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CIAO DATE: 11/04
International Affairs:
A Russian Journal
Russia Will Never Accept the Role of a Poor Relation
A. Orlov *
The political and expert community is mainly convinced that in the last fifteen years the world has been living through a transition from the bi–polar to a new order based on the real balance of forces and interests that took shape when the Soviet Union, and the East European system of allied relationships, left the world scene. Today, the world community is busy discussing how close it is to the desired aim of stability based on the new elements and whether the emerging world order is a bi–polar or a multipolar one or whether it combines elements of both. In the latter case the question is to which extent both patterns are present in the current world order and how globalization (so popular today) affects international relations and the world as a whole.
To my mind these discussions leave out an important, or even the central question: to which extent does the present correspond to the expectations and forecasts that to a great extent contributed, intellectually and politically, to the process of the recent radical changes? To correctly assess our nearest and distant future, we should give the correct answer to this question.
Fifteen years ago the future world, at least within its “civilized limits” looked like a huge capitalist “City of the Sun” with no barriers, nearly non–existent state borders and a huge common expanse in economics, politics and law, of which Russia was expected to become part. At that time there was no talk about NATO’s eastward expansion; doubts were voiced about its continued existence: with the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw bloc its raison d’etre seemed to evaporate. It was the boldest analysts who dared to talk, sotto voce, about spreading the NATO zone to the GDR. The first anti–Iraqi coalition, a response to Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait, looked like a pattern of future concerted and effective actions of the world community against the regimes that dared to violate the spirit and letter of the UN Charter and the norms and principles of international law. It looked as if nobody and nothing will darken the bright horizons of mankind and of Russia as its component and inalienable part.
Nearly fifteen years have passed since that time. Has the world become a more stable and safer place? To which degree have the lofty ideas about a nearly ideal system of international relations nurtured by statesmen and politicians of that time become realized? Has Russia managed to find a place in the contemporary world that matches its geopolitical, military, intellectual, economic, cultural, and historical potential?
We all know that the world today differs radically from that of the Cold War period where its basic parameters are concerned. Russia and the leading Western states are maintaining stable, and in some areas, partner, relationships. There is practically no threat of a large–scale armed conflict in which WMD might be used and in which Russia and the West might find themselves on the opposite sides. Russia is gradually, and not without difficulties, integrating into the world economy the process being eased by a uniquely favorable external situation created by the high oil and gas prices. Much has been already written about active and useful cooperation between Russia and the West in antiterrorist struggle. These are obviously positive developments.
There is another side of the medal; in fact the disturbing factors are no less numerous.
The main thing that cannot be longer ignored is a gradual and persistent erection of a new curtain or a wall between Russia and the “Euroatlantic world” that has been going on for several years now. It would be an overstatement to describe it as an “iron curtain” or another Berlin Wall yet the intention to separate Russia from the West is absolutely clear.
In the first half of the 1900s, the Russian citizens did not need visas to travel to the larger part of Central and Southeastern Europe — today this is a pleasant memory, nothing more. The rigid visa regime typical of the EU countries, the core of the so–called Schengen Zone, was not simplified for the Russian citizens (something that could have been expected in the context of the pleasant anticipations of the 1990s) — it was tightened, both technically and geographically. Amid the euphoria of the 1980s and early 1990s nobody could imagine, even in the worst of moods, that in less than ten–year time the question about the transit of Russian citizens and Russian cargos to the Kaliningrad region would develop into a stumbling block. As a result, the Russian enclave was turned, in a European, polite way, into a besieged fortress of sorts.
What happened to the dreams about a single European economic expanse nurtured by the perestroika heroes? The dreams had been never realized while the process took another course — toward financial and economic consolidation of Western Europe with Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Baltic republics. As a result the European Union enlarged to 25 members. This organization has spread to the vast territory that for centuries or at least decades was the zone of Moscow’s special economic interests. Russia has been left outside the new European “colossus” one of the feet of which stands at out state borders.
The EU is frequently described as Russia’s largest economic partner the relations with which are successfully developing while inevitable problems are negligible. This is quite natural: we have been neighbors for a long time—recently we became very close neighbors yet we cannot ignore an obvious economic expansion to the East. Recently, President of the European Commission Romano Prodi tried to encourage the Russian leaders by saying that the EU had reached its geographic limits and would not move further. Should this be interpreted as an absence of interest in Ukraine and Belarus? This is hardly true. Ten years ago the EU present territory would have looked like a bad dream. Now we know that bad dreams can realize, especially in politics.
At the last Russia–EU summit held in Moscow late in May the EU promised to help Russia join the WTO. The summit reconfirmed its intention to move toward a “common expanse” with Russia. One would like to hope that this time the process will unfold much faster than in the past when this idea was first formulated at the political level. One more thing. The highly promising comments came immediately after the EU had received new members: this might be a coincidence while those who took them for the desire to appease Russia could have been wrong.
Finally, about NATO: for many years in the Cold War period its membership had remained the same, therefore when Spain joined it in the early 1980s the West was anticipating, with bated breath, a military and political response from the Soviet Union. There were fears that the Soviet Union might admit Cuba into the Warsaw Treaty Organization. This did not happen: the Kremlin preferred to demonstrate restrain and limited itself to threatening rhetoric in the press and much milder diplomatic vocabulary in official documents. In fact, the Soviet Union pointed an admonitory finger at the West and accepted the fact of Spanish membership.
Very soon the events in the East took an unexpected turn that changed the world beyond recognition. At first, bold ideas about disbanding NATO as a historical atavism had been more or less prominent among the Western political establishment; little by little, however, the situation developed in a different direction. By the middle 1990s, the ideas about the need to strengthen the alliance qualitatively and extend it by admitting new members from among the most “prepared” former enemies conquered the Western corridors of power. The result is obvious: 26 members (more than the fairly large EU membership); there is no geographical end to this expansion.
Russia is treating this extension negatively yet does not dramatize it.
One would like to know, however, what aims the bloc is pursuing by moving to the East. Are they the already stated aims of fighting terrorism, carrying out peacekeeping operations, supporting democracy, etc? Or are there different aims? One gets an impression that we saw this in the past. Once more military bases are set up at Russia’s territory; once more foreign military planes fly along our borders while the Baltic States became a “gray zone” outside the CFE Treaty. Their recent NATO membership has radically changed the situation with the conventional forces in Europe.
What is behind these developments? So far, we have not received a detailed and clear answer to this simple question, which is very important for Russia. We are told that Russia and the West are no longer enemies, that they are partners therefore our concerns are unfounded. In this case there are no reasons for NATO to move eastward, far beyond its historical area. Its eastward extension is accompanied by reports and analytical deliberations appearing in great numbers in the West that in the nearest future Russia will inevitably fall apart into five or ten independent states. This brings the past to mind once more. In short, there are many unanswered questions.
The world today is very different from the world of the dreams of the 1990s. International terrorism as a global challenge to mankind has affected all worldwide processes yet this influence is much more shallow to be associated with certain trends caused by different reasons and following their own course.
What will happen in the world in the next 10 to 15 years? Shall we be confronted with more unpleasant surprises? We should try to answer these questions today.
For a long time, Russia was formulating its new foreign policy and adapting it to new worldwide realities. Little by little the country came too close to the line that under certain unfavorable circumstance may become the brink of an abyss. I do not mean to say that Russia is threatened by something or somebody even though there are issues requiring our close attention. At the same time, strategic security (as a sum–total of factors that ensure a state’s security for a long–term perspective) has become much lower in the past 15 years. Russia’s stability depends to a much greater extent than before on circumstances totally or partially outside our control. Described in chess terms the chessmen of our opponent control the larger part of the chessboard; this allows him to strengthen his positions while our pieces are all cornered.
Is the West aware of the numerous risks its unbridled military–political and economic eastward expansion is fraught with? I think that this awareness does exist yet I doubt that the course was carefully thought out and fully understood. The war of the United States and some of its close allies in Iraq graphically demonstrated that in certain Western countries the subjective factor had come to the fore (to become the dominant one in some cases) when it came to important decision–making. Somebody does not like something–this is enough to set the state machine in motion so that to convince the public at home and abroad that certain measures (normally, the use of force) are inevitable. The way of thinking and action eagerly applied today can be best described as Machiavellian.
According to classical canons the subjective voluntarist decisions are typical of the authoritarian regimes, while democracy is seen as a safety belt of sorts against doubtful programs people or groups of people might try to impose on society. Life has corrected this commonly accepted theory. Regrettably, today the key tenets of democracy are frequently misinterpreted to fit specific situations, specific countries, and specific individuals. This fact requires comprehension and should be examined through the prism of Russia’s national interests. I have to remind here that in the past the Russian leaders tried to maintain stable relations with Napoleon and Hitler: in both cases this ended in catastrophic wars. These analogies do not perfectly fit the current realities yet the lessons of history should be learned.
The everyday diplomatic activities should not screen the gradual emergence of challenges that might develop into threats in 10 or even 20 years. I would like to say that logic suggests that the West is strengthening its strategic security by enlisting new allies and extending the geographical zone of its military–political control. By the same token, the Western countries have created more knots of contradictions, which in future may cripple their own interests. These are inevitable hazards of long–term planning.
Does the West seek confrontation with Russia? The answer is negative: today this line looks like an absolutely irrational one. We all know, however, that influential groups among the ruling elite of the key Western states guided by the stereotypes born in the previous decades would like to see Russia as a weak state with a secondary role to play on the international arena, a state forced to take orders from the West and afraid to manifest excessive independence.
In its turn, Russia will never accept the role of a poor relation, which the West would like to impose on it. Russia will never tire of asserting right to play a leading role on the world scene. This is a source of serious contradictions. Russia will refuse to be mollified by soothing statements and gestures—it will never accept an intrusion into the historical zone of its military–political, economic and cultural influence. More pressure from the West will cause more negative feelings. In fact, nothing the West is doing to help Russia join the WTO, to develop closer cooperation with the EU, to establish equal interaction with NATO, etc, no matter how important, can be regarded as a complete and adequate compensation for the lost strategic security that took many decades to be created.
What course should Russia pursue? It can pretend to be ignoring the West’s eastern expansion and concentrate on extending cooperation and interaction with the Euroatlantic world. This tactics, undoubtedly favored by many, will gradually and imperceptibly deprive us of complete freedom and limit the resource of our independence both on the domestic and international scene.
There is another option: while actively building up our relations with the West we should try to stem its geographic expansion to the east. How can this be done? The answer is obvious: we should build up integration within the CIS. We should achieve a breakthrough in this field: the current sluggish integration efforts are seen by our CIS partners as simulation of activity, as a game pursued to defeat (or deceive) the partner rather than to work together for the sake of efficient treatment of many issues. For the sake of objectivity it should be said that in recent years integration within the CIS has been accelerating: this is especially true of individual directions and of bilateral cooperation. The recent round table discussions carried out by the Foreign Ministry of Russia that were attended by political and public figures and leading political scientists revealed that Russian society had realized that restoration of Russia’s multisided influence on the territory, on which it predominated in the past in the military–political, economic, cultural and other spheres had no alternatives.
It is interesting to note that many of the participants pointed out that Russia should be prepared to financial and economic sacrifices for the sake of integration. They referred to the experience of German unification when Bonn had not wavered to make considerable investments for the future so that to accelerate adaptation of the former GDR to the new conditions.
The CIS is Russia’s soft underbelly, to borrow the expression from Winston Churchill. At the same time, it offers huge economic advantages to Russia in the form of new markets and workforce; it creates a strategic deepness of Russia’s defense system and an area for Russian culture and the language: so far Russian is still used in the CIS countries though the English language and Western mass culture are on an offensive.
NATO and the EU will need time to let the new members adjust—this period should be used to push forward integration within the CIS and to finally form the united state of Russia and Belarus. Otherwise we can expect that in future we should have probably pay much more to ensure our security.
Endnotes
Note *: Aleksandr Orlov, Deputy Director, Department of Foreign Policy Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; Candidate of Sciences (History). Back