|
|
|
|
International Affairs:
A Russian Journal
Kosovo: Russia’s Interests Are Very Important
By V. Baranovskii
None of the international and political events of the decade drew a similarly furious response from Russia as NATO’s military operation in the Balkans. This obviously reflected the general trends of comprehending the country’s relationships with the world around it done by the political class and the public as a whole. At the same time the response was caused by the contradictory, unstable and poorly structuralized nature of the process through which Russia’s national interests are being formed. What is more, while NATO’s eastward movement and the response to it created a myth about a political consensus in Russia the reaction to Kosovo causes apprehensions of its common ground and possible results.
There are several major political problems in the gamut of Russia’s national interests: the interests associated with the region; the interests of Russia and its closest neighbors; the interests connected with the European political space; the interests related to the global level of the international relations system. There is also a domestic political dimension and its manifestation in practical political steps.
***
Significantly, the Kosovo crisis is associated not so much with Russia’s specific regional as with her wider general interests. This is what makes the present situation different from the conflict of the beginning of the century when Russia was competing with other powers for influence in the region.
Indeed, her political response bears practically no trace of Russia’s economic interests in the Balkans. The reasons are simple: they are not different from Russia’s interests elsewhere and are of secondary importance in this particular context.
Trade in oil and gas is the only exception. It spells hard currency incomes—and is vitally important for Serbia which is losing its oil storages and oil refineries through NATO bombings. This posed the question of Russia’s lost profit because of NATO and EU’s embargo on energy fuels deliveries to Yugoslavia. Naturally enough, Russia refused to obey the measures imposed in contradiction to the UN procedures. Pipelines can be bombed or blocked, tankers prevented from reaching the oil terminals in Montenegro. The latter may become a casus belli that will push back the lost profit issue.
The Slavic (Orthodox) solidarity dimension was rather prominent at the early stage yet never emotionally dominating. Its political side was quickly subdued and left to the marginals to pursue. The position (real or potential) of the non-Slavic ethnic groups and the non-Orthodox regions and/or population was a cold shower: Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Ingushetia, some other North Caucasian regions clearly showed where they stood.
Solidarity with the Serbs is of a different nature. It is born by compassion for a victim of blatant injustice and for the weaker side under an unprecedentedly strong pressure of the stronger. This is what makes Yeltsin’s words about Russia’s “high moral position” (sarcastically commented by some media) concordant with the public opinion.
The above has created a paradox of parallel opinions in the West: while the war is illegal it is prompted by the moral imperatives of solidarity with the Kosovo Albanians. In Russia, too, the public proceeds from moral imperatives. Russia and the West apply them to different objects.
In the West, much had been said about ethnic purges in Kosovo before the operation began. In Russia the media had practically ignored them. The early stages of bombing left the Russian TV viewers with the opinion that tens and hundreds of thousands of the Kosovo Albanians were escaping from the NATO bombs and missiles. It should be said in all justice that the Russian media quickly reached a balance in covering the events in the Balkans. (So far, the West has not shown a parallel trend.)
The dynamics of public opinion polls in Russia testify: the share of people equally blaming NATO and Slobodan Milosevic is increasing. Naturally enough, he is not “demonized” in the way this is done in the West yet Russian solidarity with the Serbs has acquired new colors. For example: what Belgrade was doing in Kosovo was wrong yet, (1) its actions never reached the genocide dimensions (it was precisely NATO bombings that allowed Belgrade to drive Albanians away on a mass scale); (2) the West is treating the Serbs according to double standards by manifesting total indifference to the fate of hundreds of thousands of Serbs driven away from Croatian Krajna in 1994-1995 and to the repressions against the Kurds that are going on for many years in Turkey.
The question of a probable union with Yugoslavia that all of a sudden surfaced at the early stages of campaign and attracted wide attention is directly related to Russia’s regional interests in the Balkans. Two interrelated arguments are obvious. First, Russia in principle should desire loyal partners (or clients) in the Balkans. Second, Yugoslavia is best suited to the role due to its ethnic and religious kinship and the fact that today it badly needs Russia.
The initial, somewhat hysterical, enthusiasm over the “union of three” (Russia-Byelorussia-Yugolavia) was cooled down by weighty counterarguments. The threat of involvement into the war is too high a price to pay for an alliance with Belgrade (it will inevitably embrace the military dimension). There are doubts about Milosevic and mistrust of him (bordering on certainty): he will go together with Russia as long and as far as he needs her. He may change his course quickly especially after the war when the ruined country will need Western money and resources to rehabilitate. At the psychological level the doubts are prompted by the Baltic syndrome: the Baltic nations repaid with “black ingratitude” Russia’s support of their independence.
This cannot but leave an imprint on the alliance with Yugoslavia issue. Many find the project attractive in the long term while at present its advantages are vague. People on top preferred a cautious approach: no haste in such delicate matters. As a result the subject was nearly buried: the idea of the alliance remained outlined and its impracticality clearly demonstrated.
At the same time, Russia’s political presence in the Balkans has emerged as the most obvious, if not articulated, motive of the country’s regional interests. Two things make the subject really important. First, Russia should be present in the region to have her say in the course of events there (NATO’s military operation is regarded as spearheaded against Russia and as aiming at her complete and final removal from the Balkans.) Second, Russia’s presence is possible because in the region it may be welcomed as an important balancing element.
Opinions about Russia’s role in the Balkans differ yet many regard it as basically successful. Indeed, the Balkans are probably the only region outside the former Soviet Union where Russia stands a chance to secure the aims outside the reach of other international leaders. Serbs trust her and this is a unique lever of influence. In any case, in February 1994 Russia managed to prevent NATO’s air attacks on the Serbian forces grouped at Sarajevo—this was the first action in the post-Soviet period which reconfirmed the country’s great power status.
***
Alarmist sentiments play a considerable role in the perception of the NATO Balkan operation in Russia fed, first and foremost, by projecting the Kosovo situation onto Russia. Indeed, if NATO regards “humanitarian catastrophes” (especially ethnically induced) as an invitation to interfere and if similar situations emerge or are provoked in Russia it seems logical to believe that the war in Yugoslavia directly concerns Russia. This is best described by the formula “Serbia today, Russia tomorrow.”
The West is perplexed and puzzled mainly because there is a clear understanding that Russia, no matter how weak, is not “an average country.” Indeed, the West responded to the Chechen conflict in a mild and unprovocative manner. There is a counterargument, too: this attitude may change in future since Russia is growing weaker, not stronger. Her interests may well become threatened if the Kosovo pattern is extended.
In this context Russia is also concerned with the existing or possible tension seats along her borders that might attract NATO—“Serbia today, Nagorny Karabakh tomorrow.” NATO may show caution in its relationships with Russia and will be much less restrained in relation to the post-Soviet space outside her. This will challenge the conviction that the former Soviet Union is the zone of Russia’s vital interests.
The very threat of military interference probably created hopes that the NATO bombings would consolidate the CIS on the anti-NATO basis. In fact, there were several encouraging noises coming, for example, from the Ukrainian parliament. No consolidated position inside the CIS was created; the attempt to boycott the NATO jubilee session failed.
Some of the CIS leaders read the Kosovo pattern as a potential key to their own protracted conflicts. Armenia and Azerbaijan cherish such hopes in relation to Nagorny Karabakh where their interests clash. Sometimes such hopes seem paradoxical: Edouard Shevarnadze, for example, stated that the Kosovo model might help Georgia return Abkhazia. One should recognize that the Kosovo pattern supports the separatists in Kosovo. By extended logic it is Abkhazia (which can supply numerous evidence of pressure and ethnic discrimination) that may get such support.
In any case the Kosovo events are seriously damaging the interests identified with Russia’s possible special role on the post-Soviet space (or in the CIS.)
***
Viewed from Russia what the West is doing in Kosovo justifies all apprehensions about an emerging NATO-centrist Europe. Earlier the Russian concern over NATO’s eastward expansion was somewhat artificial (it was fanned from the top). The Kosovo events made this concern natural and real.
Indeed, the thesis about “NATO’s aggressive character” that had sounded like a throwback from the Cold War era was confirmed by the Alliance’s practical steps. An opposite is also true: until recently the ideas about NATO as a structure that was bringing stability looked convincing in relation to Central and Eastern Europe (much was said about the conflict-prone Transylvania issue)—today, they hold no water.
The Yugoslav events brought Russia face to face with the problem of her further relations with NATO. Those who opposed the Founding Act are arguing that their approach was amply justified. They insist that any cooperation with the North Atlantic Alliance is an illusion that adds legitimacy to its continued existence. They say that Russia should sever all relations with the alliance to demonstrate her total rejection of its policy in Yugoslavia.
Obviously, if pursued this line (for example, an official withdrawal from the Founding Act) will do nothing but demonstrate that the confrontational model is revived. At the same time, the conflict should be switched onto political rails which requires contacts with NATO. It should be added that in the post-Kosovo context NATO will remain an influential European structure and that Russia will hardly profit from an absence of interaction mechanisms.
Finally Russia’s interests were manifested through a dramatic lowering of the level of relationships with NATO that could not be severed completely and irrevocably. They may improve in future yet the hopes (if any) of creating a sort of a NATO-Russia axis as a structure-forming element of European security should be buried. So far the Russia-NATO partnership stays in deep freeze. Whether or not it will survive post-crisis defrosting remains to be seen. One can hardly expect much better prospects for the Russia-NATO cooperation even if “together with NATO” crisis settlement proves efficient.
The events in Kosovo aggravated Russia’s concern over the alliance’s eastward movement. At the same time they created a diametrically different approach: having burnt its fingers in Kosovo NATO will show more caution and slow down its advance towards the Russian borders. This will be also prompted by the alliance’s desire to defuse Russia’s arrogant response to the operation in Yugoslavia. Some people think that the potential NATO candidates will think twice before joining the North Atlantic Alliance.
Russia is demonstrating a paradoxical combination of unbounded indignation with NATO and expectations of the alliance’s inevitable weakening caused by contradictions among its members over Kosovo and predicted West European displeasure with American hegemony.
It should be added that the anti-NATO sentiments in Russia are spearheaded against the United States. Russian commentators are disappointed with Europe. They all agree that it had not choice but to side with the US and therefore feels very uncomfortable.
This gives rise to hopes that it will be possible to draw closer to Europe. It is commonly believed that there are more chances today, when Moscow presents no threat, than before when Europe needed American protection. The general feeling is that the US messianic claims cannot but stir up rejection in more civilized Europe less inclined to use force in a primitive and thoughtless manner. It seems probable that in view of the Kosovo events Russia, on an increasing degree, will turn to Europe. This perfectly fits the ideology of opposing “the unipolar world,” as well as the traditional Soviet line at exploiting trans-Atlantic contradictions.
The Kosovo events threw into bolder relief Russia’s desire to push OSCE to the forefront of European politics. The crisis developments in former and present Yugoslavia seem to confirm the structure’s inefficiency yet they have also demonstrated that other multisided mechanisms give even less hope that Russia’s major interests can be adequately protected.
This explains Russia’s desire to boost up OSCE’s role. West Europeans are sending signals that they do not rule this out or, at least, they agree on its greater involvement in political settlement. This will be especially expedient if NATO’s failure is generally recognized.
OSCE may play an important role in the post-crisis Balkan reorganization while EU may play the leading role in the economic sphere. Russia feels it important to push NATO to the margin of the process.
***
The general problems of current international development are the most painful aspect of Russia’s deliberation about the Kosovo crisis. Her approach demonstrates three major themes.
First, there is nearly a physiological feeling that the operation in Yugoslavia marked a critical turning point: international law is endangered and the post-WWII world order is crumbling. The results of both are perceived as a catastrophe. Russia is convinced that she should prevent an erosion of the UN Security Council and formation of a new international system based on an arbitrary interference into domestic affairs of states on a humanitarian or any other pretext. Russia believes that this interpretation of the “Kosovo file” will rally many countries including such heavyweights as China and India.
Traditionally, the agents of international affairs are divided into the states wishing to preserve the status quo and the revolutionary states seeking to change it. Russia is a conservative force while the US and NATO are, in fact, the agents working towards revolutionary changes in the international political system.
One can expect well-substantiated arguments from both sides—they cannot be simply ignored so we just leave them outside the article’s scope. One should point out that Russia’s arguments related to the Kosovo problem bypass in silence the need to change the international system because of its low efficiency. In the West the problem is amply discussed even by the critics of the air warfare against Yugoslavia. There is every ground to believe that in the post-Kosovo era the problem will come to the fore in the international political agenda. Russia should bear this in mind.
The second major subject that Russia is facing on the global political level is her role in the emerging world order. It is of a clearly “oligarchic” nature: major decision-making belongs to a small group of states. Russia’s painful emotions are born by her doubts about her own possibility to join the group of the chosen and whether or not she will be accepted as such by its members.
It was precisely the Kosovo developments that confirmed these doubts. Russia felt that she had been pushed to the back burner, and not only that. The most dramatic variant of these feeling speaks of a new redivision of the world, comparable with two previous ones (in 1918 and 1945) or even more radical.
Can Russia gain a higher place in the international political hierarchy? The lamentations about Russia’s great power status leave the world unmoved. What is more they have discredited the approach as such since Russia is unable to practically confirm this status. NATO’s Kosovo-related decisions clearly and discouragingly proved this once more. There are two options: either to accept the situation and adjust to it or to challenge the chosen and make them take Russia into account. They are not mutually exclusive-they are rather mutually complementary.
The first invites to side with those who call the tune on the international stage and be prepared to play a role of secondary importance. Some people believe that this is the only choice which should be accepted for pragmatic reasons: strong states are better allies than marginal states. In Russia today few are prepared to agree with this sort of pragmatic deliberations. Their rejection is highly emotional, they insist that NATO deliberately insulted us. People find it hard to believe that we have to cooperate with the West because of loans, etc.
There is another option: we can force the world to take us into account through diplomatic maneuvering (courting China and India, setting up a CIS-based coalition or supporting anti-Western regimes.) The use of force has much more supporters in Russia today. This is the third motive related to Russia’s global political interests in connection with the Kosovo events.
Finally, the most contradictory and hazardous consequence of the Kosovo developments is the current reassessment of the use of force. It is recognized that NATO has found itself in an impasse by applying force and that force is not always an adequate measure. This is addressed to the West. At home another argument is applied: the Serbs are suffering because they are weak. We are not taken into account for the same reason. We should abandon high flown words about good and justice and concentrate on creating an adequate military potential.
As a result Russia is seriously revising her policy of military preparations and the related doctrines (more about that below). There is another side of the problem: the use of force looks justified. If NATO has chosen this method in Yugoslavia Russia should not hesitate either in any situation which (she believes) injures her interests. This is true not only of Russia alone. There is a long chain of problems: from China’s policy vis-a-vis Taiwan to a possible revived interest in the chemical or bacteriological weapons of mass destruction for the poor.
It should be noted that a greater interest in Russian armaments on the international markets is a possible side effect coming somewhat later and subdued by the impression produced by NATO’s high precision weapons used in Yugoslavia.
On the whole, it is doubtful that Russia will benefit from the revived instincts to stake on military force and use it. This is the most dangerous side of the Kosovo episode. It is in Russia’s interests to try to smooth down and minimize the problem rather than to aggravate it. This can be done only together with the West which seems rather difficult today.
***
The Kosovo-induced attempts to comprehend the Russian interests are part of the political struggle unfolding in the country. The events have left their strong imprint on it. Some of the Russian analysts believe that they may change Russia’s development course.
The events created considerable problems for the “pro-Western” liberal democratic forces. The majority of them condemned NATO’s actions yet they will find it hard to explain the need to cooperate with the West and to create a similar sociopolitical system in Russia.
In fact, this side of the Russian political specter is facing an unprecedented identity crisis. There is a commonly shared opinion that NATO’s decision to attack Yugoslavia dealt a serious blow at the ideas about Western democracy. In this sense bombs and missiles damaged not so much the Serbs as the still weak Russian democracy.
Communists and national patriots exploited the events in Kosovo to reproach the official power with the failure of its West-oriented foreign-political strategy, to step up tension by declaring Russia a “besieged fortress,” and to fan the accompanying sentiments, such as xenophobia, militarized mentality, etc.
The official power feels it important to use the Balkan events to pursue domestic political aims by playing a constructive role in the crisis settlement. Success on the international arena and Russia’s higher international prestige will strengthen the authority of the president and the cabinet inside the country. On the other hand, the opposition is hurling accusations at them for their inadequate support of Yugoslavia. If Russia fails to achieve a settlement the opposition will step up its criticism.
The coming parliamentary and presidential elections are always present in a very conspicuous way in nearly all the steps taken by the leading Russian politicians in connection with the Yugoslav developments. We can point to Yurii Luzhkov’s Paris visit as the bombardment began, Yevgenii Primakov being pushed aside by the president and Viktor Chernomyrdin’s intense activity as the president’s special representative. These and similar actions reflect the domestic political turmoil or are its outcome.
I should say that this is normal and can happen elsewhere while Russia exhibits some purely Russian excesses. What Chernomyrdin is doing looks more like a PR action that regular negotiations.
One should be careful not to overestimate the degree of mutual influence of the Kosovo problems and the domestic developments in Russia. In any case, Aleksandr Lebed’ was obviously wrong when he hastened to point to the developments’ consolidating potential (“Here is the national idea for you”). These developments will affect the coming elections but will not determine their outcome.
***
How is the conglomerate of interests described above realized in practice? It seems that three main subjects have been selected: first, Russia’s absolute rejection of NATO’s policy in Kosovo and her readiness to oppose the possible results; second, Russia’s desire to avoid a total collapse of the relationships with the West; third, Russia’s determination to participate in the settlement (and gain some important political points).
Russia has outlined her stand firmly and energetically. What is more, the government has acquired serious grounds, of significance both inside and outside the country, to pursue a somewhat tougher foreign policy at the practical and rhetorical levels which is confirmed by the Russian representatives being recalled from the NATO headquarters.
Russia announced that the Kosovo events made it necessary to revise many of the military dimensions of the country’s security. The list of the related ideas is long and impressive:
This invites several comments.
First, all this was said before—the Kosovo events added urgency to the arguments. Second, there are rather influential forces in Russia ready to employ these ideas in their corporate interests. At the same time there are obvious financial and economic limits which cut short many deliberations on the subject. For example, if doubled the share of defense spendings in GDP will be twice as high as in any European country which will require a different economic system. There is a temptation to exploit the situation to cut down funding of the socially important fields on the pretext of the need to increase military spendings (“the nation that refuses to feed its own army will feed the army of its enemy”).
As soon as panic or war mongering are opposed with reason more balanced ideas about Russia’s interests come to the fore. For example:
The Kosovo-induced process has started—nobody knows whether it will strengthen Russia’s security. It is clear, though, that the nature of its comprehension is changing together with the ideas of how to maintain it. In the long term this may seriously affect the nature of Russia’s relationships with the West.
Today, Russia is facing an important task created by the Balkan crisis: to avoid a wide-scale confrontation with the West. There are also specific and current problems such as the IMF credits.
On the whole, the official circles described the Russian interests in clear terms. Much has been done to quench the wave of enthusiasm created by those who are seeking a new Cold War. At the same time Russia refrained from discussing possible military-political aid to Yugoslavia such as despatching ships of war to the conflict zone and stayed away from extending it military and technical assistance by delivering antiaircraft systems so as not to be drawn into the war.
At the political level there is a combination of a negative attitude to NATO and a desire to preserve and develop two-sided relationships with Western partners. Even in her relations with the United States Russia go to all lengths to avoid irreversible consequences. Russia is selective in her relations with other Western countries: while Igor’ Ivanov’s visit to the United Kingdom, one of the active participants in the anti-Yugoslav operation, was cancelled there is a general trend to continue and activate contacts.
The Russian side made its best to avoid negative impacts of the Kosovo problem on the “extra-NATO” cooperation channels with the Western countries. This is true, first and foremost, of the European Union. Russia still regards the agreement on partnership and cooperation with it as very important—it keeps open the door leading to a political dialogue. Significantly, Russia offered nearly no political response to the EU decision to support the operation in Kosovo in general and the embargo on energy fuels deliveries to Yugoslavia in particular.
No matter how negative is the Russian public’s assessment of the NATO operation there is another side to it. Russia has got a chance to raise her international political rating by foreign political efforts to stem the crisis and put in onto the political settlement rails.
Paradoxically enough, the Kosovo drama supplied Russia with a unique chance, absent from the pre-crisis situation, to play a weighty role on the international scene. Russia has returned to the limelight, she is asked to interfere as an intermediary, she is heeded to, she knows how to draw out of the impasse in which NATO has found itself.
Russian diplomacy is doing everything to use this chance which can strengthen the country’s international positions. Suffice it to say that it proved possible to revive the hibernating G8 format. This situation causes certain apprehensions as well: can this activity be counterproductive from the point of view of Russia’s interests?
This is fed by a possible failure to stop the war: Russia’s image will be damaged especially among the Serbs (“There is God in heaven and Russia on earth”). In fact it is being eroded by daily bombings.
Russia runs a risk to remain a simple messenger between the two main figures in the conflict without any real possibility to influence them. This does not befit a great power which should offer its own ideas of a settlement. Some people voice doubts about Russia’s impartiality: she is either accused of a desire to impose on Milosevic NATO’s demands or to impose on the West the Yugoslav position.
There is an opinion that the West is prepared to promote Russia as a peace maker to use her as a political screen behind which the military operation will go on. Some people suspect that this is the Western way of neutralizing Russia “at a low price” and quench her alienation and animosity created by the Kosovo developments.
There is a grain of truth in these opinions yet there are more pluses than minuses in Russia’s role as an intermediary. The balance can be tipped, however, by possible futile threats (“We shall see that no harm comes to the Serbs” or “Hands off Kosovo”, etc.). As time goes on Russia’s influence may become devalued and turn into a noisy action—the role of an intermediary is a very sensitive one. Finally, the domestic circumstances such as impeachment and the hasty change of the cabinet also damaged Russia’s possibilities. An important international role requires consolidated political power at home.
Still, there is every ground to believe that the Russian Kosovo-related interests are too significant for Russia to remove herself from the scene. The negative aspects should be transformed into a political advantage; Russia should also outline her long-term foreign political interests and decide on her conduct on the international scene.
Vladimir Baranovsky is Deputy Director of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences.