International Affairs: Peace and Security in the Middle East

International Affairs:
A Russian Journal
Vol. 44, No. 6/December 1998–January 1999

Peace and Security in the Middle East—A Feasible Goal?

By V. Posuvaliuk _*

Recently there has been a tangible positive shift in the Middle East peace process. A Palestinian–Israeli agreement was signed at Wye Plantation near Washington, specifying the obligations of the Palestinian leadership and the Israeli government, including on the practical implementation of the highly important second stage of Israeli troop withdrawal from Palestinian land. Under the document, more than 40 percent of earlier occupied territory is to pass under the control of the Palestinian National Authority.

Russia cordially welcomed these accords, considering them, with good reason, as a major step forward, which became possible thanks to the constructive spirit, foresight, and political courage displayed by the Palestinian and the Israeli leaders. It is also important that the document that was signed not only addresses some practical matters at the current stage of Palestinian–Israeli negotiations but also opens the way to further progress and a final settlement in the region. This is how we assess the sides’ obligations, as recorded in the Wye River Memorandum, to begin, as a matter of urgency, the discussion of the final status of Palestinian territories.

The progress made has become possible thanks to the efforts of many sides. Considerable credit here, without a doubt, belongs to the U.S. cosponsor and personally to U.S. President B. Clinton who was highly instrumental in encouraging the Palestinians and the Israelis to reach a compromise. Yet it is also important to note the work that was accomplished, at the same time as the United States, by Russia, as the second cosponsor of the Middle East peace process, as well as by the European Union, Egypt, Jordan, and other champions of peace in the Middle East.

While fully recognizing the significance of the latest Palestinian–Israeli accords, Russia is nonetheless convinced that there is no reason whatsoever for euphoria or complacency. Even more difficult tasks are yet to be addressed — namely, agreeing on the final status of Palestinian territories, including the status of Jerusalem, addressing the problem of refugees, and doing many, many other things. Sure, to advance toward this objective, it is vital to make progress not only on the Palestinian but also the Syrian and Lebanese tracks of the negotiating process; without success in these areas there can be no question about a lasting peace in the Middle East. It is also important to resume multilateral negotiations on regional problems. It is our view that, considering the progress made on the Palestinian track, the situation is gradually becoming more favorable for this. Russia as cosponsor of the Middle East peace process and a sincere and consistent advocate of peace and prosperity in the Middle East, will work vigorously to sustain and further the positive dynamics of the peace process. Moreover, we are ready to cooperate with all those who hold dear the cause of a just and lasting settlement in the Middle East, and we are convinced that broad, coordinated international efforts are necessary to achieve regional stability and ensure long-term Arab–Israeli conciliation.

***

Addressing a meeting with senior officials of the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 12 May 1998, President B.N. Yeltsin instructed Russian diplomats to search for ways of enhancing the efficacy of our steps in the foreign policy sphere. The president pointed out that oftentimes intractable problems are successfully addressed thanks to nontraditional, unorthodox, essentially innovative forms of interaction between participants in international relations — for example, “no-necktie meetings,” activity by the informal “troika” with the participation of Russia, the FRG and France, and so forth.

The emphasis placed by B.N. Yeltsin on the need for preparing new political moves to deal with long-standing international problems compels an in-depth analysis of the situation in each concrete sector where Russia pursues a pro-active foreign policy line. This approach appears especially topical and applicable with respect to the Arab–Israeli conflict. The years-long confrontation between the Arabs and the Jews and between the Arab states and Israel, aggravated by the historical evidence of non-constructive participation by the world powers in Middle East developments (within the entire spectrum — from military-political interference to playing an “honest broker”), gives plenty of cause to talk about a relative inefficacy of conflict resolution efforts in the region. In effect, a kind of a vicious circle has emerged, with parties to the dispute working to convince others that their principles and positions are solely correct and that their fears and concerns are legitimate, but at the same time being extremely reluctant to meet each other halfway. It would seem that with the end of the Cold War the main fuse — confrontation between the two superpowers — was removed from the Middle East powder keg. It is history now. Nevertheless, as RF Foreign Minister Ye. Primakov said in his speech at the 52nd session of the UN General Assembly, the Middle East conflict has acquired an “autonomous character” and “autonomous evolution,” and this fact does little to reduce its threat to international security. It should also be added in this connection that this autonomy even irks some quarters, accustomed to relying on somebody else’s mediation more than on their own initiative, which requires political will and courage. The history of the Arab–Israeli conflict has seen numerous peacemaking efforts, designed to remove the barrier of hostility between Israel and its Arab neighbors. In fact, even the well known Resolution 181 (II) of the UN General Assembly on the division of Palestine into a Jewish and an Arab state, dated 29 November 1947, was adopted with a view to cutting the Gordian knot of Arab–Jewish contradictions that had arisen on Palestinian land in the 20s–40s. However, today it is apparently an oversimplification to treat the Palestinian problem as mainly relating to “the sphere of human relations and political rights” while approaching its resolution as lying through “a correct assessment of the general situation and a striving to find a humane solution to this matter”(see: Report by the Special Committee on Palestine, submitted to the General Assembly; UN General Assembly Document A/364, dated 3 September 1947, p. III). The political evolution of the Middle East, which has turned into a region affected by the metastases of a chronic confrontation, is well in evidence now. Despite the serious efforts that were made at the time to implement a plan for Arab–Jewish separation (and naturally, with a view to subsequent reconciliation of the two nations), the result was deplorable. Why? Without a doubt, because it ignored the regional chemistry of the Middle East situation at the time. After a number of Arab states rejected the idea of the division of Palestine, the Middle East card came to hinge on strong-arm options, based on the use of force. Sad as it may be, an option that was tried once, even if unsuccessfully, no longer appeared completely impossible. Policy based on the use of force prevailed in 1956, in 1967, and in 1973. It is not our mission to judge who was right and who was to blame for the fact that the historical events evolved according to the well known scenarios. This is a subject of hundreds of books, memoirs, and scholarly studies whose authors, incidentally, oftentimes express opposite views. Even so, it is important to note that the sprouts of compromise and conciliatory solutions were drowned in the general clamor of policy based on the use of force.

The 1978 Camp David Accords resulted from Egyptian President A. Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in November 1977. They could, in theory, have become the line beyond which the peace negotiation mechanism would have demonstrated its obvious advantages compared to options based on the use of force. True, this was partially proven, and the two decades of stable, even though “cool” peace between Egypt and Israel are worth plenty.

Nonetheless, there was no comprehensive, all-inclusive (and this needs to be stressed) advance toward peace at the time. Again, let us leave historians to analyze all the “pros” and “cons” of the Camp David scheme. Obviously today there are also plenty of those who regard Camp David as a separate deal at the expense of the all-Arab cause which effectively wrecked the struggle of the Palestinian people for its independence and statehood. Something else is more important for us now: Where did the authors of Camp David err when they proposed their Framework for Peace in the Middle East? A framework that was never filled with real substance. Again, we believe that the reason for this was the attempt to deal with the matter on somebody else’s behalf (in this case, on behalf of Palestinians), without taking into account the opinion of a considerable number of parties involved in the conflict (in addition to Palestinians, other Arab countries and the USSR).

In other words, Camp David ignored political reality and the possibilities, even if limited, for building peace in the 70s. As a result, the nut of the Middle East conflict proved hard to crack, even though a tiny crack did appear in it. Political changes that occurred in the world and in the Middle East some 15 years later made it possible to move over from the Camp David scheme to the beginning of a real Palestinian–Israeli peace process and the signing of a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan. Once again, the negotiating mechanism proved its superiority over the factor of force. And once again, the impetus was provided by an innovative and historically bold, unorthodox solution — the mutual recognition of Israel and the PLO.

Could the fate of Israeli–Palestinian relations, including the 1993 Oslo Accords and the 1995 Interim Agreement, have been the same as that of the Camp David Framework for Peace in the Middle East? Most probably not. The basic difference is, among other things, the incomparably more substantive positive support that the Palestinian–Israeli reconciliation and the Israeli–PLO dialogue received internationally.

This support is still alive today — in the form of the mechanism of Russian–U.S. cosponsorship, initiated at the 1991 Madrid Conference, the active role of the world community in backing the negotiating process, economic and financial participation by many states in helping the Palestinians, and their readiness to promote wide-ranging regional cooperation. Nonetheless, the peace process has not become irreversible — yet we were all but certain about its “immutability”. International support does not seem to be enough for this. What is even worse is that some serious flaws have emerged in the peace process. The reason for this is nothing new — just like before, it is the insufficient mutual respect for the positions and opinions of parties to the Middle East settlement. The aforementioned Madrid Conference apparently involved all sides concerned in the negotiating process.

Even so, having defined the form of negotiations, it failed to give them a new substance, as required by the principles of an all-inclusive settlement. Neither can we discount such a factor, which apparently has considerable importance in the Middle East environment, as the role of concrete political leaders in advancing (or obstructing) responsible solutions. We can only guess as to what the Middle East situation would be like had A. Sadat not gone to Jerusalem or had Y. Rabin and S. Peres not revised the Israeli approach toward its relationship with the PLO. Today we are seeing a warping of the Middle East peace process, resulting from Israel’s revision of its negotiations concept.

In view of the aforementioned, we should now like to formulate the main question: Is there a possibility for innovative solutions of a breakthrough kind, given the current state of the Middle East peace process? And, what, or who, is the key factor to making such decisions? It seems that the likelihood of a comprehensive Middle East settlement being achieved hinges on a limited set of political steps in specific areas. The first and foremost element of the settlement lies in the “land-security-peace” triangle. Each of the rival sides today is trying to move this triangle in such a way that the issue that worries it the most should be positioned on its apex. Whereas the Arab picture appears to be more or less logical — the Arabs put liberation of Israeli occupied territories at the top — Israel seems to be trying simultaneously to combine two apexes at one point: security and peace. Although it needs to be said bluntly that with a clear-cut political will and a firm commitment to a just and definitive solution, this turning around of the |”Rubic cube” might appear a purely scholastic exercise.

If present Israeli leaders were asked to say whether they are ready — with many “ifs” — to pull out of Arab territories occupied by Israel after the 1967 war, there would be no straightforward, unequivocal answer. They would start talking at length about these “ifs” relating to the concepts of “peace” and “security”. Something to this effect: ”Provided that these “ifs” are addressed, we might consider the pullback option. ” Of course, this is better than a categorical “no”. And this option, as Ye. Primakov has so often stressed, should not be discarded. But how does it work out in practice? Israel perforce (with two apexes at the same point) gives priority to its own security. Who, one may ask, has the right to deny it this right, considering the historical experience and the present day perception of the Israeli state in the Arab world? The point, however, is that B. Netanyahu and his government do not in the least trust anybody’s pledges, guarantees, assurances, or signatures. Presumably, they do not even regard them as a political factor. “The main hurdle to peace,” the present Israeli prime minister writes, “|is the persistent refusal by the Arabs to recognize Israel’s right to exist” (B. Netanyahu. A Place in the Sun, 1996, p 501). And if this is the case, Israel should still rely only on itself — on its might, its armed forces, and an ingenious policy, dictating to the region what it should be like. And it is impossible to prove to Israel today that the Arabs are ready for peace.

Many believe that despite the changes that have occurred in the world and in the Middle East, the existence of a diversified infrastructure of the peace process and possibilities for upgrading it in line with the Madrid principles, Israel essentially espouses the views of the “pre-Madrid” era, when, indeed, strong-arm arguments, based on the use of force, prevailed in the political domain. Furthermore, this line of conduct by Israel is not empty propaganda or pure ideology. The lack of trust in the Arabs readiness for peace with Israel manifests itself in the behavior by its government on the practical level. The scheme for re-deployment of Israeli troops on the West Bank, envisioned by the 1995 Interim Agreement (the dispute over another 9 percent or 13 percent of territory that could be ceded to the Palestinians does not make any difference) has been essentially consigned to oblivion. Claims that the Palestinian authority does not take sufficient measures to fight terrorism and that it is unable to control the situation in areas under its jurisdiction have taken on a chronic character.

Moreover, Israel clearly defined where it will draw the |red lines’ as part of the final settlement with the Palestinians. They will be impressive insofar as concerns “security areas” or ”buffer zones,” the status of Jerusalem as the capital, the non-return of Palestinian refugees, the non-creation of an independent Palestinian state, the preservation of Israeli settlements, extensive control over the water sources and the infrastructure of the West Bank, and so forth. This also essentially applies to the Israeli–Syrian negotiations. The central thesis in the Israeli position is that there have been no obligations on the part of Israel with respect to the Golan Heights. It is also a kind of a “red line.” What was said at the earlier negotiations, Israel maintains, is worthy of attention, but not more than that. And if this is so, the sheer possibility of discussing the troop pullback from the Golan Heights should be made contingent on how the Israelis eventually solve the intricate riddle with the Syrians: What comes first — land, peace, or security?

Recently Israel made a move on the third, Lebanese, track, coming out with an initiative concerning UN Security Council Resolution 425. It would seem that the Israeli leadership agreed to regard security as an outcome of peace: It announced its readiness to pull its troops out of the south of Lebanon and, based on this, to coordinate security measures. As it turned out, however, the resolution comprised conditions taking the problem of the Israeli withdrawal outside the framework as defined by Resolution 425, calling for direct Israeli–Lebanese negotiations on matters falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Lebanese authorities. The security factor again took center stage when Israel decided to discuss with the Lebanese authorities exactly how Hezbollah was going to be disarmed and what they would do with the “Army of South Lebanon.” Furthermore, it effectively ignored the setup that has evolved in recent years in the form of an interconnection between the Syrian and the Lebanese negotiating tracks.

What is the upshot of all this? It seems that all negotiating lines are in a state of profound crisis. What we are seeing today is not only a major slowing down of the peace process but also deterioration of the situation around the Arab–Israeli settlement as a whole. In this situation there is a pressing need for innovative solutions and steps with respect to Middle East negotiations. Of course, it is still possible to move further in small steps, essentially pretending that the peace process is still alive. It is also possible to rely on the world community’s commitment to this process, and hope that amid the changes that have occurred in the international situation it will be possible to preserve the status quo and to control potential manifestations of discontent on the part of the Arabs. Meanwhile, reality itself might force the Arab partners to accept the Israeli conditions. Especially given that leadership in the Arab world might eventually change and that it is therefore premature to show flexibility.

This policy is not likely to bring any dividends to its authors, or peace and security to countries and nations in the Middle East. Meanwhile, the region is really ripe for major peace solutions: The Madrid process showed this graphically, and it is really lamentable that events are following a different scenario. Especially in view of the fact that the aforementioned scenario, which is unacceptable to the Arabs, is just one possible clue to the direction in which the unpredictable “turbulence” of the Middle East could evolve. If anything, the region should be ready to embrace any scenario. It would be far more productive if Israel thought about returning the process of negotiations with the Palestinians to the spirit and letter of the 1995 Interim Agreement, primarily insofar as concerns the pullback parameters; if it took a new look at the elements of its position on the final settlement (Jerusalem, settlements, and so forth), which appear immutable today; and if it related seriously to the idea of a complete pullback from the Golan Heights and the south of Lebanon in exchange for comprehensive peace and security for Israel. Each of these options offers a vast space for political creativity and innovative, unorthodox solutions. It is only important to see their objective very clearly. Russia is ready to play an active co-sponsoring role in ensuring that this objective is achieved.

It is wrong to try to artificially narrow, at Russia’s expense, the scope of those who are trying not to cut but to untie the Gordian knot in the Middle East. Here Moscow commands an enormous authority, knowledge of the region and not at all a bad team of experts on the Middle East. At the same time it should not be forgotten that in making all these proposals, Russia, interested in a lasting peace in the Middle East, is to a considerable extent motivated by the desire to build up its successfully evolving relations with Israel as well as with other countries in the region.

It is appropriate to note here that the aforementioned cosponsoring role of Russia is wide-ranging and comprehensive by virtue of the fact that the system of Russia’s foreign policy relations in the Middle East today is indeed well balanced and all-inclusive — in contrast to the 70s and the 80s, when for well known reasons Soviet policy was oriented exclusively toward the Arab countries. And although the “new age” of our country’s diplomatic relations with Israel is relatively short — this coming fall they will be seven years old — they are evolving quite successfully and dynamically. Within a short time span, not only a full-blown, substantive political dialogue and contacts on various lines have been established, but bilateral contacts are being actively filled with a new substance. Within just a few years, foreign trade has reached quite a decent volume, but nonetheless the sides are aiming, within the next several years, to increase it several times over. Today Russia and Israel are discussing projects that only recently appeared unthinkable — from joint space research and state of the art industrial programs to plans for Russian participation in building the metro in Tel Aviv and cooperation in fighting organized crime.

Basically, there is nothing unusual about this situation. Russian–Israeli relations are unique: After all, more than 1 million Israelis come from Russia or other CIS countries, which creates a kind of a bridge linking our countries by thousands of human threads. This powerful potential is, objectively, an extremely rich source for promoting exchanges, especially considering that, freed from the well known political and ideological constraints of the past years, this spring has every reason to start spurting with a renewed force. It is indicative in this respect that many of the so-called Russian Israelis have in recent years been generating impulses and concrete initiatives designed to advance our cooperation. Even when Russia is faced with some extremely difficult financial problems, these people are urging businessmen not to abandon the Russian market, promoting and developing mechanisms to support the implementation of bilateral projects.

Very little time is left before one highly notable event: At the start of the third millennium, hundreds of millions of people will mark the 2000th Christmas anniversary. Naturally, the main festivities will occur on the territory of Palestine and Israel, where the guests and pilgrims, including Russians, will flow in large numbers. We should like to hope that the upcoming festivities in the land that is considered holy for the world’s three monotheistic religions, will serve both to further advance Russian–Israeli and Russian–Palestinian relations and to promote a better mutual understanding between the nations of the Middle East, thus contributing to peace in this still unstable region, and strengthening international stability and security.

Endnotes

*: Viktor Posuvaliuk is deputy minister of foreign affairs of Russia. Back.