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CIAO DATE: 01/01
International Affairs:
A Russian Journal
Some Thoughts on the Afghan Developments
N. Kozyrev *
The peace the Afghans needed so much was not brought either by the withdrawal of Soviet troops in February 1989 or by the downfall of Najibulla's government in spring 1992. The fire of an internal strife plunged the country into an abyss of disasters and destruction comparable only to the tragedy of Lebanon: Kabul had been razed to the ground, population is suffering a genocide, there is no longer an economy to speak of. The mudjaheddin, politically, religiously and ethnically patchy alliance, driven together by the common struggle against foreign occupation and the Najibulla regime connected with it, were locked in power struggle. Their former patrons (the United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia) were gradually losing their grip on the Islamic leaders in Afghanistan: the latter no longer needed patronage and aid to the same extent they had wanted them before.
Unwilling to accept the new balance of forces and trying to reinstate themselves in Afghanistan the former patrons (especially Pakistan) staked on the Taleban as a new force in the country. The movement that has under its control over 90 percent of the Afghan territory restored mediaeval order there: there is a despotic military rule guided by the Sharia; the Taleban uprooted all shoots of modern civilization. Music, cinema and entertainment on TV are banned; women are not allowed to work or to study; they can emerge into streets safely wrapped into yashmaks and in a male company.
Even the most loyal followers of Homeini and the most zealous Islamic extremists in Iran were forced to admit that their Afghan pupils had gone too far.
The Taleban turned the country into a center of international terrorism and drug business, which is threatening not only its neighbors (Russia among them) but also Europe and the United States. This prompts a conclusion that those responsible for the present state of affairs there have to pool efforts to stop the regime of lawlessness, violence and violations of human rights. It has already driven the country into an impasse where drug trafficking and export of terrorism are flourishing.
Russia (as the legal heir to the Soviet Union) and the United States are both responsible to a certain degree for the present state of affairs. The former introduced and then withdrew the troops, which rocked the boat of Afghan instability and fanned the fire of ethnic and religious enmity that had been smoldering long before the Soviet Union brought in its troops. The United States are equally (or even more) responsible: it was their money and their political and military support which allowed pro-Islamic extremist leaders (Hekmatiar, Rabbani, Ahmad Shah Masoud) and their groups to build up force and come to power. Later when they had escaped from American, Pakistani and Saudi control their patrons staked on the Taleban. This marked a beginning of another strife, bloodier and crueler than the previous one. The regional and world security has also suffered. The worst thing about the present state of affairs is that while the Taleban looks much stronger their final and long-term triumph is very doubtful. The country's history has proved many times that central power, no matter who headed it, has never been strong enough. Indeed, the Uzbeks, Tajiks, Khazareans, and other ethnic groups will never succumb to power of other nationalities, such as Pushtu. It seems that sooner or later the Taleban that represents the Pushtu tribes will have to enter into a compromise with the Northern Alliance. Mass scale mutual annihilation, which nobody would be able to stop, is the only option.
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Until quite recently here in Russia and especially in the United States the Afghan problem was underestimated–meanwhile it has reached a peak of its urgency. There were objective reasons for lack of attention: there was Kosovo (for the United States) and there was Chechnya (in Russia). This is a poor excuse, though. A lack of attention to the Afghan factor is as grave a mistake as is the ideological and military encouragement of the Kosovo Albanian extremism or the Chechen separatists. Their natural inspiring milieu is Afghanistan of the Taleban. From this it follows that Russia and the United States, two countries most involved in the events and possessing levers to put pressure on both sides (the US on the Taleban and Russia, on the Northern Alliance) should act as co-sponsors of the Afghan settlement according to the Middle East pattern in which Russia should have a weightier role to play.
Islamic militants who penetrated into Kirghizia and Uzbekistan are the best illustration of the far-flung plans of those who are inspiring international terrorism and the ideas of the "world Islamic revolution." Afghanistan has become a source of destabilization in Central Asia: it houses camps of the Tajik, Uzbek and even Chechen opposition; there are attempts to carry out in Central Asia the designs that failed in Chechnya and Daghestan. Recently, the Taleban has scored a series of victories and reached the Tajik frontier. This spells a danger of a direct intervention and clashes with Russian border guards. One can agree with the clerical and political elite who says that the Islamic world and Islam have nothing to do with extremists and adventurers exploiting Islamic slogans. Yet it would be wrong to ignore the fact that those who are fighting for political power to extend it to the neighboring territories rely on Islam. We should bear in mind that the Islamic extremists are active on a vast territory stretching from Africa to the Far East and that kidnapping is not limited to Chechnya alone: hostages are taken in the Philippines, too. In fact, any religion and especially Islam, is a powerful instrument of brainwashing. In the past, on many occasions the Islamic and Christian banners legitimized cruel and bloody wars and conquests of vast territories. In other words, at the threshold of the new millennium mankind is running a risk of falling victim to international terrorism and extremism fed by all sorts of religions or, rather, their militant trends supported by all sorts of political regimes.
In this context one is pleased to learn that on 1-2 August, 2000 the Russian-American Workgroup for Afghanistan held its first sitting in Washington. This is an important step in the right direction. The group headed by V. Trubnikov, First Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia, and Thomas Pickering, Senior Deputy of the US State Secretary for political questions, issued a joint statement. The sides condemned terrorism and drug trafficking encouraged by the Taleban and discussed joint actions to counter the threat of international terrorism coming from Afghanistan with diplomatic, law enforcement and other measures within the legal framework. They also intend to create conditions that will make it possible to set up a government on a wide basis in this country. In other words, Russia and the United States have reserved the right to recur to diplomatic and economic measures and the use of force (sanctions) within the legal framework which means that they will guide themselves by the UN Charter and Resolution 1267 of the UN Security Council on Afghanistan.
The joint Russian-American workgroup for Afghanistan is a weighty addition to the work being done by the "Six plus Two" group consisting of Afghanistan's neighbors (China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) and two "friends" of Afghanistan (Russia and the US) that is engaged in examining the entire set of questions connected with the Afghan settlement. The group meets regularly in New York at the level of the members' permanent representatives at the UN. The latest meeting took place on 15 September, 2000, during the Millennium Summit. It was conducted at the foreign ministers level, which added weight to its activities. Regrettably, its progress is slowed down by the position of Pakistan, which blocks many of the group's decisions.
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One feels that pressure is justified and that if applied by the United States and Russia, two leaders, it could produce positive results. Positive developments seem even more probable if pressure is combined with sanctions.
I think, however, that the above would not be enough to bring the Taleban to the negotiation table together with the Northern Alliance. The latter is ready to talk. What is needed is pressure on Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. It was their direct military, financial, and political support that first created the Taleban and later made its military victories possible. Pakistan has reasons of its own to maintain instability in Afghanistan: it does not want the Pushtu of Afghanistan to unite with its North-West Frontier population of kindred Pushtu tribes.
In fact, throughout the 11 years of Soviet troops' absence from Afghanistan Pakistan has been constantly interfering into its internal affairs. Pakistan did not heed not only the Geneva Agreements but also international legal norms and behaved there as though on its own territory.
Saudi Arabia is no better: it is encouraging Islamic extremism and Wahhabism, one of its variants, in Afghanistan and the region as a whole. Russia has to fight Wahhabism in Chechnia. I am convinced that it is important to uproot not only the results but also the causes of the situation in Afghanistan. This means that pressure should be put on the Taleban and its patrons. A possibility of sanctions should not be excluded.
At the same time one has to bear in mind that Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are pursuing political aims while channeling Islamic extremism of the Wahhabites and the Taleban to fight the infidels and the apostates in the north, as far from their territories as possible. They are resolved to prevent an "Islamic revolution" of the Iranian type in their countries and exclude a possibility of the Muslim clergy usurping power. This is another equally important political aim. The Saudi and Pakistani leaders are convinced that by switching their Islamists' attention to the external factor while giving them money and military support they avert a danger of upheavals at home. Yet this is not that simple: if the Islamic extremists prevail in Afghanistan they might be willing to bring Islamic order to the countries of their patrons. In this case the weapon, including ideological weapon, used in the Caucasus and Central Asia might be turned against the masters. Nurturing Islamic extremism or any sort of extremism, for that matter, is a hazardous occupation.
The importance of Afghanistan for Russia can hardly be overestimated. Peace and stability there will positively echo in Russia's CIS neighbor region (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kirghizia). Russia itself will profit if the Afghan leaders abandon the policy of international terror and drug trafficking: this will deprive the Chechen separatists of ideological and material support. The Unites States have announced that combating international terrorism and drugs was one of their main foreign political objectives. Indeed, Osama bin Laden sheltered by the Taleban is a strong enough challenge. One can only wish that if, and when, this challenge disappears the United States would go on with their course. Hopefully, the United States have finally recognized that the Taleban threatens not only its neighbors. It is a threat to the regional and world stability. Mankind has already learned that the results of any one ideology declared the only correct and worthy of existence are pernicious. Today, we should not permit a revival of the Sharia laws that infringe on human rights.
It seems advisable for the Russian-American Workgroup to extend its geographical scope to Islamabad, Riyadh, Teheran, and, probably, other places. Russia and the United States will also need the UN which, with their help and despite its rather clumsy past activities in Afghanistan, should become the main instrument of national reconciliation long overdue in that country. In general, the Asian countries seem to need an organization of the OSCE type which, guided by the UN, could maintain and protect Asian security.
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The experience of the Geneva Agreements on Afghanistan and the withdrawal of Soviet troops achieved with an active participation of a UN special representative can be borrowed today. At the same time the unsuccessful experiments conducted in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan with certain UN involvement are better avoided. Here I have in mind the cease-fire, the coalition government, elections to the Loia jirga and to the parliament, etc. suggested by the UN emissaries. In the Afghan context these measures could not be realized though under different circumstances they could have become an instrument of peace in that country. The main thing about them is who and when suggest them.
Najibulla and his cabinet accepted them while the mudjaheddin rejected them outright: they were much stronger at that time and felt that triumph was close at hand. By the irony of fate those who declined the compromises with the DRA leaders at the turn of the 90s have found themselves in the same quandary. Today the Taleban practically rejects all compromises offered by the Northern Alliance supported by the Russian Federation. Obviously neither Russia nor the United States should delude themselves about a possibility of a compromise: as long as the Taleban gets help from Pakistan and Saudi Arabia it will remain sure of its strength and in no need of compromises. The situation calls for a revival of the Geneva Agreements on Afghanistan that have not been annulled. The foreign minister of Pakistan also signed them–his signature clearly banning interference in the domestic affairs of Afghanistan and support of any separatist force there. All agreements should be fulfilled–this is prescribed by international law. Pakistan as one of its subjects is bound by it. I am inclined to think that without military or any other outside help the Taleban will become more tractable.
The revived Geneva Agreements will pose a very topical question: Why is foreign interference in Afghanistan going on 11 years after the Soviet troops were withdrawn? It is fanning the bloodshed of a fratricidal war. The answer is close at hand: Pakistan and the United States, two signatories of the document, wanted nothing more than a withdrawal of the Soviet troops; they have chosen to ignore another aspect: discontinuation of interference into Afghanistan's domestic affairs.
Obviously, any effort to start peace talks should begin with an attempt to stop those who are interfering into the domestic affairs there. This is the first step towards a round table of negotiations at which the United Nations should try to reconcile the sides.
One should exclude the use of peacekeeping forces in the most vulnerable or key localities and settlements if a cease-fire agreement is reached. This question calls for a careful preliminary examination with due account for the negative experience and a kind of an allergy the nation has acquired after ten years of foreign occupation.
Deployment of peacekeepers in Afghanistan is a sensitive issue because of the country's past and the nation's specific character. In any case, if used in Afghanistan peacekeepers could distribute humanitarian aid and foodstuffs and protect civilians and their property to boost the peacekeeping forces' prestige. This will allow them later to start doing their main job: preserving and maintaining peace. It is advisable, at the initial stages, to staff the peacekeeping forces for Afghanistan with people from the neighboring countries (Pakistan, Iran, and probably Arabs.)
***
One can think of several variants of switching to a civilized and democratic state order in Afghanistan. On the one hand, such system should provide peace and stability; on the other, take into account as much as possible the ethnic and religious traditions and customs, and the patchwork nature of the nation's ethnic, religious, and cultural composition. Otherwise, all efforts to bring peace to the Afghans will fail. Monarchy can be prescribed if the idea can bring Afghans together and prevent score settling between the Pushtu, Uzbeks, Tajiks and other ethnic groups and also among the Shi'ites and Sunnis. Unfortunately former king Zakhir Shah is too old to become a reconciliatory figure and a symbol of stability. Earlier, he had been rejected by the mudjaheddin now united into the Northern Alliance. The Taleban, too, will be hardly inclined to cede power to anybody far removed from the movement and, in general, from the political process of the last two decades.
There is a possibility of a federation or a confederation the latter implying a higher degree of democracy and political awareness of the nation. Both are absent from Afghanistan today. It seems that a confederation will split the country into several de facto independent and self-ruling territories. Central power will become nothing but a fiction. Tension and instability will remain and will preclude any political or economic order therefore the people will remain as vulnerable as ever, their civic rights and freedoms unprotected.
A federation is the answer. It will account for the Islamic traditions and the numerous varied ethnic and cultural features. For example, an Islamic Federation of Afghanistan might be set up within which the ethnically and religiously different regions (now called provinces) will enjoy adequately wide authority under strong central power shaped as a parliamentary rather than presidential democracy. Indeed, there can be no strong president in the country made up of clans and tribes who inevitably will belong to one of them thus causing opposition of the rest. The parliament and the government of the parliamentary majority in which all Afghan ethnic groups are represented seem to answer the needs of democratic developments in Afghanistan. The details and the transitory stages, which will require a provisional coalition cabinet, can be better discussed at the second stage when a cease-fire, peace talks and a compromise are reached.
It seems that Russia and the United States should pay particular attention to all these details. The task is challenging to say the least yet discontinuation of the war and the drift to domestic political settlement depend on it. The world community badly needs such settlement and the matter is urgent.
Note: * Nikolai Ivanovich Kozyrev is Vice Rector of the Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, and Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary; Minister-Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in Afghanistan between 1983 and 1986 Back