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CIAO DATE: 10/04
International Affairs:
A Russian Journal
America's Foreign Policy in the Election Year
V. Kremeniuk *
In the election year the White House is working hard to make President Bush's foreign policy, one of the planks of his election platform, even more attractive to the voters. Approved by the nation it should be presented as an answer to the common people's cherished dreams. This is not easy: the president has scored no "absolute victories" neither has he suffered "total defeats." Everything that the president does abroad has its positive and negative sides, the former to be used by the administration in the election race, the latter to be exaggerated by its opponents. The final foreign policy balance might prove to be unpopular.
This is what Senator John F. Kerry who has nearly secured democratic nomination counts on.
By acting resolutely in Afghanistan and Iraq, by hurling invectives at the "axis of evil" and by slighting the U.N. and some of its allies the Bush Administration demonstrated that it has resolved to pursue an active policy solely in the interests of the United States and in disregard of all sorts of conventions such as international law. The nation's majority eagerly agreed with this.
Being fully aware of this President Bush tries to use every single chance to confirm his dedication to an active and aggressive style when defending what he describes as the "national interest." In his annual address of January 2004 he pointed to the tasks of his administration in the election year: America's greater military might; closer alliances with those who share the American foreign policy aims and interests; an even harsher treatment of those who "threaten" America and a veiled warning to those who had so far failed to choose support of the U.S. as their policy. Later, when speaking at the National Defense University President Bush extended the foreign policy range with a more active struggle against the threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons that he believed to be the greatest danger for America.
Still, the White House knows that as soon as its foreign policy falls into a trap popular support and that of the media and the Congress will evaporate to leave behind justified accusations of recklessness, risky manipulations with America's interests and positions abroad, and short-sightedness. This should be avoided at all costs in the election year.
It is not hard to convince the Americans that the blows at Afghanistan and Iraq and the efforts to prevent North Korea from obtaining nuclear weapons, etc. meet the U.S. interests. It is much harder to convince them that there were no other options and that by supporting these steps the Americans are not so much supporting the president personally as demonstrating their patriotism and support of what is described as America's interests. The struggle between the Administration and its opponents over the foreign policy issues in the election year may concentrate on how America's interests should be interpreted and whether President Bush's interpretation is the most correct one. This will push the issue of the chosen means and methods to the background.
Foreign Policy Agenda
No matter who is responsible for decision-making in America they have to deal with a number of problems created by other countries: relations with allies complicated by the end of the Cold War when the common enemy disappeared; relations with recent enemies and the need to build up new relationships to be fitted into the unipolar world; relations with the group of transitory states (among which there are recent foes) to be arranged according to the U.S. preferences; finally, relations with a group of failed states with no stable system of power and no sustainable economic development ruled by dictators of all hues living on drug trafficking and terrorism. It is vitally important to answer the main question: how should the United States as the only superpower arrange its global policy?
The events of 11/09 caused a noticeable shift in America's foreign policy priorities. Indeed, had 11 September not happen the Bush Administration would have followed in the previous administration's footsteps. It would have addressed the main foreign policy issue of the time: relationships with the NATO allies, with Japan, China, Russia, etc. Unwilling to step into the shadow of his predecessor President Bush took time to formulate his foreign policy doctrine. This was postponed at least till September 2001 when the half-baked doctrine was hastily made public. The president described different foreign policy priorities: the war on international terror acquired special urgency; relations with those countries that supported international terror (Afghanistan and the Taliban, Iraq and the Hussein regime, North Korea and Kim Chong-il's regime, Iran and the regime of ayatollahs) should be urgently revised.
This cannot be described as an ill-timed restructuring that differed greatly from what had been proclaimed in the 2000 election campaign. The part that dealt with the relationships with other countries (and with the majority of other issues for that matter) was deliberately vague and boring. This explains an absence of the nation's clear choice that forced the governor of Florida to pull up his brother with a hastily invented vote count procedure. In fact, George Bush's bleak foreign policy platform could be taken either for lack of ideas or for a vague promise to present a novel foreign policy doctrine that would allow America to resolve all the problems it was facing as the only superpower.
George Bush staked on counterterrorist struggle and won, at least in the short-term perspective. He united the nation and strengthened domestic security. He obtained unconditional support of the U.N. and the NATO allies for his retribution action against the Taliban. Russia extended its political and military support and agreed on American military presence in Central Asia and Georgia. This inspired the president to move further in his war on terror: he devises a program of action at home and abroad to deliver heavy blows at the "axis of evil" countries and to realize, in the foreseeable future, the course at American domination in the world.
This had been partly formulated by the previous American administration yet because of their traditional bias to multi-sided actions the Democrats refrained from decisive and direct demonstration of the U.S. supremacy. They did not want to be accused of imperialist policies and wanted to garb American policies in the clothes of "extending democracy." George Bush pushed aside the niceties and declared that America had the right to carry out unilateral actions if it saw it fit; it had merely to formulate a dilemma for its allies and the U.N.: either to side with the United States unconditionally or to become short of its enemy. He demanded complete loyalty from Russia and China.
Being too hasty and unprepared this program led to the Iraqi crisis and created serious problems for the incumbent president even though the United States enjoys unrivalled domination. Indeed, the speedy military victory over Saddam Hussein for the sake of which America had disagreed with the U.N. Security Council and had unfolded a wide propaganda campaign based on false information was never crowned with the U.S. military control over Iraq. The country is an arena of fierce guerilla warfare fraught with a huge loss of American lives that the nation will find it hard to accept. This alone will cripple George Bush's election campaign of 2004.
To carry out the Iraqi adventure, the Administration did not hesitate to deceive the public at home (Hussein was falsely accused of working on WMD; recently the nation learned that a war on Iraq had been discussed even prior to 11/09, etc.), the U.N. and its own allies. This has become widely known - something that does not make the incumbent president more popular. The United States discredited the U.N. Security Council by starting the war without its resolution; the United States went as far as spoiling relations with France, Germany, Russia, China, and all other Security Council members with the exception of the U.K.
Everything had been done to score a speedy and impressive victory in Iraq in an anticipation of a landslide victory in November and of foreign policy triumphs all over the world. This did not happen. The situation has been "suspended," successes are not convincing, nearly $80 billion more have been asked for and given while a settlement is still far away. The public is inclined to mock at the president's doubtful successes while the clumsy efforts of the newly formed Department of Homeland Security to make the 2003 Christmas safe caused an obvious discontent. There is no progress in the relationships with the allies: it was only the loyal friend and ally Tony Blair who welcomed the American president during his latest European tour; other leaders treated the president with obvious coolness.
Relations with Allies
The allies treat the United States and President Bush differently: there are friends like Blair and Berlusconi among them and critics and ill-wishers like President Chirac, Chancellor Schroeder, and Japanese Prime Minister Koidzumi. This should not be taken to mean that the American system of allied relationships is about to fall apart yet one cannot ignore the fact that President Bush's intention to put his country on the Olympus of world politics from which its decisions should be accepted without a murmur caused a lot of skepticism among the Cold-War tested allies. They have grown accustomed to an absolutely different style within the alliance; once the Cold War was over and strict discipline was no longer needed the allies expected that Washington would readjust its behavior as well.
The revolt in the allied ranks was taken for an insult; Washington was especially displeased with France that was one of the first to deny its support to the Iraqi war. Its great-power status, its absolutely correct legal position, its past, and its cultural heritage dealt a heavy blow at self-respect of the "boors" (even by American standards) in the Bush Administration and the entire American ruling class. Indeed, it was not a backward country that knew nothing about laws, justice, and democracy that rejected them. It was the country of Voltaire and Rousseau, Descartes and D'Alembert, and Alexis de Tocqueville. It was the most cultured and most intellectual of the Western countries that criticized them. This added to the insult - in response it was decided that French fries should receive an American name.
Irritation with the allies apart (after all, the U.S. did start the war on Iraq) there was a lingering impression that President Bush and his foreign policy team had failed to fully realize that the West had no global enemy and that, therefore, the Cold War ethics and approaches were no longer applicable. Besides, the European Union should be taken into account: its potential is comparable to that of the United States and, therefore, merits attention. The desire to exploit the war on terror to discipline the allies once more failed: the threat was not serious enough to force everybody to close the ranks around the leaders despite its irritating behavior. On top of this Paris, Berlin, and Moscow were displeased with Washington's attempts to ignore their objections.
Its decision on Iraq cost the U.S. Administration, among other things, crippled allied relations with France and Germany. Weighed on the virtual political scales the result remains vague: was an absence of a visible success in Iraq worth the U.S. Administration's demonstration of its disdain to the law and allied relations? Was it wise to venture the allied relations consolidated during the Cold War years with huge material and spiritual resources if no adequate, tangible and weighty gain was in sight? These are not idle or abstract questions. If America's further actions alienate some more European states the E.U. may become anti-American.
An absence of a global enemy and dissention over Iraq coupled with certain other elements of President Bush's policy are disrupting America's ties with its allies. One of such elements is the creation of the national ABM system that while protecting North America will leave Europe exposed for a fairly long time. More than that: George Bush plans to build up the U.S. military potential so that to widen the gap between the military might of the United States and united Europe. The Europeans negatively responded to the split into the "Old" and "New" Europe over the Iraq issue provoked by the Bush Administration that set the core of the old NATO allies that failed to support Washington against the newcomers prepared to welcome any Washington's initiatives (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Rumania, and others).
These doubtful results of the president's efforts have split the nation, which is worse than the damage done to the allied relations. Part of the Americans, patriots and ultra-patriots, has sided with the president and look at France and Germany as traitors. There is another camp of more objectively minded and cautious people. They are convinced that it was President Bush who by his clumsy actions provoked France and Germany (and Russia) to protest against Washington's unilateral policy. This sacrificed years of efforts of previous administrations to cement NATO and strengthen America's positions in the U.N. Security Council to President G. Bush's ambitions, lack of professionalism, and rashness.
Relations with the "Lower Tier" Countries
Logically enough the war on terror has moved forward the issue of the U.S. relationships with the failed states, the "lower tier" countries. This happened to the Republicans, the party that had betrayed neither interest in such countries nor any skill in handling the problem. This explains why the Democrats are pointing to the obvious failures of the present Administration in this sphere. At all times the Third World has remained unruffled by the threat of force: there the war has become a permanent factor. Aid is a much more powerful instrument that the Bush Administration has not yet used - it is beyond its sphere of interests. In fact, the United States cannot scare the "lower tier" countries even if it threatens with another round of bombings.
In the American foreign policy context relations with these states are developing into a serious problem. For personal reasons President George Bush has made a purely policing problem of antiterrorist struggle a global issue. In many American minds he associated the country's foreign policy victories with its prestige in relatively weak countries with unstable regimes and poor populations and, therefore, of little consequence on the global scale rather than linking American successes to the traditional and important NATO allies and Japan or to such giants as China, India, and Russia. The incumbent president has said time and again that he was not so much concerned with the poor countries' prosperity and successful development as with the positions of "terrorists" in them and their ability to damage the interests of the United States and its allies.
As a result, President Bush has narrowed down the wide range of possibilities of the United States as the only superpower to the function of a self-appointed policeman. The American Administration preferred to ignore the country's resources and its former experience in developing the burgeoning economies of South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and other countries as well as the fact that the "lower tier" countries were eager to accept aid and support in an absence of rivals like the former Soviet Union or China. The Administration remained unimpressed and developed into a global "sheriff." Tastes differ - each of the presidents had their own priorities-nobody can question the right of this president to act in the Texan style. Yet one may question his choice as hardly reasonable and adequate.
In fact, while the use of force in unstable and weak countries looks promising it may create problems. Today, President Bush is reminded about this daily and hourly. More likely than not military weakness in such cases is compensated for by the readiness of the local people and their leaders to sacrifice themselves in a guerilla war with no frontline and no rules. In Muslim countries with their traditions of self-sacrifice in the name of Allah such wars are unpredictable.
Having selected "international terrorism" as the sphere in which his efforts will bring fast and cheap dividends President Bush has found himself in a quandary: first, the war on terror never ends (therefore, no intervals for election campaigns are possible); second, there are no forces inside such countries willing to support American efforts: Karzai's regime in Afghanistan is weak while no adequate local structure in Iraq seems to be possible; third, antiterrorist struggle should always remain on the brink of a warfare - something that allies and neutral countries do not like.
The present Administration's concentration on military struggle against terrorism in other countries is politically risky. It does not promise an "absolute victory" as the experience of the war on Iraq has testified yet a chance of acquiring more headaches is very real. This may threaten America with a long-term involvement with no foreign policy dividends. The situation is potentially hazardous for President Bush: much has been said and little has been gained. The state and private news companies are torturing the American public with forecasts of more terrorist acts.
The U.S. and the "Intermediate Tier" Countries
While Americans remain bogged down in Iraq and potentially in other countries of the "axis of evil" they will never be able to address another, much more important issue, namely their relations with China, Russia, India, and other countries that either have already revised their development priorities or are prepared to so. They have concentrated on social and economic prosperity at the expense of an ideology or military superiority.
Revised relations with former enemies - China and Russia - are the most important aspect of the issue. Relations with China are developing relatively smoothly: China has managed to convince the United States that it was neither a rival nor an enemy but a peace-loving and reasonable country prepared to build up its relations with America on the basis of mutual interests and mutual advantages. In the 1990s, when Americans tried to present China as a global enemy, Chinese diplomats had to work hard to avoid the label. The future of their relations is still vague: it is strongly affected by the human rights issue in China, the occupation of the Tibet that the United States has not recognized, the reunification of Taiwan with continental China, something that the U.S. has been successfully opposing. The relations are not free from potential contradictions and even conflicts that have remained suppressed so far. There is hope that with time the relations between China and America will become even better.
The relations between America and Russia can be described as "neither friends nor foes." The repeated efforts to move them beyond the "strategic partnership" boundary all failed: Moscow and Washington did not become allies. "Strategic partnership" is a happy euphemism of vague relationships and vague mutual obligations. It can be used to explain important breakthroughs (like the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty) and an absence of deeper and stronger cooperation such as mutual penetration of capitals, merging markets, and political and economic interdependence.
The worst thing about "strategic partnership" is its possible worsening. No quarrels and no confrontation between the United States and France, Germany or Japan will affect their allied relationships. At a certain stage the mechanism of protecting the allied relations comes into play: it minimizes the damage, offers alternatives and improves the situation. Since Russia and the United States are not allies the cooling over Iraq may cripple their relations to a much greater extent. So far, Russia has not formulated a clear idea about its relations with the U.S. because their drawing closer in the security sphere (arms control and war on terror) has already given as much as it could to both countries. They cannot expect more from the same source (it was in the Cold War time that an alliance could hinge on arms control alone).
Russia never moved toward an alliance. First, such step required very developed democratic institutions (the free press, independent courts, guarantees to the opposition, non-interference of the state in private businesses, etc.) without which the United States will never agree to regard Russia as a democratic state. Therefore, no alliance is possible. Second, idle deliberations about desirability of foreign, American in particular, investments should have been supported long ago with practical measures: the country should have become open to foreign banks; the state should have provided foreign companies with legal guarantees and concluded intergovernmental agreements on the status of foreign capitals. The only real merging of the economies of both countries achieved by YUKOS (the YUKOS- and Sibneft-based energy giant that sold 40 percent of its shares to Exxon and Mobil Oil) was destroyed by clumsiness of the Russian law-enforcers. The United States could not approve of the methods used to secure the victory of the "party of power" at the December 2003 parliamentary elections: from the American point of view this was "too much."
The recent coolness between the U.S. and Russia is far removed from "another Cold War" announced by the hastiest of the observers. It seems, however, that the coolness that logically followed Moscow's opposition to the war on Iraq is developing into a favorable foreign policy issue bringing rating points to the president. Amid chauvinism and even xenophobia raised by the Iraqi war America badly needs an enemy abroad. Russia that has opted for "managed democracy," an active struggle against dissidents, and private enterprise is best suited for this role especially while threatening its neighbors (Ukraine and Georgia). The U.S. administration will never hesitate to appoint it an enemy and will even profit from this.
The White House foreign policy advisors are not friendly disposed toward Russia, either: some of those who orient on the National Security Council (such as Condoleezza Rice) are convinced that Russia is unable to formulate and carry out the reforms in defense, economics, and the social sphere, which means that it is condemned to follow in the Soviet footsteps to further stagnation. This means, such people argue, that there is no sense in talking to Russia about long-term objectives: the country may be subjected to even greater upheavals that will probably demand even greater American interference and greater responsibilities than during the Soviet Union's collapse.
Other experts, nearly all of them neo-conservatives looking at the Pentagon (like Richard Perle) are inclined to think that Russia is moving toward a dictatorship. They do not believe that democracy is possible in Russia at least under its present leaders and are convinced that its missile-nuclear potential will present a real threat to the United States if Russia becomes a dictatorship. Until quite recently President Bush disagreed with both yet the worsened relations between Moscow and Washington because of the Iraqi crisis and an objective need of an enemy may urge him to deteriorate these relations still more (irrespective of Russia's politics) to defend himself and his harsh course from critics.
A "Lonely Superpower"?
Today, like in 1948 it is foreign policy issues that will, to a great extent, determine the outcome of the presidential race. In 1948, it was the beginning of the Cold War against an absolutely unacceptable sociopolitical system that was on the agenda together with the U.S. leading role in this war. In 1948, it was determined whether the United States would emerge on the world scene as the leader of struggle between the friendly part of the world against an alien or even hostile part. Today, a much more important issue is on the agenda: will the United States develop into the only leader of the world and whether it can and is prepared to perform this mission.
Whether the country should shoulder the mission is not discussed: the majority of the American establishment has clearly accepted the fact that having been left the only superpower in the post-Cold War world the United States is doomed to become the global leader. In fact, the world does not question this either. There are politicians or parties in the E.U., China and Russia who while criticizing the failures or the most provocative of American steps hope, at heart, that in future their countries will be able to throw the gauntlet to the United States and snatch its global leadership. Today, nobody except the most scandalous figures, speak openly about this; none of the serious politicians and political scientists dare to openly mention this.
It is wrong to think that Washington's global leadership has been generally and willingly recognized. If its actions cause a large-scale resistance of the type we all witnessed at the early stages of the Iraqi crisis American leadership will be contested by any part of the world. There is no reason to believe that American leadership has become an uncontestable truth. Washington's actions are scrutinized in America and outside it because they might either bring the world system together and add stability to it or sow fear and suspicion among its members and disunite them. With few exceptions all countries want peace; they want to ensure rights and freedoms to their citizens, provide them with good living conditions and help them improve their standards of living. These priorities make them America's allies or partners since American policy and social order are rooted in these values.
On the other hand, if American policies for different reasons become dominated by chauvinism, intolerance, disrespect to sovereignties and disdain to the world public opinion the United States will become enemy No. 1 of the part of the world that nurtures suspicions of American intentions. This means that the present stage is extremely complicated and should be treated with caution. Today the only power able to claim global leadership may play a positive and stimulating role in the world; it may help the majority of the countries to finally conquer their barbarity and poverty and enter the road leading to relative prosperity. The same country may become a negative force threatening the rest of the world against which other countries will join ranks.
The cavalier manner with which President Bush attacked the "axis of evil" strengthened apprehensions in relation to the United States shared by both its allies and non-allies. Many of the Americans have suddenly realized that their country may become a "lone superpower" if they fail to force their politicians to show more wisdom and tact, if they fail to convince them to stop humiliating the countries unable to answer Washington's demonstration of force in kind. The results of presidential elections will show to which extent the battles around the foreign policy issue will change the frame of mind and affect the final choice. By the same token the rest of the world will be informed about its future.
Endnotes
Note *: Viktor Kremeniuk, Deputy Director, Institute for the U.S. and Canadian Studies, RAS, Doctor of Sciences (History). Back