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CIAO DATE: 08/06
International Affairs:
A Russian Journal
Iran: Horizons of Future Cooperation
G. Ivashentsov *
Relations with Iran have at all times been given considerable importance in Russia's foreign policy. These relations have a long history (Persian shah embassy first visited Moscow in 1521) that has seen ups and downs, just like the history of relations between any two neighboring states.
Let us, however, leave history to historians and consider this question: What makes present-day Iran important for Russia and what should be the priorities of Russian-Iranian relations so as to best ensure Russia's interests?
Iran Today
Iran (the Islamic Republic of Iran, IRI) today is certainly not the self-isolated state that it was during the first decade after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. President Seyed Mohammad Khatami's idea about the dialogue between civilizations had a broad response in the world. The blockade was broken and diplomatic relations were restored with all former partners except the United States. Iran's voice carries weight at various international forums while its leaders are accorded red carpet treatment in the main European and Asian capitals. The country is implementing a large number of economic projects with a share of foreign capital, including with such U.S. controlled organizations as the IMF and the World Bank.
A general trade agreement between Iran and the European Union is pending. The EU countries account for approximately one-quarter of Iran's total foreign trade: The IRI's trade with the EU in 2003 was worth 15.2 billion euros (as compared to 13.6 billion euros in 2002), including 3.7 billion euros with Italy and 3 billion with Germany. Iran's trade is also appreciably growing with Asian Pacific countries - Japan ($6 billion), China (approx. $5 billion), South Korea (more than $4 billion), and India (approx. $3 billion). It is indicative that these countries seek long-term oil and natural gas supply agreements with Iran. Thus, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (controlled by the state) provided a $1.2 billion credit for three years to the National Iranian Oil Company in exchange for guaranteed oil supplies over a nine-year period while this past May, a memorandum of understanding was signed between the Chinese National Petrochemical Corporation and the National Iranian Gas Export Company on shipping to China more than 110 million tonnes of Iranian liquefied gas over a period of 25 years.
Tehran is aware that this was to a very large extent facilitated by Iran's rapprochement with the Soviet Union and then with Russia as Moscow became a trailblazer in cooperation with Iran after the Islamic Revolution, when on the threshold of the 1980s-1990s, Russia, first, returned to such Soviet-Iranian projects as the Isfahan metallurgical combine and then resumed the construction of a nuclear electric power station in Bushehr and the development of the South Pars gas field, at the same time resuming supplies of arms and military equipment to Iran.
Iran today is probably the only country in the Greater Middle East that, despite all of the internal and external difficulties, is steadily building up its economic, scientific-technical, and military capability. Should this trend continue Iran - with its 70 million population, which is fairly literate, compared to neighboring states (81.4 percent literacy rate), relatively young (70 percent under age 30), and ideologically consolidated, on the basis of Islamic values; with a highly intellectual elite; with more than 11 percent of the world's oil and 18 percent of natural gas reserves; with more than 500,000-strong armed forces, and with a strategic geographic position enabling it to control sea and land routes between Europe and Asia - is destined to emerge as a regional leader. This means that the Islamic Republic of Iran will be playing an increasing role in resolving problems not only in the Near and Middle East but also in such regions that are rather sensitive for Russia as Transcaucasia, Central Asia, and the Caspian region. This is why dialogue with Iran and partnership with it on a bilateral and regional as well as a broad international basis is objectively becoming one of the key tasks in Russia's foreign policy.
Solidarity with Russia
Fulfillment of this task is facilitated by the fact that having set the course for a rapprochement with Russia 15 years ago, Iran has been consistently showing solidarity with it, rendering it the needed support on virtually all major international and regional as well as internal Russian issues - be it the building of a multipolar world order, the strengthening of the role of the UN in international affairs or, which is extremely important for Russia, the Chechen problem, which the IRI from the outset recognized as an internal affair of the Russian Federation. Tehran has never had any contacts with Chechen terrorists nor allowed them to operate on Iranian territory in any form. As it held the rotating president of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in 1997 through 2000, Iran consistently blocked the adoption of anti-Russia resolutions at this highly influential Islamic organization. It is also noteworthy that Iran was one of the first countries to support President V.V. Putin's initiative on expanding Russia's cooperation with the OIC.
Tehran recognizes Russia's special interests in the CIS area and reckons with them, building its political line in Central Asia and the Caucasus on the basis of cooperation, not rivalry, with Russia. A good case in point over the past decade of Russian-Iranian cooperation is the breakthrough that was achieved in the resolution of the inter-Tajik conflict and the signing, in 1997, of the General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan. Another example is Russia's interaction with Iran on Afghanistan, which serves as an important contributory factor in the ongoing political processes in Afghanistan. Iranian representatives took part in the Bonn and the Berlin conference on Afghanistan; Tehran supports the resolutions that were adopted there on the political settlement and economic reconstruction in Afghanistan, making its contribution to their implementation, together with Russia and other members of the international community.
Iran to a very large degree shares Russia's approaches toward a political settlement in Iraq. Of course, Tehran has its own specific interests in Iraq, not least because the Iranians and the country's Shi'ite community share the same faith. Even so, Tehran's position on fundamental aspects of the settlement - such as, e.g., restoration of the country's sovereignty, the transfer of power to a legitimate government, the central role of the United Nations in Iraq, and the replacement of coalition forces with a peacekeeping force formed on the basis of a UN mandate - enables Russia to count on Iran's support for its constructive line on a settlement in Iraq, including at the UN.
Fundamentals and Basic Principles of Cooperation
The IRI religious and political leadership constantly stresses that Iran regards Russia as a reliable and promising partner with the number of advocates of closer cooperation with Moscow steadily increasing in the country. One important landmark in Russia's relations with Iran was the signing of the March 12, 2001 treaty on the fundamentals of relations and principles of cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran, which laid a sound legal groundwork for bilateral relations in a basically new international situation.
The treaty says, above all, that the advancement of relations and cooperation responds to the fundamental interests of both states. The Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran seek to develop these relations on a broad and long term basis, convinced that international problems in the contemporary world should be resolved only in accordance with the principles of sovereign equality, political independence, territorial integrity, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-use of force and non-interference in states' internal affairs, as enshrined in the UN Charter. Under the treaty, each side undertook not to use force or threaten to use force in their relations, not to use its territory as a base for aggression, for subversive or separatist actions against the other side while all problems that may arise must be resolved only by peaceful means.
The treaty also provides that should one of the sides be subjected to aggression on the part of any state, the other side must not provide any military or other assistance to the aggressor state, which could contribute to the continuation of the aggression, but will deploy efforts to make sure that the dispute that has evolved be adjusted on the basis of the UN Charter and rules of international law.
The sides also declared their intention to cooperate in uprooting international terrorism, in combating hostage taking, drug trafficking, gun running, and so on.
Active Dialogue
The past four years have been marked by an active Russian-Iranian dialogue on various levels. There have been four meetings between the two countries' presidents, V.V. Putin and S. M. Khatami: in the course of the IRI president's official visit to Russia (March 12 through 15, 2001); within the framework of the Millennium Summit (New York, September 2000); as part of the Caspian Summit in Turkmenistan (April 23 and 24, 2002), and at the OIC Summit in Malaysia (October 16, 2003). V.V. Putin and S. M. Khatami had telephone conversations on September 24, 2001, June 16, 2003, and March 10, 2004. There are reciprocal visits between the RF and Iranian Security Council secretaries, foreign ministers, and heads of other government agencies and departments in the two countries. Interparliamentary contacts are developing dynamically, as are direct contacts between certain regions of Russia and provinces of Iran. There is a permanent Russian-Iranian commission on trade and economic cooperation and a joint Russian-Iranian commission on military-technical cooperation, which meet in regular sessions. All of this helps build up and consolidate the potentiality of Russian-Iranian partnership - be it on key issues of regional and international politics or cooperation in the trade, economic, military-technical, scientific, and cultural sphere.
Areas of Cooperation
The principal areas of Russia's trade and economic cooperation with Iran are: the energy, including nuclear power, sector; metallurgy; the oil and gas industry, and transport. Russia is in the top 10 of Iran's principal foreign trade partners. In 2003, the volume of trade between the two countries was $1.37 billion. This is a major factor contributing to Russia's economic development, given that Russian export accounts for 90 percent of bilateral trade, the bulk of it being machinery and equipment, transport facilities, and metal products.
Construction of the first unit of the nuclear electric power station in Bushehr continues under the August 25, 1992 agreement between Russia and Iran, on a turnkey basis. In August 2003, the RF government approved a protocol on the return of spent nuclear fuel from the Bushehr nuclear electric power station to Russia that, pursuant to the aforementioned agreement, the sides are currently in the process of finalizing the protocol for the signing.
Within the next few years, especially if the problem of mutual crediting of capital-intensive projects is resolved to mutual satisfaction, trade turnover could increase several fold. There is already a good groundwork for this: Negotiations are in progress on the Russian-Iranian Zohre communication satellite project; shipment of Russian-made Tu-204 passenger planes to Iran; contracts to build the Tabas coal heat and electric power station with 2x315 mw capacity with the possibility of subsequently increasing it to 4x315 mw, and the development of the Mazino coal field for this heat and electric power station; contracts to install additional power generating units at the Isfahan and Ahvaz heat and electric power stations, which were built with Russian technical assistance; and to develop the 15th and 16th blocks of the Southern Pars gas field. There is a good outlook for the participation by Russian and Iranian companies in joint projects both in Russia and in Iran (manufacturing and marketing of Russian Gazel trucks in Iran and of Iranian Samand vehicles in Russia as well as construction of the Kazvin - Resht - Astara railway line in Iran) and in third countries (construction of Iran-India and Iran-Armenia gas pipelines as well as the building of the Sangtudin hydroelectric power station in Tajikistan).
The Iranian side stresses its interest in promoting interaction with Russia in coordinating natural gas shipments to international markets. Coordination of gas supplies and pipeline construction projects as well as expansion in the substitution practice could substantially increase the positions of both countries here, given that Russia and Iran now account for up to 60 percent of the world's proven natural gas reserves.
In September 2000, Russia signed an intergovernmental agreement with Iran and India on creating a North-South transport corridor, Iran with its diversified transport system being its essential component. This transport corridor ensures the transportation of cargo from South and Southeast Asia to Western and Northern Europe and back within a shorter time and with lower costs than along the existing routes, in particular via the Suez Canal.
The Caspian Sea
The intensive dialogue on the Caspian occupies an important place in Russian-Iranian relations. The Caspian problem became acute following the break-up of the Soviet Union, when in the place of only two states - the USSR and Iran, which had equal and exclusive rights to maritime and economic activity in the Caspian Sea, the circle of participants in such activity expanded with newly independent states: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. Moscow and Tehran agree that the Caspian must be made a region of peace, stability, good-neighborliness, and mutually beneficial cooperation. These shared approaches are reflected in a joint statement by the RF and IRI presidents on the legal status of the Caspian Sea (March 12, 2002) as well as in a joint statement by the two countries' foreign ministers (March 10, 2003). At the same time, members of the "Group of Five" Caspian states still have disagreements over certain essential aspects of the legal status of the Caspian.
There are also differences on a number of issues between Russia and Iran. But then this is what in fact dialogue is for - to overcome such disagreements. Other examples of successful Russian-Iranian dialogue on the Caspian include Iran's support for Russia's proposals on settling the problem of transit by vessels of Caspian states via Russian inland waterways on the basis of bilateral agreements; on the possibility of building trans-Caspian pipelines only subject to environmental appraisal of projects and its subsequent approval by all of the littoral states; and on the impermissibility of the military presence of third countries in the Caspian.
Moscow takes a positive view of Iran's initiative on holding in Tehran the Second Caspian Summit of five Caspian countries - Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, believing that the summit agenda should be broad and informal, to include topical issues not only on the regional but also on the global level. The preparation of the summit per se is expected to facilitate the harmonization of the sides' positions on outstanding issues of the legal status, finalization of draft agreements on cooperation in fishing, hydrometeorology, shipping, etc. The Russian side supports the idea of creating a council of the Caspian heads of state. Moscow believes that this would help effectively formalize the structuring of the Caspian Group of Five as a new institution of multipartite regional cooperation.
Russia welcomes the negotiations on the delimitation of the south Caspian that Iran is conducting with Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, convinced that there is simply no other viable alternative to a mutually acceptable settlement. This is borne out by the experience of Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan, which, to their mutual satisfaction, managed to divide up the seabed and subsoil of the Northern and Central Caspian. It is Russia's view that a settlement in the south of the Caspian is also possibly only on the basis of compromise. Moscow hopes that Iranian diplomacy, which is characterized by pragmatism and flexibility, will take this into consideration.
Iran's Nuclear Program
Over the past few years, Iran has been pursuing a flexible policy on nuclear nonproliferation. Country's top state and government officials have repeatedly spoken out in favor of efforts designed to strengthen international security and strategic stability, to end the arms race, and to reduce nuclear arsenals. Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) - true, the latter has yet to be ratified by the Mejlis (the Iranian parliament).
At the same time, there are a number of peculiarities in Iran's nuclear policy that raise questions, not least with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This applies, in particular, to purported omissions in the information about its nuclear program that Iran presents to the IAEA, its strong aspiration to carry on uranium enrichment programs, and so on. The Iranian Mejlis is dragging its feet on ratification of the additional protocol to the safeguards agreement with the IAEA, granting the latter a right to conduct surprise inspections of any nuclear installations in Iran. As a result, the United States, in particular, proposed that the issue of the Iranian nuclear program be submitted to the UN Security Council for consideration.
As far as Russia is concerned, in the course of the September 2004 session of the IAEA board of directors, it supported the consensus that had evolved on an Iranian resolution. Moscow acts on the assumption that this approach is fully in line with the tasks of ensuring cooperation between Tehran and the IAEA in straightening out the remaining questions about certain aspects of Iran's nuclear program. The IAEA resolution contains a list of concrete measures whose implementation will effectively help alleviate tension around the Iranian nuclear program. Only a full implementation of the recommendations contained in the new resolution will help take the "Iranian issue" off the agenda of the Board of Directors with the IAEA's verification activity returning to the normal routine work that it conducts in non-nuclear states signatory to the NPT.
Russia supports the right of Iran as an NPT signatory to peaceful uses of atomic energy and intends to continue cooperation with the IRI in this sphere. At the same time, the prospects for and the scale of this cooperation are predicated on the extent to which Tehran honors its international obligations to the IAEA. Furthermore, development of this cooperation is also contingent on the resolution of the problem of the return of spent nuclear fuel from the Bushehr nuclear electric power station to Russia.
The past few years have witnessed historic events that are crucial to the future of both countries. The collapse of the shah regime and the establishment of an Islamic state in Iran, the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the emergence of new geopolitical realities in the region - all of this could not but affect the evolution of Russian-Iranian relations.
The interests of Russia's political and trade and economic cooperation with Iran, including in the nuclear energy sphere, make it necessary also to take into account the specifics of Iran's relations with other Russian partners, a strengthening of political and economic relations with them being strategically important for it.
It is also strategically important for Russia that Iran does not pose any threat to its national security. This applies to the nonproliferation of both nuclear and missile technology and threats of international terrorism and drug trafficking.
Russia is not interested to see the confrontation between Washington and Tehran continuing: Russian officials have repeatedly stated this on various levels. Quite the contrary, normalization of U.S.-Iranian relations would be conducive to a general normalization of the situation in the region as a whole.
At the same time, Russia is entitled to view Iran with it own eyes and to expect its partners to reckon with its interests in the region. Moscow is objectively interested to see neighboring Iran remain a factor of stability and cooperation in the south of the CIS. This is why Russia favors an active and trusted dialogue with Iran on a wide range of matters, taking into account the difficult situation that has evolved in the region. Moscow acts on the assumption that Russia and Iran need each other, that good-neighborly relations between Russia and Iran are extremely important for ensuring the national security interests of the two countries as well as for ensuring peace and stability in the region and beyond.
Endnotes
Note *: Gleb Ivashentsov, Director, Second Asian Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. Back