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CIAO DATE: 01/01
International Affairs:
A Russian Journal
Russia and the West: Seeking the Right Distance
V. Kremeniuk *
The Foreign Policy Conception of the Russian Federation has been published. This is a much needed and, in principle, correct document which will help the state to identify its foreign political priorities for the future. It has attracted much attention in this country and abroad, it is actively analyzed, approved and criticized. Yet one feels that any final judgment on it is premature.
A foreign political conception is not a diplomatic note. It is a policy-forming document that addresses public at large and which provides a picture of the world as seen from Russia. Our country has outlined in it its expectations and the roads it is prepared to travel in quest of the desired aims. Our friends are expected to realize that Russia is a peaceful country concerned with its own economy and culture; that it no longer wants to be a threat to any other country and that it will go to all lengths to prove this. When reading the document the foes are expected to realize that Russia is firmly resolved to defend, with all means at its disposal, the lawful interests of it own, those of its friends and allies, and to maintain the international legal principles and norms.
These, and many other related problems, defy the language of a diplomatic document. Diplomacy is part of a specific environment where important political problems are addressed with specific means: talks, compromises, and concessions. They are an inalienable part of the foreign political process yet not the only or the main part of it. Foreign policy of any state brings together many components: politics, ideology, economy, military strategy, culture, science, art and, finally, private interests of those who want to travel or live abroad and run their businesses there.
This explains why a purely diplomatic vocabulary applied to the political process outside the country and inside it leads to at least to misunderstandings: first, many of those interested in foreign political issues, but far removed from diplomacy, will fail to grasp the "niceties" of the document; second, everything that is passed over in silence in it or translated into a diplomatic parlance will be used against Russia as its weakness (or inability to discuss many things in plain terms), as an absence of a clear-cut understanding of its own interests and tasks (which happened under Andrei Kozyrev), or as an inability to formulate the national interests and aims in a way that will inspire society and its most active elements (as is done in developed democracies.)
The conception answers one of the fundamental questions of Russia's foreign policy in a diplomatically vague manner: how does the country see its interaction with the outside world which has already outstripped it in its development? Will it strain its forces, will it struggle to catch up with the Western countries and find its place among them? Or will it succumb, under the continued blows of the economic crisis, mounting crime and corruption, the Chechen war, and the widening gap between power and society, to the obscurantist forces and return to the Soviet times when it was alienated from the world and lived in a shell of its "national specifics?"
New World Discovered
In fact, a widely accepted understanding that the country had to restore its ties with the outside world was one of the most powerful reasons to discontinue the communist experiment in Russia.
In the conditions of an acute deficit of information about the outside world and its complexities and specific features gave rise, in the first post-Soviet years, to a huge number of fakes, imitations and attractive forgeries in a shape of all sorts of centers, foundations, institutes, and councils. Acting in the best traditions of the market economy they launched unbridled promotion to attract fledgling managers with promises of "partnership" with the West, "strategic partnership" and other things in an attractive wrapping that stood on neither solid knowledge and serious analysis and assessment of Russia's possibilities, nor common sense.
Numerous analytical centers in the West maintained a favorable balance on the market: they filled in the niche vacated by traditional Sovietology, which had failed to predict the Soviet system's collapse. The key element of the entire structure was numerous consumers of this product in Russia with political and economic reasons of their own to trust the empty and hardly justified promises issued by self-appointed foreign policy experts. It was through them that contacts with certain Western circles were established, it was through them that money traveled in both directions (the so-called Western aid to the non-existing democracy in Russia and stolen millions of Russia's money), it was through them that the ideas of a "strategic partnership" were filled with hot air.
The so-called opposition presented by the communists and Russian chauvinists fanned the orgy with their lamentations about undermining "the Russian power's might" and the Western schemes of "subjugating Russia." In an absence of serious or weighty arguments this created an illusion that Russia and the West had reached the state when our country could be exposed to the danger of succumbing to alien ideas and models. In fact this stage is far away: Russia has just entered the world of the already established ties and connections and its first steps are rather clumsy.
Russian society lacked reliable and exhaustive knowledge about the world and this brought two negative results. On the one hand, Russia proved unable to promptly sort out the political and economic models functioning in the world and to find, through public discussions, which of them (political liberalism, free market, authoritarianism, guided economy, etc.) suited its conditions best. We have not done this. On the other hand, it is still unclear whether the West, East, South or CIS is the best partner and how far this partnership should go. Obviously both problems should be addressed simultaneously. They have not yet been resolved in Russia–either both or individually.
The solution depends, first and foremost, on the balance of forces in Russia itself. Are those who want to "open" the country to the world, to introduce democracy and the free market still strong enough (despite the failures of the democratic changes and economic reforms)? Can they count on popular support, power structures and bureaucracy? Or will they, having scored no spectacular successes, be forced to leave the political stage? Will their place be taken by those who are still exploiting either the nearly forgotten communist past or the slogans of "great Russia," a "strong state" and other attributes of great-power mentality?
The sincere and detailed answers to these questions depend on the degree to which people in Russia realize how deep is the gap that separates them from the developed world. It is also necessary to understand what precisely created this gap: indeed, simple figures of per capita GDP, the amount of calories consumed, or the money allocated on education and health protection are not enough (though more likely than not an analysis begins and ends there). We have to form an adequate idea of what the Russian citizens should do to catch up with, or simply come closer, to that, another, world.
An adequate idea calls for a better understanding of the difference in the public, political, and economic mechanisms. In the West they ensure sustainable growth and reproduction and make the majority interested in supporting the existing institutes. In Russia they bring stagnation, accumulate contradictions and cause our lagging behind the developed countries of the West. Everybody knows that a higher labor productivity, political involvement, social cooperation and other elements of social progress in the West have not been created by technological progress (which did occur and of which Soviet economists and experts in planning wrote a lot). These things were created by a large amount of material and spiritual factors born by public thought and practice and boosted by what the ruling circles in the West are doing.
"Another" World
The high level and high quality of living, political freedoms, healthy environment, the rule of law and pluralism are the most noticeable feature of life in the West that cause havoc in the mind of people from undeveloped and poor totalitarian states. As a rule, this is more than enough to create an urge to emigrate to the West whether legally or illegally. This is more than enough to create in those who stay behind in the slums of large cities and humble huts of the countryside the feeling of doom and hopelessness and a desire to revenge on the rich.
In any case, closer contacts with the world of the rich and developed countries of the West have always produced ambiguous effects in the poor countries. In those who rule them the contacts create an urge to get access to the goods and pleasures of the developed world. Increased exploitation and limitation of the knowledge about this world were two natural results. Those who could challenge the drab and unattractive reality were resolved to leave to change their lot and obtain their share of the possibilities offered by that world. The rest were left with a desire to do something so that to force the world of the rich and the free to share their boons: either to throw themselves on the mercy of the victor and live at the expense of a rich patron or to rise in a revolt to force the rich to return their "loot."
In any case since the time of Rome encounters of the two worlds have never passed without consequences which, as a rule, never kept the world waiting. Progress unfolded, there were battles for it, and new countries and peoples joined in the universal stream and tempo of human civilization. This also happened today, albeit in a very specific form and to a very different degree. The "iron curtain" collapsed. Russia and other post-Soviet states got a real chance to leave behind poverty and lawlessness together with many of their delusions and naive dreams. They got a chance to get from the West not only high-quality goods, elements of a healthier and more meaningful life but also the patterns of public mechanisms that promote civic freedoms, sustainable economic growth and the country's flourishing.
The social structure and cultural specificities apart one cannot but pay attention to the fact that these countries, have resolved, in principle, the problems that have been eluding solution in Russia. Indeed, the majority there have access to healthy housing conditions; there is enough fairly cheap, varied and high-quality foodstuffs; there is a ramified and high-quality system of transportation and communication; there are health services and social security. It would be wrong to imagine that the situation in all these spheres is perfect yet (1) nearly two generations (or even more in some of these countries) are living in the deficit-free conditions in these vitally important spheres; (2) these countries elaborated and put in place administration mechanisms which allow them to keep the services at the high level without much effort. These fundamental problems were resolved in the seventies; the Western countries got a chance to formulate the task of a "quality of life" (as a sum-total of definite elements) as a domestic and international political issue. The Carter Administration (1977-1981) formulated a political issue of the conception of the "basic needs of man" as an inalienable part of the "human rights" conception. They met in Carter's development strategy that underlay the American legislation in the international development sphere (1979) and UN activity in the same area. The Western countries shouldered a task of creating a development model to ensure well-being of all social groups and of helping other countries to set up similar mechanisms. From that time on the East Asian "tigers" (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) started a swift evolution towards prosperity; several Asian and Latin American countries followed.
Obviously, it was the Cold War that prompted the developed democratic states to pay attention to the better living conditions for their nations and the Third World countries. At the same time, their efforts reflected an increased level of understanding of the basic principles of social policy and the need to win the people on their side. This greatly improved the political and social climate, lowered the level of confrontation and promoted social cooperation among all sorts of strata, the upper and the lower strata in the first place. In the West the course towards better living standards for all was not viewed as charity but as the basic element of a movement towards a society equally needed by the rich and the poor, the left and the right, entrepreneurs and their workforce.
The scientific and technological revolution left its imprint in the social policies in the West. It demonstrated that freedom and a free creative personality, on the one hand, and technical progress, on the other, were two sides of the same medal. Personal development was stimulated, its interests protected, man's ties with society and production encouraged. In this way the West first, reached the unheard-of rates of technical progress; second, mobilized the most active forces to protect society and move it further. With time the human factor became one of the key elements in technical and social progress in the West.
In the West social cooperation was developing together with a general understanding that all were responsible for the state of affairs in the country, its future and its survival, its natural and genetic potential, and cultural heritage. This general understanding added weight to law and order as the cornerstones of social stability and predictability. Deep inside the society this understanding was a sigh that civic society was intensively ripening. Richard Nixon's resignation from the post of the US President in 1974 under a threat of impeachment and a series of resignations of high officials in Japan were of a great importance for the West. They demonstrated the world that the laws were omnipotent and that they played a system-forming role in developing the civic society. Respect for law and order and devotion to the legal norms has become normal features in the developed countries and a sign of their maturity.
Finally, the main thing: how the system of international relations was formed. When the Cold War was drawing to its end and the future of the military blocs had to be decided it seemed that both NATO and WTO would be liquidated. What followed was unexpected: WTO had fallen apart as soon as Moscow relieved pressure on its allies while NATO had gotten a new lease of life. It has become even more attractive for the old members and tempted post-communist Central and East European states. Indeed, a cursory glance at other Western alliances, be it the European Union, OAS or OECD will detect their good form, sustainable development, attraction for outsiders and an obvious advantages for the members.
We have to admit that the "other" world survived in the Cold War period, outlived it, and showed much more stability, attractiveness, reliability and magnetism felt by the common people and politicians in the former socialist countries. The first question they asked themselves was: What can be done to join the world of the rich and free and to blend with it?
There is no doubt that the post-socialist countries guided themselves by these two questions in their political behavior. History gave them a chance to return to European civilization. Russia, too, succumbed to a temptation to formulate a vague conception of "strategic partnership" which screened Yeltsin and his cronies' desire to get access to the rich Western resources. In exchange Russia was prepared to play a role of a Western "partner" in limiting strategic armaments and non-proliferating weapons of mass destruction while the Soviet military giant was falling apart. Other former socialist countries had nothing of the kind to offer. All of them, including the largest ones, such as Poland, Ukraine or Kazakhstan, had to capitulate, totally and unconditionally, to the West in a hope that it will appreciate this and reciprocate.
The West which looks at first glance easy going and indulgent turns out to be a very exacting partner. Indeed, the times when the West tolerated dictators of the Somosa or Marcos type as allies for the sake of illusory victories over communism are in the past. Today, the West applies strict standards to potential partners' political systems, their legislation and law enforcement procedures, social politics (children, senior citizens and the disabled), the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, economy, ecology, etc. The standards are even stricter in relation to those countries, which want closer relations or membership in Western institutions. This is caused not so much by the desire to emphasize the difference between the countries of traditional democracy and freedoms and the newcomers but by an understanding that allied relationships in the West and with the West require shared values and absolute dedication to principles and obligations.
The above is either directly worded in documents (of the Council of Europe, for example) or has become part of international law and an inalienable part of the obligations shouldered by all members of the economic and political groups of the West. The last several decades have seen considerable changes in this field: the entire international system, its rules and laws is overshadowing sovereignties irrespective of the countries' political orientations. Today, each of the governments is confronted with much stricter demands in the field of both international and domestic policies. Whether the government is ready to abide by the "code of conduct" has become nearly the only criterion the West applies when deciding on cooperation with it. Other options are either complete ignoring and deprivation of the boons the West can offer (in the form of loans, credits, know-how, foodstuffs, and participation in communication projects) or even confrontation (as is the case with Iraq, Libya, Iran, North Korea, and Cuba.)
Strategy on Russia
The West is not going to enter into confrontation with Russia–and this is obvious. Intelligent politicians there know that confrontation will kill off the feeble shoots of democracy in Russia, that the special services and the generals will once more come to power and remain in power for a long time and that even enfeebled and nearly ruined Russia will be able to cause the West much harm. Therefore the West (having probed into the Russian ruling circles' readiness to introduce serious democratic reforms and to translate into reality the principles of freedom and prosperity) realized that the Russian political system was still too shaky. In a country torn between the desire to turn back into the communist past and an understanding that this was no answer to its urgent problems the possibilities of positive shifts were negligible while the political system still too immature.
This means that the West is facing a problem of determining its policy towards a large and potentially strong country in which the social forces able to push the country closer to democracy and the market were still weak and unable to come to power which belonged to big bureaucrats underpinned by the power structures. Its economy is paralyzed by the unresolved question of ownership and its relation with the powers that be. This makes Russia a source of all sorts of disturbances ranging from spontaneous massive emigration to spontaneous inroads into what is believed to be the key regions (the Caucasus, the Caspian, and the Baltics). The above also offers a difficult problem: how to maintain normal working relations with Russia. Too much depends on the Kremlin intrigues rather than on an insignificant consensus therefore the West tends either to simplify the situation (an open confrontation) or to help bring to power friendlier and more predictable elements.
Today the West–its alliances and governments–are trying to outline the limits within which it will be prepared to deal with Russia. First, Russia's membership in G-8 has, so far, exhausted its possibilities to integrate into the Western structures. Nobody wants it in NATO even if Russia will try hard to get into it. Its membership in other structures is questionable. Second, the period of "the most favored nation" in relation to loans and credits is drawing to an end. In future Russia will hardly get new large loans; it cannot expect any considerable forgiveness of its debts either. Third, the West has clearly outlined its cooperation with Russia in regional security: there will be created a cordon sanitaire of sorts between NATO and Russia in the form of GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) or GUUAM (the same countries and Uzbekistan). On the whole, the West decided to revive the idea of a buffer zone between its structures and Russia so that to avoid direct confrontation and the need to cooperate too closely with Russia in the security sphere.
It would be a great exaggeration to say that the West has succeeded. Even if it tries very hard it will be unable either to encircle Russia with the ring of "indirect containment" or to elaborate a political line acceptable to all Western countries. This forces the West to accompany its basically anti-Russian strategy with placatory gestures and will not interfere with Russia's desire to console itself with the ideas of multipolarity. From the practical point of view they are nothing more than nostalgia of its great-power past.
Indeed, even China, one of Russia's partner in "multipolarity," will not raise a finger if there is as much as a host of a threat to its economic interests in the West because of its partnership with Russia.
Hence, Russia is facing at least three strategic problems. First, to decide on a further political line in the conditions of looming partial isolation in the West and the necessity to side with such "outcast" countries as North Korea, Iraq, Libya, and Cuba. Will Russia be able to risk its ties with the West if the former decides that Russia has gone too far in its flirtation with them? Second, can Russia that has halted its advance to democracy count on understanding of any kind in the West and its readiness to create, if not partner, then relations of "mutual tolerance" and "parallel coexistence"? Third, can the socioeconomic formation now in existence in Russia create a mode of production that will allow the country to avoid its dependence on the world oil prices and start producing enough acceptable commodities (foodstuffs, domestic chemicals, household electric appliances, clothes, footwear, etc.) to prevent this dependence?
It seems that there are certain constant elements that Russia will have to deal with when trying to answer the above questions. First, the geostrategic situation. Like hundreds of years ago Russia has now found itself in a geographical situation which does not prevent active ties with the rest of the world but does not make them easier, either. Indeed, the country lost natural harbors in the Baltics and in the northern part of the Black Sea; pipelines and all sorts of other communication lines cross the states that though using Russian resources set exorbitant prices for transit; very much as usual the eastern regions get less attention of the center and nearly no resources. In fact, the huge territory and a weakly developed means of communication and administration are a burden for Russia, not an advantage. The precious resources of the territory whet the appetites of other countries and put the issue of the country's territorial integrity high on the list of priorities.
So far, the military and strategic problems have preserved their urgency and their impact on Russia's situation and its relations with the outside world. One could expect certain positive changes once the Cold War had ended. Some of these expectations have come true: the nuclear threat became more distant or even disappeared; there is no possibility of a large-scale war in Europe between the two blocs; there is no threat of Russia's involvement in a local war for ideological reasons. At the same time, Russia is still threatened by NATO, the recent doctrine of which is biased more towards police interference into domestic affairs of other states and much less towards maintaining balance in the conflict-prone regions. The threat of a local war in Russia or in neighboring states caused by terrorists is still topical. The end of the Cold War did not put an end of a military threat to Russia and this considerably limits its strategic choices.
Finally, there is a problem of a growing gap in the development levels and production efficiency between Russia and the West. Until quite recently it was of an economic and financial nature because it touched upon two most important aspects of Russia's foreign policy. The first one is the problem of debts (including Soviet debts) that, even if not shaping Russia-the West relations, is a source of constant pressure on Russia. There is also a problem of the growing dependence of Russia's consumer and production markets on Western products (foodstuffs, industrial goods, computers, know-how, and equipment). Taken separately, this dependence does not threaten Russia the economy of which is surviving, to a great extent, at the expense of oil, gas and other mineral resources exports. If the economic gap continues to widen Russian will inevitably face a threat of being expelled from G-8 and becoming an eternal debtor of the rich countries and an appendage of the world economy and international relations.
In short, it would be stretching a point to say that Russia still can choose between drawing closer to the West and keeping distance from it for strategic reasons. In actual fact, time for such choice has passed. Today the question is whether there is time for Russia to cut down its sovereignty and the great-power status or not. Has the gap between Russia and the West become too wide? In case of a positive answer Russia has no choice but either to move to the roadside of history with all the predictable consequences we had many years ago or to throw itself to the mercy of the victor and recognize a complete failure of its policy and economy. (Something of this kind happened to the Ottoman Empire early in the twentieth century.)
The real choice seems to be limited by these two appalling options. This suggests the only possible course for the future. In its relations with the outside world Russia should follow a strategy of continued changes and active borrowing from the West. Here I have in mind not money (which may not be given to us), nor high technologies (this failed under Soviet power), nor foodstuffs and consumer goods (done under Yeltsin) but the mechanisms and institutes without which progress is impossible. This was the road Germany, Italy and Japan took in the wake of World War II; in the 70s and 80s it was East Asian, Southeast Asian, and Latin American countries, which opted for this variant.
One should not expect prompt and spectacular successes: the road abounds in traps of domestic upheavals. Indeed, there are internal forces that want a revanche, an "administrative order," and a police state instead of the rule of law. There is a lot of empty talk about the "Pinochet phenomenon" designed to throw off guard those concerned with an advance of reaction. Everybody should realize that Pinochet succeeded not only, and not so much, thanks to police control. There were three other factors: a powerful flow of foreign investments into Chilean economy, a developed system of private ownership, and strong influence of the church. We have none of the three factors in this country. To survive in a dignified way and avoid the fate of a slave Russia should turn to the West (like this was done under Peter the Great); it should not be afraid to closely cooperate with it. This does not mean that it should abandon the freedom of choice and become totally dependent on the West. The contrary is true: a readiness to cooperate with it goes well with such conceptions as "multipolarity," and other elements of foreign political maneuvering which emphasize the complex and sophisticated nature of Russia's foreign policy and its reserves. Russia can become a link connecting the West and the East, the North and the South, between the "outcast" countries and the civilized world.
We should clearly understand that if the strategy fails the entire nation will be shaken by large-scale upheavals; the most creatively minded, talented and promising people will emigrate. Russia will find itself isolated from the rest of the world and subjected to a blockade that it will hardly survive as a single state. The experience of the late 80s when the communist system was falling apart has shown that missiles, tanks and the police are no remedy for mass disorders and disintegration of the state.
Note: * Viktor Kremeniuk is Doctor of Sciences (History) and Professor. Back