Realities of the Fourth Russian Republic and War in the Balkans

International Affairs:
A Russian Journal
June 1999

Realities of the Fourth Russian Republic and War in the Balkans
Editor-in-Chief of International Affairs Boris Piadyshev Interviews Vladimir Ryzhkov

International Affairs. Let’s begin by referring to a passage in the poem about WWII “Vassilii Terkin” the gist of which is that different as we are in Russia, we constitute one nation and there is no alternative but try and get out of the mess together. The character in Aleksandr Tvardovskii’s poem, written more than fifty years ago, made as it were a call for accord, for joining forces failing which it would be impossible to get out of the mess. It worked at that time. Today we can only dream about accord in society and political movements failing which the country’s revival is unthinkable. Now there have emerged sympathetic protests with regard to the US and NATO aggression against Yugoslavia. But this unanimity will only last as long as the situation persists.

V. Ryzhkov. I must say with sadness that the country’s main political forces are not ready today for major decisions. It turns out that they are in one way or another interested in preserving the status quo. That is to say, in the condition of our state when it is, very unfortunately, is wobbly, weak, riven by internal conflicts, with institutions that are mutually irresponsible and political forces that are not sufficiently mature from the point of view of competence and responsibility. These political forces take either diametrically opposite or considerably dissimilar views of Russia. This brings to my mind Tocqueville who, as he reflected on causes of French revolutions in the middle of the 19th century, concluded that revolutions are caused not by poverty of the population, not owing to a big difference in incomes that makes some people rich and other poor, but owing to the fact that the political class and political elite cannot agree on at least five fundamental principles and values on which society could stand. Take the situation in modern-day Russia. Communists have their own ideas about the country’s territory, where its borders should run, what the system of government and what sort of economy there should be. Democrats have totally different ideas about the borders, economy and system of government. But there are also some other ideas, say, those of national-patriots, the ideas of some or other totalitarian political forces. The net result is that when we try to reach accord, it turns out that there is no agreement on a single serious question. None of the key questions of Russia’s public life have been resolved. Debates are still on whether the republic proclaimed by Kerensky on 10 September 1917 was legitimate, whether it is worth while to revert to monarchy. This is the subject of serious debate, as before. We still cannot either recognize or contest the existing border of the Russian Federation. This is the subject of heated debate. There is no unity. We have not decided yet whether private property is legitimate or illegitimate in Russia. This is still the subject of heated debate. We are still arguing about whether Russia should be a unitary or federal state. We are still arguing about limits of freedom—political freedom, freedom of speech, religious freedom. These are also subjects of heated debate and attacks from all quarters. As a result, I am compelled very regretfully to conclude that there is no ground for accord in modern-day Russia. That all attempts to reach accord are not unlike attempts to paste together two icebergs. I also am obliged to state that these differences are not the result of irresponsibility, ill will or incompetence of politicians. This is to a large extent a real reflection of the attitudes existing among the masses of people. It is true that tens of millions of people think on the same lines as the communists. Tens of millions of people think the same as democrats. Tens of millions of people think the same as national-patriots. This means that civil war potentially exists not only in the minds and deeds of politicians but that it potentially exists also among the masses of people. I therefore have to state that all the alternatives are open as before. And that the alternative of a closed society is quite likely. And that the alternative of an open society has not been lost. And that there are some other models of social development. But there is one thing that can be stated with utmost certainty. The political class—I to not want to use the word elite, in my view, our politicians do not merit being called that, and it would be more accurate to speak about the political class, that is to say, about the entire aggregate of parliamentary deputies, ministers, premiers, ex-premiers, governors, senators, and so on, leading journalists, editors of the major periodicals—this entire political class comprised of three to five thousand people, that has been determining the country’s development over recent years, not only did it do nothing to formulate these general values, it proved to be highly irresponsible, mercenary, corrupt, disposed to mutual destruction, incompetent, unprofessional. Whereas in 1991, when new Russia emerged, when the Russia nation faced two interrelated tasks—to build a modern democratic state and modern competitive market economy—seven or eight years later, today, we have to state with deep regret that we failed in both. We do not have an efficient state, still less, a normal modern economy. Once again we are forced to argue today about basics. Like on the first day of creation, today we face the same two tasks. Now that the Yeltsin cycle is drawing to a close and we are on the threshold of parliamentary and presidential elections, we once again discuss basics. And we can see once again that each leading political force sees these basics in absolutely its own way. The nation faces the alternative of choosing between irreconcilable political camps, irreconcilable ideologies and, unfortunately, so far irreconcilable world outlooks.

International Affairs. Premier Ye. Primakov proposed the conclusion of a sort of a “non-aggression pact” between the power branches shortly before the elections.

V. Ryzhkov. This is yet another recent tentative attempt to reach accord that has failed. That document on accord in which I was taking an active part, and which was agreed by the working group composed of representatives of the State Duma, Federation Council, President and Government, got a thumbs down from a number of main political forces, the Communists and Yabloko in particular. Although the Federation Council voted in its favor, there are practically no chance that the State Duma will support it. Apparently it becomes totally meaningless. All the really serious things that were proposed became finally watered down by the working group proper. In particular, I would like to draw your attention to the initiatives that were proposed, including those we proposed. They dealt with changing the balance of power between the power branches with the objective to create a responsible parliament—responsible government tandem in the country. We proposed to end the situation typical of modern-day Russia where a politically weak government has remained coupled for several years now with a politically irresponsible parliament. We proposed the adoption of the French model that would, on the one hand, guarantee the country against troubles and misery organized by the still immature parties by preserving the presidency and the president’s right to disband parliament if the internal political situation should reach the boiling point. On the other, we wanted to arrange so that the Duma majority of whatever configuration resulting from the upcoming December 1999 elections should be responsible for the policy followed by the government. The model we proposed is very simple. We keep the president as supreme commander and head of state who guarantees the Constitution, human rights, conducts foreign policy, as someone who can call early elections in the event of government crisis. At the same time, we grant the Duma majority, the coalition majority, the right to form a government (provided some or other party wins the absolute majority, it can be a one-party government) and to be responsible for the policy conducted by this government. Well then, our efforts showed that today at least the president and government side is not ready for such a responsible step, for a responsible parliament and a politically strong government. Furthermore, since the Constitution abounds as it does in many drawbacks and hiatuses that have been revealed to date, the elite could have taken a serious step and update it. But no such a step was taken. Instead, there followed noncommittal remarks to the effect that the sides were having consultations. Thus, the work on this document showed that the main political forces for reasons that can be discussed separately are not ready today for major and serious decisions to firm up the state system.

International Affairs. None of the previous heads of government of the Russian Federation were specially favored by the people. Ye. Primakov is an exception. Most people, without a doubt, have faith in him, he is, perhaps, the only person in power who has an air of confidence, who emanates some kind of magnetism. He behaved prudently when the Serbian crisis arose.

V. Ryzhkov. Primakov’s popularity phenomenon per se, in conditions when, far from improving, the economic situation even continues to worsen, shows that society has grown absolutely weary with the fighting of opposing camps both in the political sphere and within society itself. Society is infinitely worn out by fights between a democratic son and a communist father who talk politics over the kitchen table day in and day out and cannot agree for what is seven or eight years now. Society is waiting for some sort of a synthesis. It is waiting for a unifying idea which could end these differences on a new basis and offer a new set of values. Many people in Russia now hope that Primakov would do precisely this. That he slams the table with his fist and says: “Enough’s enough. As Christ said, there is no longer any distinction between Gentiles and Jews.” Same in Russia. There will be no longer this or that ideology in Russia, there should be a clear system of objectives and values to which all of us will aspire. This is the first reason for his popularity, people associate with him a new stage. And another thing, everybody hopes for calm under Primakov. The last years have worn out society. Look at the brief record of our recent history: 1991—Russia’s first president elected, standoff between the Russia’s authorities and the Soviet Union authorities; August—the coup attempt, the State Committee for the State of Emergency formed; December— Minsk Accords signed to touch off disintegration of the USSR. 1992 - liberalization of prices, precipitous decline of living standards, economic ties with CIS countries break, Congress of People’s Deputies heads toward standoff with the president. 1993—the standoff reaches its height, referendum in April on confidence in the president and October developments in Moscow (shooting at the government house—Ed.) followed right off by a new Constitution and election for the first Duma). 1994—immediate start of a standoff between the new Duma and the president, the Black Tuesday (the ruble collapses), political and economic instability mounts. 1995—political and economic instability continues to grow, new elections for the State Duma robs the country of six months. 1996—presidential elections right on the heels of the Duma elections cause further considerable destabilization in the country. 1997—the only relatively stable year, and yet the political class was unable to restrain itself and staged a government crisis in October that nearly culminated in the dissolution of the State Duma and resignation of the government. 1998—March, V. Chernomyrdin gets dismissed; 17 August—an acute financial and economic crisis followed by an attempted dismissal of Kirienko, V. Chernomyrdin returns and then departs, Ye. Primakov takes charge. 1999—we were hardly into three months of the year when February became overshadowed by a government crisis, a clash between the government and the media; March—a crisis involving General Prosecutor Skuratov, developments surrounding the Serbian crisis; 15 April is scheduled as the date of an impeachment procedure against Yeltsin; 1 May—we will turn out for protest marches, and so on and so forth. This is the country’s recent history. Well, I should have also mentioned the Chechen war and many things that occurred as it continued and that also worn down our people. They expect two things of Ye. Primakov: to offer a clear vision of the country’s future and promote stability. His prestige is high for which reason he enjoys such a great support among the population. But it is impossible not to admit the fact that he is so far not coping with the first task. That is to say, he and his cabinet have not so far proposed any clear concept on the country’s development and they are mainly putting all their efforts into keeping the situation under control and preserving political balance between the president, the Duma, the Federation Council and inside the government. Stability, too, is being put to ever new tests by the most varied sides and it is not ruled out that simply nothing will remain of this stability a couple of months from now.

International Affairs. The tests you’ve mentioned, take on some sort of ingenious forms. Some people on the one hand speak about readiness to set in motion masses of people, about strike headquarters and committees while in the same breath they say that this will be done to prevent the dismissal of the present premier or of some members of his government.

V. Ryzhkov. Calls for civilian disobedience when Russia has a government that stands closer to the communists than in all recent years show that the actual reasons for these calls are different than the future of Primakov and his government. From my point of view, this is an attempt by one part of society to impose on entire society only one ideology, in this case, a communist or post-communist ideology. This attempt is being made because, as they think, the other points of view have become so much discredited that the moment is ripe when a really well-organized minority can impose its will upon the disorganized majority, as it happened in 1917. Russian history indicates that such attempts can quite probably be crowned with success, but such a success in the final analysis spells a strategic defeat for the entire nation. It does not of course make sense to react to these calls in the way the executive branch does using threats of the Justice Ministry to organize more inspections to see if the Communist party leaders’ statements correspond with the party rules, and so on. It is impossible to win in politics using administrative measures. The entire history of Russia proves that. Its last emperor tried to defeat the revolutionary movement using his secret police. His attempt was a complete fiasco. Winning in politics is only possible through political methods. And I insist that it is possible to solve the problem of communism in Russia by only one method, by giving today’s communists the possibility to bear the responsibility for the state of affairs in the country. Had Yeltsin, already after the communists won the parliamentary elections in 1995, let the left form their government, there would have been a fundamentally different political situation in Russia now. The left would not have had the chances they have now. They would have shared with the right forces the entire responsibility for the economic situation in the country. Precisely this road was followed by Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and the other post-communist countries that were not afraid of letting the left bear their share of responsibility for the state of affairs in the country. Nicholas II brought Russia to a revolutionary situation because he opposed to the end the idea for a responsible government pushed by the Duma majority. It was his manic unwillingness to renounce the principles of autocracy, to redistribute powers in favor of parliament and make a transition from autocracy to real constitutional monarchy that led Russia to the 1917 revolution. Assessing the role of the Primakov government I must draw a rather harsh but honest conclusion: From historical point of view, his role does not differ much from the role of the Chernomyrdin cabinets of different years, Chernomyrdin was trying precisely in the same manner to preserve the balance of interests and in the precisely the same manner he was trying to take some real steps toward developing the country and permit no sharp political exacerbation. But contradictions between the various ideological camps and political forces, the generally poor balance of the system of power, the poorly structured Constitution of 1993—all these things make it impossible in principle for any prime minister to conduct an effective and successful social and economic policy and makes any prime minister, including Primakov, hostage to this permanent political instability. This permanent instability is the main feature of the Fourth Russian Republic.

International Affairs. Why fourth?

V. Ryzhkov. You will remember that the first one was founded by Kerensky who proclaimed it 10 September 1917. The second was formed by the Bolsheviks 25 October 1917. It lasted until 12 June 1918 when the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Russia was passed and the third—new Russian Republic—was proclaimed. The fourth republic was instituted by the Referendum of 12 December 1993 that approved Russia’s Constitution. I think that the Fourth Republic is now in the stage of its decline. This decline is happening right before our eyes. This system is doomed to ending its existence during the course of the next year. What is going to take its place is hard to say but it is going to be, perhaps, some new, Fifth Republic, to be founded either by the State Duma to be elected in December 1999, or by a future president to be elected in June 2000. But it seems to me that under the present conditions neither Primakov nor Yeltsin nor the State Duma nor the Federation Council are in a position to unite and conduct a sensible policy and this is plain today to everyone ranging from the finest Moscow intellectuals to lumberjacks someplace in the Russian Far East. This is the feeling of every person in Russia, every citizen of our country.

International Affairs. It is widely assumed that a market economy can only be created in Russia by young people, those who grew up in free market traditions. In other words, the next few years bode Russia nothing good.

V. Ryzhkov. Based on this principle, it would be hard to explain the phenomenon of China where market economy is being put in place by ex-Maoists with a classical Maoist education at that.

The reason does not lie in the age of Russian leaders but in their world outlook, their moral principles, or, more precisely, the lack of such, and in their professional skills which proves rather poor on closer inspection. I fear very much that a simple change of generations many in Russia and elsewhere pin their hopes on will make no difference. Much in the same way as, for example, the change of generations in Latin American countries in the 1970s through the 1980s made no difference. As one generation of dictators succeeded the other, this changed essentially nothing essentially in society. Therefore the main danger for Russia is not that the current old leaders may stay on in their positions but that new leaders will replicate the system existing in the country now. So it is not a matter of age or generation but rather a matter of changing the ideology of the political class. Once this has been done, age would be immaterial.

International Affairs. Vladimir Aleksandrovich, you are one of a few authoritative members of the young generation who have emerged very recently. What sets you apart from those young people who were in power during the previous years and the results of whose activities are notorious?

V. Ryzhkov. It seems to me that Russia fell victim to technocrat-economists. In 1991 Russia faced two interrelated tasks. To build a new state and new economy. When Yeltsin was elected in June 1991, everyone decided the first problem was solved. Once Yeltsin became elected, all was going to be well with the state. Economists became to be in great demand. Economists were in current vogue, the molders of opinions, the country’s movers and shakes. At that point there came along Yavlinskii with his program, Gaidar and a host of the since forgotten economists. All the magazines, newspapers, all periodicals were brimming over with innumerable competing programs. The president opted for the Gaidar team that launched reform. Some time after, a rather interesting thing became evident: a good program and a competent team per se do not amount at all to scoring results. They delivered no goods because the building of a new state was left unfinished. The president was trying to regulate economic life by issuing edicts. The edicts were at variance with each other and the laws. Then parliament was set up. It began to actively make laws. All that finally led to competition. The result is now in evidence: Russia has no legal basis for a modern market economy, no legal basis for the modern-day understanding of legality, and so on. Therefore what mainly sets me apart from, say Kirienko, Nemtsov, Chubais and other people whom I respect and who are economists, people of economic views on life, is that, from my point of view, the economy is at the present time of much less importance for Russia than the state and political affairs. You cannot demand that the country follow sensible reforms if the country does not have a tool to carry them through, to wit—an efficient state. The current controversy between Fedorov, Gaidar, Yavlinskii, Chubais and others about economic program nuances is absolutely scholastic, not unlike the medieval argument about the number of devils that can be set on the point of a needle. This is because there is no state capable of conducting a sensible economic policy. When Sergei Kirienko agreed, quite adventurously, to my mind, to become prime minister, I wrote under the impression a small story for the newspaper Nezavisimaia Gazeta the gist of which was that the team of technocratic economists, who were thinking up absolutely correct measures with regard to taxes, customs tariffs, and social policy were absolutely powerless because they could not take this program through parliament, have it take on the form of a law. Kirienko was persuading me to join his government. Two or three days later I was in his White House office, put that article on his desk and said: “Here’s a forecast for your government.” The forecast proved, unfortunately, right, it could not have gone wrong because it is impossible to conduct any policy in a disorganized and unbalanced state. Let me say again what I said in the beginning: We all have fallen victim to the economists who through all these years thought and still think that the most important thing is to write a correct economic program, seat back and see everything happen automatically. That’s a limited vision. This did a great damage to the future of reforms in Russia and is doing more damage till this very day. International Affairs. The great number of latest events, in particular those surrounding General Prosecutor Skuratov, continue to expose the main causes of Russia’s misery: corruption, criminal money greed for money, criminals in important offices, not to mention private businesses. Whence all this? Does this partially have to do with the nature of reforms, especially with privatization that freed the hands of criminals and gave them their head by minimizing all moral constraints?

V. Ryzhkov. It is important to realize what is primary here. The criminal nature of reform or the criminal consciousness of those implementing it. I think that if the voucher privatization were to be held, say, in Switzerland, it would have proceeded on a totally different lines than in Russia. Even if it followed the same rules that are described in our legislation. Primary, to my mind is consciousness of society, consciousness of the ruling class rather than rules described and used in this society. Here’s a generally known fact. The section in our Constitution on the President is often a literal translation from the French, from the constitution of the Fifth Republic. But what an enormous difference there is between the political culture and political mechanisms of the Fifth Republic in France and the present-day political mechanisms in Russia. When Tocqueville was writing his well-known book “Democracy in America” in the 1830s, he paid attention to this phenomenon. There were two neighboring countries, the United States and Mexico. Mexico’s Constitution was simply a translation from English into Spanish, that is to say, the American Constitution was literally translated from English into Spanish. Tocqueville was astonished by the difference between these two societies. Whereas the United States at that time was a sufficiently stable nation with appreciable control over the authority and rapidly developing economy, Mexico greatly resembled today’s Russia. Plots, coups, corruption, nepotism, favoritism, corporatism, separatism, high crime rate, corrupt law enforcement bodies, and so on. Tocqueville asked the simple question:

Why is it that the text is the same but the results are so dissimilar? And he found what I think a perfect answer 150 years ago: Written laws are important, of course, but a much greater role is played by habits, customs and moral prevalent in society. Therefore, when I hear that liberal reformers have carried through criminal reforms that led to total corruption, and embezzling, I always think that everyone took part in this total embezzling and corruption. Take any average Russian region, look at what former communists were doing all these years, say, secretaries of regional, territorial and district party committees, what former Komsomol members, secretaries of regional, territorial and district Komsomol committees were doing during that period, what important directors who had gone through fine Soviet schooling were doing, and you will see that actually the entire elite, the entire top section of Russian society took part in plundering their own country. Practically all the categories, no matter from which political camps they come, have lined their pockets and grabbed something in this feeding frenzy. This ideology, characteristic of our political class was, in my view, the main reason for the criminal nature of our reforms. It does not matter who should have conducted them, or should there have been some bonds instead of vouchers, some certificates instead of bonds, no matter how all this should have been conducted, one can, unfortunately, say that most likely than not the consequences would have been precisely the same. Therefore, the main philosophical question is as follows: Does our society and our ruling class have the moral-and-value foundations that would make it possible for our society to develop like a healthy society, or they have none? Under conditions where Orthodox values became destroyed during the past 80 years, where Soviet values could not be an appropriate substitute, where no new values emerged to replace the former and the latter, where the generally accepted slogan “enrich yourselves” that no one proclaimed became the keynote of social development, could things have been any different? I leave this seemingly open question hanging in the air.

International Affairs. If we turn to Russia’s international position, it is, perhaps, the most difficult in years.

V. Ryzhkov In eight years of its existence new Russia, and this should be admitted straight, has lost its status of geopolitical superpower. Furthermore, it is moving farther and farther away every year from the position in international affairs it held before. In actual fact, nobody, unfortunately, any longer regards Russia on the international arena as a state that is actual successor to the USSR, despite the fact that we still retain some great-power trappings, to wit, the nuclear missile potential built in the Soviet years, the unique geopolitical and geographical position which makes us simultaneously neighbors of NATO, Japan, China, and the United States. But once again, this is now a totally different geopolitical position from what it used to be. Russia, therefore, is in a rather dubious position now and the symbol of this position is when our prime minister conducts with the United States and other countries talks, rather unpleasant for us, on restructuring our foreign debt which we are in no position to service without help from our creditors. At the same time Russia is making threatening noises on the inadmissibility of violation of the principles of the post-war world, in particular, in the Balkans, on the inadmissibility of bombings in Yugoslavia without UN Security Council mandate. That is to say, it makes resolute foreign policy statements while simultaneously conducting rather humiliating talks about loans and our foreign debts. Increasingly conspicuous in this situation is the mismatch between our foreign policy and our actual possibilities. Speaking about our foreign policy today, its main principles are in need of serious adjustment, primarily to the existing realities, to our mind. This does not mean we should give up our underlying principles. This does not mean we should renounce the negative attitude to NATO’s expansion, that we should renounce the habitual approaches to the UN role, that we should renounce the habitual approaches to the OSCE, that we should renounce the habitual approaches to the nuclear balance with the United States, that we should renounce our attitude to the 1972 ABM Treaty. But we should renounce the loudmouth quality of our foreign policy, the impulse to rush over to any spot should we hear a call. We should renounce the impulse to pose as a superpower when we cannot put our own house in order. The position of, let’s say, China, in this respect appears much more attractive compared to our own. Through its efforts during 20 years, China has proven its soundness as a great power. It has proven is ability, while maintaining internal political stability, to create all the necessary conditions for economic growth. It has proven its ability to modernize its armed forces and develop its nuclear missile potential. Today, when China resolutely opposes the United States’ intention to scrap the 1972 ABM Treaty, it has the moral right to do so. It is proving itself to be a power that truly successfully solves internal political questions and thus, on quite sufficient legal grounds wants its foreign policy position taken into account. Russia, that for eight years has been demonstrating inability to solve its internal problems, doubled its foreign debts in eight years, lost half of its economic potential in eight years, showed in these eight years total inability of the political class to effectively and skillfully control society of the state and at the same time puts forward tough foreign policy demands, looks more than dubious. We are ending up in a rather tragicomic situation on the outside arena demanding, on the one hand, to be regarded as member of the G-8, and on the other hand, we are begging from the other seven countries for one credit after another. In the process, we are not making any real efforts to effectively use these credits and to really firm up our economy, firm up our country. It seems to me that Russia should certainly conduct active foreign policy. Russia should certainly keep up glorious traditions of our diplomacy. Most certainly, Russia should not leaves those platforms on the planet where we have traditionally enjoyed high prestige, had great influence. But our main efforts should be directed inside the country. To surmount difficulties, to increase Russia’s internal potential, and only then we could be reckoned with on the world arena. And another thing. We should stop emotional interference in all and everything that is happening elsewhere. We often defend someone else’s national interests forgetting our own.

International Affairs The 20th century is ending on none too happy a note—an aggression against the Serbian people, against the sovereign state of Yugoslavia.

V. Ryzhkov. The 20th century in fact came to a rather nasty start. It began in Sarajevo with the shots fired by Gavrilo Princip that unleashed World War I. At the end of it the League of Nations was established with “Eternal Peace” written on its banner. This eternal peace only lasted 20 years. The League of Nations fell to pieces and World War II broke out. At the end of it, our fathers and grandfathers, fathers and grandfathers of the present rulers of the United States, Britain, France, Germany founded the United Nations Organization which has proven a more successful project than the League of Nations. It has been keeping peace on the planet for more than 50 years. Its philosophy is based on a plain and clear principle—no political conflict can be solved through use of force. Today we are, unfortunately, witnessing the United Nations’ collapse. There is a great danger that the war unleashed by the United States and NATO against Yugoslavia—and this is the first war on the European soil against an independent state—would entail the same terrible consequences that previous wars did during the course of the 20 th century. While debating about Yugoslavia all of us, leaders of the parties and factions, use different rhetoric, but from our point of view, Russia has taken a precise and correct stance today. As a state, Russia is speaking today, first and foremost, for reinstating the post-war order in the world, for reinstating international law in the world. Russia declares that it is inadmissible to violate the UN Charter, use force without UN Security Council mandate. We suggest three steps toward peace that could be supported today by everybody despite differences of rhetoric. The first step, to bring into play all our political and diplomatic possibilities in order that the aggression against Yugoslavia be stopped. The Security Council, an emergency session of the UN General Assembly, the Council of Europe, the European Union, the OSCE, the Nonaligned Movement, bilateral contacts should all be pressed in to service to achieve the only goal -stopping the war. The second step that Russia can and should take is to bring pressure to bear, suspend contacts with NATO, stop cooperation with this structure and demand a stop to strikes at the Yugoslav soil. And the third step, when the war has been stopped, and we very much hope it would, Russia should be prepared to actually propose a realistic plan for a peaceful solution to the Kosovo problem. Russia has very serious proposals on this score. Both with regard to autonomy in Kosovo and bringing peace to this region in general.

This is Russia’s foreign policy strategy and we think it absolutely correct. The Duma has passed a resolution that paves the way to both tougher steps and the necessary Russian diplomacy maneuvers. This resolution is a statement of the simple fact—the authority in Russia takes a united stand on foreign policy, which, unfortunately cannot be said about the internal political situation.