CIAO DATE: 12/04

International Affairs:
A Russian Journal

No. 5, 2004

 

Reading Nuclear Terrorism by Graham Allison

A. Kokoshin ^*

Despite a huge number of recent publications dealing with terrorism, the subject of nuclear terrorism remains virtually unexplored.

In any case, many experts are baffled with it, to say nothing of politicians, civil servants, and other people.

Meanwhile, the threat is far from diminishing - judging by certain signs it is becoming more real. In any case, all those whose duty is to deal with the problem of the "war on terror" should pay close attention to its nuclear dimension. This explains why Prof. Graham Allison of Harvard, a prominent academic, has taken up this subject.

He became known back in the early 1970s with his definitive work The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. ¹ Later he wrote extensively on the international security issues. He is the founding dean of Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government.

In the first half of the 1990s, Allison served as Assistant Secretary of Defense.

Today, he is a classic of contemporary political science who counts many prominent politicians and diplomats among his former students.

This work is a result of many years of studies. The author gathered, sorted out and analyzed a unique volume of data and facts related to the subject stated by the title. ²

He is known for his courageous criticism of the policies of President George Bush Jr. on the eve of the war on Iraq when the country was engulfed by patriotic hysterics and when those who publicly warned the White House against this war were few and far between.

Today, Allison is known as a strategically thinking expert in the field of international security; indeed, no expert before him treated this subject in comparable detail. The book is a result of his purposeful intellectual efforts of at least ten years.

In 2004, Prof. Allison became one of the key national security advisors of Senator Kerry; the traces of this can be clearly seen in what John Kerry has said about national and international security. These speeches made him the most popular Democratic presidential candidate.

The problem of nuclear terrorism came to the fore when a possibility of a nuclear conflict between the "old" members of the nuclear club nearly disappeared (this is also true of the America-China pair with a considerable "conflict potential"). The nuclear threat had diminished considerably even before the Cold War became a thing of the past. This happened because the U.S.S.R. and the U.S., having survived a series of crises (the gravest of them being the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962) created a system of rules and agreements that reduced the threat of similar conflicts and established, at a certain moment, strategic stability.

This considerably reduced the role of the nuclear factor in world politics. In recent years, however, it reappeared on the world scene and became especially obvious when India and Pakistan acquired nuclear potentials. The process is going on in several directions: (a) appearance of new nuclear states (India and Pakistan); (b) greater possibility of more emerging nuclear states; (c) real threat of nuclear terrorism; (d) American plans of developing and use of certain types of nuclear weapons ("mininukes").

Unfortunately, we cannot exclude a possibility of a nuclear conflict between certain "old" nuclear states; in fact, nuclear terrorism belongs to a wider world political context, of which, I regret to say, Allison in his book speaks in passing.

The war the United States and Great Britain started in Iraq accelerated the processes within each of the above directions; this war has strongly weakened the international counter-terrorist coalition and removed considerable material, intellectual and organizational resources from the sphere of real "war on terror." America's authority and influence very much needed for "antiterrorist struggle" also suffered: they declined to a great extent in the Arab countries and the Islamic world as a whole, the region where they are needed most of all. (I use quotation marks when talking about "war on terror" because I am convinced that this description fails to adequately describe the problem we are all dealing with.)

Terrorist acts are organized by concrete organizations with definite ideologies and declared political aims, yet their actions cannot be legitimized by the famous formula of Clausewitz'; the Nazi regime in Germany and the fascist regime in Italy were not regarded as legitimate despite their definite political aims and definite ideology and not only because of their pathological urge to kill (that was subordinated to specific political aims).

In the first chapter of his book Allison discusses which forces may plan nuclear terrorist acts; in the second, what type of nuclear weapons the terrorists might find handy; in the third, he tries to answer the question: Where could terrorists acquire a nuclear bomb? In the fourth, he tries to guess when terrorists can deliver the first nuclear strikes. In the fifth chapter he discusses which delivery means can be used for such strikes. Together, the chapters form a section called "The Inevitable."

Pakistan is described as one of the most dangerous and probable sources of nuclear proliferation; Allison supports this statement with numerous examples.

According to his assessments, in 2004 Pakistan possessed as many as 50 nuclear weapons and enough high-enriched uranium for 50 more. "Its clandestine networks for procuring and selling nuclear technology span the globe from China, North Korea, Malaysia, and Myanmar, to the Netherlands and Germany, and on to Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates." ³

Allison writes that for many years considerable means intended fro the nuclear weapons production in Pakistan were coming from Saudi Arabia; they formed a large part of the nuckear program funding. What was more, "Over the last decade, Riyadh has also given Islamabad roughly $1.2 billion worth of oil annually, for which it has not been paid." ⁴

Some of information supplied in the book comes as a surprise. Allison writes, for example, that in January 2004 an Israeli businessman based in South Africa was detained in Denver for exporting nuclear trigger devises (a typical dual-use product) to Pakistan. He ordered 200 of these items and sent them to a man in Pakistan with links to the military. "As usual," writes the author, "the Pakistani government flatly denied any involvement in the transfer." ⁵

Even though the Pakistani Army, the dominant institution, traditionally held a moderate secular position, "a recently declassified U.S. intelligence report found that top-ranking [Pakistani] officials are worried that radical Islam is slowly seeping into the officer corps." ⁶

Having studied the problem in detail Allison supplied a complete picture of what A.Q. Khan, the "father" of the Pakistani nuclear weapons was doing. He set up a private nuclear export business trading in an impressive range of technologies. ⁷ (Much of this became known when Muammar el-Qaddafi publicly announced in 2003 that he had discontinued the Libyan nuclear program.)

A.Q. Khan, "a Pakistani national hero," led these trading operations, writes Allison, in which he actively used intermediaries from Turkey, Switzerland, and Great Britain, who did not know that they were elements of a vast structure. When exposed, he was removed from all his honorary posts he filled after he had stopped being head of the A.Q. Khan Research Laboratories in 2001. In February 2004, after several weeks of home arrest, he pleaded for forgiveness with President Musharraf and on Pakistan's state-run TV officially asked for forgiveness for his nuclear proliferation efforts. Allison writes that Khan spared no effort to remove from the Musharraf government all suspicions of complicity with his activity.

Chapter 6 of the second section, called "The Preventable" looks at nuclear terrorism through the prism of 9/11 and the war on Iraq of 2003; Chapter 7 deals with the processes and phenomena that increase the danger of nuclear terrorism and insists that they should be resolutely discontinued. In Chapter 8 he offers his variant of the "road map" of preventing nuclear terrorism.

Chapter 1 gives an impressive description of possible consequences of an explosion, by nuclear terrorists, of a ten-ton nuclear device in New York and some other American cities: the description as oppressive as necessary for the complete understanding of the problem.

In his book Allison analyzes all sorts of possible consequences of terrorist strikes at nuclear objects (atomic power stations, radio-active wastes storages, etc.).

He writes that prior to 9/11 "the U.S. government had no serious program even to account for and track the most dangerous materials" ⁸ even though newspapers carried almost weekly stories about theft of radioactive material not only in various countries, but "here at home as well." ⁹

Allison pays much attention to the reports about the huge amounts of fissionable materials stored in Russia and of their possible theft. Regrettably, he sometimes cites unreliable sources (such as the statement made in 1997 by the late General Aleksandr Lebed) about missing special "suitcase" nuclear weapons allegedly present in the Soviet and Russian nuclear arsenals. ¹⁰ By that time General Lebed was no longer Secretary of the Security Council of Russia. "Under the pressure from colleagues," writes Allison, Lebed recanted his statement. Graham Allison seems to be unaware of the fact that this political figure was famous for his extravagant statements on many other issues as well. (As far as I know he made this particular statement during his American visit to the audience that craved for similar revelations.)

Nine months after the act of "mega-terrorism" in the United States, writes Allison who has carefully studied all statements issued by Al Qaeda, one of its websites carried a statement by Abu Gheith, Osama bin Laden's press secretary, to the effect that Al Qaeda has the right to kill four million Americans, two million of them, children.

These are not random figures. According to Allison, Abu Gheith enumerated in detail the Muslim victims of the last 50 years killed by the United States and Israel in the Arab countries, Somalia, and Afghanistan.

Allison quotes from Abu Gheith: "The Americans have still not tasted from our hands what we have tasted from theirs. We have not reached parity with them" and further "Parity will require killing 4 million Americans." ¹¹

The above suggests that Al Qaeda is driven by vengeance in its anti-American actions.

Allison goes on to say that about 3 thous Americans died in the 9/11 attacks. It would take 1,400 similar assaults to reach that figure of 4 million or one nuclear attack.

In the introduction the author says that nuclear terrorism is preventable. This is his main message.

He is convinced that to achieve this everything should be done to prevent terrorists from acquiring HEU or weapons-grade plutonium: the enormous yet solvable task because the stockpiles of nuclear materials are vast but not unlimited. "This is a finite challenge, subject to a finite solution." ¹²

The author further describes "a world of three No's:" no loose nukes; no new nukes; no new nuclear states. ¹³

Together with the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency El Baradei he calls on tightening the rules of this organization related to international control over fissionable materials.

Allison is quite right when he writes that in the international efforts at nuclear non-proliferation produced certain results: early in the 1960s, President Kennedy expected ten nuclear states by 1970 instead of four and 15 to 20 nuclear states by 1975. (At that time even Sweden and Switzerland contemplated nuclear weapons of their own.-A.K.)

Today, 40 years later we still have 8, not 40, nuclear states.

Early in the 1990s, many in America doubted that Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Byelorussia would renounce their nuclear status. As a result of bold strategy, writes Allison, and of intense U.S.-Russia cooperation these countries agreed in 1994 to eliminate all nuclear weapons on their soil. "Before the end of 1996, every one of the nuclear weapons of these states had been deactivated and returned to Russia." ¹⁴ This is a most convincing example, writes the author. Granted international cooperation and careful orchestration even nuclear states can give up their weapons.

While discussing in detail his "road map" of preventing nuclear terrorism Allison quite rightly starts with stating the need of making the prevention of nuclear terrorism "an absolute national priority." He goes on to say that President Bush's speechwriters frequently inserted in presidential speeches declarations calling on the world to prevent terrorists from acquiring and using WMD yet, he says further, "these words have not been matched by deeds." ¹⁵

First, the president should have not cut down the funds (especially for Nunn-Lugar program); they should have been increased: in any case they were but a tiny share of the Pentagon's $500 billion budget.

Second, the president should appoint one of the top-ranking officials who reports directly to him as the supreme commander in a real war on nuclear terrorism. ¹⁶

Third, the president should make prevention of nuclear terrorism his personal priority, as well as the priority for the secretary of defense, state secretary, the secretary of the treasury, the CIA director, the secretary of homeland security, the attorney general, the FBI director and many other key officials. They, and members of their departments should, on the daily basis, consider what they should do in this war, assess accomplishments and roadblocks, etc.

Fourth, in his meetings and phone calls with foreign leaders the president should convince them to embrace this priority.

For example, Allison writes, the United States has many priorities for Pakistan (democratization, drugs, human rights, and progress in resolving the Kashmir conflict); still preventing nuclear proliferation from Pakistan and creation of conditions that can safely rule out repetitions of A.Q. Khan's black-marketeering are the most urgent priorities. ¹⁷

Allison is quite right when he says that given Musharraf's personal vulnerability to assassination and his uncertain hold on power "he can easily be overwhelmed by demands from America and other countries." ¹⁸ This will cripple his ability to oppose the threat of nuclear terrorism therefore President Bush should, Allison continues, to clearly identify what matters most in the U.S. relations with Pakistan and convey the message to the Pakistani leaders.

"In the war on terrorism," writes Allison, "the U.S. government has had great difficulty staying strategically focused. After a strong start, the diversion of attention and resources to war in Iraq sucked much of the drive out of the war on terrorism and blurred the targets." ¹⁹

Allison quotes from a Top Secret memo of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to his closest associates (leaked to the press) dated October 2003, two years after the declaration of the war on terrorism that asked "Are we winning or losing the Global War on Terror?" Allison's analysis says that the United States is not winning.

Speaking to the Senate Intelligence Committee CIA Director George Tenet reported that the "war on terror" is not being won since the "threat is not diminishing." He pointed out that together with the still functioning Al Qaeda there are over two dozens of terrorist groups also seeking chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials. ²⁰

Allison quite rightly writes that "the war on terrorism is a battle of alliances." ²¹ This is even more true of the war on nuclear terrorism as the "battle for hearts and minds" of people in various countries.

The war on Iraq damaged the cause of the "battle for heart and minds." Indeed, if half of the German population believes that the U.S. is as great a threat to world peace as North Korea and if three times as many Pakistanis trust bin Laden "to do the right things regarding world affairs" then "the longer-term war on terrorism in clearly in trouble." ²²

In view of this Allison reminds that more than two hundred years ago, James Madison called "for the decent respect for the opinions of mankind." ²³ "The United States," says Allison, "cannot undertake or sustain the war on nuclear terrorism unilaterally [despite its preeminence.-A.K.]." ²⁴ Today, all great powers share national interests in this sphere, says Allison. They should unite into a "global concert, a global alliance against nuclear terrorism." ²⁵

Existing alliances are badly suited for this task, this is equally true of NATO, the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty, and others. The current nuclear non-proliferation regime that consists of the official NPT and informal agreements can hardly be relied on.

The world needs a new alliance, says Allison that should begin with Russia and the United States, since they "have special obligation to address this problem." They created nuclear weapons and still own 95 percent of all nuclear weapons and material. ²⁶ They should jointly engage China that has recently taken a stand against proliferation of nuclear weapons.

First, the members of the alliance should embrace the "gold standard" for all nuclear weapons and materials on their own territory and speed the clean-out at all relevant facilities no longer in use.

Second, the alliance should shape a consensus in support of enforcement of the Three "No's" beginning with North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan.

Third, the new alliance should develop a reliable non-proliferation regime to rule out the sale and export of nuclear technologies, materials, and know-how. ²⁷

There is no doubt that Allison's assessments and recommendations should be closely studied by the relevant expert community and state leaders, the top figures included. These recommendations are not exhausting yet they have laid a foundation strongly needed for any progress in this sphere.

---

Endnotes

Note *:  Andrei Kokoshin, State Duma deputy, former Secretary of the Security Council of Russia, dean of the Department of World Politics, Moscow State University. Back

Note 1: G.T. Allison, P. Zelikow, The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Second Edition, Longman, N.Y., 1999. Back

Note 2: G.T. Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, N.Y., Times Books. Henry Holt and Company, 2004, 249 pp. Back

Note 3: Op. cit., p. 75. Back

Note 4: Op. cit., p. 77. Back

Note 5: Ibid. Back

Note 6: Ibid. Back

Note 7: Op. cit., p. 62. Back

Note 8. Op. cit., p. 8. Back

Note 9: Ibid. Back

Note 10: Op. cit., p. 10. Back

Note 11: Op. cit., p. 14. Back

Note 12: Op. cit., p. 140. Back

Note 13: Op. cit., p. 141. Back

Note 14: Op. cit., p. 145. Back

Note 15: Op. cit., p. 172. Back

Note 16: Op. cit., p. 178. Back

Note 17: Op. cit., p. 178. Back

Note 18: Op. cit., p. 179. Back

Note 19: Op. cit., p. 177. Back

Note 20: Op. cit., p. 181. Back

Note 21: Op. cit., p. 184. Back

Note 22: Op. cit., p. 185. Back

Note 23: Op. cit., p. 185-186. Back

Note 24: Op. cit., p. 187. Back

Note 25: Ibid. Back

Note 26: Op. cit., p. 188. Back

Note 27: Op. cit., p. 189. Back