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International Affairs:
A Russian Journal
To Bring Peace by Concerted Efforts
Editor-in-Chief of International Affairs Boris Piadyshev Interviews President of Finland Martti Ahtisaari
The talk took place on 21 July, 1999, in the summer presidential residence of Kultaranta, near Turku. Special presidential advisor Matti Kalliokoski and First Secretary of the Russian Embassy Igor’ Andriushchenko were also present.
For a long time M. Ahtisaari was Finland’s Permanent Envoy at the UN.
B.P. Mr. President, this is our second meeting. The first took place about five years ago when you, more diplomat than politician, won the 1994 presidential elections and stood at the head of Finland. Much has happened since that time, both in our relations, in Europe and the world.
M.A. I can tell you right away that I am not going to run for the second term. By the end of it I’ll be nearly seventy—today is the day to think about how to remain active in the world politics. I am not saying that golf and fishing will become my sole occupations when I retire.
I am absolutely satisfied with the development of Finnish-Russian relations. I can say that in the last two or three years they have become more varied and much richer. This is true of our trade, economic as well as personal contacts. The political dialogue between out two countries has grown very intensive.
B.P. Last week I took part in two seminars organized by Finnish Ambassador in Moscow Markus Lura. The first conducted jointly with the American East-West Institute was attended by prominent people. Ambassador of the Finnish Foreign Ministry R. Nuberg spoke at the second. Our Ambassador Ivan Aboimov and the embassy staff are actively contributing to cooperation between the two countries.
M.A. I should say that today is a “Russian day” for me: earlier I received Konstantin Totsky, Director of the Federal Borderguard Service of Russia. We agreed that despite the latest problems in Russia we are satisfied with the way our contacts are developing. I often repeat to my foreign partners that the Finnish-Russian 1300–kilometer long frontier is functioning smoothly: we are developing infrastructure, open new checkpoints (both international and for visitors). We are quite satisfied.
As for the relations between your country and the European Union I can say that they are very important for this European structure. Since July 1999 Finland has been acting the EU chairman which opens up new possibilities and poses new tasks. Forty percent of Russia’s foreign trade is Europe-oriented. For many years to come Europe will need imported power fuels—and Russia is the nearest source of them. In fact, you own one–third of the world gas resources. This alone is a good foundation for varied cooperation.
The results of the dialogue at various levels you have just mentioned are very positive. I read what our Ambassador Nuberg said at the recent seminar—very interesting.
Today, we are in an active period of our relations with many subjects to talk about. This all very inspiring and I believe that a full-scale dialogue will start soon. I am also convinced that the tripartite format used in Kosovo can bear fruit in other situations. All the three elements can interact further: the previous experience left a good “aftertaste” for all those involved.
B.P. I have another question.
M.A. You are welcome.
B.P. The program of the new Finnish cabinet speaks of the country’s foreign policy course as “non-alignment to military blocs and reliance on confidence-inspiring defense.” So far, the wording was “independent defense.” Why this change?
M.A. I think this is a matter of synonyms, at least, for me. I once said: look back at the Soviet period. Sometimes it looked as if the foreign policy doctrine was something like Ten Commandments hewn in stone. In fact, Finland has been and will remain a non-aligned country —politically we are part of EU. We have tied ourselves politically and are chairing the European Union. We can no longer say that our country is neutral in the traditional sense of the word. Yet nothing changed for us. We have good relationships with NATO yet do not feel that we should join it. We cooperate closely with the Alliance which is demonstrated by the Bosnia and Kosovo events. The majority of the nation supports this course—this is very important. This is true not only of the Cabinet and the parties working with it but also of the opposition. The change of words does not change policy. Different words can be used to describe the same thing. The result is what really counts.
The Balkan Crisis
B.P. Mr. President, you have made a weighty contribution to the Kosovo settlement. What was the main thing in the peace talks?
M.A. The main thing was the concerted efforts that brought peace. It was joint work by the United States, Russia, and EU. Long negotiations led us to an agreement. It would have been very hard to work on common approaches if we failed to harmonize our principles. This was what pushed us to peace.
Today, we have to concentrate on bringing democracy to Kosovo so that the refugees can safely return to their abandoned homes. Six hundred thousand Kosovo Albanians have already came back in their cars while about 75 thousand Serbs left Kosovo. This is a great problem. It is very important to prepare for winter which will require help from the international community. Humanitarian aid will be also needed to help people survive winter. It is very important for the refugees to stay in the neighboring countries to be close to Kosovo. Some time later they will be able to go back. Those who could do this are back. I believe that those who remain in the closest countries will come back before the winter sets in.
The region needs administrate structures; with time free elections to the new bodies of power will be held. This is a long process that will take time; we have to launch the mechanism of economic development. There will be a lot of work for many years to come.
B.P. What were the most difficult moments during the talks?
M.A. In fact, the entire process crowned with the Belgrade trip was hard. We had had no contacts with the Yugoslavian leaders yet we knew that at some time we should go to Belgrade together with Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin. We had several options. During the talks in Moscow [0n 26 May—Ed.] which predated the Belgrade trip we were working on bringing closer together our instructions. I suggested a draft document that would comprise the key elements of our positions. On the first day of the Moscow talks I drafted the document that was immediately translated from English into Russian.
B.P. Where did it all happen?
M.A. I was writing it in the Embassy of Finland in Moscow. On the next day we all met again in the dacha where the talks were conducted.
B.P. What dacha was it?
M.A. It was the Kuntsevo dacha.
B.P. Was it Stalin’s dacha in Kuntsevo?
M.A. That’s right. A dacha standing at a small pond.
B.P. The so-called “nearest dacha.”
M.A. The Russian delegation said that it wanted to see the document and draft its own project on the base of it. They spent several hours to word their suggestions. This was a process of introducing amendments and additions that went on and on in Bonn, Petersberg [residence at Bonn where the talks continued on 2 June—Ed.] where the delegation met on the eve of the Belgrade trip.
B.P. Who was present from the Russian side?
M.A. Besides the Special Envoy there were Foreign Minister Igor’ Ivanov, some senior Foreign Ministry officials, Colonel General Ivashov, and a group of diplomatic and military experts. This meeting started the quest for a common approach. After that we were polishing our common approach. In Moscow I spoke to President Yeltsin on the phone and met Premier Stepashin.
B.P. Looking back at this period what can you say of Russian diplomacy?
M.A. I should say that at that time Viktor Stepanovich had the key role to play as President Yeltsin’s Special Envoy. I was the European Union’s Special Envoy. Naturally, the great amount of work was done by the work groups; the Russians’ contribution was very important.
I believed it was my duty to share the experience I accumulated in the UN and international organizations when dealing with crises. Look, for the example, at the military dimension of the Kosovo process. I know that the UN Secretary- General wanted a decision similar to that reached in Bosnia and Herzegovina. During the talks we were referring to the decision to set up SFOR. This started talks about KFOR by analogy with the Bosnian operation. I repeatedly explained why the military component was so important—it was a sensitive issue for the Russian side. No wonder: in Bosnia NATO forces are the operation’s core. A possibility for a million and a half of forced migrants to return home was the main argument in favor of the Kosovo settlement: military force was needed to do precisely this. The Albanians would not have returned if Americans, British, and French were excluded from the operation. I repeated many time over that it was not the question of likings and dislikings, it was a mission to be fulfilled. The problem was to create conditions for a million and a half people to come home with the help of those whom they trusted. I know from previous experience that it was impossible to pick out friends from among the UN members. This variant won’t work.
B.P. Why was the President of Finland picked as a Special EU Envoy when it was decided to appoint two Special Envoys, one from EU and one from Russia?
M.A. It all started early in May when Viktor Stepanovich visited Washington. My name was mentioned during the talks and both the Russians and Americans said: “This is our man.” They called me and asked me: “Are you ready?” When Americans reached me on the phone I joked: “Are you looking for a sacrificial lamb?” On the whole, I liked the invitation: my term expired next February and I had no plans to run for the second term. I said at that time that the mission wasn’t worth a damn. I had no illusions about our chances to succeed.
B.P. By the way, was it stipulated for how long the Special Envoys would work?
M.A. At first, we thought we would make just one trip yet nobody knew when. Nobody knew at that time whether this would take a month of intensive efforts or would one meeting be enough. It was during the same twenty-four hours that was I approached by Russians and Americans; Chancellor Schroeder invited me to Hannover to receive a EU mandate. I said that I would do this with pleasure—this support was very important for me. When the first talks with the Russian and American delegations were just being planned I said that we had to meet all three together though the sides could, of course, have separate talks. We all agreed on Helsinki as the first venue of tripartite meetings. Why did I insist on this format? When two out of three meet separately, the third might grow suspicious... This was a very fruitful format. Today, when looking back all the sides are satisfied.
These were tough negotiations. In Moscow we sat till two in the morning. In Petersberg we stopped at a quarter to four in the morning to resume talks at 9 a.m. We never stopped until it was time to go to Belgrade in the afternoon. It sounds strange but I slept well in Belgrade: 8 hours of very sound sleep. We were all tired but the main thing was that we all worked as equal partners.
The result is positive: the hostilities stopped.
B.P. You have already said that about 600 thousand Kosovo Albanians returned...
M.A. Probably more—my figure is a week old.
B.P. You also said that 75 thousand Serbs left. Are we watching the second wave of a humanitarian problem? Are Serbs victims of ethnic purges?
M.A. No. First, the figures are too different. We have to bear in mind that the situation is rooted in the previous events. When the international community and NATO forces arrived to Kosovo they discovered mass burials of Albanians. [Two days after the talk there was information about 14 Serbs murdered while working in the field. This crime caused profound indignation.—Ed.] This cannot but create a very difficult situation and tension between the ethnic communities no matter whether we like it or not. Everybody knew that a certain number of Serbs would leave yet 75 thousand is too much. During the talks I said to my partners that we should not allow Albanians to seize flats and houses Serbs abandoned. This happened in Croatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina when one ethnic group occupied empty houses of another. This makes it next to impossible to restore status quo. I think it fundamentally important to bring to court those guilty of abuses irrespective of ethnic affiliation.
B.P. Do you think that Kosovo will remain in Yugoslavia?
M.A. In any case the peace plans clearly states that Kosovo is part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. We proceed from this in everything we are doing. This was our starting point and the factor of great importance for the Yugoslavian leaders. It is also very important that the operation is conducted under the UN aegis.
B.P. The Russian peacekeeping contingent is stationed in Kosovo under special conditions. What role do you envisage for it?
M.A. .: The talks on deploying Russian peacekeepers in Kosovo began in Belgrade. Soon after our trip to Yugoslavia we started discussing the military-technical aspects; deployment was discussed in Helsinki. I think it is very important for the Russians to behave in the same way as the peacekeepers from the US, France, Finland, or any other country. This operation is pursuing one aim only and the sides should work all together. Russia’s presence in Kosovo is fundamentally important. From the point of view of future cooperation I think it is equally important that they are cooperating with the military from other countries in this and similar operations, Bosnia, for example.
I always insisted, before and after Belgrade, that neither Russian nor Finnish peacekeepers could give Albanians confidence. We just cannot do that. If Americans, British or French were absent from the operation it would have failed because Albanians just refused to go back. This should not be taken to mean that others (Finns and Russians) have no important tasks to fulfill. The wide international contingent is demonstrating the international community’s unity. At present, Russian forces are deployed in various sectors which creates problems at the initial stage. They are placed in settlements with the predominantly Albanian population; critical voices are heard protesting against their presence. Therefore, it is very important for each of the sides to make its contingent behave correctly and impartially towards all ethnic groups. We should have no preferences—this is the pivot of the mission’s success. When pondering over the issues of security and peace in Europe I became convinced that soldiers from different countries should learn to understand one another. This dialogue can be born by communication alone, people should meet while working or relaxing. This is true of all people, not only the military.
B.P. While looking at the NATO and US military action today and taking into account the huge damage and destruction, and many victims it created can you say that this method justified itself? Was there a possibility of finding a different way?
M.A. It is very hard to think in hypothetical statements. What happened is a fact. This is related to the UN role. One can only guess, for example, what would happened if Russia sided with those who condemned Yugoslavia and acted together with them. The international community acting against the background of the Bosnian and Herzegovina events and the ethnic purges there had to take measures.
Public opinion in the NATO and the EU countries supported the punitive operation. Russian people thought differently this was why we could not reach a consensus in the UN Security Council. China had proceeded from the assumption that this was Yugoslavia’s internal issue yet when I visited China after my Belgrade trip I heard from the Chinese political leaders that each state should offer dignified treatment to its citizens. I mean that we had to deal with the situation in which the Security Council was impotent. This prompted resolute actions: those who had resources and possibilities, the countries supported by the public opinion did what they’ve done. I believe that after this nobody in the world would act in the same way lest the international community recur to the same remedy. Everybody knows that the world community would not remain silent—it will act if the rules of the game are violated, if the civil norms of treating citizens are ignored.
We have to continue the dialogue within the Security Council. This should be done each time similar situations repeat themselves; we should discuss the rules to be applied to reach an agreement. What we need is a dialogue about these rules.
There is another side: many people asked why had not these principles been followed in other situations. For example, they were applied during the Gulf War or against Iraq. There are many cases when they were not applied. I would like us to pursue a principled line in all crises which require a common opinion of all Security Council members. We have not yet reached this level of mutual understanding. We have still to arrive to shared values.
Naturally enough, if these values are disregarded we should act. Milosevic acted in the way that created numerous problems in Kosovo for everybody: Kosovo Albanians, Serbs, the UN Security Council, and sapped confidence in the UN. His actions complicated the US-Russian relationships.
B.P. You were talking about public approval in some of the West European countries. Can you say the same about your country?
M.A. Approval was not evident in all countries. The Finns, naturally, approved 1 yet in some of the South European countries, even NATO members, the action was not supported. On the whole, in the majority of the European countries and in the US these actions found support. One has to be honest and say that as bombing went on and on (72 days, on the whole) the pressure mounted. Many expected that bombing would not last long. Civilian victims also started to change the general mood.
In this sense I can say that Europe, Russia included, wanted peace. Everybody was ready to accept it. Our Belgrade trip was greeted with a sigh of relief, everybody were grateful to us.
Farewell to UN?
B.P. No matter whether one agrees or not the Kosovo events did affect to a great extent the world system, the UN role, which was practically excluded from the NATO operation. My question is: what sort of a future do you see for the UN and other international organizations set up many decades ago? Are we witnessing the system’s coming restructuring with the UN in the center of changes? Should we say farewell to it?
M.A. I do hope that in the post-Cold War period when all the states have a democratic option the UN is working in a better climate. Why did we fail to reach a unanimous agreement in the Security Council? What happened? I believe that we should have acted in Africa in the same prompt and straightforward manner as in Kosovo. I think that the international community, all of us, failed to pay attention on time to genocide and bloodshed in Rwanda. In Africa, the states began setting up security and peace structures themselves.
Why did NATO find itself the heart of the Kosovo operation? Because NATO possesses the needed experience, the best logistic and other potentials to move the forces. UN has no such forces; for many decades now it cannot reach an agreement to set up a small, five–thousand strong rapid deployment force. If the UN Secretary-General and the Security Council had such force many crises could have been stifled at the very beginning. I am convinced that UN will be actively involved in dealing with many problems if the world’s leaders, the UN members, share the same principles and values. I am not pessimistic about its future. To start the peace process in Kosovo a UN decision was needed. The civilian aspects of the Kosovo settlement are handled by UN. I believe it useful to critically assess what the international organizations are doing and add efficiency to their performance. It is very sad that we failed to advance reforms of the UN Security Council.
B.P. What do you mean?
M.A. For example, we should probably create more permanent members. Germany and Japan were suggested as such. One can expect Latin American and Asian countries to get permanent places. Still, the range of new members remains undecided. Germany and Japan as the UN main donors were suggested first. This immediately invited suggestions to include representatives of Africa, Asia, and Latin America among the permanent members. There are more aspirants than vacancies.
I would like the UN members to show healthy realism about the inefficient and artificial structures that damage the UN prestige and do not fit the situation. I believe that realism of that sort will promote progress in all countries, be it Finland or Russia. It should be reflected in everything the international organizations are doing. Nobody wants to alter the status of the present permanent members. Yet there is no agreement on new potential members. I said at all international forums that we have to concentrate on the most important problems. Sometimes I think that if the agenda of some of these forum was cut down by half we would have found ourselves on the right path.
Ideas about UN reforms are multiplying. The problem is how to show political will. This is what the UN members should do. From the point of view of UN perspectives today it has even better possibilities to play first violin.
B.P. How will this all be reflected in the first years of the new millennium?
M.A. We cannot predict what will happen some 10–20 years later where the security and military policies are concerned. We cannot predict our future. Everything that should happen will happen. I do wish with all my heart that the common values are finally reflected in real policy. By going along the road of cooperation we shall distance ourselves from the Cold War patterns. I have already said that cooperation among soldiers from different countries involved in the same operation is very important to promote good relationships among people. This is what I shall say when time comes for me to step down from my post of the president. I do not mean to say that I’ll be a common old-age pensioner. Some of my projects will be probably realized.
B.P. We all would not like to see “an old-age pensioner” next year. We wish you to actively contribute to better relationships between our countries.
M.A. I have already said that I plan to go to France to improve my French—so far, it is practically non-existent.
B.P. Next month our journal will be 45. You know that we pay great attention to Finland, one of our issues was dedicated to your country. Can you say a few words about the journal?
M.A. Probably, I’ll send a letter of greetings. This will be a pleasure.
I think that I can do positive things in such matters.
Endnotes
Note 1: Former president of Finland M. Koivisto severely criticized the NATO military action in the Helsinki Sanomat newspaper. He wrote that bombing of Yugoslavia went against the UN Charter and, equally clearly, against the NATO fundamental principles. This opinion got a fairly wide support in Finland. Back.