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CIAO DATE: 12/01
International Affairs:
A Russian Journal
The Asia-Pacific Region and Russia
M.Titarenko, V. Mikheev *
Recently, Russia's approach to the Asia-Pacific Region (APR) has exhibited certain changes. The country has acquired a new vision of its place in the economic and political processes under way there. The changes and new approaches were created by President Putin's visits to China, Japan, India, the KPDR, the Republic of Korea, and Vietnam. The Baikal Economic Forum was held in September 2000 in Irkutsk, supported by the Russian president and chaired by Egor Stroev, Chairman of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of Russia. In November 2000 President Putin took part in the APEC summit in Brunei.
Political and diplomatic activity and efforts of the academic community produced a new image of the Asia-Pacific Region. The Russian public (or its politically aware section) has realized that it is not merely a dynamically developing part of world economy—it is the region to which Russia belongs as an inalienable and strategically important element. Russia is no longer regarded only as a source of vast natural and recreational resources supplied by Siberia and the Far East to be used by the APR: the powerful intellectual and cultural potential of the country and its eastern regions can and should be tapped.
Time has come to make another step forward. We need a strategic understanding of Russia's place in the APR, new ideas about its relations with this dynamic and important region within the context of world economic globalization and emergence of the global "economics of knowledge."
Conceptual Approaches
Today, none of the countries, none of the national economies can develop successfully in the world where interdependence of states and the role of knowledge and new technologies are constantly growing. Russia is no exception. Like all other countries it needs not merely cooperation but integration into the world markets. During twenty years of its policy of economic openness China has accumulated valuable experience in this respect. It has attracted over $400 billion investments and created powerful stimuli of social and economic advance. This is the best proof that its choice was timely and correct.
The fear that those who intend to integrate Russia into the world economic cooperation want to destroy it or tear it to pieces are totally unfounded. If Russia fails to restore its economy it will run a risk of disintegration and finding itself on the roadside of world development.
One has to admit that integration into the world and regional economies which gives a chance of economic revival is also fraught with great threats and dangers. To provide rational and efficient responses to them the country has to cooperate with the rest of the world rather than trying to keep away from the processes underway in the world and its regions. This is the first important thing the Russian leaders have to keep in mind when elaborating Russia's strategy in the APR and the world as a whole.
Second, Russia is a Eurasian state with geoeconomic and geopolitical interests in Europe and Asia. In other words, it lies between the European Union and the integrating APR groups. Any efficient economic strategy and foreign policy demand a full awareness of this objective European-Asian duality of the country's development vectors. The Russian public has already recognized and accepted its European cultural, historical, economic, and civilizational roots yet the process of acceptance and recognition of Russia as a Eurasian entity has just started.
In fact, the civilizational, economic, and political nature of Russia as a Eurasian power has been left outside the framework of its specific domestic socioeconomic and foreign policy and remains there. There is an insisted demand to take account of Russia's Eurasian nature and its Eurasian destiny.
To be efficient, Russia's Eurasian policy should be well balanced, carefully substantiated and thought over. So far, Russia is not fully aware of the developments in the Asia-Pacific Region. Political thinking in Russia and the social-psychological ideas of the elite and the public at large perceive the country as a European entity. One cannot deny the fact that Russia has always had close economic and cultural relations with Europe. At the same time there is no need to oppose Europe to Asia or Russia's European dimension to the Asian one. The contrary is true: Russia's niche in the world today and, even more important, in the future world of high technologies, economic globalization and regionalization can be identified in the Eurasian context when its Eurasian dimension is taken into account.
By joining APEC Russia did the right thing: this is seen as the first response to the challenges of Asian regionalization. Time has come to identify the structure and priority of the relevant tasks and steps to resolve them. Russia can offer the Asia-Pacific Community its natural resources, transit transport facilities, intellectual potential and civilizational experience. It should be added that civilizational tasks and their solution depend on economic success that, in their turn, depend to a great extent on foreign policy.
To find the right place for Russia in Asia and the APR we should follow the advice Deng Xiaoping gave his compatriots in the late seventies: abandon dead dogmas, rely on common sense and seek truth in real facts. In case of Russia the real fact is its binary Eurasian nature. From this it follows that first, it is necessary to find Russia, as an integral entity, the right place in the world economic and political processes; second, to look at it as consisting of three geoeconomic elements (European part, Siberia, and the Far East). It should be taken into account that the European part of Russian economy is objectively inclined to cooperate with Europe and EU. Siberia with its fuel and energy, raw material and metallurgical complexes tends to the West and Russia's European part though it also needs the Asian and Pacific markets, while the Far East economically tends to Northeast Asia and APR.
This binary approach to Russia's place in the contemporary world makes it possible to look at Russia's place in the APR in two dimensions: as global economy and as regional economy which is the only correct vision. The European part of Russia's economy and, to a great extent, Siberia are represented in the APR as elements of global Russian economy. Unfortunately, so far the global nature of Russian economy is limited by the markets of oil, gas, rare earth metals and a small number of high technologies (equipment for atomic power stations, aircraft, space research, and high precision military and dual-purpose technologies).
East Siberian and Far Eastern economies are perceived in the APR as regional economies.
This suggests an important conclusion: the social-economic conception of Russia's development as a federation should take into account the Asia-Pacific factor of its economic growth. The strategy of co-development of Russia and the APR in the new century should proceed from Russia's dual position in the region: as a global economy and as a regional economy (represented by the economy of the Russian Far East and, to a certain extent, Siberia). What Russia needs in the Asia-Pacific Region is a policy that would ensure regional interpretation of its global interests and global interpretation of the regional interests of the subjects of the Russian Federation.
The third conceptual approach requires that Russia's strategy in the APR should include not only foreign (economic, political, military-political) aspects of its relations with the Asia-Pacific Region but also methods and mechanisms that would adjust domestic economic strategy of Russia to global and regional trends. In fact, the domestic economic strategy should also take into account the binary nature of Russia: on the one hand, the European and Asian component of the Russian economic complex and, on the other, the place of Russia in the APR as a global and regional (represented by the Far East) economy.
This brings us to the key issue of Russia's Asia-Pacific strategy: the issue of methodology to be used for analysis and recommendations based on it. In fact, neither the scientific, theoretical, practical or everyday approaches can ignore the fact that a conception based on inherent logic needs a methodology and an understanding of what is good and what is bad for the country.
During the Cold War anti-imperialism was the Soviet Union's methodology of its domestic and foreign policies. Confrontation of two world systems logically demanded that Siberia and the Soviet Far East played the role of "reserve territories" and a bridgehead totally separated from the Asia-Pacific world. Their economies were absolutely self-contained and tied to the European part of the USSR. After the Cold War and disintegration of the Soviet Union the inner economic ties became disrupted; ideological void appeared in the context of which Siberia (Eastern Siberia in the first place) and the Far East spontaneously turned to their closest neighbors—China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.
Too much spontaneity in the process has not allowed them to tap numerous advantages of Russia's planned integration into the APR that requires active and long-term state policy in line with contemporary world developments. Nationalism or protectionism as the basic methodology of such efforts can hardly bring positive results. We have already had negative Soviet experience and recent Russia's protectionist policies created by high import tariffs and unfavorable conditions for foreign investors in Russia. This is not all: the ideology of nationalism creates cautious or even belligerent attitude to the world and regional integration processes while protectionism perpetuated economic, technological, legal and managerial backwardness. Russia and many developing countries have already learned this. Nationalism and protectionism are especially dangerous for the country's future and may cripple stronger integration between its European and Asian parts—Siberia and the Far East with huge natural riches, but small populations without any investment possibilities of their own.
Any efficient and useful methodology of Russia and APR codevelopment in the twenty-first century should take into account the basic development trends mentioned above and should be "a globalization methodology" of sorts. This means that it should look at the world as an integrating whole and perceive the prospects of world and regional advance through concerted efforts addressed at national problems of global significance and global problems (a global unified information and communication development infrastructure, overcoming poverty in the world, environmental protection, higher educational level for all, etc.) rather than dividing countries and setting them against each other.
This approach does not lose sight of real conflicts, problems and contradictions that exist in the world today. It makes it possible to forge solutions and remove contradictions without stepping up global, regional and local antagonisms by identifying possible compromises and pooling forces and means to apply them.
The strategy of parallel development of Russia and Europe and the Pacific Asia (EU and APEC) will help Russia to fulfill its historical and civilizational Eurasian mission of a geopolitical, infrastructural, and spiritual bridge between two sub-continents and two types of civilization (European and Asian).
Political Co-development Aspects
Today, at the dawn of a new millennium the military-political and strategic situation in the Asia-Pacific Region looks favorable for Russia and its possible participation in regional integration.
In the post-Cold War world the relations between Russia and the United States do not depend on the balance of military force: they are determined by the countries' mutual desire to live in a stable world for the sake of development, national and international security, partnership and economic interdependence. The situation in Northeast Asia has become considerably more stable, military confrontation along the former Soviet-Chinese border has been reduced. There is no direct military threat for Russia today and for the nearest future.
At the same time it is wrong to ignore the lessons of NATO bombing of Yugoslavia, of interference of outside forces into the developments in Chechnya and the attempts to squeeze Russia out of Central Asia. By all means Russia should avoid another circle of arms race while protecting its national interests yet one-sided disarmament should be stopped. It needs a sufficient level of defense capability in the west and in the east.
There are regional problems in the APR: regional and local conflicts worsen the general atmosphere and prevent economic integration. At the same time integration factors and interests are gradually prevailing over the military-political factors and interests of individual states. So far the economic factors and interests have not yet become dominant and the military-political factors are still important but the majority of the APR countries have pushed them to the background. The APR neighbors are gradually mastering the skill of problem settling through political dialogues rather than the use of force.
Russia and China have managed to resolve their frontier disagreements and created conditions conducive to long-term relationships of strategic partnership and mutually advantageous cooperation. They both are APEC members. China has switched from the policy of openness to the policy of integration into global and regional markets. This opens up new horizons for Russia-Chinese relationships. Both countries have got a chance to coordinate their ideas of bilateral strategic partnership in the light of economic globalization and regionalization and complement it with coordinated policies in the both countries' relations with APEC, coordinated approaches to the long-term prospect of a common market in Northeast Asia, gradual building-up of a security system based on cooperation of all interested countries without a switch to the system of blocs. The integration aspect of Russia-Chinese strategic partnership will add international significance to it and will present it to the APR as a necessary element of the general structure of the future Asian home rather than as a hypothetical sources of threat and tension.
The relationships between Russia and Japan are moving ahead though the progress is far from being smooth. There is every reason to believe that Moscow and Tokyo will learn how to detach the still unresolved problems from their political and economic relationships and will develop them according to the demands of the time. In fact, the multisided integrating cooperation in Northeast Asia where Russia and Japan are neighbors shed a new light on the territorial dispute. Economic and political globalization has reduced its importance; it is of secondary importance as compared with the tasks of wider economic cooperation and active involvement of Siberia and the Russian Far East in it.
The June 2000 Korean summit has somewhat reduced tension on the Korean peninsula and created prerequisites for continued and deeper dialogue and cooperation between the North and the South.
The widely discussed danger of a military conflict between the Chinese People's Republic and Taiwan causes the greatest concern in the region. China is insisting on returning the island under its jurisdiction while Taiwan shows no desire to do so. The newly elected president of Taiwan has already altered his approaches to the conflict by declaring his adherence to the "one China" principle and retaining the right to discuss with Beijing the exact meaning of the formula. In practice this means continued status quo for the next four years and certain guarantees of security and stability in the region.
China and the ASEAN countries involved in a territorial dispute over the South China Sea islands have displayed a readiness, no matter how limited, to discuss the issue despite continued disagreements. There is a reduced, thought not removed altogether, possibility that force might be used.
The situation in East Timor is under international control; there are also frozen, yet unresolved territorial disputes between China and Japan and Japan and the Republic of Korea.
At the dawn of a new century the Asia-Pacific Region is still further removed from peace and stability than Europe yet there is a visible desire to settle disputes through talks and compromises. Today, the regional relations are dominated, to a much greater extent than before, by everything that brings countries closer together rather than by what creates tension and breeds conflicts.
The global changes and local conflicts obvious in the world at the threshold of a new millennium invite a fresh approach to the problem of security in the Asia-Pacific Region. Globalization of world economy and politics require coordinated and concerted efforts of all countries of the region so that to maximize the gains and minimize possible negative effects of growing interdependence in the world. There is an opposite trend towards fragmented international relations, intensified regional and ethnic conflicts that insistently demand of the region's countries more attention to their specifics when building up models of Asian security.
Politicians and academics have long been toying with the idea of setting up a regional security structure in the APR similar to OCSE. It can hardly be realized in the medium term for two reasons.
First, there are huge economic, political, and social distinctions between the European and Asia-Pacific regions. As distinct from Europe at the time when OCSE was created there are still territorial and frontier disagreements in the APR still existing between forty Pacific states. As distinct from Europe the APR is too vast to let people feel their unity. There are politicians who doubt the very term the "Asia-Pacific Region." There is more historical and cultural variety in Asia than in Europe, there is a sharper rejection of outside interference into the Asian affairs.
Second, the world as a whole has changed together with the content of the idea of security. In the post-Cold War period the trend towards globalization has replaced the socialism-capitalism opposition as "the key trend of the contemporary epoch." In this context the idea of national and collective security embraces, together with the traditional military component, the no less, or probably even more, important components: economic, cultural, information, and ecological components and international security of the individual.
This has changed the formula of international security. In that past it sounded like "security based on the balance of forces" of two military-political blocs. Today, when socialism in Europe collapsed it sounds as "security through cooperation." The latest Asian financial crisis and its national, regional, and global socioeconomic and political effects showed that economic and financial cooperation in the region is not only desirable but absolutely inevitable. The globalized economy and politics are a challenge that prompts another stage of Asian collective security: "security through dynamic cooperation."
This gives rise to at least two blocks of serious political and philosophical problems.
The "security through dynamic cooperation" formula and the demands of globalization have brought the APR governments face to face with the need to submit part of national sovereignty to the regional interests, to delegate part of national authority and power to future regional institutes. Today, few of the countries are prepared to accept these demands. It is probably unwise to force them to accept this requirement; there is no need to impose the new interpretation of the correlation between national sovereignty and regional integration on them. The situation has to ripen all by itself.
What can and should be done today is to recognize that there is a dilemma, that economic globalization and the new formula of security through dynamic cooperation demand of the sovereign states to cede part of their authority and power to regional structures.
There is another problem, that of a correlation between general humane and national values and between the emerging world civilization and regional civilizations. There are countries willing to impose on others their system of values as allegedly suiting entire mankind and ignoring, at the same time, the specific features of eastern civilizations, and of Russian Eurasian civilization. This creates a new source of tension among nations and countries of the Asia-Pacific Region, on the one hand, and the developed Western states, on the other. We all have to recognize that globalization does not spell cultural and civilizational unification but rather an increased mutual dependence and mutual enrichment of civilizations in a world of many centers.
If this is recognized then the future architecture of the Asia-Pacific security can be discussed. The progress in building up a new Asian home directly depends on a new approach gaining ground in the Asian countries to an interpretation of the best correlation between national sovereignty and regional integration.
Today, the structure of collective security in the Asia-Pacific Region looks like a multi-tier construction. UN, the Charter of which describes the most general principles of inter-state relations occupies the top tier. One has to admit that today, in the post-Cold War period when there is no longer a military opposition of two superpowers the UN structure and legal principles require a serious revision. Yet the organization remains the major multisided global structure responsible for international security and development.
Regional structures of "security through dynamic cooperation" that are being formed or may be formed can occupy the second tier. It seems that in the economic, ecological, and social spheres APEC can be turned into an institution and, with time, into a coordinator of economic policies in the region. This is how Asian regionalism can develop.
The third tier can be occupied by the already existing (ASEAN, the Shanghai Forum of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrghyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan that is cooperating with the forum open to all interested regional countries) and future (Japanese-South Korean common market, an organization of economic cooperation of Northeast Asian countries, etc.) subregional groups.
The fourth tier will belong to bilateral relations, mainly between those countries that have already announced their desire to form close and deep-going relations (such as Russia-Chinese ties aimed at strategic partnership in the twenty-first century).
Transregional structures may play an important role in building up an Asian system of collective "security through dynamic cooperation." The summits of the APR and EU countries (ASEM) as well as EU and Latin American, APR and Latin American countries (EALA) should acquire new practical significance. They can also be complemented with similar forum between the APR and CIS countries (AsCIS), APR and African states (ASAF).
It is equally important to answer the question: Who will be responsible for the intellectual, political, and financial initiative in building the Asian home? Who will be responsible for the future of collective security in Asia?
It seems that the leading powers or economic groups such as the United States, Russia, China, Japan, ASEAN, and India could play the major role in identifying the best security model for the APR and its practical implementation. Their relatively large military, economic, and intellectual potential and a relatively large weight in regional affairs make the largest powers and economic groups responsible for practical implementation of the collective security system. What is more, real success in changing the Asia-Pacific order is impossible if at least one of them disagrees.
Economic Aspects of Co-development
As it has often been noted in the Russian press, a specific feature of integration in the APR is that the region has no interstate structure of the EU type. Integration contacts among the Asian states take place at three levels: at the level of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), at the level of subregional integration groupings, both existing (ASEAN) and projected, and at the level of bilateral relations (as in the case of talks on a customs union between the Republic of Korea and Japan).
A specific feature of Russia's geographical position is that Russia borders on the APR by its resource-rich but sparsely populated part.
Three economic regions representing Siberia and the Far East (West Siberian, East Siberian and Far Eastern) and constituting three-quarters of the country's territory occupy a more modest place in the Russian economy, which has further worsened in the years of reform. In this period, the share of the eastern regions in national economic indicators has fallen nearly across the board. Such a reduction in the share of Siberia and the Far East is the result of a more intensive decline in the region in almost every kind of economic activity.
In the period of reform, Siberia and the Far East have in effect turned into mere producers of raw materials. In the structure of their industrial output, the share of the fuel and energy complex and nonferrous metallurgy has markedly increased. There has also been an increase in the share of the eastern regions in Russia's total output in these industries. By the late 1990s, the eastern regions accounted for about one-quarter of the country's electricity production, over one-half of the total output of the fuel industry and nonferrous metallurgy, and roughly one-fifth of the output of Russia's forest, woodworking, food and fishing industries. That is due to the more stable economic position of fuel and energy industries and nonferrous metallurgy compared with other industries, and to a faster rise in raw-material and energy prices in the eastern regions. The share of these regions in some lines of production is even more significant. Thus, Siberia produces around 68 percent of the country's oil and gas condensate, over 92 percent of its natural gas, and over 80 percent of its coal. That is our main potential for cooperation with the APR.
Naturally, the prospects of Russia's economic cooperation with the APR depend on the dynamics of the economic and political situation in Russia. But first, the very economic situation in the country, given the right approach, could be improved through effective cooperation with Asia-Pacific partners. And second, Russia even today, in its present crisis state, has considerable reserves for economic cooperation with the APR. Priority here should evidently be given to the following lines of cooperation, which are of strategic as well as short-term importance and which should create a close interdependence between the Russian and the Asia-Pacific economies in order to secure an advantageous place for Russia in the APR.
Of primary importance here is the development of an international transport infrastructure and an international fuel and energy system for Northeast Asia, covering Siberia, the Far East and our neighbors in the region, a point on which Russia's top leadership has already reached an agreement with Beijing and Pyongyang.
This implies the following.
First, the development of oil and gas resources of the Russian Far East and Siberia and the construction in Northeast Asia of an oil and gas supply network, and also of power transmission lines which could provide the basis for Russia's future economic integration into the APR. This includes the implementation of existing and the conclusion of new long-term agreements with Japan, PRC, DPRK, Republic of Korea and Mongolia, the construction of high-capacity oil and gas pipelines from Eastern and Western Siberia and from Sakhalin to China, Japan and the Korean Peninsula. The project provides for joint development of high-grade coal deposits in Yakutia, and also for the construction of a high-voltage transmission line for supplying electric power from the Angara hydropower system to neighboring countries of the Far East.
Second, use of Russia's "geotransport" position as a natural bridge between Europe and East Asia. 1 The main accent here should be not only on the renewal of the existing trunk railroad, but also on building new state-of-the art superhighways and railroads linking Russia's Far East with the Kaliningrad Region and with ports in the Netherlands, Germany and the Baltic countries. Plans for the development of an international transport infrastructure provide for the building of tunnels from Hokkaido to Sakhalin and from Sakhalin to mainland Russia, and for a modernization of the Trans-Siberian and Baikal-Amur railroads. That transport system is to be linked with railroads in the DPRK and the Republic of Korea, and also with Northeastern China (which is to have direct access to the Trans-Siberian and Baikal-Amur railroads) and with Northwestern China (access from Xinjiang through Kazakhstan to the Trans-Siberian Railroad) so as to close the transport ring in Northeast Asia.
Third, attraction of foreign labor for the development of Russia's sparsely populated Far Eastern regions. Russia's main partners here are China, Vietnam and the DPRK. Such a prospect gives rise to partly justified concern as to whether an influx of Chinese workers could lead to a gradual "occupation" of that part of Russia. Indeed, illegal labor from China does create juridical and social problems, but this is a task to be resolved by Russian diplomacy and Russian law-enforcement agencies. Discussion of problems relating to Chinese illegal immigration with our Chinese partners shows that the Chinese side, first, admits the existence of a problem and, second, is prepared to agree to tougher action by the Russian authorities against Chinese violating Russian law in RF territory, since the Chinese authorities themselves regard such behavior on the part of Chinese citizens as unlawful.
Fourth, the possibility of Russia deriving short-term and strategic benefits from its scientific potential, albeit shrinking but still commanding respect by Asian standards. The problem here is an organizational one. Thus, we could set up (in Russia, China and/or the Republic of Korea) some kind of technoparks making it possible to pool our scientific potential with their capital and their demand for our knowledge.
In view of the latest events on the world oil market, we could explore the possibilities of launching a Strategic Petroleum Reserve Fund in Northeast Asia with the participation of Russia, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea. At first glance, the interests of Russia as an oil exporter and of the NEA countries as oil importers in matters of regulating the world oil market may seem to diverge. But considering the scale of Russia's economy, its immense requirements for foreign investments and, consequently, its indirect dependence on the state of the world economy, including the dependence of our Far East on the regional economy, stability of the world oil market and of the global economy is highly important for Russia as well.
The idea of such a fund consists in the following. As Japan, the Republic of Korea and China make investments in oil production in Siberia and Russia's Far East, the four NEA countries set up at an acceptable price (say, $20-25 per barrel of oil) strategic oil reserves to which the partners could resort at the same price in case of a sharp spurt in prices on the world market. In this way, Russia's NEA neighbors would protect themselves against unpredictable political events in the Middle East, while Russia would get an opportunity to attract strategic long-term investments to the Asian part of its economy.
Institutionalizing the Co-development Strategy
From the standpoint of globalization methodology, Russia's interests in the APR consist in our involvement in globalization processes going forward in the region, and in ensuring our intellectual presence (so long as our economic and financial capabilities are limited) in the development of the substantive and institutional aspects of globalization, notably in the establishment of a single Asian and, in future, a single global economy.
As a concrete step to strengthen its intellectual presence, Russia should put before the world public a conception of how to reform the present system of international relations and international economic and financial relations based on a globalization concept regarding the world as a single whole and requiring rich nations to promote the use of global resources and scientific and technological capabilities in the interests of all nations, both rich and poor, while urging poor nations not to confine themselves to their own national ideas but learn to live in a world of global interdependence and advanced technology.
The task of Russian diplomacy is not simply to ensure "favorable external conditions for Russian reform," but to take advantage of the potentialities of Asian integration and the Asian economy (just as of the European economy in Europe) to carry out reforms and regenerate the country.
A special and, one might say, exceptional role in the political, economic and information backing of the strategy of Russia's development in the APR belongs to the Baikal Economic Forum. The establishment and regular meetings of the Forum help to ensure closer contacts between Russia's Siberian and Far Eastern regions with APEC, the Pacific Economic Council (PEC), and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), which are the key instruments of economic integration in the APR, in the interests of the economy of Siberia and the Far East and, consequently, of Russia as a whole.
Aiming to enlist the support of political circles, government agencies, private business and the general public in dealing with the problems of interregional integration and international cooperation in the regions of Siberia and the Far East, the Baikal Economic Forum centers its attention on these main lines:
One of the purposes of the Baikal Economic Forum is to draft documents, which could provide the basis for the development of Russia's Asia-Pacific policy. On the other hand, it seeks to foster an awareness among the Russian economic and political elite, as well as among the economic and political circles of APR countries, of the prospects opening up before Russia and the APR in the matter of developing mutually advantageous cooperation between Siberia, Russia's Far East and the APR countries.
Regular meetings of the Baikal Economic Forum could serve as a concrete mechanism for institutionalizing the process of integrating Siberia, the Far East and Russia as a whole into the Asia-Pacific economy. Alongside the widely debated institutional moves to introduce the post of vice premier or deputy foreign minister for Siberia and the Far East and other steps in this direction, it is also necessary from a regional standpoint to invigorate the activity of interregional economic associations such as the Siberian Agreement and the Far East and Trans-Baikal association. These should be turned into effective consultative and coordinating bodies for promoting mutual relations between their members within each of these associations and between two megaregional associations, and also (on a third level) between these associations and the Federal Center.
The Baikal Economic Forum could assume the functions of a political, business and intellectual center where Siberian and Far Eastern leaders, top businessmen and prominent scientists could discuss, coordinate and jointly uphold their concurring interests before the Federal Center and Asia-Pacific countries instead of jostling each other for advantage in Moscow, often at each other's expense. They could use the Forum to reach compromises in areas where the interests of the regions do not coincide. They could also balance out and synchronize their relations with the newly established structures of the Federal districts.
As regards the information and motivational function of the Baikal Economic Forum, it could help to build awareness:
Considering the track record of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, one could say, however tentatively, that the Baikal Economic Forum could become a kind of Russian mini-APEC actually serving to unite Russia's diverse economic regions with their frequently noncoinciding interests, notably in relations with foreign partners. In the event of success, the Baikal Economic Forum could also come to represent Russia's regional interests in APEC, helping Russia to play a more effective role in that forum and giving Russia's Federal economic diplomacy more room for maneuver on the APEC direction.
Main Components of the Co-development Strategy
At the First Baikal Economic Forum on September 19-23, 2000, its participants agreed that the Russia-APR co-development strategy for the 21st century could be briefly formulated as follows:
Russia's main strategic objective in the APR is to turn into a connecting link (economic, financial, communicational, cultural and civilizational) between the European and Asian economies and, on a broader scale, between the European and Asian worlds. Achievement of this objective implies the need for Russia's participation in the eventual establishment of a common Asia-Pacific economic and, subsequently, political "home" based on the principles of uniformity of law coupled with plurality of cultures and civilizational country distinctions. In this process, Russia should become an organic part of Asia-Pacific economic integration and an active intellectual, economic and political participant in the multilateral quest for mutually acceptable and globally most efficient ways and mechanisms for adapting the national economies of the Asian countries and the regional economy of the APR as a whole to the tendencies of economic and political globalization, and for expanding the impact of the knowledge economy on world affairs. This should give Russian citizens a civilizational opportunity to associate themselves not only with Europeans, but also with citizens of the APR, and to derive all the possible benefits from such a situation.
In the medium run, Russia's goal in the APR is to take an active part in economic and financial integration within the APEC framework and at subregional levels - in such formats as ASEAN-plus-three, NEA countries-plus-Russia, CIS-plus-Asia, etc. - and to take advantage of the potentialities of such integration to boost the economy of Siberia and the Far East and to improve living standards in Russia.
Our short-term goals are connected with the development of bilateral relations and Russia's current work in the APEC forum. In the format of bilateral relations, Russia's priority partners are China, Japan, the Republic of Korea and the USA. Additional opportunities, though not easy to realize, are held out by the reanimation of economic ties with Russia's former socialist allies in Asia, which to this very day remain Russia's financial debtors.
The means of achieving the strategic objectives of Russia's development in the APR include:
It goes without saying that in practice Russia's cooperation with the APR can hardly be as smooth and straightforward as it appears to be in theory. Even today there are quite a few questions that may be difficult to answer.
Is Russia welcome in the APR? How exactly should Russia's economic strategy be adapted to resolving the twofold task of co-development with the European Union and with the Asia-Pacific Region? How to balance out the interests of the Center and the regions in the co-development strategy? How to "side-step" (in a manner of speaking) the territorial dispute with Tokyo? How to induce China to take a broader view of cooperation with Russia in Northeast Asia, without confining it to bilateral ties? Given the present intensive development of relations between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea, how can the Russian Far East avoid rivalry with it in the NEA credit market? How to meet the challenges of globalization, which implies not only co-development but also tough competition in the conditions of open national markets and which makes higher demands on the technological level of national economies? And so on.
Now is the time to start looking for answers to all these questions so as not to miss our chance to become coauthor of the world's third (alongside the EU and NAFTA) deeply integrated regional community in East Asia based on the principles of "security through cooperation in development."
Endnotes
Note *: Mikhail Titarenko is Director of the Institute of the Far East, Russian Academy of Sciences, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Doctor of Sciences (Philosophy). Vassilii Mikheev is Deputy Director of the same institute and Doctor of Sciences (Economics). Back
Note 1: Strategia razvitia Rossii v ATR. Sovet Federatsii FS RF (Strategy of Russia's Development in the APR.Federation Council of the RF Federal Assembly). Moscow, 2000, p. 42. The working group for the preparation of the report was headed by Ye.S.Stroev; the report was prepared at the Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences under the direction of M.L.Titarenko.Back.