in the post-Communist world.

II. THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

This project aims to provide a microanalysis of a small section of the Czech elite's constructions of American foreign policy and neoconservatism. The analysis will look at key concepts in Czech former dissidents' discourse on American foreign policy, establishing whether those concepts form a dis-

course revealing implicit or explicit support of American neoconservatism. The methodology will follow Milliken (1999), who stresses that to establish the existence of a discourse; one must identify the “key aspects of significative practices”, the ways in which objects within the discourse are given meaning (Milliken 1999: 231).

Discourse analysis (DA) primarily aims to identify and describe the discourses used in public texts, which is to say that the intention is to stay at the level of discourse, and not venture into what actors “actually” think or perceive (Waever n.d.: 5). Furthermore, as critical social theory, it is not taken for granted that actors somehow provide objectively “true” representations of their beliefs, or even that there could be such a representation. Rather, actors must represent and recontextualise their own and others’ social actions, with the effect that the actions exist only in representations and recontextualisations (Fairclough 2001). Meaning in discourse does not arise independently from material objects, but rather is built on the relationships between objects within a sign system, and the structure of these relationships will most often occur in binary oppositions (Derrida 1981). In Milliken’s analysis, discourses “are background capabilities that are used socially, at least by a small group of officials if not more broadly in a society or among different elites and societies” (1999: 233). These background capabilities provide the means by which (in international relations) the world is organised and understood, and ultimately make possible certain policy actions, while rendering others impossible.

In foreign policy DA studies (one of three major types of DA presented by Milliken), the concern is with “explaining how a discourse articulated by elites produces policy practices (individual or joint)” (1999: 240). This study can be considered to fall under this domain, but the specific group of elites represents a very narrow section of the political spectrum. If a specific foreign policy discourse among current political elites with a personal history of dissent in fact exists, it would act as a background capacity² for understanding Czech foreign policy in relation to America. As a study involving a substantial number of intellectual and academic elites, aspects of international relations theory DA studies may also apply. This type of DA “extend[s] analyses of theoretical representations via arguments that knowledge produced in the academy is fused with that of policy-makers to make up a ‘dominant intellectual/policy perspective’” (1999: 236–237).

Milliken extends the explanatory power of foreign policy DA to “analyzing how an elite’s ‘regime of truth’ made possible certain courses of action by a state”, noting that the goal of DA should be to explain how discourses produce “policy practices” (1999: 236–237). The aim of this study is much narrower and will only explore the first step in the process – whether a coherent discourse on American foreign policy and neoconservatism can be identified among Czech former dissidents. Much more extensive research should be done to determine whether and to what extent such a discourse affects the formation of Czech foreign policy practices.

Methodology

Interviews of current academic or political elites with personal histories of dissent were collected. The sample of elites was drawn from current and for-

mer government officials (MPs, senators, foreign ministry officials), representatives of think-tanks, university professors and other “intellectuals-at-large” with a history of dissent against the Communist regime. I define dissent as participation in a dissident movement, such as Charter 77, *samizdat* publications, or other dissident activities. Furthermore, I included one individual who lived in exile during part of the communist regime.

The eight interviewees, while mostly not directly active in foreign policy making, have been involved in the process and continue to hold positions which may influence policy making. Most of the interviewees are intellectuals rather holders of governmental office, however in recent years several have held positions such as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Ambassador. Although they are now mostly in non-governmental positions, the importance of their opinions, contributions to media outlets and general intellectual discussions in the Czech Republic should not be underestimated. Some of the individuals are regular contributors to academic journals, the mass media and governmental and academic conferences, all of which serve as vectors spreading their opinion to other areas of Czech society. Others are involved with think tanks and organisations regularly producing policy briefs and recommendations, and serve as experts and sources of information for the Czech government. Furthermore, as experts in politics and international relations, their opinions and analyses may play a role in informing and convincing policy makers. With this in mind, a coherent discourse among these individuals could have considerable potential to affect the foreign policy actions of the state.

Interview structure

I used a combination of structured and semi-structured interview questions, following the findings of Aberbach and Rockman (2004), who argue that open-ended questions are more useful where there is little prior research on the subject at hand. Furthermore, open-ended questions are often more valid because “they provide a greater opportunity for respondents to organise their answers within their own frameworks” and because they allow elite respondents to answer freely rather than “being put in the straightjacket of close-ended questions” (2004: 2). The questions were structured around the features of neoconservative foreign policy as discussed in section VI, in the hopes of obtaining as much coverage of the target areas of foreign policy as possible. The eight interviews were transcribed in part and analyzed for specific linguistic and syntactical constructions consistent among respondents. The small sample size and the in-depth nature of the interviews call for close analysis of the texts and any consistencies among them to determine if the assumed discourse does exist.

III. NEOCONSERVATISM AND CZECH DISSIDENTS

Neoconservatism has become a rising political force in the United States, breaking from traditional conservatism to press for activism and morality in international relations. The origins of neoconservative thought will be discussed later (section IV), but it is useful to note that its potential influence on American politics was being recorded as early as the late 1970s and early 1980s, although it focused on domestic rather than foreign policy (Steinfels

1979, Joseph 1982). One of the major distinguishing aspects of the neoconservative vision of international relations is the belief that universal democracy (combined with US benevolent hegemony) will create a peaceful world. Furthermore, the debate over the influence of American neoconservatives is increasingly controversial and multi-faceted in the US and Europe. The Czech Republic, like other post-communist European states, has had a fairly consistent pro-American foreign policy. While other states in Europe have become hostile towards US policy since the 2003 invasion of Iraq the states of Central Europe (termed “new Europe” by Donald Rumsfeld) joined the American “coalition of the willing” in Iraq, contributing much-needed international legitimacy. The Bush administration has praised these states as sharing America’s values and remembering the hardships of totalitarian regimes.

The former Czech dissidents seem to represent the most pro-American sector of the Czech political elite. Under communism, some dissidents developed an affinity for the United States as a symbol of democracy, as the US held the main symbolic role in opposition to the Soviet Union. The US supported this image through outlets such as the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe. One interviewee noted that since 1965 he had followed the American press courtesy of the US embassy in Prague, which welcomed Czech citizens to its reading room and provided information not otherwise available. With US tacit support for indigenous democrats, the dissident elite made out of America a model for democracy and for how their countries could emerge as (or return as) democratic states. In addition, the perceived importance of the Reagan administration’s foreign policy in ending the Cold War may add to the admiration of an interventionist, pro-democracy foreign policy. The expectations of this study stem from an assumption that the experience of the Czech dissidents under a totalitarian system would inform a pro-democracy and anti-totalitarian stance similar to that of American neoconservatives.³

Furthermore, the dissident community was partially built on the ideas represented by Czechoslovakia’s pre-war democracy, founded by Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk – ideas later forbidden by the regime and idealised by the democratic opposition (Holý 1996: 48–49). NATO representative Karel Kovanda (himself a former dissident) has characterised the Czech affinity for American idealism thus: “[w]e detect a strand of idealism in US foreign policy which appeals to us: for better or worse, President Masaryk’s country – our own – was founded on the strength of Wilsonian idealism, back in 1918. It is an idealism dedicated to freedom and democracy” (Kovanda 2003). Wilsonian idealism, the (sometimes naive) desire for democracy around the world, based on the belief that democracy is a universal value, is often considered a foundation for American neoconservatism (which however, tends to push for a harder application of this policy). As we shall see in the next section, the terms Kovanda uses are very similar to those used by American neoconservatives in describing their own foreign policy vision.

Because of their experience as the democratic opposition under totalitarian rule, the dissident elite would be expected to sympathise with individuals in a similar position in other regimes. This is clearly evident in the former dissidents’ vocal support for the indigenous Cuban and North Korean democrats, which has even led to conflicts at the EU level. A speech by former Ambassador

to the US, Alexandr Vondra, illustrates how personal experiences lead to sympathy with North Korean citizens:

We do have some common experiences with my country, which had its own bitter totalitarian experiences where we struggled to bring it down. Many of my fellow citizens paid for the depravity of the communist dictatorship with exile, imprisonment and some with their life. I have had my own experiences with freedom fighting and I was fortunate enough to spend only two months in a communist prison. I mention this disturbing fact because I think it illustrates a political experience comparable with that of present-day North Korea. (Vondra 2003)

Such strong empathy with the oppressed democratic opposition in totalitarian regimes leads to indicate that the former Czech dissidents would be strongly against all such regimes and would actively support political or even military action – a position strongly favoured by US neoconservatives, but by few other sectors of the population in the US or Europe. Although the neo-conservative and Czech dissident experiences are vastly different, their reasons for supporting action against such regimes do not differ so greatly – both look to the spread of democracy as a guarantee of human rights and security around the world.

We might expect to find an underlying support for action against totalitarian regimes, possibly with America as the leading power, stemming from an understanding that the hard-line actions of President Reagan were crucial in the disintegration of the Soviet bloc. This is demonstrated in Václav Havel's appeal to the US Congress for leadership in helping "the Soviet Union on its irreversible, but immensely complicated, road to democracy" (Havel, 1990). The neoconservative movement has its roots in the vehement opposition to the Soviet Union and the US policy of *détente*. Disillusioned by Washington's "soft" approach to the Soviet Union, early neoconservatives (most of them leftists) were "mugged by reality" in Irving Kristol's phrasing, and turned to support a hard-line approach to the Soviet Union. In a similar way many of the early Czech dissident community originally supported socialism, but grew jaded with its implementation.⁴ Later generations (including most of those interviewed for this study) were certainly anti-Soviet, and generally supported a more hard-line stance by the US and Western Europe in the Cold War. As one interviewee told me: "If you understand the logic of the totalitarian system, it can be overcome, but not from within. You need international support and the assistance of a strong authority from the outside. (...) Without Ronald Reagan and his explicit rhetorics, nothing would change in Russia." It can be easily (although perhaps not always accurately), argued that this particular foreign policy of the neoconservatives would have been heavily supported by those who fought against the communist regime.

A final link between Czech dissidence and neoconservatism is the emphasis on the return of morality to politics. Morality and the fight against evil is a common strain in the writings of Havel, especially since the fall of communism and the establishment of democracy in Central Europe. "For peace cannot be attained without a readiness to defend it against the forces of evil" (Havel 1999). Furthermore, the role of a strong military behind the democracy has come into focus, especially in light of NATO's Central European ex-

pansion. “An army will always remain an unequivocal expression of the shared will to live in freedom, to defend freedom and to engage in joint efforts in order to ensure freedom for others as well” (Havel n.d.). This emphasis on the need to defend freedom (after fighting for it for so long) echoes neoconservative calls for greater military strength. The combination of anti-Soviet history and a deep-seeded belief in the importance of democracy in securing human rights help raise an expectation of similar discourses between American neoconservatives and Czech former dissidents.

IV. FEATURES OF NEOCONSERVATIVE FOREIGN POLICY

Identifying the key areas of neoconservative policy and theory can be problematic because of the wide range of opinions held by neoconservatives and the large amount of misleading or misunderstood information published on neoconservative policy beliefs.⁵ *Weekly Standard*⁶ editor David Brooks warns: “If you ever read a sentence that starts with ‘Neocons believe’, there is a 99.44 per cent chance everything else in that sentence will be untrue” (Brooks 2004: 42). Nevertheless, there are certain qualities around which a fairly coherent neoconservative worldview, specifically concerning foreign policy, is structured. I identify three guiding pillars of neoconservative foreign policy: American hegemony, hard Wilsonianism, and moralistic visions of good and evil in the world. As we shall see, these three main features are intricately connected and form a distinct and coherent mandate for US foreign policy.

American Benevolent Hegemony

After the end of the Cold War, America was often hailed as the only remaining “superpower”. For neoconservatives, this is America’s rightful place; it is the only country with the ability and desire to build and reinforce a stable, peaceful (read: democratic) world. This belief centres around a strong conviction in American exceptionalism, which Zachary Selden identifies as an almost unquestioned core idea of American foreign policy. Exceptionalism is manifest in the view of the American notion of liberal democracy as a universal concept. As a bastion of stable democracy, America has both the right and the duty to build a peaceful world society. Furthermore, the influence of the US in the world is seen as undeniably positive. Joshua Muravchik, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI),⁷ identifies as one of two basic “truths” of America’s foreign policy that “America is a great force for good in the world” (1991: 222). Irwin Stelzer, a former AEI director, writes: “Neocons believe that a militarily powerful America must play what can be reasonably described as an imperial role if there is to be a new, peaceful world order” (2004: 11).⁸ Neoconservatives envision a new world order, in which peace and democracy prevail, and America retains its power in what Charles Krauthammer has called a “unipolar era” (Kristol and Kagan 2000: 58).

Neoconservatives see dire consequences for America and the world if the superpower does not live up to these expectations:

Even if the threat from China were to disappear tomorrow, that would not relieve us of the need for a strong and active role in the world. Nor would it absolve us of the responsibilities that fate has placed on our shoulders. Given

the dangers we know currently exist, and given the certainty that unknown perils await us over the horizon, there can be no respite from this burden (Kristol and Kagan 2000: 71).

This statement, typical of neoconservative writings, blends traditional conservative pessimism, which sees no end to the possibility of evil in the world with an underlying sense of responsibility for confronting and even overcoming this evil. America is portrayed as “burdened” with the responsibility for confronting and removing these “dangers”. Neoconservatives have thus moved beyond realism to a more progressive view, in which evil can be overcome, a feature that will be explored in greater detail below.

“Hard Wilsonianism”

Although neoconservative writers claim Wilson as an important ideological predecessor, there is a significant difference in the neoconservative application of Wilsonian idealism. Democracy is still the goal, but the means have taken a more aggressive turn. This is often referred to as “hard” Wilsonianism: making democracy possible by deposing dictatorial regimes that threaten American security and the world order – using military force if all else fails, following regime change with nation-building, and relying on various ad-hoc coalitions rather than on the United Nations’ support (Stelzer 2004: 9). The traditional liberal tools of diplomacy, institutions, and multilateralism are, in the more hawkish writings, portrayed as weak and inefficient means of achieving democratisation. However, neoconservative authors are divided as to how aggressive this policy should be, and to what extent unilateralism is better than multilateralism.⁹

The neoconservative vision of a democratic world involves far more than supporting indigenous efforts to democratise; the policy is the “export of democracy”. Joshua Muravchik’s book, *Exporting Democracy* (published by the AEI), gives three reasons for America to take democracy export as the main engine of its foreign policy. First is ‘empathy with our fellow humans,’ giving others the possibility to pursue freedom in the American fashion. Lest the policy be derided as pure altruism, the second reason points to the increasing friendliness of a democratic world to American interests – “what is good for democracy is good for America” (Muravchik 1991: 222). The last reason is essentially a restatement of the democratic peace theory: a world consisting of democracies is most likely to be a peaceful world. There is clearly an understanding that the ideas and values of the US should serve as the basis for government in the rest of the world, precisely because shared or common values will both increase security and render political and ideological conflict unlikely.

Neoconservative idealism is infused with an extremely value-driven policy and a very inclusive understanding of national interests extending far beyond the minimal realist understanding. National interests extend beyond economic wellbeing and protection from immediate threats to include securing freedom and democracy around the world. In seeing liberal democracy and the free market as the most important factors in promoting peace around the world, neoconservative policy draws upon democratic peace theory. This rejection of the traditional conservative pessimistic view of a world doomed to

perish is another fundamental break with realism.¹⁰ Unlike traditional conservative realism, neoconservatism postulates that a world without conflict could be possible, if all players agreed to US-dominance and Western-style democracy. The conclusion is that national interest is no longer confined to the geographical sphere. Great powers (like the United States) must also consider their interest in ideological terms.

The spread of (Western-style) liberal democracy remains the goal of hard Wilsonianism, as Irving Kristol has argued, “not only out of sheer humanitarianism but also because the spread of liberal democracy improves U.S. security, while crimes against humanity inevitably make the world a more dangerous place” (2003: 49). In Kristol’s argument, the alternative to liberal democracy is crime against humanity. No other system is viable. Liberal democracy, accompanied by the free market, is taken for granted as the best form of government universally, and American foreign policy should strive to support democracy around the world.

Moralistic Visions of Good and Evil

To examine the final pillar of neoconservative foreign policy, moralistic visions of good and evil, a brief discussion of the movement’s political development is useful. What is now called neoconservatism has its theoretical roots in a group of individuals who in the 1930s and 40s were part of the anti-Stalinist left. Their philosophical idealism comes from an association with pre-war political leftism, which rejected cynical realist approaches to foreign policy. During the 1960s, as the New Left movement gained publicity and strength, the reactionary movement also built up steam, albeit more quietly. Within the context of the Cold War, the first generation neoconservatives¹¹ turned away from the prevailing liberal views to a hard-line stance on Communism and interventionism, emphasising the need for strong anticommunism and support for freedom around the world. In a domestic context, the group bemoaned a “lack of moral fibre” evident in the civil rights and antiwar movements, leading them to accept conservative social and moral values. Thus in contemporary neoconservative theory we can identify policy values from both sides. From its liberal underpinnings, neoconservatism takes a broad view of the national interest and America’s responsibility in the world, while from conservatism it takes a respect for tradition and moral values that also inform its foreign policy.

The underlying sense of distinct moral values is also found in neoconservative foreign policy. According to this understanding of the world, there are good and evil forces, and the distinction between them is quite clear. Edward Rhodes, in his critical appraisal of George W. Bush’s NATO policy, identifies the “changing faces of evil” in the administration’s rhetoric. The “new faces” of evil – terrorism and tyranny – are merely extensions of the same evil that has been the target of American foreign policy all along (previously in the form of Nazism and communism). “Thus while the faces, names, and forms change, the underlying *nature* of evil and the appropriate reaction to it are constant: it is the denial of individual freedom, carried out by intimidation and terror, against which the Atlantic partners have fought and must continue to fight” (Rhodes 2004: 135). In the neoconservative view of international re-

lations, evil is ever-present and ever-changing, but the forces for good are always gradually advancing against it.¹² The “end of the Cold War represented a real and irreversible victory” in the struggle against evil, although the war on evil (in the form of terrorism and tyranny) has not been won decisively (Rhodes 2004: 135).

Thus the mandate of “good” forces is to rid the world of “evil” ones. The belief that evil *can* be overcome is an important departure from traditional conservative and realist thought. These evil, tyrannical regimes cannot be expected “to play by the existing— which is to say American – rules of the game”. Therefore the answer lies in a policy of regime change including outright military means, covert support for dissidents, economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation (Kristol and Kagan: 2000: 70).

Although neoconservative thought also presents a vivid and fairly coherent policy program for domestic concerns, the focus here will remain on foreign policy. Certainly other areas of concern have not been discussed in depth, including the extension of military and defence capabilities. However, these concerns can be traced back to three fundamental values: American dominance, the universal appeal of democracy and the division of the world into good and evil. The next section will take these three features of neoconservative foreign policy as a starting point for the analysis of the interview texts. An additional section on the respondents’ conceptions of neoconservatism itself will also be included.

V. DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF INTERVIEW TEXTS

American Dominance

In neoconservative discourse, the ideal international power structure for the United States and the world is a benevolent hegemony of the United States, especially with regard to military structures. Although the desirability of American dominance is often disputed, the fact that it remains the strongest military power and that the world power structure can no longer be considered bipolar presents a level on which competing strains of IR theory converge. US dominance, therefore, is taken as a background feature of the current international relations discourse. I expect a Czech dissident discourse that recognises the status of America as hegemon and supports this position. Every dissident respondent answered that the US is the dominant power in the world, most presented a positive appraisal of US foreign policy in general, and there were varying degrees of support for US hegemony (including disagreement).

All respondents answered that America is the dominant power in the international system. Although this question was presented as a structured multiple-choice question, several respondents gave this answer even before hearing all the choices. In the discourse of these former Czech dissidents, as well as in the greater IR discourse, the perception of the US as most powerful is presented as a widely agreed “fact” or “reality”, rather than an interpretation of the global power structure.¹³ The “reality” of American dominance therefore acts as a background capacity most likely not limited to the dissident elites, and which may extend to most sectors of the Czech political spectrum.

The neoconservative discourse sees American leadership as necessary for “the maintenance of a decent and hospitable international order” (Kristol and Kagan 2000: 64). In contrast, the former dissidents interviewed all stressed the importance of increased cooperation, multilateralism, and moderation in US ambitions and power. Europe was most consistently named as a power that could or should play a larger role vis-à-vis the US. Thus there is no clear sign that any of the respondents view the proper response to increasing American power as deference or gratitude on the part of the rest of the world, the response neoconservative writers seem to expect. Embodying what several pointed out as the European affinity for cooperation, respondents highlighted multilateralism as an alternative to the perceived overly ambitious US “go-it-alone” policy.

An interesting feature of the responses is that concepts of Europe and America are consistently portrayed as opposites, with very distinct characteristics that are both complementary and the source of conflict. Whereas Europe is constructed as cynical, old, experienced (with war) and even disillusioned, America represents optimism, the new, and is seen as willing to make clear distinctions between right and wrong. According to one respondent, “We have all been educated in Central Europe and you know this is the region where you had so many wars in the past that it [taught] the people to be a little bit sceptical and relativistic.” This opposition of Europe and America (particularly as female and male) has also been described by neoconservative theorist Robert Kagan (2000), and this idea was referenced directly by one respondent. Despite these differences, Europe and America are both portrayed as democratic and sharing the same values, hence the perceived need for more cooperation between the two.

Only one respondent characterised the role of the US as negative, so the call for multilateralism does not originate in anti-American feelings. The majority of respondents, although they pointed out various US policies with which they disagree, still maintained that the overall influence of the US in the world is positive. These relatively numerous positive evaluations of the America’s influence in the world indicates a point of departure from general Czech public opinion. In a poll conducted around the same time as these interviews, over 40% of Czech respondents indicated that America represents a threat to the world.¹⁴ In contrast, none of the respondents of this study even hinted opinion that the US could represent such a danger. These former dissidents, although from various political positions, tend to evaluate US foreign policy more positively than the general Czech population. The convergence of opinion on the influence of the US and its position in the world are the strongest indicators of support position of neoconservatism. As such, the idea of America as a hegemonic force for good in the world could provide evidence of a background capacity for the policy practices of this particular discourse. However, the weakness of the other factors, as we shall see, most likely rules out the chance of establishing a coherent dissident elite discourse, let alone one supporting neoconservatism.

Democracy Export

One of the most distinguishing features of neoconservative foreign policy is its unabashed commitment to democracy-building around the world.

Democracy promotion may be a stated goal of other strains of foreign policy, but the distinguishing point of neoconservatism rests in the means through which neoconservatism is willing to pursue democracy – even by force – and the view that democracy-building constitutes security policy, which benefits the national interests of those pursuing the strategy as well. This point is also the basis for the original assumption that the former democratic opposition of the Czech Republic would support a hard-line democracy building approach that has been criticised by other sectors. These “indigenous democrats” have personal experience with totalitarianism and are therefore likely to sympathise with the cause of the democratic opposition elsewhere in the world.

To approve of universal democracy export, one must believe that democracy is fundamentally achievable in any country in the world. The policy advocated by neoconservatives sees a short- to medium-term timeframe for change, with prompting from established democracies. The quintessential contemporary example of this has become Iraq, supported by the precedents of the (re)constructions of democratic, market-oriented systems in Germany and Japan after WWII. Neoconservatives have pushed for a more active democracy-building policy and deeper commitment, especially militarily, to stabilise democracy (Boot 2004, Kristol and Kagan 2000).

In the interviewee responses three general opinions can be identified on the question of establishing democracy anywhere in the world. Two respondents believe democracy cannot be universally achieved around the world, three indicated a level of scepticism or uncertainty, and three stated that it is indeed possible in any country, albeit difficult. In this section I shall look at the constructions of democracy, and the reasons democracy export is or is not possible according to each of the three lines of opinion. I will then examine whether elements of a discourse are evident despite the contrasting opinions.

The two respondents who stated that democracy is not a universal phenomenon are both active Catholic advocates. This may serve to inform their understanding of democracy, although neither directly claimed a religious or moral reason supporting their beliefs. One respondent insisted on the phrase “liberal democracy”, defining it as based on the rule of law and private property, cooperation among citizens, and the existence of a middle class. This system developed out of the “continental or Anglo-American way of enlightenment. [It is] the product of a very special philosophy”, thus implying that systems not originating from this specific enlightenment philosophy are not capable of supporting democracy. The other respondent did not define democracy, but rather stated “I don’t think there is anything specifically universal about democracy being the best model for each and every human society.”

Both respondents, however, did acknowledge that there are ways in which democracy could be implemented in other countries. The imagery used by each in explaining the “growth” of democracy involved elements of nature: “very slow *organic* growth”, “*seeds* for that kind of a political *climate*”, “cannot *implant*... a *mature* liberal democracy”. In stressing the organic nature of democratic growth, the respondents construct democracy as something natural for a certain system and unnatural for others. One respondent specifically identified these others as “non-European”. Holý (1994) has found similar evidence of metaphors of natural and artificial systems in the Czech media and

public discourse about the creation of the Czech Republic, where the democratic Czech state is considered natural vis-à-vis the artificial Czechoslovak state.

Three respondents supported the claim that democracy is universally applicable. Each of these voiced support for democracy-building as foreign policy (implicitly for the United States, but possibly for any democratic state). Using the theory of democratic peace, two respondents noted that spreading democracy is in essence a security policy. From this perspective, all three further supported the use of military force to establish democracy in place of a non-democratic regime. Specific examples of states were used to back up the claims that democracy is possible on a universal basis. The most commonly cited examples were post-war Germany and Japan – both of which are key components of Muravchik's argument for democracy export as a foreign policy. These three former dissidents, in their approach to exporting democracy, come closest to the neoconservative view of American foreign policy. In the construction of democracy-building as security policy, several former dissidents adopted the discourse of neoconservatism.

The sceptical (or middle) viewpoint tended to divide democracy implementation into theory and reality, noting that things are much more difficult and complex in practice. These respondents, as well as those who supported democracy export, expressed doubts about the quality and endurance of democracy where the people do not understand or desire democracy.

Despite the division over the possibilities for democracy, a few common features can be distinguished in the responses. Nearly all respondents noted that there are several key concepts in the discussions of democracy: the "right local conditions", and the "long process" of democracy. What constitutes the right local conditions was not always clearly delineated, but included civil society, open debates about democracy, and the determined interest of the country in question (its citizens or government). Similar to the "organic" concept of democracy, "local conditions" require that the country desires democratic change, and that the basic tenets of democratic rule are understood and agreed upon.

The respondents almost uniformly draw on personal or "Czech" experiences in discussing democracy and its achievement around the world. This is often tied to the concept of the local conditions, as if the Czechs should understand the need for local support for democracy because they experienced a state in which their conditions favoured democracy amid the falling communist rule. The success of democracy-building in the Czech Republic is seen as a direct result of the strong desire for democracy. This experience is then applied to other cases, as one respondent told me: "every Czech will agree with this [need for local acceptance of democracy] because of our experience." These references to the Czech experience are a particularly strong part of the discourse and may also provide a clue as to why the discourse about democracy-building among the Czech elite is much less enthusiastic than in the neoconservative literature. The Czech national character has been described as inherently cynical and self-critical (Holý 1996, Brodský 2002), and the discourse about politics, even among a very specific sector of the population, should not be expected to significantly differ. This may explain the cynical

attitude towards the success of democracy-building efforts, which sharply contrasts with the idealism considered so characteristic of US and neoconservative policy. This view parallels the above-mentioned distinction between "cynical Europe" and "optimistic America".

The evidence of a coherent discourse is less evident in this aspect than in the first area (American dominance). Several aspects of the texts share similar features, but the range of different reasons given for the possibility or impossibility of specific democracies and the means necessary to bring them forth are not systematic or representative of a consistent discourse informing Czech policy.

Evil

Part of neoconservatism's underlying ideology is the view that there are unmistakable forces of evil present in the world. Also a centrepiece of conservative and moralistic views of foreign policy, the fundamental difference of the neoconservative view is a progressive belief that this evil can be overcome. Texts by neoconservative authors frequently refer to non-democratic, authoritarian regimes as "evil", and thus targets for aggressive American foreign policy. Respondents were asked to evaluate the use of the term "evil" in American foreign policy speech. In a discourse among Czech elites sympathetic to neoconservatism, one would expect references to evil as an existing, but eventually surmountable force, clearly distinguished by certain characteristics, and which can be contrasted with similarly clear "good" forces.

Nearly every respondent characterised the use of "evil" in rhetoric as a simple (or simplistic) means of expressing foreign policy. This is seen as both positive and negative. In a positive light, the policy shows that the US has the "will to speak clearly" or to mandate "clear policy", which can help overcome "European cynicism" or "relativism" which prohibits such clearly delineated policy from being set forth. One respondent characterised the US use of "evil" as a "tradition from the 80s" and several others identified it with the politics of President Reagan and the end of the Cold War. Reagan's "single-minded" policy and its legacy in central Europe seem to be an important aspect of the pro-American tendencies among dissidents (Bransten 2004).

The use of evil in American political speech was evaluated negatively by some respondents. One respondent noted that such vocabulary "puts one into the role of sovereign judge" – a role in which the United States does not belong. Another respondent, who voiced his support for such rhetoric, noted that although it is effective for mobilising a war-time population, it is not pragmatic for "serious political analysis". The simplicity and clarity of categorising some actors as evil is seen as having various uses and even political relevance, but many respondents also note that such language has distinct drawbacks.

This question was intended to reveal not only opinions towards US political rhetoric involving evil, but also at the existential level, whether evil actually exists in the international relations context. In hindsight, the question did not, in most cases, achieve this second purpose. Of the few respondents who offered their views on the existence of evil, all expressed a belief that evil does exist. In order not to presume the beliefs of those who did not offer them,

I shall concentrate only on these responses. The most striking feature of those who acknowledged evil is that the responses were couched in terms of personal experience. While there was very little narrativising, references were frequently made to “our experience”, encompassing various dimensions: small nation, Central Europe, part of the Soviet empire.¹⁵ Offering an answer based on experience seems to lend it legitimacy, especially on a topic like evil, which cannot easily be objectified.

For those who acknowledge it, evil is an existential truth, one that simply exists or is embodied in a regime. There are no explanations as to how or why it came into being, whether it was always there or evolved. The discourse assumes that evil simply is. In the responses, *regimes* are described as evil, and sometimes leaders, but citizens and nations are excluded or excused from the description. These regimes have various evil qualities; in the words of one respondent, evil regimes force “people to give public agreement and express joy over policies that these very people considered criminal or idiotic”. These evil regimes are brutal, capable of breaking people’s wills and even of “stealing people’s souls”. Yet, the evil does not take on a personality, nor does it describe the people of the country; a distinction is made between the “regime” and the people, who are construed as its victims. Several common examples were given (North Korea, Iran, Nazism, communism), but very few references were made to individual leaders. The importance of the Czech lands’ historical experience is evident in the fairly consistent naming of the Nazi and communist regimes as evil.

Of the expectations of discourse, none were met by a majority of the respondents. A select few viewed evil as an existing and surmountable force that could be identified and distinguished from good and several others acknowledged parts of this understanding. Few commonalities emerged among respondents that could have led to fruitful analysis. The “moralistic visions of good and evil” is the feature of the neoconservative discourse that receives the least support among the interviewees. This is despite the emphasis on morality in politics and the evils of the communist regime prevalent in dissident writings.

Neoconservatism

The final question in the interviews asked for the respondents to describe American neoconservatism directly. This question did not follow a foreign policy feature, but rather aimed directly at constructions of neoconservatism: its views and its influence. As an open-ended question, it left a lot of room for respondents to take any stance or framework for their descriptions. In the writings of prominent neoconservatives, there has been a contention that neoconservatism does not, in fact, represent a coherent body of thought nor group of individuals (Kristol 2003, Brooks 2004). Neoconservative writers themselves have trouble characterising neoconservatism; many decry the label altogether. In fact, the most concise depictions of neoconservatism often come from its harshest critics (Lind 2004, Zakaria 2004). I do not expect a discourse supportive of neoconservatism to adhere to a very simplistic characterisation. Instead one would expect such a discourse to present neoconservatism’s complexities alongside its strengths. Upon analysis, the interview

responses seem constructed to reinforce this disputed belief that there is a coherent and consistent body of neoconservative thought.

One of the key concepts in respondents' descriptions of neoconservatism is "idealism": neoconservatism is identified as idealist. In the discourse of international relations, "idealism" is often presented in opposition to realism. In the early 20th century, idealism encompassed the active pursuit of ideals such as civilisation, democracy and peace, challenging the traditional realist pursuit of economic power, military power, political power and strictly defined national interests. Traditional liberalism in American foreign policy represents this idealism, with a focus on negotiation, diplomacy and soft power. Contrary to liberalism, neoconservatism acknowledges possibilities for the use of force in its pursuit of goals like democracy, free trade and peaceful relations. This is what is referred to in neoconservative writings as "hard Wilsonian" policy. Neoconservatism is thus somewhat paradoxical in its combination of idealist goals with realist means. In the discourse of the Czech elites neoconservatism is depicted as opposing traditional realism and embracing an idealist view, and as a paradoxical mix of contrasting objects.

Derrida has noted that when binary opposites occur in discourse, they are almost always presented within a paradigm of power relations (Derrida 1981). This can be seen in the discourse of the US realist camp, which portrays neoconservative idealism as naive and uninformed (Prestowitz 2003). Yet the sense in which respondents used "idealism" to describe neoconservatism probably does not refer to the realist/idealist IR theory paradigm. Rather, the context is probably a more everyday one, which views "realistic" practical solutions as superior to unrealistic "idealistic" solutions, which can be naive, utopian, and unachievable. Furthermore, the language context also has bearing on the meaning of idealism. Although in English the word "idealism" has a more positively charged etymology, based in something higher – the "ideal" rather than in the ordinary "real" – the same is not necessarily true of Czech. Although the interviews were in English, it is highly likely that the linguistic context in which they are situated is Czech. In the Czech context, that which is "realistic" or practical is more reliable, and thus more desirable, than something ideal or utopian. So applying the notion of binary opposites, it can be said that idealism is the inferior of the two.

Expanding on the negative idealism that characterises neoconservatism, respondents often represented it as something of a mix of otherwise incongruous objects. For example, one respondent described neoconservatism as a mix of "neoliberal economic measures and (...) religious (...) input", while another characterised it as a "strange" combination of "antiestablishment thinking and conservative thinking", or as "trying to bring ideology into conservatism" (according to this respondent, conservatism is ideology-free). Neoconservatism thus reconciles measures or modes of thought often categorised as opposites. It also reveals a sense of confusion among the respondents as to what neoconservatism actually means and what its consequences for America and the world could be.

Those who ventured into longer descriptions of neoconservatism inevitably brought out the history of leftism and anti-Sovietism. In explaining the neoconservative turn from leftism, the most important reason offered (and for

some the only) was the disagreement with the policy of *détente*. This anti-Soviet tendency, from the perspective of dissidents of the former communist block, forms an important basis for the support, explicit or implicit, of the neoconservative position today. The experience of the dissident community under a restrictive communist regime gives these individuals empathy for dissidents under oppressive or non-democratic regimes. Furthermore, those who voiced support for the anti-Soviet policies of the neoconservative bloc most often expressed support for the current administration's policies towards other regimes (North Korea and Iran were most frequently mentioned).

The construction of neoconservatism as both idealist and hard-line in its confrontation with the Soviet Union forms a coherent picture of neoconservative foreign policy that matches the concept of hard Wilsonianism. While idealist in the sense of its belief in democracy and active global intervention, neoconservative policy is not limited to soft measures, but is willing to use hard (military) means against regimes not sharing its ideals.

Despite some convergence on the concept of idealism, and a few other scattered commonalities in responses, it is difficult to characterise the responses to direct questions about American neoconservatism as a coherent discourse. Many of the respondents were fairly knowledgeable about the origins and postulates of neoconservative thought, but understanding does not necessarily signify sympathy with the ideas. Although all respondents identified at least one of the concepts mentioned above, and several patterns can be established, the data set of texts is not comprehensive enough to comprise a coherent discourse.

VI. CONCLUSION

This study explored Czech elite constructions of American foreign policy and neoconservatism with hopes of identifying a discourse supporting neoconservatism among these former dissidents. After analysing the transcriptions of eight interviews with current members of the former dissident elites, a coherent and consistent discourse cannot be said to exist. The interview questions were scheduled around a set of neoconservative foreign policy features: American hegemony, democracy export and visions of evil. Among the respondents the most consistent discursive features included: the US's position as the dominant global power as a "reality", the US as a positive influence on the world, democracy-building as a "long process" requiring "the right local conditions", and American neoconservatism as "idealism". These discursive features, although occurring in the texts of several respondents, cannot be taken to form a consistent discourse because of the disparate nature of their occurrence and the relatively small size of the set of texts analysed.

Moreover, the constructions of American foreign policy and neoconservatism do not represent a wholly supportive view of neoconservatism for several reasons. First, there is a fair amount of disagreement on the feasibility of democracy export, especially to non-Western states, the belief in which is central to neoconservative foreign policy. Second, although many respondents expressed support for the use of "evil" in rhetoric, those who affirmed that evil is existent and recognisable in the world were few (only three). Finally, the construction of neoconservatism as "idealist", in the Czech context,

indicates a negative (although perhaps only slightly) perception of neoconservatism.

The objectives of this research were on two levels: first to establish whether a discourse exists and second to determine using that discourse the level of support for or acceptance of neoconservative political thought among the former dissidents of the Czech elite. From the data, it is not possible to state that a coherent discourse exists, despite a moderate level of similar discursive features found in the discussion of American foreign policy. This conclusion stands only for the data analysed, and a broader study of the Czech elite might provide more conclusive evidence of a discourse. Further research into the discourse of the Czech elite and former dissidents could provide more substantial evidence of a small body of support for neoconservatism in the Czech Republic. In addition, more in-depth research into the discourse of former dissidents, of which a fair amount has been written, could provide more similarities between neoconservative and dissident discourses in the Czech Republic and other former or current totalitarian societies. More systematic research into the topic on these three levels is needed for a more concrete conclusion on whether neoconservative foreign policy has found a haven in Central Europe. As such, this study can serve only as an introduction to the area, hoping to provoke discussion and further research.

ENDNOTES

¹ Due to the limited data set and scope of the project at hand, this paper aims to introduce an area in which further research is needed before concrete conclusions can be made.

² “[D]iscourses operate as background capacities for persons to differentiate and identify things, giving them taken-for-granted qualities and attributes, and relating them to other objects” (Milliken, 1999, p. 231).

³ I acknowledge that the origins of the pro-democracy and anti-totalitarian stances of the US neoconservative community and the Czech dissident community stem from very different experiences of the Cold War. However, the formation of these ideas is not the focus, but rather their symbolic presence within the Czech discourse.

⁴ However, as Falk argues, these early pro-Communist intellectuals may have actually shifted *further left* rather than to the right, in the face of a dysfunctional Communist regime: “throughout the region much of the opposition to authoritarian communism grew from and remained committed to the Left” (Falk 2003: 61).

⁵ Perhaps because the neoconservative community is seen as naïve or even hostile by more leftist academia, or perhaps for other reasons, there seems to be a lack of literature taking neoconservatism as a serious strand of thought. Even among neoconservatives there is often some disagreement over the pillars of policy. Furthermore, the term “neoconservative” itself acquired a negative connotation and was perhaps misused in the wake of the US military action against Iraq in 2003.

⁶ The *Weekly Standard* is one of the leading neoconservative publications. For a more complete discussion of neoconservative thinkers, periodicals, documents and think tanks see “Empire Builders” at *The Christian Science Monitor Online*, www.christiansciencemonitor.org/specials/neocon/index/html.

⁷ Research scholars at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) are among the most prominent neoconservative theorists and the AEI is widely considered a “neoconservative” think-tank that pushes for policies in line with these beliefs.

⁸ Stelzer (2004), p. 11.

⁹ See Kristol and Kagan (2000), and Boot (2004), for dissenting opinions on unilateralism.

¹⁰ The authenticity of the neoconservative commitment to idealist goals has been called into question. In an analysis of post-Cold War US foreign policy, Mohamed Ben Jelloun takes a postmodern understanding of the policy, characterising neoconservatives as Straussian “gentleman” or Niet-

zschean “liberal impostors” who take on “an outward (exoteric) idealism and a basically subterranean (esoteric) realism” (Ben Jelloun, 2004, p. 5). American and European leftists emphasise the importance of corporate ties for many within the current administration and tend to view active policies proposed by the neoconservatives as fronts for maintaining favourable conditions for these corporations at the expense of the rest of the world.

- ¹¹ Some of the names associated with the first generation include: Irving Kristol, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Daniel Bell, Nathan Glazer, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Michael Novak and Robert Nisbet.
- ¹² The fact that evil is ever-present and yet good constantly gains ground on it is a central contradiction of neoconservatism, but perhaps functions as an important rhetorical tool. See Rhodes (2004) for an interesting discussion of the use of “evil” as a rhetorical tool in the discussion of NATO expansion.
- ¹³ Illustrating this, one respondent even asked to clarify if I was “talking about the actual situation, reality,” and proceeded to present American dominance as the reality of the international system.
- ¹⁴ Centrum pro výzkum veřejného mínění (CVVM), 24 March 2005.
- ¹⁵ These references were not limited to just this question, but were omnipresent in the interviews. They may also serve as a tool for explaining the situation to a researcher such as myself, as an American, who is perceived as not having had experience with non-democratic regimes or the “harsh realities” they can pose.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aberbach, Joel and Rockman, Bert (2004), “Conducting and Coding Elite Interviews”. *American Political Science Association Online*. Available at: www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/Postgrads/Patrick.Bernhagen/Aberbach_02.htm
- Ben Jelloun, Mohammed, “Wilsonian or Straussian Post-Cold War Idealism?” August 2, 2004. *Swans Commentary*. Available at www.swans.com/library/art10/jelloun1.html.
- Boot, Max (2004), “Myths about Neoconservatism”. In: Stelzer, Irwin (ed.), *The Neocon Reader*. New York: Grove Press, pp. 43–52.
- Bransten, Jeremy (2004), “Reagan Leaves Behind Complex Legacy in the Former Soviet Bloc”. *In the National Interest*. 16 June 2004, www.inthenationalinterest.com/Articles/Vol3Issue24/Vol3Issue23Bransten.html.
- Brodský, Jiří (2001), “The Czech Experience of Identity”. In: Drulák, Petr (ed.), *National and European Identities in EU Enlargement*. Prague: Institute of International Relations, pp. 21–38.
- Brooks, David, “The Neocon Cabal and Other Fantasies”. In: Stelzer, Irwin (ed.), *The Neocon Reader*. New York: Grove Press, pp. 41–42.
- Centrum pro výzkum veřejného mínění (CVVM). “Důvěra k některým mezinárodním institucím a postoje k zahraniční politice a roli USA ve světě”. 24 March 2005: www.cvvm.cz/index.php?lang=0&disp=zpravy&shw=100472&offset=104&s=&r.
- Derrida, Jacques (1981), *Positions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Falk, Barbara (2003), *Dilemmas of Dissidence in East-Central Europe: Citizen Intellectuals and Philosopher Kings*. Budapest: Central European University Press.
- Fairclough, Norman (2001), “Critical discourse analysis as a method in social scientific research”. In: Wodak, R. and Meyer M. (eds.), *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: Sage Publications.
- Gedmin, Jeffrey (2004), “The Prospects for Neocconservatism in Germany”. In: Stelzer, Irwin (ed.), *The Neocon Reader*. New York: Grove Press, pp. 289–298.
- Greve, Patricia (2004), “Neoconservative Ideas and Foreign Policy in the Administration of George W. Bush: A German View”. *AICGS Advisor*, 23 January 2004. Available at: www.aicgs.org/cgreveengl.shtml.
- Havel, Václav (1990), Address to Joint Session of US Congress, 21 February 1990. Available at: old.hrad.cz/president/Havel/speeches/index-uk.html.
- Havel, Václav (n.d), “In Defense of Defense”. Available at: www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/hav1/English.
- Havel, Václav (1999), “The New NATO and its New Enemies”. Available at: www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/hav13/English.
- Holý, Ladislav (1996), *The Great Czech and the Little Nation: National Identity and the Post-Communist Transformation of Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Holý, Ladislav (1994), “Metaphors of the Natural and Artificial in Czech Political Discourse”. *Man*, New Series. Vol. 29, No. 4. pp. 809–829.

CZECH DISSIDENTS' DISCOURSE ON NEOCONSERVATISM

- Joseph, Lawrence B. (1982), "Neoconservatism in Contemporary Political Science". *The Journal of Politics*. Vol. 44, No. 4. pp. 955–982.
- Kagan, Robert (2002), "Power and Weakness". *Policy Review* No. 113. Available at: www.policyreview.org/JUN02/kagan.html.
- Kristol, Irving (2003), "The Neoconservative Persuasion". Reprinted in: Stelzer, Irwing (ed.), *The Neocon Reader*. New York: Grove Press, pp. 31–37.
- Kristol, William and Kagan, Robert (2000), "National Interest and Global Responsibility". *Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunity in American Foreign and Defense Policy*. San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000. Introduction. Reprinted in: Stelzer, Irwing (ed.), *The Neocon Reader*. New York: Grove Press, pp. 55–74.
- Kovanda, Karel (2003), "How do the new EU/NATO members prepare for the Common European Security and Defense Policy? A Czech View". Speech. Paris. 11 December 2003. Available at: www.cicerofoundation.org/lectures/format-print.htm?article=kovanda_dec03&title=Lecture+by+Karel+KOVANDA.
- Lind, Michael (2004), "A Tragedy of Errors". *The Nation*. 23 February 2004. Available at: www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20040223&s=lind.
- Milliken, Jennifer (1999), "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods". *European Journal of International Relations*. Vol. 5, No. 2., pp. 225–254.
- Muravchik, Joshua (1991), *Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny*. Washington, DC: The American Enterprise Institute Press.
- Muravchik, Joshua (2003), "The Neoconservative Cabal". *Commentary*. Reprinted in: Stelzer, Irwing (ed.), *The Neocon Reader*. New York: Grove Press, pp. 241–257.
- Prestowitz, Clyde (2003), *Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions*. New York: Basic Books.
- Rhodes, Edward (2004), "The Good, the Bad, and the Righteous: Understanding the Bush Vision of a New NATO Partnership". *Millenium: Journal of International Relations*. Vol. 33, No. 1., pp. 123–143.
- Rupnik, Jacques (1988), *The Other Europe*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
- Selden, Zachary (2004), "Neoconservatives and the American Mainstream". *Policy Review*, No. 124. Available at: www.policyreview.org/apr04/selden.html.
- Steinfels, Peter (1979), *The Neoconservatives: The Men Who Are Changing America's Politics*. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Stelzer, Irwin (2004), "Neoconservatives and Their Critics". In: Stelzer, Irwing (ed.) *The Neocon Reader*. New York: Grove Press, pp. 3–28.
- Učeň, Peter (1999), "A Decade of Conflict Within Slovak Polity". In: Dvořáková, Vladimíra (ed.), *Success or Failure? Ten Years After*. Praha: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, pp. 80–103.
- Vachudova, Milada Anna (2005), *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage and Integration after Communism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Vondra, Alexandr (2003), "Hope for the Democratic Struggle of North Koreans". Available at: www.nkhumanrights.or.kr/NKHR_new/inter_conf/Alexander_Vondra.html.
- Waever, Ole (n.d.), "European Integration and Security: Analysing French and German Discourses on State, Nation, and Europe".
- Zakaria, Fareed (2004), "'An End to Evil': Showing Them Who's Boss". *The New York Times*. Available at: www.fareedzakaria.com/articles/nyt/nytreview020804.html.