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CIAO DATE: 12/04
International Affairs:
A Russian Journal
Limit Sovereignty if the State Abuses It
E. Kuznetsova *
The subject of sovereignty will hardly ever fade out: as it develops civilization creates new, sometimes more, sometimes less "civilized" forms of the urge of people's communities to rule others.
The 20th century brought large-scale changes in all spheres. The principle of sovereignty, previously applied to a very limited number of European states spread worldwide. The system of international relations based on it became universal. The principle of the states' sovereign equality was fixed in the Charter of the United Nations and became the cornerstone of the international legal system. By creating the United Nations the world abandoned the old system, in which sovereignty was limited by the right of force, to move to a new one that limited the use of force against sovereign states.
The number of sovereign states considerably increased when the former European colonies acquired independence and equal rights with the great powers, their former mother countries. The results were sad: by the late 1960s, the fire of ethnic and civil wars had been ravaging newly independent African state (Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad); later, in the 1970s, tension spread to the eastern Mediterranean, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere.
Until the end of the Cold War the developed world remained undisturbed by the bloody conflicts in its periphery. Europe opted for "isolated" development leading to closer union, while the United States and the Soviet Union chose to get involved into the local conflicts when and if they could score points in their war against each other.
The neglect of human rights in the newly independent states turned almost common for past decades, conflicts developed into a chronic disease, while leaders took sovereignty for impunity.
Today it is no longer possible to ignore failed states (there is an opinion that they cannot be regarded as states at all 1 for several reasons: like Haiti, they create flows of refugees; like Sudan and Afghanistan, they shelter terrorist organizations; like Congo and Rwanda, they spread internal conflicts to their neighbors thus destabilizing entire regions. The developed countries need stable periphery for economic reasons as well: some of the proto-states supply the West with very much needed resources (the United States imports up to 7 percent of oil from Angola 2 . Finally, the developed countries have reached the limit, beyond which violations of human rights (massive repressions, murders, and genocide) cannot be tolerated any more.
Chaos in the periphery of the developed world raises the question whether a state ruled by the government unable to function properly can be regarded as a sovereign one. Limited sovereignty looks like a logical answer.
The Cost of Sovereignty
Sovereignty does not mean that a state is free of its obligations to other states and its own citizens. Each sovereign state has to respect the interests of others to remain a member of the club of sovereign states; it should respect international law the rights of its own citizens, international customs and commonly accepted rules. How can state sovereignty be limited? Do international agreements limit it? If they do, how should we assess America's participation in the anti-Hitler coalition? What can be said about the European Coal and Steel Community formed by six European countries? Is Russia's sovereignty limited by its membership in the CIS or Euro-Asian Economic cooperation?
States are free to sign treaties and conventions, to join alliances or coalitions that impose on them certain obligations. This does not limit their sovereignty for sovereignty is limited a priori, by state borders. In the contemporary world system the principle of sovereignty regulates interstate relations by outlining the limits of their power and jurisdiction. If international agreements limit sovereignty then the UN based on the principle of sovereign equality of states would have lost its raison d'être: The Holy See alone could have been regarded as a sovereign state. Coalitions and defense alliances likewise, being concluded for specific aims (like defeating fascism, containing the Soviet Union or dividing the Baltic states) and discontinued when the aim is achieved do not limit its members' sovereignty.
Sovereignty is limited when the state loses part or all of its rights created by its sovereignty.
Sovereignty can be limited either voluntary or under coercion.
When setting up a new political entity, a union or a group of states delegate certain rights to supranational bodies, thus voluntarily limiting their sovereignties. Those of the European states that created "a highly developed system for mutual interference in each other's domestic affairs" 3 have moved further than others toward new political forms based on limiting sovereignty. The European Union has abandoned the division into domestic and foreign affairs; the relations among the members are based on voluntary limitation of sovereignty and admission of outside interference if agreements are violated.
Sovereignty is limited by coercion if a state uses force to interfere into domestic affairs of another state to settle internal conflicts there. As distinct from voluntary limitation, here, first, interference occurs without the agreement of the state, which sovereignty is limited, and without sanctions of the international community represented by the UN. Second, coercive limitation is temporal and it lasts until the conflict is settled or until foreign troops leave the territory for other reasons.
In this article I shall analyze the coercive form of the limitation of sovereignty for it seems that by stemming sovereignty abuses in failed states we shall be able to resolve the problem of political instability.
At all times the theoretical and practical aspects of the limitation of sovereignty caused fierce discussions, therefore it is especially important to understand how and why sovereignty is limited; which international legal norms make this limitation possible; and, finally, whether the desired aims were achieved through limiting sovereignty.
The absolute majority of states, the sovereignty of which was de facto limited in the course of UN peacekeeping or humanitarian operations - Somalia, Afghanistan, Liberia, Haiti, Zaire (now the DRC), Angola, Rwanda, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Lebanon, etc. - could be described as "collapsed" 4 states by the time such interference was carried out. All of them were either torn apart by a civil war or had moved to the brink of it whether for religious (Sudan and Lebanon), ethnic (Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda) or political (in the vast majority of cases) reasons. Violence had become permanent; and the death-toll (140 thousand in Lebanon and over 1 million in Rwanda) forced the international community to interfere.
Since central power cannot control the borders such states have no borders to speak of, thus allowing tension to spread in all directions. Afghanistan under the Taliban is a typical example: no functioning central power, continued confrontation among rivaling groups and vague state borders made the country in 1996 the Al-Qaeda home; the country began to jeopardize its neighbors (Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) and tried to move tension across the border into Pakistan, a nuclear state.
Obviously, there is any number of reasons for military and political interference into the domestic affairs of "collapsed" states. Are there legal norms that make this interference possible?
The problem of dependence between the principle of sovereign equality of states and the right of the UN member-states to use force against sovereign independent states is two-fold. First, what is sovereignty? To put it differently, which rights does it give the state and which obligations does it impose on it? Second, what are the legal sources of the use of force, with which the international community limits sovereignty? Let's discuss this in greater detail.
Having been born in Europe, the idea of sovereignty, which implies the independence of states and their mutual unaccountability, finally reached the colonial possessions of European powers and struck root there. The supremacy of the Westphalian political system rested on European powers' economic and military preeminence: when the alternative Philadelphian system (based on the principle of confederation in the North American States) fell apart, it was left without rivals. In the 20th century, the Westphalian system embraced the entire world in the form of the League of Nations, the first ever international organization with 65 members (all the existing states except for the U.S. and Saudi Arabia were its members). The UN with 191 members (out of 192 states existing today) replaced it after World War II.
The UN rests on the principles of sovereignty of states and equality of sovereign states. Meanwhile, the very concept of sovereignty remains vague. Under Para 4 Art 2 Chapter I of the Charter of the United Nations all sovereign states "shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against . . . any state." Para 7, Art 2 of the same chapter guarantees sovereignty of all states conscientiously abiding by this obligation by saying: "Nothing contained in the present Chapter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter." 5 This essentially exhausts the rights and obligations of any sovereign state, which considerably narrows down the field of legal justification of the limitation of sovereignty.
This vagueness leaves loopholes unscrupulous states use for abuses of all sorts - violations of human rights in the first place. In these cases they use sovereignty to prevent humanitarian interference in their domestic affairs. The opposition of two different approaches to sovereignty reached its peak during the Kosovo crisis. While Serbia insisted on the traditional approach by saying: "If a country had not actually threatened a third party, then there could be no justification for military intervention against it", 6 the United States and its NATO allies argued differently and insisted that the human rights violations (in this case, of the Kosovo Albanians) should be stopped. This new approach that casts doubt on the inviolability of sovereignty was born by the practice of conflict settlement in the collapsed or failing states of the 1990s and literally won itself a place in the international legal system.
The growing number of humanitarian interventions, both sanctioned and unsanctioned, required legal justification. Indeed, how can the immunity of state that shows no aggression toward the world but terrorizes its citizens be overcome? There are several ways to do this.
It should be said that extended interpretation of the UN Charter and other basic UN documents provides justification of interference into domestic jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons.
According to the current norms of international law the use of force against a sovereign state (in cases other than self-defense) must be authorized only by the UN Security Council. The sovereignty of states is protected by the UN Charter and confirmed by the 1965 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty. The supporters of the idea of interventions argue that if a humanitarian intervention violates neither territorial integrity nor political independence, it does not contradict Art 2 Chapter I of the UN Charter.
Another argument in favor of humanitarian interventions stems from the vague wording of Para 4 Art 2 Chapter I of the UN Charter that says: "All members shall refrain . . . from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations" (Italics mine.-E.K.). Since the UN describes its purposes as maintenance of international peace and security as well as achievement of international cooperation "in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion," while the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 declares "recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of the human family [to be] the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world," humanitarian interventions without the UN SC sanctions are possible only in cases when the UN Security Council cannot realize its aim of protecting human rights.
Finally, it is for the UN Security Council to determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression (Art 39 Chapter VII of the UN Charter). In fact, in certain cases it was this article that was used to justify humanitarian interventions. This can be clearly seen in the Security Council resolutions on intervention in Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda. Being related to different cases these documents, however, are close where their tonality and arguments are concerned. The UN Security Council qualified the conflict in Somali, the confrontation in Haiti, the civil war in Rwanda, the conflict in Lebanon, and many other situations as threat to international peace, the maintenance of which is one of the UN purposes.
Together with the debatable cases, in which UN sanctioned the use of force against sovereign states, post-war history knows of cases when sovereignty was limited outside the UN. In 1978, Vietnam invaded Kampuchea; in 1979, Tanzania deposed dictatorship in Uganda, in 1999, NATO established its control over Kosovo, while in 2003 the U.S. started a war on Iraq. Even though in some cases the motives were noble ones (in case of Tanzania it removed hideous dictator Idi Amin), unsanctioned humanitarian actions remain a grave legal problem.
Along the Road Paved with Good Intentions
The multilateral mechanisms of the limitation of sovereignty were not the only modifications to the international practice made in the latter half of the 20th century. Two operations (in Kosovo and Iraq) unsanctioned by the UN and initiated, in fact, by the United States occurred in the last four years in addition to several UN-authorized interventions. On the whole, during the post-Soviet period the U.S. undertook nine operations (in Panama, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, twice in Iraq, and in Liberia). These interventions (camouflaged by the noble aim of defending "the oppressed craving for freedom") turned out to be mainly ineffective and, as such, highly instructive.
Displeased with the alleged inefficiency of the UN peacekeeping and humanitarian operations the United States has assumed the moral right to act according to its discretion. It sets off the UN SC clumsiness and inertia with its own flexible system of making prompt decisions about human rights violations in other countries and translates them into action. Is the system flexible and are the decisions prompt? The American interventionist policy is burdened with certain internal limitations to be reckoned with. Here are some of them.
First, each of the American interventions is prompted by American interests: economic, as is the case with Iraq; geopolitical in case of Kosovo and Panama; ideological in case of Haiti, or, in the majority of cases, by their combination.
America's history knows of cases when a decision on intervention into a sovereign country (with or without UN sanctions) was not based on obviously practical considerations, in other words, when altruism triumphed over political realism. Such operations were never long ones: witness Somalia of 1992-1993 and Liberia of 2003. In the end of 1992, having succumbed to public opinion President Bush who had already lost presidential elections dispatched 27 thous American military to Africa. The Operation Restore Hope was designed to help the starving population and did presuppose neither nation-building nor creation of efficient local power structures nor restoration of the institutes of power. This was wisely left to the UN authority. But the Americans had to break their neutrality when the UN mission arrived. Following fierce clashes with the locals and the downed American helicopter, America hastily retreated from the Horn of Africa. 7
The story of the American intervention in Liberia could have been a comic one but for the huge number of victims and the scope of the tragedy. "In August [2003] three ships, carrying around 4,500 sailors and marines, were sent to Liberia after repeated requests for American intervention. In all 225 U.S. personnel went ashore, of whom 50 succumbed to malaria. Two months later the Americans were gone." 8
Second, in recent years the Americans shaped their interventions like Blitzkriegs with limited aims and clear withdrawal strategies. 9 This is explained by the "Vietnam syndrome" or the "Vietmali complex" (the term coined after the American mission failed in Somalia 10 ), that is, by the deep-rooted fear of loss of American lives in operations outside the United States.
In fact, these "limited" aims are always highly ambitious: the Just Cause (Panama) and Uphold Democracy (Haiti) operations were launched to restore democracy there; the Iraqi Freedom was designed to stop WMD proliferation in Iraq, while the Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, to remove the terrorist-sponsoring regime. Obviously, such operations require time and clear plans of action for the period that starts after the military operation. (According to the RAND Corporation experts, "There is no quick route to nation-building. Five years seems to be the minimum required to enforce an enduring transition to democracy." 11 ) Finally, continued presence of military regiments to maintain order and skilled civilian personnel to help country enter the road of democratic development are two necessary, yet not sufficient, conditions of success.
As a result, none of the US nation-building operations of recent decades was as successful as the experience of post-war democratic developments in Germany and Japan. Obviously, nowhere the conditions were as favorable, while the Americans committed too many mistakes that ended in failures or hasty retreats. Some of the mistakes were repeated time and again: the strategies of the post-war political restoration were neglected; there were no individualized plans of democratization for each particular country; the aspirations and needs of the occupied nations were inadequately or wrongly assessed. In Panama, the discrepancy between the plans of military intervention and of political reconstruction that followed diminished the operation's positive effect. It is an open secret that on the eve of the American intervention in Iraq the American command had neither a plan of post-war restoration nor even a vague idea about the country's future development. Hence the mistakes and imprompt political moves of the interim American administration: on the one hand, there was "deba'athification" that caused irreparable losses in management structures at all levels; on the other, inaction in relation to scattered Hussein's special services and the republican guard, whose professional fighters formed the core of the resistance forces. 12 There are more examples of the same.
Third, all American interventions are sealed with Americans's profound conviction that their mission is to bring freedom and democracy to all corners of the world. The best illustration of this is the words President Bush wrote on the document that transferred sovereignty to Iraq: "Let Freedom Reign!" Thus, free elections and democratic procedures are regarded as natural priorities for American "nation-builders".
Preferring the building of formal democratic institutions to all other tasks (promoting security, civil society, and tolerance) the Americans enter into a profound contradiction with the cultural and political realm of the societies, which are not ready for democracy because of the lack of democratic experience; low level of economic development, and the weakness of civil society. Premature democratization and the inability to establish law and order create a vicious circle, while the attempts to impose democracy prompt resistance that prevents further democratization.
If before 9/11 America responded to these challenges by withdrawing its troops (as it happened in Panama and Somalia), today the stakes of nation-building in the Middle East and Central Asia are too high to allow the American "crusades" to end ingloriously.
The results of the American interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq give no ground for optimism. The situation in Afghanistan is far from normal. How can one consider the current Afghan regime a democracy if the Loya Jirga, presented as an electoral college, is, in fact, a gathering of tribal lords and clan elders? Real power belongs to the warlords, many of whom in the mid-1990s were involved in serious crimes and now are believed to be involved in drug trafficking (in 2003, it brought about $2.3 billion). 13 Without the regular army President Karzai is limited in his ability to enforce the state interests; he is even unable to disarm the regional paramilitary groups. According to the UN envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, the situation "is reminiscent of what was witnessed after the establishment of the mujahideen government in 1992." 14
The world is worried with the American practice of the limitation of sovereignty of the collapsed, failing and weak states without relevant sanctions; America's unilateral actions in Iraq produced a gap between the United States and Europe. 15 Some experts and politicians including American ones, call upon the US to return to multilateralism, 16 to use its "soft power," 17 and to abandon the idea of global domination for the sake of global leadership. 18 Others appeal to various "balancing forces" 19 and propose to build "axes" alternative to the American one (something like Paris-Berlin-Moscow). I should say that the problem is not the US hegemony or the incumbent administration's political course. The problem is the lack of efficient and comprehensive alternative the international community could apply to failing and collapsed states.
Three Steps Toward Modernization
There is a wide range of instruments the UN can use to settle conflicts and pressure the conflicting sides: peacekeeping operations, monitoring, inspections, economic sanctions, international courts and tribunals, etc. The international community, however, has not yet learned how to apply them in their complexity. It has no recipe for restoring the collapsed states' political systems; there are no scenarios of how to address this task. America can offer no scenarios, too. Thus, the number of such states is dwindling.
It will not be easy to find the right paths to global stability and legal order. This does not mean, however, that no changes are possible. Changes are badly needed. Here I shall try to outline the key directions of possible reforms.
The introduction of the principle, according to which sovereignty not only brings rights but also impose obligations should become the first step in constructing the system of limited sovereignty. A sovereign state should be obliged to comply with the rules of humanitarian law. **
While in the European countries and in the United States sovereignty never ends in the abuse of power due to mature civil societies, in the majority of the peripheral states the state power is neither controlled nor curbed because of the absence of adequate mechanisms. Their leaders disguise themselves as democrats by copying the formal side of democracy. That makes them almost unassailable for international justice.
It seems that the UN Charter is not balanced: while Art 2 of Chapter I directly bans the great powers from breaking the territorial integrity of other sovereign countries, it is very lenient when it comes to human rights.
According to international agreements on human rights such as the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1966, the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment of 1987, and others, states must respect and protect human rights. Art 6 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide envisages punishments for the non-observance or violations of the norms of the Convention: "Persons charged with genocide [ . . . ] shall be tried by a competent tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction." 20 So far the UN has instituted only two [!] special tribunals related to specific war crimes - the Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Tribunal for Rwanda. Meanwhile, the number of cases when criminals escape punishment is much greater.
Obviously, the fear of punishment for violations of the conventions (the punishments envisaged by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide are among the most severe) cannot keep the political leaders from trampling upon the rights of their own citizens.
This cannot but cause concern; one tends to agree that it has become clear now that "the international community of experts in constitutional law should subject itself to a careful analysis of the contemporary concept of sovereignty" 21 to identify, within the international humanitarian law, the obligations imposed on the state by its sovereignty.
The second step, to follow the first one, implies recommendations on the limitation of sovereignty through strategies of "long-term involvement" into the affairs of collapsed states. Political stabilization and restoration of the rule of law start when military intervention ends.
As a rule, such states are unable to cope on their own with the difficulties of post-conflict political reconstruction. Having experienced social upheavals and violence, people no longer trust one another and have no confidence in the state. One cannot expect such societies to promptly overcome suspicion or even hatred to reach consensus needed for creating legitimate power. The responsibility for the failed states' political and economic development must be handed to the outside forces that both need stability in the unstable regions and know how to achieve it.
History of international relations knows of the cases when the control over collapsed states was transferred to another state: the experience of Lebanon, Bosnia and, partly, Tajikistan, was relatively successful. Lebanon provides the best example: in 1976, neighboring Syria received a sort of a mandate on restoring law and order from the Mid-Eastern regional organizations, and played the positive role in the process. Supported by Damascus, Lebanon refused to extend the Cairo agreement on deploying the PLO troops on its territory; it reformed and consolidated its army and banned ethnic groupings within it. Syrian presence helps maintain political stability based on sharing power between Christians and Muslims. Even though Lebanon is deprived of sovereignty in foreign policy and is regarded by many as a Syria's satellite, this is an affordable cost for leaving the "club" of collapsed and failed states.
Relative progress achieved in other similar cases allows us to believe that external control over the failed states may turn useful when dealing with the problem of instability. The international community has already acquired some experience of external governance, so it would be wise to restore some forms of mandatory rule or trusteeship.
What countries will agree to shoulder this responsibility? First it comes to mind these may be European countries that witnessed the dissolution of their colonial empires but still maintain old ties with their former possessions and influence their policies. There exists a special relationship between them incorporated in the Yaounde and Lome conventions.
Some of the European countries have been de facto involved into the affairs of the failed states: in 2000, the British "blue helmets" resolved the Sierra Leone hostage crisis; in 2003, French troops established control over the city of Bunia, in the east of the Democratic Republic of Congo thus stopping the escalation of violence in the region. The recent Franco-British initiative of setting up the EU rapid reaction force to be used in UN-authorized operations confirms the European powers' readiness to be more actively involved in "rescuing" failed and collapsed states.
Finally, the third step may be the introduction of measures that will bring together all the existing mechanisms of interference creating a coherent system of the limitation of sovereignty. These measures include strict definition of cases, when sovereignty can be limited; sanctions against those states that violate the IHL, as well as the principle of imminence of punishment.
Time has come to correct the mistakes the United States committed during its recent nation-building efforts. In fact, denouncing any of the states as belonging to a virtual "axis of evil" cannot be regarded as a sufficient, and, even less so, legitimate, justification of the limitation of their sovereignty. Legitimacy is the main source of the UN power even though the principle of multilateralism has been somewhat devalued. To preserve it, the international community needs reliable and precise instruments of monitoring and assessing human rights violations.
It would be wise to create a sort of a scale of violations and introduce punishments that correspond to them. The graver the crime the greater the liability. It is absolutely necessary to introduce a system of sanctions against the delinquents, similar to that already used in the EU. *** The right of failed states to take part in the UN assemblies and to influence its decisions should be limited until the respect for human rights is re-established.
The principle of imminence of punishment should be strictly observed irrespective of the crime's gravity. If the offending country escapes punishment and if it is not banished, at least temporarily, from the community of decent sovereign states, the functioning of the entire system can be endangered.
The steps offered above are a small part of what the UN may do if considerations on limited sovereignty are recognized as useful. This article cannot provide an answer to all questions on the agenda; moreover, it rises a lot of others: Will the UN members take risk signing the documents that may become a 'death penalty' for those of them who violate human rights? Is the UN prepared to reform itself? Which countries will dispatch its troops to carry out dangerous missions? Who will be responsible for planning political reconstruction?
So far, the international legal system does not recognize yet the collapse of states, so in all its attempts to deal with failing states the international community uses the old mechanisms such as peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and economic sanctions. But they cannot help since the cause of dysfunction is rooted in the very system of international relations. One should admit that not all nations are ready for self-rule, that in some cases sovereignty can be damaging. Time has come to turn sovereignty into a privilege to be earned.
Endnotes
Note *: Ekaterina Kuznetsova, observer with the journal International Affairs.Back
Note **: The ICRC describes the international humanitarian law (IHL) as the body of rules, which, in wartime, protects people who are not or are no longer participating in the hostilities. Its central purpose is to limit and prevent human suffering in times of armed conflict. The rules are to be observed not only by governments and their armed forces, but also by armed opposition groups and any other parties to a conflict. The four Geneva conventions of 1949 and their two Additional protocols are the principal instruments of humanitarian law. Back
Note ***: Early in 2000, the EU declared a boycott of Austria and imposed a moratorium on its participation in the EU structures because of an obvious threat of a coalition cabinet dominated by the right radical Freedom Party. As a result, its leader J. Haider declined a ministerial seat. Back
Note 1: For more details, see: R. Cooper, The Breaking of Nations. Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century, London, Atlantic Books, 2003, p. 17; O. de Rivero, The Myth of Development. The Non-Viable Economies of the 21st Century, London, New York, Zed Books, 2001, p. 147. Back
Note 2: See: A. Mazin, "Pylaiushchaia Afrika," Svobodnaia mysl-XXI, 2004, No. 3 (1541), p. 64. Back
Note 3: R. Cooper, op. cit., p.27. Back
Note 4: See: R.I. Rotberg, "Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators," State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror. Ed. by R.I. Rotberg, Washington, D.C., Brookings Institution Press, pp. 5-10. Back
Note 5: UN Charter. Back
Note 6: M. Glenny, The Balkans: Nationalism, War & the Great Powers, 1804-1999, London, Penguin Books, 2001, p. 659. Back
Note 7: See: W.S. Clarke, R. Gosende, "Somalia: Can a Collapsed State Reconstitute Itself?" State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror, pp.141-142. Back
Note 8: N. Ferguson, Colossus. The Price of America's Empire, New York, The Penguin Press, 2004, p. 289. Back
Note 9: Quoted from: K. von Hippel, Democracy by Force. US Military Intervention in the Post-Cold War World, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 8. Back
Note 10: The term was coined by American diplomat Richard Holbrook. Back
Note 11: J. Dobbins, J.G. McGinn, K. Crane, S.G. Jones, R. Lal, A. Rathmell, R. Swanger and A. Timilsina, America's Role in Nation-Building. From Germany to Iraq, RAND, 2003, p. XXVI. Back
Note 12: S. Ritter, "Saddam's People Are Winning the War," International Herald Tribune, July 23, 2004, p.7. Back
Note 13: Quoted from: K. Gannon, "Afghanistan Unbound," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 2, May /June 2004, p. 37. Back
Note 14: Ibid, p. 36. Back
Note 15: See: L. Cohen-Tanugi, Les sentinelles de la liberté. L'Europe et l'Amérique au seuil du XXIe sciècle, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2003, p. 73. Back
Note 16: See, for example: W. Clark, "Winning Modern Wars. Iraq, Terrorism, and the American Empire," New York, Public Affairs, 2003, pp. 145, 149; G. Soros, "The Bubble of American Supremacy. Correcting the Misuse of American Power," New York, Public Affairs, 2004, p. 74; etc. Back
Note 17: See: J.S. Nye Jr., The Paradox of American Power. Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone, New York, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. XII, 11, 158, ff.; for more details, see: J.S. Nye Jr., "Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics," New York, Public Affairs, 2004. Back
Note 18: See: Z. Brzezinski, The Choice. Global Domination or Global Leadership? New York, Basic Books, 2004, pp. 12, 228. Back
Note 19: E. Todd, After the Empire. The Breakdown of the American Order, New York, Columbia University Press, 2003, p.167. Back
Note 20: Resolution of the UN General Assembly A/RES/260 A (III). Back
Note 21: V. Zor'kin, "Apologia Vestfal'skoy systemy," Rossia v global'noy politike, Vol. 2, No. 3, May-June 2004. p. 24. Back